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ShareNow Korah, son of Izhar son of Kohath son of Levi, betook himself, along with Dathan and Abiram sons of Eliab, and On son of Peleth—descendants of Reuben— to rise up against Moses, together with two hundred and fifty Israelites, chieftains of the community, chosen in the assembly, men of repute. They combined against Moses and Aaron and said to them, “You have gone too far! For all the community are holy, all of them, and the LORD is in their midst. Why then do you raise yourselves above the LORD’s congregation?”
(יז) כָּל מַחֲלוֹקֶת שֶׁהִיא לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם, סוֹפָהּ לְהִתְקַיֵּם. וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם, אֵין סוֹפָהּ לְהִתְקַיֵּם. אֵיזוֹ הִיא מַחֲלוֹקֶת שֶׁהִיא לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם, זוֹ מַחֲלוֹקֶת הִלֵּל וְשַׁמַּאי. וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ לְשֵׁם שָׁמַיִם, זוֹ מַחֲלוֹקֶת קֹרַח וְכָל עֲדָתוֹ:
(17) Every argument that is [for the sake of] heaven's name, it is destined to endure. But if it is not [for the sake of] heaven's name -- it is not destined to endure. What [is an example of an argument for the sake of] heaven's name? The argument of Hillel and Shammai. What [is an example of an argument not for the sake of] heaven's name? The argument of Korach and all of his followers.
- What do you think the Mishnah means by the phrase: סוֹפָהּ לְהִתְקַיֵּם?
- Why would that be?
- How does the text seem to regard this situation?
קרח כו'. לא הזכיר צד השני שהם משה ואהרן כמו שזכר בחלוקה ראשונה ב' הצדדים. לפי שבכאן אינם שווים שמשה ואהרן כוונתם לשמים היתה. ולא היתה בהם שום בחינה שלא לשם שמים. מד''ש:
Korach, etc. : It did not mention the second side [that opposed Korach], which are Moshe and Aharon, like it mentioned two sides in the first disagreement. This is because they [the two disagreements] are not equal—for Moshe and Aharon, their intention was for heaven. And they did not have any aspect within them that was not for the sake of heaven. [Their intentions were] for the sake of peace.
(א) כל מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים סופה להתקיים כלומר שאנשי המחלוקת ההיא מתקיימים ואינם אובדין, כמחלוקת הלל ושמאי שלא אבדו לא תלמידי בית שמאי ולא תלמידי בית הלל. אבל קורח ועדתו אבדו.
ואני שמעתי, פירוש סופה, תכליתה המבוקש מענינה. והמחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים, התכלית והסוף המבוקש מאותה מחלוקת להשיג האמת, וזה מתקיים, כמו שאמרו מתוך הויכוח יתברר האמת, וכמו שנתבאר במחלוקת הלל ושמאי שהלכה כבית הלל. ומחלוקת שאינה לשם שמים, תכלית הנרצה בה היא בקשת השררה ואהבת הניצוח, וזה הסוף אינו מתקיים, כמו שמצינו במחלוקת קורח ועדתו שתכלית וסוף כוונתם היתה בקשת הכבוד והשררה והיו להיפך:
(1) "Every controversy that is in the name of Heaven, the end thereof will endure." That is to say that the people of controversy are destined to endure and not be destroyed, as with the dispute between Hillel and Shammai that were not destroyed. Neither they nor the students of Hillel and Shammai. But Korach and his band perished.
And I heard the explanation of “the end,” –'its purpose and desired outcome.' The controversy which is in for the sake of Heaven, the purpose and aim is to arrive the truth, and this continues to endure, as they said that 'from a disagreement the truth will be revealed,' as was revealed in the disputes between Hillel and Shammai - that the law was like the school of Hillel. And a controversy which is not for the sake of Heaven, its purpose is to achieve power and the love of victory, and its end will not endure, as we find in the dispute of Korach and his band, whose aim and end-goal was a lust for honor and power--and their end was the opposite.
ויקרא אלקים לרקיע שמים. לא רצה ה' שיקרא בשם רקיע כי שם זה מורה על הפירוד והמחלוקת מלשון וירקעו פחי הזהב לרוקע הארץ. כי כל רקיע הוא מסך מבדיל בין שני דברים, ומטעם זה לא נאמר כי טוב בשני לפי שבו נברא המחלוקת, כי אין טובה כי אם במקום מציאת האחדות, ולכך נאמר בשלישי שתי פעמים כי טוב אחת למלאכת יום שלישי ואחת לגמר מלאכת המים שיש בו צד אחדות שנאמר יקוו המים אל מקום אחד ובעבור אחדות זה הזכיר כי טוב, אבל ביום ב' אשר ממנו יוצא כל שינוי והוא התחלה לכל שינוי ומחלוקת לא נאמר בו כי טוב ולא רצה ה' שיקרא בשם רקיע המורה על מסך מבדיל ובין אחים יפריד, ונקרא בשם שמים המורה על השלום כי שמים נגזר מלשון אש מים שעשו שלום ביניהם ונתחברו ונעשה מהם שמים והיינו שאמרו רז"ל (אבות ה.יז) כל מחלוקת שהיא לשם שמים כו' ר"ל מחלוקת שתכליתו השלום כהוראת שם שמים וק"ל. ולפי פשוטו לא נאמר כי טוב בשני לפי שלא היה בו בריאה חדשה כי הרקיע כבר נברא ביום ראשון וטעם לדבר לפי שיום שני התחלה לכל שינוי ופירוד על כן לא רצה הקב"ה להטביע טבע השינוי בשום נברא.
And God called the firmament, heaven: God did not want that it should be called with the name, firmament - [rakiya] since that name indicates division and disagreement, as per (Exodus 39:3), "And they flattened (yiraka'au) the gold [into thin plates]" - for that which was to cover the earth. Since any [rakiya] is a covering that separates between two things. And for this reason, it does not state, "that it was good" on the second day, since disagreement was created on it; since there is no good except in a place where we find unity. And therefore on the third day, "that it was good" is stated twice, once for the work of third day and once for the finishing of the water, that has an aspect of unity in it, as it is stated, "let the waters gather to one place," and because of this unity, "that it was good" is mentioned. But on the second day - from which comes out all differences, and which is the beginning of all difference and disagreement - "that it was good" was not said about it. And God did not want that [the sky] should be called firmament, which indicates a cover that separates and divides between brothers; and it was called with the name, heavens [shamayim], which indicates peace, since shamayim is composed of the words, fire [esh] and water [mayim], who made peace between between themselves and joined together, and from them was created skies. And this is what the Rabbis, of blessed memory, state (Avot 5:17), "Any disagreement that is for the sake of the heavens [shamayim], etc.;" which means to say that a disagreement whose purpose is peace, as is the teaching of the name, shamayim; and [this is] easy to understand. And according to its simple meaning, "that it was good" was not stated on the second day, since there was no new creation on it, since the firmament was already created on the first day, and the reason for [no creations happening on the second day] is because the second day is the beginning of all difference and division; hence the Holy One, blessed be He, did not want to implant a nature of difference in any creation.
א"ר אבא אמר שמואל שלש שנים נחלקו ב"ש וב"ה הללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו והללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו יצאה בת קול ואמרה אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים הן והלכה כב"ה וכי מאחר שאלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים מפני מה זכו ב"ה לקבוע הלכה כמותן מפני שנוחין ועלובין היו ושונין דבריהן ודברי ב"ש ולא עוד אלא שמקדימין דברי ב"ש לדבריהן.
Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel: For three years, the House of Hillel and the House of Shammai argued. One said, 'The halakha is like us,' and the other said, 'The halakha is like us.' A heavenly voice spoke: ;These and these are the words of the living God, and the halakha is like the House of Hillel.' A question was raised: Since the heavenly voice declared: "Both these and those are the words of the Living God," why was the halacha established to follow the opinion of Hillel? It is because the students of Hillel were kind and gracious. They taught their own ideas as well as the ideas from the students of Shammai. Not only for this reason, but they went so far as to teach Shammai's opinions first.
- What does it mean for both to be “words of the living God”?
- If so, why is halakha decided like one of them?
- What is gained by deciding the halakha is like one of them? What is lost?
(נג) שפלוני יהיה חזן - ...היום שידוע שבעו"ה הרבה מחזיקין במחלוקת בלי טעם וריח וכונתם שלא לש"ש אם היו צריכין לשאול לכל יחיד ויחיד בענין המינויים בין לענין מינוי הש"ץ או מרביץ תורה ואב"ד בעיר וכל כה"ג לא היו מסכימים לעולם.
ע"כ הולכין אחר רוב פורעי המס ואפילו פסולי קורבי ביניהם [מ"א] ועכשיו המנהג שהולכין אחר ז' טובי העיר או אחר הנבררים מן הקהל ע"ז כל מקום ומקום לפי מנהגו [פמ"ג] והכל שלא ירבו המחלוקת...:
(53) That So-and-so should be chazan - ...Today, when it is known that, in our great sinfulness, many [among us] perpetuate disputes without any reason, and their intention is not for the sake of heaven, if we had to ask each and every individual regarding the matter of appointments, either of appointing the prayer leader or teacher or judge, etc., consensus would never be reached.
Therefore, we follow the majority of tax payers, even if there are invalid relatives among them. And now, that the custom is to follow the seven benefactors [?] of the city, or after those distilled/chosen by the community -- all follows the local custom, so that disputes do not multiply...
The Korah model of controversy is contrasted with the debates between Hillel and Shammai. Those disputes were for the sake of Heaven. Neither Hillel nor Shammai was seeking personal power or glory. Each was presenting his interpretation of the Torah and his application of Halakha. Each had cogent arguments to support his view. Although they disagreed strongly on various issues, they were not opponents out to destroy each other but were colleagues in search of truth. The Talmud reflects this idea when it states that both of their views "were the words of the living God." In such debates, a ruling must be reached so that people will know what the law requires. Yet, the "losing" side has not really lost. His opinion is still quoted and taken seriously. While it did not prevail then, it might prevail at another time or in another context. Hillel and Shammai ultimately were on the same side - on the side of truth, on the side of Heaven. Their controversies reflected honest and well-reasoned differences of opinion. What they shared in common far outweighed their relatively few differences of opinion.
Some present-day disputes are clearly in the category of Korah controversies. People fight for power, seek to destroy their opponents, give vent to their egotistical ambitions in cruel and ruthless ways. These controversies are resolved through power struggles. The stronger side will win; the weaker side will be wiped out or forced to surrender. Other contemporary controversies are more akin to those of Hillel and Shammai. As long as the disputants realize they are ultimately on the same side, these controversies can be healthy aspects of our intellectual and cultural lives. We can weigh both sides calmly and reasonably. We can disagree on various points of theology or philosophy and still remain respectful and friendly to each other. [...]
In his essay "The Pursuit of the Ideal" Sir Isaiah Berlin addressed the question of how to deal with theological and philosophical disagreements. Berlin favored what he called "pluralism," an acceptance that different people might come to legitimate differences of opinion without seeing each other as mortal enemies or opponents. In his view, pluralism is "the conception that there are many different ends that men may seek and still be fully rational, fully men, capable of understanding each other and sympathizing and deriving light from each other" (The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, Farrar Straus and Giroux, New York, 1997, p.9). In other words, I may be convinced that I have the real truth, but I may still see that others — who do not share my understanding of truth — are good, sincere, and thoughtful people trying to do their best. I can learn from them, respect them, and be friendly with them. We are disputants — not enemies.
In distinguishing between the Korah-type controversies and the Hillel-Shammai-type controversies, this mishna provides insight on the nature of human conflict. By juxtaposing them, it may be alluding to the thin line between these two types of controversies. Power struggles can dress themselves up as religious debates; theological and philosophical disputes can be mere camouflage for egotistical and unsavory oppression of opponents.
Truth on earth is not, nor can be, the whole truth. It is limited, not comprehensive; particular, not universal. When two propositions conflict it is not necessarily because one is true the other false. It may be, and often is, that each represents a different perspective on reality, an alternative way of structuring order, no more and no less commensurable than a Shakespeare sonnet, a Michelangelo painting or a Schubert sonata. In heaven there is truth; on earth there are truths. Therefore, each culture
has something to contribute. Each person knows something no one else does. The sages said: 'Who is wise? One who learns from all men- 'The wisest is not one who knows himself wiser than others: he is one who knows all men have some share of the truth,
and is willing to learn from them, for none of us knows all the truth and each of us knows some of it.
Of all the rituals relevant to democracy, sacrifice is preeminent. No democratic citizen, adult or child, escapes the necessity of losing out at some point in a public decision. “It is our fate as human beings,” [Ralph] Ellison writes, “always to give up some good things for other good things, to throw off certain bad circumstances only to create others.” But sacrifice is a special sort of problem in a democracy. Democracies are supposed to rest on consent and open access to happiness for their citizens. In the dreamscape of democracy, for instance a la Rousseau, every citizen consents to every policy with glad enthusiasm. No one ever leaves the public arena at odds with the communal choice; no one must accept political loss or suffer the imposition of laws to which she has not consented. But that is a dream. An honest account of collective democratic action must begin by acknowledging that communal decisions inevitably benefit some citizens at the expense of others, even when the whole community generally benefits. Since democracy claims to secure the good of all citizens, those people who benefit less than others from particular political decisions, but nonetheless accede to those decisions, preserve the stability of political institutions. Their sacrifice makes collective democratic action possible. Democracy is not a static end state that achieves the common good by assuring the same benefits or the same level of benefits to everyone, but rather a political practice by which the diverse negative effects of collective political action, and even of just decisions, can be distributed equally, and constantly redistributed over time, on the basis of consensual interactions. The hard truth of democracy is that some citizens are always giving things up for others. Only vigorous forms of citizenship an give a polity the resources to deal with the inevitable problem of sacrifice. (28-29)
