(א) וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹקִים נַעֲשֶׂה אָדָם
וזה פשט המקרא הזה מצאתיו לרבי יוסף הקמחי והוא הנראה מכל מה שחשבו בו ופירוש "צֶלֶם" כמו תאר...
תאר מראיתו ו"דמות" הוא דמיון בצורה ובמעשה כי הקרובים בענין יקראו דומים זה לזה והנה האדם דומה לתחתונים ולעליונים בתאר והדר ... והוא מגמת פניו בחכמה ובדעת וכשרון המעשה ובדמות ממש שידמה גופו לעפר ונפשו לעליונים
(1) And God said, "Let us make man:" ...
And this simple explanation of the verse I found from Rabbi Yosef Kimchi and it is the most plausible of all that have been thought. And the explanation of [the word,] image (tselem), is like an appearance...
[meaning] the description of what he looked like. And likeness (demut) [means] similarity in form or action; such that [things] that share a resemblance in a matter are called likenesses of each other. And behold man is similar to the lower beings and the upper beings in [his] appearance and his glory. ...d this refers to the direction of his countenance towards wisdom and knowledge and skilled action. And in his likeness, his body completely resembles the dirt, and his soul, the upper creatures.
מתני׳ פרה שילדה מין חמור וחמור שילדה כמין סוס פטורה מן הבכורה שנאמר (שמות י״ג:י״ג) פטר חמור (שמות לד, כ) פטר חמור שני פעמים עד שיהא היולד חמור והנולד חמור
ומה הם באכילה בהמה טהורה שילדה כמין בהמה טמאה מותר באכילה וטמאה שילדה כמין בהמה טהורה אסור באכילה
שהיוצא מן הטמא טמא והיוצא מן הטהור טהור:
MISHNA: A cow that gave birth to something that looks like a donkey and a donkey that gave birth to something that looks like a horse are exempt from being counted a firstborn, as it is stated: “And every firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem” (Exodus 13:13); “and the firstborn of a donkey you shall redeem ” (Exodus 34:20)twice, one is not obligated unless both the birth mother is a donkey and the animal born is a donkey.
And what about eating them? In the case of a kosher animal that gave birth to something that looks like a non-kosher animal, its consumption is permitted. And a non-kosher animal that gave birth to something that looks like a kosher animal, its consumption is prohibited.
This is because that which emerges from the non-kosher animal is non-kosher and that which emerges from the kosher animal is kosher.
(7) לנפש חיה A LIVING SOUL — Also cattle and beasts are referred as "living soul" but the "living soul" נפש of man is the most highly developed of all of them, because to him was granted understanding and speech.
(כב) וַיֹּ֣אמֶר ׀ ה' אֱלֹקִ֗ים הֵ֤ן הָֽאָדָם֙ הָיָה֙ כְּאַחַ֣ד מִמֶּ֔נּוּ לָדַ֖עַת ט֣וֹב וָרָ֑ע
(22) And the LORD God said, “Now that the man has become like one of us, knowing good and bad...
רְשׁוּת לְכָל אָדָם נְתוּנָה. אִם רָצָה לְהַטּוֹת עַצְמוֹ לְדֶרֶךְ טוֹבָה וְלִהְיוֹת צַדִּיק הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדוֹ. וְאִם רָצָה לְהַטּוֹת עַצְמוֹ לְדֶרֶךְ רָעָה וְלִהְיוֹת רָשָׁע הָרְשׁוּת בְּיָדוֹ.
הוּא שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה (בראשית ג כב) "הֵן הָאָדָם הָיָה כְּאַחַד מִמֶּנּוּ לָדַעַת טוֹב וָרָע". כְּלוֹמַר הֵן מִין זֶה שֶׁל אָדָם הָיָה יָחִיד בָּעוֹלָם וְאֵין מִין שֵׁנִי דּוֹמֶה לוֹ בְּזֶה הָעִנְיָן שֶׁיְּהֵא הוּא מֵעַצְמוֹ בְּדַעְתּוֹ וּבְמַחֲשַׁבְתּוֹ יוֹדֵעַ הַטּוֹב וְהָרַע וְעוֹשֶׂה כָּל מַה שֶּׁהוּא חָפֵץ וְאֵין מִי שֶׁיְּעַכֵּב בְּיָדוֹ מִלַּעֲשׂוֹת הַטּוֹב אוֹ הָרַע. וְכֵיוָן שֶׁכֵּן הוּא פֶּן יִשְׁלַח יָדוֹ:
Every man was endowed with a free will; if he desires to bend himself toward the good path and to be just it is within the power of his hand to reach out for it, and if he desires to bend himself to a bad path and to be wicked it is within the power of his hand to reach out for it.
This is known from what it is written in the Torah, saying: "Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil" (Gen. 3.22), that is as if saying: "Behold, this species, man, stands alone in the world, and there is no other kind like him, as regards this subject of being able of his own accord, by his reason and thought, to know the good and the evil, and to do whatever his inclination dictates him with none to stay his hand from either doing good or evil; and, being that he is so, 'Lest he put forth his hand, and take also from the tree of life, and eat, and live forever'" (Ibid.)1Abodah Zarah, 16b; Megillah, 25a. G.
If there were machines which bore a resemblance to our bodies and imitated our actions as closely as possible for all practical purposes, we should still have two very certain means of recognizing that they were not real men. The first is that they could never use words, or put together signs, as we do in order to declare our thoughts to others. For we can certainly conceive of a machine so constructed that it utters words, and even utters words that correspond to bodily actions causing a change in its organs. … But it is not conceivable that such a machine should produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as the dullest of men can do.
Secondly, even though some machines might do some things as well as we do them, or perhaps even better, they would inevitably fail in others, which would reveal that they are acting not from understanding, but only from the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument, which can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need some particular action; hence it is for all practical purposes impossible for a machine to have enough different organs to make it act in all the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us act.
Turing (1950) describes the following kind of game.
Suppose that we have a person, a machine, and an interrogator. The interrogator is in a room separated from the other person and the machine. The object of the game is for the interrogator to determine which of the other two is the person, and which is the machine.
The interrogator knows the other person and the machine by the labels ‘X’ and ‘Y’—but, at least at the beginning of the game, does not know which of the other person and the machine is ‘X’—and at the end of the game says either ‘X is the person and Y is the machine’ or ‘X is the machine and Y is the person’. The interrogator is allowed to put questions to the person and the machine of the following kind: “Will X please tell me whether X plays chess?” Whichever of the machine and the other person is X must answer questions that are addressed to X. The object of the machine is to try to cause the interrogator to mistakenly conclude that the machine is the other person; the object of the other person is to try to help the interrogator to correctly identify the machine.
About this game, Turing (1950) says:
I believe that in about fifty years’ time it will be possible to programme computers...to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 percent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning. … I believe that at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.
, Rava created a man, a golem, using forces of sanctity. Rava sent his creation before Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira would speak to him but he (the golem) would not reply. Rabbi Zeira said to him: You were created by one of the members of the group, one of the Sages. Return to your dust.
| שאלות ותשובות חכם צבי סימן צג |
נסתפקתי אדם הנוצר ע"י ספר יצירה כאותה שאמרו בסנהדרין רבא ברא גברא וכן העידו על זקני הגאון מוהר"ר אליהו אבדק"ק חעלם מי מצטרף לעשרה לדברים הצריכין עשרה כגון קדיש וקדושה
מי אמרינן כיון דכתיב ונתקדשתי בתוך בני ישראל לא מיצטרף או דילמא כיון דקיי"ל בסנהדרין המגדל יתום בתוך ביתו מעה"כ כאילו ילדו מדכתיב חמשת בני מיכל כו' וכי מיכל ילדה והלא מירב ילדה אלא מירב ילדה ומיכל גדלה כו' ה"נ כיון שמעשה ידיהם של צדיקי' הוא הו"ל בכלל בנ"י שמע"י של צדיקי' הן הן תולדותם
ונ"ל דכיון דאשכחן לר' זירא דאמר מן חבריי' את תוב לעפרך הרי שהרגו ואי ס"ד שיש בו תועלת לצרפו לעשרה לכל דבר שבקדושה לא היה ר' זירא מעבירו מן העולם דאף שאין בו איסור שפיכת דמים דהכי דייק קרא (אף שיש בו דרשות אחרות) שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך דוקא אדם הנוצר תוך אדם דהיינו עובר הנוצר במעי אמו הוא דחייב עליה משום שפכ"ד יצא ההוא גברא דברא רבא שלא נעשה במעי אשה מ"מ כיון שיש בו תועלת לא היה לו להעבירו מן העולם א"ו שאינו מצטרף לעשרה לכל דבר שבקדושה כך נ"ל
Responsa of Chacham Tzvi (Tzvi Hirsch ben Yaakov Ashkenazi, 1656 - 1718) #93
I've contemplated: A person that is created by the means of The Book of Creation [i.e. a golem], just like those described in Tractate Sanhedrin: "Rabba created a being" and also as witnessed by our elder Geonim, my father and teacher R. Eliyahu Ba'al Shem of Helm ... can they be counted as part of the ten (minyan) for prayers that require ten such as Kadish and Kedusha?
Do we say that since the Torah states "And I shall be sanctified within Bnei Yisrael" [and Golem was not at Mt. Sanai] it should not be counted or perhaps [he should be counted], since it stated in Sanhedrin 19a: 'He who rears an orphan in his home Scripture considers it as if he had begotten him', since its written "Five sons of Michal" which suggests Michal bore the children however Meirav actually bore them. Rather, Meirav birthed them and Michal raised them, so too here, since he [the golem] is the product of the handiwork of the righteous it is considered generally part of Bnei Yisrael. Since it is made from the hands of the righteous it is their descendent.
It seems to me, that since R. Zeira killed it, since the Gemara states, "Creature, return to the dust" thus he killed him. And if you thought that it could participate in the ten for things that require Keduasha, then R. Zeira would not have removed it from this world, that even though he does not have a prohibition of "spilling blood", since the Torah states "Whoever sheds the blood of man, By man shall his blood be shed;"--specifically a person created by a person, i.e. only a person that is born from his mother's womb would qualify as "spilling blood", the being here was created by Rava and not from the womb of a woman. In any case, since it has utility [i.e. it could count in the minyan] he would not have removed him from this world; thus, for sure he would not be counted in the minyan for things that are holy.
(יט) וַיַּקְהֵ֨ל עֲלֵיהֶ֥ם קֹ֙רַח֙ אֶת־כָּל־הָ֣עֵדָ֔ה אֶל־פֶּ֖תַח אֹ֣הֶל מוֹעֵ֑ד וַיֵּרָ֥א כְבוֹד־ה' אֶל־כָּל־הָעֵדָֽה׃ (פ) (כ) וַיְדַבֵּ֣ר ה' אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֥ה וְאֶֽל־אַהֲרֹ֖ן לֵאמֹֽר׃ (כא) הִבָּ֣דְל֔וּ מִתּ֖וֹךְ הָעֵדָ֣ה הַזֹּ֑את וַאַכַלֶּ֥ה אֹתָ֖ם כְּרָֽגַע׃ (כב) וַיִּפְּל֤וּ עַל־פְּנֵיהֶם֙ וַיֹּ֣אמְר֔וּ אֵ֕ל אֱלֹקֵ֥י הָרוּחֹ֖ת לְכָל־בָּשָׂ֑ר הָאִ֤ישׁ אֶחָד֙ יֶחֱטָ֔א וְעַ֥ל כָּל־הָעֵדָ֖ה תִּקְצֹֽף׃ (פ)
(19) Korah gathered the whole community against them at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. Then the Presence of the LORD appeared to the whole community, (20) and the LORD spoke to Moses and Aaron, saying, (21) “Stand back from this community that I may annihilate them in an instant!” (22) But they fell on their faces and said, “O God, Source of the breath of all flesh! When one man sins, will You be wrathful with the whole community?”
דיני קדיש. ובו כב סעיפים:
אומרים קדיש וא"א אותו בפחות מי' זכרים בני חורין גדולים וה"ה לקדושה וברכו שאין נאמרין בפחות מעשרה:
They say Kaddish, and it is not said with less than ten males, who are free adults, and this is the rule for Kedushah and Barchu that are not said with less than ten.
(א) עֲשָׂרָה מִינֵי פַּסְלוּת הֵם כָּל מִי שֶׁנִּמְצָא בּוֹ אֶחָד מֵהֶן הֲרֵי הוּא פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת. וְאֵלּוּ הֵן. ... וְהַקְּטַנִּים. וְהַשּׁוֹטִים. וְהַחֵרְשִׁים. וְהַסּוּמִים...
(ט) הַשּׁוֹטֶה פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת מִן הַתּוֹרָה לְפִי שֶׁאֵינוֹ בֶּן מִצְוֹת. וְלֹא שׁוֹטֶה שֶׁהוּא מְהַלֵּךְ עָרֹם וּמְשַׁבֵּר כֵּלִים וְזוֹרֵק אֲבָנִים בִּלְבַד. אֶלָּא כָּל מִי שֶׁנִּטְרְפָה דַּעְתּוֹ וְנִמְצֵאת דַּעְתּוֹ מְשֻׁבֶּשֶׁת תָּמִיד בְּדָבָר מִן הַדְּבָרִים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא מְדַבֵּר וְשׁוֹאֵל כָּעִנְיָן בִּשְׁאָר דְּבָרִים הֲרֵי זֶה פָּסוּל וּבִכְלַל שׁוֹטִים יֵחָשֵׁב. הַנִּכְפֶּה בְּעֵת כְּפִיָּתוֹ פָּסוּל וּבְעֵת שֶׁהוּא בָּרִיא כָּשֵׁר.
(יא) הַחֵרֵשׁ כְּשׁוֹטֶה שֶׁאֵין דַּעְתּוֹ נְכוֹנָה וְאֵינוֹ בֶּן מִצְוֹת. וְאֶחָד חֵרֵשׁ מְדַבֵּר וְאֵינוֹ שׁוֹמֵעַ אוֹ שׁוֹמֵעַ וְאֵינוֹ מְדַבֵּר.
אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁרְאִיָּתוֹ רְאִיָּה מְעֻלָּה וְדַעְתּוֹ נְכוֹנָה צָרִיךְ לְהָעִיד בְּבֵית דִּין בְּפִיו. אוֹ שֶׁיִּהְיֶה רָאוּי לְהָעִיד בְּפִיו. וְיִהְיֶה רָאוּי לִשְׁמֹעַ הַדַּיָּנִים וְהָאִיּוּם שֶׁמְּאַיְּמִין עָלָיו. וְכֵן אִם נִשְׁתַּתֵּק אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּבְדַּק בְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁבּוֹדְקִין לְעִנְיַן גִּטִּין וְנִמְצֵאת עֵדוּתוֹ מְכֻוֶּנֶת וְהֵעִיד בְּפָנֵינוּ בִּכְתַב יָדוֹ אֵינָהּ עֵדוּת כְּלָל.
(יב) הַסּוּמִים אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמַּכִּירִין הַקּוֹל וְיָדְעוּ הָאֲנָשִׁים הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ פְּסוּלִין מִן הַתּוֹרָה. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא ה א) "וְהוּא עֵד אוֹ רָאָה" מִי שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לִרְאוֹת הוּא שֶׁמֵּעִיד. וְהַסּוּמָא בְּאַחַת מֵעֵינָיו כָּשֵׁר לְהָעִיד:
(1)Ten people are disqualified from testifying...a chlid, a lunatic, a deaf-mute, a blind person...
(9) A lunatic's testimony is invalid on a biblical [level] because he is not eligigle [to perform] Mitzvot. This [does not refer to] only to a lunatic who goes naked, breaks things, and throws stones rather anyone whose sanity is impaired and finds his intellect constantly confused on some point even if he can ask [questions] and converse on topic regarding other things.
(11)The deaf-mute is like a fool who has no right mind and is not a son of mitzvah. And a -mute deaf speaks and does not hear or hear and does not speak.
Even though his vision is superior and his thought is sound, he can testify in court. Or that it would be appropriate to testify in his mouth. And it will be fitting to hear the judges and the threat that threatens him. And if we remain silent even though we are examined in the way that we examined in the matter of Gettin and his testimony is found to be directed and we will testify in the future.
(12)The blind person, even though they know the voice and know people, these are disqualified from the Torah. It is said (Leviticus 5: 1) "And he is a witness or a seer." He who is worthy to see is the one who testifies. And the blind man in one of his eyes is able to testify:
(ד) גדולים - שקרא ערער על המקומות שנוהגין שהקטן אומר קדיש וברכו והקהל עונים אחריו דשלא כדין הם עושים ואפילו אם יש עשרה אנשים גדולים חוץ ממנו...שמצדד ג"כ להחמיר בזה לכתחלה.
מ"ח כששנים או ג' אומרים קדיש יחד ואחד מקדים אם באים כל אחד תוך כדי דיבור יענה עם הראשון או עם האחרון אמן ויעלה לכולם ואם יש הפסק יענה על כל אחד ואחד.
אדם הנוצר ע"י ספר יצירה אם מצטרף ליו"ד ולכל דבר שבקדושה עיין בתשובת חכם צבי סי' ס"ג ובספר עיקרי דינים מה שכתב בענין זה:
Adults - One who leads davening in places where it is customary for the children to say Kaddish and Barachu and the congragation to answer after him--they do so against the halacha even if there are ten adults besides him.
We should be stringent at the outset.
When two or three say Kaddish together and one precedes, if everyone comes at the same time, he will answer Amen with the first or with the last and it will go for all. If there is a gap and he can answer each one.
A person who is created by a book of creation, if he joins the ten for that is sacred, see the answer of the Chacham Tzvi C. S.G.
(ד) יש מתירין לומר דבר שבקדושה בתשעה וצירוף קטן שהוא יותר מבן שש ויודע למי מתפללין ולא נראין דבריהם לגדולי הפוסקי'... הגה ואפילו על ידי חומש שבידו אין לצרפו מיהו יש נוהגין להקל בשעת הדחק. [הרא"ש ומרדכי והגהות מיימוני פ"ט מהלכות תפלה]:...
(ו) ואם התחיל אחד מעשרה להתפלל לבדו ואינו יכול לענות עמה' או שהוא ישן אפ"ה מצטרף עמה':...
(ח) חרש המדבר ואינו שומע או שומע ואינו מדבר הן כפקחין ומצטרפים אבל מי שאינו שומע ואינו מדבר הרי הוא כשוטה וקטן:
(4) There are those who permit one to Daven in which [God's] holiness [is proclaimed] with 9 and a minor that is older than 6 and knows to whom we pray joins [them]. And their words were not seen for the great decisors... Rema: And even if he has a Chumash [printed Torah] in his hand we do not join him [to the 9], although there are those who follow this practice to be lenient at a time of need...
(6) If one of the 10 started to pray and [being in a section where he] could not answer with them or he is sleeping, even this one is included with them...
(8) A person that can hear but not speak, or speak but not hear, they are like hearing people and can be included. But if he is deaf and mute, he is treated like a mentally incompetent person or a minor.
The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: There was an incident involving Rabbi Eliezer, who entered a synagogue to pray, and he did not find a minyan of ten men, and he emancipated his slave and had him complete a quorum of ten. This demonstrates that one is permitted to free his slave.
The Gemara answers: Freeing a slave to enable the performance of a mitzva, e.g., completing a quorum, is different.
Can I Talk to a Droid on Shabbos?
(ט) שֵׁ֤֣שֶׁת יָמִ֣ים֙ תַּֽעֲבֹ֔ד֮ וְעָשִׂ֖֣יתָ כָּל־מְלַאכְתֶּֽךָ֒ (י) וְי֙וֹם֙ הַשְּׁבִיעִ֔֜י שַׁבָּ֖֣ת ׀ לַה' אֱלֹקֶ֑֗יךָ לֹֽ֣א־תַעֲשֶׂ֣֨ה כָל־מְלָאכָ֡֜ה אַתָּ֣ה ׀ וּבִנְךָֽ֣־וּ֠בִתֶּ֗ךָ עַבְדְּךָ֤֨ וַאֲמָֽתְךָ֜֙ וּבְהֶמְתֶּ֔֗ךָ וְגֵרְךָ֖֙ אֲשֶׁ֥֣ר בִּשְׁעָרֶֽ֔יךָ
(9) Six days you shall labor and do all your work, (10) but the seventh day is a sabbath of the LORD your God: you shall not do any work—you, your son or daughter, your male or female slave, or your cattle, or the stranger who is within your settlements.
(א(ב) נָכְרִי שֶׁעָשָׂה מְלָאכָה מֵעַצְמוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת אִם בִּשְׁבִיל יִשְׂרָאֵל עָשָׂה אוֹתָהּ אָסוּר לֵהָנוֹת בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה עַד מוֹצָאֵי שַׁבָּת וְיַמְתִּין בִּכְדֵי שֶׁתֵּעָשֶׂה. וְהוּא שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַדָּבָר בְּפַרְהֶסְיָא עַד שֶׁיֵּדְעוּ בּוֹ רַבִּים שֶׁדָּבָר זֶה בִּשְׁבִיל פְּלוֹנִי הוּא נַעֲשָׂה בְּשַׁבָּת. וְאִם בִּשְׁבִיל עַצְמוֹ בִּלְבַד עָשָׂה מֻתָּר לֵהָנוֹת בָּהּ בְּשַׁבָּת:
(2) [In the case of] a gentile who did forbidden work on his own on Shabbat: If he did it for the sake of a Jew, it is forbidden to benefit from that work until the conclusion of Shabbat; and he waits [the time it would take] in order to make it. And that is when the thing is not in public to the point that many know that this thing was done on Shabbat for the sake of x. But if he did it for himself alone, it is permissible to benefit from it on Shabbat.
GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: If a garment caught fire on one side, one may place water on its other side, and if as a result the fire is extinguished, it is extinguished. The Gemara raises an objection : If a garment caught fire on one side, one may stretch it out and cover himself with it, and if the fire is extinguished, it is extinguished. And so too, if a Torah scroll caught fire, one may open it and read it, and if the fire is extinguished, it is extinguished. Apparently, it is prohibited to actually pour water, but one may perform a permitted act that will incidentally extinguish.
תָּנָא: נֵר שֶׁאֲחוֹרֵי הַדֶּלֶת — פּוֹתֵחַ וְנוֹעֵל כְּדַרְכּוֹ, וְאִם כָּבְתָה — כָּבְתָה.
לָיֵיט עֲלַהּ רַב. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי טַעְמָא לָיֵיט עֲלַהּ רַב? אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּרַב סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְתָנָא קָתָנֵי לַהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.
מִשּׁוּם דְּרַב סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, כׇּל דְּתָנֵי כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מֵילָט לָיֵיט לֵיהּ?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּהָא אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן מוֹדֶה. דְּהָא אַבָּיֵי וְרָבָא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בִּ״פְסִיק רֵישֵׁיהּ וְלָא יְמוּת״.
It was taught: With regard to a candle behind a door, one may open and shut the door in his usual manner, and if it is extinguished, it is extinguished.
Rav would curse one who did so. Ravina said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, and some say that Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: What is the reason that Rav cursed and reprimanded one who did so? If you say it is because Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that it is prohibited to perform an unintentional act from which a prohibited labor could ensue, and the tanna taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that it is permitted to perform an unintentional act in those circumstances;
because Rav holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, he curses anyone who teaches the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? They rely on the ruling of a tanna, whose opinion is legitimate. He said to him: In this case, even Rabbi Shimon concedes that it is prohibited, as it was Abaye and Rava who both said that Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of: Cut off its head, will it not die? In an instance where the unintentional act leads to an inevitable prohibited consequence, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that the person who performs the unintentional act is liable.
If so, here too, with regard to Shabbat, it is written: “you shall not perform any labor” (Exodus 20:9). Performance is that which is prohibited; indirectly causing a prohibited action is permitted. The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Yosei maintains there is no prohibition in indirectly causing a fire to be extinguished; however, since a person is agitated about his property, if you permit him to indirectly extinguish the fire, he will come to extinguish it directly.
הרב נחום רבינוביץ
מובן מאליו שאם אדם עושה מלאכה מל"ט מלאכות ומשתמש בכוח החשמל לעשייתו, ...המפעיל חייב מן התורה...
אולם בימינו התקדם יישום החשמל והתפשט לסוגים שונים של אוטומציה בלא מגע יד אדם כלל, ואפילו לא בערב שבת וכל שכן לא בשבת עצמה... מעתה עולה השאלה: עד היכן יש לייחס לאדם פעולות הנעשות לגמרי באמצעות אוטומציה?...
כבר כתבתי בספרי שו"ת 'שיח נחום' שצריך להיות גבול עד היכן יש לייחס לאדם פעולות הנעשות לגמרי על ידי אוטומציה לעניין שבת. אך ברור שהגבול מוגדר בכך שהאדם הפועל הוא בעצמו נפרד מן המערכת שהוא פועל עליה, כלומר אין להחשיב את האדם עצמו כחלק של המערכת.
בנוסף, צריך שהפעולה שהוא עושה תהיה ניכרת לחושים ...רק במקרה כזה ניתן לאסור, אפילו בדרבנן בלבד. אולם, אם אין לאדם כל מגע שהוא עם המערכת החשמלית עצמה, ואף אינו עושה כל פעולה ייחודית להפעלת המערכת, וזו פועלת באופן עצמאי לגמרי – איך יעלה על הדעת לאסור, וכל שכן במקום שלא נעשית מלאכה מל"ט מלאכות שבת? ואפילו אם נוח לו בתוצאה ונהנה ממנה....
Rav Nachum Rabinowitz
It is self-evident that if a person performs of the 39 melachot using electricity...the one who uses it is liable biblically...
However, in our days, electricity has been applied to different usages that are fully automated, without human hands at all, not on Friday, and for sure not on Shabbat itself… Now the question is: How much can we ascribe these actions to human beings when they are fully automated?
I already wrote in Siach Nachum that there must be a limit to when we can ascribe action to people when they are fully automated. However, it is clear that the limit must be defined must be when the person acting is separated from the system he is acting on – i.e. where he cannot be considered part of the system.
Additionally, the action must be noticeable to the senses… Only then can you forbid, even rabbinically. However, if a person doesn’t touch the electrical system at all, and does no specific act to initiate the system, and it happens totally by itself – how can one even think that it is forbidden, especially when none of the 39 melachot are being done? This is even if you appreciate and benefit from it.
אָמַר רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: הַמְחַמֵּר אַחֵר בְּהֶמְתּוֹ בְּשַׁבָּת, בְּשׁוֹגֵג — חַיָּיב חַטָּאת, בְּמֵזִיד — חַיָּיב סְקִילָה.
מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר רָבָא: דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה כׇל מְלָאכָה אַתָּה וּבְהֶמְתֶּךָ״ — בְּהֶמְתּוֹ דּוּמְיָא דִידֵיהּ: מָה הוּא — בְּשׁוֹגֵג חַיָּיב חַטָּאת, בְּמֵזִיד חַיָּיב סְקִילָה. אַף בְּהֶמְתּוֹ נָמֵי — בְּשׁוֹגֵג חַיָּיב חַטָּאת, בְּמֵזִיד חַיָּיב סְקִילָה.
Rami bar Ḥama said: With regard to one who drives his laden animal on Shabbat, if he does so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if he does so intentionally, he is liable to be executed by stoning.
What is the reason? Rava said that the verse states: “You shall not perform any manner of labor, neither you…nor your animal” (Exodus 20:10). His animal is similar to himself; just as he, if he performed a prohibited labor on Shabbat unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if he did so intentionally, he is liable to stoning, so too, if his animal worked, if he did so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if he did so intentionally, he is liable to be executed by stoning.
It is very common that a person activates electric systems without intention, which causes changes that don’t have result in any overt or useful outcomes…In these cases, I think there is not a trace of melacha because they are not in the category of melechet machshevet.
Shevet ha-Levi 9:69
However, when a person does nothing, but is just walking normally, not adding any actions for melacha, even if he causes a light to be lit or the like, it is obvious that as long as he doesn’t actually intend to walk and turn on the light and the like, that we don’t attach his normal walking to the result, and there is not act of melacha.
מַתְנִי׳ הָיָה קוֹרֵא בַּתּוֹרָה וְהִגִּיעַ זְמַן הַמִּקְרָא, אִם כִּוֵּון לִבּוֹ — יָצָא.
...
גְּמָ׳ שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִצְוֹת צְרִיכוֹת כַּוָּונָה.
MISHNA: One who was reading sections of the Torah which comprise Shema, and the time for the recitation arrived, if he focused his heart, he fulfilled his obligation and need not repeat Shema.
...
GEMARA: Learn from this that mitzvot require intent.
(יט) (יט) יכוין בהתעטפו – וזהו מלבד הכוונה שצריך לכוין בלבישה לקיים מצוַת ציצית. וכתב הב"ח שכן הדין בתפילין וסוכה:
אף דבשאר מצוות יוצא אף שלא מכוין בה דבר, כי אם שעושה המצוה לשם ה' שציווה לעשותה, הנך שאני.
...
ומכל מקום נראה דכל זה לכתחילה כדי לקיים המצווה בשלמותה; אבל בדיעבד, אף אם לא כיוון בכל אלו, רק לקיים המצוַת עשה, יצא.
(19) One should have in mind when wrapping - And this is besides (ie. in addition to) the intention that one needs to have in mind when wearing [the ציצית] to fulfill the מצוה of ציצית. And the Ba"ch wrote that the same law applies to תפילין and סוכה:
Even though by other מצוות he fulfills his obligation even if he did not have any intentions, except that he is doing this מצוה for the sake of Hashem that commanded [us] to do it... but these [3 מצוות] are different.
...
Nevertheless, it seems that this is all [the] optimal [way] in order to fulfill the מצוה in it's [most] complete way. But after the fact, even if he did not have in mind by all these [3 מצוות], to only [have in mind to] fulfill the positive commandment, he fulfills his obligation.
חוץ מחרש שוטה וקטן שמא יקלקלו את שחיטתן:
...וכולן ששחטו ואחרים רואים אותם שחיטתן כשרה:
מאן תנא דלא בעינן כוונה לשחיטה אמר רבא רבי נתן היא דתני אושעיא זעירא דמן חבריא זרק סכין לנועצה בכותל והלכה ושחטה כדרכה רבי נתן מכשיר וחכמים פוסלין הוא תני לה והוא אמר לה הלכה כרבי נתן ...:
א"ר חייא בר אבא בעי רבי יוחנן קטן יש לו מחשבה או אין לו מחשבה א"ל רבי אמי ותיבעי ליה מעשה מ"ש מעשה דלא קא מבעיא ליה דתנן יש להן מעשה מחשבה נמי לא תיבעי ליה דתנן אין להן מחשבה
§ Everyone slaughters an animal, and their slaughter is valid, except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, lest they ruin their slaughter...And for all of them, when they slaughtered an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid,
Who is the tanna who taught that we do not require intent for slaughter? Rava said: It is Rabbi Natan, as Oshaya, the youngest of the of Sages, taught a: If one threw a knife to embed it in the wall, and went and slaughtered an animal in its proper manner, Rabbi Natan deems the slaughter valid, and the Rabbis deem the slaughter not valid. Oshaya teaches the baraita and he states about it: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Natan that there is no need for intent to perform a valid act of slaughter.
§ Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan raises a dilemma: Does a minor have halakhically effective thought, or does he not have halakhically effective thought? Rabbi Ami said to: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan raise this dilemma with regard to the action of a minor. What is different about the action of a minor that he does not raise a dilemma? Is it due to the fact that we learned in Kelim : A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor have the capacity to perform an action? With regard to thought as well let him not raise this dilemma, as we learned: They do not have the capacity for thought. As we learned: With regard to an acorn, a pomegranate, or a nut, which minors hollowed in order to measure dirt with them or that they affixed to a scale, the halakhic status of those shells is that of vessels, and they are susceptible to ritual impurity. By contrast, if the minors merely thought to use the shells for measuring or weighing, unlike adults, they do not thereby render those shells into vessels. The reason for this distinction is due to the fact that they have the capacity to perform an action,
חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן וְשִׁכּוֹר שֶׁנִּתְבַּלְבְּלָה דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ שְׁחִיטָתָן פְּסוּלָה מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן דַּעַת שֶׁמָּא יְקַלְקְלוּ. לְפִיכָךְ אִם שָׁחֲטוּ בִּפְנֵי הַיּוֹדֵעַ וְרָאָה אוֹתָן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ כַּהֹגֶן שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה:
A deaf-mute, a fool and a child and a drunkard who is confused his mind that slaughtered--their slaughter is invalid, because they have no da'at (knowledge) and they might mess up. Therefore if they slaughter in the presence of the someone who knows and sees them slaughter, such a slaughter is kosher:
מתני׳ הכל כשרין לכתוב את הגט אפי' חרש שוטה וקטן ...:
גמ׳ והא לאו בני דיעה נינהו אמר רב הונא והוא שהיה גדול עומד על גביו א"ל רב נחמן אלא מעתה עובד כוכבים וישראל עומד על גביו הכי נמי דכשר וכי תימא ה"נ והתניא עובד כוכבים פסול עובד כוכבים לדעתיה דנפשיה עבד
MISHNA: Anyone is qualified to write a bill of divorce, even a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor....
GEMARA: But how can a deaf-mute, imbecile, or a minor write a bill of divorce? They are not halakhically competent, Rav Huna says: And that is the case only when there was an adult standing over him. Rav Naḥman said to him: If that is so, a gentile, and a Jew stands over him, would you also say that it is valid?
And if you would say that it is also valid, but isn’t it taught in a baraita: A gentile is disqualified from writing a bill of divorce in any event? A gentile acts based on his own will.
מֻתָּר לְהָנִיחַ חֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן לִכְתֹּב טֹפֶס הַגֵּט לְכַתְּחִלָּה וְהוּא שֶׁיִּהְיֶה גָּדוֹל הַפִּקֵּחַ עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּן.
אֲבָל הָעַכּוּ''ם וְהָעֶבֶד אֵין כּוֹתְבִין הַטֹּפֶס לְכַתְּחִלָּה וַאֲפִלּוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל עוֹמֵד עַל גַּבָּן שֶׁלֹּא הִתִּירוּ לִכְתֹּב טָפְסֵי גִּטִּין שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ לְכַתְּחִלָּה אֶלָּא מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת סוֹפֵר כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:
It is allowed to let a fool and deaf-mute or a childto write the get to begin with. And a competent adult stands on over him.
But a non-Jew or a slave cannot write to begin with. Even if a Yisrael is standing over him because you are not allowed to right a get unless it is l'shma (intentional)
כתיב כי תצא אש אפילו מעצמה שהדליק בתוך שלו והלך ודלק בתוך של חבירו אפי' לא שרפה אלא עציו ואבניו או שליחכה נירו חייב לשלם הכל אא"כ הרחיק כשיעור אבל אם הרחיק כשיעור ויצא והזיק פטור: הגה וכל זה במדליק בתוך שלו אבל במדליק בתוך חבירו אפי' עברה כמה מילין חייב (טור ס"א):
Sending a fire out even if he himself lit the fire while inside his own area and it went out and burned inside his friend's area; even if it did not burn but his trees and stones, he must must pay everything even if it went a normal distance, but if he farther than expected and then harmed, he is exempt. Rema: this is only when he lit in his own area, but in someone else's area, even many miles away he is liable
לבתה הרוח כולן פטורין:
ת"ר ליבה ולבתה הרוח אם יש בלבויו כדי ללבותה חייב ואם לאו פטור אמאי ליהוי כזורה ורוח מסייעתו
אמר אביי הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שליבה מצד אחד ולבתו הרוח מצד אחר רבא אמר כגון שליבה ברוח מצויה ולבתו הרוח ברוח שאינה מצויה
הכא גרמא בעלמא הוא וגרמא בנזקין פטור:
§ The mishna : If the wind fanned the flames, all involved are exempt, [even if one fanned the fire at the same time that the wind was blowing].
A baraita : the Sages taught one fanned the flame and at the same time the wind fanned it, if his fanning has was enough to fan the flames, he is liable for damage caused , since even without the wind the fire would have spread. But if his fanning was not sufficient, he is exempt. Why? Let it be as one who winnows grain on Shabbat, and the wind assists him by separating the chaff -he is liable for desecrating Shabbat.
Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? Where he fanned the fire from one side and the wind fanned it from the other side, and the fire was blown in the direction the wind was blowing. Rava says: where he fanned it along with a typical wind, , and suddenly an atypical wind came and fanned it. Therefore, he is exempt since he could not have anticipated this.
But here, in the context of damages, he is considered to have caused damage merely through indirect action, and one who causes damage through indirect action is exempt.
אמר רבה הזורק מטבע של חבירו לים הגדול פטור מאי טעמא אמר הא מנח קמך אי בעית שקליה
§ Rabba says: One who throws another’s coin into the Great Sea is exempt from liability. What is the reason for this? He can say: The coin is resting before you; if you wish, take it. And this statement applies only if the coin is in translucent water, where the owner can see the coin, but in turbid water, where he cannot see it, it does not apply, and the one that threw it will be liable to compensate the owner.
מאי שנא בור שכן תחלת עשייתו לנזק וממונך ושמירתו עליך
What is different about Pit? It is that its initial formation (digging)t, can result in damage, and it is your property, and responsibility for its safeguarding, is incumbent upon you.
The pit is one of the primary causes of injury, and its derivatives are like it, deemed forewarned from the very beginning. Anyone who interposes an obstacle is deemed a derivative of pit, and if a person or an animal has been injured by it, the one who interposed the obstacle must pay full indemnity.
חֵרֵשׁ, שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, פְּגִיעָתָן רָעָה. הַחוֹבֵל בָּהֶן חַיָּב, וְהֵם שֶׁחָבְלוּ בַּאֲחֵרִים פְּטוּרִין.
הָעֶבֶד וְהָאִשָּׁה, פְּגִיעָתָן רָעָה. הַחוֹבֵל בָּהֶן חַיָּב, וְהֵם שֶׁחָבְלוּ בָּאֲחֵרִים, פְּטוּרִין, אֲבָל מְשַׁלְּמִין לְאַחַר זְמָן. נִתְגָּרְשָׁה הָאִשָּׁה, נִשְׁתַּחְרֵר הָעֶבֶד, חַיָּבִין לְשַׁלֵּם:
The mishna continues: With regard to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, an encounter with them is disadvantageous. One who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured others, they are exempt. This is because they lack awareness and are not responsible for their actions.
A slave and a woman, an encounter with them is disadvantageous, since one who injures them is liable. But if they were the ones who injured others, they are exempt, because they do not have money . But they pay compensation at a later time. The exemption is only temporary, as, if the woman becomes divorced or the slave becomes emancipated, and then have their own money, they are liable to pay.

