Rabbi Oshaya said: I wish to say something, but I have concerns, because of my colleagues. One who enters a house afflicted with leprosy backward, even if he was entirely inside except for his nose, he remains pure, as it is written: “He that enters into the house....shall be impure...” (Leviticus 14:46). The Torah prohibited only the normal manner of entering. But I am afraid of my colleagues saying: If if he entirely entered, he would also be pure. Rava said: his entire is no worse than vessels that are in the house, which become impure, as it is written: “And they shall empty the house…so that all that is in the house shall not be made impure” (Leviticus 14:36).

This is also taught in a baraita, Roofs in the Temple courtyard, offerings of the most sacred order may not be eaten there, and offerings of lesser sanctity may not be slaughtered there. And a ritually impure person who enters the Sanctuary via those roofs is exempt, as it is stated: “And she shall not enter into the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 12:4), teaching that the Torah prohibited only the normal manner of entering.

This is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple for which the Sanhedrin is not liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling.

To what does the tanna refer when he says: "This is..."? He is referring to a mishna found there in Horayot (8b): The Sanhedrin is not liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling with regard to a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning ritual impurity in the Temple, And one does not bring a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning ritual impurity in the Temple. But the Sanhedrin is liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling with regard to a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning a menstruating woman. And one brings a provisional guilt-offering for a positive mitzva or prohibition concerning a menstruating woman. And it is in reference to that mishna that the tanna in the mishna here says: This mitzva, that the ritually impure must be sent out of the Temple, is the positive mitzva concerning the Temple for which the Sanhedrin is not liable to bring a bull offering for an erroneous ruling. And which is the positive mitzva with regard to a menstruating woman for which the Sanhedrin is liable? If a man was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and she said to him: I have become impure, and he immediately withdrew, he is liable, because his withdrawal is as pleasant to him as his entry.

§It was stated that Abaye says in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav: He is liable for two sin-offerings. And so Rava says that Rav Shmuel bar Shaba says that Rav Huna says: He is liable for two sin-offerings, one for his entry and one for his withdrawal. Rabba discusses this: About what? If we say that it was near her expected date of menstruation, there is a difficulty: With whom? If we say with a Torah scholar, granted that he will be liable for his entry. He thought: I can engage in intercourse before she begins to menstruate. But why will he be liable for his withdrawal? That was intentional. And if with an am ha’aretz, then this and that, are like one who ate two olive-bulks of fat in one lapse of awareness. Rather, it must be a case where it was not near her expected date of menstruation, and there was no reason for the man to think that the woman would experience menstrual bleeding. And with whom are we dealing? If we say that we are dealing with a Torah scholar, then he should not be liable to bring even one sin-offering, because with regard to his initial entry, he was a victim of circumstances beyond his control, and with regard to his withdrawal, after he knew that she was a menstruating woman, his transgression was intentional, and he would be liable to receive karet. And if we are dealing with an am ha’aretz, he should be liable to bring only one sin-offering, for his immediate withdrawal. Rava reconsidered and then said: Actually, it is a case where it was near the expected date of the woman’s menstruation, and we are dealing with a Torah scholar. But he is a Torah scholar only with regard to this halakha, that it is prohibited to engage in intercourse with a woman near the expected onset of her menstruation, and he erred in thinking that he could complete the act of intercourse before she experienced menstrual bleeding. Therefore, once he learns that she has experienced menstrual bleeding, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his unwitting transgression at the time of his entry. But he is not a Torah scholar with regard to that halakha, that it is prohibited for one to immediately withdraw from a woman if she experiences menstrual bleeding during intercourse. Since he had awareness of his transgression between his two actions, this is not an instance of one lapse of awareness, and therefore he is liable to bring a second sin-offering for his unwitting transgression at the time of his withdrawal. Rava said: And we learn both of these matters for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering; we learn about entry, and we learn about withdrawal. Rava now clarifies the matter: We learn about withdrawal, as the mishna teaches: If a man was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and during the course of their act of intercourse she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, and unwittingly he immediately withdrew from her, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman. Rava continues: We learn about entry in a mishna (Nidda 14a): If a spot of blood is found on his rag, i.e., the rag that he uses to wipe his penis after intercourse, then it is clear that this blood came from the woman during their act of intercourse. Consequently, both the man and the woman are impure and are liable to bring a sin-offering for their unwitting transgression. Rava explains: What, is it not the case that the mishna speaks here of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation, and it teaches that he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his initial entry at that time? Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rava: Actually, I could say to you that the mishna speaks here of one who engaged in intercourse with a woman not near the expected date of her menstruation, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his immediate withdrawal upon learning that she had experienced menstrual bleeding. And if you would say: Why do I need to be taught once again about withdrawal? Didn’t the tanna already teach this in the mishna here? One can respond: It was necessary to teach us this, i.e., the continuation of the mishna in tractate Nidda, which states: If a spot of blood is found on her rag, i.e., the rag that she uses to wipe herself after intercourse, they are impure only because of an uncertainty, as perhaps the bleeding commenced only after they completed their act of intercourse, and therefore they are exempt from bringing a sin-offering. And since the mishna had to teach the case where the blood was found on her rag, it also taught the case where it was found on his rag, even though there is no novel element in this ruling. Ravina said to Rav Adda: Can you really interpret that mishna as referring to a case where it was not near the expected date of the woman’s menstruation, and that he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his withdrawal? But isn’t it taught in that mishna: If blood is found on his rag? And these words indicate that the blood was found only afterward, after the man had already withdrawn from the woman. That is to say, only after he withdrew from the woman he learned that she had experienced menstrual bleeding. Ravina clarifies the difficulty: And if the mishna is referring to a case where he is liable for his withdrawal, at the outset, when he withdrew from the woman, it was from then that he had knowledge of her menstrual status, as he withdrew because she had informed him that she had experienced bleeding. Of what significance is his finding blood on his rag? Rava said to Rav Adda: Listen to what your teacher, Ravina, is saying, as he has explained the matter. Rav Adda said to Rava: How can I listen to his words and accept his explanation? As it is taught in a baraita with regard to this mishna concerning blood found on a rag: This is the positive mitzva with regard to a menstruating woman for which one is liable. Rav Adda explains: And if it is so that the mishna is referring to a case where the man is liable for his initial entry, this wording is difficult, as engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman is not the violation of a positive mitzva, but a prohibition. Rava said to him: If you learned this baraita in this manner, its wording is imprecise, as it is missing words, and you should teach it like this: When blood is found on the man’s rag, this is the prohibition with regard to a menstruating woman for which one is liable. And additionally, if a man was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and during the course of their act of intercourse she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, and unwittingly he immediately withdrew from her, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for that act, and this is the positive mitzva for which one is liable with regard to a menstruating woman. § The Gemara resumes its discussion of the mishna: The Master said above in the mishna: If he immediately withdrew from the woman after having been informed that she had experienced menstrual bleeding, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman. The Gemara asks: What should one do in such a situation? Rav Huna said in the name of Rava: He should press his ten fingernails into the ground, i.e., the bed, and restrain himself and do nothing until his penis becomes flaccid, and only then should he withdraw from her, and it is good for him to do so. Rava said: That is to say, one who engages in intercourse, with a flaccid penis, with those with whom relations are forbidden is exempt. As if it enters your mind to say that he is liable, here, in the mishna, what is the reason that he is exempt if he waits and withdraws only later, after he has lost his erection? You might say that it is because he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control in that the woman experienced menstrual bleeding while he was in the middle of the act of intercourse, and not because he withdrew with a flaccid penis, as one who engages in intercourse with a flaccid penis is liable. But if he is exempt from liability because he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control, then even if he withdraws immediately, before losing his erection, he should also be exempt, for the same reason, that he is a victim of circumstances beyond his control. Abaye said to Rava: Actually, I could say to you that one who engages in intercourse, with a flaccid penis, with those with whom relations are forbidden is liable. And here, what is the reason that one who waits and withdraws only later, after he has lost his erection, is exempt? It is because he is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control. And concerning that which you said: Why, then, is he liable if he withdrew immediately, i.e., when you said: He should also be exempt, it is because he should have withdrawn with a flaccid penis and experienced little pleasure, but instead he withdrew with an erect organ and experienced great pleasure. Rabba bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: If so, according to your opinion, we find a difference in halakha between a long way and a short way with regard to a menstruating woman. If he withdrew the short way, i.e., without waiting, he has committed a transgression, and if he withdrew the long way, i.e., after waiting, he has not committed a transgression. And we learned this difference in the mishna specifically with regard to ritual impurity in the Temple. If such a distinction were also in effect with regard to a menstruating woman, the mishna would mention it. Rather, one can explain: No parallel distinction is made, because the two cases are not similar in their details. The long way here, with regard to a menstruating woman, namely, that the man must wait, is like the shortest way there, with regard to impurity in the Temple, namely, that the impure person must leave the Temple by way of the most direct route. And the long way there, with regard to the Temple, is like the shortest way here, with regard to a menstruating woman. Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, objects to what Abaye said: Did Abaye really say with regard to the mishna that if the man withdraws with a flaccid penis he is exempt because he is considered a victim of circumstances beyond his control? Apparently, then, we are speaking of a man who engaged in intercourse with a woman not near the expected date of her menstruation, and therefore the situation is considered beyond his control. But is it not Abaye who says that he is liable to bring two sin-offerings for this transgression, one for his initial entry and one for his withdrawal? Apparently, we are dealing with a man who engaged in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation, so he is considered an unwitting transgressor, who is liable to bring a sin-offering, and is not the victim of circumstances beyond his control. Consequently, Abaye’s two statements contradict each other. The Gemara answers: When this statement of Abaye was stated, that the man is liable to bring two sin-offerings, it was stated in general. It was not relating to the case in the mishna, but was an independent ruling concerning one who engages in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation. § Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosei ben Lakonya asked Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya: From where in the Torah is the prohibition concerning one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman [nidda] derived? Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya took a clod [kala] of earth and threw it at him in reproach and said to him: Is there a need to search the Torah for a derivation for the prohibition concerning one who engages in intercourse with a menstruating woman? The verse states: “And a woman who is impure by her uncleanness [nidda] you shall not approach, to uncover her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:19)? The Gemara explains the intent of the question of Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosei ben Lakonya: Rather, from where do we derive the prohibition with regard to the case in the mishna concerning one who was engaging in intercourse with a ritually pure woman, and she experienced menstrual bleeding and said to him: I have become impure, that he must not withdraw immediately? In response to this question Ḥizkiyya said: The verse states: “And if any man lies with her, and her menstrual flow shall be upon him” (Leviticus 15:24), teaching that even at any time when she is menstruating, the prohibition shall be upon him; therefore, he must not withdraw from her immediately. The Gemara asks: We found a source for a positive mitzva with regard to the manner in which one must withdraw from a menstruating woman; from where do we derive that immediate withdrawal is also subject to a prohibition? Rav Pappa said: The verse states: “And a woman who is impure by her uncleanness you shall not approach, to uncover her nakedness” (Leviticus 18:19). The Gemara explains: “You shall not approach [tikrav]” means also the opposite: You shall not withdraw, as it is written: “Those who say: Withdraw [kerav] to yourself, come not near to me, for I am holier than you” (Isaiah 65:5), where “kerav” means remove or withdraw. § Having mentioned that it is prohibited for a man to engage in intercourse with a woman near the expected date of her menstruation, the Gemara cites a baraita in which the Sages taught: The verse with regard to a menstruating woman states: “And shall you separate the children of Israel from their uncleanness” (Leviticus 15:31), Rabbi Yoshiya says: From here we derive a prohibition to the children of Israel that they must separate from their wives near the expected date of their menstruation. And how long before must they separate? Rabba says: A set interval of time for the ritual impurity of a menstruating woman, which is half of a twenty-four hour day, either the daytime or the nighttime. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: With regard to anyone who does not separate from his wife near the expected date of her menstruation, even if he has sons who are fit to be great and holy like the sons of Aaron, these sons will die due to his sin, as it is written: “And shall you separate the children of Israel from their uncleanness…this is the law…of her that is sick with her menstrual flow” (Leviticus 15:31–33), and it is stated near it: “After the death of the two sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 16:1). Concerning this matter, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who separates himself from his wife near the expected date of her menstruation will have male children, as it is written: “To distinguish between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 11:47), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: He will have sons who are worthy of teaching halakha, as it is written: “To distinguish…between the impure and the pure, and to teach the children of Israel all the statutes” (Leviticus 10:10–11). The Gemara continues to expound these verses: Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Anyone who recites havdala over wine at the conclusion of Shabbatot, and not over some other beverage, will have male children, as it is written: “To distinguish between the holy and the unholy, and between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 10:10), and it is written there once again: “To distinguish between the impure and the pure” (Leviticus 11:47), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2). Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Anyone who recites havdala over wine at the conclusion of Shabbatot will have sons who are worthy of teaching halakha, as it is written: “To distinguish between the holy and the unholy…and to teach” (Leviticus 10:10–11). Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet says that Rabbi Elazar says: Anyone who sanctifies himself with modest conduct while engaging in sexual intercourse will have male children, as it is stated: “You shall sanctify yourselves, and you shall be holy” (Leviticus 11:44), and it is stated near it: “If a woman conceive and bear a male child” (Leviticus 12:2). § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to the sliding-scale offering the verse states: “Or if a person touches any impure thing, whether it is the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher creeping animal, and it is hidden from him, so that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2). The juxtaposition of the words “and it is hidden” to the words “a creeping animal” teaches that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering when it was hidden from him that he had contracted ritual impurity from a creeping animal, but not when it was hidden from him that he was entering the Temple or partaking of sacrificial food. Rabbi Akiva says that it is from the words “and it is hidden from him, so that he is impure” that it is derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering for a lapse of awareness about his impurity, but not for a lapse of awareness about the Temple or the sacrificial food. The Gemara asks: Since Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva agree about the halakha, what is the practical difference between them? Ḥizkiyya says: There is a practical difference between them in a case where one initially knew that he had contracted ritual impurity, but he did not know whether the impurity was contracted from a creeping animal or from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal. Rabbi Eliezer holds that for him to be liable to bring an offering, we require that he initially know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass, and if he never knew this, he does not bring an offering. And Rabbi Akiva holds that for him to be liable to bring an offering, we do not require that he know this detail; since he knows in general terms that he contracted impurity, it is not necessary that one know whether he contracted the impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted the impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass. And Ulla also says: There is a practical difference between them in a case where the person did not know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal. Ulla did not say this explicitly, but rather he raises a contradiction between this statement of Rabbi Eliezer and another statement of Rabbi Eliezer, and then resolves it. He asked: Does Rabbi Eliezer actually say that in order to be liable to bring a sliding-scale offering, we require that one initially know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass? And he raises a contradiction from a baraita with regard to one who ate a forbidden food but did not know whether it was forbidden fat or it was notar, part of a sacrifice left over after the time allotted for its consumption; or one who performed labor but did not know whether it was Shabbat or Yom Kippur; or one who engaged in intercourse but did not know whether it was with his menstruating wife or with his sister. In all these cases Rabbi Eliezer holds that he must bring a sin-offering, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rabbi Eliezer says: Whichever way you look at it, he is liable. If he ate forbidden fat he is liable; if he ate notar he is liable. If he desecrated Shabbat he is liable; if he desecrated Yom Kippur he is liable. If he engaged in intercourse with his menstruating wife, he is liable; if he engaged in intercourse with his sister, he is liable. In all these cases, he knows that he transgressed, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: The verse states with regard to a sin-offering: “Or if his sin, in which he sinned, became known to him” (Leviticus 4:23), teaching that there is no liability for an offering until it becomes known to the sinner the manner in which he sinned. According to this baraita, Rabbi Eliezer himself holds that in order to become liable to bring a sin-offering, it is not necessary that one know precisely which prohibition he violated. And Ulla resolves the contradiction: There, with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering, the Merciful One states: “Or if his sin, in which he sinned, became known to him, he shall bring his offering” (Leviticus 4:23), teaching that it suffices that he knows that he committed some type of sin. Here, with regard to ritual impurity in the Temple, since it is written at the beginning of the verse: “Or if a person touches any impure thing” (Leviticus 5:2), why do I need that which is stated immediately afterward: “Or the carcass of a non-kosher creeping animal”? Conclude from it that we require that he initially know whether he contracted impurity from a creeping animal or he contracted impurity from an unslaughtered animal carcass, and if he never knew this, he does not bring an offering. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva, who does not expound the verses in this way, what does he say to this? The Gemara answers: He maintains that since the Torah needs to write both “domesticated animal” and “undomesticated animal” in the verse “or the carcass of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, or the carcass of a non-kosher domesticated animal” to teach that halakha that the school of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught (see 7a), “creeping animal” is also written, even though there is no novel element taught by the addition of that term. This is in accordance with what was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Every passage in the Torah that was stated and repeated was repeated only for the novel element introduced therein. It is the style of the Torah to repeat an entire passage to teach even one additional halakha, in this case, that which was taught by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that in general it is not necessary that the unwitting transgressor know precisely which prohibition he violated, what does he do with the words “in which he sinned,” the words from which Rabbi Yehoshua learned that there is no liability to bring an offering unless he knows precisely which sin he committed? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Eliezer, these words emphasize the fact that one is liable only when he intends to do the prohibited act, to the exclusion of one who acts unawares and has no intention to perform the action. That is to say, if one was preoccupied with another matter and, acting unawares, he transgressed a prohibition, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering. Until now the Gemara has discussed Ḥizkiyya’s understanding of the practical difference between the opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is no halakhic difference between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, as they both agree that one must know the exact source of his ritual impurity. The difference between them is limited to the interpretation of the meaning of the verses, i.e., they disagree about the source in the Torah for this halakha. And similarly, it can be reasoned that Rav Sheshet says: The difference between them is limited to the interpretation of the meaning of the verses, as Rav Sheshet would switch the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer for that of Rabbi Akiva and that of Rabbi Akiva for that of Rabbi Eliezer. He was not meticulous in his attributions of the respective opinions, as he held that there is no halakhic difference between them. Rava asked Rav Naḥman: According to both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, if one had a lapse of awareness of both this and that, his having contracted ritual impurity and his having entered the Temple, what is the halakha? Rav Naḥman said to him: He has a lapse of awareness about his impurity, and therefore he is liable. The Gemara disputes this: On the contrary, he has a lapse of awareness about the Temple, and he should therefore be exempt. Rav Ashi said: We observe his behavior. If he leaves the Temple because of the impurity, i.e., when he is told that he is impure, it is clear that the lapse of awareness that he had is about the impurity, and he is liable. And if he leaves because of the Temple, i.e., when he is told that he is in the Temple, then the lapse of awareness that he had is about the Temple, and he is exempt. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: There is no indication from here; didn’t he leave because he became aware of the Temple only because he became aware also of the impurity? Otherwise, why would he leave the Temple? And didn’t he leave because he became aware of the impurity only because he became aware also of the Temple? Otherwise, why would he leave the Temple? Rather, there is no difference, so there is no indication from here. § The Gemara begins a discussion about another topic related to awareness of impurity. The Sages taught in a baraita: If there were two paths in a certain place, one of them impure, as a corpse was buried there, and the other one pure, but it was not clear which of the two paths was impure, and someone walked on the first path and did not then enter the Temple, and then afterward he walked on the second path, forgot that he was ritually impure, and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, since he certainly contracted impurity on one of the paths and entered the Temple in a state of impurity. If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and on the third day he was sprinkled with waters of purification to purify him from the uncertain impurity imparted by a corpse, and on the seventh day he was sprinkled upon again, and he immersed himself in a ritual bath, thereby completing his purification, and then afterward he walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, since one of the paths was certainly impure and he entered the Temple after having walked on it. Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt in this latter case, because neither time that he entered the Temple was it certain that he was impure, the first time because he might not yet have become impure, and the second time because he might already have purified himself. And Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda, in the name of Rabbi Shimon, deems him exempt in all of these cases. The Gemara asks: Does Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda really exempt him in all of these cases,

MISHNA: Even though the Rabbis said that one's predicted time suffices (as an assumed start time for niddah), she is still required to examine herself, except for a niddah, and one who is waiting over pure blood. And she must only engage in intercourse if using examination cloths, except for one who is waiting over pure blood, and a virgin, whose blood is ritually pure. And she is required to examine herself twice: In the morning and at twilight. And also at a time that she is about to engage in intercourse with her husband. Women of priestly more than others when they partake of teruma. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even when they conclude partaking of teruma.