Chapter 6: Justice Systems
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ShareThese sources are from On Repentance and Repair: Making Amends In an Unapologetic World, Chapter Six. For more on On Repentance and Repair, go to OnRepentance.com.
Footnote 37
מה לנו ולצרה הזאת והלא כבר נאמר (ויקרא ה, א) והוא עד או ראה או ידע אם לא יגיד וגו' ושמא תאמרו מה לנו לחוב בדמו של זה והלא כבר נאמר (משלי יא, י) באבוד רשעים רנה: גמ׳ ת"ר כיצד מאומד אומר להן שמא כך ראיתם שרץ אחר חבירו לחורבה ורצתם אחריו ומצאתם סייף בידו ודמו מטפטף והרוג מפרפר אם כך ראיתם לא ראיתם כלום תניא א"ר שמעון בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא ראיתי אחד שרץ אחר חבירו לחורבה ורצתי אחריו וראיתי סייף בידו ודמו מטפטף והרוג מפרפר ואמרתי לו רשע מי הרגו לזה או אני או אתה אבל מה אעשה שאין דמך מסור בידי שהרי אמרה תורה (דברים יז, ו) על פי שנים עדים יומת המת היודע מחשבות יפרע מאותו האיש שהרג את חבירו אמרו לא זזו משם עד שבא נחש והכישו ומת והאי בר נחש הוא והאמר רב יוסף וכן תני דבי חזקיה מיום שחרב בית המקדש אף על פי שבטלה סנהדרי ארבע מיתות לא בטלו לא בטלו והא בטלו אלא דין ארבע מיתות לא בטלו מי שנתחייב סקילה או נופל מן הגג או חיה דורסתו מי שנתחייב שריפה או נופל בדליקה או נחש מכישו מי שנתחייב הריגה או נמסר למלכות או ליסטין באין עליו מי שנתחייב חנק או טובע בנהר או מת בסרונכי אמרי ההוא חטא אחריתי הוה ביה דאמר מר מי שנתחייב שתי מיתות ב"ד נידון בחמורה: מאומד וכו': בדיני נפשות הוא דלא אמדינן הא בדיני ממונות אמדינן כמאן כר' אחא דתניא ר' אחא אומר גמל האוחר בין הגמלים ונמצא גמל הרוג בצידו בידוע שזה הרגו וליטעמיך עד מפי עד דקתני בדיני נפשות הוא דלא אמרינן הא בדיני ממונות אמרינן והתנן אם אמר הוא אמר לי שאני חייב לו איש פלוני אמר לי שהוא חייב לו לא אמר כלום עד שיאמר בפנינו הודה לו שהוא חייב לו מאתים זוז אלמא אף על גב דפסילי בדיני ממונות אמרינן להו בדיני נפשות הכא נמי אף על גב דפסילי בדיני ממונות אמרינן להו בדיני נפשות: הוו יודעים כו': אמר רב יהודה בריה דר' חייא מלמד שעשה קין בהבל אחיו חבורות חבורות פציעות פציעות שלא היה יודע מהיכן נשמה יוצאה עד שהגיע לצוארו וא"ר יהודה בריה דר' חייא מיום שפתחה הארץ את פיה וקיבלתו לדמו של הבל שוב לא פתחה שנאמר (ישעיהו כד, טז) מכנף הארץ זמירות שמענו צבי לצדיק מכנף הארץ ולא מפי הארץ איתיביה חזקיה אחיו (במדבר טז, לב) ותפתח הארץ את פיה א"ל לרעה פתחה לטובה לא פתחה וא"ר יהודה בריה דרבי חייא גלות מכפרת עון מחצה מעיקרא כתיב (בראשית ד, יד) והייתי נע ונד ולבסוף כתיב (בראשית ד, טז) וישב בארץ נוד אמר רב יהודה גלות מכפרת שלשה דברים שנאמר (כה אמר ה' וגו') היושב בעיר הזאת ימות בחרב ברעב ובדבר והיוצא ונפל אל הכשדים הצרים עליכם יחיה והיתה לו נפשו לשלל ר' יוחנן אמר גלות מכפרת על הכל שנאמר (ירמיהו כב, ל) (כה אמר ה') כתבו את האיש הזה ערירי גבר לא יצלח בימיו כי לא יצלח מזרעו איש יושב על כסא דוד ומושל עוד ביהודה ובתר דגלה כתיב (דברי הימים א ג, יז) ובני יכניה אסיר (בנו) שלתיאל בנו אסיר שעיברתו אמו בבית האסורין שלתיאל ששתלו אל שלא כדרך הנשתלין גמירי שאין האשה מתעברת מעומד
Why would we want this trouble? Perhaps it would be better not to testify at all. But be aware, as is it not already stated: “And he being a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1)? It is a transgression not to testify when one can do so. And perhaps you will say: Why would we want to be responsible for the blood of this person? But be aware, as is it not already stated: “When the wicked perish, there is song” (Proverbs 11:10)? GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: How does the court describe testimony based on conjecture? The court says to the witnesses: Perhaps you saw this man about whom you are testifying pursuing another into a ruin, and you pursued him and found a sword in his hand, dripping with blood, and the one who was ultimately killed was convulsing. If you saw only this, it is as if you saw nothing, and you cannot testify to the murder. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ said as an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not once see one person pursue another into a ruin, and I pursued him and saw a sword in his hand, dripping with blood, and the one who was ultimately killed was convulsing. And I said to him: Wicked person, who has killed this man? Either you or I. But what can I do, since your blood is not given over to me, as the Torah states: “At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6), and I did not witness you killing him. The One Who knows one’s thoughts shall punish this man who killed another. The Sages said: They did not move from there before a snake came and bit the murderer, and he died. The Gemara questions this account: But was this murderer fit to die by being bitten by a snake? But doesn’t Rav Yosef say, and so the school of Ḥizkiyya also taught: From the day that the Temple was destroyed, although the Sanhedrin ceased to be extant, the four types of court-imposed capital punishment have not ceased. The Gemara asks: Have they really not ceased? But they have ceased, as court-imposed capital punishment is no longer given. Rather, the intention is that the halakha of the four types of court-imposed capital punishment has not ceased to be applicable. The Gemara explains: How so? For one who would be liable to be executed by stoning, either he falls from a roof or an animal mauls him and breaks his bones. This death is similar to death by stoning, in which the one liable to be executed is pushed from a platform and his bones break from the impact of the fall. For one who would be liable to be executed by burning, either he falls into a fire and is burned or a snake bites him, as a snakebite causes a burning sensation. For one who would be liable to be executed by slaying through decapitation by the sword, either he is turned over to the authorities and they execute him with a sword, or robbers come upon him and murder him. One who would be liable to be executed by strangling either drowns in a river and is choked by the water or dies of diphtheria [bisronekhi], which causes his breathing to become constricted. According to this, a murderer, whose verdict in court would be death by slaying, should not be bitten by a snake. The Sages say in explanation: That murderer had another sin for which he deserved execution by burning, and as the Master says: One who is found liable by the court to receive two types of court-imposed capital punishment is sentenced to the harsher of the two, and burning is considered a harsher death than slaying (see 50a). § The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law the court warns the witnesses not to testify based on conjecture. The Gemara comments: One can infer that it is only in cases of capital law that we do not rule based on conjecture, but in cases of monetary law, we do rule based on conjecture. In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna taught? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa. As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 3:6) that Rabbi Aḥa says: If there was a rutting male camel that was rampaging among other camels, and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage caused. The baraita indicates that Rabbi Aḥa rules that cases of monetary law are decided based on conjecture. The Gemara asks: But according to your reasoning, with regard to that which the mishna teaches, that the court warns the witnesses not to provide testimony based on hearsay, should one infer that it is in cases of capital law that we do not say that testimony based on hearsay is allowed, but in cases of monetary law, we do say that testimony based on hearsay is allowed? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (29a): If the witness said: The defendant said to me: It is true that I owe the plaintiff, or if he says: So-and-so said to me that the defendant owes the plaintiff, the witness has said nothing, i.e., his testimony is disregarded. These two statements by witnesses are examples of testimony based on hearsay, yet they are not valid in cases of monetary law. A witness’s testimony is not valid testimony unless he says, for example: The defendant admitted in our presence to the plaintiff that he owes him two hundred dinars, as by admitting the debt in the presence of witnesses he rendered himself liable to pay the amount that he mentioned. Evidently, although testimony based on hearsay is invalid in cases of monetary law, we tell the witnesses to be aware of this in capital law. Here, too, with regard to testimony based on conjecture, one can say that although testimony based on conjecture is invalid in cases of monetary law, we tell the witnesses to be aware of this in cases of capital law. § The mishna teaches that the court would say: You should know that cases of capital law are not like cases of monetary law, and would reference the murder of Abel by Cain. Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: By employing the plural term for blood, “The voice of your brother’s blood [demei] cries out to Me from the ground” (Genesis 4:10), the verse teaches that Cain caused multiple wounds and multiple injuries to his brother Abel. As Cain did not know from where the soul departs, he struck him multiple times. This continued until he came to his neck and struck him there, whereupon Abel died. And Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: From the day the earth opened its mouth and received the blood of Abel, its mouth has not opened again, as it is stated: “From the corner of the earth have we heard songs: Glory to the righteous” (Isaiah 24:16): One can infer that the songs are heard “from the corner of the earth,” but not from the mouth of the earth, as the earth never again opened its mouth. Ḥizkiyya, Rav Yehuda’s brother, raised an objection to Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya: The verse states concerning Korah and his assembly: “And the earth opened her mouth and swallowed them up, and their households, and all the men that appertained unto Korah, and all their goods” (Numbers 16:32). Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, said to him: It opened again for a deleterious purpose; it did not open again for a constructive purpose. And Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: Exile atones for half of a sin. As initially it is written in the verse concerning Cain that he said: “And I shall be a fugitive [na] and a wanderer [vanad ] in the earth” (Genesis 4:14), and ultimately it is written: “And Cain went out from the presence of the Lord, and dwelt in the land of Nod” (Genesis 4:16). Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, equates “Nod” with “nad,” and understands that Cain was given only the punishment of being a wanderer. Exile atoned for half his sin, thereby negating the punishment of being a fugitive. Rav Yehuda says: Exile atones for three matters, i.e., three types of death, as it is stated: “So says the Lord: Behold, I set before you the way of life and the way of death. He that abides in this city shall die by the sword, and by the famine, and by the pestilence; but he that goes out, and falls away to the Chaldeans that besiege you, he shall survive, and his life shall be for him for a prey” (Jeremiah 21:8–9), indicating that exile from Jerusalem will save one from those three deaths. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Exile atones for all transgressions and renders a sinner like a new person, as it is stated concerning the king Jeconiah, a descendant of King David: “So says the Lord: Write you this man childless, a man that shall not prosper in his days; for no man of his seed shall prosper, sitting upon the throne of David, and ruling anymore in Judah” (Jeremiah 22:30). And after Jeconiah was exiled it is written: “And the sons of Jeconiah, the same is Assir, Shealtiel his son” (I Chronicles 3:17). The verse employs the plural “sons of” although he had only one son, Shealtiel. “Assir,” literally, prisoner, teaches that his mother conceived him in prison. “Shealtiel,” literally, planted by God, teaches that God planted him in a way atypical of most plants [hanishtalin], i.e., people. It is learned as a tradition that a woman does not conceive when she is standing during sexual intercourse,
לעולם כרבי ישמעאל והכי קאמר את אביה ברשות אביה בשריפה ואת חמיה מחמיה בסקילה וכל אדם בחנק אמר רבא מאי שנא או אידי ואידי ממש או אידי ואידי רשות אלא אמר רבא לעולם כר"ש וקסבר ר"א נשואה כארוסה מה ארוסה חד דרגא מסקינן לה מסקילה לשריפה אף נשואה חד דרגא מסקינן לה מחנק לסקילה מתקיף לה ר' חנינא הא אידי ואידי ר"ש בשריפה קאמר אלא אמר רבינא לעולם כרבנן ואיפוך את אביה בסקילה ואת חמיה בשריפה והאי דקאמר את אביה סירכא בעלמא נקט: אמר רב נחמן אמר רבה בר אבוה אמר רב הלכה כדשלח רבין משמיה דרבי יוסי ברבי חנינא אמר רב יוסף הלכתא למשיחא א"ל אביי אלא מעתה שחיטת קדשים לא ליתני הלכתא למשיחא אלא דרוש וקבל שכר הכא נמי דרוש וקבל שכר הכי קאמרי הלכתא למה לי סוגיא דשמעתא הלכה קאמר מאי רבי ישמעאל דתניא (ויקרא כא, ט) ובת [איש] כהן כי תחל לזנות בנערה והיא ארוסה הכתוב מדבר אתה אומר בנער' והיא ארוסה או אינו אלא אפי' נשואה ת"ל (ויקרא כא, יח) איש אשר ינאף את אשת רעהו מות יומת הנואף והנואפת הכל היו בכלל הנואף והנואפת הוציא הכתוב בת ישראל בסקילה ובת כהן בשריפה מה כשהוציא הכתוב את בת ישראל לסקילה ארוסה ולא נשואה אף כשהוציא הכתוב בת כהן לשריפה ארוסה ולא נשואה זוממיה ובועלה בכלל (דברים יט, יט) ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם וגו' בועלה מאי כאשר זמם איכא אלא זוממיה בכלל מיתת בועלה משום שנאמר ועשיתם לו כאשר זמם לעשות לאחיו ולא לאחותו דברי רבי ישמעאל ר"ע אומר אחת ארוסה ואחת נשואה יצאת לשריפה יכול אפילו פנויה נאמר כאן אביה ונאמר להלן אביה מה להלן זנות עם זיקת הבעל אף כאן זנות עם זיקת הבעל א"ל ר' ישמעאל אי מה להלן נערה והיא ארוסה אף כאן נערה והיא ארוסה א"ל ר"ע ישמעאל אחי (ויקרא כא, ט) בת ובת אני דורש א"ל וכי מפני שאתה דורש בת ובת נוציא זו לשריפה אם משמע להביא את הנשואה הביא את הפנויה ואם משמע להוציא את הפנויה הוציא את הנשואה ור"ע אהני גזירה שוה למעוטי פנויה ואהני בת ובת לרבות את הנשואה ורבי ישמעאל סבר מדקאמר ליה בת ובת ש"מ הדר ביה מגזירה שוה ור' ישמעאל האי בת ובת מאי דריש ביה מיבעי ליה לכדתני אבוהי דשמואל בר אבין לפי שמצינו שחלק הכתוב בזכרים בין תמימים לבעלי מומין יכול נחלוק בבנותיהן ת"ל בת ובת ורבי עקיבא (ויקרא כא, ו) מוהם מקריבים והיו קדש נפקא ור' ישמעאל אי מההיא הוה אמינא ה"מ אינהו אבל בנותיהן לא קמ"ל ורבי ישמעאל
Actually, Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and this is what he is saying: The expression: With her father, means under her father’s authority, i.e., she is still betrothed, and she is executed by burning if she commits adultery. And the expression: With her father-in-law, means that after getting married, she engages in intercourse with her father-in-law, and she is therefore executed by stoning. And if she commits adultery with any other man after getting married, she is executed by strangulation, like any other married woman. Rava says: What is different between the wording of the two clauses of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement that allows for them to be understood differently? Either explain this one and that one literally, i.e., that she engages in intercourse with her father or father-in-law, or explain this one and that one as referring to the authority of the father or father-in-law. Rather, Rava says: Actually, Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon that burning is more severe than stoning, and Rabbi Eliezer holds that the halakha of the married daughter of a priest is comparable to that of the betrothed one. Just as with regard to the betrothed daughter of a priest we raise her punishment by one level vis-à-vis the betrothed daughter of a non-priest, from stoning to burning, so too, with regard to the married daughter of a priest, we raise her punishment by one level vis-à-vis the married daughter of a non-priest, from strangulation to stoning. Rav Ḥanina objects to this explanation: Doesn’t Rabbi Shimon himself say that both in this case and in that case, i.e., whether she is betrothed or married, the daughter of a priest is executed by burning? His opinion cannot be interpreted contrary to his own statement. Rather, Ravina says: Actually, Rabbi Eliezer’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, that the married daughter of a priest is executed by burning and the betrothed daughter of a priest is executed by stoning. And reverse the wording of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement as follows: When she is with her father, i.e., when she is betrothed, she is executed by stoning, and when she is with her father-in-law, i.e., when she is married, she is executed by burning. And the fact that the tanna states the phrase: With her father, instead of simply stating that she is betrothed, is because he was merely drawn to the common usage, i.e., the wording of the verse, and employed it. Rav Naḥman says that Rabba bar Avuh says that Rav says: The halakha in this matter is in accordance with the explanation that Ravin sent in the name of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina. Rav Yosef said in response: Does one issue a halakha for the messianic period? Since the destruction of the Temple, courts do not have the authority to adjudicate capital cases (see 52b), and this authority will be restored only once the Temple is rebuilt, in the messianic period. Therefore, what is the purpose of stating the halakha in this matter when it is not currently relevant? Abaye said to him: If that is so, let the tanna not teach all the halakhot of the slaughter of sacrificial animals, i.e., tractate Zevaḥim, as it is entirely a halakha for the messianic period. Rather, one studies these halakhot due to the principle of: Study Torah and receive reward, i.e., one is rewarded for the study of Torah regardless of its practical applicability. Here too, study Torah and receive reward. Rav Yosef responded: This is what I meant to say: Why do I need the halakha with regard to this subject to be stated? Is a halakha stated in the discussion of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement? The statements of the amora’im are merely explanations of how to understand the wording of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement, but there is no difference between them with regard to the halakha. § The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael that the betrothed daughter of a priest who committed adultery is executed by burning, whereas the married daughter of a priest who committed adultery is executed by strangulation. What is the source for the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael? It is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to the verse: “And the daughter of a priest, when she profanes herself by playing the harlot” (Leviticus 21:9), the verse is speaking of a young woman who is betrothed. Do you say that it is referring only to a young woman who is betrothed, or that it is referring even to a married woman? The verse states: “And a man who commits adultery with another man’s wife, he who commits adultery with his neighbor’s wife, both the adulterer and the adulteress shall be put to death” (Leviticus 20:10). All adulterers were included in the category of: “The adulterer and the adulteress,” and were executed by strangulation, until the verse singled out the betrothed daughter of a non-priest for execution by stoning and the daughter of a priest for execution by burning. It is therefore derived that just as when the verse singles out the daughter of a non-priest for stoning the Torah states that the reference is to a woman who is betrothed and not married, so too, when the verse singles out the daughter of a priest for burning it is referring to a woman who is betrothed and not married. The baraita continues: The conspiring witnesses concerning the daughter of a priest, and the paramour of the daughter of a priest, are included in the verse: “And you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19). The Gemara interjects and asks: What reason is there for the punishment of “as he conspired” to be applied with regard to her paramour? Rather, the baraita should be read: Her conspiring witnesses are included in the death penalty of her paramour, i.e., they are executed by strangulation, which they sought to impose upon her paramour. They are not executed by burning, which is the death penalty that they sought to impose upon her. This is because it is stated: “And you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother,” which is interpreted to mean: “To his brother,” but not to his sister. This is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: Both the betrothed and the married daughter of a priest are singled out for execution by burning. One might have thought that even an unmarried daughter of a priest who engaged in promiscuous intercourse should be executed by burning. This is incorrect, as here it is stated: “Her father,” and there it is stated, with regard to a betrothed woman who committed adultery: “Her father” (Deuteronomy 22:21). It is derived through a verbal analogy that just as below, the reference is to the promiscuous intercourse of one who has a bond to a husband, so too here, the reference is to the promiscuous intercourse of one who has a bond to a husband. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: If the halakha of a priest’s daughter who committed adultery is compared to the halakha of a betrothed woman who committed adultery, then it can be inferred that just as there the reference is specifically to a young woman who is betrothed, so too here, the reference is to a young woman who is betrothed. This serves as a proof for the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, which is that only the betrothed daughter of a priest is executed by burning. Rabbi Akiva said to him: Yishmael, my brother, I derive it from the fact that the verse could have stated: “The daughter of a priest,” but instead states: “And the daughter of a priest,” with the conjunction “and,” that married daughters of priests are also included in this punishment. Rabbi Yishmael said to him: And because you derive this from the difference between the term “the daughter” and the term “and the daughter,” we should take this married daughter of a priest out to be executed by burning? This derivation of yours is inconsistent, because if the conjunction “and” indicates the inclusion of the married daughter of a priest, then it should include the unmarried daughter of a priest too. And if it indicates the exclusion of an unmarried one, exclude the married one as well. The Gemara asks: And how would Rabbi Akiva respond? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Akiva, the verbal analogy between the halakha of the daughter of a priest and the halakha of a betrothed woman serves to exclude the case of an unmarried daughter of a priest from execution by burning, and the distinction between the terms “the daughter” and “and the daughter” serves to include the case of a married woman. And Rabbi Yishmael challenged Rabbi Akiva’s opinion because he thought that since Rabbi Akiva had said to him that a married woman is included due to the distinction between “the daughter” and “and the daughter,” it was possible to conclude from it that Rabbi Akiva had retracted his derivation from the verbal analogy, which would have included a married woman, and instead derived the halakha only from the conjunction “and” in the term “and the daughter.” But in fact, Rabbi Akiva combined this derivation with the verbal analogy. The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yishmael, what does he derive from this distinction between “the daughter” and “and the daughter”? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which the father of Shmuel bar Avin taught in a baraita: Since we find that the verse differentiates with regard to male priests between unblemished priests and blemished priests, as only unblemished priests may perform the Temple service, one might have thought we should differentiate between their daughters as well, and rule that the daughter of a blemished priest should not be sentenced to execution by burning for adultery. Therefore, instead of stating: “The daughter,” the verse states: “And the daughter,” to include the daughter of a blemished priest. The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Akiva derive this? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse: “They shall be holy to their God, and not profane the name of their God; for the offerings of the Lord, the bread of their Lord, they offer; and they shall be holy” (Leviticus 21:6). From the phrase “And they shall be holy” it is derived that all priests are considered holy, even if they cannot bring offerings in the Temple. Consequently, there is no difference in this regard between the daughter of a blemished priest and the daughter of an unblemished priest. The Gemara asks: And why does Rabbi Yishmael not derive this halakha from this verse? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yishmael would say: If it were to be derived from that verse, I would say that this matter applies with regard to the priests themselves, who are considered holy even if they are blemished, but not with regard to their daughters. Therefore, the term “and the daughter” teaches us that the halakha with regard to the daughters of blemished priests is just like the halakha with regard to the daughters of unblemished priests. The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Yishmael,
Footnote 40
(ט) אֵין הַתְּשׁוּבָה וְלֹא יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפְּרִין אֶלָּא עַל עֲבֵרוֹת שֶׁבֵּין אָדָם לַמָּקוֹם כְּגוֹן מִי שֶׁאָכַל דָּבָר אָסוּר אוֹ בָּעַל בְּעִילָה אֲסוּרָה וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. אֲבָל עֲבֵרוֹת שֶׁבֵּין אָדָם לַחֲבֵרוֹ כְּגוֹן הַחוֹבֵל אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ הַמְקַלֵּל חֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ גּוֹזְלוֹ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן אֵינוֹ נִמְחַל לוֹ לְעוֹלָם עַד שֶׁיִּתֵּן לַחֲבֵרוֹ מַה שֶּׁהוּא חַיָּב לוֹ וִירַצֵּהוּ. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחֱזִיר לוֹ מָמוֹן שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לוֹ צָרִיךְ לְרַצּוֹתוֹ וְלִשְׁאל מִמֶּנּוּ שֶׁיִּמְחל לוֹ. אֲפִלּוּ לֹא הִקְנִיט אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ אֶלָּא בִּדְבָרִים צָרִיךְ לְפַיְּסוֹ וְלִפְגֹּעַ בּוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּמְחל לוֹ. לֹא רָצָה חֲבֵרוֹ לִמְחל לוֹ מֵבִיא לוֹ שׁוּרָה שֶׁל שְׁלֹשָׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם מֵרֵעָיו וּפוֹגְעִין בּוֹ וּמְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ. לֹא נִתְרַצָּה לָהֶן מֵבִיא לוֹ שְׁנִיָּה וּשְׁלִישִׁית. לֹא רָצָה מְנִיחוֹ וְהוֹלֵךְ לוֹ וְזֶה שֶׁלֹּא מָחַל הוּא הַחוֹטֵא. וְאִם הָיָה רַבּוֹ הוֹלֵךְ וּבָא אֲפִלּוּ אֶלֶף פְּעָמִים עַד שֶׁיִּמְחל לוֹ:
(9) Neither repentance nor the Day of Atonement atone for any save for sins committed between man and God, for instance, one who ate forbidden food, or had forbidden coition and the like; but sins between man and man, for instance, one injures his neighbor, or curses his neighbor or plunders him, or offends him in like matters, is ever not absolved unless he makes restitution of what he owes and begs the forgiveness of his neighbor. And, although he make restitution of the monetory debt, he is obliged to pacify him and to beg his forgiveness. Even he offended not his neighbor in aught save in words, he is obliged to appease him and implore him till he be forgiven by him. If his neighbor refuses a committee of three friends to forgive him, he should bring to implore and beg of him; if he still refuses he should bring a second, even a third committee, and if he remains obstinate, he may leave him to himself and pass on, for the sin then rests upon him who refuses forgiveness. But if it happened to be his master, he should go and come to him for forgiveness even a thousand times till he does forgive him.
Footnote 56
מה לנו ולצרה הזאת והלא כבר נאמר (ויקרא ה, א) והוא עד או ראה או ידע אם לא יגיד וגו' ושמא תאמרו מה לנו לחוב בדמו של זה והלא כבר נאמר (משלי יא, י) באבוד רשעים רנה: גמ׳ ת"ר כיצד מאומד אומר להן שמא כך ראיתם שרץ אחר חבירו לחורבה ורצתם אחריו ומצאתם סייף בידו ודמו מטפטף והרוג מפרפר אם כך ראיתם לא ראיתם כלום תניא א"ר שמעון בן שטח אראה בנחמה אם לא ראיתי אחד שרץ אחר חבירו לחורבה ורצתי אחריו וראיתי סייף בידו ודמו מטפטף והרוג מפרפר ואמרתי לו רשע מי הרגו לזה או אני או אתה אבל מה אעשה שאין דמך מסור בידי שהרי אמרה תורה (דברים יז, ו) על פי שנים עדים יומת המת היודע מחשבות יפרע מאותו האיש שהרג את חבירו אמרו לא זזו משם עד שבא נחש והכישו ומת והאי בר נחש הוא והאמר רב יוסף וכן תני דבי חזקיה מיום שחרב בית המקדש אף על פי שבטלה סנהדרי ארבע מיתות לא בטלו לא בטלו והא בטלו אלא דין ארבע מיתות לא בטלו מי שנתחייב סקילה או נופל מן הגג או חיה דורסתו מי שנתחייב שריפה או נופל בדליקה או נחש מכישו מי שנתחייב הריגה או נמסר למלכות או ליסטין באין עליו מי שנתחייב חנק או טובע בנהר או מת בסרונכי אמרי ההוא חטא אחריתי הוה ביה דאמר מר מי שנתחייב שתי מיתות ב"ד נידון בחמורה: מאומד וכו': בדיני נפשות הוא דלא אמדינן הא בדיני ממונות אמדינן כמאן כר' אחא דתניא ר' אחא אומר גמל האוחר בין הגמלים ונמצא גמל הרוג בצידו בידוע שזה הרגו וליטעמיך עד מפי עד דקתני בדיני נפשות הוא דלא אמרינן הא בדיני ממונות אמרינן והתנן אם אמר הוא אמר לי שאני חייב לו איש פלוני אמר לי שהוא חייב לו לא אמר כלום עד שיאמר בפנינו הודה לו שהוא חייב לו מאתים זוז אלמא אף על גב דפסילי בדיני ממונות אמרינן להו בדיני נפשות הכא נמי אף על גב דפסילי בדיני ממונות אמרינן להו בדיני נפשות: הוו יודעים כו': אמר רב יהודה בריה דר' חייא מלמד שעשה קין בהבל אחיו חבורות חבורות פציעות פציעות שלא היה יודע מהיכן נשמה יוצאה עד שהגיע לצוארו וא"ר יהודה בריה דר' חייא מיום שפתחה הארץ את פיה וקיבלתו לדמו של הבל שוב לא פתחה שנאמר (ישעיהו כד, טז) מכנף הארץ זמירות שמענו צבי לצדיק מכנף הארץ ולא מפי הארץ איתיביה חזקיה אחיו (במדבר טז, לב) ותפתח הארץ את פיה א"ל לרעה פתחה לטובה לא פתחה וא"ר יהודה בריה דרבי חייא גלות מכפרת עון מחצה מעיקרא כתיב (בראשית ד, יד) והייתי נע ונד ולבסוף כתיב (בראשית ד, טז) וישב בארץ נוד אמר רב יהודה גלות מכפרת שלשה דברים שנאמר (כה אמר ה' וגו') היושב בעיר הזאת ימות בחרב ברעב ובדבר והיוצא ונפל אל הכשדים הצרים עליכם יחיה והיתה לו נפשו לשלל ר' יוחנן אמר גלות מכפרת על הכל שנאמר (ירמיהו כב, ל) (כה אמר ה') כתבו את האיש הזה ערירי גבר לא יצלח בימיו כי לא יצלח מזרעו איש יושב על כסא דוד ומושל עוד ביהודה ובתר דגלה כתיב (דברי הימים א ג, יז) ובני יכניה אסיר (בנו) שלתיאל בנו אסיר שעיברתו אמו בבית האסורין שלתיאל ששתלו אל שלא כדרך הנשתלין גמירי שאין האשה מתעברת מעומד
Why would we want this trouble? Perhaps it would be better not to testify at all. But be aware, as is it not already stated: “And he being a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1)? It is a transgression not to testify when one can do so. And perhaps you will say: Why would we want to be responsible for the blood of this person? But be aware, as is it not already stated: “When the wicked perish, there is song” (Proverbs 11:10)? GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: How does the court describe testimony based on conjecture? The court says to the witnesses: Perhaps you saw this man about whom you are testifying pursuing another into a ruin, and you pursued him and found a sword in his hand, dripping with blood, and the one who was ultimately killed was convulsing. If you saw only this, it is as if you saw nothing, and you cannot testify to the murder. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Shataḥ said as an oath: I will not see the consolation of Israel if I did not once see one person pursue another into a ruin, and I pursued him and saw a sword in his hand, dripping with blood, and the one who was ultimately killed was convulsing. And I said to him: Wicked person, who has killed this man? Either you or I. But what can I do, since your blood is not given over to me, as the Torah states: “At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to die be put to death” (Deuteronomy 17:6), and I did not witness you killing him. The One Who knows one’s thoughts shall punish this man who killed another. The Sages said: They did not move from there before a snake came and bit the murderer, and he died. The Gemara questions this account: But was this murderer fit to die by being bitten by a snake? But doesn’t Rav Yosef say, and so the school of Ḥizkiyya also taught: From the day that the Temple was destroyed, although the Sanhedrin ceased to be extant, the four types of court-imposed capital punishment have not ceased. The Gemara asks: Have they really not ceased? But they have ceased, as court-imposed capital punishment is no longer given. Rather, the intention is that the halakha of the four types of court-imposed capital punishment has not ceased to be applicable. The Gemara explains: How so? For one who would be liable to be executed by stoning, either he falls from a roof or an animal mauls him and breaks his bones. This death is similar to death by stoning, in which the one liable to be executed is pushed from a platform and his bones break from the impact of the fall. For one who would be liable to be executed by burning, either he falls into a fire and is burned or a snake bites him, as a snakebite causes a burning sensation. For one who would be liable to be executed by slaying through decapitation by the sword, either he is turned over to the authorities and they execute him with a sword, or robbers come upon him and murder him. One who would be liable to be executed by strangling either drowns in a river and is choked by the water or dies of diphtheria [bisronekhi], which causes his breathing to become constricted. According to this, a murderer, whose verdict in court would be death by slaying, should not be bitten by a snake. The Sages say in explanation: That murderer had another sin for which he deserved execution by burning, and as the Master says: One who is found liable by the court to receive two types of court-imposed capital punishment is sentenced to the harsher of the two, and burning is considered a harsher death than slaying (see 50a). § The mishna teaches that in cases of capital law the court warns the witnesses not to testify based on conjecture. The Gemara comments: One can infer that it is only in cases of capital law that we do not rule based on conjecture, but in cases of monetary law, we do rule based on conjecture. In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna taught? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Aḥa. As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Bava Kamma 3:6) that Rabbi Aḥa says: If there was a rutting male camel that was rampaging among other camels, and then a camel was found killed at its side, it is evident that this rampaging camel killed it, and the owner must pay for the damage caused. The baraita indicates that Rabbi Aḥa rules that cases of monetary law are decided based on conjecture. The Gemara asks: But according to your reasoning, with regard to that which the mishna teaches, that the court warns the witnesses not to provide testimony based on hearsay, should one infer that it is in cases of capital law that we do not say that testimony based on hearsay is allowed, but in cases of monetary law, we do say that testimony based on hearsay is allowed? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (29a): If the witness said: The defendant said to me: It is true that I owe the plaintiff, or if he says: So-and-so said to me that the defendant owes the plaintiff, the witness has said nothing, i.e., his testimony is disregarded. These two statements by witnesses are examples of testimony based on hearsay, yet they are not valid in cases of monetary law. A witness’s testimony is not valid testimony unless he says, for example: The defendant admitted in our presence to the plaintiff that he owes him two hundred dinars, as by admitting the debt in the presence of witnesses he rendered himself liable to pay the amount that he mentioned. Evidently, although testimony based on hearsay is invalid in cases of monetary law, we tell the witnesses to be aware of this in capital law. Here, too, with regard to testimony based on conjecture, one can say that although testimony based on conjecture is invalid in cases of monetary law, we tell the witnesses to be aware of this in cases of capital law. § The mishna teaches that the court would say: You should know that cases of capital law are not like cases of monetary law, and would reference the murder of Abel by Cain. Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: By employing the plural term for blood, “The voice of your brother’s blood [demei] cries out to Me from the ground” (Genesis 4:10), the verse teaches that Cain caused multiple wounds and multiple injuries to his brother Abel. As Cain did not know from where the soul departs, he struck him multiple times. This continued until he came to his neck and struck him there, whereupon Abel died. And Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: From the day the earth opened its mouth and received the blood of Abel, its mouth has not opened again, as it is stated: “From the corner of the earth have we heard songs: Glory to the righteous” (Isaiah 24:16): One can infer that the songs are heard “from the corner of the earth,” but not from the mouth of the earth, as the earth never again opened its mouth. Ḥizkiyya, Rav Yehuda’s brother, raised an objection to Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya: The verse states concerning Korah and his assembly: “And the earth opened her mouth and swallowed them up, and their households, and all the men that appertained unto Korah, and all their goods” (Numbers 16:32). Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, said to him: It opened again for a deleterious purpose; it did not open again for a constructive purpose. And Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, says: Exile atones for half of a sin. As initially it is written in the verse concerning Cain that he said: “And I shall be a fugitive [na] and a wanderer [vanad ] in the earth” (Genesis 4:14), and ultimately it is written: “And Cain went out from the presence of the Lord, and dwelt in the land of Nod” (Genesis 4:16). Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, equates “Nod” with “nad,” and understands that Cain was given only the punishment of being a wanderer. Exile atoned for half his sin, thereby negating the punishment of being a fugitive. Rav Yehuda says: Exile atones for three matters, i.e., three types of death, as it is stated: “So says the Lord: Behold, I set before you the way of life and the way of death. He that abides in this city shall die by the sword, and by the famine, and by the pestilence; but he that goes out, and falls away to the Chaldeans that besiege you, he shall survive, and his life shall be for him for a prey” (Jeremiah 21:8–9), indicating that exile from Jerusalem will save one from those three deaths. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Exile atones for all transgressions and renders a sinner like a new person, as it is stated concerning the king Jeconiah, a descendant of King David: “So says the Lord: Write you this man childless, a man that shall not prosper in his days; for no man of his seed shall prosper, sitting upon the throne of David, and ruling anymore in Judah” (Jeremiah 22:30). And after Jeconiah was exiled it is written: “And the sons of Jeconiah, the same is Assir, Shealtiel his son” (I Chronicles 3:17). The verse employs the plural “sons of” although he had only one son, Shealtiel. “Assir,” literally, prisoner, teaches that his mother conceived him in prison. “Shealtiel,” literally, planted by God, teaches that God planted him in a way atypical of most plants [hanishtalin], i.e., people. It is learned as a tradition that a woman does not conceive when she is standing during sexual intercourse,
Footnote 68
(ט) אֵין הַתְּשׁוּבָה וְלֹא יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפְּרִין אֶלָּא עַל עֲבֵרוֹת שֶׁבֵּין אָדָם לַמָּקוֹם כְּגוֹן מִי שֶׁאָכַל דָּבָר אָסוּר אוֹ בָּעַל בְּעִילָה אֲסוּרָה וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. אֲבָל עֲבֵרוֹת שֶׁבֵּין אָדָם לַחֲבֵרוֹ כְּגוֹן הַחוֹבֵל אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ הַמְקַלֵּל חֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ גּוֹזְלוֹ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן אֵינוֹ נִמְחַל לוֹ לְעוֹלָם עַד שֶׁיִּתֵּן לַחֲבֵרוֹ מַה שֶּׁהוּא חַיָּב לוֹ וִירַצֵּהוּ. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחֱזִיר לוֹ מָמוֹן שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב לוֹ צָרִיךְ לְרַצּוֹתוֹ וְלִשְׁאל מִמֶּנּוּ שֶׁיִּמְחל לוֹ. אֲפִלּוּ לֹא הִקְנִיט אֶת חֲבֵרוֹ אֶלָּא בִּדְבָרִים צָרִיךְ לְפַיְּסוֹ וְלִפְגֹּעַ בּוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּמְחל לוֹ. לֹא רָצָה חֲבֵרוֹ לִמְחל לוֹ מֵבִיא לוֹ שׁוּרָה שֶׁל שְׁלֹשָׁה בְּנֵי אָדָם מֵרֵעָיו וּפוֹגְעִין בּוֹ וּמְבַקְּשִׁין מִמֶּנּוּ. לֹא נִתְרַצָּה לָהֶן מֵבִיא לוֹ שְׁנִיָּה וּשְׁלִישִׁית. לֹא רָצָה מְנִיחוֹ וְהוֹלֵךְ לוֹ וְזֶה שֶׁלֹּא מָחַל הוּא הַחוֹטֵא. וְאִם הָיָה רַבּוֹ הוֹלֵךְ וּבָא אֲפִלּוּ אֶלֶף פְּעָמִים עַד שֶׁיִּמְחל לוֹ:
(9) Neither repentance nor the Day of Atonement atone for any save for sins committed between man and God, for instance, one who ate forbidden food, or had forbidden coition and the like; but sins between man and man, for instance, one injures his neighbor, or curses his neighbor or plunders him, or offends him in like matters, is ever not absolved unless he makes restitution of what he owes and begs the forgiveness of his neighbor. And, although he make restitution of the monetory debt, he is obliged to pacify him and to beg his forgiveness. Even he offended not his neighbor in aught save in words, he is obliged to appease him and implore him till he be forgiven by him. If his neighbor refuses a committee of three friends to forgive him, he should bring to implore and beg of him; if he still refuses he should bring a second, even a third committee, and if he remains obstinate, he may leave him to himself and pass on, for the sin then rests upon him who refuses forgiveness. But if it happened to be his master, he should go and come to him for forgiveness even a thousand times till he does forgive him.
Footnote 69
אֲתָא רַבִּי חִיָּיא — הֲדַר לְרֵישָׁא. עֲיַיל בַּר קַפָּרָא — הֲדַר לְרֵישָׁא. אֲתָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בְּרַבִּי — הֲדַר לְרֵישָׁא. אֲתָא רַבִּי חֲנִינָא (בַּר) חָמָא, אָמַר: כּוּלֵּי הַאי נֶהְדַּר וְנֵיזִיל? לָא הֲדַר. אִיקְּפִיד רַבִּי חֲנִינָא, אֲזַל רַב לְגַבֵּיהּ תְּלֵיסַר מַעֲלֵי יוֹמֵי דְּכִפּוּרֵי וְלָא אִיפַּיַּיס. וְהֵיכִי עָבֵיד הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: כׇּל הַמְבַקֵּשׁ מָטוּ מֵחֲבֵירוֹ אַל יְבַקֵּשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ יוֹתֵר מִשָּׁלֹשׁ פְּעָמִים! רַב שָׁאנֵי. וְרַבִּי חֲנִינָא, הֵיכִי עָבֵיד הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: כׇּל הַמַּעֲבִיר עַל מִדּוֹתָיו — מַעֲבִירִין לוֹ עַל כׇּל פְּשָׁעָיו! אֶלָּא: רַבִּי חֲנִינָא חֶלְמָא חָזֵי לֵיהּ לְרַב דְּזַקְפוּהוּ בְּדִיקְלָא, וּגְמִירִי דְּכֹל דְּזַקְפוּהוּ בְּדִיקְלָא — רֵישָׁא הָוֵי. אָמַר: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בָּעֵי לְמֶעְבַּד רְשׁוּתָא וְלָא אִיפַּיַּיס, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלֵיזִיל וְלִגְמַר אוֹרָיְיתָא בְּבָבֶל. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִצְוַת וִידּוּי עֶרֶב יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים עִם חֲשֵׁכָה. אֲבָל אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: יִתְוַדֶּה קוֹדֶם שֶׁיֹּאכַל וְיִשְׁתֶּה, שֶׁמָּא תִּטָּרֵף דַּעְתּוֹ בִּסְעוּדָה. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהִתְוַדָּה קוֹדֶם שֶׁאָכַל וְשָׁתָה — מִתְוַדֶּה לְאַחַר שֶׁיֹּאכַל וְיִשְׁתֶּה, שֶׁמָּא אֵירַע דְּבַר קַלְקָלָה בַּסְּעוּדָה. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהִתְוַדָּה עַרְבִית — יִתְוַדֶּה שַׁחֲרִית. שַׁחֲרִית — יִתְוַדֶּה בְּמוּסָף, בְּמוּסָף — יִתְוַדֶּה בְּמִנְחָה, בְּמִנְחָה — יִתְוַדֶּה בִּנְעִילָה. וְהֵיכָן אוֹמְרוֹ? יָחִיד אַחַר תְּפִלָּתוֹ, וּשְׁלִיחַ צִבּוּר אוֹמְרוֹ בָּאֶמְצַע. מַאי אָמַר? אָמַר רַב: ״אַתָּה יוֹדֵעַ רָזֵי עוֹלָם״. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: ״מִמַּעֲמַקֵּי הַלֵּב״. וְלֵוִי אָמַר: ״וּבְתוֹרָתְךָ כָּתוּב לֵאמֹר״. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: ״רִבּוֹן הָעוֹלָמִים״. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אָמַר: ״כִּי עֲוֹנוֹתֵינוּ רַבּוּ מִלִּמְנוֹת וְחַטֹּאתֵינוּ עָצְמוּ מִסַּפֵּר״. רַב הַמְנוּנָא אָמַר: ״אֱלֹהַי, עַד שֶׁלֹּא נוֹצַרְתִּי אֵינִי כְּדַאי. עַכְשָׁיו שֶׁנּוֹצַרְתִּי, כְּאִילּוּ לֹא נוֹצַרְתִּי. עָפָר אֲנִי בְּחַיַּי, קַל וָחוֹמֶר בְּמִיתָתִי. הֲרֵי אֲנִי לְפָנֶיךָ כִּכְלִי מָלֵא בּוּשָׁה וּכְלִימָּה. יְהִי רָצוֹן מִלְּפָנֶיךָ שֶׁלֹּא אֶחֱטָא, וּמַה שֶׁחָטָאתִי — מְרוֹק בְּרַחֲמֶיךָ, אֲבָל לֹא עַל יְדֵי יִסּוּרִין״. וְהַיְינוּ וִידּוּיָא דְרָבָא כּוּלַּהּ שַׁתָּא, וּדְרַב הַמְנוּנָא זוּטָא בְּיוֹמָא דְכִפּוּרֵי. אָמַר מָר זוּטְרָא: לָא אֲמַרַן, אֶלָּא דְּלָא אָמַר: ״אֲבָל אֲנַחְנוּ חָטָאנוּ״, אֲבָל אָמַר: ״אֲבָל אֲנַחְנוּ חָטָאנוּ״ — תּוּ לָא צְרִיךְ. דְּאָמַר בַּר הַמְדּוּדֵי: הֲוָה קָאֵימְנָא קַמֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל, וַהֲוָה יָתֵיב, וְכִי מְטָא שְׁלִיחָא דְצִבּוּרָא וְאָמַר: ״אֲבָל אֲנַחְנוּ חָטָאנוּ״, קָם מֵיקָם, אֲמַר: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ עִיקַּר וִידּוּי הַאי הוּא. תְּנַן הָתָם: בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה פְּרָקִים בַּשָּׁנָה כֹּהֲנִים נוֹשְׂאִין אֶת כַּפֵּיהֶן אַרְבָּעָה פְּעָמִים בַּיּוֹם: בְּשַׁחֲרִית, בְּמוּסָף, בְּמִנְחָה, וּבִנְעִילַת שְׁעָרִים. וְאֵלּוּ הֵן שְׁלֹשָׁה פְּרָקִים: בְּתַעֲנִיּוֹת, וּבְמַעֲמָדוֹת, וּבְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים. מַאי נְעִילַת שְׁעָרִים? רַב אָמַר: צְלוֹתָא יַתִּירְתָּא. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: ״מָה אָנוּ מֶה חַיֵּינוּ״. מֵיתִיבִי: אוֹר יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, בְּשַׁחֲרִית מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, בְּמוּסָף מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, בְּמִנְחָה מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, בִּנְעִילָה מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה! תַּנָּאֵי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים עִם חֲשֵׁיכָה מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, וְחוֹתֵם בְּוִידּוּי — דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע, וְאִם רָצָה לַחְתּוֹם בְּוִידּוּי — חוֹתֵם. תְּיוּבְתָּא דִשְׁמוּאֵל תְּיוּבְתָּא. עוּלָּא בַּר רַב נְחֵית קַמֵּיהּ דְּרָבָא. פְּתַח בְּ״אַתָּה בְּחַרְתָּנוּ״ וְסַיֵּים בְּ״מָה אָנוּ מֶה חַיֵּינוּ״, וְשַׁבְּחֵיהּ. רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נָתָן אָמַר: וְיָחִיד אוֹמְרָהּ אַחַר תְּפִלָּתוֹ. אָמַר רַב: תְּפִלַּת נְעִילָה פּוֹטֶרֶת אֶת שֶׁל עַרְבִית. רַב לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דַּאֲמַר: צְלוֹתָא יַתִּירָה הִיא, וְכֵיוָן דְּצַלִּי לֵיהּ — תּוּ לָא צְרִיךְ. וּמִי אָמַר רַב הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר תְּפִלַּת עַרְבִית רְשׁוּת! לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר חוֹבָה קָאָמַר. מֵיתִיבִי: אוֹר יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, שַׁחֲרִית שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, מוּסָף שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, בִּנְעִילָה מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע וּמִתְוַדֶּה, עַרְבִית מִתְפַּלֵּל שֶׁבַע מֵעֵין שְׁמוֹנֶה עֶשְׂרֵה. רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל מִשּׁוּם אֲבוֹתָיו: מִתְפַּלֵּל שְׁמוֹנֶה עֶשְׂרֵה שְׁלֵימוֹת,
Rabbi Ḥiyya, Rav’s uncle and teacher, came in, whereupon Rav returned to the beginning of the portion and began to read it again. Afterward, bar Kappara came in, and Rav returned to the beginning of the portion out of respect for bar Kappara. Then Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, came in, and he returned again to the beginning of the portion. Then, Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama came in, and Rav said to himself: Shall I go back and read so many times? He did not return but continued from where he was. Rabbi Ḥanina was offended because Rav showed that he was less important than the others. Rav went before Rabbi Ḥanina on Yom Kippur eve every year for thirteen years to appease him, but he would not be appeased. The Gemara asks: How could Rav act this way? Didn’t Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina say: Anyone who requests forgiveness from another should not ask more than three times? The Gemara answers: Rav is different, since he was very pious and forced himself to act beyond the letter of the law. The Gemara asks: And how could Rabbi Ḥanina act this way and refuse to forgive Rav, though he asked many times? Didn’t Rava say: With regard to anyone who suppresses his honor and forgives someone for hurting him, God pardons all his sins? The Gemara explains: Rather, this is what happened: Rabbi Ḥanina saw in a dream that Rav was being hung on a palm tree, and he learned as a tradition that anyone about whom there is a dream in which he was being hung on a palm tree will become the head of a yeshiva. He said: Learn from this that providence has decreed that he must eventually become the head of the yeshiva. Therefore, I will not be appeased, so that he will have to go and study Torah in Babylonia. He was conscious of the principle that one kingdom cannot overlap with another, and he knew that once Rav was appointed leader, he, Rabbi Ḥanina, would have to abdicate his own position or die. Therefore, he delayed being appeased, so that Rav would go to Babylonia and be appointed there as head of the yeshiva. In this way, the dream would be fulfilled, as Rav would indeed be appointed as head of a yeshiva, but since he would be in Babylonia, Rabbi Ḥanina would not lose his own position. § The Sages taught: The main mitzva of confession is on Yom Kippur eve when darkness falls. But the Sages said: One should also confess on Yom Kippur eve before he eats and drinks at his last meal before the fast lest he become confused at the meal, due to the abundance of food and drink, and be unable to confess afterward. And although one confessed before he ate and drank, he confesses again after he eats and drinks, as perhaps he committed some sin during the meal itself. And although one confessed during the evening prayer on the night of Yom Kippur, he should confess again during the morning prayer. Likewise, although one confessed during the morning prayer, he should still confess during the additional prayer. Similarly, although one confessed during the additional prayer, he should also confess during the afternoon prayer; and although one confessed during the afternoon prayer, he should confess again during the closing prayer [ne’ila]. And where in the Yom Kippur prayers does one say the confession? An individual says it after his Amida prayer, and the prayer leader says it in the middle of the Amida prayer. The Gemara asks: What does one say; what is the liturgy of the confession? Rav said: One says the prayer that begins: You know the mysteries of the universe, in accordance with the standard liturgy. And Shmuel said that the prayer begins with: From the depths of the heart. And Levi said that it begins: And in your Torah it is written, saying, and one then recites the forgiveness achieved by Yom Kippur as stated in the Torah. Rabbi Yoḥanan said that it begins: Master of the Universe. Rabbi Yehuda said that one says: For our iniquities are too many to count and our sins are too great to number. Rav Hamnuna said: This is the liturgy of the confession: My God, before I was formed I was unworthy. Now that I have been formed, it is as if I had not been formed. I am dust while alive, how much more so when I am dead. See, I am before You like a vessel filled with shame and disgrace. May it be Your will that I may sin no more, and as for the sins I have committed before You, erase them in Your compassion, but not by suffering. The Gemara comments: This is the confession that Rava used all year long; and it was the confession that Rav Hamnuna Zuta used on Yom Kippur. Mar Zutra said: We said only that one must follow all these versions when he did not say the words: But we have sinned. However, if he said the words: But we have sinned, he need not say anything further because that is the essential part of the confession. As bar Hamdudei said: I was standing before Shmuel and he was sitting; and when the prayer leader reached the words: But we have sinned, Shmuel stood. Bar Hamdudei said: Learn from here that this is the main part of the confession, and Shmuel stood up to emphasize the significance of these words. § We learned in a mishna there, in tractate Ta’anit: At three times in the year, priests raise their hands to recite the priestly benediction four times in a single day: In the morning prayer, in the additional prayer, in the afternoon prayer, and at the closing [ne’ila] of the gates. And these are the three times in the year: During communal fasts for lack of rain, on which the ne’ila prayer is recited; and during non-priestly watches [ma’amadot], when the Israelite members of the guard parallel to the priestly watch come and read the account of Creation (see Ta’anit 26a); and on Yom Kippur. The Gemara asks: What is the closing of the gates, i.e., the ne’ila prayer? Rav said: It is an added prayer of Amida. And Shmuel said: It is not a full prayer but only a confession that begins with the words: What are we, what are our lives? The Gemara raises an objection to this from a baraita, as it was taught: On the night of Yom Kippur, one prays seven blessings in the Amida prayer and confesses; during the morning prayer, one prays seven blessings and confesses; during the additional prayer, one prays seven blessings and confesses; during the afternoon prayer, one prays seven blessings and confesses; and during the ne’ila prayer, one prays seven blessings and confesses. This concurs with Rav’s opinion that ne’ila is an added prayer. This is a dispute between tanna’im They all agree that ne’ila is an added prayer but disagree about the obligation to confess at the ne’ila prayer, as it was taught in a baraita: At the end of Yom Kippur, as darkness falls, one prays seven blessings of the Amida and confesses and ends with the confession; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: He prays seven blessings of the Amida, and if he wishes to end his prayer with a confession, he ends it in this way. The Gemara says: If so, this is a refutation of the opinion of Shmuel, since all agree that ne’ila is a complete prayer. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation. The Gemara relates: Ulla bar Rav went down to lead the ne’ila prayer before Rava, who was in the synagogue. He opened the prayer with: You have chosen us, and he concluded with: What are we, what are our lives? And Rava praised him. Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said: And an individual says it after his Amida prayer. The individual says the confession after his Amida prayer, not within the Amida prayer as the prayer leader does. Rav said: The ne’ila prayer exempts one from the evening prayer. Since one recited an added prayer after the afternoon prayer, when darkness fell, it serves as the evening prayer. The Gemara comments that Rav conforms to his line of reasoning above, as he said: It is an added prayer, and since he has prayed it he needs no further prayer in the evening. The Gemara is surprised at this: And did Rav actually say this? Didn’t Rav say: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the one who says that the evening prayer is optional? If it is optional, why would Rav use the term exempt? One is exempt even if he does not pray the closing prayer. The Gemara answers: He said this in accordance with the statement of the one who says that the evening prayer is mandatory. Even according to the opinion that maintains that the evening prayer is mandatory, if one recites ne’ila, he has fulfilled his obligation to recite the evening prayer. The Gemara raises an objection from that which we learned in a baraita: During the evening after Yom Kippur, one prays seven blessings in the Amida and confesses; during the morning prayer, one prays seven blessings in the Amida and confesses; during the additional prayer, one prays seven blessings in the Amida and confesses; during ne’ila one prays seven blessings in the Amida and confesses; and during the evening prayer, one prays seven blessings in an abridged version of the eighteen blessings of the weekday Amida prayer. One recites the first three blessings, the final three, and a middle blessing that includes an abbreviated form of the other weekday blessings. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says in the name of his ancestors: One prays the full eighteen blessings of the weekday Amida prayer as usual,
