You shall keep My laws and My rules, by the pursuit of which human beings shall live: I am יהוה.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yoḥanan, what does he do with this verse: “And your brother shall live with you”? The Gemara answers: He requires the verse for that which is taught in a baraita: If two people were walking on a desolate path and there was a jug [kiton] of water in the possession of one of them, and the situation was such that if both drink from the jug, both will die, as there is not enough water, but if only one of them drinks, he will reach a settled area, there is a dispute as to the halakha. Ben Petora taught: It is preferable that both of them drink and die, and let neither one of them see the death of the other. This was the accepted opinion until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that the verse states: “And your brother shall live with you,” indicating that your life takes precedence over the life of the other.

It is a mitzva to wage a defensive war against Israel’s enemies. This mitzva is even greater than the mitzva of saving human life, as one is not required to risk his own life in order to save the life of another, or even multiple lives. In contrast, it is a mitzva – incumbent upon every individual – to risk one’s life to save the Jewish people from their enemies (Mishpat Kohen §143; Tzitz Eliezer 13:100; see Peninei Halakha: Collected Essays II 11:3).

Furthermore, it is also a mitzva to wage war to prevent future danger, even though doing so will put lives at risk and require Shabbat desecration. This is in accordance with the statement of the Sages that if enemies come to pillage border towns, even if they are taking only straw and hay, “we attack them with weapons and desecrate Shabbat on their account” (Eruvin 45a). We do this because if our enemies know that they can steal without repercussions, they will ultimately end up attacking people. This is also the ruling of Shulḥan Arukh (329:6). Accordingly, it is a mitzva to perform ongoing security operations on Shabbat, to protect our borders from our enemies. Nowadays, the entire country of Israel has the status of border towns with respect to preventing terror attacks (R. Shlomo Goren). Therefore, throughout Israel, it is a mitzva to perform ongoing security operations on Shabbat, to protect life and property.

I have my very own vineyard:
You may have the thousand, O Solomon,
And the guards of the fruit two hundred!

The Gemara asks: Does this mean: This verse too is non-sacred, and it is not necessary to say that the verse cited earlier is non-sacred? But that which Shmuel says: A monarchy that kills one of every six individuals in the world is not punished for doing so, as that is the prerogative of a monarch, as it is stated: “My vineyard, which is mine, is before me; you, Shlomo shall have the one thousand,” this is a reference to the monarchy of Heaven; “and two hundred for those who guard its fruit,” this is a reference to the monarchy of earth. Of the 1,200 mentioned in the two parts of the verse, two hundred, or one-sixth, are the prerogative of the earthly monarch. Shmuel, who interprets the mention of Shlomo in this verse as referring to God, holds neither in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna nor in accordance with the opinion introduced with the term: Some say. Both tanna’im agree that the reference in the verse is to Solomon and not to the Holy One, Blessed be He.

The mishna adds: In what case are all of these statements, with regard to the various exemptions from war, said? They are said with regard to elective wars. But in wars whose mandate is a mitzva, everyone goes, even a groom from his room and a bride from her wedding canopy. Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case are all of these statements, with regard to the various exemptions from war, said? They are said with regard to wars whose mandate is a mitzva. But in obligatory wars, everyone goes, even a groom from his room and a bride from her wedding canopy.

(5) Then the officials shall address the troops, as follows: “Is there anyone who has built a new house but has not dedicated it? Let him go back to his home, lest he die in battle and another dedicate it. (6) Is there anyone who has planted a vineyard but has never harvested it? Let him go back to his home, lest he die in battle and another harvest it. (7) Is there anyone who has paid the bride-price for a wife, but who has not yet taken her [into his household]? Let him go back to his home, lest he die in battle and another take her [into his household as his wife].” (8) The officials shall go on addressing the troops and say, “Is there anyone afraid and disheartened? Let him go back to his home, lest the courage of his comrades flag like his.”

(5) When a man has newly taken a woman [into his household as his wife], he shall not go out with the army or be assigned to it for any purpose; he shall be exempt one year for the sake of his household, to give happiness to the woman he has taken.

The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “He shall not go out with the army” (Deuteronomy 24:5); one might have thought it is with the army that he does not go out, but he does go to supply water and food to the army and to repair the roads for them. Therefore, the verse states: “Neither shall he be charged with any business.” One might have thought that I include even one who has built a house and has not dedicated it, or one who has planted a vineyard and has not used its fruit, or one who has betrothed a woman and has not taken her as his wife? The verse states: “Neither shall he be charged with any business”; you do not charge him with any responsibilities, but you do charge others. The Gemara asks: And since the Torah states: “Neither shall he be charged with any business,” why do I need to be taught: “He shall not go out with the army”? The Gemara answers: The Torah adds this clause so that he will violate two prohibitions if he goes out to war: “He shall not go out with the army,” and: “Neither shall he be charged.”

(45) All the Israelite males, aged twenty years and over, enrolled by ancestral houses, all those in Israel who were able to bear arms— (46) all who were enrolled came to 603,550. (47) The Levites, however, were not recorded among them by their ancestral tribe.

(10) When you [an Israelite warrior] take the field against your enemies, and your God יהוה delivers them into your power and you take some of them captive, (11) and you see among the captives a beautiful woman and you desire her and would take her [into your household] as your wife,

Similarly, a dilemma was raised before them: What is the halakha with regard to the permissibility for a priest who goes to war to engage in intercourse with a beautiful woman captured in that war? Does one say that the case of a beautiful woman is a novelty in that the Torah permits a man to engage in intercourse with a gentile woman? Consequently, it is no different in the case of a priest and no different in the case of an Israelite, as both are permitted to engage in intercourse with this woman. Or perhaps the case of priests is different, since the Torah includes additional mitzvot for them? Rav said: It is permitted, and Shmuel said: It is prohibited. The Gemara comments: With regard to the first act of sexual intercourse between the soldier priest and the gentile woman, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as the Torah spoke only in response to the evil inclination, and the evil inclination of a priest is as strong as that of an Israelite. This passage serves to prevent intercourse performed in a prohibited manner, which is relevant to a priest as well.

§ The Sages taught: With regard to one who goes to stadiums [le’itztadinin] where people are killed in contests with gladiators or beasts, or to a camp of besiegers [ulkharkom] where different forms of entertainment are provided for the besieging army, and he sees there the acts of the diviners and those who cast spells, or the acts of the clowns known as bukiyon, or mukiyon, or muliyon, or luliyon, or belurin, or salgurin, this is categorized as “the seat of the scornful”; and with regard to such places the verse states: “Happy is the man that has not walked in the council of the wicked, nor stood in the way of sinners, nor sat in the seat of the scornful. But his delight is in the Torah of the Lord” (Psalms 1:1–2). You learn from here that these matters bring a person to dereliction of the study of Torah, since had he not sat in “the seat of the scornful,” he would delight in the study of Torah.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita: One is permitted to go to stadiums, because he can scream and save the life of a Jew who would otherwise be killed there; and it is permitted to go to a camp of besiegers, because at times one can provide for the public welfare by petitioning the besiegers and saving the residents of the town, provided that he is not counted as one of them; but if he is counted as one of them, it is prohibited. This is difficult, as there is a contradiction between the statement about attending stadiums in the first baraita and the statement about attending stadiums in the second baraita, and is similarly difficult as there is a contradiction between the statement about a camp of besiegers in the first baraita and the statement about a camp of besiegers in the second baraita.

The Gemara continues: Granted, the apparent contradiction between one statement about a camp of besiegers and the other statement about a camp of besiegers is not difficult, as here, the first baraita is referring to a case where he is counted as one of them, and there, the second baraita is referring to a case where he is not counted as one of them. But with regard to the contradiction between the ruling about attending stadiums in the first baraita and the ruling about attending stadiums in the second baraita, it is difficult.