סוגיה 21- תנאי כתובה: פדיון מן השבי
Save
Copy
Add to Collection
Export to Google Docs
Shareבעולם העתיק, כמו אף בימינו אנו, מוכרת המציאות האכזרית של נפילה בשבי. מלבד שבויי מלחמה, נשים ואנשים נשבים כאמצעי לסחיטת כספי הכופר שישולמו תמורת פדיונם. למרבה הצער, בתקופת השבי חווים רבים מן הקרבנות התעללות פיזית, מינית ונפשית. אחת מן ההתחייבויות של האיש כלפי אשתו היא לפדות אותה במקרה שנשבתה.
[אם] לֹא כָתַב לָהּ,
אִם תִּשְׁתַּבָּאִי אֶפְרְקִנָּךְ וְאוֹתְבִנָּךְ לִי לְאִנְתּוּ
[אם תילקחי בשבי אפדה אותך ואשיבך להיות לי לאשה]
וּבְכֹהֶנֶת [אשת כהן], אֲהַדְרִנָּךְ [אחזירך] לִמְדִינְתָּךְ,
חַיָּב,
שֶׁהוּא תְנַאי בֵּית דִּין:
(8) If he did not write in her ketubah, "If you are captured I will ransom you, and will take you back as a wife;" or, with regard to the wife of a kohen, "and will bring you back to your land [your father's home]," he is obligated [nevertheless], as that is a [fixed] stipulation [enacted] by the court.
נִשְׁבֵּית, חַיָּב לִפְדּוֹתָהּ.
וְאִם אָמַר, הֲרֵי גִטָּהּ וּכְתֻבָּתָהּ, תִּפְדֶה אֶת עַצְמָהּ,
אֵינוֹ רַשָּׁאי.
(9) If she was taken captive, he is obligated to ransom her. And if he says, "Here is her document of divorce, and [the amount of] her ketubah, let her ransom herself [at her own expense]," he is not allowed [to do so]. If she gets injured, he is obligated to [pay for] her [to be] healed. [However, if] he says, "Here is her document of divorce, and [the amount of] her ketubah, let her heal herself [at her own expense]," he is allowed [to do so].
תלמוד בבלי, מסכת כתובות, דף נ"ב עמוד א'
"נשבית חייב לפדותה וכו'".
תנו רבנן:
נשבית בחיי בעלה ואחר כך מת בעלה
הכיר בה בעלה- יורשין חייבין לפדותה
לא הכיר בה בעלה-
אין יורשין חייבין לפדותה.
לוי סבר למיעבד עובדא כי הא מתניתא
אמר ליה רב: הכי אמר חביבי:
לית הלכתא כי הא מתניתא
אלא כי הא דתניא
נשבית לאחר מיתת בעלה-
אין היתומין חייבין לפדותה
ולא עוד, אלא אפילו נשבית בחיי בעלה
ואחר כך מת בעלה
אין היתומין חייבין לפדותה
שאין אני קורא בה 'ואותבינך לאינתו'
In the case of a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite, who are entitled to a marriage contract despite the fact that the relationship is forbidden and they must get divorced, he is not obligated to redeem her, as I do not apply to her the clause: And I will restore you to me as a wife, as she is forbidden to him. Rava said: In any case where the prohibition of her captivity, i.e., the fact that she was taken captive, causes her to be forbidden to her husband, as in the case of a priest’s wife who was taken captive, he is obligated to redeem her. However, if another prohibition causes her to be forbidden to her husband, e.g., the case of a widow who is married to a High Priest, he is not obligated to redeem her. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. As it is taught in a baraita: In the case of one who vows that his wife may not derive benefit from him, in which case he must divorce her, and she is then taken captive, Rabbi Eliezer says: He redeems her and gives her the payment for her marriage contract. Rabbi Yehoshua says: He gives her the payment for her marriage contract but he does not have to redeem her, as he may not take her back as his wife, due to his vow. Rabbi Natan said: I asked Sumakhos: When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he gives her the payment for her marriage contract but he does not have to redeem her, was he referring to a case where he vowed that she may not derive benefit from him and she was subsequently taken captive, or was he speaking of one who was taken captive and he subsequently vowed that she may not derive benefit from him? And he said to me: I have not heard a tradition on this matter, but it would appear that Rabbi Yehoshua does not obligate the husband to redeem her in a situation where he vowed that she may not derive benefit from him and she was subsequently taken captive. As, if you say that the same halakha applies in a case where she was taken captive and he subsequently vowed that she may not derive benefit from him, the husband might come to engage in trickery. If he wants to release himself from the duty to ransom his wife after she is captured, he can simply vow that she may not derive benefit from him, in which case he would be obligated to pay her only the marriage contract. The Gemara now analyzes the suggested comparison between the opinions cited in this baraita and the dispute between Abaye and Rava. What, is it not the case that the tanna’im disagree about a priest who vows that his wife, i.e., the wife of a priest, may not derive benefit from him? And Abaye spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer when he said that the husband must redeem his wife even if she is forbidden to him due to something other than the fact that she was taken captive, and Rava spoke in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. The Gemara refutes this suggestion: No; with what are we dealing here? With a case where she vowed not to derive benefit from him, and her husband upheld it for her by neglecting to nullify her vow when he heard it. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Eliezer maintains that he is putting his finger between her teeth, i.e., he causes the vow to be in effect, and therefore he must redeem her and return her to her native province. And Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that she put her finger between her own teeth, i.e., she is responsible for the vow, because she is the one who initially pronounced it. The Gemara asks: If Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that she put her finger between her own teeth, what is the payment of the marriage contract doing here? Why must he pay her marriage contract if it is her fault that they cannot remain married? And furthermore, it was stated above that Rabbi Natan said: I asked Sumakhos: When Rabbi Yehoshua said that he gives her the payment for her marriage contract but he does not have to redeem her, was he referring to a case where he vowed that she may not derive benefit from him and she was subsequently taken captive, or was he speaking of one who was taken captive and he subsequently vowed that she may not derive benefit from him? And he said to me: I have not heard a tradition on this matter, but it is reasonable to assume that the case is where he took the vow and she was subsequently taken captive, as otherwise there is a concern that the husband will engage in trickery. But if this is referring to a case where she was the one who vowed not to derive benefit from him, what is the difference to me whether he upheld her vow and she was subsequently taken captive, and what is the difference to me whether she was taken captive and he subsequently upheld her vow? Either way there is no reason to be concerned that he might engage in trickery, since she was the one who took the vow. Rather, this is actually referring to a case where he was the one who initially vowed that she may not derive benefit from him. And Abaye explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning, and Rava explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning. Abaye explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning as follows: With regard to a widow who is married to a High Priest, everyone agrees that he is obligated to redeem her. If she was a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite, everyone agrees that he is not obligated to redeem her. In the case of a priest who takes a vow prohibiting his wife, i.e., the wife of a priest, from deriving benefit from him, likewise everyone agrees that he is obligated to redeem her, as this is the same as the case of a widow who is married to a High Priest, as he can fulfill the requirement to restore her to her native province. When they disagree it is in the case of an Israelite who vows that his wife, i.e., the wife of an Israelite, may not derive benefit from him. Rabbi Eliezer follows the status of the woman at the outset, i.e., when the marriage contract was written. Since at that time he could restore her to be his wife, the obligation he took upon himself to redeem her from captivity remains in effect, despite the fact that he can no longer do so due to the vow. And Rabbi Yehoshua follows the status of the woman at the end, and holds that since, in practice, the husband cannot take her back as a wife because of the vow, he is no longer obligated to ransom her. Similarly, Rava explains the baraita according to his line of reasoning: In the case of a widow married to a High Priest, and a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman married to an Israelite, everyone agrees that he is not obligated to redeem her, as the prohibition against her remaining married to him results from a cause other than her captivity. When they disagree it is with regard to one who vows that his wife may not derive benefit from him, whether she is the wife of a priest or the wife of an Israelite. Rabbi Eliezer follows her status at the outset and holds that since he obligated himself to ransom her when he wrote the marriage contract he must act accordingly. And Rabbi Yehoshua follows her status at the end, and holds that since he cannot fulfill his obligation to restore her as his wife due to a factor other than her captivity, he is entirely exempt from redeeming her. § The mishna taught that if she was taken captive, her husband is obligated to redeem her. The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of a wife who was taken captive in her husband’s lifetime and afterward her husband died before he could redeem her, if her husband was aware of her captivity, the heirs are obligated to redeem her, but if her husband was not aware of her captivity, his heirs are not obligated to redeem her. The Gemara relates: Levi thought to act in accordance with this baraita. Rav said to him: My uncle [ḥavivi], Rabbi Ḥiyya, said as follows: The halakha is not in accordance with this baraita. Rather, it is in accordance with that which is taught in a different baraita: If she was taken captive after the death of her husband, the orphans are not obligated to redeem her. And moreover, even if she was taken captive in her husband’s lifetime and he heard about it, and afterward her husband died, the orphans are not obligated to redeem her, as I cannot apply to her the clause in the marriage contract: And I will restore you to me as a wife. Since this stipulation cannot be fulfilled, the obligation to redeem her does not apply. § The Sages taught: If she was taken captive and they were seeking ransom from her husband of up to ten times her value, i.e., far more than the usual ransom for a captive of this kind, on the first occasion she is taken captive he must redeem her. From this point forward, i.e., if she was taken captive a second time, if he wants to, he redeems her, but if he does not want to redeem her, he does not have to redeem her, as the Sages obligated him to redeem her only once. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:
ביאור:
שנינו במשנה שאם נשבית אשתו - חייב לפדותה.
תנו רבנן [שנו חכמים]:
נשבית אשה בחיי בעלה, ואחר כך מת בעלה בלי שהספיק לפדותה.
אם הכיר בה בעלה, כלומר, נודע לבעלה טרם מותו שנשבתה - יורשין חייבין לפדותה.
לא הכיר בה בעלה - אין יורשין חייבין לפדותה.
ומספרים: לוי סבר למיעבד עובדא כי הא מתניתא
[חשב לעשות מעשה כמו הברייתא הזו].
אמר ליה [לו] רב: הכי [כך] אמר חביבי [דודי ר' חייא]:
לית הלכתא כי הא מתניתא [אין הלכה כברייתא זו],
אלא כי הא דתניא [כמו זו ששנינו בברייתא אחרת]:
נשבית לאחר מיתת בעלה -אין היתומין חייבין לפדותה.
ולא עוד, אלא אפילו נשבית בחיי בעלה ונודע לו הדבר
ואחר כך מת בעלה - אין היתומין חייבין לפדותה.
ומדוע - שאין אני קורא בה את התנאי הכתוב בכתובה: "ואותבינך לאינתו" [ואחזירך לאשה].
שנינו במשנה שאם נשבית אשתו - חייב לפדותה.
תנו רבנן [שנו חכמים]:
נשבית אשה בחיי בעלה, ואחר כך מת בעלה בלי שהספיק לפדותה.
אם הכיר בה בעלה, כלומר, נודע לבעלה טרם מותו שנשבתה - יורשין חייבין לפדותה.
לא הכיר בה בעלה - אין יורשין חייבין לפדותה.
ומספרים: לוי סבר למיעבד עובדא כי הא מתניתא
[חשב לעשות מעשה כמו הברייתא הזו].
אמר ליה [לו] רב: הכי [כך] אמר חביבי [דודי ר' חייא]:
לית הלכתא כי הא מתניתא [אין הלכה כברייתא זו],
אלא כי הא דתניא [כמו זו ששנינו בברייתא אחרת]:
נשבית לאחר מיתת בעלה -אין היתומין חייבין לפדותה.
ולא עוד, אלא אפילו נשבית בחיי בעלה ונודע לו הדבר
ואחר כך מת בעלה - אין היתומין חייבין לפדותה.
ומדוע - שאין אני קורא בה את התנאי הכתוב בכתובה: "ואותבינך לאינתו" [ואחזירך לאשה].
עיון ודיון:
1. אם האישה נשבתה, האיש חייב לפדותה. הסבירו את ההבחנה שעושה משנה ח' בין
פדיון "רגיל" לבין פדיון של אשת כהן. ממה נובע שוני זה?
2. א. הציגו בלשונכם את המקרה המתואר במשנה ט'. מדוע ירצה הבעל לנהוג כך?
ב. מהו דין המשנה במקרה זה? נסו לנמק ולהסביר מדוע המשנה קבעה כך.
3. בסוגיית התלמוד (כתובות נ"ב א') מובאות שתי ברייתות.
א. מהי ברייתא?
ב. רשמו את שני הביטויים בסוגיה זו המצביעים על הבאת ברייתא.
4. "לוי סבר למיעבד עובדא כי הא מתניתא" – מה חשב לוי לעשות? מדוע?
תארו את המקרה!
5. מה פסק רב? על מה הוא התבסס? הסבירו את הנימוק המשפטי לדבריו.
6. מבחינה מוסרית- האם אתם מסכימים עם פסיקתו של רב? נמקו!
1. אם האישה נשבתה, האיש חייב לפדותה. הסבירו את ההבחנה שעושה משנה ח' בין
פדיון "רגיל" לבין פדיון של אשת כהן. ממה נובע שוני זה?
2. א. הציגו בלשונכם את המקרה המתואר במשנה ט'. מדוע ירצה הבעל לנהוג כך?
ב. מהו דין המשנה במקרה זה? נסו לנמק ולהסביר מדוע המשנה קבעה כך.
3. בסוגיית התלמוד (כתובות נ"ב א') מובאות שתי ברייתות.
א. מהי ברייתא?
ב. רשמו את שני הביטויים בסוגיה זו המצביעים על הבאת ברייתא.
4. "לוי סבר למיעבד עובדא כי הא מתניתא" – מה חשב לוי לעשות? מדוע?
תארו את המקרה!
5. מה פסק רב? על מה הוא התבסס? הסבירו את הנימוק המשפטי לדבריו.
6. מבחינה מוסרית- האם אתם מסכימים עם פסיקתו של רב? נמקו!
