Mussar With Marcelo: The Importance of Asking Questions

Essay by Rabbi Sacks: The Neccesity of Asking Questions

Most traditional cultures see it as the task of a parent or teacher to instruct, guide or command. The task of the child is to obey. “Children should be seen, not heard,” goes the old English proverb. “Children, be obedient to your parents in all things, for this is well-pleasing to the Lord,” says a famous Christian text. Socrates, who spent his life teaching people to ask questions, was condemned by the citizens of Athens for corrupting the young. In Judaism the opposite is the case. It is a religious duty to teach our children to ask questions. That is how they grow.

Judaism is the rarest of phenomena: a faith based on asking questions, sometimes deep and difficult ones that seem to shake the very foundations of faith itself. “Shall the Judge of all the earth not do justice?” asked Abraham. “Why, Lord, why have you brought trouble on this people?” asked Moses. “Why does the way of the wicked prosper? Why do all the faithless live at ease?” asked Jeremiah. The book of Job is largely constructed out of questions, and God’s answer consists of four chapters of yet deeper questions: “Where were you when I laid the earth’s foundation? ... Can you catch Leviathan with a hook? ... Will it make an agreement with you and let you take it as your slave for life?”

Judaism is not a religion of blind obedience. Indeed, astonishingly in a religion of 613 commandments, there is no Hebrew word that means “to obey.” When Hebrew was revived as a living language in the nineteenth century, and there was need for a verb meaning “to obey,” it had to be borrowed from the Aramaic: le-tsayet. Instead of a word meaning “to obey,” the Torah uses the verb shema, untranslatable into English because it means [1] to listen, [2] to hear, [3] to understand, [4] to internalise, and [5] to respond. Written into the very structure of Hebraic consciousness is the idea that our highest duty is to seek to understand the will of God, not just to obey blindly. Tennyson’s verse, “Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do or die,” is as far from a Jewish mindset as it is possible to be.

Why? Because we believe that intelligence is God’s greatest gift to humanity.

אָמַר רַבִּי שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר נַחְמָנִי: מַאי דִּכְתִיב ״אִם נָבַלְתָּ בְהִתְנַשֵּׂא וְאִם זַמּוֹתָ יָד לְפֶה״ — כׇּל הַמְנַבֵּל עַצְמוֹ עַל דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה — סוֹפוֹ לְהִתְנַשֵּׂא. וְאִם זָמַם — יָד לְפֶה.
Similarly, Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: What is the meaning of that which is written: “If you have done foolishly in lifting up yourself, or if you have planned devices [zamota], lay your hand over your mouth” (Proverbs 30:32)? Anyone who abases himself over matters of Torah, asking questions despite the shame he feels for his ignorance, will ultimately be exalted. And if he muzzles [zamam] himself due to embarrassment, he will end up with his hand over his mouth, unable to answer.

(ד) וְלָמָּה מַזְכִּירִין אֶת דִּבְרֵי שַׁמַּאי וְהִלֵּל לְבַטָּלָה, לְלַמֵּד לַדּוֹרוֹת הַבָּאִים שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא אָדָם עוֹמֵד עַל דְּבָרָיו, שֶׁהֲרֵי אֲבוֹת הָעוֹלָם לֹא עָמְדוּ עַל דִּבְרֵיהֶם:

(4) And why do they record the opinions of Shammai and Hillel for naught? To teach the following generations that a man should not [always] persist in his opinion, for behold, the fathers of the world did not persist in their opinion.

AGAINST "opinion shopping":

(טז) רַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הָיָה אוֹמֵר, עֲשֵׂה לְךָ רַב, וְהִסְתַּלֵּק מִן הַסָּפֵק, וְאַל תַּרְבֶּה לְעַשֵּׂר אֹמָדוֹת:

(16) Rabban Gamaliel used to say: appoint for thyself a teacher, avoid doubt, and do not make a habit of tithing by guesswork.

רבן גמליאל אומר עשה לך רב. והסתלק מן הספק. ואל תרבה לעשר אומדות. זה אשר צוה הנה לעשות רב אינו לענין הלמוד אבל להוראה שים לך רב שתסמוך עליו באיסור והיתר והסתלק אתה מן הספק כאמרם בירושלמי זיל אייתי לי זקן מן השוק דאסמוך עליה ואשרי לך וכן צוה שיברח מהוצאת המעשרות באומד מפני שהוא מן הספקות:
Rabban Gamliel says, "Make for yourself a mentor, remove yourself from doubt and do not frequently tithe by estimation." That which he commanded here to make a mentor is not regarding study, but rather legal decisions: place for yourself a mentor, that you can rely upon in the forbidden and the permissible, and you can remove yourself from doubt. [It is] as they say in Talmud Yerushalmi Moed Katan 1:10, "Go and bring me an elder from the marketplace and I will rely upon him and permit [it] to you." And so [too] did he command to flee from putting out tithes by estimation, because it is from the doubts.
בִּשְׁלָמָא הוּא מְטַהֵר, וְהֵם מְטַמְּאִין — לְחוּמְרָא. אֶלָּא הוּא מְטַמֵּא וְהֵם מְטַהֲרִין, הֵיכִי הָוֵי? וְהָא תַּנְיָא: חָכָם שֶׁטִּמֵּא — אֵין חֲבֵרוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְטַהֵר, אָסַר — אֵין חֲבֵרוֹ רַשַּׁאי לְהַתִּיר! קָסָבְרִי כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא נִגָּרְרוּ בָּתְרֵיהּ.
The Gemara considers the details of this event: Granted, Ḥanina would rule an item pure and the Sages from Eretz Yisrael would rule it impure; they ruled stringently. But in a case where he ruled an item impure and they ruled it pure, what are the circumstances? How could they rule pure that which he ruled impure? Was it not taught in a baraita: If a Sage ruled an item impure, his colleague is not permitted to rule it pure; if he prohibited it, his colleague may not permit it? The Gemara explains: They held that they must do so in this case, so that people would not be drawn after him; due to the exigencies of the time they overturned his rulings.
וּמִי עָבְדִינַן כִּתְרֵי חוּמְרֵי? וְהָא תַּנְיָא: לְעוֹלָם הֲלָכָה כְּבֵית הִלֵּל, וְהָרוֹצֶה לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי עוֹשֶׂה, כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל עוֹשֶׂה. מִקּוּלֵּי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּמִקּוּלֵּי בֵּית הִלֵּל — רָשָׁע. מֵחוּמְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּמֵחוּמְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל — עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב אוֹמֵר: ״הַכְּסִיל בְּחֹשֶׁךְ הוֹלֵךְ״. אֶלָּא, אִי כְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי כְּקוּלֵּיהוֹן וּכְחוּמְרֵיהוֹן, אִי כְּבֵית הִלֵּל כְּקוּלֵּיהוֹן וּכְחוּמְרֵיהוֹן.
The Gemara poses a question: But do we adopt the respective stringencies of two authorities who disagree on a series of issues? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: The halakha is always in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, but one who wishes to act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai may do so, and one who wishes to act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel may do so. If he wishes to adopt both the leniencies of Beit Shammai and also the leniencies of Beit Hillel, he is a wicked person. And if he wishes to adopt both the stringencies of Beit Shammai and also the stringencies of Beit Hillel, with regard to him the verse states: “The fool walks in darkness” (Ecclesiastes 2:14). Rather, he should act either in accordance with Beit Shammai, following both their leniencies and their stringencies, or in accordance with Beit Hillel, following both their leniencies and their stringencies.
אמר מר בריה דרבינא מותבינא תיובתא כלפי סנאיה דרבא לעולם הלכתא כדברי ב"ה והרוצה לעשות כדברי בית שמאי עושה כדברי בית הלל עושה מקולי בית שמאי ומקולי ב"ה רשע מחומרי בית שמאי ומחומרי בית הלל עליו הכתוב אומר (קהלת ב, יד) הכסיל בחושך הולך אלא אי כבית שמאי כקוליהן וכחומריהן אי כבית הלל כקוליהן וכחומריהן הא גופא קשיא אמרת לעולם הלכה כדברי ב"ה והדר תני והרוצה לעשות כדברי ב"ש יעשה לא קשיא כאן קודם בת קול כאן לאחר בת קול ואי בעית אימא אף לאחר בת קול ורבי יהושע היא דאמר אין משגיחין בבת קול
Mar, son of Ravina, said: I offer a conclusive refutation to the enemies of Rava, a euphemism for Rava himself, from a baraita: The halakha is always in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel, but one who wishes to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai may do so, and one who wishes to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel may do so. But if one wishes to adopt both the leniencies of Beit Shammai and also the leniencies of Beit Hillel, he is a wicked person. And one who wishes to adopt both the stringencies of Beit Shammai and the stringencies of Beit Hillel, with regard to him the verse states: “The fool walks in darkness” (Ecclesiastes 2:14). Rather, one should act either in accordance with Beit Shammai, following both their leniencies and their stringencies, or in accordance with Beit Hillel, following both their leniencies and their stringencies. The Gemara objects to the wording of the baraita: This baraita itself is difficult. First you say that the halakha is always in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel, and then you teach that one who wishes to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai may do so. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. Here, the statement that a person may act as he wishes was made before the Divine Voice emerged and announced that the halakha is always in accordance with Beit Hillel. There, the statement that the halakha is always in accordance with Beit Hillel was made after the Divine Voice issued this ruling. And if you wish, say instead that even the statement that a person may act as he wishes was made after the Divine Voice announced that the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel, and this statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who says: One disregards a Divine Voice that attempts to intervene in matters of halakha. According to him, the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel has not yet been decided.
ומי עבדינן כתרי חומרי והתניא לעולם הלכה כדברי ב"ה והרוצה לעשות כדברי ב"ש עושה כדברי ב"ה עושה מקולי ב"ש ומקולי ב"ה רשע מחומרי ב"ש ומחומרי ב"ה עליו הכתוב אומר (קהלת ב, יד) והכסיל בחשך הולך אלא אי כב"ש בקוליהון ובחומריהון אי כב"ה בקוליהון ובחומריהון
The Gemara questions Rabbi Akiva’s conduct: But do we adopt the respective stringencies of two authorities who disagree on a series of issues? Isn’t it taught in a baraita: The halakha is always in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel, but one who wishes to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai may do so, and one who wishes to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel may do so. If he adopts both the leniencies of Beit Shammai and also the leniencies of Beit Hillel, he is a wicked person. And if he adopts both the stringencies of Beit Shammai and the stringencies of Beit Hillel, with regard to him the verse states: “The fool walks in darkness” (Ecclesiastes 2:14). Rather, one should act either in accordance with Beit Shammai, following both their leniencies and their stringencies, or in accordance with Beit Hillel, following both their leniencies and their stringencies. If so, why did Rabbi Akiva follow two contradictory stringencies?
אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: עִנְוְותָנוּתוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי זְכַרְיָה בֶּן אַבְקוּלָס, הֶחְרִיבָה אֶת בֵּיתֵנוּ, וְשָׂרְפָה אֶת הֵיכָלֵנוּ, וְהִגְלִיתָנוּ מֵאַרְצֵנוּ.
Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The excessive humility of Rabbi Zekharya ben Avkolas destroyed our Temple, burned our Sanctuary, and exiled us from our land.
בית הלל אומ' מגביהין מעל השלחן עצמות וקלפין, בית שמיי אומ' מסלק את הטבלה כולה ומנערה. זכריה בן אבקילס לא היה נוהג לא כדברי בית שמיי ולא כדברי בית הלל, אלא נוטל ומשליך לאחר המטה. אמ' ר' יוסה ענותנותו של ר' זכריה בן אבקילס היא שרפה את ההיכל.
ר"ע גמריה אסתפק ליה ולא ידע אי ב"ה באחד בשבט (אומר) אי בט"ו בשבט (אומר)
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva wished to act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, but he was in doubt about his tradition and did not know whether Beit Hillel said that the new year for trees is on the first of Shevat or whether they said that it is on the fifteenth of Shevat, and so he set aside two tithes in order to conform with both possibilities.
ילתא אייתא דמא לקמיה דרבה בר בר חנה וטמי לה הדר אייתא לקמיה דרב יצחק בריה דרב יהודה ודכי לה והיכי עביד הכי והתניא חכם שטימא אין חברו רשאי לטהר אסר אין חבירו רשאי להתיר מעיקרא טמויי הוה מטמי לה כיון דא"ל דכל יומא הוה מדכי לי כי האי גונא והאידנא הוא דחש בעיניה דכי לה
§ The Gemara relates that Yalta, Rav Naḥman’s wife, brought blood before Rabba bar bar Ḥana, and he deemed her ritually impure. She then brought it before Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, and he deemed her pure. The Gemara asks: But how could Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, act in this manner? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: In the case of a halakhic authority who deemed an item impure, another halakhic authority is not allowed to deem it pure; if one halakhic authority deemed a matter prohibited, another halakhic authority is not allowed to deem it permitted? The Gemara explains that initially Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, deemed her impure, but he changed his mind when Yalta said to him: Every day that I bring blood of this kind of color to Rabba bar bar Ḥana he deems me pure, and specifically now he issued a different ruling, as he feels pain in his eye. Upon hearing this, Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, deemed her pure.
דתנן דן את הדין זיכה את החייב חייב את הזכאי טימא את הטהור טיהר את הטמא מה שעשה עשוי וישלם מביתו
The Gemara returns to the matter at hand. As we learned in a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a judge issued a judgment and erred, and he acquitted one who was in fact liable, or deemed liable one who should have in fact been acquitted, or if he ruled that a pure item is impure, or ruled that an impure item is pure, and by doing so he caused a litigant a monetary loss, what he did is done, i.e., the judgment stands, and the judge must pay damages from his home, i.e., from his personal funds. He is therefore liable to pay the damages even though he caused the loss indirectly.