You shall not render an unfair decision: do not favor the poor or show deference to the rich; judge your kin fairly.

The Sages taught: The verse states: “But in righteousness shall you judge your colleague” (Leviticus 19:15), from which it is derived: The court must ensure that there will not be a situation where one litigant is sitting and one litigant is standing, or a situation where one litigant says everything that he needs to say to present his case and one litigant, the judge says to him: Curtail your statement. Alternatively, it is derived from the verse: “But in righteousness shall you judge your colleague,” that you should judge another favorably, and seek to find justification for his actions, even if when interpreted differently his actions could be judged unfavorably.

Rav Yosef teaches that from the verse: “But in righteousness shall you judge your colleague [amitekha],” it is derived: With regard to one who is with you [im she’itekha] in observance of Torah and in fulfillment of mitzvot, try to judge him favorably, in the manner that the Gemara will now explain. The Gemara relates: Rav Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, had a trial pending before Rav Naḥman. Rav Yosef sent a message to Rav Naḥman: Ulla our friend is a colleague in Torah and mitzvot, with regard to whom the verse states that you should judge him favorably. Rav Naḥman said: For what purpose did he send this message to me? Does he expect me to grant him preferential treatment? Every judgment must be undertaken with righteousness. Rav Naḥman then said: Rav Yosef sent me the message to ensure I would open with Rav Ulla’s dispute first. in the event that other cases come before me for judgment, in deference to the Torah because he is a Torah scholar. Alternatively, Rav Yosef informed me that Rav Ulla is a Torah scholar with regard to circumstances where the ruling is not clear-cut and the decision is rendered based on the discretion of the judges, that is, when the court is unable to rule solely based on the testimony presented in court and the judges arrive at their ruling based on their sense of the matter. Rav Yosef informed Rav Naḥman that if the case is decided based on judicial discretion, Rav Ulla is worthy of having the decision ruled in his favor.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said: By Torah law, the adjudication of one judge is also valid (by loans and debts), as it is stated: “In righteousness shall you judge your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:15), in the singular. But by rabbinic law, three judges are required, due to the concern that a single judge may be one of those who sit idly on street corners, i.e., unlearned people who are not involved in business and are unlikely to judge the case correctly. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that with three judges they will not be among those who sit idly on street corners? How is this concern addressed by increasing the number of judges? The Gemara answers: When there are three judges it is impossible, i.e., highly unlikely, that there is not among them one who is learned.

The commandment to judge with righteousness:

The root of the commandment is revealed to all - as with equitability in judgement, the world is civilized. But if a judge honors one of the litigants over the other, the [latter] disputant will fear to say all of his claims in front of him. And from this, the judgement will come out twisted. And about that which we said that it is a commandment upon one wise in words of Torah - and he be a righteous man - to judge those who disagree, that this is included in the commandment as well; there is benefit in this as well, as he will judge a true judgement. But if this one that knows does not want to judge, other people who are not wise will judge them, and they will slant the judgement towards one of the litigants without knowing.

Also about that which we said that every person is obligated to judge his fellow favorably - that it is included in the commandment - is a cause for there to be peace and amity among people. And [so] it comes out that the essence of the whole intent of the commandment is to help in the civilization of people with righteousness of judgement, and to bring peace among them with the removal of suspicion of one man towards another.

And this commandment is practiced in every place and at all times by males - as they are obligated to judge, and not females. However, also females are obligated about that which we said is included in this commandment, and that is to judge one's fellow favorably.

A Torah Sage... should judge everyone in a good light...

[The Chofetz Chaim cites Rabbeinu Yonah (Sha'arei Teshuvah 218), the

S'mag (Positive Mitzvah 106) and the S'mak (Mitzvah 225) who all rule

that judging one's fellow positively is a Torah obligation. This is in

contrast to the Rambam who rules that it is a Middah Tovah (a character trait worthy of striving for), but not a Torah obligation.]

The reader should not grab [my argument to refute it] and say that the Rambam definitely disagrees with Rabbeinu Yonah, the S'mag and S'mak, and rules that [judging one's fellow positively] is merely a [good] character trait, but not a positive Mitzvah. And [do not cite] as proof that which the Rambam wrote there, at the end of his commentary on the Mishnah [in Pirkei Avos, Source B2]: "[judging positively] is the way of the pious"

[implying that it is not a Torah obligation applicable to all people]. [Such an understanding] is incorrect, for the Rambam is dealing there with a person whom I do not know [and therefore cannot

know] if he is a Rasha [a person with a negative reputation] or a Tzaddik [a person with a positive reputation]. For such a person [who I do not know], I am certainly not obligated by the Torah to judge him positively.

It is merely a [good] character trait to do so.

Similarly, [to understand] the Rambam in Hilchos De'os 5:7

who lists this [behavior] among the attributes of a Talmid Chachom -

and the implication is that it is a mere [good] character trait [and not a

command]-[one must say] that he is speaking there about such a case

[also, where I do not know the person].

You should know [that this is the correct understanding of the Rambam

In Hilchos De'os 5:7] for he cites the words of the Mishnah in Pirkei Avos

[1:6]: "Judge every person positively" [not fellow, but person whom you do not know], but we [in the discussion in the Sefer Chofetz Chaim] are dealing with a person with whom I am familiar, and know that he is not a Rasha, but is a Beinoni [someone of average character. For such

a person] it is a Torah obligation [to judge him positively]. A proof [for this understanding of the opinion of the Rambam] is from the [wording of] the Rambam himself in Sefer HaMitzvos (Mitzvah 177) where he writes explicitly: "Included [in the verse] is the

obligation to judge his friend positively." From the wording "obligation"

it seems that it is relevant to all types of people [not just the pious], for

the 613 Mitzvos were given to all of Israel.

[You can] see that our approach is true, for the Mishneh in Avos, and the Rambam in Hilchos De'os [Source A6] above, [are both] dealing with [positive] character traits [as opposed to obligations, and therefore] they say, "and judge every person positively," [whereas] the Gemara in Shevuos [Source A2] and the Sefer HaMitzvos which deal with the explanation of the positive Mitzvah of "you must judge righteously" [B'Tzedek Tishpot] it says, "And you must judge your fellow positively." [The words] "your fellow" implies someone that you recognize not to be a Rasha.

"and judge every person as meritorious:"

1) Its subject is when there is a person whom you do not about him if he is righteous or if he is wicked and you see him doing an act or saying something and if you interpret it one way it will be good and if you interpret in another way it will be bad - [in this case,] take it to the good and do not think bad about it.

2) But if the man is known to be famously righteous and of good deeds; and an action of his is seen that all of its aspects indicate that it is a bad deed and a person can only determine it to be good with great stretching and a distant possibility, it is fit that you take it that it is good, since there is some aspect of a possibility that it is good.

3) And so [too] when it is an evildoer and his deeds are famous, and afterwards we see him that he does a deed, all of the indications about which are that it is good but there is an aspect of a distant possibility that it is bad; it is fit to guard oneself from him and not to believe that it is good, since there is a possibility for the bad.

4) But when he is not known and the deed is indeterminate towards one of the two extremes; according to the ways of piety, one must judge a person as meritorious towards whichever extreme of the two extremes [would be the case].

The Sages taught in a baraita: One who judges another favorably is himself judged favorably. And there was an incident involving a certain person who descended from the Upper Galilee and was hired to work for a certain homeowner in the South for three years. On the eve of the Day of Atonement, he said to the homeowner: Give me my wages, and I will go and feed my wife and children. The homeowner said to him: I have no money. He said to him: In that case, give me my wages in the form of produce. He said to him: I have none. The worker said to him: Give me my wages in the form of land. The homeowner said to him: I have none. The worker said to him: Give me my wages in the form of animals. He said to him: I have none. The worker said to him: Give me cushions and blankets. He said to him: I have none. The worker slung his tools over his shoulder behind him and went to his home in anguish. After the festival of Sukkot, the homeowner took the worker’s wages in his hand, along with a burden that required three donkeys, one laden with food, one laden with drink, and one laden with types of sweets, and went to the worker’s home. After they ate and drank, the homeowner gave him his wages. The homeowner said to him: When you said to me: Give me my wages, and I said: I have no money, of what did you suspect me? Why did you not suspect me of trying to avoid paying you? The worker answered, I said: Perhaps the opportunity to purchase merchandise [perakmatya] inexpensively presented itself, and you purchased it with the money that you owed me, and therefore you had no money available. The homeowner asked: And when you said to me: Give me animals, and I said: I have no animals, of what did you suspect me? The worker answered: I said: Perhaps the animals are hired to others. The homeowner asked: When you said to me: Give me land, and I said: I have no land, of what did you suspect me? The worker answered: I said: Perhaps the land is leased to others, and you cannot take the land from the lessees. The homeowner asked: And when you said to me: Give me produce, and I said: I have no produce, of what did you suspect me? The worker answered: I said: Perhaps they are not tithed, and that was why you could not give them to me. The homeowner asked: And when I said: I have no cushions or blankets, of what did you suspect me? The worker answered: I said: Perhaps he consecrated all his property to Heaven and therefore has nothing available at present. The homeowner said to him: I swear by the Temple service that it was so. I had no money available at the time because I vowed and consecrated all my property on account of Hyrcanus, my son, who did not engage in Torah study. The homeowner sought to avoid leaving an inheritance for his son. And when I came to my colleagues in the South, the Sages of that generation, they dissolved all my vows. At that point, the homeowner had immediately gone to pay his worker. Now the homeowner said: And you, just as you judged favorably, so may God judge you favorably.

Harav Yosef Chaim

The Ben Ish Chai