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ShareRabbi Danny Nevins - all comments below from his T'shuvah on Electricity on Shabbos
These associations imply that there is something creative about melakhah—it is the language of creation for both God and for people. In desisting from creative labor on Shabbat, even the labor of tabernacle construction, the Israelite identifies with both the active and the resting states of God. The type of creativity discussed here is one in which material reality is transformed, rather than the .)He ceased from work and was refreshed (Ex. 31:17 ,שבת וינפש ,creativity of song, speech and other expressions of emotion and ideas. In fact, the cessation of physical creativity functions as a catalyst for spiritual creativity on Shabbat, as it says of God.
(ב) אֲבוֹת מְלָאכוֹת אַרְבָּעִים חָסֵר אֶחָת. הַזּוֹרֵעַ. וְהַחוֹרֵשׁ. וְהַקּוֹצֵר. וְהַמְעַמֵּר. הַדָּשׁ. וְהַזּוֹרֶה. הַבּוֹרֵר. הַטּוֹחֵן. וְהַמְרַקֵּד. וְהַלָּשׁ. וְהָאוֹפֶה. הַגּוֹזֵז אֶת הַצֶּמֶר. הַמְלַבְּנוֹ. וְהַמְנַפְּצוֹ. וְהַצּוֹבְעוֹ. וְהַטּוֹוֶה. וְהַמֵּסֵךְ. וְהָעוֹשֶׂה שְׁנֵי בָתֵּי נִירִין. וְהָאוֹרֵג שְׁנֵי חוּטִין. וְהַפּוֹצֵעַ שְׁנֵי חוּטִין. הַקּוֹשֵׁר. וְהַמַּתִּיר. וְהַתּוֹפֵר שְׁתֵּי תְפִירוֹת. הַקּוֹרֵעַ עַל מְנָת לִתְפֹּר שְׁתֵּי תְפִירוֹת. הַצָּד צְבִי. הַשּׁוֹחֲטוֹ. וְהַמַּפְשִׁיטוֹ. הַמּוֹלְחוֹ, וְהַמְעַבֵּד אֶת עוֹרוֹ. וְהַמּוֹחֲקוֹ. וְהַמְחַתְּכוֹ. הַכּוֹתֵב שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת. וְהַמּוֹחֵק עַל מְנָת לִכְתֹּב שְׁתֵּי אוֹתִיּוֹת. הַבּוֹנֶה. וְהַסּוֹתֵר. הַמְכַבֶּה. וְהַמַּבְעִיר. הַמַּכֶּה בַפַּטִּישׁ. הַמּוֹצִיא מֵרְשׁוּת לִרְשׁוּת. הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲבוֹת מְלָאכוֹת אַרְבָּעִים חָסֵר אֶחָת:
(2) This fundamental mishna enumerates those who perform the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat, which number forty-less-one. They are grouped in accordance with their function: One who sows, and one who plows, and one who reaps, and one who gathers sheaves into a pile, and one who threshes, removing the kernel from the husk, and one who winnows threshed grain in the wind, and one who selects the inedible waste from the edible, and one who grinds, and one who sifts the flour in a sieve, and one who kneads dough, and one who bakes. Additional primary categories of prohibited labor are the following: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, and one who combs the fleece and straightens it, and one who dyes it, and one who spins the wool, and one who stretches the threads of the warp in the loom, and one who constructs two meshes, tying the threads of the warp to the base of the loom, and one who weaves two threads, and one who severs two threads for constructive purposes, and one who ties a knot, and one who unties a knot, and one who sews two stitches with a needle, as well as one who tears a fabric in order to sew two stitches. One who traps a deer, or any living creature, and one who slaughters it, and one who flays it, and one who salts its hide, a step in the tanning process, and one who tans its hide, and one who smooths it, removing hairs and veins, and one who cuts it into measured parts. One who writes two letters and one who erases in order to write two letters. One who builds a structure, and one who dismantles it, one who extinguishes a fire, and one who kindles a fire. One who strikes a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), and one who carries out an object from domain to domain. All these are primary categories of labor, and they number forty-less-one.
R' Nevins -
This list may be broken into five functions. #1‐11: the production of bread; #12‐24: the production of clothing; #25‐33: hunting and preparing hides as parchment for writing; #34‐38: the construction of tools and shelter; and #39: the transportation of goods. We may summarize the list by stating that the rabbinic understanding of melakhah regards the transformation of material reality to serve the needs of civilized people for food, clothing, writing, shelter and tools.
Labors which leave no durable impact on the material environment are not considered to be forbidden as melakhah. As Mishnah Shabbat 12:1 declares, הכלל כל העושה מלאכה ומלאכתו מתקיימת בשבת חייב זה, "this is the rule: anyone who performs work and his work is stable (or endures) on the Sabbath 49 is culpable.” This general principle is stated in a Mishnah which functions as a header to the second half of the tractate and its discussion of the first 38 labors.
Rabbi Hanina bar Hama asserts that the Mishnah’s list is in accord with the tabernacle labors; other theories indicate that the Torah supplied the quantity but not the identity of the labors. One view claims 39 as the number of references to the word melakhah (in three forms) in the entire Torah; at B. Shabbat 49b the rabbis struggle to identify which instances should be included on the list. Elsewhere in the Bavli 54 and in the Yerushalmi, 55 the rabbis derive the number 39 from plays on the gematria (numerical value) of the words אלה הדברים in Exodus 35:1.
Derivative Shabbat prohibitions are said to resemble the primary categories in their physical function, purpose or result. 67 One example of a toledah is watering plants; this is forbidden as a derivative of the primary category of זורע (sowing seeds) . Both activities have the purpose of making a plant grow in the soil, but the mechanisms are physically distinct. Thus watering is not banned as a form of sowing, but rather is a derivative labor sharing the same goal of causing plants to grow.
If the physical mechanism, פעולה, is different from that of the primary prohibition, but the purpose and the result, תכלית , .are identical, then an activity is considered forbidden as a toledah or derivative of the primary category. If the mechanism, purpose and result are different, then the activity under consideration would not be forbidden as melakhah, though it might still be inconsistent with the command to rest on Shabbat.
Hebrew Bible, the significance of this claim is unclear. In the Bavli (Hagigah 10b), the rabbis clarify the Mishnah’s puzzling statement by saying that while there are in fact many verses about Shabbat in the Torah, the matter of intentional labor is not explained in the text, but must be inferred:
מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה, ומלאכת מחשבת לא כתיבא
Indeed, the question of intention is essential to the rabbis’ determination of whether any given action is considered to have violated an established prohibition.
A)דבר שאינו מתכוון - Unintended and unanticipated melakhah. If a person performs a permitted act on Shabbat knowing that it is possible but not inevitable that a melakhah might result from his/her activity, such action is permitted despite the unintended consequence. The classic examples are dragging a chair on a dirt floor, which could cause a rut, but is not considered to be “plowing,” and walking across a lawn, which could uproot some grass, but is not considered “harvesting.”
B) פסיק רישא ולא ימות ,Unavoidable melakhah. If a person likewise performs an action on Shabbat for a permitted purpose but knows that it is inevitable that a beneficial melakhah will result from the activity, such action is deemed by the rabbis to be forbidden by biblical law as an unavoidable and beneficial consequence. This category’s name comes from its classic example—a man wants to give a child a chicken head to play with on Shabbat; he cuts off the head, not intending to kill the chicken per se, but פסיק רישיה ולא ימות ) "if you cut off its head, will it not die?”
C) פסיק רישיה ולא ניחא ליה - Unavoidable and undesirable melakhah. Similarly, if a person intends to perform a permitted act on Shabbat knowing that it is inevitable that a melakhah will result from the activity, except that he will receive no benefit from this result (and may suffer a loss), many authorities permit the action, though some Ashkenazi poskim rule stringently
D) מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה -
Intentional act, but for a purpose different from the melakhah. Finally, if a person intentionally performs a melakhah
on Shabbat, but for a permitted purpose unrelated to its forbidden result, this is the subject of debate. In the Talmud, Rabbi Shimon considers such an act to be permitted, whereas Rabbi Yehudah forbids it. Later authorities mostly side with Rabbi Shimon’s leniency, ruling that such an action is not banned by the Torah, but they nevertheless ban it by force of rabbinic decree. The classic citation of מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה s Bavli Shabbat 73b, though there are other references to the debate throughout the tractate and other volumes. This case refers to a man who digs a hole on Shabbat, which is normally forbidden as either the melakhah of “digging”, בונה , or “building", חופר, depending on whether the hole is inside or outside of the home. In this case, however, this man’s interest is not in producing a hole, but rather in gathering some dirt. Rabbi Shimon permits the act, whereas Rabbi Yehudah forbids it—almost. In the end, even Rabbi Yehudah permits this because in this case the act of digging is considered to be קלקול, destructive (since it leaves an unhelpful and even hazardous hole in the field or floor). While the majority view is that such melakhah does not violate the biblical ban, the rabbis prohibited it of their own authority.
The question of intention is significant when considering the melakhot possibly involved in using electricity. For example, some electrical switches may create an arc of flame when flipped. It is forbidden to light a fire, מבעיר but in this case, the creation of sparks is not inevitable and is not the actor’s intention and is generally not even observed. Causing such sparks would therefore be considered only a possible consequence of the act, and certainly not one which benefits the actor. Thus we would deem their creation to be permitted as unintended and unanticipated, דבר שאינו מתכוון
To summarize this introductory discussion, in order to establish that a given action is biblically prohibited as melakhah, one must show that the act is physically comparable or has comparable intentions and results to one of the primary categories. or its derivations. Absent such results and intentions, the act may still be forbidden by authority of the rabbis, but will not be considered biblically prohibited. Rabbinic prohibitions are generally binding, but they bear lesser penalties and may be superseded by competing halakhic values.
