(6)And these are items that belong to gentiles and are prohibited, but their prohibition is not that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited: Milk that was milked by a gentile and a Jew did not see him performing this action, and their bread and oil. The mishna notes that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and his court permitted the oil of gentiles entirely. The mishna resumes its list: And boiled and pickled vegetables, whose usual manner of preparation involves adding wine and vinegar to them...

The mishna teaches: And bread belonging to gentiles is prohibited for consumption. Rav Kahana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Unlike oil, bread was not permitted by a court. The Gemara asks: From the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan states that bread was not permitted in court, can it be inferred that there is a different opinion that claims that a court did permit it? The Gemara answers: Yes, as when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: Once Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went out to the field, and a gentile brought before him a se’a of bread baked in a large baker’s oven [purnei]. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: How exquisite is this loaf of bread! What did the Sages see that caused them to prohibit it? The Gemara asks, incredulously: What did the Sages see that caused them to prohibit it? It was prohibited due to the concern that Jews might befriend gentiles while breaking bread with them, which could lead to marriage with gentiles. The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was not asking why bread was prohibited in general. Rather, he asked: What did the Sages see that caused them to prohibit bread even in the field, where this concern does not apply? The Gemara notes that upon hearing of this incident the people thought that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permitted the bread of gentiles. But that is not so; Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi did not actually permit such bread. This is why Rabbi Yoḥanan emphasized that the bread of gentiles was never permitted by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s court. The Gemara records an alternate version of this episode. Rav Yosef, and some say Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda, says: The incident did not occur in this manner. Rather, they said: Once Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi went to a certain place and saw that bread was scarce for the students in the study hall. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Is there no baker [palter] here who can prepare bread? Upon hearing of this incident, the people thought to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was referring to a gentile baker, which would indicate that bread baked by a professional baker is permitted, even if he is a gentile. But in reality, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi stated his question only in reference to a Jewish baker. The Gemara cites two qualifications of the leniency that people inferred from the above incident. Rabbi Ḥelbo said: Even according to the one who thought to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was referring to a gentile baker, we said that the bread is permitted only where there is no Jewish baker, but in a place where there is a Jewish baker, the leniency would certainly not apply. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even according to the one who thought to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was referring to a gentile baker, that statement applies only in the field, but in the city it would not apply, and the bread would still be prohibited due to the possibility of marriage with a gentile.

The Gemara asks: And how could Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permit an ordinance issued by the students of Shammai and Hillel? But didn’t we learn in a mishna that a court cannot void the statements of another court, unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number? And furthermore, doesn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to all issues, a court can void the statements of another court, except the eighteen matters decreed by the students of Beit Shammai, as, even if Elijah and his court were to come and rescind them, one would not listen to him.Rav Mesharshiyya said: What is the reason that none of the eighteen decrees can be voided? Since the prohibition spread among the majority of the Jewish people, it cannot be voided. But with regard to oil, its prohibition did not spread among the majority of the Jewish people, and therefore it can be voided. As Rabbi Shmuel bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Our Sages sat and inspected the matter of gentiles’ oil and determined that its prohibition had not spread among the majority of the Jewish people, and our Sages relied upon the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and upon the statement of Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok, who would say: The Sages issue a decree upon the community only if most of the community is able to abide by it. As Rav Adda bar Ahava said: What is the verse from which it is derived? It is the verse: “You are cursed with the curse, yet you rob Me, even this whole nation” (Malachi 3:9). This teaches that if there is the acceptance of the whole nation, yes, an ordinance may be instituted, but if not, no, the ordinance may not be instituted.

§ The Gemara discusses the matter itself: Balei says that Avimi of Nota says in the name of Rav: The prohibitions with regard to gentiles’ bread and their oil, their wine and their daughters, are all from the eighteen matters issued in a single day in the time of the students of Shammai and Hillel...And Geneiva says in the name of Rav: Gentiles’ bread, oil, wine, and daughters were all decreed upon due to the concern that Jews might participate in idol worship with gentiles as a result of intermingling with them. As, when Rav Aḥa bar Adda came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Yitzḥak says: They decreed a prohibition upon their bread due to their oil. The Gemara asks: In what way is the prohibition with regard to oil stronger than the prohibition with regard to bread? That is, why does the primary concern relate to the oil of gentiles rather than their bread? The Gemara offers a different interpretation: Rather, they issued a decree prohibiting their bread and their oil due to their wine. And they issued the decree prohibiting their wine due to the fact that this leads to familiarity, and Jews will come to marry their daughters. And they issued a decree prohibiting their daughters due to something else, idolatry.

(12) Although [our Sages] forbade bread [baked] by gentiles, there are places where leniency is shown regarding this matter and bread baked by a gentile baker is purchased in a place where there is no Jewish baker and it is in a field, because this is a pressing situation. There is, by contrast, no one who will rule that leniency may be shown with regard to bread baked by a homeowner. For the primary reason for [our Sages'] decree was [to prevent] intermarriage. If one will eat the bread of a [gentile] homeowner, [it is likely that] he will feast with him.

We taught in the chapter אין מעמידין: And these are items that belong to gentiles and are prohibited, but their prohibition is not that of an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited: their bread, oil, and cooked things...And we can explain that (in the gemara), R. Yohanan is not disagreeing on R. Helbo, but rather coming to increase the permission--that even in a city, any case where there is not a Jewish baker, bread of a non-Jewish baker is permitted (according to R. Helbo); and R. Yohanan comes to say that in the field, even if there is in a city near it a Jewish baker, we don't trouble her to go to the city to buy from this baker, since in the field itself there is not a Jewish baker (and so one can eat bread from a non-Jewish one)...However this is davka from a baker, and davka in a place where there is not a Jewish baker, but from a homeowner, even if the person doesn't have something else to eat, it is still forbidden unless it is life-threatening, for example if they'd fasted excessively...And the reason it's permitted to buy from a baker is because their bread is made to sell, and so buying it doesn't create significant intimacy...And if there's a Jewish baker in the area but the non-Jewish baker makes nicer bread, or a different kind of bread, it's permitted to buy from the non-Jewish baker.

This implies that there's someone who permits--From the fact that it says bread was not permitted by the beit din, it implies that if they wanted, they could have permitted--seemingly it's prohibition didn't spread. And this is what we rely upon nowadays to eat the bread of non-Jews, since the prohibition did not spread throughout all the Jews...

(2) There are places that are lenient about this, [where] they buy bread from an idolater's bakery in a situation where there is no Jewish bakery, since this is considered a "time of pressing need." Rem"a: And some say that even in a place where "Jews' bread" can be found, it is permitted (Beit Yosef following the Mordechai; Sefer Mitzvot Hakatan; Hagaot Ashri; Mahar"i; Issur VeHeter §44). But regarding personal bread, no-one rules leniently, since the essence of the decree is because of the concern of intermarriage, and if one eats the bread of [idolatrous] home-owners, he will come to dine by them. Rem"a: However, it is not called "personal bread" unless he made it for the people of his own household, but if he made it to sell, it is called commercial bread, even if he doesn't normally [sell bread].

(5) There are those who say that one who has bread in their hand, or there's a Jewish baker nearby, but the non-Jewish baker makes nicer bread, or of a different kind, it's permitted to buy from the non-Jewish bread...since his mind is more settled/pleased with the bread of this baker on account of its quality/significance, in his eyes this is like "a time of pressing need."

(8) There are those who say that in a place where no bakers are found whatsoever, even the bread of a homeowner is permitted (Rema: and one doesn't need to wait for kosher bread, and this is our practice.)

And according to the opinion of my master my father the Rosh, there is no distinction between bread of a homeowner and bread of a baker.

§ The mishna teaches: And boiled vegetables prepared by gentiles are prohibited....the cooking of gentiles is prohibited by rabbinic law, and the verse is cited as a mere support. The Gemara discusses the particulars of the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles. Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says that Rav says: Any item that is eaten as it is, i.e., raw, is not subject to the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles. The Gemara remarks: In the study hall in Sura, they taught it this way. In Pumbedita, they taught it like this: Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says that Rav says: Any item that is not eaten together with bread on the table of kings is not subject to the prohibition against eating the cooking of gentiles. In other words, foods that are not eaten by distinguished individuals are not subject to this prohibition.

(9) There are other substances which are forbidden by the Sages. Even though there is not a basis for their prohibition in Scriptural Law, they decreed against their use to separate from the gentiles so that Jews will not intermingle with them and intermarry. They are: It is forbidden to drink [alcoholic beverages] with them even in a place where there was no suspicion that the wine was poured as a libation. And they forbade eating from their bread or cooked dishes even in a place where there is no suspicion that the food was forbidden.

Rashi's commentary: The rabbis decreed [that one must not eat "stewed" or cooked foodstuffs of a non-Jew] because of the concern lest they eat impure things. And more [than this concern] it seems that the reason [for this decree] is because of [the concern] of intermarriages [between Jews and non-Jews].

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Concerning milk, with regard to what need we be concerned? Why is the milk prohibited? If it is due to the concern that a gentile might exchange the milk of a kosher animal with the milk of a non-kosher animal, this concern is unfounded, as kosher milk is white whereas non-kosher milk has a green tinge to it, and therefore they are easily distinguishable. And if it is prohibited due to the concern that it might be mixed with non-kosher milk, let the Jew curdle the milk obtained from the gentile, as the Master said: Milk from a kosher animal curdles, but milk from a non-kosher animal does not curdle.

GEMARA:We learn from the mishna that which the Sages taught explicitly in a baraita: A Jew may sit beside a gentile’s flock and wait while the gentile milks his animals and brings the milk to the Jew, and he not need be concerned, even if he cannot see the milking process from his seated position. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is known that there is no non-kosher animal in the gentile’s flock, isn’t it obvious that the milk is permitted? Why would the baraita teach an obvious halakha? And if there is a non-kosher animal in his flock, then why is the milk permitted, considering the fact that the Jew could not see the gentile from where he sat?

The Gemara explains: Actually, this is referring to a case where there is a non-kosher animal in the flock, and when the Jew is standing he can see the gentile, but when he is sitting he cannot see the gentile. Lest you say: Since when the Jew is sitting, he cannot see the gentile, we should be concerned that perhaps the gentile will bring non-kosher milk and mix it with the kosher milk, the baraita therefore teaches us that since when the Jew is standing, he can see him, the gentile is fearful of being caught and does not mix anything into the milk.