This source sheet is part of the larger Ta’amei HaPardes Commentary, a project of the Pardes Institute of Jewish Studies. This is sheet 1 of 5 on the topic of Talmud.
מַתְנִי׳ מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּהֲגוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת מְלָאכָה...
MISHNA: In a place where the people were accustomed to perform labor...
The first five mishnayot of this chapter deal with the authority of minhag (religious custom). To be more precise, the discussion is about practices which are not technically prohibited by law, but the community decided to refrain from them nevertheless. The opening Mishna deals with the custom of refraining from labor from the morning before Pesach, even though labor is not prohibited by law until midday. The Mishna notes that different locations adopted different practices, and thus a person who travels from a place that practiced one custom to a place that practiced another custom would find themselves in a tension between their original custom and the local custom.
In addition to the example of the custom to eat or refrain from roasted meats at the seder included in our chapter, the Mishna offers other examples of different places having different customs. These include the timing of when fruits of the Sabbatical year must be removed from the home, the selling of goats and sheep to gentiles, lighting candles before the onset of Yom Kippur, and working on the Ninth of Av. There are many other examples of authoritative minhag in Tannaitic literature spanning different areas of practice. Examples from the Mishna include the minhag to say or not say a blessing over the recitation of the Megilla on Purim (Megilla 4:1), customs governing business transactions (Bava Metzia 4:11 and 5:5), and payment of workers (Bava Metzia 7:1 and 9:1). In addition to examples found in Tosefta Pesachim, which include returning betrothal money after the death of the groom and funeral and mourning practices (3: 11-12), we find many other examples where local practice is deemed to be authoritative. The Tosefta in Rosh Hashana says the text of the Mussaf on Rosh Hashana is determined by local practice (2:11), Tosefta Berachot teaches that the recitation of the mourner’s blessing is based on minhag (3:23), while Tosefta Ketubot says that certain dowry practices and the responsibilities of the wife are based on custom. These are just some examples of the numerous instances in which minhag is seen to be authoritative. From these examples it appears that minhag operates in many different ways. Our Mishna is an example of a minhag of stringency, where a community added on to the legal requirement. The example of reciting a blessing over Megilla reading or mourning rituals appear to be examples of minhag determining which legal opinion to follow. The customs governing commerce and acquisition deal with what people can expect or demand when dealing with transactions or other economic issues.
The Mishna does not define the parameters of a “place” in regards to the authority of minhag. We could be talking about geography, a shared Rabbinic authority for the location, or political authority. In later times some halakhic authorities will speak about regions or countries that share minhagim.
The fact that a legal code like the Mishna recognizes the authority of minhag and the diversity of minhagim reflects a willingness to accept multiple practices as legitimate, as opposed to attempting to legislate a singular approach. In the Yerushalmi on our Mishna, Resh Lakish (R. Shimon ben Lakish) raised this as a problem to R. Yochanan. He asked whether this legitimation of multiple minhagim was in fact a violation of dividing groups according to different practices:
רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ שָׁאַל לְרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. וְאֵינוֹ אָסוּר מִשּׁוּם בַּל תִתְגּוֹדְדוּ. אָמַר לֵיהּ. בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁאֵילּוּ עוֹשִׂין כְּבֵית שַׁמַּי וְאֵילּוּ עוֹשִׂין כְּבֵית הִלֵּל.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Is it not forbidden because of “do not split into sects”? He said to him, in case these follow the House of Shammai and those the House of Hillel.
This phrase at the end of our Mishna is particularly challenging. The phrase threatens to undermine the Mishna itself. The Mishna established that customs of stringency follow the individual, even when they come to a new place. This suggests that one must observe their minhag of either working or not working even if they come from a place that does the opposite. If they are coming from a place that does not have the stringency, i.e., their practice is to work, they can observe the local stringency of not working at the new place without violating their personal minhag or generating conflict. If their minhag is to not work, and they come to a place where the custom is to work, they will have a conflict. If they keep their stringent minhag of not working they will create conflict. If they work, they will be violating the stringent minhag.
הַהוֹלֵךְ מִמָּקוֹם וְכוּ׳. בִּשְׁלָמָא הַהוֹלֵךְ מִמָּקוֹם שֶׁעוֹשִׂין לְמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵין עוֹשִׂין — נוֹתְנִין עָלָיו חוּמְרֵי מָקוֹם שֶׁהָלַךְ לְשָׁם, וְאַל יְשַׁנֶּה אָדָם מִפְּנֵי הַמַּחְלוֹקֶת וְלָא לֶיעְבֵּיד. אֶלָּא מִמָּקוֹם שֶׁאֵין עוֹשִׂין לְמָקוֹם שֶׁעוֹשִׂין, אַל יְשַׁנֶּה אָדָם מִפְּנֵי הַמַּחְלוֹקֶת וְנַעְבֵּיד? הָא אָמְרַתְּ: ״נוֹתְנִין עָלָיו חוּמְרֵי מָקוֹם שֶׁהָלַךְ לְשָׁם וְחוּמְרֵי מָקוֹם שֶׁיָּצָא מִשָּׁם״! אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אַרֵישָׁא. רָבָא אָמַר: לְעוֹלָם אַסֵּיפָא, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: אֵין בָּזוֹ מִפְּנֵי שִׁינּוּי הַמַּחְלוֹקֶת. מַאי קָא אָמְרַתְּ — הָרוֹאֶה אוֹמֵר מְלָאכָה אֲסוּרָה? מֵימָר אָמְרִי: כַּמָּה בַּטְלָנֵי הָוֵי בְּשׁוּקָא.
We learned in the mishna with regard to refraining from performance of labor on Passover eve: With regard to one who travels from a place where people perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people do not, or from a place where people do not perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people do, the Sages impose upon him the stringencies of the place from which he left and the stringencies of the place to which he went. The Gemara asks: Granted, in the case of one who travels from a place where people perform labor to a place where they do not perform labor, the Sages impose upon him the stringencies of the place to which he went, and a person should not deviate from the standard practice in that place due to potential dispute, and he should not perform labor. However, if one traveled from a place where people do not perform labor to a place where they do perform labor, is the ruling there too, that a person should not deviate from the standard practice in that place due to conflict, and perform labor? That cannot be. Didn’t you say: The Sages impose upon him the stringencies of the place to which he went and the stringencies of the place from which he left? He should not perform any labor. Abaye said: The principle that one should not deviate due to potential dispute is referring to the first clause, that one who arrives at a place where people do not perform labor adopts the local stringency. Rava said: Actually, it is possible to say this halakha is also referring to the latter clause of the mishna, and this is what it is saying: Refraining from labor does not constitute a deviation that causes dispute. What are you saying; one who sees him will say that he is not working because he believes that performing labor is prohibited, contrary to local practice? That is unlikely, as when people see him inactive that will not be their assumption. Instead, they will say: How many idle people there are in the market every day who do not work. In this case, people will assume that this individual was unable to find work that day.
נִיחָא מִמְּקוֹם שֶׁעוֹשִׂין לִמְקוֹם שֶׁאֵינָן עוֹשִׂין. מִמְּקוֹם שֶׁאֵין עוֹשִׂין לִמְקוֹם שֶׁעוֹשִׂין. וִיבַטֵּל. שֶׁהֲרֵי כַמָּה בְטֵילִין יֵשׁ לוֹ בְאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם. רִבִּי סִימוֹן בְּשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. בְּמַתְמִיַהּ.
One understands “one goes from a place where he works to one where he does not work.” “From a place where he does not work to one where he works,” why should he not be idle? Are there not may idlers at that place? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he causes to wonder.


