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Shareאלא הא דתנן מצא תכריך של שטרות או אגודה של שטרות ה"ז יחזיר הכי נמי דניחא ליה ללוה לאהדורי ליה למלוה אלא אמר רבא סימנין דאורייתא דכתיב (דברים כב, ב) והיה עמך עד דרוש אחיך אותו וכי תעלה על דעתך שיתננו קודם שידרשנו אלא דרשהו אם רמאי הוא או אינו רמאי לאו בסימנין שמע מינה אמר רבא אם תמצי לומר סימנין דאורייתא אם תמצי לומר הא פשיט ליה סימנין דאורייתא משום דאיכא למימר כדשנינן סימנין וסימנין יניח סימנין ועדים ינתן לבעל העדים סימנין וסימנין ועד אחד עד אחד כמאן דליתיה דמי ויניח עדי אריגה ועדי נפילה תנתן לעדי נפילה דאמרינן זבוני זבנה ומאיניש אחרינא נפל מדת ארכו ומדת רחבו תנתן למדת ארכו דמדת רחבו שעורי קא משער לה כד מכסי לה מרה וקאי ומדת ארכו לא משתער לה מדת ארכו ומדת רחבו ומדת גמיו ינתן למדת ארכו ורחבו מדת ארכו ומדת רחבו ומדת משקלותיו ינתן למדת משקלותיו הוא אומר סימני הגט והיא אומרת סימני הגט ינתן לה במאי אילימא במדת ארכו ורחבו דלמא בהדי דנקיט ליה חזיתיה אלא נקב יש בו בצד אות פלוני הוא אומר סימני החוט והיא אומרת סימני החוט ינתן לה במאי אילימא בחיורא ובסומקא ודלמא בהדי דנקיט ליה חזיתיה אלא במדת ארכו הוא אומר בחפיסה והיא אומרת בחפיסה ינתן לו מ"ט מידע ידעה דכל מה דאית ליה בחפיסה הוא דמנח ליה: מתני׳ ועד מתי חייב להכריז עד כדי שידעו בו שכניו דברי ר"מ ר' יהודה אומר שלש רגלים ואחר הרגל האחרון שבעה ימים כדי שילך לביתו שלשה ויחזור שלשה ויכריז יום אחד: גמ׳ תנא שכני אבידה מאי שכני אבידה אילימא שכינים דבעל אבידה אי ידע ליה ליזול ולהדריה נהליה אלא שכני מקום שנמצאת בו אבידה: רבי יהודה אומר כו': ורמינהו בשלשה במרחשון שואלין את הגשמים ר"ג אומר בז' בו (שהוא) ט"ו יום אחר החג כדי שיגיע אחרון שבא"י לנהר פרת אמר רב יוסף לא קשיא כאן במקדש ראשון כאן במקדש שני במקדש ראשון דנפישי ישראל טובא דכתיב בהו (מלכים א ד, כ) יהודה וישראל רבים כחול אשר על הים לרוב בעינן כולי האי במקדש שני דלא נפישי ישראל טובא דכתיב בהו (עזרא ב, סד) כל הקהל כאחד ארבע רבוא אלפים שלש מאות וששים לא בעינן כולי האי אמר ליה אביי והא כתיב (נחמיה ז, עב) וישבו הכהנים והלוים וגו' (עזרא ב, ע) והמשוררים והשוערים וכל ישראל בעריהם וכיון דהכי הוא אפכא מסתברא מקדש ראשון דנפישי ישראל טובא דמצוות עלמא ומשתכחי שיירתא דאזלי בין ביממא ובין בליליא לא בעינן כולי האי וסגי בתלתא יומא מקדש שני דלא נפישי ישראל טובא ולא מצוות עלמא ולא משתכחי שיירתא דאזלי בין ביממא ובין בליליא בעינן כולי האי רבא אמר לא שנא במקדש ראשון ולא שנא במקדש שני לא הטריחו רבנן באבדה יותר מדאי אמר רבינא שמע מינה כי מכריז גלימא מכריז דאי סלקא דעתך אבידתא מכריז בעינן למטפי ליה חד יומא לעיוני במאניה אלא שמע מינה גלימא מכריז שמע מינה רבא אמר אפילו תימא אבידתא מכריז לא הטריחו רבנן באבידה יותר מדאי ת"ר רגל ראשון אומר רגל ראשון רגל שני אומר רגל שני רגל שלישי אומר סתם ואמאי לימא רגל שלישי דלא אתי לאחלופי בשני שני נמי
The Gemara asks: But there is that which we learned in that mishna (20a): If one found a roll of documents or a bundle of documents, he shall return the documents to whomever describes the roll and the bundle, which serve as distinguishing marks. Would one say that so too, if one returns lost items on the basis of distinguishing marks due to the tacit agreement of the owners, it is satisfactory to the debtor to have the documents returned to the creditor? Rather, Rava said: Identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, as it is written: “And if your brother be not near you, and you know him not, then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall be with you until your brother claims [derosh] it, and you shall return it to him” (Deuteronomy 22:2). Would it enter your mind that he would give the lost item to him before he claims it? How can the finder return it if he does not know the identity of the owner? Rather, the verb derosh is not referring to the claim of the owner; it is referring to the scrutiny performed by the finder. Scrutinize him [darshehu] to determine whether the claimant is a swindler or whether he is not a swindler. Only then may you return the lost item to him. What, is it not that the one who claims the lost item proves that he is not a swindler on the basis of distinguishing marks that he provides? Rava affirms: Conclude from it that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law. Rava begins his statement and says: If you say that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law. The Gemara interjects: If you say? Didn’t he already resolve the dilemma and conclude that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law? The Gemara answers: Rava phrased his statement conditionally due to the fact that although he holds that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, one could reject his conclusion and say as we explained previously (27b), that when the mishna states that the finder scrutinizes whether he is a swindler, he does so on the basis of witnesses and not on the basis of distinguishing marks. The Gemara resumes Rava’s interrupted statement: If you say that identification of an item on the basis of distinguishing marks is by Torah law, then in a case where an item is found and two people claim it as theirs, and one describes distinguishing marks on the item and the other describes distinguishing marks on the item, the finder shall leave it in his possession and not give it to either claimant. In a case where one person describes distinguishing marks on the item and the other brings two witnesses to support his claim of ownership, the item shall be given to the claimant with witnesses. In a case where one person describes distinguishing marks on the item and the other describes distinguishing marks on the item and brings one witness to support his claim of ownership, the one witness is as one who is not there, and the finder shall leave it in his possession. The testimony of a single witness has no legal standing in this case. In a case where one claimant to a found garment brings witnesses who testify that the garment was woven for him, and the other claimant brings witnesses who testify that the garment had fallen from him, the garment shall be given to the claimant whose witnesses testified that the garment had fallen from him, as we say that perhaps the one for whom it was woven sold the garment and it fell from another person, who is the current owner. If one claimant provides the measure of length of a lost garment and the other provides the measure of its width, the garment shall be given to the claimant who provided the measure of its length, as one can approximate the measure of its width when its owner dons the garment and stands, but the measure of its length cannot be approximated in that manner. Therefore, it is a more clear-cut distinguishing characteristic. If one claimant provides the measure of its length and the measure of its width and the other provides the measure of its gamma, its combined length and width, which together form the Greek letter gamma, but does not provide each measure individually, the item shall be given to the claimant who provided the measure of its length and the measure of its width separately. If one claimant provides the measure of its length and the measure of its width and the other provides the measure of its weight, the item shall be given to the claimant who provided the measure of its weight, which, because it is more difficult to approximate, is a more clear-cut distinguishing characteristic. Rava continues: In a case where a bill of divorce is found and it is unclear whether it had been delivered to the wife, and the husband, who reconsidered, states the distinguishing marks of the bill of divorce and claims that he did not yet give it to his wife, and the wife, who wants to be divorced, states the distinguishing marks of the bill of divorce and claims that she already received it, the document shall be given to the wife. The Gemara asks: With what distinguishing mark did she describe the bill of divorce? If we say that she described it with the measure of its height and its width, that is not a clear-cut distinguishing mark; perhaps while her husband was holding the bill of divorce, she saw it, although he had not yet given it to her. Rather, it must be that she says that there is a perforation alongside such and such letter in the document, which she could know only if the bill of divorce had been in her hand. In a case where the husband states the distinguishing marks of the string with which the bill of divorce is bound, and she states the distinguishing marks of the string, the document shall be given to the wife. The Gemara asks: With what distinguishing mark did she describe the string? If we say that she described it by saying that the string is white or by saying that it is red, this cannot be the mark based on which she proves her ownership, as perhaps while her husband was holding the bill of divorce, she saw the string. Rather, it must be that she stated the measure of its length. As the string was wrapped around the document, she would know its length only if the bill of divorce had been in her hand. In a case where the husband claims that the bill of divorce was not given to the wife and states that it was stored in a case, and the wife claims that she received the bill of divorce and states that it was stored in a case, the document shall be given to the husband. What is the reason? Identification of the document based on its storage cannot prove her ownership, as she knows that he places any valuable item that he has in his possession in the case. MISHNA: And until when is one who finds a lost item obligated to proclaim his find? He is obligated to do so until the moment that the neighbors will know of its existence; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is obligated to proclaim his find for three pilgrimage Festivals and for seven days after the last of the three pilgrimage Festivals, so that its owner will have time to go to his home, a trip lasting up to three days, and ascertain that he in fact lost the item, and he will return to Jerusalem, a trip lasting up to three days, and proclaim his loss for one day. GEMARA: The mishna teaches that one must proclaim his find until his neighbors will know of its existence. A tanna taught: One must proclaim his find until the neighbors of the lost item will know of its existence. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the expression: Neighbors of the lost item? If we say that the reference is to neighbors of the owner of the lost item, he need not proclaim his find, as if the finder knows who lost the item, let him go and return it to him. The Gemara answers: Rather, the reference is to the neighbors of the place where the lost item was found. § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: He is obligated to proclaim his find for three pilgrimage Festivals and for seven days after the last of the three pilgrimage Festivals, so that its owner will go to his home, a trip lasting up to three days, will ascertain that he in fact lost the item, and will return to Jerusalem, a trip lasting up to three days, and proclaim his loss for one day. Apropos Rabbi Yehuda’s calculation of three days as the duration of a pilgrim’s travel from Jerusalem to his home, the Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna (Ta’anit 10a): On the third of the month of Marḥeshvan one starts to request rain by inserting the phrase: And grant dew and rain, in the blessing of the years, the ninth blessing of the Amida prayer. Rabban Gamliel says: One starts to request rain on the seventh of Marḥeshvan, which is fifteen days after the conclusion of the festival of Sukkot, so that the last of those who are in Eretz Yisrael on the pilgrimage to Jerusalem can reach their homes beyond the Euphrates River before the onset of rain, which would make crossing the river more hazardous. Apparently, it takes fifteen days for those who came for the pilgrimage Festivals to return home, not three days. Rav Yosef says: This is not difficult. Here, in the mishna in tractate Ta’anit, Rabban Gamliel’s statement is referring to the duration of the journey during the First Temple period, which took fifteen days; whereas there, Rabbi Yehuda’s statement is referring to the duration of the journey during the Second Temple period, which took three days. The Gemara explains the answer: During the First Temple period, when the Jewish people were very numerous, as it is written with regard to them: “Judea and Israel were many, as the sand that is by the sea in multitude, eating and drinking and rejoicing” (I Kings 4:20), we need that much time for them to travel from Jerusalem to the farthest reaches of Eretz Yisrael, due to the wide distribution of the large population. During the Second Temple period, when the Jewish people were not very numerous, as it is written: “The whole congregation together was forty and two thousand three hundred and sixty” (Ezra 2:64), we do not need that much time for them to travel from Jerusalem to the farthest reaches of Eretz Yisrael, due to the limited distribution of the small population. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: But isn’t it written: “So the priests, and the Levites, and some of the people, and the singers, and the porters, and the Gibeonites, dwelt in their cities, and all Israel in their cities” (Ezra 2:70). The verse indicates that despite their limited numbers, the Jewish people dwelt in all the cities that they inhabited previously, and the distance to the far reaches of Eretz Yisrael was no shorter during the Second Temple period. Abaye continued: And since that is the reality, the opposite is reasonable. During the First Temple period, when the Jewish people were very numerous and when everyone was structured in groups, and caravans could be found that traveled both during the day and during the night, we do not need that much time to travel from Jerusalem to the farthest reaches of Eretz Yisrael, and three days suffice. By contrast, during the Second Temple period, when the Jewish people were not very numerous and when everyone was not structured in groups, and therefore, caravans could not be found that traveled both during the day and during the night, we need that much time, i.e., fifteen days, to travel from Jerusalem to the farthest reaches of Eretz Yisrael. Rava said: It is no different during the First Temple period and it is no different during the Second Temple period; the requisite travel time to the border was fifteen days, as the opinion of Rabban Gamliel indicates. Nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda calculated three days of travel to the border because the Sages did not wish to trouble the finder excessively in returning a lost item by requiring him to wait an extended amount of time. Ravina says: Learn from the calculation of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna that when a finder proclaims his find he specifies the nature of the item, e.g., he proclaims that he found a cloak. As, if it enters your mind that the finder proclaims that he found a lost item without specifying its nature, we need to increase the period of time afforded the owner to ascertain that he lost an item, and add one day for him to examine all his vessels. Rather, learn from it that the finder proclaims that he found a cloak. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that the finder specifies the nature of the item. Rava said: Even if you say that the finder proclaims that he found an unspecified lost item, nevertheless, Rabbi Yehuda does not require extending the period afforded the owner, because the Sages did not wish to trouble the finder excessively in returning a lost item by requiring him to wait an extended amount of time. The Sages taught in a baraita: On the first pilgrimage Festival after finding the lost item, the finder proclaims his find and says: This is the first pilgrimage Festival that I am proclaiming this find. On the second pilgrimage Festival after finding the lost item, the finder proclaims his find and says: This is the second pilgrimage Festival that I am proclaiming this find. On the third pilgrimage Festival, the finder proclaims his find and says his proclamation without specification of the number of the Festival. The Gemara asks: And why does he not specify the number of the Festival? Just as he specified the previous two Festivals, let him say that it is the third pilgrimage Festival. The Gemara answers: He does not specify that it is the third pilgrimage Festival, so that one who hears him will not come to confuse it with the second pilgrimage Festival. If the finder were to proclaim that it is the third [shelishi] Festival, it is possible that the owner would mistakenly hear the word second [sheni] and believe that there is time remaining to reclaim his lost item. Since on the second Festival he mentions the number and on the third Festival he does not mention a number, there is no potential for confusion. The Gemara asks: Based on that reasoning, on the second pilgrimage Festival too, the finder should not mention the number of the Festival,
אתיא לאחלופי בראשון הא קא אתי רגל שלישי ת"ר בראשונה כל מי שמצא אבידה היה מכריז עליה שלשה רגלים ואחר רגל אחרון שבעת ימים כדי שילך שלשה ויחזור שלשה ויכריז יום אחד משחרב בית המקדש שיבנה במהרה בימינו התקינו שיהו מכריזים בבתי כנסיות ובבתי מדרשות ומשרבו האנסים התקינו שיהו מודיעין לשכיניו ולמיודעיו ודיו מאי משרבו האנסין דאמרי אבידתא למלכא רבי אמי אשכח אודייא דדינרי חזייה ההוא בר נש דקא מירתת א"ל זיל שקול לנפשך דלאו פרסאי אנן דאמרי אבידתא למלכא ת"ר אבן טוען היתה בירושלים כל מי שאבדה לו אבידה נפנה לשם וכל מי שמוצא אבידה נפנה לשם זה עומד ומכריז וזה עומד ונותן סימנין ונוטלה וזו היא ששנינו צאו וראו אם נמחת אבן הטוען: מתני׳ אמר את האבידה ולא אמר סימניה לא יתן לו והרמאי אע"פ שאמר סימניה לא יתן לו שנאמר (דברים כב, ב) עד דרוש אחיך אותו עד שתדרוש את אחיך אם רמאי הוא אם אינו רמאי: גמ׳ אתמר רב יהודה אמר אבידתא מכריז ור"נ אמר גלימא מכריז רב יהודה אמר אבידתא מכריז דאי אמרת גלימא מכריז חיישינן לרמאי ר"נ אמר גלימא מכריז לרמאי לא חיישינן דא"כ אין לדבר סוף תנן אמר את האבידה ולא אמר את סימניה ה"ז לא יתן לו אי אמרת בשלמא אבידתא מכריז הא קמ"ל אע"ג דאמר גלימא כי לא אמר סימנין לא מהדרינן ליה אלא אי אמרת גלימא מכריז אמר איהו גלימא ואמר איהו גלימא צריכא למימר כי לא אמר סימנין לא מהדרינן ליה אמר רב ספרא לעולם גלימא מכריז אמר איהו גלימא ואמר איהו סימנין ומאי לא אמר את סימניה לא אמר סימנין מובהקין דידה: והרמאי אע"פ שאמר את סימניה ה"ז לא יתן לו: ת"ר בראשונה כל מי שאבדה לו אבידה היה נותן סימנין ונוטלה משרבו הרמאין התקינו שיהו אומרים לו צא והבא עדים דלאו רמאי את וטול כי הא דאבוה דרב פפא אירכס ליה חמרא ואשכחוה אתא לקמיה דרבה בר רב הונא אמר ליה זיל אייתי סהדי דלאו רמאי את וטול אזל אייתי סהדי אמר להו ידעיתון ביה דרמאי הוא אמרו ליה אין אמר להו אנא רמאה אנא אמרו ליה אנן לאו רמאי את קאמרינן אמר רבה בר רב הונא מסתברא לא מייתי איניש חובתא לנפשיה: מתני׳ כל דבר שעושה ואוכל יעשה ויאכל ודבר שאין עושה ואוכל ימכר שנאמר (דברים כב, ב) והשבותו לו ראה היאך תשיבנו לו מה יהא בדמים ר"ט אומר ישתמש בהן לפיכך אם אבדו חייב באחריותן ר"ע אומר לא ישתמש בהן לפיכך אם אבדו אין חייב באחריותן: גמ׳ ולעולם אמר רב נחמן אמר שמואל עד י"ב חדש תניא נמי הכי כל דבר שעושה ואוכל כגון פרה וחמור מטפל בהן עד י"ב חדש מכאן ואילך שם דמיהן ומניחן עגלים וסייחין מטפל בהן שלשה חדשים מכאן ואילך שם דמיהן ומניחן אווזין ותרנגולין מטפל בהם שלשים יום מכאן ואילך שם דמיהן ומניחן אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק תרנגולת כבהמה גסה תניא נמי הכי תרנגולת ובהמה גסה מטפל בהן שנים עשר חודש מכאן ואילך שם דמיהן ומניחן עגלים וסייחין מטפל בהן ל' יום מכאן ואילך שם דמיהן ומניחן אווזין ותרנגולין וכל דבר שטיפולו מרובה משכרו מטפל בהן שלשה ימים מכאן ואילך שם דמיהן ומניחן קשיא עגלים וסייחין אעגלים וסייחין אווזין ותרנגולין אאווזין ותרנגולין עגלים וסייחין אעגלים וסייחין לא קשיא הא דרעיא והא דפטומא אווזין ותרנגולין אאווזין ותרנגולין נמי לא קשיא הא ברברבי הא בזוטרי: ושאינו עושה ואוכל: תנו רבנן והשבותו לו ראה היאך תשיבנו לו שלא יאכיל עגל לעגלים וסיח לסייחין אווזא לאווזין ותרנגול לתרנגולין: מה יהא בדמים רבי טרפון אומר ישתמש וכו': עד כאן לא פליגי
because perhaps one who hears him will come to confuse it with the first pilgrimage Festival? The Gemara answers: Confusing the second Festival with the first is not a problem, as in any case, won’t the finder come on the third pilgrimage Festival, thereby giving the owner another opportunity to recover his lost item? § The Sages taught: Initially, anyone who found a lost item would proclaim his find for three pilgrimage Festivals and for seven days after the last of the three pilgrimage Festivals, so that its owner will go to his home, a trip lasting up to three days, and will return to Jerusalem, a trip lasting up to three days, and proclaim his loss for one day. But from the time that the Temple was destroyed, may it be rebuilt speedily in our days, the Sages instituted that those who find lost items shall proclaim their finds in synagogues and study halls. And from the time that the oppressors proliferated, the Sages instituted an ordinance that one who finds a lost item shall inform his neighbors and acquaintances, and that will suffice for him. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of: From the time that the oppressors proliferated? The Gemara answers: It is from the time that they say: A lost item belongs to the king. The Sages were concerned that any public proclamation would result in confiscation of the lost item. The Gemara relates: Rabbi Ami found a vessel full of dinars. A certain Roman saw that he was wary and hesitant to take it. The Roman said to him: Go, take it for yourself; as we are not Persians, who say that a lost item belongs to the king. The Sages taught in a baraita: There was a Claimant’s Stone in Jerusalem, and anyone who lost an item would be directed there and anyone who found a lost item would be directed there. This finder would stand and proclaim his find and that owner would stand and provide its distinguishing marks and take the item. And that is the place about which we learned in a mishna (Ta’anit 19a): Go and see if the Claimant’s Stone has been obscured by the rising water. MISHNA: If a claimant accurately stated what type of item the lost item that was found by another is, but did not state, i.e., describe, its distinguishing marks, the finder shall not give it to him. And in the case of a swindler, even though he stated its distinguishing marks, the finder shall not give the lost item to him, as it is stated: “And if your brother be not near you, and you know him not, then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall be with you until your brother claims [derosh] it [oto], and you shall return it to him” (Deuteronomy 22:2). Would it enter your mind that the finder would give it to him before he claims it? How can the finder return it if he does not know the identity of the owner? Rather, the verb derosh is not referring to the claim of the owner; it is referring to the scrutiny performed by the finder. You shall not return the lost item until you scrutinize [shetidrosh] your brother to determine whether he, the claimant, is a swindler or whether he is not a swindler. GEMARA: It was stated that Rav Yehuda said: One who finds an item proclaims that he found a lost item without specifying its nature. And Rav Naḥman said: He specifies the nature of the item, e.g., he proclaims that he found a cloak. Rav Yehuda said: One who finds an item proclaims that he found a lost item, as if you say that he proclaims that he found a cloak, we are concerned about the possibility that a swindler may attempt to claim the item. Perhaps the swindler learned that another person lost that item, and he will ascertain its distinguishing marks, provide those distinguishing marks, and claim the item. Rav Naḥman said: The finder proclaims that he found a cloak, and we are not concerned about the possibility that a swindler may attempt to claim the item, as if so, there is no end to the matter. Even if the finder does not specify the nature of the item, perhaps a swindler would be able to guess its nature. The Gemara cites proof from that which we learned in the mishna: If a claimant accurately states what type of item the lost item that was found by another is, but did not state its distinguishing marks, the finder shall not give it to him. Granted, if you say the finder proclaims that he found an unspecified lost item, this mishna teaches us that even though the claimant indeed stated that the lost item is a cloak, as long as he did not state its distinguishing marks, we do not return it to him. But if you say that the finder proclaims that he found a cloak, if the finder stated that he found a cloak and the claimant stated that he lost a cloak, does it need to be said that when he did not state its distinguishing marks, we do not return it to him? Rav Safra said: Actually, one could say that the finder proclaims that he found a cloak, and the mishna is referring to a case where the finder stated that he found a cloak, and the claimant stated its distinguishing marks. And what is the meaning of the phrase in the mishna: If he did not state its distinguishing marks? It means: If he did not state its clear-cut distinguishing marks but rather stated distinguishing marks that are not exclusive to the item. Therefore, he does not prove his ownership. § The mishna teaches: And in the case of a swindler, even though he stated its distinguishing marks, the finder shall not give the lost item to him. The Sages taught: Initially, anyone who lost an item would provide its distinguishing marks and take it. But when the swindlers proliferated, the Sages instituted an ordinance that the finders will say to him: Go and bring witnesses who can testify that you are not a swindler, and take your item. The Gemara relates: This is as in that incident involving the father of Rav Pappa, who lost a donkey and others found it. He came before Rabba bar Rav Huna to reclaim his donkey. Rabba bar Rav Huna said to the father of Rav Pappa: Go and bring witnesses who can testify that you are not a swindler, and you may take your donkey. The father of Rav Pappa went and brought witnesses. Rabba bar Rav Huna said to the witnesses: Do you know about him that he is a swindler? The witnesses said: Yes. Rav Pappa’s father said, incredulously, to the witnesses: I am a swindler? The witnesses said to him: We were saying that you are not a swindler. They had thought the question was if he was not a swindler, and therefore responded in the affirmative. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: It is reasonable to conclude that the witnesses actually intended to support Rav Pappa’s father, because presumably, a person does not bring condemnation upon himself; Rav Pappa’s father would not have volunteered to provide witnesses who would testify against him. MISHNA: If one finds any living being that works and generates enough revenue to cover the costs of the food that it eats, it shall work and eat while in the finder’s possession. And any living being that does not work but it does eat shall be sold, as it is stated: “Then you shall bring it into your house, and it shall be with you until your brother claims it, and you shall return it to him” (Deuteronomy 22:2), indicating that the finder must see how best to return it to him. Since the owner must repay the finder for his expenditures, if feeding the animal costs more than its value, the finder’s keep-ing the animal in his possession will prevent the owner from recovering it. What shall be done with the money received from the sale of the animal? Rabbi Tarfon says: The finder may use it; therefore, if the money is lost, he is liable to pay restitution for it. Rabbi Akiva says: He may not use the money; therefore, if it is lost, he is not liable to pay restitution for it. GEMARA: The mishna teaches that an animal that generates enough revenue to cover the costs of the food that it eats shall work and eat while in the finder’s possession. The Gemara asks: And must he care for the animal forever? Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: He cares for the animal until twelve months pass. This is also taught in a baraita: If one finds any living being that works and generates enough revenue to cover the costs of the food that it eats, e.g., a cow or a donkey, he tends to them until twelve months pass. From that point forward, one assesses their value, sells them, and places the money aside for the owner. If one finds calves and foals, which are young and unfit for labor, he tends to them for three months, as they do not earn their keep. From that point forward, one assesses their value, sells them, and places the money aside for the owner. If one finds geese and roosters, he tends to them for thirty days. From that point forward, one assesses their value, sells them, and places the money aside for the owner. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The legal status of a chicken is like that of a large domesticated animal in that the eggs it lays suffice to cover the cost of its food, and therefore the finder keeps it for twelve months. This is also taught in a baraita: If one finds a chicken and a large domesticated animal, he tends to them for twelve months. From that point forward, one assesses their value, sells them, and places the money aside for the owner. If one finds calves and foals, he tends to them for thirty days. From that point forward, one assesses their value, sells them, and places the money aside for the owner. If one finds geese and roosters and anything that costs more to tend to than the revenue generated by it, he tends to them for three days. From that point forward, one assesses their value, sells them, and places the money aside for the owner. The Gemara asks: It is difficult, as there is a contradiction between the ruling in the first baraita that the finder keeps calves and foals for three months and the ruling in the second baraita that the finder keeps calves and foals for thirty days; and there is another contradiction between the ruling in the first baraita that the finder keeps geese and roosters for thirty days, and the ruling in the second baraita that the finder keeps geese and roosters for three days. The Gemara answers: The contradiction between the ruling in the first baraita with regard to calves and foals and the ruling in the second baraita with regard to calves and foals is not difficult. This ruling in the first baraita that the finder keeps them for three months is referring to calves and foals that graze in the pasture, and that ruling in the second baraita that the finder keeps them for thirty days is referring to calves and foals that need to be fattened and therefore require greater exertion on the part of the one who finds them. The contradiction between the ruling in the first baraita with regard to geese and roosters and the ruling in the second baraita with regard to geese and roosters is also not difficult. This ruling in the first baraita that the finder keeps them for thirty days is referring to large geese and roosters, which do not require great exertion, and that ruling in the second baraita that the finder keeps them for three days is referring to small geese and roosters, which require great exertion. The mishna teaches: And any living being that does not work but it does eat shall be sold. The Sages taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And you shall return it to him” (Deuteronomy 22:2), indicating that the finder must see how best to return it to him, meaning that one shall not feed the value of a calf to the lost calves that he is tending, nor the value of a foal to the lost foals that he is tending, nor the value of a goose to the geese that he is tending, nor the value of a rooster to the roosters that he is tending. Were the finder to do so, ultimately, the owner would receive nothing. § The mishna teaches: What shall be done with the money received from the sale of the animal? Rabbi Tarfon says: The finder may use it; therefore, if the money is lost, he is liable to pay restitution for its loss. Rabbi Akiva says: He may not use the money. Therefore, if it is lost, he is not liable to pay restitution. The Gemara analyzes the tannaitic dispute: Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree
אלא כשנשתמש בהן אבל לא נשתמש בהן אם אבדו פטור לימא תיהוי תיובתא דרב יוסף דאתמר שומר אבידה רבה אמר כש"ח רב יוסף אמר כש"ש אמר לך רב יוסף בגניבה ואבידה דכ"ע לא פליגי דחייב כי פליגי באונסין דשואל ר"ט סבר שרו ליה רבנן לאשתמושי בגוייהו והוה ליה שואל עלייהו ור"ע סבר לא שרו ליה רבנן לאשתמושי בגוייהו הלכך לא הוי שואל עלייהו א"ה לפיכך דאמר ר"ע למה לי א"א בשלמא בגניבה ואבידה הוא דפליגי היינו דקתני ר"ע אומר לא ישתמש בהן לפיכך אם אבדו אינו חייב באחריותן ס"ד אמינא שומר שכר הוי כדרב יוסף ובגניבה ואבידה מחייב קא משמע לן לפיכך השתא דאמרת לא ישתמש בהן שומר שכר לא הוי ולא מחייב בגניבה ואבידה אלא אי אמרת בגניבה ואבידה דכולי עלמא לא פליגי דחייב כי פליגי באונסין דשואל מאי לפיכך דרבי עקיבא הכי מבעי ליה למתנא ר"ע אומר לא ישתמש בהן ואנא ידענא דכיון דלא ישתמש בהן לאו שואל הוי ואינו חייב באחריותן לפיכך דרבי עקיבא למה לי משום לפיכך דרבי טרפון ולפיכך דרבי טרפון למה לי הכי קאמר כיון דשרו ליה רבנן לאשתמושי בגוייהו כמאן דאישתמש בגוייהו דמי וחייב באחריותן והא אבדו קתני
only in a case where the finder used the money. But in a case where the finder did not use the money, everyone agrees that if the money is lost, the finder is exempt from paying restitution for its loss. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this shall be a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rav Yosef, as it was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to the legal status of a bailee charged with safeguarding a lost item. Rabba said: His legal status is like that of an unpaid bailee, who is liable to compensate the owner of the deposited item only in cases of negligence. Rav Yosef said: His legal status is like that of a paid bailee, who is liable to compensate the owner of the deposited item even in cases of theft or loss. When the mishna teaches that if the finder did not use the money everyone agrees that he is exempt from paying restitution for its loss, it apparently contradicts the statement of Rav Yosef. The Gemara answers that Rav Yosef could have said to you: In cases of theft or loss, everyone agrees that a bailee charged with safeguarding a lost item is liable to pay restitution for it. When they disagree is in a case of damage caused by circumstances beyond his control, for which it is the obligation of a borrower to pay compensation. The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Tarfon holds: The Sages permitted him to use the money, and he is therefore a borrower with regard to it, and is liable to compensate the owner even in the event of circumstances beyond his control. And Rabbi Akiva holds: The Sages did not permit him to use the money, and he is therefore not a borrower with regard to it. The Gemara asks: If so, why do I need the statement that Rabbi Akiva said: He may not use the money; therefore, if it is lost, he is not liable to pay restitution for it? Granted, if you say that it is in cases of theft or loss that they disagree, I understand that is the reason that the tanna teaches in the mishna that Rabbi Akiva says: He may not use the money; therefore, if it is lost, he is not liable to pay restitution for it. The Gemara explains: Since it enters your mind to say that the legal status of the finder is like that of a paid bailee, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef, and that in cases of theft and loss the finder is liable to pay restitution, Rabbi Akiva teaches us: Therefore, if it is lost, he is not liable to pay restitution. Now that you said that he may not use the money, he is not a paid bailee and is not liable to pay restitution in cases of theft and loss. But if you say that in cases of theft or loss, everyone agrees that a bailee charged with safeguarding a lost item is liable to pay restitution for it, and when they disagree it is in cases of damage caused by circumstances beyond his control for which it is the obligation of a borrower to pay compensation, what is the meaning of the statement of Rabbi Akiva: Therefore, if it is lost, he is not liable to pay restitution for it? Rather, this is what the mishna should have taught: Rabbi Akiva says: He may not use the money; and I would know that since he may not use the money, he is not considered a borrower, and consequently bears no financial responsibility. Why do I need the statement that Rabbi Akiva said: Therefore, if it is lost, he is not liable to pay restitution for it? The Gemara answers: The explanation appended to the statement of Rabbi Akiva is indeed extraneous. It was added in order to create a parallel between the formulation of the statement of Rabbi Akiva and the formulation of the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. The phrase: Therefore, if the money is lost, he is not liable to pay restitution for it, was appended to the statement of Rabbi Akiva due to the explanation: Therefore, if the money is lost, he is liable to pay restitution for it, stated by Rabbi Tarfon. The Gemara asks: And why do I need the statement that Rabbi Tarfon said: Therefore, if the money is lost, he is liable to pay restitution for it? The Gemara answers: This is what the mishna is saying: Since the Sages permitted him to use the money, his legal status is like that of one who actually used it and therefore, he is liable to pay restitution for it. The Gemara asks: How can Rav Yosef explain that the dispute in the mishna is with regard to damage caused by circumstances beyond his control? But doesn’t the mishna teach: Therefore, if the money is lost? The disagreement between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva is with regard to a case of damage due to loss, and not with regard to a case of damage caused by circumstances beyond one’s control.
כדרבה דאמר רבה נגנבו בלסטים מזויין אבדו שטבעה ספינתו בים אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כר' טרפון ביד רחבה הוה ליה הנהו זוזי דיתמי אתא לקמיה דרב יוסף אמר ליה מהו לאשתמושי בגוייהו א"ל הכי אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כר' טרפון א"ל אביי ולאו אתמר עלה א"ר חלבו אמר רב הונא לא שנו אלא בדמי אבידה הואיל וטרח בה אבל מעות אבידה דלא טרח בהו לא והני כמעות אבידה דמו א"ל זיל לא שבקו לי דאשרי לך: מתני׳ מצא ספרים קורא בהן אחד לשלשים יום ואם אינו יודע לקרות גוללן אבל לא ילמוד בהן בתחלה ולא יקרא אחר עמו מצא כסות מנערה אחד לשלשים יום ושוטחה לצרכה אבל לא לכבודו כלי כסף וכלי נחושת משתמש בהן לצרכן אבל לא לשחקן כלי זהב וכלי זכוכית לא יגע בהן עד שיבא אליהו מצא שק או קופה וכל דבר שאין דרכו ליטול הרי זה לא יטול: גמ׳ אמר שמואל המוצא תפילין בשוק שם דמיהן ומניחן לאלתר מתיב רבינא מצא ספרים קורא בהן אחד לשלשים יום ואם אינו יודע לקרות גוללן גוללן אין שם דמיהן ומניחן לא אמר אביי תפילין בי בר חבו משכח שכיחי ספרים לא שכיחי ת"ר השואל ספר תורה מחבירו הרי זה לא ישאילנו לאחר פותחו וקורא בו ובלבד שלא ילמוד בו בתחלה ולא יקרא אחר עמו וכן המפקיד ס"ת אצל חבירו גוללו כל שנים עשר חדש פותחו וקורא בו אם בשבילו פתחו אסור סומכוס אומר בחדש שלשים יום בישן שנים עשר חדש ר"א בן יעקב אומר אחד זה ואחד זה שנים עשר חדש: אמר מר השואל ספר תורה מחבירו הרי זה לא ישאילנו לאחר מאי אריא ס"ת אפי' כל מילי נמי דאמר ר"ש בן לקיש כאן שנה רבי אין השואל רשאי להשאיל ואין השוכר רשאי להשכיר ס"ת איצטריכא ליה מהו דתימא ניחא ליה לאיניש דתיעביד מצוה בממוניה קמ"ל פותחו וקורא בו פשיטא ואלא למאי שייליה מיניה סיפא איצטריכא ליה ובלבד שלא ילמוד בו בתחלה וכן המפקיד ס"ת אצל חבירו גוללו כל שנים עשר חדש פותחו וקורא בו מאי עבידתיה גביה ותו אם בשבילו פתחו אסור הא אמרת פותחו וקורא בו הכי קאמר אם כשהוא גוללו פותחו וקורא בו מותר אם בשבילו פתחו אסור סומכוס אומר בחדש שלשים יום בישן שנים עשר חדש ר"א בן יעקב אומר אחד זה ואחד זה שנים עשר חדש ר"א בן יעקב היינו תנא קמא אלא אימא ר' אליעזר בן יעקב אומר אחד זה ואחד זה שלשים יום: אבל לא ילמוד בו בתחלה ולא יקרא אחר עמו: ורמינהו לא יקרא פרשה וישנה ולא יקרא בו פרשה ויתרגם ולא יפתח בו יותר מג' דפין ולא יקראו בו שלשה בני אדם בכרך אחד הא שנים קורין אמר אביי לא קשיא כאן בענין אחד כאן בשני ענינים: מצא כסות מנערה אחד לשלשים יום: למימרא דניעור מעלי לה והאמר רבי יוחנן מי שיש לו גרדי אומן בתוך ביתו ינער כסותו בכל יום אמרי בכל יום קשי לה אחד לשלשים יום מעלי לה איבעית אימא לא קשיא הא בחד והא בתרי איבעית אימא לא קשיא הא בידא והא בחוטרא איבעית אימא לא קשיא הא בדעמרא הא בדכיתנא א"ר יוחנן כסא דחרשין ולא כסא דפושרין ולא אמרן אלא בכלי מתכות אבל בכלי חרש לית לן בה ובכלי מתכות נמי לא אמרן אלא דלא צויץ אבל דצויץ לית לן בה ולא אמרן אלא דלא שדא ביה ציביא אבל שדא ביה ציביא לית לן בה: וא"ר יוחנן מי שהניח לו אביו מעות הרבה ורוצה לאבדן ילבש בגדי פשתן וישתמש בכלי זכוכית וישכור פועלים ואל ישב עמהן ילבש בכלי פשתן בכתנא רומיתא וישתמש בכלי זכוכית בזוגיתא חיורתא וישכור פועלים ואל ישב עמהן תרגומא
The Gemara answers that the statement in the mishna: Therefore, if the money is lost, he is liable to pay restitution for it, can be explained in accordance with the statement of Rabba, as Rabba says concerning another mishna (58a): When the tanna says that they were stolen, the reference is to a case where the item was stolen by armed bandits; when he says that they were lost, the reference is to a case where the agent’s ship sank at sea. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, who said that it is permitted for the finder to use the money. The Gemara relates: There were these dinars that belonged to orphans that were in the possession of Raḥava. Raḥava came before Rav Yosef and said to him: What is the halakha; is it permitted for me to use these dinars? Rav Yosef said to him: This is what Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Tarfon. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Wasn’t it stated concerning this halakha that Rabbi Ḥelbo says that Rav Huna says: The Sages taught this halakha, that it is permitted to use the money, only in a case of money received from the sale of a lost item that one found and that is no longer financially viable for one to tend to it. This is permitted, since he exerted himself and tended to it. But in the case of lost coins, where he did not exert himself in order to tend to them, it is not permitted for him to use them. And the case of these dinars in Raḥava’s possession is similar to a case of lost coins. Rav Yosef accepted Abaye’s objection and said to Raḥava: Go; as they did not allow me to permit the use of the dinars for you. MISHNA: If one found scrolls, he reads them once in thirty days in order to ventilate them and prevent mold. And if he does not know how to read, he rolls and unrolls them in order to ventilate them. But he shall not study passages in them for the first time, as he would leave the scroll exposed to the air for a lengthy period, thereby causing damage. And another person shall not read the scroll with him, as each might pull it closer to improve his vantage point, which could cause the scroll to tear. If one found a garment, he shakes it once in thirty days, and he spreads it out for its sake, to ventilate it, but he may not use it as a decoration for his own prestige. If one found silver vessels or copper vessels, he may use them for their own sake to prevent tarnish and rust, but he may not use them to the extent that he will erode them. If he finds gold vessels or glass vessels, which are not ruined by neglect, he may not touch them until Elijah will come and identify the owner. If a person found a sack or a basket or any other item that it is not his typical manner to take and carry because it is beneath his dignity, he shall not take it, as one need not demean himself in order to return a lost item. GEMARA: Shmuel says: One who finds phylacteries in the marketplace and is in need of phylacteries assesses their value and immediately places the money aside for the owner. Ravina raises an objection from the mishna: If one found scrolls, he reads them once in thirty days; and if he does not know how to read, he rolls and unrolls them. Ravina infers: To roll and unroll them, yes, he may do so, but assess their value and place the money aside, no, he may not. Abaye said: There is a difference between phylacteries and scrolls. Phylacteries are available at the house of bar Ḥavu, where they are produced in large quantities, but scrolls are not available, as Torah scrolls are not easily obtained. § The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of one who borrows a Torah scroll from another, that person may not lend it to another, i.e., a third person. He may open it and read it, provided that he does not study passages in it for the first time, lest the scroll be exposed for a lengthy period of time and sustain damage. And another person shall not read the scroll with him, lest the scroll tear. And likewise, in the case of one who deposits a Torah scroll with another, the bailee rolls it every twelve months, and he may open it and read it. If it is for himself that he opened it, it is prohibited. Sumakhos says: In the case of a new Torah scroll, one rolls it every thirty days because the ink is not yet dry and must be more frequently ventilated. By contrast, in the case of an old Torah scroll, one rolls it every twelve months. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: In the case of both this new Torah scroll, and the case of that old Torah scroll, one rolls it every twelve months. The Gemara analyzes the baraita: The Master said: In the case of one who borrows a Torah scroll from another, that person may not lend it to another, i.e., a third person. The Gemara asks: Why did the tanna teach this halakha specifically with regard to a Torah scroll? This is the halakha with regard to any item as well, as Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Here in a mishna (Gittin 29a), Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi taught: A borrower is not allowed to lend the item that he borrowed to someone else, and a renter is not allowed to rent out the item that he rented to someone else. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the tanna to mention the halakha specifically with regard to a Torah scroll, lest you say that a person is amenable to having a mitzva performed with his property and would consequently not mind if his Torah scroll was lent to another. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that the borrower may not lend even a Torah scroll. The baraita continues: He may open it and read it. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? And rather, for what purpose did he borrow the Torah scroll from him, if not to read it? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach the last clause: Provided that he does not study passages in it for the first time. The baraita continues: And likewise, in the case of one who deposits a Torah scroll with another, the bailee rolls it every twelve months, and he may open it and read it. The Gemara asks: What is the bailee doing with it? As a paid bailee, he has no right to read it. And furthermore, whereas the tanna teaches: If it is for himself that he opened it, it is prohibited, didn’t you say in the previous passage: He may open it and read it? The Gemara answers: This is what the tanna is saying: If, when he is rolling the Torah scroll to ventilate it, he opens it and reads it, it is permitted. If it is for himself that he opened it, it is prohibited. The baraita continues: Sumakhos says: In the case of a new Torah scroll, one rolls it every thirty days because the ink is not yet dry and must be more frequently ventilated. By contrast, in the case of an old Torah scroll, one rolls it every twelve months. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: In both the case of this new Torah scroll and the case of that old Torah scroll, one rolls it every twelve months. The Gemara asks: What is the dispute here; it appears that the statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov is identical to the statement of the first tanna, who stated without qualification that one rolls a Torah scroll every twelve months. The Gemara answers: Rather say that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Both In the case of this new Torah scroll and the case of that old Torah scroll, one rolls it every thirty days. § The Gemara resumes its analysis of the mishna, which teaches with regard to borrowed scrolls: But he shall not study passages in them for the first time and another person shall not read the scroll with him. The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita (Tosefta 2:31): If one borrows a scroll, he shall not read a passage and review it, and he shall not read a passage in it and translate the passage, and he shall not open it more than three columns at a time, and three people shall not read in it together from one volume. The Gemara infers: But two people may read it together, contrary to the ruling in the mishna. Abaye said: It is not difficult. Here, where it is inferred from the baraita that two may read one scroll together, it is referring to a case where they are reading one matter and each is aware of the progress of the other. There, in the mishna, where the ruling is that two may not read one scroll together, it is referring to a case where they are reading two different matters, as each is oblivious to the progress of the other and may pull the scroll closer to improve his vantage point. § The mishna teaches: If one found a garment, he shakes it once in thirty days. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that shaking a garment is beneficial for it? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: Only one who has access to a skilled weaver [gardi] in his house may shake his garment every day, as the weaver can replace the damaged garments with new ones. The Sages say: Shaking a garment every day is harmful to it, but shaking it once in thirty days is beneficial for it. If you wish, say instead: It is not difficult. In this mishna, where the ruling is that shaking a garment is beneficial, the reference is to a case where one person shakes the garment. And that statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who rules that shaking the garment causes damage, is referring to a case where two people shake the garment. If you wish, say instead: It is not difficult. In this mishna, where the ruling is that shaking a garment is beneficial, the reference is to a case where one shakes the garment by hand. And that statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who rules that shaking the garment causes damage, is referring to a case where one shakes the garment with a stick. If you wish, say instead: It is not difficult. In this mishna, where the ruling is that shaking a garment is beneficial, the reference is to a case where one shakes a garment made of wool. And that statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who rules that shaking the garment causes damage, is referring to a case where one shakes a garment made of linen. The Gemara cites additional statements by Rabbi Yoḥanan providing practical advice. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: It is preferable to drink from a cup of witches and not to drink from a cup of lukewarm water, which is extremely unhealthy. Rabbi Yoḥanan qualifies his statement: We said this only with regard to lukewarm water in metal vessels, but in earthenware vessels we have no problem with it. And even in metal vessels, we said this only in a case where the water had not been boiled, but if the water had been boiled we have no problem with it. And we said that lukewarm water is unhealthy only in a case where one did not cast flavorings into the water, but if he cast flavorings into the water we have no problem with it. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of one whose father be-queathed him a great deal of money and he seeks to lose it, he should wear linen garments, and should use glass vessels, and should hire laborers and not sit with them to supervise. The Gemara elaborates: He should wear linen garments; this is stated with regard to Roman linen, which becomes tattered quickly. He should use glass vessels; this is stated with regard to expensive white glass. And he should hire laborers and not sit with them; the explanation is