The Great Supermarket Chametz Debate
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Shareמַתְנִי׳ הַמּוּדָּר הֲנָאָה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ וְאֵין לוֹ מַה יֹּאכַל — נוֹתְנוֹ לְאַחֵר לְשׁוּם מַתָּנָה, וְהַלָּה מוּתָּר בָּהּ. מַעֲשֶׂה בְּאֶחָד בְּבֵית חוֹרוֹן שֶׁהָיָה אָבִיו נוֹדֵר הֵימֶנּוּ הֲנָאָה, וְהָיָה מַשִּׂיא אֶת בְּנוֹ. וְאָמַר לַחֲבֵרוֹ: חָצֵר וּסְעוּדָה נְתוּנִים הִינָּן לְפָנֶיךָ, אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבֹא אַבָּא וְיֹאכַל עִמָּנוּ בִּסְעוּדָה. אָמַר: אִם שֶׁלִּי הֵם — הֲרֵי הֵם מוּקְדָּשִׁין לַשָּׁמַיִם. אָמַר לוֹ: נָתַתִּי לְךָ אֶת שֶׁלִּי שֶׁתַּקְדִּישֵׁם לַשָּׁמַיִם?! אָמַר לוֹ: נָתַתָּ לִי אֶת שֶׁלְּךָ אֶלָּא שֶׁתְּהֵא אַתָּה וְאָבִיךְ אוֹכְלִין וְשׁוֹתִין וּמִתְרַצִּין זֶה לָזֶה, וִיהֵא עָוֹן תָּלוּי בְּרֹאשׁוֹ. אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: כׇּל מַתָּנָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ שֶׁאִם הִקְדִּישָׁהּ תְּהֵא מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת — אֵינָהּ מַתָּנָה. גְּמָ׳ מַעֲשֶׂה לִסְתּוֹר! חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: וְאִם הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ — אָסוּר. וּמַעֲשֶׂה נָמֵי בְּבֵית חוֹרוֹן בְּאֶחָד, דַּהֲוָה סוֹפוֹ מוֹכִיחַ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ. אָמַר רָבָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ ״וְהִינָּן לְפָנֶיךָ אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁיָּבֹא אַבָּא״. אֲבָל אָמַר לֵיהּ: ״שֶׁיְּהוּ לְפָנֶיךָ, שֶׁיָּבֹא אַבָּא״ — ״מִדַּעְתְּךָ״ הוּא דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ. לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא: אָמְרִין לַהּ, אָמַר רָבָא: לָא תֵּימָא טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ ״וְהִינָּן לְפָנֶיךָ״ הוּא דְּאָסוּר, אֲבָל אֲמַר לֵיהּ ״הֵן לְפָנֶיךָ שֶׁיָּבֹא אַבָּא וְיֹאכַל״ — מוּתָּר. אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ אָמַר לֵיהּ ״הֵן לְפָנֶיךָ יָבֹא אַבָּא וְיֹאכַל״ — אָסוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא — סְעוּדָתוֹ מוֹכַחַת עָלָיו.
But it is prohibited for them to benefit from objects of that city, which are considered to be jointly owned by all its residents. And what are examples of objects belonging to those who ascended from Babylonia? For example, the Temple Mount, and the Temple Courtyards, and the water cistern in the middle of the road. And what are objects of that city? For example, the city square, and the bathhouse, and the synagogue, and the ark which houses the Torah scrolls, and the Torah scrolls. And one who writes, i.e., signs, his portion of the shared objects of that city over to the Nasi. Rabbi Yehuda says: This is the halakha with regard to both one who writes his portion over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person. Rabbi Yehuda adds: What is the difference between one who writes it over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person? That one who writes it to the Nasi need not formally confer possession of the item, whereas one who writes it over to a common person must confer possession to him. And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one must confer possession, and they specifically mentioned the Nasi only so as to speak in the present, addressing situations that were prevalent. Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee do not have to write their portion over to the Nasi because their fathers already wrote it for them, declaring that all the public property belongs to him. GEMARA: The mishna appears to teach that one who is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from another may not benefit from property written over to the Nasi. The Gemara asks: Why is it forbidden? Rav Sheshet said: This is what the mishna is teaching: And what is their remedy, i.e., what can be done to enable the forbidden individuals to benefit from communal property? They should write their portion over to the Nasi, thereby relinquishing their shares in the communal property. The Gemara continues its quotation from the mishna: This is the halakha with regard to both one who writes his portion over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person. Rabbi Yehuda adds: What is the difference between one who writes it over to the Nasi and one who writes it over to a common person? That one who writes it to the Nasi need not formally confer possession of the item, whereas one who writes it over to a common person must confer possession to him. And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one must confer possession, and they specifically mentioned the Nasi only so as to speak in the present. § The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee do not have to confer possession of their portion to the Nasi because their forefathers already wrote it for them. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: The people of Galilee were quarrelsome [kanteranin] and would often take vows prohibiting benefit from one another. So their forefathers arose and wrote their portions of the public property over to the Nasi so that they would be able to use communal property. MISHNA: With regard to one who is prohibited by a vow from deriving benefit from another and he does not have anything to eat, the other may give the food to someone else as a gift and he is then permitted to eat it. The mishna recounts: An incident occurred involving someone in the city of Beit Ḥoron whose father had vowed not to derive benefit from him, and the son was marrying off his own son and wanted his father to be able to participate in the wedding meal. And he therefore said to another: The courtyard where the wedding will take place and the wedding meal are given before you as a gift, but only so that my father will come and eat with us at the meal. The recipient said: If they are mine, they are all hereby consecrated to Heaven, i.e., the Temple, and are forbidden to everyone. The son said to him in anger: And did I give you my property so that you should consecrate it to Heaven? He, the recipient, said to him: You gave me your property only so that you and your father would eat and drink and thereby appease each other, and the sin of transgressing the vow would be hung on his, i.e., my, head, as I enabled the transgression. The Sages therefore said: Any gift that is not so absolute so that if the recipient were to consecrate the gift it would be consecrated, is not a gift. In other words, in order for it to be a gift, the recipient must have the ability to consecrate it. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Was an incident cited to contradict that which was initially stated in the mishna? The mishna explicitly stated that one may give a gift to another in order to bypass the prohibition of a vow. The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching like this: And if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, i.e., if the prior owner protests that he gave the gift only as a technicality in order to bypass the vow, it is forbidden. And to illustrate this point, there was also an incident in Beit Ḥoron concerning someone whose ultimate protest proved that his initial intent was not to give a true gift. Rava said: They taught this prohibition only in a case where he said to him: And the gifts are given before you only so that my father should come, as he explicitly mentioned that he did not intend to give an absolute gift. But if he said to him less explicitly: That they should be before you that my father should come, there is no prohibition, since he is essentially saying to him: It is up to your judgment whether or not to invite him. Some say another version of this statement. Rava said: Do not say that the reason for the prohibition is because he said to him: And the gifts are given before you only so that my father will come, and that is why it is forbidden; but if he said to him: They are before you so my father should come and eat, it would be permitted. This is not so. Rather, even if he said to him: They are before you, my father should come and eat, it is forbidden. What is the reason for this? His wedding meal proves about him that his sole intention was to bypass the vow.
מַתְנִי' עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֲנִי כֹּהֵן וְנִמְצָא לֵוִי לֵוִי וְנִמְצָא כֹּהֵן נָתִין וְנִמְצָא מַמְזֵר מַמְזֵר וְנִמְצָא נָתִין בֶּן עִיר וְנִמְצָא בֶּן כְּרַךְ בֶּן כְּרַךְ וְנִמְצָא בֶּן עִיר עַל מְנָת שֶׁבֵּיתִי קָרוֹב לַמֶּרְחָץ וְנִמְצָא רָחוֹק רָחוֹק וְנִמְצָא קָרוֹב עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ בַּת אוֹ שִׁפְחָה מְגוּדֶּלֶת וְאֵין לוֹ אוֹ עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לוֹ וְיֵשׁ לוֹ עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לוֹ בָּנִים וְיֵשׁ לוֹ אוֹ עַל מְנָת שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ וְאֵין לוֹ וּבְכוּלָּם אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרָה בְּלִבִּי הָיָה לְהִתְקַדֵּשׁ לוֹ אַף עַל פִּי כֵן אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת וְכֵן הִיא שֶׁהִטְעַתּוּ גּמ' הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּזַבֵּין לְנִכְסֵיהּ אַדַּעְתָּא לְמִיסַּק לְאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל וּבְעִידָּנָא דְּזַבֵּין לָא אֲמַר וְלָא מִידֵּי אָמַר רָבָא הָוֵי דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב וּדְבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָם דְּבָרִים מְנָא לֵיהּ לְרָבָא הָא אִילֵּימָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן יַקְרִיב אֹתוֹ מְלַמֵּד שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ יָכוֹל בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר לִרְצֹנוֹ הָא כֵּיצַד כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר רוֹצֶה אֲנִי וְאַמַּאי הָא בְּלִבֵּיהּ לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָן דְּבָרִים וְדִילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם דַּאֲנַן סָהֲדִי דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּכַפָּרָה אֶלָּא מִסֵּיפָא וְכֵן אַתָּה מוֹצֵא בְּגִיטֵּי נָשִׁים וְשִׁחְרוּרֵי עֲבָדִים כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר רוֹצֶה אֲנִי וְאַמַּאי הָא בְּלִבֵּיהּ לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן דְּבָרִים שֶׁבַּלֵּב אֵינָן דְּבָרִים וְדִילְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם מִשּׁוּם דְּמִצְוָה לִשְׁמוֹעַ דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים
What is the meaning of: Torah, that Rabbi Yoḥanan said? It is homiletic interpretation of the Torah. And this statement applies only if he said to her: I study [taneina]. But if he says to her: I am a tanna [tanna ana], she is not betrothed unless he studies halakha, i.e., Mishna, Sifra and Sifrei, and Tosefta. If a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a student of Torah, one does not say that he must be a student who is scholarly like Shimon ben Azzai or like Shimon ben Zoma, who were called students despite their great knowledge, as they were never ordained. Rather, it means anyone who, when he is asked one matter in any topic of his studies, responds appropriately and can say what he has learned, and this suffices even if his statement was in the tractate of Kalla. Similarly, if a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a scholar, one does not say that he must be like the scholars of Yavne, like Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues. Rather, it is referring to anyone who, when he is asked about a matter of wisdom on any topic related to the Torah, responds appropriately and can say what he has learned. If a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am strong, one does not say that he must be as strong as Abner ben Ner, King Saul’s cousin and general, or as strong as Joab ben Zeruiah, King David’s nephew and general. Rather, it means anyone of whom others are afraid due to his strength. If a man says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am wealthy, one does not say he must be as wealthy as Rabbi Elazar ben Ḥarsom or as wealthy as Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, but rather it can refer to anyone who is honored by the members of his town due to his wealth. If one says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a righteous man, then even if he was a completely wicked man she is betrothed, as perhaps in the meantime he had thoughts of repentance in his mind and is now righteous. Similarly, if one says to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a wicked man, then even if he was a completely righteous man she is betrothed, as perhaps he had thoughts of idol worship in his mind, a serious sin that would earn him the label of wicked. § Apropos the discussion with regard to various attributes, the Gemara cites a related statement: Ten kav of wisdom descended to the world; Eretz Yisrael took nine of them and all the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of beauty descended to the world; Jerusalem took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one. Ten kav of wealth descended to the world; Rome took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one. Ten kav of poverty descended to the world; Babylonia took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one. Ten kav of arrogance descended to the world; Eilam took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one. The Gemara asks: But did arrogance not descend to Babylonia? But isn’t it written: “Then I lifted my eyes and saw, and behold there came forth two women, and the wind was in their wings, for they had wings like the wings of a stork. And they lifted up the measure between the earth and the heaven. Then I said to the angel that spoke with me: ‘To where do they take the measure?’ And he said to me: ‘To build her a house in the land of Shinar’” (Zechariah 5:9–11). And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This refers to flattery and arrogance that descended to Babylonia, i.e., Shinar. This indicates that arrogance reached Babylonia as well. The Gemara answers: Yes, it descended to here, to Babylonia, and it made its way to there, to Eilam. The language of the verse is also precise, as it teaches: “To build her a house,” which indicates that the original intention was to build a house in Babylonia, but it was not built there. The Gemara comments: Conclude from it that arrogance did not remain in Babylonia. The Gemara further asks: Is that so? But didn’t the Master say: A sign of arrogance is poverty, and there is poverty in Babylonia, and not in Eilam. The Gemara answers: To what kind of poverty is this referring? It is poverty with regard to Torah, which was characteristic of Eilam. As it is written: “We have a little sister, and she has no breasts” (Song of Songs 8:8), and Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This refers to Eilam, whose inhabitants merited to learn but did not merit to teach. They did not produce Torah scholars capable of imparting their wisdom to others. The Gemara returns to its list of endowments of various groups: Ten kav of strength descended to the world; the Persians took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of lice descended to the world; Media took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of witchcraft descended to the world; Egypt took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of plagues descended to the world; pigs, which carry disease, took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of licentiousness descended to the world; Arabia took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of brazenness descended to the world; Meishan, near Babylonia, took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of conversation descended to the world; women took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of drunkenness descended to the world; the Kushites took nine and the rest of the world took one. Ten kav of sleep descended to the world; slaves took nine and all the rest of the world in its entirety took one. MISHNA: If one said to a woman: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a priest, and he was found to be a Levite; or if he said: A Levite, and he was found to be a priest; or if he said: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a Gibeonite, a people prohibited by rabbinic law from marrying into the congregation, i.e., from marrying a Jew of fit lineage, and he was found to be a mamzer, who is prohibited by Torah law to marry into the congregation; or he said: A mamzer, and he was found to be a Gibeonite; or if he said: Be betrothed to me on the condition that I am a resident of a small town, and he was found to be a resident of a large city; or he said: A resident of a city, and he was found to be a resident of a town; or if he said: Be betrothed to me on the condition that my house is close to the bathhouse, and it was found to be far; or he said: Far from the bathhouse, and it was found to be close, she is not betrothed. Or if he said that she is betrothed to him on the condition that he has a grown daughter or a maidservant, and he does not have one, or on the condition that he does not have one and he has one; or on the condition that he has no sons, and he has sons, or on the condition that he has sons and he does not have sons, then she is not betrothed. And in all these cases, despite the fact that she later stated: I intended to become betrothed to him nevertheless, whether or not he fulfilled the condition, she is not betrothed. And similarly, if it was she who misled him by making the betrothal conditional upon a statement of hers that turned out to be incorrect, the betrothal will not take effect. GEMARA: The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael, but at the time that he sold the property he did not say anything with regard to his intention. Ultimately, he did not ascend to Eretz Yisrael, and he wished to renege on the sale. Rava said: Since he did not explicitly state that he was selling his property on the condition that he ascend to Eretz Yisrael, that is an unspoken matter that remained in the heart, and unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters. The Gemara asks: From where does Rava learn this principle? If we say it is from that which we learn in a baraita: With regard to one who pledges to bring a burnt-offering, the verse states: “If his offering be a burnt-offering of the herd, he shall offer it a male without blemish; he shall bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting, according to his will, before the Lord” (Leviticus 1:3). The seemingly superfluous words “he shall offer it” teaches that they coerce him to bring the offering. I might have thought that it can be offered entirely against his will, by taking it from his possession and sacrificing it; therefore, the verse states: “According to his will.” How can these texts be reconciled? They coerce him until he says: I want to bring the offering. The Gemara asks: But why should this be effective; but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him to bring the offering, and it is not according to his will. Rather, is it not because we say: Unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters, and his intention is rendered irrelevant by his explicit statement? The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps there it is different, since it is clear to us that it is satisfactory for him to achieve atonement, despite his earlier statement to the contrary. Rather, the Gemara derives a proof from the latter clause of that same baraita: And similarly, you find with bills of divorce of women and bills of manumission of slaves that when the court rules that a man must divorce his wife or free his slave and he does not want to, they coerce him until he says: I want to divorce my wife, or: I want to free my slave. But why should this be effective; but in his heart it is not satisfactory for him to divorce her or to free him. Rather, is it not because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters? The Gemara rejects this proof as well: But perhaps there it is different, because it is a mitzva to listen to the statements of the Sages, and the assumption is that when he is required to divorce his wife or free his slave, his true desire is to perform the mitzva. Rather, Rav Yosef says: The proof is from here (64a): In the case of one who betroths a woman and he said: I thought that she was the daughter of a priest, and she is in fact the daughter of a Levite; or I thought she was the daughter of a Levite, and she is found to be the daughter of a priest; I thought she was poor, and she is wealthy; or I thought she was wealthy, and she is poor, she is betrothed despite his mistaken assumption, because she did not mislead him. But why is she betrothed; but he said: I thought that she had a different characteristic, and he betrothed her with that in mind? Rather, it is because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters. Abaye said to him: Perhaps it is different there, since the ruling there is that she requires a bill of divorce only as a stringency, and they are not definitively betrothed. Rather, Abaye said that the proof is from here, from the mishna: And in all these cases, despite the fact that she later stated: I intended to become betrothed to him nevertheless, she is not betrothed. But why should her betrothal not take effect at all; but she said: I intended to become betrothed? This clause of the mishna teaches that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant. The Gemara rejects this proof: But perhaps it is different there, as, since he stipulated explicitly that a certain condition was true, it is not in her power to uproot his condition through thoughts alone. Rather, Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin says: There was an incident of this kind in Rav Ḥisda’s study hall, and Rav Ḥisda brought the case to Rav Huna’s study hall, and they resolved it from this mishna (Me’ila 21a): In the case of one who says to his agent: Bring me such and such an item from the window ledge or from the box [hadeluskema], forgetting that the item in question was consecrated property and any use of it would constitute misuse of consecrated property, and the agent brought it to him, then although at that point the owner said: My intention was that you bring the item only from this other place, once he brought the item to him from that place that he had mentioned, once the agent uses it the owner is liable for having misused consecrated property. But why should he be responsible; but he said: My intention was for the other place, so the agent did not fulfill his mission. Rather, is it not because we say that unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant matters? The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps it is different there, since it is suspected that he is coming to exempt himself from bringing an offering for his misuse by claiming that he intended a different item. Since there is cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place, his claim is not accepted. This cannot serve as a proof that in general, unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant. The Gemara responds: If all he wanted to do was exempt himself from the obligation to bring an offering, he could have said that the misuse was intentional, as one who misuses consecrated property intentionally is not obligated to bring an offering. Therefore, there is no cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place. The Gemara counters: It is not common for a person to place himself in the category of a wicked person by claiming to have committed a transgression intentionally. Therefore, once again, there is cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place. The Gemara continues to ask: To exempt himself from the obligation to bring an offering, he could have said: After the agent left I remembered that it was consecrated property. Such a claim would also have rendered him exempt, as we learned in that same mishna (Me’ila 21a): If one sent an agent to bring a particular item, and the owner remembered that it was consecrated and the agent did not remember but proceeded to fulfill his agency, it is the agent who has misused consecrated property and is liable to bring an offering, not the one who designated him, since the latter remembered and canceled the agency. There is no cause to question the truth of his statement that he had intended that the agent bring the item from the other place. Therefore, the fact that this state-ment is not accepted can serve as a proof that in general, unspoken matters that remain in the heart are not significant. The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael and explicitly stated this intention to the buyer. He ascended to Eretz Yisrael but he was not able to settle there. Upon his return to Babylonia, he sought to nullify the sale. Rava said: Whoever ascends to Eretz Yisrael does so with the intention of settling there, and as he was not able to settle there he can nullify the sale. There are those who say a different version, that Rava said the opposite: He intended to ascend to Eretz Yisrael, and he ascended, so he cannot nullify the sale. The Gemara relates a similar incident: There was a certain man who sold his property with the intention of ascending to Eretz Yisrael, but ultimately he did not ascend there. Rav Ashi said: If he had wanted to do so, he could have ascended. Since the matter depended upon him, there are no grounds for nullifying the sale. There are those who say Rav Ashi said as follows: If he had wanted to do so, couldn’t he have ascended? Since nothing prevented him from leaving, the sale is not nullified. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the two versions of Rav Ashi’s statement? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case when circumstances beyond his control occurred along the way, preventing him from going. According to the first version of the statement of Rav Ashi, the sale is upheld; but according to the second version, where Rav Ashi responded in the form of a question, the implication is that if there actually had been something that prevented him from ascending, the sale would be nullified. MISHNA: In the case of one who says to his agent: Go and betroth for me so-and-so in such and such a place, and the agent went and betrothed her in a different place, she is not betrothed, since he instructed that the betrothal take place in a particular location. But if he said: Go and betroth the woman for me, she is in such and such a place; and the agent betrothed her in a different place, she is betrothed, since he did not mean that the agent should betroth her specifically there, but was merely telling him where to find her. GEMARA: The Gemara comments: And we also learned in a mishna with regard to bills of divorce (Gittin 65a): With regard to one who says to his agents: Give this bill of divorce to my wife in such and such a place, and they gave it to her in another place, the divorce is invalid. If he said to them: She is in such and such a place, and they gave it to her in another place, it is valid. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state this halakha with regard to both betrothal and divorce, because had the tanna taught us only with regard to betrothal, you might say: In a case when he is coming to draw her near to him through betrothal, he thinks: They love me in this place and will not say negative remarks about me, but they hate me in that place and will say negative remarks about me. Therefore, he told the agent to perform the betrothal in a certain place and is particular that it take place only there. But with regard to bills of divorce, when he is coming to distance her from him, you might say he does not care where the divorce itself is performed. The tanna therefore informs us that this is not the case. And conversely, if the tanna had taught us only with regard to divorce, I would have said that he is particular only in the case of divorce, because in this place it is acceptable for him to degrade himself through divorce, whereas in that place it is not acceptable for him to do so; but with regard to betrothal, which involves no degradation, you might say he does not care where he betroths her. Therefore, it is necessary to state the halakha in both cases. MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths a woman on the condition that there are no vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, and it was found that there were vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, she is not betrothed, since his condition was not fulfilled. If he married her without specification, and it was found that there were vows incumbent upon her to fulfill, the marriage takes effect. Nevertheless, he has the right to divorce her, and she is divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract, as it is assumed that he would not have married her had he known that she was limited by her vows. Similarly, if he betrothed her on the condition that there are no blemishes upon her, and she was discovered to have blemishes, she is not betrothed. In a case where he married her without specification and she was discovered to have blemishes, he has the right to divorce her, and she is divorced without receiving payment of her marriage contract. As to what is defined as a blemish, the rule is that all the blemishes that disqualify priests from performing the Temple service, as detailed in tractate Bekhorot, also disqualify women from receiving their marriage contract in case of divorce. GEMARA: The Gemara comments: And we also learned a mishna like this with regard to the halakhot of marriage contracts, as the same mishna appears in tractate Ketubot (72b). The Gemara explains: Here it was necessary for the tanna to mention this halakha with regard to betrothal, and he taught the halakha of marriage contracts due to teaching the halakha of betrothal; there it was necessary for the tanna to mention this halakha with regard to marriage contracts, and he taught the halakha of betrothal due to teaching the halakha of marriage contracts. MISHNA: In the case of one who betroths two women together with an item worth one peruta, so that the value of each woman’s share was not worth one peruta, or who betroths one woman with an item worth less than one peruta, despite the fact that he later sent the traditional gifts [sivlonot] of a groom to the bride,
גופא אמר רבא ישראל מומר אוכל נבילות לתיאבון בודק סכין ונותן לו ומותר לאכול משחיטתו מאי טעמא כיון דאיכא התירא ואיסורא לא שביק התירא ואכיל איסורא
a string [dekurya] of birds, and the Jew does not know whether they were properly slaughtered, he severs the head of one of them and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat the meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. In arriving at their respective interpretations of the mishna, Abaye inferred from the first clause of the baraita and Rava inferred from the latter clause of the baraita. Abaye inferred from the first clause: The slaughter performed by a Samaritan is permitted in a case where there is a Jew actively supervising to ensure that the slaughter was performed properly, that the reason it is permitted is that the Jew is standing over him. But if the Jew exits and enters, then no, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. Rava inferred from the latter clause: If the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. The reason that it is necessary to administer this test is due only to the fact that the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal. But in a case where the Jew exits and enters, it is permitted to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered ab initio. The Gemara raises an objection: And according to Abaye, the latter clause is difficult. The Gemara answers that Abaye could have said to you: The tanna also characterizes the case where a Jew exits and enters as a case of: If the Jew came and found the Samaritan. The Gemara raises an objection: And according to Rava, the first clause is difficult. The Gemara answers that Rava could have said to you: The case where a Jew exits and enters is also considered like a case where the Jew is standing over him, and it is included in that halakha. § The baraita continues: Similarly, if the Jew found a string of birds in the possession of a Samaritan, and the Jew does not know whether they were properly slaughtered, he severs the head of one of them and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. The Gemara asks: Why is that a reliable indication? Let us be concerned that perhaps it is this bird alone, whose head the Jew severed, that the Samaritan slaughtered properly, and the rest are unslaughtered carcasses. Rav Menashe said an answer to this question. Before presenting his answer, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for the three statements of Rav Menashe cited in this tractate, this one and two others: Inserts, a scalpel (see 31a), into rams (see 51a). Rav Menashe’s answer is as follows: The case in the baraita is one where the Jew inserts the string of birds under the corners of his garment and hands the Samaritan the head of one of the birds. In that way, the Samaritan has no way of knowing from which bird the head was taken. If he ate it, apparently all the birds were slaughtered properly. The Gemara challenges: And perhaps the Samaritan placed a distinguishing mark in that bird, indicating to him that it is the kosher one. Rav Mesharshiyya said: The case in the baraita is one where the Jew crushed the head that he gave the Samaritan, thereby rendering it indistinguishable from the others. The Gemara challenges this answer: And perhaps the Samaritans hold there is no source for the slaughter of a bird in the Torah. Therefore, the fact that the Samaritan ate the bird’s head is no proof that the bird was properly slaughtered. The Gemara rejects that possibility: And according to your reasoning, those actions that disqualify the slaughter of an animal: Interrupting the slaughter, pressing the knife, concealing the knife in the course of an inverted slaughter, diverting [hagrama] the knife from the place of slaughter, and ripping the simanim from their place before cutting them, are they written in the Torah? Rather, even though the details are not all written in the Torah, once the Samaritans embraced those disqualifications, they embraced them, and a Jew may rely on their slaughter; when they eat from the meat, it is permitted for a Jew to eat the meat as well. Here too, although the requirement of ritual slaughter for a bird is not written in the Torah, once the Samaritans embraced the mitzva of ritual slaughter, they embraced it in the same manner that it is performed by Jews. And with regard to mitzvot that are not written explicitly in the Torah that Samaritans embraced, the question of whether they are presumed to fulfill them in the manner that Jews fulfill them or they are not presumed to do so is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: It is permitted to eat the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it. Rabbi Elazar prohibits the consumption of the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, because the Samaritans are not experts in the details of mitzvot like Jews and do not know the precise nature of leaven prohibited by the Torah. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: On the contrary, with regard to any mitzva that the Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews. Therefore, one may assume that they prepared the matza properly. The Gemara proceeds to analyze that baraita. The Master said: It is permitted to eat the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that if the matza is permitted one fulfills his obligation with it on Passover? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that Samaritans are not expert in the mitzva of guarding the matza for the sake of the mitzva, the tanna teaches us that they are expert. Rabbi Elazar deems it prohibited to eat the matza of Samaritans on Passover, due to the fact that the Samaritans are not experts in the details of mitzvot. He holds that Samaritans are not expert in the mitzva of guarding the matza for the sake of the mitzva. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to any mitzva that Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews. The Gemara raises an objection: That is identical to the opinion of the first tanna. The Gemara explains: There is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a mitzva that is written but with regard to which the Samaritans did not embrace it. The first tanna holds: Once the mitzva is written in the Torah, even if there is no knowledge that they embraced it, Samaritans can be relied upon to perform it properly. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Even with regard to a mitzva written in the Torah, if they embraced its observance, yes, one may rely on the Samaritans, but if they did not embrace its observance, no, one may not rely on them. The Gemara challenges: If it is so that this is the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the formulation of his statement is imprecise. He said: With regard to any mitzva that Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews; this indicates that one may rely upon Samaritans to observe those mitzvot even if they are not written in the Torah. Therefore, he should have said: If they embraced, which addresses the statement of the first tanna. Contrary to the first tanna, who said that one may rely upon Samaritans with regard to any mitzva that is written, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that one may rely upon them only if they embraced the mitzva. Rather, there is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a mitzva that is not written and with regard to which the Samaritans embraced its observance. The first tanna holds: Since it is not written, even though they embraced its observance one may also not rely upon them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Once it is known that they embraced observance of a mitzva, they embraced the mitzva and one may rely upon them. § With regard to the statement of Rava cited earlier (3a), the Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rava says: In the case of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, if he seeks to slaughter an animal, one examines a knife to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks and gives it to the transgressor, and it is permitted to eat from what he slaughtered. The Gemara explains: What is the reason? Since in this case there is the option to slaughter the animal in a permitted manner or to slaughter the animal in a prohibited manner, such a transgressor would not intentionally forsake the permitted manner and eat food slaughtered in a prohibited manner. Since he has a knife that was examined and the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, the food is presumed to be permitted, and there is no concern that perhaps he intentionally sabotaged the slaughter. The Gemara challenges: If so, then even in a case where the Jew did not examine the knife, it should be permitted to eat from the animal slaughtered by the transgressor. The Gemara answers: It is prohibited because if the transgressor discovers that the knife is flawed, he does not exert himself to replace it with a knife with a smooth blade. The Sages said to Rava: A baraita is taught that supports your opinion: With regard to the leavened bread of transgressors, who do not eradicate their leavened bread before Passover, after Passover
וּתְנֵינָא זָכִין לָאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו וְאֵין חָבִין לוֹ אֶלָּא בְּפָנָיו
and this person, Rabbi Yehuda from India, departed to death, and that individual, Mar Zutra, departed to life by receiving a slave. And there are those who say that this slave was a minor, and Mar Zutra did not act in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul. As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a convert who dies without heirs and Jews plundered his property, as it is considered ownerless, and among his possessions were slaves, then, whether the slaves were adults or minors, they acquire ownership of themselves and become freemen, as they can acquire themselves from the ownerless property. Abba Shaul says: Adult slaves acquire ownership of themselves and become freemen. But with regard to minor slaves, anyone who takes possession of them acquires them. According to the opinion of Abba Shaul, Mar Zutra did not have to hasten to acquire the slave during Rabbi Yehuda’s lifetime before the slave would acquire himself. He could have waited until Rabbi Yehuda died before acquiring the slave. § The mishna teaches that a slave can acquire himself by means of money, and Rabbi Meir rules that this money must be given by others. The Gemara comments: This ruling indicates that with money given by others, yes, the slave can be freed in this manner, but not by giving money himself. The Gemara inquires: With what are we dealing? If we say that this is referring to emancipating the Canaanite slave without his consent, that creates a difficulty. After all, we have heard that Rabbi Meir is the one who says: It is against the slave’s interest to leave his master’s authority for freedom, as he thereby loses out on certain benefits; and we learned in a baraita: One can act in a person’s interest in his absence, but one can act against a person’s interest only in his presence. How can one act against the slave’s interest and free him without his consent? Rather, it is obvious that this slave was freed with his consent, and the mishna teaches us this: With money given by others, yes, the slave can be freed in this manner, but by giving money himself, no, he cannot be freed in this manner, despite his consent. Evidently, a slave has no acquisition without his master. It is impossible for a slave to perform an independent act of acquisition, as everything acquired by him immediately belongs to his master. Consequently, he cannot be in possession of money with which he can acquire himself. Instead, the money must be given to his owner by somebody else. The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: He can be freed by means of a bill of manumission if he accepts it by himself. The Gemara analyzes this ruling: If he accepts it by himself, yes, but if it is accepted by others, no, he cannot acquire his freedom in this manner. And if this document is produced with the slave’s consent, as claimed above, why is it not effective if it is accepted by others? The Gemara adds: And if you would say in response: What is the meaning of: If he accepts it by himself? This means that in addition to being freed if the bill of manumission is accepted by others, he can also be freed if he accepts it by himself, and according to this interpretation the mishna teaches us this, that his bill of manumission and his ability to acquire himself come simultaneously. In other words, although he did not have the legal power to acquire himself while he was still a slave, when he receives his bill of manumission he attains this ability at that same moment. The Gemara explains why this interpretation of the mishna is problematic: But Rabbi Meir did not teach this ruling, as it is taught in a baraita: A slave can be freed by means of a bill of manumission if he accepts it by himself, but not if it is accepted by others; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Abaye said: Actually, according to Rabbi Meir the mishna is referring to a case where the master received money without the slave’s consent, and acquisition effected with the giving of money is different: Since it acquires him against his will from another master, as the slave’s consent is not necessary in that case, it likewise acquires him for himself against his will. His consent is not required, despite the fact that it is against his interest to be freed. The Gemara asks: If so, that the halakha that a slave can be freed with the giving of money without his consent is predicated on the halakha that he can be acquired by means of the giving of money to his previous master without his consent, he should also be freed with a document if it is accepted by others without his consent. The Gemara answers: This document is discrete, and this document is discrete, i.e., the comparison between the acquisition of a slave and his emancipation is invalid in the case of a document, as a document of sale is not similar to a bill of manumission. The Gemara asks: Here too, this money is discrete and this money is discrete, as the money is given for a different purpose in the cases of acquisition and manumission. The Gemara answers: In any event, the coin itself is one, i.e., there is no noticeable difference between the coin used for acquisition of a slave and one that would be used for emancipating him. The same cannot be said with regard to documents, as particular texts serve specific purposes, and the same document could not be used for both acquiring a slave and emancipating him. Rava said the following distinction: With regard to emancipation by means of money, his master’s receipt of the money causes him to be freed, not the giving of the money by others. Therefore, they are not considered to have harmed the slave without his consent. By contrast, in the case of a document, the receipt of the document by others on behalf of the slave causes him to be freed, and one can incur liability for another person only in his presence. § The mishna teaches: And the Rabbis say: The slave can be freed by means of money given by himself. The Gemara analyzes this ruling: By means of money given by himself, yes, he can be emancipated in this manner, but with money given by others, no, he cannot be emancipated in this manner. The Gemara asks: Why not? Although this was indeed performed without the slave’s consent, after all, we heard that the Rabbis say: It is in a slave’s interest to go out from the master’s authority to freedom. And we learned in a baraita: One can act in a person’s interest in his absence, but one can act against a person’s interest only in his presence. Why, then, isn’t he freed when others give the money, considering that this change of status is to his advantage? And if you would say: What is the meaning of the phrase: By means of money given by himself? This means that not only can he be redeemed by means of money given to others but he can be redeemed even by means of money given to himself, and it teaches us that a slave has the ability to receive an acquisition without his master. If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: He can be freed by means of a bill of manumission if it is accepted by others. This indicates: If it is accepted by others but not if he accepts it by himself. And yet we maintain that according to the Rabbis his bill of manumission and his ability to acquire his freedom come simultaneously. If so, why can’t he be freed through a document he accepts by himself? And if you would say: What is the meaning of: If it is accepted by others? This means that not only can he be emancipated if he accepts the bill of manumission by himself, but he can even be freed if it is accepted by others, and the mishna teaches us this: That it is in a slave’s interest to go out from the master’s authority to freedom. If so, there is no difference between emancipation by means of money and emancipation by means of a document, and therefore let us combine them and teach them together and say: A slave can be freed by means of money and by means of a bill of manumission, whether by others or whether by himself. Rather, it is clear that there is a difference between money and a document. When he is emancipated by means of money, a slave can be freed whether by means of money given by others or whether by means of money given by himself. In the case of a bill of manumission, he can be emancipated if it is accepted by others but not if he accepts it by himself. And this latter clause is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: A slave can also be freed with a bill of manumission if it is accepted by others but not if he accepts it by himself. And there are three disputes with regard to the matter. There are the opinions of Rabbi Meir, the Rabbis, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. Rabba said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar? He derives this by means of a verbal analogy, understanding the meaning of “to her [lah],” written with regard to a maidservant in the verse: “Nor was freedom given to her” (Leviticus 19:20), from the meaning of “for her [lah],” written with regard to a wife: “And he writes for her a bill of divorce” (Deuteronomy 24:3). Just as a woman is not divorced until the husband moves the bill of divorce from his domain to a domain that is not his, and the bill of divorce is ineffective as long as it remains in his domain; so too, a slave is not freed unless the master moves the bill of manumission to a domain that is not his. Since the slave belongs to him, the document will remain the master’s even if he gives it to the slave. Therefore, he can be freed by means of a document only through other people who receive the document on his behalf. Rabba raises a dilemma:
גיגית נר וקדרה לב"ש אפקורי מפקר להו. ואף על גב דבעלמא בעי הפקר בפני שלשה, הכא דלאפרושי מאיסור הוא לא בעי דמסתמא מפקר להו בגמר דעת. ולי נראה דמשום הפקר בית דין נגעו בה דלב בית דין מתנה עליהם להפריש העם מאיסור, דאי לא תימא הכי ודאי כולי עלמא לאו דב"ש ידעי וכל שכן במקום ב"ה.
קשיא לי בשלמא אליבא דרב יוסף ניחא דאיכא לתרוצי משום הפקר, אלא לרבה דמפרש טעמא דב"ש משום גזירה במלאכות הנגמרות בשבת, אי הכי גיגית וקדרה לב"ש מאי טעמא שרו. ויש לומר דאף לרבה הוי טעמא משום הפקר, כלומר: שהן מפקירין התבשיל עצמו ובדבר המופקר לא גזרו. ודחוק הוא. ואלא יש לומר דלרבה ניחא דכיון שאין האיסור אלא מדבריהם ומשום גזירה בנר וגיגית דלא אפשר לא גזרו, ובקדרה נמי לא החמירו לבשל לגמרי מבערב מפני שהיא גזירה שאין רוב הצבור יכולין לעמוד בה, ושפוד שאמרו במתניתין היינו משום דגזירתו קרובה ומצויה דשמא יחתה בגחלים, אבל לרב יוסף דמוקי לה בשביתת כלים ודאורייתא הוא לדידיה הוא דקשיא להו גיגית נר וקדרה היכי שרו לה ב"ש. כך נראה לי
(כ) מִי שֶׁהַדִּין נוֹתֵן שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ וְלֹא רָצָה לְגָרֵשׁ. בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּכָל מָקוֹם וּבְכָל זְמַן מַכִּין אוֹתוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר רוֹצֶה אֲנִי וְיִכְתֹּב הַגֵּט וְהוּא גֵּט כָּשֵׁר. וְכֵן אִם הִכּוּהוּ עַכּוּ''ם וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ עֲשֵׂה מַה שֶּׁיִּשְׂרָאֵל אוֹמְרִין לְךָ וְלָחֲצוּ אוֹתוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּיַד הָעַכּוּ''ם עַד שֶׁיְּגָרֵשׁ הֲרֵי זֶה כָּשֵׁר. וְאִם הָעַכּוּ''ם מֵעַצְמָן אֲנָסוּהוּ עַד שֶׁכָּתַב הוֹאִיל וְהַדִּין נוֹתֵן שֶׁיִּכְתֹּב הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט פָּסוּל. וְלָמָּה לֹא בִּטֵּל גֵּט זֶה שֶׁהֲרֵי הוּא אָנוּס בֵּין בְּיַד עַכּוּ''ם בֵּין בְּיַד יִשְׂרָאֵל. שֶׁאֵין אוֹמְרִין אָנוּס אֶלָּא לְמִי שֶׁנִּלְחַץ וְנִדְחַק לַעֲשׂוֹת דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְחֻיָּב בּוֹ מִן הַתּוֹרָה לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ כְּגוֹן מִי שֶׁהֻכָּה עַד שֶׁמָּכַר אוֹ עַד שֶׁנָּתַן. אֲבָל מִי שֶׁתְּקָפוֹ יִצְרוֹ הָרַע לְבַטֵּל מִצְוָה אוֹ לַעֲשׂוֹת עֲבֵרָה וְהֻכָּה עַד שֶׁעָשָׂה דָּבָר שֶׁחַיָּב לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ אוֹ עַד שֶׁנִּתְרַחֵק מִדָּבָר הָאָסוּר לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ אֵין זֶה אָנוּס מִמֶּנּוּ אֶלָּא הוּא אָנַס עַצְמוֹ בְּדַעְתּוֹ הָרָעָה. לְפִיכָךְ זֶה שֶׁאֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה לְגָרֵשׁ מֵאַחַר שֶׁהוּא רוֹצֶה לִהְיוֹת מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל וְרוֹצֶה הוּא לַעֲשׂוֹת כָּל הַמִּצְוֹת וּלְהִתְרַחֵק מִן הָעֲבֵרוֹת וְיִצְרוֹ הוּא שֶׁתְּקָפוֹ וְכֵיוָן שֶׁהֻכָּה עַד שֶׁתָּשַׁשׁ יִצְרוֹ וְאָמַר רוֹצֶה אֲנִי כְּבָר גֵּרֵשׁ לִרְצוֹנוֹ. לֹא הָיָה הַדִּין נוֹתֵן שֶׁכּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לְגָרֵשׁ וְטָעוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל אוֹ שֶׁהָיוּ הֶדְיוֹטוֹת וַאֲנָסוּהוּ עַד שֶׁגֵּרֵשׁ הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט פָּסוּל הוֹאִיל וְיִשְׂרָאֵל אֲנָסוּהוּ יִגְמֹר וִיגָרֵשׁ. וְאִם הָעַכּוּ''ם, אֲנָסוּהוּ לְגָרֵשׁ שֶׁלֹּא כַּדִּין אֵינוֹ גֵּט. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמַר בְּעַכּוּ''ם רוֹצֶה אֲנִי וְאָמַר לְיִשְׂרָאֵל כִּתְבוּ וְחִתְמוּ הוֹאִיל וְאֵין הַדִּין מְחַיְּבוֹ לְהוֹצִיא וְהָעַכּוּ''ם אֲנָסוּהוּ אֵינוֹ גֵּט:
(20) When a man whom the law requires to be compelled to divorce his wife does not desire to divorce her, the court should have him beaten until he consents, at which time they should have a get written. The get is acceptable. This applies at all times and in all places.
Similarly, if gentiles beat him while telling him: "Do what the Jews are telling you to do," and the Jews have the gentiles apply pressure on him until [he consents] to divorce his wife, the divorce is acceptable. If, however, the gentiles compel him to write [a get] on their own initiative, the get is [merely] unacceptable. The rationale is that the law requires him to give a divorce.
Why is this get not void? For he is being compelled - either by Jews or by gentiles - [to divorce] against his will [and a get must be given voluntarily].
Because the concept of being compelled against one's will applies only when speaking about a person who is being compelled and forced to do something that the Torah does not obligate him to do - e.g., a person who was beaten until he consented to a sale, or to give a present. If, however, a person's evil inclination presses him to negate [the observance of] a mitzvah or to commit a transgression, and he was beaten until he performed the action he was obligated to perform, or he dissociated himself from the forbidden action, he is not considered to have been forced against his will. On the contrary, it is he himself who is forcing [his own conduct to become debased].
With regard to this person who [outwardly] refuses to divorce [his wife] - he wants to be part of the Jewish people, and he wants to perform all the mitzvot and eschew all the transgressions; it is only his evil inclination that presses him. Therefore, when he is beaten until his [evil] inclination has been weakened, and he consents [to the divorce], he is considered to have performed the divorce willfully.
[Different laws apply when] the law does not require him to divorce his wife, and a Jewish court or simple people compel him to divorce her. This get is deemed unacceptable. Since, however, it was Jews who compelled him, he [is advised] to complete the divorce [in a proper manner]. If, by contrast, gentiles compel him to divorce when it was not required, the divorce is void. Even though he tells the gentiles that he consented and tells the Jews to write and sign [a get], since the law does not require him to divorce, and he was compelled to do so by gentiles, the get is void.
אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: הַעֲרָמָה קָא אָמְרַתְּ — שָׁאנֵי הַעֲרָמָה דְּאַחְמִירוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן טְפֵי מִמֵּזִיד.
And if it is so that if one baked without having placed an eiruv for the joining of cooked foods, it is permitted to eat the bread, let the baraita simply teach: With regard to one who transgressed the prohibition and baked, it is permitted to eat the bread. Rav Adda bar Mattana said: There is no proof from here, as the tanna is teaching a remedy involving acting in a permitted manner, and is not teaching a remedy involving a prohibited act. The tanna did not want to teach that it is also possible to solve the problem in this proscribed manner. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a resolution from a different baraita: One who prepared an eiruv for the joining of cooked foods on a Festival eve may bake and cook and insulate food on the Festival for Shabbat that occurs on the following day, and if he wants to eat his eiruv on Shabbat, he has permission to do so. But if he ate it on the Festival before he baked or before he insulated, he may neither bake, nor cook, nor insulate, neither for himself nor for others, and likewise others may neither bake nor cook for him. However, even without an eiruv, one in this situation may cook for the Festival itself, and if he left over part of what he cooked, he has left it over for Shabbat, provided that he does not employ artifice to circumvent the prohibition by saying that he is cooking a large amount for guests on the Festival, when in fact he has Shabbat in mind. And if he employed artifice to circumvent the prohibition, it is prohibited to eat the food, by decree of the Sages. This indicates that one who cooks on a Festival for Shabbat in a prohibited manner may not eat the food. Rav Ashi said: This is no proof, as you speak of a case of artifice, and a case of artifice is different, as the Sages were more stringent with regard to one who employs artifice than with regard to one who intentionally cooks on a Festival for Shabbat. One who purposely transgresses is aware of his sin; therefore, he might repent and desist from his prohibited behavior, thereby preventing others from learning from his actions. However, one who employs artifice to circumvent a prohibition thinks that he is acting in a permitted manner. He is therefore likely to continue his practice. Furthermore, people might emulate him, and the halakha of preparing an eiruv might be forgotten. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that there is another reason to reject the proof from this baraita: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya and in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai. As it is taught in a baraita that Ḥananya says that Beit Shammai say: One may not bake bread on a Festival for Shabbat unless he prepared an eiruv for the joining of cooked foods on the eve of the Festival specifically with bread; and one may not cook any type of dish unless he prepared an eiruv with a cooked dish; and one may not insulate food unless there was hot food insulated from the eve of the Festival. And Beit Hillel say: One may prepare an eiruv for the joining of cooked foods with one cooked dish and use it for all his needs, i.e., baking, cooking, and insulating. Since Ḥananya’s opinion in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai is strict in this case, it may be assumed that he is stringent after the fact as well, and therefore the baraita provides no proof. The Gemara offers yet another suggestion. We learned in a mishna: In the case of one who transgressed a rabbinic prohibition and tithed his produce on Shabbat, if he did so unwittingly, he may eat of it; if he acted intentionally, he may not eat of it. This indicates that one may not derive benefit from a transgression that he committed intentionally. The Gemara rejects this argument: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha with regard to a case where he has other produce and therefore does not greatly suffer as a result. However, the Sages may have been more lenient with one who did not make an eiruv for the joining of cooked food and consequently has nothing to eat. The Gemara poses another resolution: Come and hear a proof from a different source: In the case of one who immerses his vessels on Shabbat, an activity that the Sages prohibited because it is akin to repairing a vessel, if he did so unwittingly, he may use them; however, if he did so intentionally, he may not use them. This shows that the product of an action performed in a prohibited manner is prohibited. The Gemara rejects this argument: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha with regard to a case where he has other vessels and is not forced to use these ones. Alternatively, it is possible for him to manage by borrowing vessels from others. But if one failed to set aside an eiruv for the joining of cooked foods, perhaps the Sages allowed him to eat the food he cooked on the Festival for Shabbat since it is difficult to obtain food from others on Shabbat. The Gemara suggests another proof: Come and hear that which was taught in the following baraita: In the case of one who cooks on Shabbat, if he did so unwittingly, he may eat the food that he cooked; but if he cooked it intentionally, he may not eat it. This demonstrates that one who purposely violated a prohibition may not benefit from his prohibited action. The Gemara rejects this argument: There is no proof from here; the prohibition of Shabbat desecration is different, since it entails karet and execution by a court. The same stringency might not necessarily apply to cooking on a Festival for the sake of the next day, and therefore the question raised above remains unresolved. § It is stated in the mishna: Beit Shammai say that for the purpose of the joining of cooked foods one must prepare two cooked dishes, whereas Beit Hillel say that one dish suffices. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, who taught in the Tosefta that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that two dishes are necessary. With regard to what do they disagree? They disagree with regard to a fried fish and the egg on it, as Beit Shammai say: Two proper dishes are required, and this fish is considered only a single dish; and Beit Hillel say: One dish of this kind is viewed as two dishes and is therefore suitable for an eiruv for the joining of cooked foods. And they both agree that if one sliced a cooked egg and placed it inside the fish, or if he mashed leeks [kaflotot] and placed them inside the fish, they are considered two dishes. Rava said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the tanna of our mishna and in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel that one dish suffices. The mishna states that if one ate the food prepared before the Festival as an eiruv or if it was lost, he may not rely on it and cook with the initial intent to cook for Shabbat. Abaye said: We have a tradition that if one prepared a proper eiruv and began kneading his dough on a Festival for Shabbat, and in the meantime his eiruv was eaten, he may finish baking the bread. Since he had begun in a permitted manner, he is allowed to complete the process and bake the bread. MISHNA: If a Festival occurs directly after Shabbat, i.e., on a Sunday, and one wishes to behave in a proper manner and purify himself and his vessels in honor of the Festival, Beit Shammai say: One must immerse everything before Shabbat, and Beit Hillel say: Vessels must be immersed before Shabbat, but a person may immerse himself even on Shabbat. And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel both agree that one may bring ritually impure water into contact with ritually pure water in stone vessels on Shabbat in order to purify the water. Impure water can be purified if it is placed into a vessel that does not contract ritual impurity, such as a stone vessel, and then lowered with the vessel into a ritual bath. The water becomes purified when it comes into contact with the water of the ritual bath. Although this is not considered proper immersion, water may nevertheless be purified in this manner. However, one may not immerse the impure water in a ritually impure vessel in order to purify the vessel at the same time. Likewise, one may immerse on a Festival from one principle to another, and from one group to another, as will be explained in the Gemara. GEMARA: In any event, everyone agrees, i.e., both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree, that one may not immerse a vessel on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that one may not do so? Which type of prohibited labor does it involve? Rabba said: It is a decree issued by the Sages as a preventive measure,
שאני הערמה כו' - לעולם עבר ואפה מותר והערמה אינה ראיה לכאן דשאני הערמה ממזיד דאיכא למימר אחמור בה רבנן בהערמה טפי ממזיד דאלו מזיד רשע הוא לעבור על דברי חכמים ואין אחרים למדים הימנו והוא עצמו משים אל לבו ושב הלכך לא מעקרא תורת עירוב אבל מערים סבור לעשות בהיתר הלכך לא ישיב אל לבו לחזור בו ואחרים למדין הימנו ומעקרא תורת עירוב הלכך קנסוהו רבנן:
(יא) צריך לבדוק. דכשיבא בפסח לאו ברשותיה קיימא דליבטליה וכשראוהו עובר עליו (רש"י) משמע דקודם שראוהו אין עובר עליו (ב"ח) וצ"ע דהא בגמרא דידן קאי על חמץ ידוע וא"כ אף על פי שלא ראוהו עובר עליו כיון שהו' ברשותו לכן נ"ל דה"ק דקוד' שרואהו י"ל שכב' נאכל או נאבד או ישראל מכרו מפני שהוא כמשיב אביד' כמ"ש סי' תמ"ג ס"ב אבל כשבא לביתו ורואהו עובר עליו עמ"ש סי' תל"ד: