The heaven and the earth were finished, and all their array. On the seventh day God finished the work that had been undertaken, ceasing^aceasing Or “resting.” on the seventh day from doing any of the work. And God blessed the seventh day and declared it holy—having ceased on it from all the work of creation that God had done.

Remember the sabbath day and keep it holy. Six days you^cyou Including a householder’s wife, as a co-administrator. shall labor and do all your work, but the seventh day is a sabbath of the ETERNAL your God: you shall not do any work—you, your son or daughter, your male or female slave, or your cattle, or the stranger who is within your settlements. For in six days GOD made heaven and earth and sea—and all that is in them—and then rested on the seventh day; therefore GOD blessed the sabbath day and hallowed it.

Six days you shall do your work, but on the seventh day you shall cease from labor, in order that your ox and your donkey may rest, and that your home-born slave and the stranger may be refreshed.

And GOD said to Moses: Speak to the Israelite people and say: Nevertheless, you must keep My sabbaths, for this is a sign between Me and you throughout the ages, that you may know that I GOD have consecrated you. You shall keep the sabbath, for it is holy for you. One who profanes it shall be put to death: whoever does work on it, that person shall be cut off from among kin. Six days may work be done, but on the seventh day there shall be a sabbath of complete rest, holy to GOD; whoever does work on the sabbath day shall be put to death. The Israelite people shall keep the sabbath, observing the sabbath throughout the ages as a covenant for all time: it shall be a sign for all time between Me and the people of Israel. For in six days GOD made heaven and earth, [before] ceasing from work and being refreshed on the seventh day.

Moses then convoked the whole Israelite community^awhole Israelite community Or the leadership, on everyone’s behalf. and said to them:
These are the things that GOD has commanded you to do: On six days work may be done, but on the seventh day you shall have a sabbath of complete rest, holy to GOD; whoever does any work on it shall be put to death. You shall kindle no fire throughout your settlements on the sabbath day.

You shall each revere your mother and your father, and keep My sabbaths: I the ETERNAL am your God.

You must not carry false rumors; you shall not join hands with the guilty to act as a malicious witness: You shall neither side with the mighty^amighty In contrast to others “multitude.” to do wrong—you shall not give perverse testimony in a dispute so as to pervert it in favor of the mighty— nor shall you show deference to a poor person in a dispute.

Observe the sabbath day and keep it holy, as the ETERNAL your God has commanded you.

If you refrain from trampling^frefrain from trampling Lit. “turn back your foot from.” the sabbath,
From pursuing your affairs on My holy day;
If you call the sabbath “delight,”
GOD ’s holy day “honored”;
And if you honor it and go not your ways
Nor look to your affairs, nor strike bargains—

THE precepts of the eighth class are enumerated in “the Section on Seasons” (Sefer zemannim). With a few exceptions, the reasons for all of them are stated in the Law. The object of Sabbath is obvious, and requires no explanation. The rest it affords to man is known; one-seventh of the life of every man, whether small or great, passes thus in comfort, and in rest from trouble and exertion. This the Sabbath effects in addition to the perpetuation and confirmation of the grand doctrine of the Creation. The object of the Fast of Atonement is evident. The Fast creates the sense of repentance; it is the same day on which the chief of all prophets came down [from Mount Sinai] with the second tables, and announced to the people the divine pardon of their great sin; the day was therefore appointed for ever as a day devoted to repentance and true worship of God. For this reason all material enjoyment, all trouble and care for the body, are interdicted, no work may be done; the day must be spent in confession; ever- one shall confess his sins and abandon them. Other holy days are appointed for rejoicing and for such pleasant gathering as people generally need. They also promote the good feeling that men should have to each other in their social and political relations. The appointment of the special days for such purposes has its cause. The reason for the Passover is well known. It is kept seven days, because the period of seven days is the unit of time intermediate between a day and a month. It is also known how great is the importance of this period in Nature, and in many religious duties. For the Law always follows Nature, and in some respects brings it to perfection; for Nature is not capable of designing and thinking, whilst the Law is the result of the wisdom and guidance of God, who is the author of the intellect of all rational beings. This, however, is not the theme of the present chapter: let us return to our subject. The Feast of Weeks is the anniversary of the Revelation on Mount Sinai. In order to raise the importance of this day, we count the days that pass since the preceding festival, just as one who expects his most intimate friend on a certain day counts the days and even the hours. This is the reason why we count the days that pass since the offering of the Omer, between the anniversary of our departure from Egypt and the anniversary of the Lawgiving. The latter was the aim and object of the exodus from Egypt, and thus God said, “I brought you unto myself” (Exod. 19:4). As that great revelation took place only on one day, so we keep its anniversary only one day: but if the eating of unleavened bread on Passover were only commanded for one day, we should not have noticed it, and its object would not have been manifest. For it frequently happens that we take the same kind of food for two or three days. But by our continuing for a whole period [of seven days] to eat unleavened bread, its object becomes clear and evident. New-Year is likewise kept for one day; for it is a day of repentance, on which we are stirred up from our forgetfulness. For this reason the shofar is blown on this day, as we have shown in Mishneh-torah. The day is, as it were, a preparation for and an introduction to the day of the Fast, as is obvious from the national tradition about the days between New-Year and the Day of Atonement. The Feast of Tabernacles, which is a feast of rejoicing and gladness, is kept seven days, in order that the idea of the festival may be more noticeable. The reason why it is kept in the autumn is stated in the Law, “When thou hast gathered in thy labours out of the field” (Exod. 23:16); that is to say, when you rest and are free from pressing labours. Aristotle, in the ninth book of his Ethics, mentions this as a general custom among the nations. He says: “In ancient times the sacrifices and assemblies of the people took place after the ingathering of the corn and the fruit, as if the sacrifices were offered on account of the harvest.” Another reason is this—in this season it is possible to dwell in tabernacles, as there is neither great heat nor troublesome rain. The two festivals, Passover and the Feast of Tabernacles, imply also the teaching of certain truths and certain moral lessons. Passover teaches us to remember the miracles which God wrought in Egypt, and to perpetuate their memory; the Feast of Tabernacles reminds us of the miracles wrought in the wilderness. The moral lessons derived from these feasts is this: man ought to remember his evil days in his days of prosperity. He will thereby be induced to thank God repeatedly, to lead a modest and humble life. We eat, therefore, unleavened bread and bitter herbs on Passover in memory of what has happened unto us, and leave [on Succoth] our houses in order to dwell in tabernacles, as inhabitants of deserts do that are in want of comfort. We shall thereby remember that this has once been our condition; [comp.] “I made the children of Israel to dwell in booths” (Lev. 23:43); although we dwell now in elegant houses, in the best and most fertile land, by the kindness of God, and because of His promises to our forefathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who were perfect in their opinions and in their conduct. This idea is likewise an important element in our religion; that whatever good we have received and ever will receive of God, is owing to the merits of the Patriarchs, who “kept the way of the Lord to do justice and judgment” (Gen. 18:19). We join to the Feast of Tabernacles the Feast of the Eighth Day, in order to complete our rejoicings, which cannot be perfect in booths, but in comfortable and well-built houses. As regards the four species [the branches of the palm tree, the citron, the myrtle, and the willows of the brook] our Sages gave a reason for their use by way of Agadic interpretation, the method of which is well known to those who are acquainted with the style of our Sages. They use the text of the Bible only as a kind of poetical language [for their own ideas], and do not intend thereby to give an interpretation of the text. As to the value of these Midrashic interpretations, we meet with two different opinions. For some think that the Midrash contains the real explanation of the text, whilst others, finding that it cannot be reconciled with the words quoted, reject and ridicule it. The former struggle and fight to prove and to confirm such interpretations according to their opinion, and to keep them as the real meaning of the text; they consider them in the same light as traditional laws. Neither of the two classes understood it, that our Sages employ biblical texts merely as poetical expressions, the meaning of which is clear to every reasonable reader. This style was general in ancient days; all adopted it in the same way as poets [adopt a certain style]. Our Sages say, in reference to the words, “and a paddle (yated) thou shalt have upon thy weapon” [azeneka, Deut. 23:14]: Do not read azeneka, “thy weapon,” but ozneka, “thy ear.” You are thus told, that if you hear a person uttering something disgraceful, put your fingers into your ears. Now, I wonder whether those ignorant persons [who take the Midrashic interpretations literally] believe that the author of this saying gave it as the true interpretation of the text quoted, and as the meaning of this precept: that in truth yated, “the paddle,” is used for “the finger, “and azeneka denotes “thy ear.” I cannot think that any person whose intellect is sound can admit this. The author employed the text as a beautiful poetical phrase, in teaching an excellent moral lesson, namely this: It is as bad to listen to bad language as it is to use it. This lesson is poetically connected with the above text. In the same sense you must understand the phrase, “Do not read so, but so,” wherever it occurs in the Midrash. I have departed from my subject, but it was for the purpose of making a remark useful to every intellectual member of the Rabbanites. I now return to our theme. I believe that the four species are a symbolical expression of our rejoicing that the Israelites changed the wilderness, “no place of seed, or of figs, or of vines, or of pomegranates, or of water to drink” (Num. 20:5), with a country full of fruit-trees and rivers. In order to remember this we take the fruit which is the most pleasant of the fruit of the land, branches which smell best, most beautiful leaves, and also the best of herbs, i.e., the willows of the brook. These four kinds have also those three purposes: First, they were plentiful in those days in Palestine, so that every one could easily get them. Secondly, they have a good appearance, they are green; some of them, viz., the citron and the myrtle, are also excellent as regards their smell, the branches of the palm-tree and the willow having neither good nor bad smell. Thirdly, they keep fresh and green for seven days, which is not the case with peaches, pomegranates, asparagus, nuts, and the like.

Rather, is it not that the first clause of the baraita is dealing with the contrast between Shabbat and idolatry, and the latter clause of the baraita is dealing with contrasting Shabbat and other mitzvot? And what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one thought that it was permitted fat, and ate it, and later discovered that it was forbidden fat. This is one example of other mitzvot where one is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where he is exempt, as one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is exempt. And according to Abaye, who holds that he is liable in that case, what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one had something in his mouth and he thought it was spittle and swallowed it with no intention to eat it, and it turned out to be forbidden fat that he swallowed. This is one example of other mitzvot, where he is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where the phrase: He is exempt, is referring to the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground. In that case, even Abaye agrees that he is exempt. However, one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is liable since he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Therefore, no proof can be cited from this baraita. A similar dispute between Abaye and Rava was stated. In the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain, for which he would not be liable by Torah law, and it turned out that he threw it four cubits, in violation of the prohibition by Torah law against carrying an object four cubits in the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits, and, consequently, does not intend to perform a prohibited act. Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw, and ultimately a throw that traveled a prohibited distance was executed. Another dispute between them was stated. In the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain and threw an object more than four cubits, and, ultimately, it was found to be the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. And Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a prohibited throw. In a private domain, he may throw an object as far as he chooses. And Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to mention these three disputes, despite their similarities, because each one teaches a unique element. As, had the Gemara taught us only the first, the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground, we would have said that it was only in that case that Rava said he is exempt, as he does not intend to perform an act of prohibited severing. He had no intention to perform an action that entails desecration of Shabbat. However, the ruling in the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain and he threw it four cubits would be more stringent, as an object cannot be thrown four cubits without being thrown two cubits. A throw of two cubits is a component part of the four-cubit throw. Consequently, say that in that case Rava agrees with Abaye, as he performed an act that has a prohibited dimension to it. And, had the Gemara taught us the dispute in this case of throwing two cubits as well, we would have said that it is only in that case that Rava says that he is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits. A throw of fewer than four cubits does not constitute a transgression. However, in the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain, and ultimately it was found to be the public domain where the individual intends to execute a throw of four cubits, which is a prohibited distance, say that Rava agrees with Abaye that he is liable. Therefore, it is necessary to mention all three cases in which they disagree. We learned in a mishna: The primary categories of labor are forty-less-one, and we discussed it and asked: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if one performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Granted, according to Abaye, who said that in a case like that one mentioned above, where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits he is liable, you find that circumstance in a case where he was aware that the prohibition of Shabbat applies to certain labors, and he was aware that particular labors were prohibited, and was mistaken with regard to measures. He intended to perform an act involving less than the prohibited measure, and it turned out that the action he performed involved an amount equal to or greater than the prohibited measure. That is an unwitting act that renders him liable to bring a sin-offering, according to Abaye. However, according to Rava, who said that he is exempt in a case where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits, in what circumstances do you find that he would be liable for each and every one? Is it in a case where, with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional, and, with regard to the prohibited labors, his actions were unwitting? It works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition and performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly. If he holds in accordance with that opinion, you find a case where one could be liable for each and every prohibited labor when he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is karet. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. The question then arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the halakhot of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that this prohibition is by Torah law. MISHNA: This fundamental mishna enumerates those who perform the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat, which number forty-less-one. They are grouped in accordance with their function: One who sows, and one who plows, and one who reaps, and one who gathers sheaves into a pile, and one who threshes, removing the kernel from the husk, and one who winnows threshed grain in the wind, and one who selects the inedible waste from the edible, and one who grinds, and one who sifts the flour in a sieve, and one who kneads dough, and one who bakes. Additional primary categories of prohibited labor are the following: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, and one who combs the fleece and straightens it, and one who dyes it, and one who spins the wool, and one who stretches the threads of the warp in the loom, and one who constructs two meshes, tying the threads of the warp to the base of the loom, and one who weaves two threads, and one who severs two threads for constructive purposes, and one who ties a knot, and one who unties a knot, and one who sews two stitches with a needle, as well as one who tears a fabric in order to sew two stitches. One who traps a deer, or any living creature, and one who slaughters it, and one who flays it, and one who salts its hide, a step in the tanning process, and one who tans its hide, and one who smooths it, removing hairs and veins, and one who cuts it into measured parts. One who writes two letters and one who erases in order to write two letters. One who builds a structure, and one who dismantles it, one who extinguishes a fire, and one who kindles a fire. One who strikes a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), and one who carries out an object from domain to domain. All these are primary categories of labor, and they number forty-less-one.

My father was a tanner, and one Shabbat he said: Bring me hides and we will sit on them (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). In other words, even the hides of a craftsman may be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to wooden boards belonging to a homeowner, one may move them on Shabbat; however, those belonging to a craftsman, one may not move them. And if, however, he thought to place bread upon them for guests, both these, the boards of the homeowner, and those, the boards of the craftsman, may be moved. Apparently, the raw materials of a craftsman may not be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Wooden boards are different in that one is particular about them that they not be damaged. Hides, on the other hand, are not damaged when one sits on them. The Gemara cites another proof. Come and hear that which was taught in a different baraita: With regard to hides, whether they are tanned or whether they are not tanned, it is permitted to move them on Shabbat. The Sages said that tanned hides have a unique legal status, distinct from the status of hides that have not been tanned only with regard to ritual impurity. Only tanned hides become ritually impure. What, is it not saying that there is no difference whether they are hides belonging to a homeowner and there is no difference whether they are hides belonging to a craftsman; in both cases they may be moved on Shabbat? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, the baraita is referring exclusively to hides belonging to a homeowner. The Gemara asks: But with regard to hides belonging to a craftsman, what is the halakha? Is it true that they may not be moved on Shabbat? If so, that which was taught in the baraita: The Sages said that the legal status of tanned hides is distinct from the status of hides that have not been tanned only with regard to ritual impurity; let the tanna of the baraita distinguish and teach within the halakhot of Shabbat itself, and say: In what case is this statement, that there is no distinction between whether or not the hides were tanned, said? It was stated specifically with regard to hides belonging to a homeowner. However, with regard to hides belonging to a craftsman, no, if they were tanned they may not be moved. The Gemara answers: Since the entire baraita is speaking with regard to hides of a homeowner, it would have been forced to elaborate at greater length to introduce the distinction with regard to the hides of a craftsman than it did to introduce the distinction with regard to ritual impurity. The Gemara notes that this issue is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to hides belonging to a homeowner, one may move them on Shabbat, and those of a craftsman, one may not move them. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to both these, the hides of a homeowner, and those, the hides of a craftsman, one may move them. The Gemara relates that those same Sages who sat and discussed the issue of hides, sat again and they raised a dilemma: That which we learned in the mishna: The primary categories of labor, which are prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat, are forty-less-one; to what does this number correspond? That is to say, what is the source of this number? Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama said to them: They correspond to the labors in the Tabernacle. All types of labor that were performed in the Tabernacle are enumerated as primary categories of labor with respect to Shabbat. However, other labors, even if they are significant, are not enumerated among the primary categories of labor since they were not performed in the Tabernacle. Rabbi Yonatan, son of Rabbi Elazar, said to them that so said Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yosei ben Lakonya: They correspond to the instances of the words labor, his labor, and the labor of, that appear in the Torah a total of forty-less-one times. Rav Yosef raised a dilemma: The term his labor is written with regard to Joseph: “And it came to pass about this time, that he came into the house to do his labor; and there was none of the men of the house there within” (Genesis 39:11). Is it included in the count of the thirty-nine instances or not? Abaye said to him: And let us bring a Torah scroll and count the instances of the word labor and thereby determine whether or not there are thirty-nine instances without that one. Didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in a case of similar uncertainty: They did not move from there until they brought a Torah scroll and counted them? Rav Yosef said to Abaye: I cannot reach a conclusion relying solely on a count because there is another instance of the term labor, whose meaning is not clear to me. The reason I am uncertain is because it is written with regard to the Tabernacle: “For the labor they had was sufficient for all the work to do it, and too much” (Exodus 36:7). The question arises whether or not this mention of labor is included in the count of thirty-nine instances, i.e., whether or not it refers to actual labor. And if it does, that verse with regard to Joseph should be understood in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the expression, to do his labor, is a euphemism. It means that it was to attend to his needs and engage in relations with Potiphar’s wife that he entered. Or, perhaps, the verse relating to Joseph: “He came into the house to do his labor,” is included in the count, and it refers to actual labor. And this verse: “The labor they had was sufficient,” is saying the following: That they completed the preparatory labor, i.e., they brought all the materials, not that they engaged in the actual labor. Let the uncertainty stand unresolved. With regard to the matter itself, it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the thirty-nine labors of Shabbat correspond to the labors performed in the Tabernacle. As it was taught in a baraita: One is only liable for performing a labor to which there was a corresponding labor in the Tabernacle. They sowed in order to grow dyes for the Tabernacle, and therefore you may not sow on Shabbat. They reaped, and therefore you may not reap on Shabbat. They lifted the boards from the ground in the wilderness, which is a public domain, and placed them into the wagon, which is a private domain, and therefore you shall not carry objects in from the public domain to the private domain on Shabbat. They lowered the boards from the wagon to the ground, and therefore you shall not carry objects out from the private domain to the public domain on Shabbat. They took boards and other objects out and passed them from wagon to wagon, i.e., from one private domain to another private domain, and therefore you shall not take objects out from one private domain to another private domain on Shabbat. The Gemara expresses astonishment with regard to the last clause of the baraita: One who takes an object out from one private domain to another private domain, what prohibited labor is he thereby performing? The Gemara answers: It was Abaye and Rava who both said, and some say that it was Rav Adda bar Ahava who said: This is referring to taking an object out from one private domain to another private domain via the public domain, as the space between the two wagons in the wilderness was a public domain. We learned in the mishna: One may insulate food in wool fleece, and he may not move it. Rava said: This halakha that fleece may not be moved on Shabbat applies only to a case where one did not insulate food in it. Only in that case is it set-aside. However, if one insulated cooked food in it, he may move it. By insulating food in the fleece, he indicated that he intends to use it on Shabbat. A certain Sage for whom it was his first day in that study hall raised an objection to Rava from our mishna: One may insulate food in wool fleece, and one may not move it. How, then, does he act if he insulated food in wool fleece and now wishes to remove the pot?

All of these [forbidden] labors and all analogous activities are referred to as primary categories of labor. What is meant by an "analogous activity"? Plowing, digging, or making a groove [in the ground] are all considered to be primary categories of work. For each one involves digging in the ground and they all reflect a single activity.¹In this and the following two halachot, the Rambam emphasizes how other activities that are analogous to the thirty-nine mentioned in the previous halachah are not considered as solely derivatives of the primary category of labor; they have the same status as the primary categories themselves. In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2) and in Halachah 9 of this chapter, he uses the term - "labors corresponding to a single category of labor" to describe such activities. This phrase is also used by the Mishnah, Shabbat 7:1 (although interpreted differently by other authorities).
The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rav Moshe Kohen as objecting to the Rambam's statements, for the Mishnah specifically states that there are thirty-nine such categories of forbidden labor, while according to the Rambam there would be far more. He thus considers all these other activities as derivatives.
The Maggid Mishneh does not see such a difficulty, explaining that, as the Rambam illustrates in the examples he cites in this and the following halachot, the activity being performed is basically the same as the primary category of labor. Thus it is not proper for such an activity to be called a derivative. Similarly, since these activities are identical in nature to the existing categories, it is not proper to consider them as being an additional category with regard to the total sum.
Kalkalat Shabbat adds that the activities that the Rambam mentions as analogous to the primary categories of labor are not counted as additional categories because they were not necessary for the construction of the Sanctuary.

GEMARA: With regard to the main issue, the Gemara asks: After all, throwing is a subcategory of carrying out. Where is the primary category of prohibited labor of carrying out itself written in the Torah? Isn’t it necessary to clarify the primary category before discussing the subcategory? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: As the verse said: “And Moses commanded, and they passed a proclamation throughout the camp saying: Neither man nor woman should perform any more work to contribute to the Sanctuary; and the people stopped bringing” (Exodus 36:6). According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, Moses commanded the people to cease bringing contributions in order to prevent them from bringing their contributions on Shabbat. He then explains: Where was Moses sitting? He was in the camp of the Levites, and the Levites’ camp was the public domain. And he said to Israel: Do not carry out and bring objects from the private domain, your camp, to the public domain, the camp of the Levites. The Gemara asks: And how do you know that he was standing and commanding the people on Shabbat? Perhaps he was standing during the week, and Moses commanded the cessation of contributions because the labor of the Tabernacle was completed, since all the necessary material was already donated, as it is written: “And the work was sufficient for them for all of the work to perform it, and there was extra” (Exodus 36:7). Rather, derive this by means of a verbal analogy between passing mentioned in this context and passing mentioned with regard to Yom Kippur. It is written here, with regard to the Tabernacle: “And they passed a proclamation throughout the camp,” and it is written there, with regard to Yom Kippur: “And you shall pass a blast of a shofar on the tenth day of the seventh month, on Yom Kippur you shall sound a shofar throughout your land” (Leviticus 25:9). Just as there, with regard to the shofar of the Jubilee Year, passing is on a day on which it is prohibited to perform labor, so too, here passing is on a day on which it is prohibited to perform labor. The Gemara asks: We found a source prohibiting carrying out from a private domain into the camp of the Levites. From where do we derive that carrying in is also considered a prohibited labor? The Gemara answers: It is a logical inference. After all, carrying is from one domain to another, so what difference is there to me whether it is carrying out or carrying in? Carrying from one domain to another is prohibited; the direction in which the object is carried makes no difference. However, carrying out is a primary category, while carrying in is a subcategory, as it is not stated explicitly in the biblical text. The Gemara now questions the distinction between primary categories and subcategories of labor. After all, one is liable for this, carrying out, and one is liable for that, carrying in. Why is this called a primary category, and why is this called a subcategory? What is the point of the distinction? The Gemara answers: The practical ramification is that if one performs two different primary categories together, or alternatively, if one performs two subcategories of two different primary categories together, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. And if one performs a primary category of labor together with its own subcategory, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. The Gemara further asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who renders one liable for the performance of a subcategory of prohibited labor when performed together with a primary category, why is this called a primary category, and why is this called a subcategory? The Gemara answers: According to him, that which was a significant labor in the Tabernacle is called a primary category; that which was not a significant labor in the Tabernacle is not called a primary category. Alternatively, perhaps that which is written explicitly in the Torah is called a primary category, and that which is not written explicitly in the Torah is called a subcategory. And as for the halakha that we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who throws an object on Shabbat a distance of four cubits in the public domain and it lands on a wall, if the wall was higher than ten handbreadths, it is as if he threw it into the air, and he is exempt. If the wall was lower than ten handbreadths, it is as if he threw it onto the ground, and one who throws an object a distance of four cubits onto the ground in the public domain is liable. The Gemara asks: If one threw an object four cubits in the public domain, and it did not go from one domain to another, from where do we derive that he is liable? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya said: Because the weavers of the tapestries in the Tabernacle throw their needles to each other when they need to borrow the other’s needle. Throwing was a labor performed in the Tabernacle; therefore, one is liable for performing it. The Gemara wonders: Why do weavers need needles? Rather, emend the statement to say: Because those who sewed the tapestries throw their needles to each other. The Gemara asks: Is it clear that they had to throw needles to each other? Perhaps they sat next to each other. The Gemara answers: It is clear that they kept their distance from each other. If they sat too close, they would reach each other and hurt one another with their needles. The Gemara asks: Perhaps, even though they kept their distance, they sat within four cubits of each other, and they would not throw the needles farther than that. In the absence of proof of their sitting arrangement, this halakha cannot be derived from those who sewed the tapestries. Rather, Rav Ḥisda said: Throwing an object four cubits in the public domain is prohibited because the weavers of the tapestries in the Tabernacle threw the shuttle, to which the thread of the warp was tied on the tapestry. Weaving entails throwing the thread of the warp through the threads of the woof. The Gemara asks: That is not actually throwing, as didn’t the weaver hold the end of the thread in his hand? One is not liable for throwing an object when part of it remains in his hand. Rather, this must be referring to the final throw, when the weaving was finished and the weaver released the thread from his hand. The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the shuttle go in an exempt domain? The tapestry was less than four handbreadths wide, rendering it an exempt domain even though it is four cubits long. One who throws in an exempt domain is exempt. Rather, it is because the weavers of tapestries throw the shuttle to those who seek to borrow it from them. The Gemara asks: But perhaps they sat next to each other? The Gemara answers: That is impossible because they would reach one another and disturb one another when tightening the thread at the end of the tapestry. The Gemara asks: And perhaps they were not in a straight line but staggered. That would enable the weavers to sit adjacent to each other without disturbing each other’s work. And furthermore, did they borrow from each another? Wasn’t the following taught in a baraita of the Sage Luda? The verse states: “And all the wise men who performed all of the work of the Sanctuary came, each one from the work he was doing” (Exodus 36:4). From that verse it is derived: Each performed the labor from his own work, and they would not perform the labor from their friends’ work. Each person had his own tools and did not need to borrow from others. And furthermore, the Gemara asks: Even if the halakha of throwing was derived from here, from where do we derive that one who carries an object four cubits in the public domain is liable? Rather, apparently, this halakha is not derived from the labor performed in the construction of the Tabernacle. Rather, all the halakhot related to carrying four cubits in the public domain are learned through tradition and not derived from the text. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The wood gatherer who was sentenced to death for desecrating Shabbat (see Numbers 15:33–36) was one who carried four cubits in the public domain. He was stoned for performing the prohibited labor of carrying. It was taught in a baraita: He was one who detached still-growing branches. He was stoned for performing the prohibited labor of detaching. Rav Aḥa, son of Rabbi Ya’akov, said: He was one who gathered sticks together into a pile. The Gemara asks: What is the practical ramification of determining precisely which prohibited labor the wood gatherer performed? The Gemara answers: The ramification is with regard to the statement of Rav, as Rav said: I found a hidden scroll in the house of Rabbi Ḥiyya. And in it, it is written that Isi ben Yehuda says: The number of primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat is forty-less-one. And if one performed all of them in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. The Gemara asks: One and no more? We learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if one performed all the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. This citation from the hidden scroll cannot be accurate. Rather, emend this statement in the hidden scroll and say that one is not liable for one of them. There is a primary category of labor among the thirty-nine primary categories of prohibited labor whose violation does not incur the death penalty. The identity of this category that is not punishable by death was not specified. It is obvious to Rav Yehuda that one who carries four cubits in the public domain is liable to receive the death penalty. And it is obvious to the baraita that one who detaches is liable to receive the death penalty. And it is obvious to Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov that one who gathers is liable to receive the death penalty. In other words, this Master maintains: With regard to this labor, in any case, there is no uncertainty. And this Master maintains: With regard to that labor, in any case, there is no uncertainty. Each Sage maintains that the prohibited labor that he attributed to the wood gatherer incurs the death penalty and is certainly not the labor referred to in the hidden scroll. On the topic of the wood gatherer, the Gemara cites that which the Sages taught in a baraita: The wood gatherer mentioned in the Torah was Zelophehad, and it says: “And the children of Israel were in the desert and they found a man gathering wood on the day of Shabbat” (Numbers 15:32), and below, in the appeal of the daughters of Zelophehad, it is stated: “Our father died in the desert and he was not among the company of them that gathered themselves together against the Lord in the company of Korah, but he died in his own sin, and he had no sons” (Numbers 27:3). Just as below the man in the desert is Zelophehad, so too, here, in the case of the wood gatherer, the unnamed man in the desert is Zelophehad; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said to him: Akiva, in either case you will be judged in the future for this teaching. If the truth is in accordance with your statement that the wood gatherer was Zelophehad, the Torah concealed his identity, and you reveal it. And if it the truth is not in accordance with your statement, you are unjustly slandering that righteous man.

My father was a tanner, and one Shabbat he said: Bring me hides and we will sit on them (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). In other words, even the hides of a craftsman may be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to wooden boards belonging to a homeowner, one may move them on Shabbat; however, those belonging to a craftsman, one may not move them. And if, however, he thought to place bread upon them for guests, both these, the boards of the homeowner, and those, the boards of the craftsman, may be moved. Apparently, the raw materials of a craftsman may not be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: Wooden boards are different in that one is particular about them that they not be damaged. Hides, on the other hand, are not damaged when one sits on them. The Gemara cites another proof. Come and hear that which was taught in a different baraita: With regard to hides, whether they are tanned or whether they are not tanned, it is permitted to move them on Shabbat. The Sages said that tanned hides have a unique legal status, distinct from the status of hides that have not been tanned only with regard to ritual impurity. Only tanned hides become ritually impure. What, is it not saying that there is no difference whether they are hides belonging to a homeowner and there is no difference whether they are hides belonging to a craftsman; in both cases they may be moved on Shabbat? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, the baraita is referring exclusively to hides belonging to a homeowner. The Gemara asks: But with regard to hides belonging to a craftsman, what is the halakha? Is it true that they may not be moved on Shabbat? If so, that which was taught in the baraita: The Sages said that the legal status of tanned hides is distinct from the status of hides that have not been tanned only with regard to ritual impurity; let the tanna of the baraita distinguish and teach within the halakhot of Shabbat itself, and say: In what case is this statement, that there is no distinction between whether or not the hides were tanned, said? It was stated specifically with regard to hides belonging to a homeowner. However, with regard to hides belonging to a craftsman, no, if they were tanned they may not be moved. The Gemara answers: Since the entire baraita is speaking with regard to hides of a homeowner, it would have been forced to elaborate at greater length to introduce the distinction with regard to the hides of a craftsman than it did to introduce the distinction with regard to ritual impurity. The Gemara notes that this issue is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to hides belonging to a homeowner, one may move them on Shabbat, and those of a craftsman, one may not move them. Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to both these, the hides of a homeowner, and those, the hides of a craftsman, one may move them. The Gemara relates that those same Sages who sat and discussed the issue of hides, sat again and they raised a dilemma: That which we learned in the mishna: The primary categories of labor, which are prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat, are forty-less-one; to what does this number correspond? That is to say, what is the source of this number? Rabbi Ḥanina bar Ḥama said to them: They correspond to the labors in the Tabernacle. All types of labor that were performed in the Tabernacle are enumerated as primary categories of labor with respect to Shabbat. However, other labors, even if they are significant, are not enumerated among the primary categories of labor since they were not performed in the Tabernacle. Rabbi Yonatan, son of Rabbi Elazar, said to them that so said Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi Yosei ben Lakonya: They correspond to the instances of the words labor, his labor, and the labor of, that appear in the Torah a total of forty-less-one times. Rav Yosef raised a dilemma: The term his labor is written with regard to Joseph: “And it came to pass about this time, that he came into the house to do his labor; and there was none of the men of the house there within” (Genesis 39:11). Is it included in the count of the thirty-nine instances or not? Abaye said to him: And let us bring a Torah scroll and count the instances of the word labor and thereby determine whether or not there are thirty-nine instances without that one. Didn’t Rabba bar bar Ḥana say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in a case of similar uncertainty: They did not move from there until they brought a Torah scroll and counted them? Rav Yosef said to Abaye: I cannot reach a conclusion relying solely on a count because there is another instance of the term labor, whose meaning is not clear to me. The reason I am uncertain is because it is written with regard to the Tabernacle: “For the labor they had was sufficient for all the work to do it, and too much” (Exodus 36:7). The question arises whether or not this mention of labor is included in the count of thirty-nine instances, i.e., whether or not it refers to actual labor. And if it does, that verse with regard to Joseph should be understood in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the expression, to do his labor, is a euphemism. It means that it was to attend to his needs and engage in relations with Potiphar’s wife that he entered. Or, perhaps, the verse relating to Joseph: “He came into the house to do his labor,” is included in the count, and it refers to actual labor. And this verse: “The labor they had was sufficient,” is saying the following: That they completed the preparatory labor, i.e., they brought all the materials, not that they engaged in the actual labor. Let the uncertainty stand unresolved. With regard to the matter itself, it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that the thirty-nine labors of Shabbat correspond to the labors performed in the Tabernacle. As it was taught in a baraita: One is only liable for performing a labor to which there was a corresponding labor in the Tabernacle. They sowed in order to grow dyes for the Tabernacle, and therefore you may not sow on Shabbat. They reaped, and therefore you may not reap on Shabbat. They lifted the boards from the ground in the wilderness, which is a public domain, and placed them into the wagon, which is a private domain, and therefore you shall not carry objects in from the public domain to the private domain on Shabbat. They lowered the boards from the wagon to the ground, and therefore you shall not carry objects out from the private domain to the public domain on Shabbat. They took boards and other objects out and passed them from wagon to wagon, i.e., from one private domain to another private domain, and therefore you shall not take objects out from one private domain to another private domain on Shabbat. The Gemara expresses astonishment with regard to the last clause of the baraita: One who takes an object out from one private domain to another private domain, what prohibited labor is he thereby performing? The Gemara answers: It was Abaye and Rava who both said, and some say that it was Rav Adda bar Ahava who said: This is referring to taking an object out from one private domain to another private domain via the public domain, as the space between the two wagons in the wilderness was a public domain. We learned in the mishna: One may insulate food in wool fleece, and he may not move it. Rava said: This halakha that fleece may not be moved on Shabbat applies only to a case where one did not insulate food in it. Only in that case is it set-aside. However, if one insulated cooked food in it, he may move it. By insulating food in the fleece, he indicated that he intends to use it on Shabbat. A certain Sage for whom it was his first day in that study hall raised an objection to Rava from our mishna: One may insulate food in wool fleece, and one may not move it. How, then, does he act if he insulated food in wool fleece and now wishes to remove the pot?

In everything, God always requires you, as a Jewish father, to instill in your children whom God has graced you with, while they are still with their father, that which God asks from you and your offspring. While they are still young, bring them close to God and encourage the desire in their hearts to be connected, embraced, and clinging to the Jewish people's life and fate. But on the evening of that day when you, yourself, celebrate the birthday of the Jewish people, God's creation of this amazing nation amid mankind, the beginning of your mission as a Jew — God dedicated this evening to sanctifying your offspring, to bringing your children into the covenant with you, your young children upon whose closeness to God or, God forbid, their profaning His name, the eternity of the Jewish people and the future of our nation depend upon. Through these children, you may nurture the planting of renown (alluding to Ezekiel 34:29), which God planted for eternity through the exodus from Egypt. So that they may grow and become worthy of being the fruit of holiness for jubilation — when you pass around the pieces of the bread of affliction [the matzah] to yourself and to them, while you are connecting to the mission of your people and the dedication of the Jewish people to the God of their fathers and His Torah — do not minimize the words that come out of the purity of your heart. Speak to them, to your children, and let them hear about the supernal nature of this sublime mission, to be a father to Jewish children and to be children of the living God. Teach them the concept of the bread of affliction; acquaint them with the spirit of the Passover holiday, which ascends upon high. Make them understand the supernal nature of God's deeds and wonders in Egypt and of the name of Israel, which He bequeathed to His people when He took them out from darkness to light and from slavery to freedom. Circumcision (Milah) When Avraham was 99 years old, Hashem appeared to him and said: "I am the Almighty God; walk before Me and be complete! I establish My covenant between Me and you, and I will multiply you exceedingly." Then Avraham fell on his face, and God spoke to him, saying: "Behold, My covenant is with you, and you shall become the father of a multitude of nations. No longer shall your name be called Avram; rather, your name shall be Avraham, for I have made you the father of many nations. I will make you exceedingly fruitful, and I will establish you as nations, and kings will descend from you. I will uphold My covenant between Me and you and your descendants after you throughout their generations as an everlasting covenant, to be God to you and to your descendants after you. I give to you and your descendants after you the land of your sojournings, the entire land of Canaan, as an everlasting possession, and I will be their God." God then said to Avraham: "But you must also observe My covenant, you and your descendants after you throughout their generations. This is My covenant, which you shall observe between Me and you and your descendants after you: Every male among you shall be circumcised. You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and this shall be the sign of the covenant between Me and you. At eight days old, every male among you shall be circumcised throughout your generations, whether born in your house or purchased with silver from a foreigner who is not of your descendants. Those born in your household and those bought with your silver must be circumcised, so that My covenant shall be in your flesh as an everlasting covenant. Any uncircumcised male who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin shall be cut off from his people; he has broken My covenant." (Genesis 17:1-14) Hashem also commanded Mosheh: "Speak to the children of Israel, saying: If a woman gives birth to a male child, on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised." (Leviticus 12:2-3) "Walk before Me and be complete!" Let your entire life be lived before My all-encompassing presence. In every moment of your existence, direct your gaze toward Me and dedicate every part of your life to My service! And thus, be whole! Do not divide your being—thinking that your spirit belongs to Heaven while your body belongs to the earth, that you serve God with your soul while indulging the desires of the flesh. Be whole! See even your body as an instrument of divine service, and recognize that every power, even those of the body, has been entrusted to you for a sacred purpose. Dedicate your body to Me just as you dedicate your soul, and thus be whole and unified—your entire being moved by a single thought, consecrated to the One and Only God. Thus, God spoke to Avraham when He commanded him to place His seal on the most physical part of his body, thereby sanctifying and consecrating the body for divine purpose. You must keep the forces of your body sacred. Do not squander them in base sensual indulgence. Do not use them against the will of your God, but rather for the purpose for which He has given them to you. Be a complete human, a complete servant of God! Even in the most physical of acts, see only a sacred duty meant for the holy purpose of building the world. Keep your physical strength sacred for this divine purpose and restrain the demands of the flesh within these sacred bounds. Know that God will hold you accountable for every ounce of energy you waste outside His service or use against His will. Let the seal of Avraham remind you of this! Let it restrain your actions when desire tempts you to stray. Be wise and understand! Do not deceive yourself by thinking: "There is nothing in the world as much under my control as my own body. Whom would I harm if I use my body according to my desires?" But know that in doing so, you sin against God, your Creator, who owns both you and your body, with all its desires and inclinations. He is your Father, the One who placed upon your flesh the holy covenantal seal. This is a sign that you must rule over your body and its desires, sanctifying them for God's purpose. The eternal survival of your people is also founded upon the preservation of the holiness and purity of the covenantal seal. It was designed in such a way that, among Israel, base physical desire cannot dominate entirely, leading to the corruption of the entire generation and its annihilation from among the nations—as happened to other peoples, whose indulgence in bodily lusts weakened them and drained the strength of their vitality, causing their destruction. But in Israel, even among sinful ancestors, pure children are born, ready to grow like strong seedlings. This ensures that from generation to generation, the Garden of God will flourish anew, and the spirit and glory of God will walk among it. When the spirit of a past generation has fallen due to its corruption, a new generation will arise in Israel, untouched by its predecessor’s impurity. But the desecration of the covenantal seal leads to human degradation, reducing one to the level of an animal, causing moral corruption, and bringing impurity into future generations. It defiles the dignity of family life, bringing upon them terrible and lasting afflictions that become an inheritance of disease from weakened ancestors to their descendants. Only a body that is strong and steadfast in holiness and purity can house a strong and sacred spirit. Thus says the Lord: "I will establish My covenant between Me and you and your descendants after you, for their generations, as an everlasting covenant—to be God to you and your descendants after you… And you shall keep My covenant, you and your descendants after you, for their generations. This is My covenant that you shall keep between Me and you and your descendants after you: Every male among you shall be circumcised… And an uncircumcised male who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin shall be cut off from his people; he has broken My covenant.” One who rejects this covenant severs his connection to God and uproots the very foundations of his existence. Thus, God spoke to Avraham, and thus He speaks to every descendant of Avraham. And you, young men reading these words, do not carry the seal of Avraham in vain! Do not let yourselves be swept away by the degeneracy of the times! If you are truly the children of Avraham, you must uphold a high standard. Let this seal protect you from moral corruption! Let it strengthen you in times of struggle—it will surely help you achieve victory. When youth everywhere withers like a decayed flower, when society rushes toward spiritual decline, let your pride be in remaining strong, in standing firm in the holy calling that you bear as a son of Israel. "Walk before Me always and be pure, unblemished, and whole!" This is what God calls upon you to do through the seal of the covenant at every moment when temptation arises. Will you mock this call? Will you throw away the honor of Israel for the sake of fleeting animal pleasure? It is the duty of the father not only to physically nurture his child but also to raise him in mind and heart as a true human being and a Jew. Therefore, the father bears the responsibility to bring his son into the covenant of Avraham on the eighth day. If he neglects this duty, the communal authorities must ensure it is carried out. If they too fail, then every male descendant of Avraham, upon reaching religious maturity, is obligated to undergo circumcision himself. If he refuses, the Torah states: "That person shall be cut off from his people." Since circumcision is not merely a physical alteration but a spiritual elevation—raising the human being from animalistic indulgence to moral responsibility—it must be performed in the daytime, the time of action and purpose. A healthy child must be circumcised on the eighth day. If the child is sick or physically weak, circumcision is postponed until full recovery. If the illness affected the entire body, the procedure must be delayed for seven full days after recovery. If the condition affected only one limb, it is performed as soon as the child has regained strength. Since circumcision is an irreversible act, it is delayed in cases of doubt to protect the child's life. If two previous brothers died due to circumcision, a third son is circumcised only after he has grown stronger. If there is uncertainty about the exact birth time—whether it occurred before or after nightfall—the eighth day is counted from the following day. If the eighth day falls on Shabbat or a festival, circumcision is postponed to the ninth day unless it is known with certainty that the child was born during the day. All additional laws regarding circumcision can be found in sections 260-266. This is the “sin” through which a private individual falls and is humbled from his exalted position; this very sin is the one through which nations have strayed and have been wiped away from under the heavens of the Lord, and generations of human beings have been brought low to the dust. And it is none other than the sin and the iniquity through which Israel also fell and was humbled, because, due to this sin, “idolatry and the lusts of the senses” will always accompany him—yet such a thing must not be, for Israel must not descend to such a low level without the possibility of rising again, heaven forbid. For the Torah has acted countless times because of this and has always concerned itself to prevent Israel from being swallowed up and from being destroyed from the land. Therefore, let us not forget that the Lord placed us in the world of the Lord, for this world is the “property of the Lord,” and its gifts are given to us only for a specific purpose. To us have been entrusted many testimonies, commandments, and laws, some of which we have already come to know intellectually, and upon these depend also the commandments concerning the acquisition of the land—“new produce” and “orlah.” But just as the Lord gave the land to man to “serve and guard it,” so the Lord, for a second time in His world, bequeathed the “Land of Israel” to His people to be “the portion of their inheritance” according to their special actions. Israel, which is a people even without land and kingdom, is still called a “people” even before it attains “the land of its possession,” for the bond of nationality is not connected merely to the physical area of a place; rather, Israel is a “people” according to the great and enlightened idea inherent in the spirit of its essence. Israel bears this idea and the testimony of life, which it is called to fulfill, and this is in particular its divinely allotted portion. Nevertheless, because the Lord wished for Israel to be a “people” even in its external state among the nations, He gave it also a “special land” according to the special actions of His people. But in order that this land—which is intended to serve as the means to bring into effect the “name and testimony of Israel” in its fullness—does not become a source of stumbling or of corruption through the sin of property acquisition, the Lord commanded His people to observe these commandments in the land: “Shemittah” (the Sabbatical year), “Yovel” (the Jubilee), “Bikkurim” (first fruits), “Terumah” (offering), “Ma’aser” (tithes), “Challah” (dough offering). Especially concerning the acquisition of the land of Israel, Shemittah and Yovel, on the one hand, testify in themselves as a judgment of justice, since the Lord is the Master of all this property; and on the other hand, by prohibiting the labor of the land in its acquisition, they testify according to the understanding of “Sabbath” with regard to property acquisition in general. We must consider, on the one hand, “new produce” and “orlah” with regard to the acquisition of land in general, and on the other hand, “Bikkurim,” “Terumah,” “Ma’aser,” and “Challah,” since they are intended specifically for the acquisition of the “Land of Israel.” Of these latter, we will only mention “Challah,” which, according to the Kabbalah, remains incumbent upon us even now. Behold, if you have given your word and promise to give over ownership and money has been given in accordance with the decree, however, the sale has not been finalized by one of the methods of acquisition — we may not say that the matter was completed and they are allowed to go back on it. Nevertheless, if either the buyer or the seller goes back on it after money was received or after the buyer placed a sign on the merchandise, the curse of, "He who exacted payment," is given to him in court. That is, "He Who exacted payment from the people of the generation of the flood, and from the people of the generation of the dispersion, and from the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, and from the Egyptians at the Sea, He will exact payment from whoever does not stand by his word" (Bava Metzia 48a). And even one who only does business orally is obligated by his word, even though he has not performed an action. Yet even though a buyer or seller who only goes back on his word does not receive the curse of "He who exacted payment," he is called one lacking in faith. Anyone who promises something to his fellow in a way that his fellow should be able to rely upon it and goes back on it is considered someone lacking in faith (Choshen Mishpat 204). Indeed it is so — do not destroy [bal taschit]! That is God's first great general call to you, man. That is when you see yourself as the ruler and governor over the face of His earth. Behold, you see dirt, plants, and animals around you; and they already carry the seal of your human projects, to study and appraise them, through human effort and ingenuity, to serve your human purposes, to have them become your shelter, clothing, sustenance, and tools. So you have acquired them, that they should be in your possession, such that you stand amid your rulership over the face of the earth and all that exists are your servants to do your will and bidding. Yet you suddenly raise your hand to amuse yourself or to pour out your anger and swallow up and destroy something that can [otherwise] be used for your purposes. But you want to pound and break and obliterate that thing that you can make helpful and use properly. You surely desire this since, when you see creations below your level as things disconnected from justice and righteousness, you do not fear the Lord. Yet He is indeed their Shield and Protector, taking up their case with justice. So instead of thinking about them as means for the thoughtful acts of man, you see them haughtily, to have your power and the might of your will rule over them and to pour out your furious rage over them. Then the voice of God's great call thunders over you, "Do not destroy! Get away from it; act like a human being!" For it is truly only by using that which exists around you for the thoughtful and reasonable use of man as My Torah guides and designates that you are a man. Then you have power and possession over them. For I have given you, man, power and possession over them by way of a divine mandate. However, if you destroy, if you ruin, if you obliterate, you are no longer man, but rather a wild animal or a predatory beast, so that you no longer have possession over what exists around you. For I have lent them to you only for wise human use. So don't ever forget that I am the One who lent them to you! However, if you act perversely, if you act without intelligence and good sense towards anything, small or big, behold you are acting wickedly, rebelling and stealing from God's earth! Behold, you then turn into a murderer and robber of God's possessions. You are a sinner, and you have violated the holiness of the possession. Then God will make this call to you and protect everything, small or big, with this call. With the utterance of this word, He will grant righteous justice to the small or big against the plots of your heart and the violence of your hand! It is not for the sake of the prevention of bodily sickness that God arranged these laws about your food. Rather the Torah itself explains their reason: Just like the Temple of God, which symbolizes the ideal of the holy and sanctifies you for His sake, becomes defiled by impurity - that is, anything that is foreign to, or below the human realm (see the section on Service, Chapter 21) - so too are the forbidden foods "impure" for the holy sanctuary that you yourself constitute. Your body, your soul and your spirit form the essential playing field of your existence, which is designated for holiness. If you eat these foods, your body may well be nourished and become fatter. However, your animal impulse will be greatly aroused; or your body will only become a tool for your spirit. Instead of your soul becoming sanctified - meaning raising itself above any trace of animalism - it will descend to this low level, or become apathetic and lethargic. And your spirit can expect to encounter a greater struggle for which it is less equipped. It calls out to you again and again: It is impure to you! Do not defile yourselves with them! You will become impure from them! The meaning of becoming impure is to compromise preparedness for the designation of holiness. And behold you have been designated to be holy people, the children of a great holy congregation; and you have been chosen to attach yourselves to God and to walk in His ways. God said to you to be holy, "since I, your God, am holy." So then, you must guard your bodies like the holy sanctuary for your divine souls. As behold, the body is also for God. And that which is generally referred to as impure (tumah) is also referred to as something repulsive (sheketz), a disgusting thing. Something repulsive and disgusting is something that you reject on your own as a foreign body that is unfit for your constitution. And so just like your body naturally rejects anything that the sense of taste finds to be a foreign substance or unfit; so too must you reject these foods because they are repulsive, foreign and unfit for your spiritual constitution. Lest your spiritual constitution itself become repulsive, and you become distanced and turn away from your holy designation which you are meant to carry as a Jew. Likewise, abomination (toevah) - your spiritual constitution should abominate these foods, since they are antithetical to your spiritual designation and only nourish your animal impulse. These are the words of God's Torah. The main things about a mikveh (ritual bath) are: That the water should not be gathered by a person's possession, meaning a vessel; and also not arrive through any object that is susceptible to becoming impure. And [the water] must be gathered in one place. It can be flowing water or rain water that has not flown through or over anything that is susceptible to becoming impure. When rain water, it must be standing and not running. And the mikveh needs to have the necessary amount of water, and the like. Regarding the immersion, there may not be anything that separates between the thing that is being immersed and the water; and it must be completely placed within the water of the mikveh and fully immersed. (See Yoreh Deah 120, 201, 202.) Be fruitful and multiply! From now on, plant the planting of your species in the world. From now on, grow the thread of life at every instance and every time. Raise your offspring for all time so that they will continue to build and establish what you have left still unfinished and not yet sturdy. Plant your vine in the garden of the Lord, your species on the earth, so that it will grow to be a faithful planting in the vineyard of the House of Israel. And do everything in your power for your offspring, to raise them and educate them for God. And all the good things that you have acquired, fear of God, love of God, trust in God, living with faith in God — bequeath all these things to the next generation. With such an inheritance, you will continue through your offspring and their actions; and you, too, will live on and be remembered eternally. Let your house not be closed and sealed only for yourself and your household, to be a place of rest and peace only for yourselves. Rather let it be open for the benefit of the desolate poor people, for the hungry, the thirsty and for all who seek shelter and refuge for themselves. You should happily and lovingly bring in any guest who has no other letter of introduction that would recommend him except for that which comes from his being a creation of the Omnipotent, a son of our Father in Heaven. Hence receive him joyfully, bring him into your house, supply his needs and even accompany him [when he leaves] so that he will be secure on his journey. On these days that are memorial days of joy, they should not say such things that mention something sad relating to the fleetingness of life or sad thoughts about distressing matters - like veHu rachum (and He is merciful), rachum vechanun (merciful and compassionate), El erekh apayim (God full of patience) and yaankha (He should answer you). Likewise [is this the case] on other days primarily marked by joy besides Channukah and Purim: The fifteenth of Av; the fifteenth of Shevat; Rosh Chodesh (the first day of the month); Purim Katan; the thirty-third day of the omer; the eves of Yom Kippur and Rosh HaShanah; all of the month of Nissan; the days between Yom Kippur and Sukkot; from Rosh Chodesh Sivan until the day after Shavuot. Also [is this true] on private days of joy that have a national character, like a house of nuptials and a milah (circumcision). (They say yaankha at a milah with regard to the child for his healing.) Also [do we omit these] at the house of a mourner and on Tisha B'Av, for other reasons. 2) Festivals First we acknowledge that the creation of both the body and the spirit of the Jewish people was from God ("You have chosen us... And you have brought us close"); and that the maintenance of the body and the spirit of the nation is also an act of God ("and Your great name"). We then make note of the special import of this holiday ("and gave"). Then we speak about the special character of the day - whether it is about the creation of the Jewish people or its maintenance, the request from God concerning the creation or maintenance of the Jewish people is in, "May it come and may it ascend," and in, "And raise up for us." This is like, "God and God of our Forefathers, accept," on Shabbat. This is to bring down the blessing of the holiday: Life, peace and joy - may they come to fruition in our lives. And after the standing prayer (amidah), we recite the Hallel. On the first days of Pesach and on all the days of Sukkot, it is 'full Hallel,' like Chanukkah. But on the later days of Pesach, it is like Rosh Chodesh (the first day of the month): We skip [some sections] and recite 'half Hallel.' (The reason is explained nicely: It is because the latter days of Pesach do not only remind us of the salvation of the Jewish people, but rather also of the downfall of the Egyptians and their drowning in the sea. So it is like the Sages, may their memory be blessed, say [Yalkut Shimoni on Nakh 1085], that it is not good to say and prolong verse and praise about the destruction of the creations of God. That is why Hallel is not full [on those days]. Tisha B'Av at night: The scroll of Lamentations. It is the emotions of the prophet Jeremiah's soul and his dirge that he took up about the destruction of the holy city of Jerusalem and the Temple. And it is especially about the sin that Jerusalem and his people sinned, which is what caused that awful destruction to happen. And while glancing with eyes full of tears, he instructs and shows the path that leads to repentance and towards the revival of Israel, to renew our days as of old (alluding to Lamentations 5:21). Sukkot: They recite Ecclesiastes in the morning service of Shabbat of the intermediate days of the festival (Chol HaMoed) of Sukkot. As it shows that the maintenance of the body and the spirit of the nation is through God. This is in order to know that, without God, all human competition, all human actions and calculations, as well as the results of the toil of his efforts and his mighty hand - they are altogether empty.

Resting from labor¹Within the context of the Sabbath laws, labor does not refer to strenuous work, but rather to the performance of one of the thirty nine labors that were necessary for the construction of the Temple or a labor which is analogous to them. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 1.)
The Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah is significant. Our Rabbis have offered two definitions of the mitzvah of resting on the Sabbath: In his commentary on Yevamot 6a, the Rashba states that the mitzvah is negative in nature: one refrains from performing prohibited labors. In contrast, in his commentary on Leviticus 23:24, the Ramban explains that the mitzvah possesses a positive dimension: to spend the day in a restful frame of mind, abstaining from all activities - even those that are not forbidden labors - which would disrupt this tranquility.
From the Rambam's choice of wording in this halachah, it would appear that he follows the first view. From his statements in Chapter 21, Halachah 1, however, it would appear that he accepts the second perspective. (See also Tzafenat Paneach.) on the seventh day fulfills a positive commandment,²Sefer HaMitzvot (Positive Commandment 154) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 85) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. as [Exodus 23:12] states, "And you shall rest on the seventh day."³In Sefer HaMitzvot (General Principle 9), the Rambam mentions that the commandment to rest on the Sabbath is mentioned 12 times in the Torah. Sefer HaKovetz and others question why the Rambam cites this proof-text in particular. Anyone who performs a labor on this day negates the observance of a positive commandment and also transgresses a negative commandment,⁴Many of the mitzvot involve a positive and a negative commandment which share a single objective. for [ibid. 20:10] states, "Do not perform any labor [on⁵ Sefer HaMitzvot (Negative Commandment 320) and Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 32) consider this to be one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. it]."
What are the liabilities incurred by a person who performs labor [on this day]? If he does so willingly,⁶i.e., without being forced by others as a conscious act of defiance,⁷and not inadvertently.
The Radbaz (Vol. V, Responsum 1510) notes that the Rambam uses the expression "willingly, as a conscious act of defiance" with regard to the transgressions of idolatry (Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 3:1), the Sabbath laws, and the laws of Yom Kippur (Hilchot Sh'vitat Asor 1:1). With regard to all other transgressions punishable by כרת, the Rambam merely states "as a conscious act of defiance."
The Radbaz explains that it is possible that the Rambam mentioned the concept of "willingly" with regard to these three transgressions because they are the first cases of כרת mentioned in the Mishneh Torah. After mentioning the concept on these three occasions, he does not think further repetition is necessary. he is liable for karet;⁸כרת means "cut off." Mo'ed Katan 28a relates that a person liable for כרת would die prematurely, before reaching the age of fifty. The Rambam (Hilchot Teshuvah 8:1) emphasizes that being "cut off in this world" is not the sum total of Divine retribution for such a transgression. In addition, the person's soul is also cut off and prevented from reaching the world to come. if witnesses who administer a warning are present,⁹As explained in Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:1-2, punishment is not administered for the violation of a transgression unless the transgressor is made aware of the punishment he could receive for his deed. he should be stoned [to death].¹⁰See Numbers 15:35. This is the most severe form of execution. If he performs [labor] without being conscious of the transgression,¹¹accidentally, performing a forbidden labor or doing so without awareness of the transgression involved he is liable to bring a sin offering of a fixed nature.¹²The Rambam uses this term to differentiate the sin offering required from a קרבן עולה ויורד - a guilt offering - which differs depending on the financial status of the person bringing it. See Hilchot Shegagot 1:4.

[Regarding the Sabbath,] the Torah [Exodus 23:12] states: "[On the seventh day,] you shall cease activity." [This implies] ceasing [even the performance of certain] activities that are not [included in the categories of the forbidden] labors.¹As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, this statement has raised the attention of the commentaries concerned with how the Rambam defines the scope of the positive commandment to cease activity on the Sabbath. Many authorities explain that this positive commandment is merely a restatement of the prohibition against performing forbidden labors. Others (see the commentary of the Ramban on Exodus 23:12 encompasses holding back from performing any activity that will disturb the atmosphere of rest and peace that characterizes the Sabbath.
[The Torah left the definition of the scope of this commandment to] the Sages, [who] forbade many activities as sh'vut. Some activities are forbidden because they resemble the forbidden labors, while other activities are forbidden lest they lead one to commit a forbidden labor. These [activities] include the following:²The Rambam uses the next four chapters to delineate various activities that were forbidden because of the two reasons he mentions above. In his discussion of this matter, he gives examples of activities that are related to each of the categories of forbidden labor.

The Sages forbade the carrying of certain objects on the Sabbath in the same manner as [one carries] during the week. Why was this prohibition instituted?⁴⁶In this and in the following halachah, the Rambam sets the conceptual basis for the prohibitions described as muktzeh. The particular laws that result from these principles are described in the following two chapters. [Our Sages] said: If the prophets warned that the manner in which a person walks on the Sabbath should not resemble the manner in which he walks during the week, and similarly, one's conversation on the Sabbath should not resemble one's conversation during the week, as it is written, "[refraining from]... speaking about [mundane] matters," surely the manner in which one carries on the Sabbath should not resemble the manner in which one carries during the week.
In this manner, no one will regard [the Sabbath] as an ordinary weekday and lift up and repair articles, [carrying them] from room to room, or from house to house, or set aside stones and the like. [These restrictions are necessary] for since the person is idle and sitting at home, [it is likely that] he will seek something with which to occupy himself. Thus, he will not have ceased activity and will have negated the motivating principle for the Torah's commandment [Deuteronomy 5:14], "Thus... will rest."⁴⁷See the notes on the beginning of Chapter 21, which use this halachah as a support for the principle that the positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath is more than just a restatement of the negative commandment not to perform forbidden labor.

[Regarding the Sabbath,] the Torah [Exodus 23:12] states: "[On the seventh day,] you shall cease activity." [This implies] ceasing [even the performance of certain] activities that are not [included in the categories of the forbidden] labors.¹As mentioned in the notes on Chapter 1, this statement has raised the attention of the commentaries concerned with how the Rambam defines the scope of the positive commandment to cease activity on the Sabbath. Many authorities explain that this positive commandment is merely a restatement of the prohibition against performing forbidden labors. Others (see the commentary of the Ramban on Exodus 23:12 encompasses holding back from performing any activity that will disturb the atmosphere of rest and peace that characterizes the Sabbath.
[The Torah left the definition of the scope of this commandment to] the Sages, [who] forbade many activities as sh'vut. Some activities are forbidden because they resemble the forbidden labors, while other activities are forbidden lest they lead one to commit a forbidden labor. These [activities] include the following:²The Rambam uses the next four chapters to delineate various activities that were forbidden because of the two reasons he mentions above. In his discussion of this matter, he gives examples of activities that are related to each of the categories of forbidden labor.

As, when a curtain had a worm which made a tear in it, they would tear the curtain further to lengthen the tear, and that enabled them to then sew it in a manner that obscured the tear. Rav Zutra bar Toviya said that Rav said: One who tightens the thread of a stitch on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. If two parts of a garment that were sewn together begin to separate, and one pulls the thread to reattach them, it is tantamount to having sewn them. The Gemara cites additional halakhot cited by Rav Zutra in the name of Rav. And one who learns even one matter from a magosh, a Persian priest, is liable to receive the death penalty. And one who knows how to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations, and does not do so, one may not speak with him because his actions are improper. The Gemara proceeds to discuss the additional halakhot cited by Rav Zutra bar Toviya. With regard to the magosh, Rav and Shmuel disagreed. One said that they are sorcerers, while the other said they are heretics. The Gemara adds: Conclude that Rav is the one who said that they are heretics, as Rav Zutra bar Toviya said that Rav said: One who learns one matter from the magosh is liable to receive the death penalty. As, if it should enter your mind that they are sorcerers, wasn’t it written: “When you come into the land which the Lord your God gives you, you shall not learn to do after the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found among you any one that makes his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, one that uses divination, a soothsayer, or an enchanter, or a sorcerer” (Deuteronomy 18:9–10)? And the Sages inferred: You shall not learn to do, but you may learn to understand and to teach the topic of sorcery. Apparently, merely learning about sorcery does not violate a prohibition. Only acting upon that learning is prohibited. Rav, who prohibited learning even a single matter from a magosh, must hold that they are heretics, not merely sorcerers. The Gemara states: Indeed, conclude that Rav is the one who said that they are heretics. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of bar Kappara: Anyone who knows how to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations and does not do so, the verse says about him: “They do not take notice of the work of God, and they do not see His handiwork” (Isaiah 5:12). And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that there is a mitzva incumbent upon a person to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations? As it was stated: “And you shall guard and perform, for it is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations” (Deuteronomy 4:6). What wisdom and understanding is there in the Torah that is in the eyes of the nations, i.e., appreciated and recognized by all? You must say: This is the calculation of astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations, as the calculation of experts is witnessed by all. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who traps a deer or any other living creature. The Sages taught in a Tosefta: One who traps a ḥilazon and breaks its shell to remove its blood for the dye is liable to bring only one sin-offering. He is not liable for breaking the shell. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is liable to bring two, for performing the prohibited labors of trapping and for threshing, as Rabbi Yehuda would say: The breaking of a ḥilazon is included in the primary category of threshing, as its objective is to extract the matter that he desires from the shell that he does not. The Rabbis said to him: Breaking the shell is not included in the primary category of threshing. Rava said: What is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis? They hold: Threshing applies only to produce that grows from the ground. One who extracts other materials from their covering is exempt. The Gemara asks: Even if extracting blood is not considered threshing, let him be liable for taking a life as well. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is referring to a case where he broke its shell after it was dead. Rava said: Even if you say that he broke it when it was alive, he is exempt. Since he had no intention of killing the ḥilazon, he is considered as one who is acting unawares with regard to taking a life. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Didn’t Abaye and Rava both say that Rabbi Shimon, who rules that an unintentional act is permitted, agrees that in a case of: Cut off its head and will it not die, one is liable? One who performs an action that will inevitably result in a prohibited labor cannot claim that he did not intend for his action to lead to that result. Lack of intention is only a valid claim when the result is merely possible, not inevitable. Since one who extracts blood from a ḥilazon inevitably takes its life, how can Rava claim that his action is unintentional? The Gemara answers: Here it is different, as the longer the ḥilazon lives, the better it is for the trapper, so that its dye will become clear. Dye extracted from a live ḥilazon is a higher quality than that which is extracted from a dead one. Rabbi Shimon agrees that one who performs an action with inevitable consequences is liable only in a case where the consequences are not contrary to his interests. Since he prefers that the ḥilazon remain alive as long as possible, he is not liable for the inevitable consequences. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: As there was no slaughter necessary for construction of the Tabernacle, one who slaughters an animal, due to what prohibited labor is he liable? Rav said: He is liable due to dyeing, as in the course of the slaughter the hide is dyed with blood. And Shmuel said: He is liable due to taking a life.

MISHNA: The aforementioned pepper mill is a composite vessel, and each of its parts must be considered independently with respect to ritual impurity. It is susceptible to ritual impurity because of each of the three vessels of which it is comprised: It is susceptible to impurity because it is a wooden receptacle, it is susceptible to impurity because it is a metal vessel, and it is susceptible to impurity because it is a sieve. GEMARA: A Sage taught: The lower section of the mill is susceptible to impurity because it is viewed as a receptacle, since the ground pepper descends into it. The middle section is susceptible to impurity because it is a sieve, as it serves to filter the pepper. Finally, the upper part, in which the pepper is actually ground, is susceptible to impurity because it is a metal vessel. Although it is not a receptacle, it is nevertheless susceptible to impurity, since it is made of metal. MISHNA: A child’s wagon, with which he plays and upon which he also sits, is susceptible to ritual impurity imparted by treading. It is considered a fixed seat of the child, so that if the child is a zav and he sits on the wagon, it contracts the ritual impurity imparted by the treading of a zav. And this wagon may be handled on Shabbat, as it is considered a vessel. And it may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat only upon cloth, a stone pavement, or the like, as otherwise it would create a furrow when dragged, and one would be liable due to the prohibited labor of plowing. Rabbi Yehuda says: For this reason, no vessels may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat except for a wagon, which is permitted because its wheels do not make a furrow in the ground but merely press the earth down. Since no earth is moved from its place, this is not considered digging or plowing on Shabbat. GEMARA: It is taught in the mishna that a child’s wagon is susceptible to ritual impurity imparted by treading. Why? It is because he leans on it. The mishna also teaches that this wagon may be handled on Shabbat. Why? It is because it has the status of a vessel, and one may handle a vessel on Shabbat. The mishna further teaches that a child’s wagon may be dragged on Shabbat only upon cloth. The Gemara infers: Upon cloth, yes, it is permitted; but directly on the ground, no, it is not permitted. What is the reason for this halakha? It is because he creates a furrow in the ground when he drags the wagon across it. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: An unintentional act, i.e., a permitted action from which an unintended prohibited labor ensues on Shabbat, is prohibited, even though the person performing it does not have the prohibited labor in mind. As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, didn’t he say: An unintentional act is permitted, since there was no intention to perform the prohibited action? As we learned explicitly in a mishna that Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a bed, a chair, or a bench on the ground, provided that he does not intend to make a furrow. Even if one forms a furrow unwittingly, one need not be concerned, as this was not his intention. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna as follows: Rabbi Yehuda says: No vessels may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat except for a wagon, because it merely presses the earth down. This is not prohibited as plowing because it does not create a furrow. This indicates that a wagon may be dragged on the ground on Shabbat because, yes, it presses the earth down, but it does not make a furrow. Since it has already been established that the first section of the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and there it appears that a wagon dragged along the ground makes a furrow, Rabbi Yehuda seems to contradict himself. The Gemara answers: It must be explained that this is a dispute between two tanna’im who hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda but differ with regard to the content of that opinion. The first tanna holds that even a wagon makes a furrow, whereas the other tanna maintains in the name of Rabbi Yehuda that a wagon does not make a furrow. MISHNA: One may not trap fish from their ponds on a Festival even with the intention of eating them, as this falls into the category of hunting, a type of labor that is not permitted on a Festival. Nor may one place food before them, as it is not his duty to feed them; rather, they maintain themselves by eating smaller fish or different types of algae that grow in the water. However, one may trap an animal or a bird from their enclosures [beivarim], as they are viewed as already captured, and therefore the action is not considered an act of hunting. And one may also place food before them as one does for other household animals. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not all enclosures are identical with respect to the halakhot of hunting. This is the principle: With regard to any animal

This is the baraita that Rabbi Zakkai taught before Rabbi Yoḥanan: There is a stringency with regard to Shabbat vis-à-vis other mitzvot, and conversely, there is a stringency with regard to other mitzvot vis-à-vis Shabbat. There is a stringency with regard to Shabbat, as with regard to Shabbat, if one performed two distinct acts of labor in one lapse of awareness, he is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each and every act, which is not so with regard to other mitzvot. Conversely, there is a stringency with regard to other mitzvot, as with regard to other mitzvot, if one sinned unwittingly, without intent to perform the act of the transgression at all, he is nevertheless obligated to bring an offering, which is not so with regard to Shabbat. The Gemara examines this baraita in detail. The Master said: There is a stringency with regard to Shabbat, as with regard to Shabbat, if one performed two distinct acts of labor in one lapse of awareness, he is obligated to bring a sin-offering for each act. What are the circumstances? If we say that he unwittingly performed acts of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, the corresponding situation with regard to other mitzvot is a case where one unwittingly consumed forbidden fat and blood. If so, there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot; here, one is obligated to bring two sin-offerings, and there, one is obligated to bring two sin-offerings. Rather, what are the circumstances with regard to other mitzvot where one is obligated to bring only one sin-offering? One is obligated in a case where he consumed forbidden fat and again consumed forbidden fat within one lapse of awareness. The corresponding situation with regard to Shabbat is a case where one performed an act of reaping and performed another act of reaping within one lapse of awareness. In that case too there is no difference between Shabbat and other mitzvot; here, one is obligated to bring one sin-offering, and there, one is obligated to bring one sin-offering. The Gemara comments: And that is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi Zakkai: Go out and teach this baraita outside; it is not worthy of being taught in the study hall. The Gemara asks: What is the difficulty that caused Rabbi Yoḥanan to disregard the baraita? Actually, perhaps I will say to you that the baraita is referring to a case where one performed acts of reaping and grinding on Shabbat, and when the baraita states: Which is not so with regard to other mitzvot, it is not referring to all mitzvot in general; rather, we arrive at the halakha of idol worship, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami. As Rabbi Ami says: If one sacrificed an animal as an idolatrous offering and burned incense and poured a libation, all in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is obligated to bring only one sin-offering. The Gemara answers: The baraita cannot be interpreted as referring to idol worship, as it teaches in the last clause: There is a stringency with regard to other mitzvot, as with regard to other mitzvot, if one sinned unwittingly, without the intent to perform the act at all, he is nevertheless obligated to bring an offering. The Gemara explains why this cannot be referring to idol worship. What are the circumstances of one who unwittingly transgresses the prohibition of idol worship without the intent to perform the act? If he thought that a house of idol worship was a synagogue and bowed to it, he is certainly exempt, as his heart was directed toward Heaven. Rather, it must be a case where the transgressor saw the statue of a person and bowed to it. If he accepted that person upon himself as a god, he is an intentional transgressor and is liable to receive the death penalty, not to bring an offering. And if he did not accept him upon himself as a god, what he did is nothing. Rather, the baraita must be referring to a case where one worshipped an idol due to love or due to fear of a person, and he was unaware that this is prohibited. This works out well according to Abaye, who says that one who engages in idol worship due to love or fear is liable; accordingly, one who does so unwittingly must bring an offering. But according to Rava, who says that one who does so is exempt, what can be said? Rather, the baraita must be referring to a case where the transgressor says to himself that idol worship is permitted in general. Accordingly, the statement in the baraita: Which is not so in the halakhot of Shabbat, is referring to one who was under the impression that performing labor on Shabbat is permitted. One who performs prohibited labor under those circumstances is completely exempt, while one who transgresses under those circumstances with regard to idol worship is obligated to bring a sin-offering. This interpretation of the baraita is difficult, as Rava asked Rav Naḥman about the halakha in a case where one violated Shabbat during a lapse of awareness of both this, that it was Shabbat, and that the particular labor that he performed is prohibited on Shabbat. And Rava’s question was only with regard to whether to deem the person obligated to bring one sin-offering or whether to deem him obligated to bring two sin-offerings. There is no one who says that such a person is entirely exempt, in accordance with this interpretation of the baraita. Therefore, the baraita cannot be referring to idol worship. The Gemara challenges this conclusion: What is the difficulty in interpreting the baraita as referring to idol worship? Actually, perhaps I will say to you that the first clause of the baraita is referring to the contrast between Shabbat and idol worship, and the last clause is referring to the contrast between Shabbat and other mitzvot. And the halakha of one who transgressed other mitzvot unwittingly, without intent to perform the act, is referring to, e.g., a case where one has forbidden fat in his mouth and thinks it is spittle, and he swallows it. In that case he must bring an offering for his transgression, which is not so with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat, where in a parallel case one would be exempt. As, for example, one who intended to lift a plant that was detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground is exempt. One is not liable for an unintentional act of labor on Shabbat. And this distinction is in accordance with the statement that Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says, as he says: One who acts unawares with forbidden fats or with those with whom sexual relations are forbidden, i.e., one who accidentally consumed forbidden fat or engaged in forbidden sexual intercourse, without intending to perform the act at all (see Yevamot 54a), is obligated to bring a sin-offering, since he derived pleasure from the transgression. But one who acts unawares on Shabbat, performing forbidden labor, is exempt, as the Torah prohibits only planned labor. Since the baraita can be explained in this manner, the Gemara explains why Rabbi Yoḥanan rejected it anyway: Rabbi Yoḥanan conforms to his standard line of reasoning, in that he does not interpret the first clause of a baraita with one explanation and the last clause of the same baraita with one other explanation. Rabbi Yoḥanan does not accept the premise that a baraita can be referring to a different matter in each clause unless it states so explicitly. As Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Whoever explains to me the mishna concerning a barrel (Bava Metzia 40b) in accordance with the opinion of one tanna, I will carry his clothes after him to the bathhouse, i.e., I will attend him as a servant, as although that mishna can be explained by dividing it into two different opinions, I do not accept that type of explanation. Therefore, Rabbi Yoḥanan does not accept the suggestion that the first clause of the baraita here is referring to idol worship and the last clause is referring to other mitzvot. § The Gemara discusses the matter itself, namely, whether one who engages in several forms of idol worship in the same lapse of awareness brings more than one sin-offering.

but only from the granary and the winepress, so too, teruma of the tithe is separated only from the granary and the winepress. The Gemara asks: If the mishna is referring to produce from which teruma gedola has not been separated, it is appropriate to use the term: Calculates. However, according to the suggestion that it is referring to a first tithe, from which teruma of the tithe must be separated, why does the mishna state: Calculates? The tanna of the mishna should have said: Measures. The amount of teruma gedola to be separated is calculated by estimation, as there is no fixed amount for this teruma according to Torah law. With regard to the teruma separated from first tithe, however, the Torah established the fixed amount of one-tenth, and one is required to measure precisely. The Gemara explains: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Elazar ben Gimmel, as it is taught in a baraita: Abba Elazar ben Gimmel says: The verse states: “And your teruma shall be reckoned to you as though it were the corn of the granary and as the fullness of the winepress” (Numbers 18:27). The verse speaks of two terumot. One is teruma gedola, and the other one is teruma of the tithe. Just as teruma gedola is separated by estimation and is not measured exactly, and it is enough to separate it by thought, as the word “reckoned” implies that the mere intention to separate a particular portion serves to remove the rest of the produce from its untithed state, so too, teruma of the tithe can also be separated by estimation and by thought. § Since it was mentioned incidentally, the Gemara discusses the matter itself: Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: With regard to first tithe, in a case in which the Levite preceded the priest while the grain was still on the stalks, its name renders it untithed produce, until he separates from it the teruma of the tithe. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this halakha? Rava said: Since the name of the first tithe was called upon it, the obligation of the teruma of the tithe takes effect as well. The Gemara cites a similar halakha that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: With regard to first tithe, in a case in which the Levite preceded the priest while the grain was still on the stalks, before it was threshed and turned into a pile, the owner separated first tithe before teruma. In that case, the separated tithe is exempt from teruma gedola. Although teruma gedola should have been separated from the produce first, and it should have included some of the produce taken as the first tithe, the Levite is nevertheless exempt from separating this teruma. This is because it is stated: “And you shall set apart from it a teruma for the Lord, even a tenth part of the tithe” (Numbers 18:26), which indicates: A tenth part of the tithe, i.e., the teruma of the tithe, I, God, said to you that you must separate it, and you are not obligated in both teruma gedola and teruma of the tithe from the first tithe. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If so, if there is a source for this halakha in the Torah, even if the Levite preceded the priest, i.e., first tithe was separated after the grain had been threshed and the kernels of grain placed in a pile, then it should also be exempt from teruma gedola. Abaye said to Rav Pappa: With regard to your claim, the verse states: “From all that is given you, you shall set apart that which is the Lord’s teruma” (Numbers 18:29). This verse indicates that God’s teruma, i.e., teruma gedola, must be taken from all the produce, including the tithe. The Gemara asks: And what did you see that led you to require the separation of teruma gedola from first tithe that was taken from processed grain piled in the granary but not from first tithe that was taken from grain on stalks? Abaye answers: This, grain that has been threshed and placed into piles, is completely processed and has become grain, and that, grain that remains on the stalk, has not yet become grain. Until the grain is threshed and assembled in a pile, the obligation to separate teruma does not take effect, as it is not considered grain. When such unprocessed grain is designated first tithe, it ceases to be untithed produce and the opportunity to separate teruma from it has been missed. However, once the grain has been processed, and the obligation to separate teruma has taken effect, it is as if the teruma is already mixed in, and the obligation to separate it cannot be overridden by the fact that this produce has been designated first tithe. § We learned in a mishna there (Ma’asrot 4:5): One who peels grains of barley to eat them raw may peel them one by one and eat them immediately without tithing them, as this is considered a casual manner of eating. But if he peeled and placed several of them into his hand, he is obligated to separate tithes. Rabbi Elazar said: And a similar halakha applies to Shabbat. Peeling grains of barley one by one is not considered threshing, and it is permitted; if a whole handful of grains are peeled together, this does constitute the prohibited labor of threshing. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav’s wife peel for him barley on Shabbat by the cupful? And likewise Rabbi Ḥiyya’s wife would peel barley for him on Shabbat by the cupful. Rather, if Rabbi Elazar’s comment was stated in this context, it was stated with regard to the latter clause of that same mishna (Ma’asrot 4:5): With regard to one who husks kernels of wheat by hand, he may blow onto the chaff to disperse it a little at a time and eat the kernels without separating tithes. But if he blows on the kernels and puts a large amount of them into his lap, he is obligated to separate tithes from the food. It was with regard to this teaching that Rabbi Elazar said: And a similar halakha applies to Shabbat. Rabbi Abba bar Memel strongly objects to this: And with regard to the first clause of the mishna, one should conclude: Yes, if one peeled a handful of barley, it is considered prepared with regard to tithes, but no, it is not considered threshing with regard to Shabbat? But is there anything that, with regard to Shabbat, is not considered the completion of the labor and may be performed; and yet, with regard to tithes, it is considered the completion of the labor? Isn’t the prohibition against work on Shabbat far more stringent than tithes in all its details? Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, strongly objects to this claim: And is there no example of a halakha in which tithes are treated more stringently than Shabbat? And is there not the halakha of their granary for tithes, as we learned in a mishna (Ma’asrot 1:5): What is the equivalent of their granary, i.e., the point at which the processing of various vegetables is completed so that they become obligated in tithes? With regard to cucumbers and gourds, they become obligated from when one trims the thin hairs that cover them [misheyefaksu], and for those he did not trim, from when he assembles them in a pile. And we also learned in a mishna (Ma’asrot 1:6), with regard to onions, that it is from when one assembles them in a pile. Whereas with regard to Shabbat, one who assembles produce in a pile is exempt, as this is not a prohibited labor on Shabbat. Rather, what have you to say? Why is one exempt if he forms a pile on Shabbat? The Torah prohibited only planned, constructive labor on Shabbat, the type of work that involves the creation of something new, and the formation of a pile is not considered that kind of labor. Here too, with regard to peeling barley, the Torah prohibited creative work. Although collecting the peeled barley in one’s hand is considered the completion of the labor in respect to tithes, it is not prohibited labor on Shabbat. Apropos husking kernels on Shabbat, the Gemara asks: How may one husk grain on a Festival? Abaye said in the name of Rav Yosef: One finger on another, i.e., one may place the kernels between two fingers and rub. And Rav Avya said in the name of Rav Yosef: One may even do so one on two, i.e., between the thumb and two fingers. Rava said: Since he alters the manner in which he performs the activity, he may even do so with one finger on all the rest. The Gemara further asks: How may one blow on the grain, to winnow it in a permitted manner on Shabbat? Rav Adda bar Ahava said that Rav said: One blows

as we learned in a mishna, Rabbi Yosei says: If a zav was riding on an animal, and there was a garment beneath it, if he was riding the horse, he renders the garment impure by means of the horse’s front legs. Only then is it impure; if it was beneath the horse’s hind legs it is not. And if he was riding the donkey, he renders the garment impure by means of the donkey’s hind legs. Only then is it impure; if it was beneath the donkey’s front legs it is not. The reason for this distinction is that a horse rests primarily on its front legs, and a donkey rests primarily on its hind legs. But why should a garment beneath the hind legs of a horse or the front legs of a donkey remain ritually pure? Don’t the legs assist each other? Is the reason not because we say that one who assists is insubstantial? Rav Ashi said: We, too, also learned support for this halakha in a different mishna. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to a priest that stood in the Temple, and one of his feet was on a vessel, and one of his feet was on the floor, or one of his feet was on a stone, and one of his feet was on the floor, while performing priestly Temple rites; we see, if the vessel was removed or the stone was removed, whether he would still be capable of standing on one foot on the ground. If so, his service is valid. And if he could not stand on one foot, his service is invalid. Is he considered to be standing on the floor, in which case the service is valid, or is he not considered to be standing on the floor, in which case the service is invalid? The Gemara asks: And why, if he would still be capable of standing on one foot, should it be valid? Don’t his legs assist each other? Isn’t the reason because we say: One who assists is insubstantial? Ravina said: We, too, also learned support for this in a different mishna. All service performed in the Temple must be performed with the right hand. If he received the blood in his right hand, and his left hand assisted his right hand, his service is valid. And why is his service valid? Aren’t his hands assisting each other? Isn’t the reason because we say: One who assists is insubstantial? The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that it is so. The Master said in a baraita cited above: With regard to an action performed by two people, when this person is capable of performing it alone and that person is capable of performing it alone, Rabbi Meir deems them liable. A dilemma was raised before the students: Do we require a measure that determines liability for this person and a measure that determines liability for that one; or perhaps one measure that determines liability is sufficient for them all? Rav Ḥisda and Rav Hamnuna disagreed. One said: There must be a measure that determines liability for this person and a measure that determines liability for that one. And one said: One measure of liability is sufficient for them all. Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: We, too, also learned a mishna in support of the opinion that one measure is sufficient. It states in the mishna in tractate Zavim: If a zav was sitting on a bed, and there were four garments beneath the four legs of the bed, they are all ritually impure because the bed is incapable of standing on three legs. And why should they be ritually impure? Let them require a measure of the weight of a zav for this garment and a measure of the weight of a zav for that garment. All the garments should only become impure if there was one zav on the bed for each garment. Is it not because we say that in order to make the garments impure one measure of impurity is sufficient for them all? Therefore, both parties are liable for one measure that determines liability. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We, too, also learned an additional support from a different source. With regard to a deer that entered the house, and one person locked the door before it on Shabbat and prevented it from exiting, one is liable for performing the prohibited labor of trapping on Shabbat. If two people locked the door, they are exempt. If one is incapable of locking the door alone, and two people locked it, they are liable. And why are they liable? Let them require a measure of trapping for this person and a measure of trapping for that person. Is it not because we say that one measure of trapping is sufficient for them all? Ravina said: We, too, also learned an additional support from a different source. With regard to partners who stole an animal and slaughtered it, they are obligated to pay four or five times its value, as stated in the Torah. And why are they liable? Let them require a measure of slaughtering for this one and a measure of slaughtering for that one. Is it not because we say that one measure of slaughtering is sufficient for them all? And Rav Ashi said: We, too, also learned an additional support from a similar source. Two people who carried out a weaver’s reed on Shabbat are liable. And why are they liable? Let them require a measure of carrying for this one and a measure of carrying for that one. Is it not because we say that one measure of carrying is sufficient for them all? Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: This cannot serve as a proof, for perhaps the rod has a measure equivalent to that which is used to cook an easily-cooked egg for this one and an easily-cooked egg for that one. That is the measure that determines liability for carrying out wood on Shabbat. He answered him: If so, let the baraita teach us the halakha with regard to an ordinary reed. What is different here that led the baraita to teach the halakha specifically about a weaver’s reed? Rather, the baraita is certainly referring to a reed that is a single unit. Again Rav Aḥa rejects the proof: And perhaps it has a measure equivalent to that which is used to weave a cloth for this one and to weave a cloth for that one. That is the measure that determines liability. Rather, proof cannot be learned from this baraita. The tanna who recited mishnayot in the study hall taught before Rav Naḥman: Two people who carried out a weaver’s reed on Shabbat are exempt, and Rabbi Shimon deems them liable. Rav Naḥman was surprised at this. He asked: Toward where are you facing? This is the diametric opposite of their opinions. Rather, say an emended baraita: They are liable, and Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt. MISHNA: One who carries out foods less than the measure that determines liability for carrying out food in a vessel on Shabbat is exempt, even for carrying out the vessel, because the vessel is secondary to the food inside it. Since one is not liable for carrying out the food, he is not liable for carrying out the vessel either. Similarly, one who carries out a living person on a bed is exempt, even for carrying out the bed, because the bed is secondary to the person. One who carries out a corpse on a bed is liable. And similarly, one who carries out an olive-bulk of a corpse, or an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, or a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal, which are the minimal measures of these items that transmit ritual impurity, is liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems him exempt. He holds that one is only liable for performing a prohibited labor for its own sake. One who carries out an object in order to bring it to its destination is liable. However, people carry out a corpse or an animal carcass only to be rid of them. GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: One who carries out the measure that determines liability for carrying out foods in a vessel on Shabbat is liable for carrying out the food and exempt for carrying out the vessel. And if that vessel was needed by him for another purpose, he is liable even for carrying out the vessel. The Gemara wonders with regard to the second halakha: Can we conclude from it that one who eats two olive-bulks of forbidden fat in the course of one lapse of awareness is liable to bring two sin-offerings? In that case, one who carries out a vessel with food inside it has performed two actions that fall under the rubric of one prohibited labor. Why should he be liable to bring two sin-offerings? Rav Sheshet said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where

The Gemara explains: It is found in a case where a pocketlike protrusion impedes sewing. Therefore, one tears the garment and tucks the protruding portion under the seam. MISHNA: One who rends his garment in his anger or in anguish over his dead relative is exempt. And anyone else who performs labors destructively on Shabbat is exempt. And one who performs a labor destructively in order to repair is liable, and his measure for liability is equivalent to the measure for one who performs that labor constructively. The measure that determines liability for one who whitens, or one who combs, or one who dyes, or one who spins wool is the full width of a double sit, which is the distance between the forefinger and the middle finger. And for one who weaves two threads, the measure that determines liability is one sit. GEMARA: We learned in the mishna: One who rends his garment in anger or in anguish over his dead relative is exempt. The Gemara raises a contradiction to this based on a baraita: One who rends his garment in his anger or in his mourning or in his anguish over his dead relative is liable for performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat. And even though he desecrates Shabbat by tearing his garment, he nevertheless fulfilled his obligation of rending his garment in mourning. Apparently, one is liable for rending his garment in anguish over the dead. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this mishna, which states one is liable for rending his garment, is referring to his own dead relative for whom he is obligated to tear his garment. And that mishna, which states one is exempt for rending his garment, is referring to any unrelated dead person. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: Over his dead relative? The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna, which says that he is exempt, is referring to his own dead; however, it is referring to those relatives who are not subject to the obligation of mourning by Torah law. The Gemara asks: And even so, if the dead person is a Torah scholar, one is obligated to rend one’s garment in anguish over his death, as it was taught in a baraita: When a Torah scholar dies, everyone is his relative. The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind that everyone is his relative? Rather, say: Everyone is considered to be like his relative, in the sense that everyone rends his garment in anguish over him, and everyone bares his shoulder over him in mourning, and everyone eats the mourner’s meal over him in the public square as mourners do. The death of a Torah scholar is a personal loss for every Jew. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this halakha in a case where the dead person is not a Torah scholar. The Gemara asks: And if he was an upright person, aren’t all those present at his death obligated to rend their garments over his death? As it was taught in a baraita: Why do a person’s sons and daughters die when they are young? They die so that he will cry and mourn over the death of an upright worthy person. The Gemara asks: They die so that he will cry? Is security taken from him in advance to ensure that he fulfills his obligation? Rather, emend the statement and say: It is because he did not cry or mourn over an upright person who died, as anyone who cries over an upright person who died, they forgive him for all his transgressions because of the honor he accorded to the deceased. Nevertheless, it is difficult, as one is required to rend his clothing over the death of an upright person. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this halakha in a case where the deceased was not an upright person. The Gemara asks: And if one is standing close to the deceased when the soul leaves the body, he is obligated to rend his garment, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One who is standing over the deceased at the time of the departure of the soul is obligated to rend his garment. To what is this similar? It is similar to a Torah scroll that was burned. The Gemara answers: It was only necessary for the mishna to teach this halakha in a case where he is not standing there at the time of the departure of the soul. The Gemara asks further: This works out well in terms of resolving the contradiction with regard to his dead relative. However, the contradiction between the ruling in the mishna that one who rends his garment in his anger is not liable, and the ruling in the baraita that one who rends his garment in his anger is liable, is still difficult. The mishna exempts one who rends garments in anger, while the baraita deems him liable. The Gemara answers: The contradiction between his anger in the mishna and his anger in the baraita is also not difficult, as this ruling in the baraita that deems him liable is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and that ruling in the mishna that exempts him is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara elaborates: This ruling in the baraita follows Rabbi Yehuda, who said that one who performs a prohibited labor on Shabbat that is not needed for its own sake is liable for performing it. Therefore, one who rends his garment in anger is liable. That ruling in the mishna which exempts him is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that one who performs a labor that is not needed for its own sake is exempt for performing it. The Gemara asks: Say that you heard that Rabbi Yehuda rules that one is liable for performing a labor not needed for its own sake in the case of a constructive act; did you hear him deem one liable in the case of a destructive act? Rabbi Avin said: This case, where one rends his garment in anger, is also constructive, because in doing so he assuages his anger. Rending his garment calms him; therefore, it can be said that he derives benefit from the act of rending, and it is consequently a constructive act. The Gemara asks: And is it at all permitted to tear in that manner? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Ḥilfa bar Agra, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: One who rends his garments in his anger, or who breaks his vessels in his anger, or who scatters his money in his anger, should be like an idol worshipper in your eyes, as that is the craft of the evil inclination. Today it tells him do this, and tomorrow it tells him do that, until eventually, when he no longer controls himself, it tells him worship idols and he goes and worships idols. Rabbi Avin said: What verse alludes to this? “There shall not be a strange god within you, and you shall not bow to a foreign god” (Psalms 81:10). What is the strange god that is within a person’s body? Say that it is the evil inclination. One may not rend his garments in anger, because in doing so he is deriving pleasure from satisfying the evil inclination. The Gemara answers: It is only necessary to discuss this in a case where one does so to instill fear in the members of his household. In order to show them that he is very angry, he tears and breaks objects even though he is not that angry. In that case he maintains control of himself and is not in danger of succumbing to the evil inclination. It is like the incident where Rav Yehuda sought to display his anger and he pulled threads off his garment. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov smashed broken vessels, Rav Sheshet threw small fish on his maidservant’s head, and Rabbi Abba broke the lid of a jug. All of these Sages caused minimal damage in creating the impression that they were angry. Apropos the laws of mourning for an upright person and a Torah scholar, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: Anyone who sheds tears over an upright person, the Holy One, Blessed be He, counts his tears and places them in His treasury, as it is stated: “You have counted my wanderings, put my tears into your bottle, are they not in your book?” (Psalms 56:9). Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Anyone who is lazy in eulogizing a Torah scholar, it is fitting to bury him alive, as it is stated: “And they buried him in the border of his inheritance in Timnat-seraḥ, which is in the hill-country of Ephraim, on the north of the mountain of Ga’ash” (Joshua 24:30). This teaches that the mountain raged against them to kill them because they did not eulogize him appropriately. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Whoever is lazy in eulogizing a Sage does not live a long life, and his punishment is measure for measure. Since he was unconcerned with the death of the Sage, in the heavens they will be unconcerned with his death. The Holy One, Blessed be He, conducts Himself in this manner, as it is stated: “In full measure [besase’a], when You send her away You contend with her” (Isaiah 27:8), and the Sages derived that God punishes from the words: “You contend with her,” and He does so measure for measure, se’a for se’a, from the word sase’a in the verse above. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is stated: “And the nation worshipped the Lord all the days of Joshua and all the days of the Elders, who lived many days after Joshua” (Judges 2:7), indicating that the Elders lived long lives even though they did not eulogize Joshua properly. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Babylonian, you should be more precise in your reading. They indeed lived many days; however, they did not live many years. In fact, they did not live to the end of that year. Again he asked: But then with regard to the verse “So that your days and the days of your children will multiply on the land which the Lord your God swore to give to your fathers, as the days of the heavens over the earth” (Deuteronomy 11:21), would you also say that here the reward is to live many days but not years? He answered him: A blessing is different and should be interpreted in its most expansive sense. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one of the brothers dies,

Whenever [a forbidden labor is performed] in a destructive manner, one is not held liable.⁴⁷As mentioned previously, the prohibition against labor on the Sabbath was derived from a comparison to the labors performed in the construction of the Sanctuary. In that instance, all the labors had a positive intent.
(The Rambam's statements imply that performing a forbidden labor with a destructive intent is not forbidden by the Torah at all, but is merely a Rabbinic prohibition. There are opinions which differ, and maintain that although the Torah did not hold one liable in such an instance, the act is forbidden by the Torah itself.) What is implied? A person who injures a colleague or an animal with a destructive intent,⁴⁸However, see Chapter 8, Halachah 8, which states that if a person injures another person as an expression of anger, he is liable, for in his own mind his activity is constructive; he is releasing pent up emotion. one who rips or burns garments, or one who breaks utensils with a destructive intent is not held liable.
A person who dug a pit solely because he needed the earth inside it is considered as having performed a [forbidden] labor with a destructive intent, and is therefore free of liability.⁴⁹The Maggid Mishneh and others note that this activity is only destructive when the pit is dug within a home. Digging a pit for the sake of its earth in a field, by contrast, is not considered a destructive act. It is, however, a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה (see Halachah 7), for the digger has no desire for the pit, the object of the work. As mentioned, other authorities free a person in such an instance; the Rambam, however, would normally hold one liable. Although he performed a [forbidden] labor, he is not held liable because he had a destructive intent.

In everything, God always requires you, as a Jewish father, to instill in your children whom God has graced you with, while they are still with their father, that which God asks from you and your offspring. While they are still young, bring them close to God and encourage the desire in their hearts to be connected, embraced, and clinging to the Jewish people's life and fate. But on the evening of that day when you, yourself, celebrate the birthday of the Jewish people, God's creation of this amazing nation amid mankind, the beginning of your mission as a Jew — God dedicated this evening to sanctifying your offspring, to bringing your children into the covenant with you, your young children upon whose closeness to God or, God forbid, their profaning His name, the eternity of the Jewish people and the future of our nation depend upon. Through these children, you may nurture the planting of renown (alluding to Ezekiel 34:29), which God planted for eternity through the exodus from Egypt. So that they may grow and become worthy of being the fruit of holiness for jubilation — when you pass around the pieces of the bread of affliction [the matzah] to yourself and to them, while you are connecting to the mission of your people and the dedication of the Jewish people to the God of their fathers and His Torah — do not minimize the words that come out of the purity of your heart. Speak to them, to your children, and let them hear about the supernal nature of this sublime mission, to be a father to Jewish children and to be children of the living God. Teach them the concept of the bread of affliction; acquaint them with the spirit of the Passover holiday, which ascends upon high. Make them understand the supernal nature of God's deeds and wonders in Egypt and of the name of Israel, which He bequeathed to His people when He took them out from darkness to light and from slavery to freedom. Circumcision (Milah) When Avraham was 99 years old, Hashem appeared to him and said: "I am the Almighty God; walk before Me and be complete! I establish My covenant between Me and you, and I will multiply you exceedingly." Then Avraham fell on his face, and God spoke to him, saying: "Behold, My covenant is with you, and you shall become the father of a multitude of nations. No longer shall your name be called Avram; rather, your name shall be Avraham, for I have made you the father of many nations. I will make you exceedingly fruitful, and I will establish you as nations, and kings will descend from you. I will uphold My covenant between Me and you and your descendants after you throughout their generations as an everlasting covenant, to be God to you and to your descendants after you. I give to you and your descendants after you the land of your sojournings, the entire land of Canaan, as an everlasting possession, and I will be their God." God then said to Avraham: "But you must also observe My covenant, you and your descendants after you throughout their generations. This is My covenant, which you shall observe between Me and you and your descendants after you: Every male among you shall be circumcised. You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and this shall be the sign of the covenant between Me and you. At eight days old, every male among you shall be circumcised throughout your generations, whether born in your house or purchased with silver from a foreigner who is not of your descendants. Those born in your household and those bought with your silver must be circumcised, so that My covenant shall be in your flesh as an everlasting covenant. Any uncircumcised male who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin shall be cut off from his people; he has broken My covenant." (Genesis 17:1-14) Hashem also commanded Mosheh: "Speak to the children of Israel, saying: If a woman gives birth to a male child, on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised." (Leviticus 12:2-3) "Walk before Me and be complete!" Let your entire life be lived before My all-encompassing presence. In every moment of your existence, direct your gaze toward Me and dedicate every part of your life to My service! And thus, be whole! Do not divide your being—thinking that your spirit belongs to Heaven while your body belongs to the earth, that you serve God with your soul while indulging the desires of the flesh. Be whole! See even your body as an instrument of divine service, and recognize that every power, even those of the body, has been entrusted to you for a sacred purpose. Dedicate your body to Me just as you dedicate your soul, and thus be whole and unified—your entire being moved by a single thought, consecrated to the One and Only God. Thus, God spoke to Avraham when He commanded him to place His seal on the most physical part of his body, thereby sanctifying and consecrating the body for divine purpose. You must keep the forces of your body sacred. Do not squander them in base sensual indulgence. Do not use them against the will of your God, but rather for the purpose for which He has given them to you. Be a complete human, a complete servant of God! Even in the most physical of acts, see only a sacred duty meant for the holy purpose of building the world. Keep your physical strength sacred for this divine purpose and restrain the demands of the flesh within these sacred bounds. Know that God will hold you accountable for every ounce of energy you waste outside His service or use against His will. Let the seal of Avraham remind you of this! Let it restrain your actions when desire tempts you to stray. Be wise and understand! Do not deceive yourself by thinking: "There is nothing in the world as much under my control as my own body. Whom would I harm if I use my body according to my desires?" But know that in doing so, you sin against God, your Creator, who owns both you and your body, with all its desires and inclinations. He is your Father, the One who placed upon your flesh the holy covenantal seal. This is a sign that you must rule over your body and its desires, sanctifying them for God's purpose. The eternal survival of your people is also founded upon the preservation of the holiness and purity of the covenantal seal. It was designed in such a way that, among Israel, base physical desire cannot dominate entirely, leading to the corruption of the entire generation and its annihilation from among the nations—as happened to other peoples, whose indulgence in bodily lusts weakened them and drained the strength of their vitality, causing their destruction. But in Israel, even among sinful ancestors, pure children are born, ready to grow like strong seedlings. This ensures that from generation to generation, the Garden of God will flourish anew, and the spirit and glory of God will walk among it. When the spirit of a past generation has fallen due to its corruption, a new generation will arise in Israel, untouched by its predecessor’s impurity. But the desecration of the covenantal seal leads to human degradation, reducing one to the level of an animal, causing moral corruption, and bringing impurity into future generations. It defiles the dignity of family life, bringing upon them terrible and lasting afflictions that become an inheritance of disease from weakened ancestors to their descendants. Only a body that is strong and steadfast in holiness and purity can house a strong and sacred spirit. Thus says the Lord: "I will establish My covenant between Me and you and your descendants after you, for their generations, as an everlasting covenant—to be God to you and your descendants after you… And you shall keep My covenant, you and your descendants after you, for their generations. This is My covenant that you shall keep between Me and you and your descendants after you: Every male among you shall be circumcised… And an uncircumcised male who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin shall be cut off from his people; he has broken My covenant.” One who rejects this covenant severs his connection to God and uproots the very foundations of his existence. Thus, God spoke to Avraham, and thus He speaks to every descendant of Avraham. And you, young men reading these words, do not carry the seal of Avraham in vain! Do not let yourselves be swept away by the degeneracy of the times! If you are truly the children of Avraham, you must uphold a high standard. Let this seal protect you from moral corruption! Let it strengthen you in times of struggle—it will surely help you achieve victory. When youth everywhere withers like a decayed flower, when society rushes toward spiritual decline, let your pride be in remaining strong, in standing firm in the holy calling that you bear as a son of Israel. "Walk before Me always and be pure, unblemished, and whole!" This is what God calls upon you to do through the seal of the covenant at every moment when temptation arises. Will you mock this call? Will you throw away the honor of Israel for the sake of fleeting animal pleasure? It is the duty of the father not only to physically nurture his child but also to raise him in mind and heart as a true human being and a Jew. Therefore, the father bears the responsibility to bring his son into the covenant of Avraham on the eighth day. If he neglects this duty, the communal authorities must ensure it is carried out. If they too fail, then every male descendant of Avraham, upon reaching religious maturity, is obligated to undergo circumcision himself. If he refuses, the Torah states: "That person shall be cut off from his people." Since circumcision is not merely a physical alteration but a spiritual elevation—raising the human being from animalistic indulgence to moral responsibility—it must be performed in the daytime, the time of action and purpose. A healthy child must be circumcised on the eighth day. If the child is sick or physically weak, circumcision is postponed until full recovery. If the illness affected the entire body, the procedure must be delayed for seven full days after recovery. If the condition affected only one limb, it is performed as soon as the child has regained strength. Since circumcision is an irreversible act, it is delayed in cases of doubt to protect the child's life. If two previous brothers died due to circumcision, a third son is circumcised only after he has grown stronger. If there is uncertainty about the exact birth time—whether it occurred before or after nightfall—the eighth day is counted from the following day. If the eighth day falls on Shabbat or a festival, circumcision is postponed to the ninth day unless it is known with certainty that the child was born during the day. All additional laws regarding circumcision can be found in sections 260-266. This is the “sin” through which a private individual falls and is humbled from his exalted position; this very sin is the one through which nations have strayed and have been wiped away from under the heavens of the Lord, and generations of human beings have been brought low to the dust. And it is none other than the sin and the iniquity through which Israel also fell and was humbled, because, due to this sin, “idolatry and the lusts of the senses” will always accompany him—yet such a thing must not be, for Israel must not descend to such a low level without the possibility of rising again, heaven forbid. For the Torah has acted countless times because of this and has always concerned itself to prevent Israel from being swallowed up and from being destroyed from the land. Therefore, let us not forget that the Lord placed us in the world of the Lord, for this world is the “property of the Lord,” and its gifts are given to us only for a specific purpose. To us have been entrusted many testimonies, commandments, and laws, some of which we have already come to know intellectually, and upon these depend also the commandments concerning the acquisition of the land—“new produce” and “orlah.” But just as the Lord gave the land to man to “serve and guard it,” so the Lord, for a second time in His world, bequeathed the “Land of Israel” to His people to be “the portion of their inheritance” according to their special actions. Israel, which is a people even without land and kingdom, is still called a “people” even before it attains “the land of its possession,” for the bond of nationality is not connected merely to the physical area of a place; rather, Israel is a “people” according to the great and enlightened idea inherent in the spirit of its essence. Israel bears this idea and the testimony of life, which it is called to fulfill, and this is in particular its divinely allotted portion. Nevertheless, because the Lord wished for Israel to be a “people” even in its external state among the nations, He gave it also a “special land” according to the special actions of His people. But in order that this land—which is intended to serve as the means to bring into effect the “name and testimony of Israel” in its fullness—does not become a source of stumbling or of corruption through the sin of property acquisition, the Lord commanded His people to observe these commandments in the land: “Shemittah” (the Sabbatical year), “Yovel” (the Jubilee), “Bikkurim” (first fruits), “Terumah” (offering), “Ma’aser” (tithes), “Challah” (dough offering). Especially concerning the acquisition of the land of Israel, Shemittah and Yovel, on the one hand, testify in themselves as a judgment of justice, since the Lord is the Master of all this property; and on the other hand, by prohibiting the labor of the land in its acquisition, they testify according to the understanding of “Sabbath” with regard to property acquisition in general. We must consider, on the one hand, “new produce” and “orlah” with regard to the acquisition of land in general, and on the other hand, “Bikkurim,” “Terumah,” “Ma’aser,” and “Challah,” since they are intended specifically for the acquisition of the “Land of Israel.” Of these latter, we will only mention “Challah,” which, according to the Kabbalah, remains incumbent upon us even now. Behold, if you have given your word and promise to give over ownership and money has been given in accordance with the decree, however, the sale has not been finalized by one of the methods of acquisition — we may not say that the matter was completed and they are allowed to go back on it. Nevertheless, if either the buyer or the seller goes back on it after money was received or after the buyer placed a sign on the merchandise, the curse of, "He who exacted payment," is given to him in court. That is, "He Who exacted payment from the people of the generation of the flood, and from the people of the generation of the dispersion, and from the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, and from the Egyptians at the Sea, He will exact payment from whoever does not stand by his word" (Bava Metzia 48a). And even one who only does business orally is obligated by his word, even though he has not performed an action. Yet even though a buyer or seller who only goes back on his word does not receive the curse of "He who exacted payment," he is called one lacking in faith. Anyone who promises something to his fellow in a way that his fellow should be able to rely upon it and goes back on it is considered someone lacking in faith (Choshen Mishpat 204). Indeed it is so — do not destroy [bal taschit]! That is God's first great general call to you, man. That is when you see yourself as the ruler and governor over the face of His earth. Behold, you see dirt, plants, and animals around you; and they already carry the seal of your human projects, to study and appraise them, through human effort and ingenuity, to serve your human purposes, to have them become your shelter, clothing, sustenance, and tools. So you have acquired them, that they should be in your possession, such that you stand amid your rulership over the face of the earth and all that exists are your servants to do your will and bidding. Yet you suddenly raise your hand to amuse yourself or to pour out your anger and swallow up and destroy something that can [otherwise] be used for your purposes. But you want to pound and break and obliterate that thing that you can make helpful and use properly. You surely desire this since, when you see creations below your level as things disconnected from justice and righteousness, you do not fear the Lord. Yet He is indeed their Shield and Protector, taking up their case with justice. So instead of thinking about them as means for the thoughtful acts of man, you see them haughtily, to have your power and the might of your will rule over them and to pour out your furious rage over them. Then the voice of God's great call thunders over you, "Do not destroy! Get away from it; act like a human being!" For it is truly only by using that which exists around you for the thoughtful and reasonable use of man as My Torah guides and designates that you are a man. Then you have power and possession over them. For I have given you, man, power and possession over them by way of a divine mandate. However, if you destroy, if you ruin, if you obliterate, you are no longer man, but rather a wild animal or a predatory beast, so that you no longer have possession over what exists around you. For I have lent them to you only for wise human use. So don't ever forget that I am the One who lent them to you! However, if you act perversely, if you act without intelligence and good sense towards anything, small or big, behold you are acting wickedly, rebelling and stealing from God's earth! Behold, you then turn into a murderer and robber of God's possessions. You are a sinner, and you have violated the holiness of the possession. Then God will make this call to you and protect everything, small or big, with this call. With the utterance of this word, He will grant righteous justice to the small or big against the plots of your heart and the violence of your hand! It is not for the sake of the prevention of bodily sickness that God arranged these laws about your food. Rather the Torah itself explains their reason: Just like the Temple of God, which symbolizes the ideal of the holy and sanctifies you for His sake, becomes defiled by impurity - that is, anything that is foreign to, or below the human realm (see the section on Service, Chapter 21) - so too are the forbidden foods "impure" for the holy sanctuary that you yourself constitute. Your body, your soul and your spirit form the essential playing field of your existence, which is designated for holiness. If you eat these foods, your body may well be nourished and become fatter. However, your animal impulse will be greatly aroused; or your body will only become a tool for your spirit. Instead of your soul becoming sanctified - meaning raising itself above any trace of animalism - it will descend to this low level, or become apathetic and lethargic. And your spirit can expect to encounter a greater struggle for which it is less equipped. It calls out to you again and again: It is impure to you! Do not defile yourselves with them! You will become impure from them! The meaning of becoming impure is to compromise preparedness for the designation of holiness. And behold you have been designated to be holy people, the children of a great holy congregation; and you have been chosen to attach yourselves to God and to walk in His ways. God said to you to be holy, "since I, your God, am holy." So then, you must guard your bodies like the holy sanctuary for your divine souls. As behold, the body is also for God. And that which is generally referred to as impure (tumah) is also referred to as something repulsive (sheketz), a disgusting thing. Something repulsive and disgusting is something that you reject on your own as a foreign body that is unfit for your constitution. And so just like your body naturally rejects anything that the sense of taste finds to be a foreign substance or unfit; so too must you reject these foods because they are repulsive, foreign and unfit for your spiritual constitution. Lest your spiritual constitution itself become repulsive, and you become distanced and turn away from your holy designation which you are meant to carry as a Jew. Likewise, abomination (toevah) - your spiritual constitution should abominate these foods, since they are antithetical to your spiritual designation and only nourish your animal impulse. These are the words of God's Torah. The main things about a mikveh (ritual bath) are: That the water should not be gathered by a person's possession, meaning a vessel; and also not arrive through any object that is susceptible to becoming impure. And [the water] must be gathered in one place. It can be flowing water or rain water that has not flown through or over anything that is susceptible to becoming impure. When rain water, it must be standing and not running. And the mikveh needs to have the necessary amount of water, and the like. Regarding the immersion, there may not be anything that separates between the thing that is being immersed and the water; and it must be completely placed within the water of the mikveh and fully immersed. (See Yoreh Deah 120, 201, 202.) Be fruitful and multiply! From now on, plant the planting of your species in the world. From now on, grow the thread of life at every instance and every time. Raise your offspring for all time so that they will continue to build and establish what you have left still unfinished and not yet sturdy. Plant your vine in the garden of the Lord, your species on the earth, so that it will grow to be a faithful planting in the vineyard of the House of Israel. And do everything in your power for your offspring, to raise them and educate them for God. And all the good things that you have acquired, fear of God, love of God, trust in God, living with faith in God — bequeath all these things to the next generation. With such an inheritance, you will continue through your offspring and their actions; and you, too, will live on and be remembered eternally. Let your house not be closed and sealed only for yourself and your household, to be a place of rest and peace only for yourselves. Rather let it be open for the benefit of the desolate poor people, for the hungry, the thirsty and for all who seek shelter and refuge for themselves. You should happily and lovingly bring in any guest who has no other letter of introduction that would recommend him except for that which comes from his being a creation of the Omnipotent, a son of our Father in Heaven. Hence receive him joyfully, bring him into your house, supply his needs and even accompany him [when he leaves] so that he will be secure on his journey. On these days that are memorial days of joy, they should not say such things that mention something sad relating to the fleetingness of life or sad thoughts about distressing matters - like veHu rachum (and He is merciful), rachum vechanun (merciful and compassionate), El erekh apayim (God full of patience) and yaankha (He should answer you). Likewise [is this the case] on other days primarily marked by joy besides Channukah and Purim: The fifteenth of Av; the fifteenth of Shevat; Rosh Chodesh (the first day of the month); Purim Katan; the thirty-third day of the omer; the eves of Yom Kippur and Rosh HaShanah; all of the month of Nissan; the days between Yom Kippur and Sukkot; from Rosh Chodesh Sivan until the day after Shavuot. Also [is this true] on private days of joy that have a national character, like a house of nuptials and a milah (circumcision). (They say yaankha at a milah with regard to the child for his healing.) Also [do we omit these] at the house of a mourner and on Tisha B'Av, for other reasons. 2) Festivals First we acknowledge that the creation of both the body and the spirit of the Jewish people was from God ("You have chosen us... And you have brought us close"); and that the maintenance of the body and the spirit of the nation is also an act of God ("and Your great name"). We then make note of the special import of this holiday ("and gave"). Then we speak about the special character of the day - whether it is about the creation of the Jewish people or its maintenance, the request from God concerning the creation or maintenance of the Jewish people is in, "May it come and may it ascend," and in, "And raise up for us." This is like, "God and God of our Forefathers, accept," on Shabbat. This is to bring down the blessing of the holiday: Life, peace and joy - may they come to fruition in our lives. And after the standing prayer (amidah), we recite the Hallel. On the first days of Pesach and on all the days of Sukkot, it is 'full Hallel,' like Chanukkah. But on the later days of Pesach, it is like Rosh Chodesh (the first day of the month): We skip [some sections] and recite 'half Hallel.' (The reason is explained nicely: It is because the latter days of Pesach do not only remind us of the salvation of the Jewish people, but rather also of the downfall of the Egyptians and their drowning in the sea. So it is like the Sages, may their memory be blessed, say [Yalkut Shimoni on Nakh 1085], that it is not good to say and prolong verse and praise about the destruction of the creations of God. That is why Hallel is not full [on those days]. Tisha B'Av at night: The scroll of Lamentations. It is the emotions of the prophet Jeremiah's soul and his dirge that he took up about the destruction of the holy city of Jerusalem and the Temple. And it is especially about the sin that Jerusalem and his people sinned, which is what caused that awful destruction to happen. And while glancing with eyes full of tears, he instructs and shows the path that leads to repentance and towards the revival of Israel, to renew our days as of old (alluding to Lamentations 5:21). Sukkot: They recite Ecclesiastes in the morning service of Shabbat of the intermediate days of the festival (Chol HaMoed) of Sukkot. As it shows that the maintenance of the body and the spirit of the nation is through God. This is in order to know that, without God, all human competition, all human actions and calculations, as well as the results of the toil of his efforts and his mighty hand - they are altogether empty.

One who drills a hole of any size is liable. Granted, according to Rav, who said that one who makes a hole is liable due to the prohibited labor of building, here too, he should be liable because he appears as one who is making a hole for the purpose of building. However, according to Shmuel, drilling a hole is not a completion of the labor. The labor will be complete only when a stake or pin is inserted into the hole. Until he does so, he cannot be liable for completing the labor. The Gemara answers: With what we are dealing here? With a case where one drilled a hole with an iron nail and left it inside the surface in which he drilled the hole. That is considered a completion of labor because there is no intention to remove the nail from its hole. We learned in the mishna that this is the principle: Anyone who performs a prohibited labor and his labor endures on Shabbat is liable. The Gemara asks: What does the phrase: This is the principle, come to include? The Gemara explains: It comes to include a case where one carved out a vessel with a capacity of half a kav [kefiza] into a piece of wood in which it was possible to chisel a vessel with a capacity of a whole kav. Since this labor endures on Shabbat and it can be used, it is considered a complete labor and he is liable. We also learned in the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who strikes an anvil with a sledgehammer is liable. The Gemara wonders: What has he done by striking the anvil that would render him liable? It was Rabba and Rav Yosef who both said in explanation: He is liable because he trains his hand for his work by striking the anvil. The sons of a man named Raḥava found this answer difficult: If so, one who observed a craft being performed on Shabbat and learned to perform that craft through observation, would he also be liable? Only one who performs an actual labor on Shabbat is liable. Rather, it was Abaye and Rava who both said in explanation: He is liable, as those who flatten plates of metal for the Tabernacle do so. They would strike the anvil with the sledgehammer in order to straighten the sledgehammer’s handle, which became crooked. That was also taught in a baraita. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who strikes an anvil with a sledgehammer during his labor is liable, as those who flatten plates of metal for the Tabernacle do so. MISHNA: One who plows is liable for plowing any amount of land on Shabbat. One who weeds and removes grass on Shabbat, and one who removes dry branches and who prunes any amount is liable. With regard to one who gathers wood, if he did so to enhance the tree or the land, he is liable for any amount; if he did so for fuel, he is liable for collecting a measure equivalent to that which is used to cook an easily cooked egg. With regard to one who gathers grass, if he did so to enhance the plants or the land, he is liable for any amount; if he did so to feed an animal, he is liable for collecting a measure equivalent to a goat’s mouthful. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: For what use is plowing any amount of land suited? The Gemara answers: It is suited for a single pumpkin seed. The corresponding situation in the Tabernacle was as it is suitable for planting a single stalk of herbs to make dyes. We also learned in the mishna: One who weeds, and one who removes dry branches, and who prunes any amount is liable. The Sages taught that in a baraita: With regard to one who severs endives that grow like weeds, or who prunes reeds [zeradim]; if he did so for human consumption, he is liable in the measure of a fig-bulk; if he did so for animal consumption, he is liable in a measure equivalent to a goat’s mouthful. If he did so for fuel, he is liable for severing a measure equivalent to that which is used to cook an easily cooked egg. If he did so to enhance the land, he is liable for any amount. The Gemara asks: Aren’t all these done to enhance the land? Each stalk that a person uproots enhances the land. It was Rabba and Rav Yosef who both said in explanation: They taught this baraita with regard to swampland, where grass is not uprooted to enhance the land. Abaye said: Even if you say that the baraita is referring to a field that is not a swampland, it can be referring to a case where one did not intend to enhance the land. The Gemara asks: However, is it not Abaye and Rava who both say that Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one is liable only for performing an intentional action, concedes that one is liable in a case of cut off its head, will it not die? In any case where the outcome is inevitable, as in this case where the land will be enhanced, one’s lack of intention does not exempt him. The Gemara answers: Abaye’s statement was only necessary in a case where one did so on another’s land. Since he did not intend for that outcome to eventuate and he derives no benefit from enhancing the land, he is not liable in that case. MISHNA: One who writes two letters on Shabbat, whether he did so with his right hand or his left, whether they were the same letter or two different letters, whether he did so using two different types of ink, in any language, he is liable. Rabbi Yosei said: One is deemed liable for writing two letters only due to marking, as they would write symbols on adjacent beams of the Tabernacle to know which beam was another beam’s counterpart. Rabbi Yehuda said: We found that one is liable for writing even if he did not complete what he was writing, so that he wrote a small name that constituted part of a longer name, e.g., Shem [shin mem] from the name Shimon or from Shmuel; Noaḥ [nun ḥet] from Naḥor; Dan [dalet nun] from Daniel; Gad [gimmel dalet] from Gaddiel. In all of these cases, the first two letters of the longer name constitute the shorter name. GEMARA: The Gemara questions the beginning of the mishna: Granted, for writing with the right hand let one be liable, as that is the typical manner of writing. However, for writing with the left hand, why is one liable? That is not the typical manner of writing. Rabbi Yirmeya said: When the mishna taught that one who writes with his left hand is liable, they taught it with regard to one who is left-handed. The Gemara asks: And if so, let his left hand have the same legal status as everyone’s right hand; for writing with his left hand, let him be liable, for writing with his right hand, let him not be liable. Rather, Abaye said: This mishna refers to an ambidextrous person, who is liable for writing with either hand. Rav Ya’akov, son of the daughter of Ya’akov, said: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: One is deemed liable for writing two letters only due to marking. As such, one is liable for writing a letter even if he writes it imprecisely with his left hand. The Gemara asks: From the fact that the latter clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, the first clause of the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara answers: That is not necessarily the case. The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and the attribution of his second statement was for emphasis alone. We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: We found that one is liable for writing even if he did not complete what he was writing, so that he wrote a small name that constituted part of a longer name. The Gemara asks: Rather, is that to say that according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is one who writes two letters that are two different types of letters who is liable; however, one who writes two letters that are one type of letter is not liable? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that it is written: “When a leader sinned, and he unwittingly performed one of any of the commandments which the Lord his God commanded not to do, and is guilty” (Leviticus 4:22)? The Sages taught: I might have thought that one is not guilty until he performs a complete labor, e.g., until he writes the entire name that he intended to write, or until he weaves the entire garment, or until he crafts the entire sieve made from the reeds of the warp and the woof; therefore, the verse states: “A soul who sins unintentionally in any of the Lord’s commandments which one shall not perform, and did an action from one of these” (Leviticus 4:2). The emphasis on the phrase “from one” teaches that in order for one to be liable, it is sufficient that he perform only part of the prohibited labor. However, if that is derived from the use of the phrase “from one,” I might have thought that one is liable even if he wrote only a single letter, or even if he wove only a single thread, or even if he crafted only a single eye of the sieve, i.e., arranging the reeds to create a warp, and then interweaving a single reed as a woof;

In everything, God always requires you, as a Jewish father, to instill in your children whom God has graced you with, while they are still with their father, that which God asks from you and your offspring. While they are still young, bring them close to God and encourage the desire in their hearts to be connected, embraced, and clinging to the Jewish people's life and fate. But on the evening of that day when you, yourself, celebrate the birthday of the Jewish people, God's creation of this amazing nation amid mankind, the beginning of your mission as a Jew — God dedicated this evening to sanctifying your offspring, to bringing your children into the covenant with you, your young children upon whose closeness to God or, God forbid, their profaning His name, the eternity of the Jewish people and the future of our nation depend upon. Through these children, you may nurture the planting of renown (alluding to Ezekiel 34:29), which God planted for eternity through the exodus from Egypt. So that they may grow and become worthy of being the fruit of holiness for jubilation — when you pass around the pieces of the bread of affliction [the matzah] to yourself and to them, while you are connecting to the mission of your people and the dedication of the Jewish people to the God of their fathers and His Torah — do not minimize the words that come out of the purity of your heart. Speak to them, to your children, and let them hear about the supernal nature of this sublime mission, to be a father to Jewish children and to be children of the living God. Teach them the concept of the bread of affliction; acquaint them with the spirit of the Passover holiday, which ascends upon high. Make them understand the supernal nature of God's deeds and wonders in Egypt and of the name of Israel, which He bequeathed to His people when He took them out from darkness to light and from slavery to freedom. Circumcision (Milah) When Avraham was 99 years old, Hashem appeared to him and said: "I am the Almighty God; walk before Me and be complete! I establish My covenant between Me and you, and I will multiply you exceedingly." Then Avraham fell on his face, and God spoke to him, saying: "Behold, My covenant is with you, and you shall become the father of a multitude of nations. No longer shall your name be called Avram; rather, your name shall be Avraham, for I have made you the father of many nations. I will make you exceedingly fruitful, and I will establish you as nations, and kings will descend from you. I will uphold My covenant between Me and you and your descendants after you throughout their generations as an everlasting covenant, to be God to you and to your descendants after you. I give to you and your descendants after you the land of your sojournings, the entire land of Canaan, as an everlasting possession, and I will be their God." God then said to Avraham: "But you must also observe My covenant, you and your descendants after you throughout their generations. This is My covenant, which you shall observe between Me and you and your descendants after you: Every male among you shall be circumcised. You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and this shall be the sign of the covenant between Me and you. At eight days old, every male among you shall be circumcised throughout your generations, whether born in your house or purchased with silver from a foreigner who is not of your descendants. Those born in your household and those bought with your silver must be circumcised, so that My covenant shall be in your flesh as an everlasting covenant. Any uncircumcised male who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin shall be cut off from his people; he has broken My covenant." (Genesis 17:1-14) Hashem also commanded Mosheh: "Speak to the children of Israel, saying: If a woman gives birth to a male child, on the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised." (Leviticus 12:2-3) "Walk before Me and be complete!" Let your entire life be lived before My all-encompassing presence. In every moment of your existence, direct your gaze toward Me and dedicate every part of your life to My service! And thus, be whole! Do not divide your being—thinking that your spirit belongs to Heaven while your body belongs to the earth, that you serve God with your soul while indulging the desires of the flesh. Be whole! See even your body as an instrument of divine service, and recognize that every power, even those of the body, has been entrusted to you for a sacred purpose. Dedicate your body to Me just as you dedicate your soul, and thus be whole and unified—your entire being moved by a single thought, consecrated to the One and Only God. Thus, God spoke to Avraham when He commanded him to place His seal on the most physical part of his body, thereby sanctifying and consecrating the body for divine purpose. You must keep the forces of your body sacred. Do not squander them in base sensual indulgence. Do not use them against the will of your God, but rather for the purpose for which He has given them to you. Be a complete human, a complete servant of God! Even in the most physical of acts, see only a sacred duty meant for the holy purpose of building the world. Keep your physical strength sacred for this divine purpose and restrain the demands of the flesh within these sacred bounds. Know that God will hold you accountable for every ounce of energy you waste outside His service or use against His will. Let the seal of Avraham remind you of this! Let it restrain your actions when desire tempts you to stray. Be wise and understand! Do not deceive yourself by thinking: "There is nothing in the world as much under my control as my own body. Whom would I harm if I use my body according to my desires?" But know that in doing so, you sin against God, your Creator, who owns both you and your body, with all its desires and inclinations. He is your Father, the One who placed upon your flesh the holy covenantal seal. This is a sign that you must rule over your body and its desires, sanctifying them for God's purpose. The eternal survival of your people is also founded upon the preservation of the holiness and purity of the covenantal seal. It was designed in such a way that, among Israel, base physical desire cannot dominate entirely, leading to the corruption of the entire generation and its annihilation from among the nations—as happened to other peoples, whose indulgence in bodily lusts weakened them and drained the strength of their vitality, causing their destruction. But in Israel, even among sinful ancestors, pure children are born, ready to grow like strong seedlings. This ensures that from generation to generation, the Garden of God will flourish anew, and the spirit and glory of God will walk among it. When the spirit of a past generation has fallen due to its corruption, a new generation will arise in Israel, untouched by its predecessor’s impurity. But the desecration of the covenantal seal leads to human degradation, reducing one to the level of an animal, causing moral corruption, and bringing impurity into future generations. It defiles the dignity of family life, bringing upon them terrible and lasting afflictions that become an inheritance of disease from weakened ancestors to their descendants. Only a body that is strong and steadfast in holiness and purity can house a strong and sacred spirit. Thus says the Lord: "I will establish My covenant between Me and you and your descendants after you, for their generations, as an everlasting covenant—to be God to you and your descendants after you… And you shall keep My covenant, you and your descendants after you, for their generations. This is My covenant that you shall keep between Me and you and your descendants after you: Every male among you shall be circumcised… And an uncircumcised male who does not circumcise the flesh of his foreskin shall be cut off from his people; he has broken My covenant.” One who rejects this covenant severs his connection to God and uproots the very foundations of his existence. Thus, God spoke to Avraham, and thus He speaks to every descendant of Avraham. And you, young men reading these words, do not carry the seal of Avraham in vain! Do not let yourselves be swept away by the degeneracy of the times! If you are truly the children of Avraham, you must uphold a high standard. Let this seal protect you from moral corruption! Let it strengthen you in times of struggle—it will surely help you achieve victory. When youth everywhere withers like a decayed flower, when society rushes toward spiritual decline, let your pride be in remaining strong, in standing firm in the holy calling that you bear as a son of Israel. "Walk before Me always and be pure, unblemished, and whole!" This is what God calls upon you to do through the seal of the covenant at every moment when temptation arises. Will you mock this call? Will you throw away the honor of Israel for the sake of fleeting animal pleasure? It is the duty of the father not only to physically nurture his child but also to raise him in mind and heart as a true human being and a Jew. Therefore, the father bears the responsibility to bring his son into the covenant of Avraham on the eighth day. If he neglects this duty, the communal authorities must ensure it is carried out. If they too fail, then every male descendant of Avraham, upon reaching religious maturity, is obligated to undergo circumcision himself. If he refuses, the Torah states: "That person shall be cut off from his people." Since circumcision is not merely a physical alteration but a spiritual elevation—raising the human being from animalistic indulgence to moral responsibility—it must be performed in the daytime, the time of action and purpose. A healthy child must be circumcised on the eighth day. If the child is sick or physically weak, circumcision is postponed until full recovery. If the illness affected the entire body, the procedure must be delayed for seven full days after recovery. If the condition affected only one limb, it is performed as soon as the child has regained strength. Since circumcision is an irreversible act, it is delayed in cases of doubt to protect the child's life. If two previous brothers died due to circumcision, a third son is circumcised only after he has grown stronger. If there is uncertainty about the exact birth time—whether it occurred before or after nightfall—the eighth day is counted from the following day. If the eighth day falls on Shabbat or a festival, circumcision is postponed to the ninth day unless it is known with certainty that the child was born during the day. All additional laws regarding circumcision can be found in sections 260-266. This is the “sin” through which a private individual falls and is humbled from his exalted position; this very sin is the one through which nations have strayed and have been wiped away from under the heavens of the Lord, and generations of human beings have been brought low to the dust. And it is none other than the sin and the iniquity through which Israel also fell and was humbled, because, due to this sin, “idolatry and the lusts of the senses” will always accompany him—yet such a thing must not be, for Israel must not descend to such a low level without the possibility of rising again, heaven forbid. For the Torah has acted countless times because of this and has always concerned itself to prevent Israel from being swallowed up and from being destroyed from the land. Therefore, let us not forget that the Lord placed us in the world of the Lord, for this world is the “property of the Lord,” and its gifts are given to us only for a specific purpose. To us have been entrusted many testimonies, commandments, and laws, some of which we have already come to know intellectually, and upon these depend also the commandments concerning the acquisition of the land—“new produce” and “orlah.” But just as the Lord gave the land to man to “serve and guard it,” so the Lord, for a second time in His world, bequeathed the “Land of Israel” to His people to be “the portion of their inheritance” according to their special actions. Israel, which is a people even without land and kingdom, is still called a “people” even before it attains “the land of its possession,” for the bond of nationality is not connected merely to the physical area of a place; rather, Israel is a “people” according to the great and enlightened idea inherent in the spirit of its essence. Israel bears this idea and the testimony of life, which it is called to fulfill, and this is in particular its divinely allotted portion. Nevertheless, because the Lord wished for Israel to be a “people” even in its external state among the nations, He gave it also a “special land” according to the special actions of His people. But in order that this land—which is intended to serve as the means to bring into effect the “name and testimony of Israel” in its fullness—does not become a source of stumbling or of corruption through the sin of property acquisition, the Lord commanded His people to observe these commandments in the land: “Shemittah” (the Sabbatical year), “Yovel” (the Jubilee), “Bikkurim” (first fruits), “Terumah” (offering), “Ma’aser” (tithes), “Challah” (dough offering). Especially concerning the acquisition of the land of Israel, Shemittah and Yovel, on the one hand, testify in themselves as a judgment of justice, since the Lord is the Master of all this property; and on the other hand, by prohibiting the labor of the land in its acquisition, they testify according to the understanding of “Sabbath” with regard to property acquisition in general. We must consider, on the one hand, “new produce” and “orlah” with regard to the acquisition of land in general, and on the other hand, “Bikkurim,” “Terumah,” “Ma’aser,” and “Challah,” since they are intended specifically for the acquisition of the “Land of Israel.” Of these latter, we will only mention “Challah,” which, according to the Kabbalah, remains incumbent upon us even now. Behold, if you have given your word and promise to give over ownership and money has been given in accordance with the decree, however, the sale has not been finalized by one of the methods of acquisition — we may not say that the matter was completed and they are allowed to go back on it. Nevertheless, if either the buyer or the seller goes back on it after money was received or after the buyer placed a sign on the merchandise, the curse of, "He who exacted payment," is given to him in court. That is, "He Who exacted payment from the people of the generation of the flood, and from the people of the generation of the dispersion, and from the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, and from the Egyptians at the Sea, He will exact payment from whoever does not stand by his word" (Bava Metzia 48a). And even one who only does business orally is obligated by his word, even though he has not performed an action. Yet even though a buyer or seller who only goes back on his word does not receive the curse of "He who exacted payment," he is called one lacking in faith. Anyone who promises something to his fellow in a way that his fellow should be able to rely upon it and goes back on it is considered someone lacking in faith (Choshen Mishpat 204). Indeed it is so — do not destroy [bal taschit]! That is God's first great general call to you, man. That is when you see yourself as the ruler and governor over the face of His earth. Behold, you see dirt, plants, and animals around you; and they already carry the seal of your human projects, to study and appraise them, through human effort and ingenuity, to serve your human purposes, to have them become your shelter, clothing, sustenance, and tools. So you have acquired them, that they should be in your possession, such that you stand amid your rulership over the face of the earth and all that exists are your servants to do your will and bidding. Yet you suddenly raise your hand to amuse yourself or to pour out your anger and swallow up and destroy something that can [otherwise] be used for your purposes. But you want to pound and break and obliterate that thing that you can make helpful and use properly. You surely desire this since, when you see creations below your level as things disconnected from justice and righteousness, you do not fear the Lord. Yet He is indeed their Shield and Protector, taking up their case with justice. So instead of thinking about them as means for the thoughtful acts of man, you see them haughtily, to have your power and the might of your will rule over them and to pour out your furious rage over them. Then the voice of God's great call thunders over you, "Do not destroy! Get away from it; act like a human being!" For it is truly only by using that which exists around you for the thoughtful and reasonable use of man as My Torah guides and designates that you are a man. Then you have power and possession over them. For I have given you, man, power and possession over them by way of a divine mandate. However, if you destroy, if you ruin, if you obliterate, you are no longer man, but rather a wild animal or a predatory beast, so that you no longer have possession over what exists around you. For I have lent them to you only for wise human use. So don't ever forget that I am the One who lent them to you! However, if you act perversely, if you act without intelligence and good sense towards anything, small or big, behold you are acting wickedly, rebelling and stealing from God's earth! Behold, you then turn into a murderer and robber of God's possessions. You are a sinner, and you have violated the holiness of the possession. Then God will make this call to you and protect everything, small or big, with this call. With the utterance of this word, He will grant righteous justice to the small or big against the plots of your heart and the violence of your hand! It is not for the sake of the prevention of bodily sickness that God arranged these laws about your food. Rather the Torah itself explains their reason: Just like the Temple of God, which symbolizes the ideal of the holy and sanctifies you for His sake, becomes defiled by impurity - that is, anything that is foreign to, or below the human realm (see the section on Service, Chapter 21) - so too are the forbidden foods "impure" for the holy sanctuary that you yourself constitute. Your body, your soul and your spirit form the essential playing field of your existence, which is designated for holiness. If you eat these foods, your body may well be nourished and become fatter. However, your animal impulse will be greatly aroused; or your body will only become a tool for your spirit. Instead of your soul becoming sanctified - meaning raising itself above any trace of animalism - it will descend to this low level, or become apathetic and lethargic. And your spirit can expect to encounter a greater struggle for which it is less equipped. It calls out to you again and again: It is impure to you! Do not defile yourselves with them! You will become impure from them! The meaning of becoming impure is to compromise preparedness for the designation of holiness. And behold you have been designated to be holy people, the children of a great holy congregation; and you have been chosen to attach yourselves to God and to walk in His ways. God said to you to be holy, "since I, your God, am holy." So then, you must guard your bodies like the holy sanctuary for your divine souls. As behold, the body is also for God. And that which is generally referred to as impure (tumah) is also referred to as something repulsive (sheketz), a disgusting thing. Something repulsive and disgusting is something that you reject on your own as a foreign body that is unfit for your constitution. And so just like your body naturally rejects anything that the sense of taste finds to be a foreign substance or unfit; so too must you reject these foods because they are repulsive, foreign and unfit for your spiritual constitution. Lest your spiritual constitution itself become repulsive, and you become distanced and turn away from your holy designation which you are meant to carry as a Jew. Likewise, abomination (toevah) - your spiritual constitution should abominate these foods, since they are antithetical to your spiritual designation and only nourish your animal impulse. These are the words of God's Torah. The main things about a mikveh (ritual bath) are: That the water should not be gathered by a person's possession, meaning a vessel; and also not arrive through any object that is susceptible to becoming impure. And [the water] must be gathered in one place. It can be flowing water or rain water that has not flown through or over anything that is susceptible to becoming impure. When rain water, it must be standing and not running. And the mikveh needs to have the necessary amount of water, and the like. Regarding the immersion, there may not be anything that separates between the thing that is being immersed and the water; and it must be completely placed within the water of the mikveh and fully immersed. (See Yoreh Deah 120, 201, 202.) Be fruitful and multiply! From now on, plant the planting of your species in the world. From now on, grow the thread of life at every instance and every time. Raise your offspring for all time so that they will continue to build and establish what you have left still unfinished and not yet sturdy. Plant your vine in the garden of the Lord, your species on the earth, so that it will grow to be a faithful planting in the vineyard of the House of Israel. And do everything in your power for your offspring, to raise them and educate them for God. And all the good things that you have acquired, fear of God, love of God, trust in God, living with faith in God — bequeath all these things to the next generation. With such an inheritance, you will continue through your offspring and their actions; and you, too, will live on and be remembered eternally. Let your house not be closed and sealed only for yourself and your household, to be a place of rest and peace only for yourselves. Rather let it be open for the benefit of the desolate poor people, for the hungry, the thirsty and for all who seek shelter and refuge for themselves. You should happily and lovingly bring in any guest who has no other letter of introduction that would recommend him except for that which comes from his being a creation of the Omnipotent, a son of our Father in Heaven. Hence receive him joyfully, bring him into your house, supply his needs and even accompany him [when he leaves] so that he will be secure on his journey. On these days that are memorial days of joy, they should not say such things that mention something sad relating to the fleetingness of life or sad thoughts about distressing matters - like veHu rachum (and He is merciful), rachum vechanun (merciful and compassionate), El erekh apayim (God full of patience) and yaankha (He should answer you). Likewise [is this the case] on other days primarily marked by joy besides Channukah and Purim: The fifteenth of Av; the fifteenth of Shevat; Rosh Chodesh (the first day of the month); Purim Katan; the thirty-third day of the omer; the eves of Yom Kippur and Rosh HaShanah; all of the month of Nissan; the days between Yom Kippur and Sukkot; from Rosh Chodesh Sivan until the day after Shavuot. Also [is this true] on private days of joy that have a national character, like a house of nuptials and a milah (circumcision). (They say yaankha at a milah with regard to the child for his healing.) Also [do we omit these] at the house of a mourner and on Tisha B'Av, for other reasons. 2) Festivals First we acknowledge that the creation of both the body and the spirit of the Jewish people was from God ("You have chosen us... And you have brought us close"); and that the maintenance of the body and the spirit of the nation is also an act of God ("and Your great name"). We then make note of the special import of this holiday ("and gave"). Then we speak about the special character of the day - whether it is about the creation of the Jewish people or its maintenance, the request from God concerning the creation or maintenance of the Jewish people is in, "May it come and may it ascend," and in, "And raise up for us." This is like, "God and God of our Forefathers, accept," on Shabbat. This is to bring down the blessing of the holiday: Life, peace and joy - may they come to fruition in our lives. And after the standing prayer (amidah), we recite the Hallel. On the first days of Pesach and on all the days of Sukkot, it is 'full Hallel,' like Chanukkah. But on the later days of Pesach, it is like Rosh Chodesh (the first day of the month): We skip [some sections] and recite 'half Hallel.' (The reason is explained nicely: It is because the latter days of Pesach do not only remind us of the salvation of the Jewish people, but rather also of the downfall of the Egyptians and their drowning in the sea. So it is like the Sages, may their memory be blessed, say [Yalkut Shimoni on Nakh 1085], that it is not good to say and prolong verse and praise about the destruction of the creations of God. That is why Hallel is not full [on those days]. Tisha B'Av at night: The scroll of Lamentations. It is the emotions of the prophet Jeremiah's soul and his dirge that he took up about the destruction of the holy city of Jerusalem and the Temple. And it is especially about the sin that Jerusalem and his people sinned, which is what caused that awful destruction to happen. And while glancing with eyes full of tears, he instructs and shows the path that leads to repentance and towards the revival of Israel, to renew our days as of old (alluding to Lamentations 5:21). Sukkot: They recite Ecclesiastes in the morning service of Shabbat of the intermediate days of the festival (Chol HaMoed) of Sukkot. As it shows that the maintenance of the body and the spirit of the nation is through God. This is in order to know that, without God, all human competition, all human actions and calculations, as well as the results of the toil of his efforts and his mighty hand - they are altogether empty.

As, when a curtain had a worm which made a tear in it, they would tear the curtain further to lengthen the tear, and that enabled them to then sew it in a manner that obscured the tear. Rav Zutra bar Toviya said that Rav said: One who tightens the thread of a stitch on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering. If two parts of a garment that were sewn together begin to separate, and one pulls the thread to reattach them, it is tantamount to having sewn them. The Gemara cites additional halakhot cited by Rav Zutra in the name of Rav. And one who learns even one matter from a magosh, a Persian priest, is liable to receive the death penalty. And one who knows how to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations, and does not do so, one may not speak with him because his actions are improper. The Gemara proceeds to discuss the additional halakhot cited by Rav Zutra bar Toviya. With regard to the magosh, Rav and Shmuel disagreed. One said that they are sorcerers, while the other said they are heretics. The Gemara adds: Conclude that Rav is the one who said that they are heretics, as Rav Zutra bar Toviya said that Rav said: One who learns one matter from the magosh is liable to receive the death penalty. As, if it should enter your mind that they are sorcerers, wasn’t it written: “When you come into the land which the Lord your God gives you, you shall not learn to do after the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found among you any one that makes his son or his daughter to pass through the fire, one that uses divination, a soothsayer, or an enchanter, or a sorcerer” (Deuteronomy 18:9–10)? And the Sages inferred: You shall not learn to do, but you may learn to understand and to teach the topic of sorcery. Apparently, merely learning about sorcery does not violate a prohibition. Only acting upon that learning is prohibited. Rav, who prohibited learning even a single matter from a magosh, must hold that they are heretics, not merely sorcerers. The Gemara states: Indeed, conclude that Rav is the one who said that they are heretics. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of bar Kappara: Anyone who knows how to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations and does not do so, the verse says about him: “They do not take notice of the work of God, and they do not see His handiwork” (Isaiah 5:12). And Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that there is a mitzva incumbent upon a person to calculate astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations? As it was stated: “And you shall guard and perform, for it is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations” (Deuteronomy 4:6). What wisdom and understanding is there in the Torah that is in the eyes of the nations, i.e., appreciated and recognized by all? You must say: This is the calculation of astronomical seasons and the movement of constellations, as the calculation of experts is witnessed by all. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who traps a deer or any other living creature. The Sages taught in a Tosefta: One who traps a ḥilazon and breaks its shell to remove its blood for the dye is liable to bring only one sin-offering. He is not liable for breaking the shell. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is liable to bring two, for performing the prohibited labors of trapping and for threshing, as Rabbi Yehuda would say: The breaking of a ḥilazon is included in the primary category of threshing, as its objective is to extract the matter that he desires from the shell that he does not. The Rabbis said to him: Breaking the shell is not included in the primary category of threshing. Rava said: What is the rationale for the opinion of the Rabbis? They hold: Threshing applies only to produce that grows from the ground. One who extracts other materials from their covering is exempt. The Gemara asks: Even if extracting blood is not considered threshing, let him be liable for taking a life as well. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is referring to a case where he broke its shell after it was dead. Rava said: Even if you say that he broke it when it was alive, he is exempt. Since he had no intention of killing the ḥilazon, he is considered as one who is acting unawares with regard to taking a life. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Didn’t Abaye and Rava both say that Rabbi Shimon, who rules that an unintentional act is permitted, agrees that in a case of: Cut off its head and will it not die, one is liable? One who performs an action that will inevitably result in a prohibited labor cannot claim that he did not intend for his action to lead to that result. Lack of intention is only a valid claim when the result is merely possible, not inevitable. Since one who extracts blood from a ḥilazon inevitably takes its life, how can Rava claim that his action is unintentional? The Gemara answers: Here it is different, as the longer the ḥilazon lives, the better it is for the trapper, so that its dye will become clear. Dye extracted from a live ḥilazon is a higher quality than that which is extracted from a dead one. Rabbi Shimon agrees that one who performs an action with inevitable consequences is liable only in a case where the consequences are not contrary to his interests. Since he prefers that the ḥilazon remain alive as long as possible, he is not liable for the inevitable consequences. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: As there was no slaughter necessary for construction of the Tabernacle, one who slaughters an animal, due to what prohibited labor is he liable? Rav said: He is liable due to dyeing, as in the course of the slaughter the hide is dyed with blood. And Shmuel said: He is liable due to taking a life.

The baraita continues by citing a dispute concerning Rabbi Shimon’s opinion. Rabbi Shimon exempts him from the obligation to bring an offering in this particular case. Since he became pure in between, at no point did he have definite knowledge that he was impure. For one to be liable to bring an offering for entering the Temple in a state of ritual impurity he must have knowledge of the impurity at the beginning and the end, and a lack of knowledge in the middle. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda deems him exempt from the obligation to bring an offering in all of those cases, and he reports this opinion in the name of Rabbi Shimon. Before explaining the contradictions between the opinions of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, the Gemara asks a question about Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda’s statement: Can it be that Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt even in the first case? Since he walked down both paths prior to entering the Temple, he had definite knowledge of his impure status. Rava said: What are we dealing with here? We are dealing with a case where he walked on the first path, and at the time of his walking on the second path he forgot that he had previously walked on the first path. Consequently, the knowledge that would render him liable to bring a sin offering is incomplete. And it is with regard to this point that they disagree: The first tanna holds that partial knowledge is considered like full knowledge, and Rabbi Shimon holds that partial knowledge is not considered like full knowledge. The Gemara returns to discuss the contradictions for which it cited this baraita. The Master said: If he walked on the first path and entered the Temple, and then he received the sprinkling of the ashes of the red heifer on the third and seventh days, and immersed, and subsequently walked on the second path and entered the Temple, he is liable to bring a sin offering. The Gemara asks: Why is he liable? After all, he did not have definite knowledge of his ritual impurity each time he entered the Temple. Although it is certain that after walking on the second path he had contracted ritual impurity at some point, as he had been purified in between, there was no specific point at which he had knowledge of definite impurity. Reish Lakish said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who does not require knowledge at the outset, before an unwitting transgression, in order to render one liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You may even say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that definite knowledge is necessary to render one liable to bring a sin offering, as here they rendered uncertain knowledge like full knowledge. The Gemara explains the contradiction: It enters your mind to say that Rabbi Yoḥanan meant that here they rendered uncertain knowledge like full knowledge, and the same is true for the entire Torah. Therefore, it is difficult, as there is an apparent contradiction between the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan above and this statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Here, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that uncertain knowledge is considered like full knowledge, whereas earlier he stated that uncertain knowledge, unlike full knowledge, does not divide separate unwitting transgressions to render one obligated to bring multiple sin offerings. And likewise it is difficult with regard to the apparent contradiction between the statement of Reish Lakish earlier and the statement of Reish Lakish here. Reish Lakish previously stated that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that uncertain knowledge divides unwitting transgressions to render one obligated to bring separate sin offerings, whereas here he explains that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, not Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara comments: Granted, the apparent contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan and the other statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan is not difficult. One can answer that when he said: Here they rendered uncertain knowledge like full knowledge, he meant specifically here, but with regard to the entire Torah it is not considered like full knowledge. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that this particular case is an exception? Here, with regard to ritual impurity, it is written: “Or if anyone touch any impure thing…and it was concealed from him that he is impure” (Leviticus 5:2). This indicates that even when one has knowledge that has an uncertainty to it, the verse renders him obligated to bring an offering. But with regard to the rest of the entire Torah it is written: “If his sin, which he has sinned, be known to him” (Leviticus 4:28). This teaches that it is only if he has full knowledge that he is obligated to bring an offering. But the contradiction between one statement of Reish Lakish and the other statement of Reish Lakish is difficult: Instead of interpreting the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, he should interpret it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara answers: This is what Reish Lakish is teaching us by establishing the baraita in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael: That Rabbi Yishmael also does not require knowledge at the outset, before an unwitting transgression, in order to render one liable to bring a sin offering. The Gemara objects: But that is already taught explicitly in a mishna, as we learned (Shevuot 14b) that Rabbi Yishmael says: The verse states: “It was concealed from him” (Leviticus 5:2–3), twice. One mention of the phrase serves to render one obligated to bring a sin offering for a lapse of awareness of his state of ritual impurity when he entered the Temple, and the other mention of the phrase teaches that he is obligated to bring a sin offering for a lapse of awareness during which he forgot that the building he was entering while impure was the Temple. Since this is the same verse that is the source for the requirement of knowledge at the outset, evidently Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with this opinion, as he derives a different halakha from the verse. The Gemara explains: It was necessary for Reish Lakish to state that Rabbi Yishmael does not require knowledge at the outset, as it might enter your mind to say: Although Rabbi Yishmael has no verse from which he could derive this requirement, perhaps he has a tradition with regard to the requirement of prior knowledge. By establishing that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, Reish Lakish teaches us conclusively that Rabbi Yishmael does not require knowledge at the outset. MISHNA: If one has pieces of forbidden fat and notar before him and he ate one of them and he does not know which of them he ate; or if his menstruating wife and his sister were with him in the house and he unwittingly engaged in intercourse with one of them and he does not know with which of them he unwittingly engaged in intercourse; or if Shabbat and Yom Kippur occurred adjacent to one another and he performed prohibited labor during the intervening twilight period and he does not know on which of the days he performed the labor, in all of these cases, Rabbi Eliezer deems the transgressor liable to bring a sin offering, as he certainly sinned, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems the transgressor exempt, as he does not know the nature of his sin. Rabbi Yosei said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to one who performs prohibited labor during the intervening twilight period because they concur that he is exempt, as I say: He performed part of the labor today, and he performed part of the labor the following day. With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to the case of one who performs prohibited labor in the midst of the day, and he does not know whether it was on Shabbat that he performed the labor or whether it was on Yom Kippur that he performed the labor; or with regard to one who performs a prohibited labor and he does not know which labor he performed. As, in those cases Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rabbi Yehuda said: Rabbi Yehoshua would deem him exempt even from bringing a provisional guilt offering. Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Shimon Shezuri say: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree with regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from one category, e.g., he picked a grape from a vine on Shabbat and does not know which vine it was, as in that case they both agree that he is liable, since he knows the nature of his sin. With regard to what case did they disagree? With regard to a case involving a matter where his lack of knowledge involves items from two categories, e.g., he picked fruit from a tree on Shabbat and does not know whether it was from a vine or from a fig tree. As, in that case Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering, since he certainly sinned, and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt, as he does not know the nature of his sin. Rabbi Yehuda said: Even if one intended to pick figs and he picked grapes, or to pick grapes and he picked figs, or to pick black figs and he picked white figs, or to pick white figs and he picked black figs, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin offering and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rabbi Yehuda added: I wonder if Rabbi Yehoshua deemed him exempt in that case, as even in his opinion the person intended to perform a prohibited labor. The mishna asks: If it is so, that he is not exempt according to Rabbi Yehuda, why is it stated: “If his sin, wherein he has sinned” (Leviticus 4:23), from which it is derived that one is liable only if the object of the sin was the one that he intended? The mishna answers: This serves to exclude one who acts unawares and does not intend to perform a prohibited action at all. GEMARA: With regard to the first clause of the mishna and the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: Whichever way you look at it he is liable to bring a sin offering. If it was forbidden fat that he ate, he is liable; and if it was notar that he ate, he is also liable. If it was with his menstruating wife that he engaged in intercourse, he is liable; and if it was with his sister that he engaged in intercourse, he is also liable. If it was on Shabbat that he performed the forbidden labor, he is liable; and if it was on Yom Kippur that he performed the labor, he is also liable. The result of any one of these scenarios is that he is liable to bring a sin offering. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him in response: The verse states: “If his sin, which he has sinned, be known to him, he shall bring for his offering a goat, a male without blemish” (Leviticus 4:23). It is derived from the phrase: “Wherein he has sinned,” that he is not liable until it becomes known to him specifically with which item he sinned. The Gemara asks: And as for Rabbi Eliezer, what does he do with this phrase: “Which he has sinned”? The Gemara answers: He requires it for the halakha that only one who is aware of his action is liable, as this phrase excludes one who acts unawares and inadvertently commits a transgression.

And if you say that the people of Hotzal do so and therefore they should be liable, their intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people. MISHNA: One who intends to carry out an object with the object before him, and as he was walking the object came to be carried behind him, is exempt. However, if he intended to carry it out behind him and it came to be carried before him, he is liable. In truth they said: A woman who girded herself in a pants-like sinar worn beneath the outer garments, whether she placed an object before her or behind her, and it came to be carried on the other side, she is liable, as it is common for the sinar to be reversed. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even those royal couriers, who receive notes [pittakin], carry those notes in their belts, and are not particular where on their belt they carry the notes (Rav Hai Gaon), are liable for carrying out the notes whether they carried them before them or behind them. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is different about the case of one who intended to carry an object before him and it came to be carried behind him that he is exempt? The reason is that his intention was not realized. Since he did not perform the act that he intended to perform, he is exempt. If so, then even in the case of one who intended to carry an object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, he should also be exempt because his intention was not realized. Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed, in the sense that it cites the opinions of two different Sages. He who taught this halakha did not teach that halakha. Rava said: And what difficulty is there here? Perhaps it can be explained as follows. With regard to one who intended to carry an object before him, and it came to be carried behind him, this is the reason that he is exempt: He intended to provide the object with outstanding protection, seeing it at all times, and ultimately he managed to provide the object with reduced protection. Since that was not his intention, it is not considered a prohibited labor and he is exempt. Whereas one who intended to carry an object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, this is the reason he is liable: He intended to provide the object with reduced protection, and ultimately he managed to provide the object with outstanding protection. Rather, what is the difficulty here? It is the inference inferred from the mishna that is difficult. One who intends to carry out an object before him, and the object came to be carried behind him, is exempt. By inference: One who intends to carry out an object behind him, and indeed, the object came to be carried behind him, is liable. Say the latter clause of the mishna: One who intends to carry out an object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, is the case where he is liable. By inference: One who intends to carry out an object behind him, and indeed, the object came to be carried behind him, is exempt. The inference from the first clause contradicts the inference from the latter clause. Rabbi Elazar said: This mishna is disjointed. He who taught this halakha did not teach that halakha. Rav Ashi said: What difficulty is there here? Perhaps the mishna is stating the halakha utilizing the following didactic style: It was not necessary, and it should be understood as follows. It was not necessary to teach that a person who intended to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, is liable. That is obvious because his intention was realized. However, it was necessary for the mishna to teach that even in a case where he intended to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried before him, he is liable. It would have entered your mind to say: Since his intention was not realized, he should not be liable. Therefore, the mishna teaches us: Since he intended to provide the object with reduced protection, and ultimately he managed to provide the object with outstanding protection, he is liable. And the case where one intended to carry out the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, is the subject of a dispute between the tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: One who carried out coins in his money belt, and its opening was facing up, is liable because this is the typical method of carrying coins. However, if one carried it out with its opening facing down, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: Do you not agree that in a case where one intends to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, that he is liable? Apparently, one who intended to provide his object with reduced protection and realized that intention is liable. And they said to him: And do you not agree that one who carries out an object in a backhanded manner or with his foot is exempt? Apparently, carrying out an object in an atypical manner is not considered carrying. Rabbi Yehuda said: I said one thing to the Rabbis in support of my opinion, and they said one thing to me. I did not find a response to their statement, and they did not find a response to my statement. From the fact that he said to them: Do you not agree that in a case where one intends to carry the object behind him, and it came to be carried behind him, he is liable? Can it not be inferred that the Sages deem one exempt in that case? Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis dispute this matter. The Gemara asks: And according to your reasoning, from the fact that the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: Do you not agree that one who carries out an object in a backhanded manner is exempt, can it not be inferred that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable, even for carrying out in a backhanded manner? Wasn’t it taught explicitly in a baraita: With regard to one who carries an object out in a backhanded manner or with his foot, everyone agrees that he is exempt? Rather, the baraita should be understood as follows. With regard to one who intended to carry an object behind him, and the object came to be carried out behind him, everyone agrees that he is liable. With regard to one who carried out an object in a backhanded manner or with his foot, everyone agrees that he is exempt. Where they disagree is in a case where one carried coins in his money belt with its opening facing down. This Master, Rabbi Yehuda, likens it to the case of one who intended to carry an object behind him and the object came to be carried out behind him, and deems him liable; and this Master, the Rabbis, liken it to the case of one who carried out an object in a backhanded manner or with his foot, and deems him exempt. We learned in the mishna: In truth they said: A woman who girded herself in a pants-like sinar, whether she placed an object before her or behind her, and it came to be carried on the other side, she is liable. It was taught in the Tosefta: In every instance that the mishna employs the phrase: In truth, that is the undisputed halakha. And we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says that even those who receive notes, i.e., royal couriers who transmit messages, place notes in their belts, and are not particular about which side the note is on (Rav Hai Gaon), are liable for carrying out notes, whether they carry the notes out in front of them or behind them. We learned a different explanation: Because the royal scribes do this, they place their notes on all sides of their belts. MISHNA: One who carries a large mass out to the public domain on Shabbat is liable. If two carried it out together, they are exempt because neither performed a complete prohibited labor. However, if one person is unable to carry it out alone, and therefore two people carried it out, they are liable. And Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt even in that case. GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and some say that Abaye said this, and some say that it was taught in a baraita: With regard to an action performed by two people, when this person is capable of performing it alone, and that person is capable of performing it alone, Rabbi Meir deems them liable, and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon deem them exempt. If both this person is incapable and that person is incapable of performing the action alone, and therefore they performed it together, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir deem them liable, and Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt. If this person is capable, and that person is incapable, and they performed it together, everyone agrees that he is liable. That was also taught in a baraita: One who carries a large mass out to the public domain on Shabbat is liable. If two carried it out together, Rabbi Meir deems them liable, and Rabbi Yehuda says: If one is incapable of carrying it out, and two carried it out, they are liable. And if not, if each person is capable of carrying it out himself, and nevertheless they carried it out together, they are exempt. And Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt even if neither was capable of performing the action alone. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? What is the biblical source of these halakhot? The Gemara answers that the source is as our Sages taught in Torat Kohanim, the halakhic midrash on Leviticus. It is written: “And if one person among the common people sins unwittingly by performing it, any one of God’s commandments not to be done, and be guilty” (Leviticus 4:27). The Gemara interpreted: “By performing it,” means that one who performs a transgression in its entirety is liable, and not one who performs part of it. How so? If two people were holding a pitchfork and gathering the stalks, or holding a shuttle and weaving the threads of the warp, or holding a quill and writing, or holding a reed and carrying it out to the public domain, I might have thought they are liable, therefore the verse states: “By performing it.” One who performs a transgression in its entirety is liable, and not one who performs only part of it.

Rather, is it not that the first clause of the baraita is dealing with the contrast between Shabbat and idolatry, and the latter clause of the baraita is dealing with contrasting Shabbat and other mitzvot? And what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one thought that it was permitted fat, and ate it, and later discovered that it was forbidden fat. This is one example of other mitzvot where one is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where he is exempt, as one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is exempt. And according to Abaye, who holds that he is liable in that case, what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one had something in his mouth and he thought it was spittle and swallowed it with no intention to eat it, and it turned out to be forbidden fat that he swallowed. This is one example of other mitzvot, where he is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where the phrase: He is exempt, is referring to the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground. In that case, even Abaye agrees that he is exempt. However, one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is liable since he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Therefore, no proof can be cited from this baraita. A similar dispute between Abaye and Rava was stated. In the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain, for which he would not be liable by Torah law, and it turned out that he threw it four cubits, in violation of the prohibition by Torah law against carrying an object four cubits in the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits, and, consequently, does not intend to perform a prohibited act. Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw, and ultimately a throw that traveled a prohibited distance was executed. Another dispute between them was stated. In the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain and threw an object more than four cubits, and, ultimately, it was found to be the public domain, Rava said: He is exempt. And Abaye said: He is liable. The Gemara elaborates: Rava said: He is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a prohibited throw. In a private domain, he may throw an object as far as he chooses. And Abaye said: He is liable, as he intends to execute a standard throw. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to mention these three disputes, despite their similarities, because each one teaches a unique element. As, had the Gemara taught us only the first, the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground, we would have said that it was only in that case that Rava said he is exempt, as he does not intend to perform an act of prohibited severing. He had no intention to perform an action that entails desecration of Shabbat. However, the ruling in the case of one who intended to throw an object two cubits in the public domain and he threw it four cubits would be more stringent, as an object cannot be thrown four cubits without being thrown two cubits. A throw of two cubits is a component part of the four-cubit throw. Consequently, say that in that case Rava agrees with Abaye, as he performed an act that has a prohibited dimension to it. And, had the Gemara taught us the dispute in this case of throwing two cubits as well, we would have said that it is only in that case that Rava says that he is exempt, as he does not intend to execute a throw of four cubits. A throw of fewer than four cubits does not constitute a transgression. However, in the case of one who thought that he was in the private domain, and ultimately it was found to be the public domain where the individual intends to execute a throw of four cubits, which is a prohibited distance, say that Rava agrees with Abaye that he is liable. Therefore, it is necessary to mention all three cases in which they disagree. We learned in a mishna: The primary categories of labor are forty-less-one, and we discussed it and asked: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if one performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. Granted, according to Abaye, who said that in a case like that one mentioned above, where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits he is liable, you find that circumstance in a case where he was aware that the prohibition of Shabbat applies to certain labors, and he was aware that particular labors were prohibited, and was mistaken with regard to measures. He intended to perform an act involving less than the prohibited measure, and it turned out that the action he performed involved an amount equal to or greater than the prohibited measure. That is an unwitting act that renders him liable to bring a sin-offering, according to Abaye. However, according to Rava, who said that he is exempt in a case where one intended to throw an object two cubits and it traveled four cubits, in what circumstances do you find that he would be liable for each and every one? Is it in a case where, with regard to Shabbat, his actions were intentional, and, with regard to the prohibited labors, his actions were unwitting? It works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: Once he was unwitting with regard to the fact that the punishment for his transgression is karet, even though he was aware that his action was in violation of a Torah prohibition and performed the transgression intentionally, he is considered to have sinned unwittingly. If he holds in accordance with that opinion, you find a case where one could be liable for each and every prohibited labor when he was aware that performing labor on Shabbat involves violation of a Torah prohibition, but he was unaware that the punishment for violating that prohibition is karet. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said: It is not considered unwitting until he was unwitting with regard to both the prohibition and karet, the result is that he is completely unaware of all the prohibited labors of Shabbat. The question then arises: With regard to what aspect of Shabbat was he aware? If he was completely unaware of all the labors prohibited on Shabbat, in what sense were his actions intentional with regard to Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He was aware of the halakhot of the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that this prohibition is by Torah law. MISHNA: This fundamental mishna enumerates those who perform the primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat, which number forty-less-one. They are grouped in accordance with their function: One who sows, and one who plows, and one who reaps, and one who gathers sheaves into a pile, and one who threshes, removing the kernel from the husk, and one who winnows threshed grain in the wind, and one who selects the inedible waste from the edible, and one who grinds, and one who sifts the flour in a sieve, and one who kneads dough, and one who bakes. Additional primary categories of prohibited labor are the following: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, and one who combs the fleece and straightens it, and one who dyes it, and one who spins the wool, and one who stretches the threads of the warp in the loom, and one who constructs two meshes, tying the threads of the warp to the base of the loom, and one who weaves two threads, and one who severs two threads for constructive purposes, and one who ties a knot, and one who unties a knot, and one who sews two stitches with a needle, as well as one who tears a fabric in order to sew two stitches. One who traps a deer, or any living creature, and one who slaughters it, and one who flays it, and one who salts its hide, a step in the tanning process, and one who tans its hide, and one who smooths it, removing hairs and veins, and one who cuts it into measured parts. One who writes two letters and one who erases in order to write two letters. One who builds a structure, and one who dismantles it, one who extinguishes a fire, and one who kindles a fire. One who strikes a blow with a hammer to complete the production process of a vessel (Rabbeinu Ḥananel), and one who carries out an object from domain to domain. All these are primary categories of labor, and they number forty-less-one.

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that the primary categories of labor number forty-less-one. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this tally? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who sows, and one who plows. The Gemara asks: Since, after all, in terms of plowing, one plows first and only then sows, let the tanna teach first one who plows, and afterward let him teach one who sows. The Gemara answers: The tanna ordered the mishna based on the practice in Eretz Yisrael, where they sow first and then plow. In Eretz Yisrael, the practice was to plow a second time after sowing to cover the seeds. A baraita is taught with regard to the prohibited labor of sowing: One who sows, and one who prunes the branches of vines to accelerate their growth, and one who plants, and one who bends the branch of a vine or a tree into the ground so that it takes root while still attached to the trunk, and one who grafts the branch of one tree onto another have all performed one type of labor, as they all stimulate plant growth. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us? The Gemara explains: This teaches us that one who unwittingly performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single primary category of labor, like those listed in the baraita, is liable to bring only one sin-offering, since they are considered aspects of the same labor. Rabbi Aḥa said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Ami said: One who prunes is liable for the labor of planting. And one who plants, and one who bends, and one who grafts is liable for the labor of sowing. The Gemara is surprised at this: Is that to say that one who bends and one who grafts a branch, for sowing, yes, he is liable; for planting, no, he is not liable? These labors, performed on trees, are more similar to planting. Rather, say as follows: One is liable even for sowing, as with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat there is no difference between sowing and planting. Rav Kahana said: One who prunes a tree and needs the wood that he hewed from the tree for fuel or some other purpose is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One sin-offering due to the labor of reaping, like anyone who severs an item from the ground for the purpose of harvesting the detached object, and one sin-offering due to the labor of planting, since he thereby stimulates growth of the plant. Similarly, Rav Yosef said: One who reaps alfalfa is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping, since he is cutting the plant for animal feed, and one due to planting, since cutting stimulates the growth of the alfalfa. Similarly, Abaye said: One who cuts beet leaves is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping and one due to sowing. We learned in the mishna among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who plows. A tanna taught in a baraita with regard to the labor of plowing: One who plows, and one who digs, and one who makes a furrow in the ground have all performed one type of labor. Rav Sheshet said: One who had a mound of earth and removed it in the house, thereby evening the surface, is liable due to the labor of building, as he thereby engages in construction of the house. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Similarly, Rava said: One who had a hole and filled it, in the house he is liable due to the labor of building. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat and digs the hole only because he needs its dirt is exempt for that act, which is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law. And even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in general one who performs labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of that action, is liable for it; that ruling applies only to a purpose that is constructive. However, this purpose is destructive, as one performs an act that unnecessarily mars the surface of the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would agree that in this case he is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who reaps. It was taught in a Tosefta with regard to the labor of reaping: One who reaps, and one who picks grapes, and one who harvests dates, and one who collects olives, and one who gathers figs have all performed one type of labor, as they all involve picking fruit. Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of earth at a palm tree and severed dates is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to severing, which is a subcategory of the primary category of reaping; and one for extracting, which is a subcategory of the primary category of threshing, as he removes something edible, the date, from its cover, its cluster. Rav Ashi said: In that case, one is exempt, since that is not the typical manner of severing, and that is not the typical manner of extracting, and one who performs a labor in an atypical manner is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who gathers. Rava said: One who gathers salt from salt pools is liable due to the labor of gathering, as he gathers a substance from the field into a pile. Abaye said: That is not so, as the prohibition of gathering by Torah law applies only to produce that grows from the ground. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who threshes. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: One who threshes, and one who beats flax to remove it from the hard cover of its stalk, and one who strikes a cotton plant to remove the cotton seeds have all performed one type of labor. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who winnows, and one who selects, and one who grinds, and one who sifts. The Gemara asks: The prohibited labor of winnowing is the same as the prohibited labor of selecting, which is the same as the prohibited labor of sifting. They are all identical in the manner in which they are performed and have the same objective: Separating food from the accompanying waste. Why was it necessary to list them all? An answer was provided by Abaye and Rava, who both said and established a principle: Any manner of labor that was performed in the Tabernacle, for the purposes of the Tabernacle,

Similarly, one who sows seeds, plants trees, extends trees,²One of the methods of agriculture common in the Talmudic period was to plant vines - and in certain instances, trees - by taking a branch from an existing vine or tree and, without severing it from its source, burying it in the ground. In this manner, it would sprout roots, and ultimately a new plant would grow from this base. grafts [branches to] trees,³Taking branches from one tree and grafting them to another so that they will grow. or prunes trees:⁴As the Rambam states in Chapter 8, Halachah 2, pruning a tree is beneficial in causing it to grow. He also explains this concept in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Sh'vi'it 4:5, "One cuts off [branches] at a specific place to improve the tree."
The Eglei Tal and others note that the Rambam (Hilchot Shemitah 1:3, based on Mo'ed Katan 3a) considers pruning merely a derivative of planting with regard to the concept of forbidden labor in the Sabbatical year, while in the present context it is considered in the same status as planting itself.
The Eglei Tal resolves this difficulty on the basis of the principle that with regard to the Sabbath, it is, "thoughtful work," that the Torah forbade. This principle does not apply with regard to the prohibitions against working the land in the Sabbatical year.
Accordingly, since the activities of planting and pruning are very different, pruning is considered only a derivative with regard to the Sabbatical year. With regard to the Sabbath labors, however, intent is of fundamental importance. Since the intent of both activities is the same - to enable the plant to grow - they are both given equal status. All of these [activities] are considered a single primary category of [forbidden] labor, [for] they share a commonality, since all these activities have a single intent:⁵With this statement, the Rambam explains the difference between the sets of activities mentioned in the previous halachah, and those mentioned in this halachah. Plowing, digging, and making a groove are very similar activities, but they differ in their objectives. The activities mentioned in this halachah, by contrast, do not resemble each other; nevertheless, they share the same intent. to cause [a plant] to grow.

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that the primary categories of labor number forty-less-one. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this tally? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who sows, and one who plows. The Gemara asks: Since, after all, in terms of plowing, one plows first and only then sows, let the tanna teach first one who plows, and afterward let him teach one who sows. The Gemara answers: The tanna ordered the mishna based on the practice in Eretz Yisrael, where they sow first and then plow. In Eretz Yisrael, the practice was to plow a second time after sowing to cover the seeds. A baraita is taught with regard to the prohibited labor of sowing: One who sows, and one who prunes the branches of vines to accelerate their growth, and one who plants, and one who bends the branch of a vine or a tree into the ground so that it takes root while still attached to the trunk, and one who grafts the branch of one tree onto another have all performed one type of labor, as they all stimulate plant growth. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us? The Gemara explains: This teaches us that one who unwittingly performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single primary category of labor, like those listed in the baraita, is liable to bring only one sin-offering, since they are considered aspects of the same labor. Rabbi Aḥa said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Ami said: One who prunes is liable for the labor of planting. And one who plants, and one who bends, and one who grafts is liable for the labor of sowing. The Gemara is surprised at this: Is that to say that one who bends and one who grafts a branch, for sowing, yes, he is liable; for planting, no, he is not liable? These labors, performed on trees, are more similar to planting. Rather, say as follows: One is liable even for sowing, as with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat there is no difference between sowing and planting. Rav Kahana said: One who prunes a tree and needs the wood that he hewed from the tree for fuel or some other purpose is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One sin-offering due to the labor of reaping, like anyone who severs an item from the ground for the purpose of harvesting the detached object, and one sin-offering due to the labor of planting, since he thereby stimulates growth of the plant. Similarly, Rav Yosef said: One who reaps alfalfa is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping, since he is cutting the plant for animal feed, and one due to planting, since cutting stimulates the growth of the alfalfa. Similarly, Abaye said: One who cuts beet leaves is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping and one due to sowing. We learned in the mishna among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who plows. A tanna taught in a baraita with regard to the labor of plowing: One who plows, and one who digs, and one who makes a furrow in the ground have all performed one type of labor. Rav Sheshet said: One who had a mound of earth and removed it in the house, thereby evening the surface, is liable due to the labor of building, as he thereby engages in construction of the house. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Similarly, Rava said: One who had a hole and filled it, in the house he is liable due to the labor of building. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat and digs the hole only because he needs its dirt is exempt for that act, which is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law. And even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in general one who performs labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of that action, is liable for it; that ruling applies only to a purpose that is constructive. However, this purpose is destructive, as one performs an act that unnecessarily mars the surface of the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would agree that in this case he is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who reaps. It was taught in a Tosefta with regard to the labor of reaping: One who reaps, and one who picks grapes, and one who harvests dates, and one who collects olives, and one who gathers figs have all performed one type of labor, as they all involve picking fruit. Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of earth at a palm tree and severed dates is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to severing, which is a subcategory of the primary category of reaping; and one for extracting, which is a subcategory of the primary category of threshing, as he removes something edible, the date, from its cover, its cluster. Rav Ashi said: In that case, one is exempt, since that is not the typical manner of severing, and that is not the typical manner of extracting, and one who performs a labor in an atypical manner is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who gathers. Rava said: One who gathers salt from salt pools is liable due to the labor of gathering, as he gathers a substance from the field into a pile. Abaye said: That is not so, as the prohibition of gathering by Torah law applies only to produce that grows from the ground. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who threshes. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: One who threshes, and one who beats flax to remove it from the hard cover of its stalk, and one who strikes a cotton plant to remove the cotton seeds have all performed one type of labor. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who winnows, and one who selects, and one who grinds, and one who sifts. The Gemara asks: The prohibited labor of winnowing is the same as the prohibited labor of selecting, which is the same as the prohibited labor of sifting. They are all identical in the manner in which they are performed and have the same objective: Separating food from the accompanying waste. Why was it necessary to list them all? An answer was provided by Abaye and Rava, who both said and established a principle: Any manner of labor that was performed in the Tabernacle, for the purposes of the Tabernacle,

as it is likely to collapse. But in the case of a spring that did not just emerge, which is not likely to collapse because its walls have already stabilized, even a field that ordinarily suffices with rainwater may be irrigated. The Gemara asks: If that were so, then to whom, i.e., to which tanna, would you attribute the mishna? According to this interpretation, the mishna does not correspond to any opinion, while according to the previous interpretation, it corresponds to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rather, it must be that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, a newly emerged spring is no different from a spring that did not just emerge. A field that requires irrigation, yes, it may be irrigated, while a field that suffices with rainwater, no, it may not be irrigated. And the baraita opted to teach this dispute in the case of a newly emerged spring in order to convey the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Meir, which states that one may irrigate even from a newly emerged spring, and even a field that suffices with rainwater. § It was stated that the amora’im disputed the following question: With regard to one who weeds or one who waters seedlings on Shabbat, for what prohibited labor do we forewarn him? Judicial punishment may be administered to a sinner only if he has been forewarned by two witnesses prior to the commission of his offense. This forewarning must include the specific transgression being violated, and on Shabbat it must include the specific category of prohibited labor that the action involves. Rabba said: It is due to the prohibition against plowing. Rav Yosef said: It is due to the prohibition against sowing. Rabba said: According to my opinion it is reasonable. Just as the usual objective of plowing is to loosen the earth, so too, this, weeding or watering, loosens the earth. Rav Yosef said: According to my opinion, it is reasonable. Just as the usual objective of sowing is to cause the fruit to grow, here too, weeding or watering causes the fruit to grow. Abaye said to Rabba: According to your opinion, it is difficult, and according to the opinion of Rav Yosef, it is difficult. Abaye explains: According to your opinion, it is difficult: Is it true that for the prohibition against plowing, yes, he is forewarned, but for the prohibition against sowing, no, he is not forewarned? Similarly, according to the opinion of Rav Yosef, it is difficult: Can it be that for the prohibition against sowing, yes, he is forewarned, but for the prohibition against plowing, no, he is not forewarned? Everyone should agree that weeding and watering fall under the categories of both plowing and sowing. And if you say that anywhere that there are two possible categories of prohibited labor into which a particular action might fall, one is liable to be punished for only one of them, didn’t Rav Kahana say: If one prunes the branches of a vine on Shabbat and he needs the wood for firewood or any other purpose, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings? He is liable to bring one sin-offering for violating the primary category of sowing, as pruning vines facilitates their growth, and so it is a sub-category of sowing. And he is liable to bring one sin-offering for violating the primary category of reaping, as the essence of reaping is detaching that which one needs from the ground. Since he needs the wood that he is detaching from the vine, his action is considered reaping. Consequently, one action that incorporates two prohibited labors causes liability for both. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is difficult according to both opinions. Rav Yosef raised an objection to the opinion of Rabba from what is taught in the following baraita: One who weeds in proximity to diverse kinds of seeds, or covers with earth the exposed roots of diverse kinds, is flogged for transgressing the prohibition against diverse kinds, i.e., tending different species of crops in one area of the same field, as it is stated: “You shall not sow your field with two kinds of seed” (Leviticus 19:19). Rabbi Akiva says: Even one who maintains in his field a mixture of species that he could have uprooted is flogged for violating the prohibition against diverse kinds of seeds. Rav Yosef explains: Granted, according to my opinion, that I say that one who weeds on Shabbat is forewarned for the prohibited labor of sowing, this is the reason he is liable to be punished with flogging for weeding diverse seeds: Sowing diverse kinds is prohibited. But according to you, who said that one who weeds on Shabbat is forewarned for plowing, why is one liable to be flogged for weeding in proximity to diverse kinds? Is plowing prohibited in connection with diverse kinds? At the time of plowing, there is no mixture of different species of crops, so plowing cannot be prohibited in this case. Rabba said to him: According to my opinion, one who weeds a field of diverse kinds is flogged not because he is guilty of plowing, but for violating the prohibition against maintaining a mixture of species in his field. The Gemara objects: However, from the fact that it teaches in the latter clause of the baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: Even one who maintains in his field a mixture of species is liable to be flogged, it may be inferred that according to the anonymous first tanna, the liability for weeding is not for maintaining diverse kinds, but for performing some other prohibited labor. The Gemara rejects this opinion: In fact, the entire baraita reflects the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and it is stated in the style of what is the reason. The baraita should be understood as follows: What is the reason that one who weeds and one who covers the exposed roots of diverse kinds with earth is flogged? He is flogged for maintaining diverse kinds in his field, as Rabbi Akiva says: Even one who maintains in his field a mixture of species is flogged. With regard to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, the Gemara asks: What is the reason for Rabbi Akiva’s opinion? How did he derive this prohibition from the verses? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: “You shall not sow your field with mingled seed” (Leviticus 19:19). I have derived from this verse that only sowing diverse kinds is prohibited. From where is it derived that maintaining diverse kinds, which does not involve any positive action, is also prohibited? The verse states: “Diverse kinds, you shall not sow your field with mingled seed” (Leviticus 19:19). The prohibition against planting different species of a crop in one area of the same field is preceded in the verse by the prohibition against crossbreeding livestock: “You shall not let your cattle gender with a diverse kind.” A slight change in punctuation yields the phrase: Diverse kinds in your field, you shall not, indicating that merely preserving diverse kinds in one’s field is prohibited. § The Gemara returns to the original topic of discussion: We learned in the mishna: One may irrigate a field that requires irrigation on the intermediate days of a Festival as well as during the Sabbatical Year. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to the intermediate days of a Festival, where the prohibition against irrigation is due to the mandate to avoid excessive exertion on the Festival, in a case of considerable loss, the Sages permitted one to exert himself. However, during the Sabbatical Year, both according to the one who said that one who waters is liable due to the prohibition against sowing, and according to the one who said that one is liable due to the prohibition against plowing, are sowing and plowing permitted during the Sabbatical Year? How can these actions be permitted when the Torah explicitly renders prohibited working the land during the Sabbatical Year? Abaye said: The mishna is referring to the Sabbatical Year in the present time, when its prohibitions are only by rabbinic decree, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: When the verse states: “And this is the manner of the release, every creditor will release that which he has lent to his neighbor” (Deuteronomy 15:2), the verse speaks of two releases: One is the release of land, that one must refrain from working the land, and the other is the release of money, that one must refrain from collecting debts. This verse equates these two releases, indicating that when you are mandated by Torah law to release land, you must release money, and when you are not mandated to release land, you need not release money. This indicates that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, at the present time, the release of land is not mandated by Torah law. Therefore, observance of the Sabbatical Year is mandated only by rabbinic law, and the Sages were lenient in a case of significant loss. Rava said: Even if you say that the mishna was taught in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and maintain that the observance of the Sabbatical Year, even at the present time, is mandated by Torah law, one can understand the leniency in the mishna. The reason for the leniency with regard to irrigation is because only primary categories of labor were prohibited by the Merciful One, i.e., by Torah law,

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that the primary categories of labor number forty-less-one. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this tally? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who sows, and one who plows. The Gemara asks: Since, after all, in terms of plowing, one plows first and only then sows, let the tanna teach first one who plows, and afterward let him teach one who sows. The Gemara answers: The tanna ordered the mishna based on the practice in Eretz Yisrael, where they sow first and then plow. In Eretz Yisrael, the practice was to plow a second time after sowing to cover the seeds. A baraita is taught with regard to the prohibited labor of sowing: One who sows, and one who prunes the branches of vines to accelerate their growth, and one who plants, and one who bends the branch of a vine or a tree into the ground so that it takes root while still attached to the trunk, and one who grafts the branch of one tree onto another have all performed one type of labor, as they all stimulate plant growth. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us? The Gemara explains: This teaches us that one who unwittingly performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single primary category of labor, like those listed in the baraita, is liable to bring only one sin-offering, since they are considered aspects of the same labor. Rabbi Aḥa said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Ami said: One who prunes is liable for the labor of planting. And one who plants, and one who bends, and one who grafts is liable for the labor of sowing. The Gemara is surprised at this: Is that to say that one who bends and one who grafts a branch, for sowing, yes, he is liable; for planting, no, he is not liable? These labors, performed on trees, are more similar to planting. Rather, say as follows: One is liable even for sowing, as with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat there is no difference between sowing and planting. Rav Kahana said: One who prunes a tree and needs the wood that he hewed from the tree for fuel or some other purpose is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One sin-offering due to the labor of reaping, like anyone who severs an item from the ground for the purpose of harvesting the detached object, and one sin-offering due to the labor of planting, since he thereby stimulates growth of the plant. Similarly, Rav Yosef said: One who reaps alfalfa is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping, since he is cutting the plant for animal feed, and one due to planting, since cutting stimulates the growth of the alfalfa. Similarly, Abaye said: One who cuts beet leaves is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping and one due to sowing. We learned in the mishna among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who plows. A tanna taught in a baraita with regard to the labor of plowing: One who plows, and one who digs, and one who makes a furrow in the ground have all performed one type of labor. Rav Sheshet said: One who had a mound of earth and removed it in the house, thereby evening the surface, is liable due to the labor of building, as he thereby engages in construction of the house. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Similarly, Rava said: One who had a hole and filled it, in the house he is liable due to the labor of building. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat and digs the hole only because he needs its dirt is exempt for that act, which is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law. And even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in general one who performs labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of that action, is liable for it; that ruling applies only to a purpose that is constructive. However, this purpose is destructive, as one performs an act that unnecessarily mars the surface of the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would agree that in this case he is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who reaps. It was taught in a Tosefta with regard to the labor of reaping: One who reaps, and one who picks grapes, and one who harvests dates, and one who collects olives, and one who gathers figs have all performed one type of labor, as they all involve picking fruit. Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of earth at a palm tree and severed dates is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to severing, which is a subcategory of the primary category of reaping; and one for extracting, which is a subcategory of the primary category of threshing, as he removes something edible, the date, from its cover, its cluster. Rav Ashi said: In that case, one is exempt, since that is not the typical manner of severing, and that is not the typical manner of extracting, and one who performs a labor in an atypical manner is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who gathers. Rava said: One who gathers salt from salt pools is liable due to the labor of gathering, as he gathers a substance from the field into a pile. Abaye said: That is not so, as the prohibition of gathering by Torah law applies only to produce that grows from the ground. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who threshes. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: One who threshes, and one who beats flax to remove it from the hard cover of its stalk, and one who strikes a cotton plant to remove the cotton seeds have all performed one type of labor. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who winnows, and one who selects, and one who grinds, and one who sifts. The Gemara asks: The prohibited labor of winnowing is the same as the prohibited labor of selecting, which is the same as the prohibited labor of sifting. They are all identical in the manner in which they are performed and have the same objective: Separating food from the accompanying waste. Why was it necessary to list them all? An answer was provided by Abaye and Rava, who both said and established a principle: Any manner of labor that was performed in the Tabernacle, for the purposes of the Tabernacle,

MISHNAH: There are 39 categories of work. He who ploughs, who sows, who harvests, who binds into sheaves, who threshes, and who winnows, who selects, who grinds, and who sifts, who makes dough, and who bakes⁴As noted earlier, since the Sabbath prohibition is repeated at the start of the rules of building the Tabernacle, Ex. 35:1–3, one concludes that the prohibited actions are those needed for building the Tabernacle and the Service performed in it. The first series (11 categories) describes actions needed to prepare cereal offerings and the shew-bread. The second series (13 categories) catalogues the making of the priestly garments.. He who shears wool, who bleaches it, who cards it, who dyes it, who spins it, who prepares the loom, who ties two threads as warp, who weaves two rows, who hits two threads, who ties, and who unties. Also who sews two stitches, who tears in order to sew two stitches.
He who catches a deer, who slaughters it, who skins it, who salts it, who rubs it clean⁵To remove both hair outside and remainders of flesh inside to prepare for the tanning process which turns hide into leather., who tans it, who cuts it, who writes two letters, and who erases in order to write two letters⁶This series of 9 categories describes both sacrifices and the production of writing material which in pre-Mishnaic times was mostly leather..
He who builds, and who tears down, who extinguishes fire, and who lights fire, and who hits with a hammer⁷A name for the formal end of any production process., and who transports from one domain to another⁸This is mentioned last because in most cases it is a weak prohibition since “public domain” into which one may not transport by biblical standards is exists mostly outside a built-up area.; these are the 39 categories of work. HALAKHAH: “The categories of work are 39.” From where that the categories⁹⁶A hint that exactly 39 categories of work should be forbidden on the Sabbath (i. e., that a maximum of 39 sacrifices would be required for unintentional violations of the Sabbath rest.) of work are from the Torah? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Corresponding to the thirty-nine occurrences of מלאכה in the Torah⁹⁷The count works out if one counts all occurrences of מְלָאכָה together with its suffixed forms מְלַאכְתּוֹ, etc., but omitting all construct states מְלֶאכֶת.. They asked before Rebbi Aḥa, everywhere where מלאכות is written it should count for two! Rebbi Ashian said, Rebbi Aḥa checked by eye the entire Torah and did not find this word written⁹⁸The plural מְלָאכוֹת is not found in the Pentateuch. Therefore each occurrence of the word counts as one.. The following is necessary: He came into the house to do his work⁹⁹Gen. 39:11. It must be counted even though the word is in suffixed form and does not refer to the Sabbath. is with them. God completed on the Seventh Day His work which He did¹⁰⁰Gen. 2:2., is with them. Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated: Six days you shall eat unleavened bread and on the seventh day you should not do work¹⁰¹Deut. 16:8, the last occurrence of the word in the Torah. comes to complete the 39 “works” written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥmani: Corresponding to the 39 times “service” and “work” is written about the Tabernacle¹⁰²In Ex. and Num. Here again for the word עֲבוֹדָה the base form and the suffixed forms are counted, but the construct state עֲבוֹדַת is not.. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it does not say “this is the word” but these are the words.¹⁰³Ex. 35:1, the introductory paragraph which indicates that the Sabbath prohibitions may not be violated in building the Tabernacle, and which therefore forms the basis of the list of the 39 categories from an analysis of the activities needed to build the Tabernacle and to serve in it.” “Word”, “words,” “words”. From here about categories and derivatives¹⁰⁴The plural indicates that each category stands for many different actions, Babli 70a, 97b. (In the Appendix to Yalqut Šimony published by L. Ginzberg in שרידי הירושלמי p. 316 the reading is מכאן לאבות מלאכות “from here for categories”, the plural only indicates that there are different categories of work on the Sabbath.). Rebbi Ḥanina of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Abbahu. Alef is one, Lamed is 30, He is five, “word” is one, “words” are two¹⁰⁵The gematria (numerical value if each letter is used as a numeral in the Alexandrian system) of אלה is 36; one has somehow to find another 3 to reach the traditional number of 39.. From here the 39 “works” written in the Torah. The rabbis of Caesarea say, at its place nothing is missing, א is one, ל 30 , ח 8. The rabbis never hesitate to identify ה and ¹⁰⁶Cf. Peah 7:6 Note 113, Maˋaser Šeni 5:3, Soṭah 8:4 Note 179. In all other occurrences of substitution of ח for ה one obtains a word which makes sense; this cannot be said here (Babli Berakhot 32a).ח. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish worked on this Chapter for three and one half years¹⁰⁷They made a list of all actions traditionally forbidden on the Sabbath.. They produced 39 derivatives for each single one. Where they found a way to include it they included it¹⁰⁸Where they could they classified them according to the official categories.. Where they did not find a way to include it they classified it as “who hits with a hammer.^7,A name for the formal end of any production process.¹⁰⁹A catch-all category for actions difficult to categorize. It is clear that the list of prohibited actions must have preceded the classification.” The sons of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya worked on this Chapter for six months. They produced six derivatives for each single one. The sons of the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya follow the method of their father, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated¹¹⁰Quoted again later in the discussion of Mishnah 2, after Note 267. The Babylonian version of this baraita is in the Babli 73b, Tosephta 9:17.: “One who cuts grain, harvests grapes, harvests olives, cuts tree branches, tears out, plucks fruits, are all [liable] because of harvesting.¹¹¹These are six actions classified under the same category. “Tearing out” refers among other things to tearing out hairs.” Rebbi Sidor¹¹²His name seems to have been Isidor; changed to avoid the mention of pagan deities. said, Jehudah the son of the rabbi¹¹³The Elder R. Ḥiyya. Makhširin is a rather short Mishnah Tractate of only 6 Chapters accompanied by Tosephta of 3 Chapters. studied Makhširin for six months. In the end there came a student of Rebbi Simai and asked him, but he could not answer. He¹¹⁴R. Simai’s student. The important one of R. Ḥiyya’s twins was Ḥizqiah, not Jehudah. said, it is recognizable that this one never passed by the gate of the Torah. “The categories of work are 39.” For which purpose? For if he did all of them in one oblivion he is liable only once¹¹⁵This statement contradicts Mishnah 1 and the quote in the Babli (69a) as well as a quote from the Yerushalmi (not in our text) by R. Salomon Adani; it has to be changed into “is liable for each single one.”. ¹¹⁶This paragraph and the next are also in Nazir 6:1 but the origin is here as will be seen in the commentary. The introductory statement is from earlier in the Chapter, Notes 28–30. The text in braces was copied from there and has no place here. Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke it in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke it in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Zeˋira: Should he¹¹⁷The idol worshipper. not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: Do not perform any work¹¹⁸Ex. 20:8., principle. Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places¹¹⁹Ex. 35:3., a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which one alone is guilty¹²⁰A forbidden action on the Sabbath which is executed only by the common effort of several people is not prosecutable. This is an application of the 9^th hermeneutical principle of R. Ismael: Any detail which was subsumed under a principle but is mentioned separately in order to instruct, was not mentioned for itself but to explain the entire principle [Sifra Introduction 2; Pereq 1(1)]. In the text this is called “principle and detail”, which in the technical language of the Babli refers to the completely different rule No. 5 [Sifra Introduction (1,7)]. In Mekhilta dR. Ismael p. 347 the argument is attributed to R. Jonathan (who in the Babli 70a appears as R. Nathan.)
Whether there is a connection between rules 5 and 9 is left open in the Babli, Baba qamma 85a, decided in the negative in Menaḥot 55b. Menaḥem Cahana, in an exhaustive study of the problem (קווים להתפתחות של מידת כלל ופרט בתקופת התנאים p. 173–216 in: Studies in Talmudic and Midrashic Literature in Memory of Tirzah Lifshitz) holds that the original tannaitic theory knew only of two principles, one which corresponded to the later (Babli, Sifra, Sifry) rules entitled “principle and detail”, “detail and principle”, “principle and detail and principle”; the other one referring to all rules which in Babylonian formulation start with “any detail which was subsumed under a principle”. His arguments support the thesis of the present commentary that Mekhilta, Sifra, Sifry (and Tosephta) in our hands are essentially Babylonian editions. (A different interpretation of the verses is in the Babli 70a).. Also here: Do not worship them¹²¹Ex. 20:4., a principle. Do not prostrate yourself¹²¹Ex. 20:4., a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the action of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which one alone is guilty¹²⁰A forbidden action on the Sabbath which is executed only by the common effort of several people is not prosecutable. This is an application of the 9^th hermeneutical principle of R. Ismael: Any detail which was subsumed under a principle but is mentioned separately in order to instruct, was not mentioned for itself but to explain the entire principle [Sifra Introduction 2; Pereq 1(1)]. In the text this is called “principle and detail”, which in the technical language of the Babli refers to the completely different rule No. 5 [Sifra Introduction (1,7)]. In Mekhilta dR. Ismael p. 347 the argument is attributed to R. Jonathan (who in the Babli 70a appears as R. Nathan.)
Whether there is a connection between rules 5 and 9 is left open in the Babli, Baba qamma 85a, decided in the negative in Menaḥot 55b. Menaḥem Cahana, in an exhaustive study of the problem (קווים להתפתחות של מידת כלל ופרט בתקופת התנאים p. 173–216 in: Studies in Talmudic and Midrashic Literature in Memory of Tirzah Lifshitz) holds that the original tannaitic theory knew only of two principles, one which corresponded to the later (Babli, Sifra, Sifry) rules entitled “principle and detail”, “detail and principle”, “principle and detail and principle”; the other one referring to all rules which in Babylonian formulation start with “any detail which was subsumed under a principle”. His arguments support the thesis of the present commentary that Mekhilta, Sifra, Sifry (and Tosephta) in our hands are essentially Babylonian editions. (A different interpretation of the verses is in the Babli 70a).. He answered: For the Sabbath, He mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail¹²²In the same sentence. Cf. Babli Pesaḥim 6b, Bava qamma 85a, Menaḥot 55b, Niddah 33a.. He retorted: Is it not written: Do not prostrate yourself before another power¹²³Ex. 34:14.? He who sacrifices to Elohim shall be banned¹²⁴Ex. 22:19. For this argument the reference to Elohim is taken to apply to idols. The masoretic vocalization applying a definite article must refer to God in His function as Judge, God as Creator, Ruler of the physical world, to Whom propitiatory sacrifices are forbidden; sacrifices are legitimate only if offered to YHWH, God the Merciful and Dispenser of Grace. This is the interpretation adopted at the end of the paragraph. In all of Lev. and Num., there is never any mention of a sacrifice to Elohim.. He mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place! He said, since you do [not]¹²⁵Added from the text in Nazir, needed for an understanding of the text. infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar¹²⁶Since 34:14 does not teach anything not contained in Ex. 20:5.. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle¹²⁷If prostrating had been mentioned after worshipping, the 5th hermeneutical principle would imply that the two notions are identical in intent. As the verse stands, it cannot be interpreted as “principle and detail”, therefore the 9^th principle does not apply to idolatry since the detail does not follow after the principle.. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He gave the general principle regarding its worship but detailed the works of Heaven¹²⁸The prohibition refers to performing for idolatry any ceremony commanded for the worship of Heaven. The case of R. Zakkai really has no connection with the argument about the status of the mention of prostrating oneself in the Second Commandment.. Rebbi Mana said, lighting fire was mentioned unnecessarily¹²⁹Since the prohibition of making fire is implied in the Fourth Commandment in any reasonable interpretation. Therefore, making fire is a detail which can be used to characterize all work forbidden on the Sabbath.; prostrating oneself was mentioned by necessity to explain about itself since it is not work¹³⁰Nothing is changed or produced by prostrating oneself; it is not obvious that it should be forbidden under any circumstances.. This follows what Ḥizqiah stated: He who sacrifices to powers shall be banned¹²⁴Ex. 22:19. For this argument the reference to Elohim is taken to apply to idols. The masoretic vocalization applying a definite article must refer to God in His function as Judge, God as Creator, Ruler of the physical world, to Whom propitiatory sacrifices are forbidden; sacrifices are legitimate only if offered to YHWH, God the Merciful and Dispenser of Grace. This is the interpretation adopted at the end of the paragraph. In all of Lev. and Num., there is never any mention of a sacrifice to Elohim.. Sacrificing was mentioned separately to teach about everything¹³¹Since punishment for sacrificing is spelled out separately, any punishment for an act of idolatry must be given separately by the 9^th rule, supporting R. Zakkai against R. Joḥanan., prostrating oneself to explain about itself since it is not work. Rebbi Jeremiah said, lighting fire was mentioned by necessity, to teach that courts should not sit on the Sabbath¹³²In the Babli, Yebamot 6b, this is a Tannaitic statement from the school of R. Ismael, appended to an argument also quoted in Mekhilta dR. Ismael, Wayyaqhel.. What is the reason? It says here, in all your settlements, and it says there, these . . should be rules of law for your generations, in all your settlements¹³³Num. 35:29.. Since “settlements” mentioned there refers to courts, “settlements” referred to here also refers to courts. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say that it was mentioned separately necessarily is as if it was mentioned separately not by necessity,¹³⁴Since the argument is based on Num. 35:29, not on Ex. 22:19, the latter verse can be used in an application of the 9^th rule. and any item mentioned separately unnecessarily instructs¹³⁵It is axiomatic that the Torah contains no unnecessary statements. If an item is singled out and there is no apparent reason for this one has to conclude that anything to be inferred about this particular item applies to all similar cases.. This implies that one item which was mentioned separately by necessity does not divide¹³⁶Since we found a reason why the item was mentioned one cannot infer that it is established as a separate rule.. If it was mentioned not by necessity it divides¹³⁷It is a general hermeneutical rule (No. 4) that two parallel items are just that, two separate items, and no additional inferences or comparisons are possible. If both are prohibitions, infractions generate separate liabilities.. If two items were mentioned separately, do they divide? Let us hear from the following: From where that he transgresses a prohibition whoever brings to the altar meat of a purification offering¹³⁸For purification and reparation offerings, blood is sprinkled on the altar and fat is burned. The meat must be eaten by the priests; it cannot be sacrificed., or meat of a reparation offering, or meat of most holy offerings¹³⁹Most holy offerings are elevation offerings which are completely burned, purification and reparation offerings already mentioned, and the public well-being offering accompanying the Two Leavened Breads on Pentecost which introduce the season of the wheat harvest. Only the last item can be meant here, where the meat also must be eaten by the priests., or meat from simply holy offerings¹⁴⁰The family sacrifices, of which only blood and fat are given to the altar, Lev. Chapter 3., or the remainder of the ˋOmer¹⁴¹The barley offering on the Festival of Unleavened Bread, of which a handful is burnt on the altar and the remainder must be eaten by the priests. Lev. 23:10. or the Two Breads¹⁴²The Two Breads to be brought on Pentecost, to be eaten by the priests with the meat of the public well-being offering (Note 139). Lev. 23:17., or the Shew Bread¹⁴³Of which the incense is burned on the altar; the bread itself has to be eaten by the priests, Lev. 24:5–9., or remainders of cereal offerings¹⁴⁴To be eaten by the priests after a handful was burned on the altar, Lev. Chapter 2., or leaven¹⁴⁵This again refers to the Two Breads, the only leavened offering., or date honey¹⁴⁶Which as an offering of first fruits is consumed by the priest after being presented to the altar but not brought onto the altar. Deut. 26:2.? The verse says¹⁴⁷Lev. 2:12., for any leaven or any date honey you may not turn into smoke as a fire gift to the Eternal. Therefore anything that had been given to the fire is under “do not turn into smoke”¹⁴⁸If any part or appendix had to be given to the fire on the altar, there is a prohibition to put any of the remainder on the altar.. Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan. Should not the Two Breads, being mentioned separately, teach about all sancta on the ramp¹⁴⁹The ramp on which the priest ascends to the altar since it is forbidden to build steps to the altar (Ex. 20:22). The ramp was physically separated from the altar.? He told him, it follows what was stated, the altar¹⁵⁰Lev. 2:12: As an offering of first fruits you may offer them to the Eternal but on the alter they shall not ascend for pleasant scent., this means not only the altar, from where to include the ramp? The verse says¹⁵⁰Lev. 2:12: As an offering of first fruits you may offer them to the Eternal but on the alter they shall not ascend for pleasant scent., on the altar they shall not be lifted. I could think neither as an act of worship nor as act of worship. The verse says¹⁵⁰Lev. 2:12: As an offering of first fruits you may offer them to the Eternal but on the alter they shall not ascend for pleasant scent., as aroma smell, I was saying this only as an act of worship¹⁵¹Since the ramp is inclined, stepping on the ramp in the course of a service would be “ascend for pleasant scent” and is forbidden. But depositing the first fruits on the ramp while the priest remains standing on the floor of the Temple court until he takes them to be consumed is not covered by the prohibition. Sifra Ṣaw Pereq 1(11).. (He retorted,)¹⁵²An addition from the corrector; this has to be deleted since the next paragraph shows that the speaker still is R. Joḥanan; the following is a continuation of the baraita quoted. them is a restriction¹⁵³Anything other than leaven and date honey is not covered by the verse.. For these one is liable on the ramp, for all other sancta one is not liable on the ramp. Because it is written them. If them had not been written, it would instruct¹⁵⁴Then leaven and date honey would just be examples of items to be consumed by the priests.. That means, two items which were mentioned separately do (not)¹⁵⁵A correction by the scribe himself but in error as shown by the next paragraph. separate¹⁵⁶To prohibit burning on the altar what must be consumed by priests or laity it would have been enough to give one example. Since two were given, it implies that bringing to the altar is a separate sin for each of them (and equally all others).. Rebbi Ḥananiah the son of Rebbi Hillel said, they do not separate, therefore they instruct¹⁵⁷Since they are mentioned in one verse they are not two independent items; previous argument is not applicable. Since it is a single item it permits inference for all sancta.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun does not say so but Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan, should not the Two Breads, being mentioned separately, teach about all sancta on the ramp¹⁴⁹The ramp on which the priest ascends to the altar since it is forbidden to build steps to the altar (Ex. 20:22). The ramp was physically separated from the altar.? He said to him, them is a restriction. For these one is liable on the ramp, for all other sancta one is not liable on the ramp¹⁵⁸But on the altar one is liable at least in violation of a positive commandment. Babli Menaḥot 37b/38a.. This implies that a single item which is mentioned separately necessarily does not divide, but unnecessarily it divides¹³⁵It is axiomatic that the Torah contains no unnecessary statements. If an item is singled out and there is no apparent reason for this one has to conclude that anything to be inferred about this particular item applies to all similar cases.. Two items which are mentioned separately do not divide but according to Rebbi Ismael they do divide, as Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the words of Rebbi Ismael are that two items which are mentioned separately divide¹⁵⁹From here on and the next paragraphs there is a parallel (but not an exact copy) in Sanhedrin 7:5 Notes 72–125.
One of R. Ismael’s hermeneutical principles is that “a detail which was singled out from a general category was singled out not for itself but as an example for the entire category.” R. Abun bar Ḥiyya states that according to R. Ismael this holds only for a single detail, not for two or more.. As Rebbi Ismael stated, you shall neither divine nor cast spells¹⁶⁰Lev. 19:26. Divination is an attempt to predict the future by magical means; spellbinding is practical witchcraft. Both are particular examples in the prohibition of witchcraft (Ex. 22:17), but no penalty is indicated.. Were not divining and spellbinding included in the general class¹⁶¹To use witchcraft is a capital crime (Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:5); in the absence of witnesses there is an automatic Divine verdict of extirpation. But the special cases of divination and spellbinding only trigger a verdict of extirpation; they are not cases for the human court. This illustrates R. Ismael’s principle. In Sifra Qedošim Pereq 6(2), R. Ismael and R. Aqiba identify divination and spellbinding as examples of make-believe witchcraft which according to Mishnah Sanhedrin 7:19 is not punishable by the human court. Automatically, these are separate examples of sins which require a purification sacrifice if done without criminal intent. A person who unintentionally acts as sorcerer, divinator, and spellbinder has to bring three sacrifices.? The were mentioned separately to be treated differently from the general case¹⁶²Hermeneutical principle #5 on R. Ismael’s list states that a general expression followed by particulars only refers to the particulars. If both general expression and details declare the same., one has to find a reason why the details have to be mentioned separately.. In general by extirpation, the separate case by extirpation²In error.; the word of Rebbi Joḥanan implies that it is “general case and detail¹⁶²Hermeneutical principle #5 on R. Ismael’s list states that a general expression followed by particulars only refers to the particulars. If both general expression and details declare the same., one has to find a reason why the details have to be mentioned separately.”, as Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, since anybody who would perform any of these abomination s, they will be extirpated¹⁶³Lev. 18:29. This verse decrees a general verdict of extirpation on any violation of sexual taboos spelled out in Lev.18, whether or not they are criminally punishable.. Was not his sister included in the general class¹⁶⁴The sister is forbidden in Lev. 18:9 but in the chapter about penalties, Lev. 20:17, the punishment is reserved for Heaven. and was mentioned separately of the general class to divide from the general class. Rebbi Eleazar objected, is it not written¹⁶⁵Lev. 20:19. The wording might be slightly misleading., the nakedness of your mother’s sister and your father’s sister you shall not uncover, for he would touch his relative? He told him, this was mentioned separately for a reason, to judge by “touching”¹⁶⁶Lev. 20:19 makes two statements: The punishment is reserved for Heaven and the sin is committed the moment the genitals of the parties touch, without any penetration. Mishnah Yebamot 6:2 extends the equivalence of touching and penetration to all sexual offenses.. He said to him, is it not written¹⁶⁷Lev. 20:18. The implications are the same as for v. 19., a man who would lie with an unwell woman, uncover her nakedness and touch her source? He told him, this was mentioned separately for a reason, to judge the one “touching” as finishing. That you should not say, since he is liable for her [already]¹⁶⁸The word was deleted by the corrector but it is necessary for the understanding of the text. Since in Lev. 15 it is stated that simple touching (not sexual “touching”) a niddah causes impurity and is forbidden to the male, her prohibition differs materially from the other sexual taboos. for impurity we should not consider for him “touching” as finishing. Therefore it was necessary to mention (that he is liable for each single one.)¹⁶⁹This seems to be extraneous to the discussion. However, since the statement is also found in the Genizah text of Sanhedrin, it seems to be original and explains that Lev. 18:29 decrees separate extirpation and, therefore, separate sacrifices for unintentional sin, for each separate category of incest. He said to him, is it not written¹⁷⁰Lev. 20:20., a man who would sleep with his aunt, his uncle’s nakedness he uncovered? He told him, this was mentioned separately to judge by childlessness. But is it not written¹⁷¹Lev. 20:21., a man who would marry his brother’s wife, she is separated? He told him, this was mentioned separately to judge by childlessness, as Rebbi Yudan¹⁷²The Amora. His counterpart in the Babli is the third generation Amora Rabba (Rav Abba bar Naḥmani). The Babli (Yebamot 55a) applies both statements to both verses. said, where it is written childless they shall be¹⁷¹Lev. 20:21., they will be without children, childless they shall die¹⁷⁰Lev. 20:20., they bury their children. Rebbi Yose said, it was necessary that his aunt be mentioned separately, to exclude his maternal brother’s wife¹⁷⁴From punishment by loss of children (rejected in the Babli, Yebamot 55a).. It is said here his aunt, and it is said there¹⁷⁵Lev. 25:49. Since the subject of the entire Chapter is inheritance, it is understood that only the male line is addressed., either his uncle or his uncle’s son shall free him. Since by his uncle mentioned there, the verse understands his father’s paternal brother, also by his aunt mentioned here, the verse speaks of his father’s paternal sister¹⁷⁶In Sanhedrin: His paternal uncle’s wife. This is more appropriate for the argument here since his father’s or mother’s sisters are forbidden by Lev. 18:12,13 and the prohibition is unproblematic.. Also his brother’s wife¹⁷⁷Who is forbidden in Lev. 18:16. can be inferred from his aunt. Since by his aunt mentioned there, the verse speaks of his father’s paternal brother’s wife, also by his brother’s wife mentioned here, the verse speaks of his paternal brother’s wife. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? As Rebbi Ismael stated: It is said here his brother’s wife and it is said there¹⁷⁸Lev. 20:21, the penalty clause referring to the prohibition formulated in Lev. 18:16., a man who would take his brother’s wife, she is niddah¹⁷⁹In biblical Hebrew, the meaning of the root נדד is the same as Arabic نحاد “to separate, to disperse”. This applies both to the menstruating woman (Lev. 18:19), to whom relations with her husband are forbidden, and to the person excommunicated (מְנֻדֶּה) who is separated from the community. In rabbinic Hebrew, the word נִדָּה is used exclusively for the menstruating woman; this is the reference made here, even though the argument is equally valid for the excommunicated person. (Babli Yebamot 54b.). Since a menstruating woman will be permitted after being forbidden, also his paternal brother’s wife may be permitted after being forbidden.¹⁸⁰The menstruating woman is permitted after her purification; the brother’s wife may be permitted, viz., if the brother dies childless. In the latter case, “brother” means paternal brother (Yebamot 1:1, Note 45). This excludes his maternal brother’s wife, who cannot be permitted after being forbidden¹⁸¹But for whom no punishment is spelled out.. But Rebbi Ismael himself had a problem: from where does one prove it¹⁸²This refers to the paragraph before the last, where R. Joḥanan explained that the sister had a special role in the list of incest prohibitions, to deduce that from the different levels of punishment the blanket decree of extirpation really represents separate decrees for each kind of infraction. In Sanhedrin, the name here is Joḥanan. But Ismael may be the correct attribution, since according to one opinion in the Babli, Zebaḥim 107b, this is R. Ismael’s position. S. Liebermann prefers to read “Eleazar” since the supporting argument is quoted in the latter’s name.? Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Two prohibitions and one extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation¹⁸³This answers the question. It is rather frequent to find verses containing multiple prohibitions covered by one mention of extirpation where the context makes it clear that each single infraction triggers extirpation.. What is the reason? ¹⁸⁴Ex. 30:32,33 regarding the holy oil. Only v. 33 is discussed.It should not be used to be rubbed on anybody’s skin and in its proportions you shall not imitate it, and it is written, a person who would compound similarly, or who would put it on a stranger, will be extirpated from his people, that is two prohibitions and one extirpation. The prohibitions split the extirpation¹⁸⁵A person who inadvertently compounds aromatic oil in the same composition as holy oil and uses it on people has to bring two sacrifices. Babli, Makkot 14b.. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? The verse speaks about males. His sister is mentioned to teach about all females¹⁸⁶While in the punishments listed in Lev. 20 both sexes are mentioned, the prohibition in Chapter 18 are all formulated for the male, except that the mention of extirpation is formulated (18:29) for “all persons”. Since the punishment for marrying one’s sister is extirpation (20:17) for both partners, it proves that the “persons” mentioned in 18:29 are both male and female.. Does Rebbi Eleazar not accept this? He has it from do not come near¹⁸⁷Lev. 18:6, the verse introducing incest prohibitions. While the verse starts אִישׁ אִישׁ it is agreed that the meaning is not “every man” but “every person”., equally male or female. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? He explains it but it is not clear¹⁸⁸Since אִישׁ אִישׁ really means “every man” it needs a supporting argument.
מחוור is Babylonian spelling of Galilean מחובר “logically connected”; in the ms. it is a corrector’s change., so also from the following: Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Zeˋira, should not well-being sacrifices, being treated separately, split all sancta regarding impurity¹⁸⁹Impurity of well-being sacrifices, the only ones available to lay people, is treated at length in Lev. 7:11–27. Impurity of sacrifices available to priests is treated in Lev. 22:1–16. One should assume that a priest who inadvertently eats a combination of impure well-being and other sacrifices has to bring separate purification sacrifices; but this is not the case.? He told him, it was necessary that they be treated separately, to eliminate sancta dedicated for the upkeep of the Temple regarding larceny¹⁹⁰While misuse of all kinds of sancta is larceny, it is punishable only if the monetary value of the misuse is at least one peruṭah. Misuse of one half peruṭah’s worth of Temple donations and one half peruṭah’s worth of sacrifices is not punishable., lest one be liable for them because of mushiness¹⁹¹Sacrificing with the intent of eating of the sacrificial meat out of its time and place., leftovers¹⁹²Eating of sacrificial meat after its allotted time., and impurity. But is that not a Mishnah? “All sancta destined for the altar combine with one another with respect to liability for mushiness, leftovers, and impurity¹⁹³This shows that well-being and other sacrifices are equal in the hand of the Cohen, Mishnah Meˋilah 4:1. The categories of mushiness, leftovers, and impurity do not apply to monetary gifts to the Temple. Anything donated to the Temple which is not a sacrifice or a Temple vessel is sold by the Temple treasurer and thereby reverts to fully profane status.,” in contrast to sancta destined for the upkeep of the Temple. Since they do not combine, they do split¹⁹⁵Somebody committing simultaneous larceny involving gifts to the Temple and sacrifices has to atone separately for the two offenses.. Rebbi Ḥanina¹⁹⁶The Genizah text in Sanhedrin reads Ḥinena, preferable for chronological reasons. said, so it is. They split but do not combine¹⁹⁷R. Ḥanina’s statement is an assertion that the rules are different for well-being and other sacrifices. This would agree with the Babli, Meˋilah 15a, that in fact well-being and purification offerings do not combine; the contrary statement of the Mishnah is classified as a rabbinic stringency.. If He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as a prohibition, the word of Rebbi Eleazar is that this is a general principle followed by a detail¹⁹⁸If a pentateuchal verse partially is an exhortation to action and partially a prohibition, it nevertheless forms a logical unit.. ¹⁹⁹From here to the end of the discussion there exists a parallel in Kilaim 8:1, Notes 20–36 (Babli Moˋed qaṭan 3a). The punishment for violating a biblical prohibition for which no penalty is specified is by flogging. The problem is that ploughing is not specifically mentioned in Lev. 25. Rebbi Eleazar said, one whips for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not whip for ploughing in the Sabbatical year. What is Rebbi Eleazar’s reason? The Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal²⁰⁰Lev. 25:2., a general principle. Your field you shall not sow, your vineyard you shall not prune²⁰¹Lev. 25:4., detail. Sowing and pruning were included in the general case; why were they mentioned separately? To include with them; since sowing and pruning are particular in that they perform work on the soil or on a tree, I have only what is work on the soil or on a tree. How does Rebbi Joḥanan treat this? They are two different things, and two different details for one general principle do divide. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion do they not divide²⁰²To require separate atonement if performed inadvertently.? He holds that because they do not divide, they are for making inferences. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, are they not for making inferences? There is a difference here because He stated a general principle as a positive commandment but the detail as prohibitions. No positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. Rebbi Eleazar said, a positive commandment allows inferences for a prohibition but no prohibition allows inferences for a positive commandment. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion it is obvious that one may dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it^202*During the Sabbatical year.. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion, may one dig cisterns, ditches, and caves during it^202*During the Sabbatical year.? Just as one cannot make inferences for prohibitions, so one should not be able to make inferences for permissions²⁰³For R. Joḥanan, if ploughing is not sanctionable, digging for other than agricultural purposes certainly is permitted. But for R. Eleazar digging is work on the soil (in the language of his argument) but not in the field (as forbidden in the verse.). Rebbi Abba from Carthage said, Rebbi Joḥanan’s reason is six years you shall sow, not in the Sabbatical; and six years you shall prune your vineyard²⁰⁴Lev. 25:3., not in the Sabbatical at all. Any prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment; one violates a positive commandment²⁰⁵As such it is not sanctionable; cf. Sanhedrin 5:3, Note 73.. Rebbi Yose said, there is not even a positive commandment²⁰⁶He takes R. Eleazar literally at his word. If Lev. 25:3–4 represents a general principle followed by a detail (even if the principle is a positive commandment and the detail a prohibition) then by R. Ismael’s rule כְּלָל וּפְרָט אֵין בִּכְלָל אֶלָּא מַה שֶׁבִּפְרָט “general principle followed by detail: the general principle only applies to the detail”, nothing not mentioned in the verse is prohibited.
Since R. Yose was R. Jeremiah’s student, he should be mentioned after his teacher (which he is both in Sanhedrin and Kilaim.). Rebbi Jeremiah said, one violates a positive commandment. Why is it written that the Land shall keep a Sabbath for the Eternal²⁰⁰Lev. 25:2.? That is for the prohibition implied by it²⁰⁷This refers to R. Yose’s opinion, that sowing and pruning are forbidden in the Sabbatical but these and all other agricultural work are violations of the positive commandment to give rest to the Land.. I could think that they should be giving lashes for the addition²⁰⁸The prohibition of agricultural work after the harvest of the preceding year, different for work on the soil or on trees. This has nothing to do with the rules of the Sabbath or with general principles of hermeneutics; it is from Kilaim 8:1, Notes 26–28.. Rebbi Joḥanan explains the baraita: I could think that one gives lashes for ploughing during the Sabbatical year, but Rebbi Eleazar explains the baraita: I could think that one gives lashes for the first two terms²⁰⁹Rabbinic prohibitions to prepare fields or prune trees after harvest in the year before the Sabbatical. The time tables are different for different kinds of work; Mishnah Ševiˋit 1:1,2:1.. Some Tannaïm state: Six years you shall sow your field, and six years you shall prune your vineyard; but some Tannaïm state: Your field you shall not sow, etc. He who says six years supports Rebbi Joḥanan; he who says your field you shall not sow supports Rebbi Eleazar²¹⁰As explained in the preceding paragraph..
A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar:²¹¹Sifry 70. Babli, Zebaḥim 106a. Beware of, a prohibition. Lest, a prohibition²¹²This is a principle accepted in both Talmudim. A verse stating “beware of” or “lest” does not need an explicit “do not” in order to be classified as a prohibition.. And it is written²¹³Deut. 12:13–14: Beware, and do not offer your elevation sacrifices at any place you see. Only at the place which the Eternal will choose … there you shall offer your elevation sacrifices and there you shall do everything which I am commanding you. This is a general prohibition followed by two specific positive commandments. The two verses are parallel, not logically consecutive as R. Eleazar would require.: There, you shall offer your elevation offerings and there you shall make. There, you shall offer, that is the offering; and there you shall make, that is slaughtering and sprinkling. Just as offering is a positive commandment and a prohibition²¹⁴A positive commandment to be performed at the Chosen Place and a prohibition everywhere else., so slaughtering and sprinkling which are positive commandments should be covered by a prohibition. Because it is written there you shall offer, and there you shall make. Therefore, if there you shall offer, and there you shall make were not written, no positive commandment would allow inferences for a prohibition and no prohibition would allow inferences for a positive commandment²¹⁵As maintained by R. Joḥanan.. How does Rebbi Joḥanan handle this? That you should not say as you say referring to the Sabbath: If one dug a hole, made a ditch, or dug to put in a pole, he is guilty only of one offense²¹⁶The activities quoted here are all derivatives of ploughing (Babli 73b).. Similarly, if he slaughtered and offered, he should be guilty only of one offense; therefore, it was necessary to say, he is liable for every single action²¹⁷In the Babli, Zebaḥim 107b, according to one opinion this is R. Ismael’s position.. Anywhere one stated categories there are derivatives. There, we have stated²¹⁸Mishnah Bava qamma 1:1.: “There are four categories of damages. The ox”, this is the horn. Goring and pushing are main categories. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If it bit, lay down, kicked, these are derivatives of the horn. There, we have stated²¹⁹Mishnah Kelim 1:1.: “The categories of impurity, the crawling animal and semen.” What are derivatives of crawling animals? Rebbi Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Naḥum: pushings. What are pushings? Touching²²⁰Both in Šabbat and Bava qamma categories are labels of sets of derivatives. But in Kelim, treating of impurity, derivative impurity is less infectuous than original impurity, and there are successive states of derivative impurity. The nature of אָב in impurity really is not comparable to the nature of אָב in the other two cases.. The main category of impurity makes everything impure, derivative impurity transmits impurity only to food and drink, or clay vessels²²¹This is not an exhaustive list and does not take into account that different implements may be subject to impurities in different degrees depending on the kind of original impurity in question. In general, metal vessels may become impure by touch from derivative impurities but not clay vessels (Mishnah Zavim 5:1); all food and drinks may become impure by derivative impurities of the first degree. Babli Bava qamma 2b.. Food and drink and [clay]²²²Missing in the text but indicated by the construct state of the word כֶּלִי. vessels cannot become main categories of impurity to transmit impurity²²³This statement requires that מַשְׁקִין be translated as “drinks”. The same word may also mean “fluids”, but human body fluids may be sources of original impurity and the water used for the ashes of the Red Cow may become the source of original impurity.. Gonorrhea. And here, we have stated: “The categories of work are 39.” Ploughing is a category. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If one dug a hole, made a ditch, or dug to put in a pole, these are derivatives of ploughing²¹⁶The activities quoted here are all derivatives of ploughing (Babli 73b).. All categories of work they learned from the Tabernacle⁴As noted earlier, since the Sabbath prohibition is repeated at the start of the rules of building the Tabernacle, Ex. 35:1–3, one concludes that the prohibited actions are those needed for building the Tabernacle and the Service performed in it. The first series (11 categories) describes actions needed to prepare cereal offerings and the shew-bread. The second series (13 categories) catalogues the making of the priestly garments.. What kind of ploughing was in the Tabernacle? They ploughed to plant dyestuff²²⁴To dye threads used to weave the gobelins of the Tabernacle and the priest’s garments.. How much does one have to plough to become liable? Rebbi Mattaniah said, enough to plant a leek. Rebbi Aḥa bar Rav said, enough to plant a wheat sprout. There²²⁵Mishnah 9:7. The Mishnah details minimal amounts which create liability if carried from private to public domain. Even though in general food requires a minimal amount of the volume of a dried fig, seeds of garden vegetables create liability in smaller amounts. Palestinian dried figs are rather small (Mishnah Kelim 17:7)., we have stated: “Two green melon²²⁶This is Maimonides’s determination, cf. Kilaim 1:2 Note 38. In modern Hebrew the word means “zucchini”. seeds make liable, two squash seeds, two Egyptian bean seeds.” It was stated, two Median wheat kernels. Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: Since wheat was so much appreciated they treated it like garden vegetables that are not eaten²²⁵Mishnah 9:7. The Mishnah details minimal amounts which create liability if carried from private to public domain. Even though in general food requires a minimal amount of the volume of a dried fig, seeds of garden vegetables create liability in smaller amounts. Palestinian dried figs are rather small (Mishnah Kelim 17:7).. For everything which improves the soil one is liable²²⁷According to the Babli, 103a, the liability is triggered by the most minute amount of work, contradicting the opinions in the Yerushalmi earlier in this paragraph. because of ploughing: One who digs²²⁸A cistern or other storage facility., who cuts²²⁹A ditch (for irrigation or drainage)., who inserts²³⁰A spike or log in the ground, for making a fence., who deposits dung²³¹Leads his animal onto the property so they should fertilize it by their droppings., who hoes, who fertilizes, who sweeps²³²A dirt floor. As Or zaruaˋ Šabbat §55 notes, this disagrees with the Babli which restricts the category of ploughing to land which may be used for agriculture., who sprinkles²³²A dirt floor. As Or zaruaˋ Šabbat §55 notes, this disagrees with the Babli which restricts the category of ploughing to land which may be used for agriculture., who splits blocks²³³A block of earth which must be broken up before it can be sown., who clears forests, who sets fire to reed thickets²³⁴Also for clearing for agriculture. or palm swamps, and following Rebbi Zeˋira a water canal prepares its banks for sowing²³⁵Since the banks are watered automatically. Babli Moˋed qaṭan 2b in the name of Rabba (Abba bar Naḥmani, contemporary of R. Zeˋira)., who removes stones²³⁶To turn barren land into an agriculturally usable area., who builds terraces²³⁷On hill slopes., who fills the rifts under olive trees, and who makes depressions for vines²³⁸For watering the individual vines., and for anything which improves the soil one is liable because of ploughing. ²³⁹This paragraph also is in Beṣah 1:3; its main subject are the rules of the holiday. However, since Mishnah Megillah 1:8 states that the only difference between the rules for Sabbath and for holidays is that preparation of food is permitted on holidays, the discussion is relevant also for the rules of the Sabbath. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who cooks carcass meat on a holiday is not flogged, because the category of cooking is permitted on a holiday²⁴⁰It is presumed that carcass meat, which is forbidden as human food, is not prepared as animal feed. For R. Joḥanan (Babli Beṣah 12b) since making fire and cooking is permitted for preparing food on the holiday (Ex. 12:16) it is permitted for any purpose.. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is flogged, for the category of cooking is permitted only for food²⁴¹He disputes that cooking be permitted for anything that is not food.. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected to this [statement] by Rebbi Joḥanan. Then one who ploughs on a holiday should not be flogged since actions of the category of ploughing are permitted on a holiday²⁴²This refers to Mishnah Beṣah 1:2. Since preparation of food is permitted on a holiday, it is permitted to slaughter for food. If a bird or a wild animal is slaughtered, its blood has to be covered by dust (Lev. 18:13). If no dust is available, the House of Shammai permit to take a prong and dig up some dust; the House of Hillel hold that in this case one should not slaughter but they agree that if one slaughtered one may take a prong and dig. Digging is a derivative of ploughing as noted in the preceding paragraph.. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ila: ordinary ploughing was not permitted²⁴³Since no spade is authorized, the work is not professional and, since the intent is not to prepare the soil for agriculture, the prohibition is rabbinical; the Houses of Shammai and Hillel do not disagree about the interpretation of a biblical commandment.. Rebbi Shammai said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ila, this²⁴⁴Both the Houses of Shammai and of Hillel do permit to use a spade; they must hold that the intent determines liability. is Rebbi Simeon’s, for Rebbi Simeon said, only if he needs the essence of the matter²⁴⁵There is liability only if the prohibited action is the object of his intent, not a by-product. Cf. Chapter 2, Note 19.. Rebbi Yose met Rebbi Aḥa. He said to him, did you say this? But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, the words of Rebbi Meïr are that in 24 matters the House of Shammai are lenient and the House of Hillel restrictive, and this is one of them. Should we say 23²⁴⁶Since in this interpretation both Houses agree that the digging does not create liability and the biblical commandment to cover the blood overrides the rabbinic “fence around the law”.? But Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon both said the same²⁴⁷Mishnah Beṣah 1:2 is anonymous and therefore presumed to be R. Meïr’s. If it implies the position of R. Simeon then both must agree in this matter. The opponent of R. Simeon in this matter is Rebbi Jehudah, student of his father R. Ilai, who was a student of the Shammaite R. Eliezer. It is intrinsically unlikely that the House of Shammai should accept what later was formulated by R. Simeon.. But were we not of the opinion that Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon both said the same²⁴⁸Chapter 2, Note 19. Babli 31b.? Should we say, Rebbi Meïr, Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Simeon all three said the same²⁴⁹Then we should hold that this is their (direct or indirect) teacher R. Aqiba’s position and it is difficult to fathom who would disagree; but we see that this opinion is not generally accepted in tannaitic sources.? But matters which are problematic for the rabbis are obvious for you; are those which are obvious for the rabbis [problematic for you]²⁵⁰The words in brackets are added from the text in Beṣah. “Everybody else questions whether R. Meïr agrees with R. Simeon while you assert this. Then you will have to question what in the sequel is stated as the rabbi’s opinion.” S. Liebermann refers to this sentence the remark of Or zaruaˋ Šabbat 55, that he suspects this Yerushalmi paragraph to contain a scribal error.? If one harvested for grasses²⁵¹He was weeding and using the uprooted weeds as fodder. This is forbidden on a holiday as it is forbidden on the Sabbath, but since there is a question of multiple liabilities the reference is to the Sabbath. he is liable for harvesting but is not liable for improving the soil. There is only the problem if he harvested in order to improve the soil. Is he liable for harvesting and for improving the soil? Even if you say it follows Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he ploughed, in any case he harvested²⁵²In the Babli, these rabbis are identified with R. Jehudah.. Rebbi Mana said, the words of the rabbis support Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed a fish²⁵³A pickled herring which may be eaten cold on the Sabbath. Babli 145a., if for its body he is not liable, but if to produce fish sauce he is liable. Even if you say that he said this following Rebbi Simeon, but for the rabbis in any case he compressed, in any case he produced fish sauce²⁵⁴This is all one liability; since he compressed the fish he produced fish sauce and is liable. The Babli holds that R. Simeon agrees that in this case there is liability; technically this is called פְּסִיק רֵישָׁא “cut off the head”. The image is that of a murderer who claims that he never intended to kill his victim, only to cut off his head. Since death is an automatic consequence of cutting off the head, he is guilty of murder. Similarly in the Babli, R. Simeon agrees that an automatic consequence of an intended action is included in the intended action; the Yerushalmi disagrees (and, therefore, does not declare that R. Simeon defines practice.). For any activity which quickens a fruit to ripen one is liable because of sowing. One who plants, who sinks²⁵⁵He takes a branch of a vine, bends it down into a ditch, covers the ditch with earth, and lets it come out again. Then the branch will grow roots in the earth and one has a new vine., who grafts, who prunes, who trains²⁵⁶He binds the branches to an espalier., who removes dead branches, who dirties²⁵⁷In modern terms, applying pesticide (Mishnah Ševiˋit 2:4)., who removes leaves, who dusts²⁵⁸This also is a way to combat insect infestations., who smokes²⁵⁹Either to smoke out worms and insects or to protect against cold spells., who removes worms, who sprinkles with ashes²⁵⁸This also is a way to combat insect infestations., who oils, who waters, who drills holes²⁶⁰Punctures unripe sycamore figs to let them ripen for human consumption., who makes houses²⁶¹No convincing explanation is available for this expression., and for anything which quickens a fruit to ripen one is liable because of sowing. ²⁶²This paragraph is also on Kilaim 8:1 (Notes 32–36, כ) and Sanhedrin 7:5 (Note 125, נ).[Rebbi]²⁶³Added from the parallel sources. Zeˋira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Cahana²⁶⁴Since Ḥiyya bar Ashi was among the older students of Rav, Cahana mentioned here must be an older Sage (Cahana I) who already was a recognized authority when Rav returned from Galilee to Babylonia.: He who is planting on the Sabbath is guilty because of sowing. Rebbi Zeˋira said, he who prunes is like one who plants. If he planted and pruned on the Sabbath, according to Cahana he is guilty on two counts²⁶⁵In the interpretation of the Babli, 73b, and Moˋed qaṭan 2b, this refers to the case where he prunes with the intent of using the cut branches as wood; then he is simultaneously harvesting and sowing., according to Rebbi Zeˋira only on one count. Did not Rebbi Zeˋira say the pruner is like the planter, did he say perhaps the planter is like the pruner²⁶⁶Pruning is a subcategory of sowing concerning the Sabbath just as planting is, but planting is not like pruning for the Sabbatical year since planting belongs to sowing and pruning was mentioned separately in the verse, Lev. 25:3.? All was included in the category of sowing; pruning was singled out for particular stringency²⁶⁷Following the argument made for the Sabbath, it would not have been necessary to have pruning singled out in the laws of the Sabbatical. Since it is obvious that for the Sabbatical, pruning is a separate offense, pruning can be a subcategory of sowing for the Sabbath only as a stringency, not a leniency.. Because pruning was singled out for particular stringency you want to exempt it because of sowing? This means, there is no difference. If he planted and pruned on the Sabbath, according to both Cahana and Rebbi Zeˋira he is guilty on two counts. “And who harvests.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated¹¹⁰Quoted again later in the discussion of Mishnah 2, after Note 267. The Babylonian version of this baraita is in the Babli 73b, Tosephta 9:17.: “One who cuts grain, harvests grapes, harvests olives, cuts tree branches, tears out, plucks fruits, are all because of harvesting.¹¹¹These are six actions classified under the same category. “Tearing out” refers among other things to tearing out hairs.” One who cuts sponge²⁶⁵In the interpretation of the Babli, 73b, and Moˋed qaṭan 2b, this refers to the case where he prunes with the intent of using the cut branches as wood; then he is simultaneously harvesting and sowing., papyrus, or corals²⁶⁶Pruning is a subcategory of sowing concerning the Sabbath just as planting is, but planting is not like pruning for the Sabbatical year since planting belongs to sowing and pruning was mentioned separately in the verse, Lev. 25:3. is liable for harvesting and planting²⁶⁷Following the argument made for the Sabbath, it would not have been necessary to have pruning singled out in the laws of the Sabbatical. Since it is obvious that for the Sabbatical, pruning is a separate offense, pruning can be a subcategory of sowing for the Sabbath only as a stringency, not a leniency.. One who cuts coriander, leeks, celery, rocket²⁶⁸Accadic gergirū, eruca sativa., endives²⁶⁹Greek τρώξιμος, -ον, “edible”; τά τρώξιμα “vegetables eaten raw”, in rabbinic sources traditionally used for endives., sesame²⁷⁰With the quote in Arukh, reading כשומין., mint, is liable for harvesting and sowing²⁷¹For garden vegetables, “sowing” is the appropriate word. The reason is the same as in the preceding case, Note 267.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, one who puts a flowerpot with a hole on a flowerpot with a hole is liable for harvesting and sowing²⁷²If something grows in a flowerpot with a hole in the bottom through which the soil absorbs moisture, removing the pot from the soil amounts to harvesting. Putting it down again, even on an empty flowerpot with a hole in the bottom, enables moisture to be absorbed again and amounts to sowing.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, one who cuts down the stem of a sycamore is liable three for it²⁷³Sycamores grow again when cut down. Therefore cutting on the Sabbath is both harvesting and planting. The third offense is not connected with the cutting; Note 275.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they²⁷⁴The two statements in the name of R. Simeon ben Laqish are consistent with one another. do not disagree. One who cuts it is liable for harvesting and for sowing. One who planes²⁷⁵This turns a tree into building material. it is liable for hitting with a hammer⁷A name for the formal end of any production process.. The rabbis of Caesarea say, one who catches a fish or anything by which he separates it from the environment it needs to live is liable because of harvesting²⁷⁶The action which qualifies as harvesting is removing the fish from the water. This applies also to fish already caught but kept in water.. “He who binds into sheaves.” Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai asked, what are the derivatives of binding into sheaves? Rebbi Yose: I heard the reason following Rebbi Simeon²⁷⁷R. Simeon ben Laqish who earlier was reported to have established derivatives for all categories mentioned in the Mishnah. from Rebbi Aḥa, but I do not remember what I heard. What about it? One who pounds²⁷⁸To separate the grain from the shell. rice²⁷⁹Greel ὄρυζα, ἡ., barley, groats²⁸⁰Latin alica, -ae., is liable because of threshing. He who spreads out ṣeli figs²⁸¹He is spreading out fruit or food to dry. The translation of צלין as “figs for drying” is tentative, cf. Peah 7:4 Note 86., raisins, ²⁸²This word is totally unexplained. Brüll in his review of Levy’s Dictionary proposes to read מטוטלה “bunch (of berries)”, but the word should denote a definite kind of fruit (or meat?) put out to dry in the sun.מסוסלה, bucellata²⁸³A kind of bread consisting only of crust; cf. Ḥallah 1:6 Note 182. Italian buccella “bread crust”., is liable because of binding into sheaves. For anything involving food one is liable because of binding into sheaves, involving shells because of threshing²⁸⁴For consistency, probably one should read the sentence about threshing after the one about binding into sheaves.. A woman if she mixes wheat²⁸⁵If she mixes different qualities of wheat grain and then shakes the mixture to distribute the different kinds evenly, the bran will fall off by the shaking. For each kind of work one investigates the maximum number of liabilities created., because she is sifting; if she breaks the tips²⁸⁶Of whole grains. The outer shells will fall off; this is threshing., because she is threshing; if she breaks the sides²⁸⁷She takes the grain out of the peel., because she is selecting; if she hits, because she is grinding; if she sifts, because she is winnowing; if she completes her work, because she is hitting with a hammer²⁸⁸In contrast to the Babli, the Yerushalmi admits a liability for “hitting with a hammer” for completing professional work even for the preparation of food.. This linen weaver with a mallet²⁸⁹Greek κόπανον, τό “pestle”. because of threshing; with a roller because of grinding; with a winnowing shovel²⁹⁰Reading מערוכה for מערובה “mixer”. because of winnowing; with a spoon because of selecting; if he splits because of using a hatchet; if he tears out²⁹¹Cutting linen thread, not plucking flax plants. because of cutting; if he completes his work, because he is hitting with a hammer. One who is grinding garlic, if he breaks the tips, because he is threshing; if he takes the outer leaves, because he is selecting; if he pounds in a mortar, because he is grinding; if it produces liquid, because of making dough; if he completes his work, because he is hitting with a hammer. This sausage maker²⁹²The word appears only here and in Beṣah 4:4. The translation follows Meïri in his Commentary to Babli Beṣah 32a, accepted by S. Liebermann., if he selects²⁹³Reading מבחר for מכחד. shavings for casings, because of selecting; if he hacks with a coarse file, because of threshing, if he pounds in a mortar, because he is grinding; if it produces liquid, because of making dough; if he fills a hollow²⁹⁴Latin antrum, -i, “cavity”., because of building; if he cuts off bast, because of cutting; if he completes his work, because he is hitting with a hammer. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if one compressed fish²⁵³A pickled herring which may be eaten cold on the Sabbath. Babli 145a., if for their body he is not liable, but to produce fish sauce he is liable. Rav²⁹⁵As the sequel shows, one has to read רב for רבא. said, if one compressed pickles²⁹⁶Vegetables or fruits preserved in vinegar without cooking., if for their body it is permitted, for their fluid it is forbidden²⁹⁷The prohibition is rabbinical only since the fluid absorbed by the pickle it from the outside. Pressing an orange on the Sabbath is a biblical infraction creating liability but squeezing a pickle is not.. Preserves²⁹⁸Preserved by cooking for an extended time. both for their body or their fluid is forbidden²⁹⁹In the Babli 145a: “permitted”.. Samuel said, both for pickles and for preserves, both for their body or their fluid it is forbidden. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the statement of Rav disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Mana asked him, why? Because one said forbidden and permitted but the other said liable and not liable³⁰⁰R. Joḥanan notes that compressing fish for their body is rabbinically prohibited but creates no biblical liability while for its fluid it would be a biblical infraction, but Rav states that compressing pickles for their body is permitted, for their fluid does not create biblical liability.. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, if one crushed an onion, if it was to give taste it is forbidden, if to reduce its sharpness it is permitted³⁰¹In the first case he creates on the Sabbath a kind of spice that did not exist before; this is rabbinically forbidden. In the second case where he takes already existing food and improves it, it is a permissible way.. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Huna: One may hide a radish in salt on condition not to leave it there³⁰²It cannot stay until after the Sabbath since one may not prepare from the Sabbath for a weekday. Cf. Babli 108b.. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Huna: [If there came]³⁰³The addition is from the quote of the sentence in Meïri ad 73b. his clothes from the tailor he may wear them; if they tore³⁰⁴Tosephta Eruvin 8:10 (Zuckermandel 11:11). He should not publicly be seen fixing his garments. they tore. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Huna: If his garments were entangled with thorns he straightens them out in a guarded place on condition that he not tear³⁰⁴Tosephta Eruvin 8:10 (Zuckermandel 11:11). He should not publicly be seen fixing his garments.. Rebbi Zeˋira said in the name of Rav Huna: If (he took) mortar [fell]³⁰⁵Reading נפל for נטל. on his garments he may rub it off with one hand, on condition that he not grind down. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rav Huna: mint, one is permitted, three is forbidden, two is questionable³⁰⁶In the interpretation of S. Liebermann, crushing one mint plant is permitted, three already is professional work and forbidden. It probably does not mean that 1, 3, 2 people are involved in the work (cf. Babli 113a).. One who bathes, Rav Huna and Rav Jehudah. One said, so it is permitted and so it is forbidden³⁰⁷It is not spelled out what kind of washing is permitted and what is forbidden on the Sabbath since R. Zeˋira, whom we follow, only permits dunking oneself in the water but nothing else.. But the other one said, so and so it is forbidden. Rebbi Abba bar Zamina went bathing with Rebbi Zeˋira; he did not let him do either one or the other. If water fell on his garments. Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah. One said, to shake it off is permitted, to rub it off is forbidden; but the other one switches³⁰⁸The problem is that it may wash the garment; cf. Babli 147a line 1 ff.. Rebbi Abba (bar)³⁰⁹Read: R. Abba in the name of R. Ḥiyya bar Ashi, as in the next sentence. Ḥiyya bar Ashi, one who spits absorbs it in his garment and does not worry³¹⁰He puts his shoe on the spittle and crushes it. This is a problem on a dirt floor. Babli 121b.. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi, the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi disagreed. One said, one spits and crushes; the other said, one does not spit and crush. Where do they differ? If it is not on a mosaic floor³¹¹Greek ψῆφος, ἡ, “pebble, mosaic stone”, meaning a stone floor.. But if there is a mosaic floor he spits and crushes. If he spat and the wind carried it away he is liable because of winnowing; and for anything which is diminished by the wind³¹²Since he wanted to spit, it is intentional. If then the wind carries it farther than 4 cubits in the public domain, he is liable. Similarly in other cases where he intentionally initiated the action. Babli Bava qamma 60a, Bava batra 26a. one is liable because of winnowing. “And who selects.” Rebbi Yudan said, one picks out pebbles the entire day and does not incur liability, and one takes the volume of a dried fig and immediately incurs liability. How is this? If he was sitting on top of a heap of grain and picks out pebbles the entire day, he does not incur liability³¹³Since by sitting on top he cannot reach the lower parts of the heap, there will remain pebbles in the grain; the grain will not qualify as pebble-free and command a higher price on the market. Since in the Mishnah “selecting” was mentioned in preparation to milling, and grain with pebbles cannot be milled, his action does not qualify as “selecting” in the sense of the Mishnah. But taking a small quantity in his hand allows him to clear out all stones; this is “selecting” and biblically forbidden on the Sabbath. Babli 74a.; if he took in his hand the volume of a dried fig and picked out he is liable. ³¹⁴This and the following paragraphs are from Beṣah 1:10 (י) and refer to Mishnah Beṣah 1:9: “The House of Shammai say, he who selects legumes on a holiday selects the food and eats. But the House of Hillel say, he selects normally, on his chest, or from a basket, or from a pot, but not on a table, nor with a sieve. Rabban Gamliel says, also he puts them in water and scoops off.” The House of Shammai permit only to pick out the edible parts and eat them directly. The House of Hillel hold that separating the beans from the chaff belongs to the activities permitted as preparation of food and in principle permit any kind of selection; they only require that it should not be done in a weekday fashion. They certainly will agree that the restrictions are purely rabbinical. Rebbi Jonah asked, if he did this on the Sabbath, in the opinion of the House of Shammai would he be liable? Rebbi Yose said to him, why not? If he did it on the Sabbath would he not be liable according to the House of Hillel? And here he is liable. Rebbi Mana said, my father Rebbi Jonah said it correctly. It is a problem only for the House of Shammai. Why? Because the category of selecting was permitted on the holiday, nothing of the category of selecting was permitted on the Sabbath³¹⁵The objection of R. Yose is pointless. There is no problem for the House of Hillel since they hold that selecting as a category is permitted on the holiday but forbidden on the Sabbath. But we do not know whether the House of Shammai hold the same and are rabbinically restrictive on the holiday more than the House of Hillel or whether they hold that selecting does not belong to the preparation of food but to preliminaries to preparation which are not exempted on the holiday and for which, therefore, the rules are identical on Sabbath and holiday. Since in his days, in the middle of the Fourth Century, the House of Shammai had disappeared for 250 years, no answer can be given.. ³¹⁶Here starts a new Genizah fragment (G) edited by L. Ginzberg, p. 84.
The paragraph has a parallel in the Babli, 74a/b. If one selected food out of food, Ḥizqiah said, one is liable; Rebbi Joḥanan said, one is not liable³¹⁷It is somewhat difficult to understand Ḥizqiah’s position. What is biblically forbidden on the Sabbath is removing chaff from food, not food from chaff (except, as mentioned later in this paragraph, if the entire batch was cleaned, when there is no difference what was taken from where.) Biblically Ḥizqiah would have to forbid to remove the food one does not want to eat from the food one wants to eat; the other way would only be rabbinically forbidden.. A baraita disagrees with Ḥizqiah: He selects and eats, he selects and puts on the table³¹⁸For immediate consumption. There is no difference whether one puts food in his own mouth or in others’.. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: explain it if guests were eating what was served. But was it not stated: On condition that he did not select all of its kind? In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, because one who selects (normally)³¹⁹To be deleted with the other two sources. on the Sabbath is liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, because one who selects normally at (one) [another]³²⁰The text in brackets (following the other two sources) is the correct one. The “other place” is the Sabbath; the origin of this paragraph also is in Beṣah. Liability on the Sabbath can always be avoided by doing things in a decidedly unprofessional way; the mention of doing things “normally” is appropriate here. place is liable. In the opinion of Ḥizqiah, even rings among rings³²¹String figs from a heap of string figs., even pomegranates among pomegranates. Or is it so, even people among people³²²Then it would be forbidden on the Sabbath to call people to read the Torah unless they had been selected beforehand. This we never heard.? How is this? Everybody agrees with that of Rebbi Immi. For Rebbi Immi had guests; he brought before them lupines³²³Greek θέρμος, ὁ. and beans³²⁴Greek φάσηλος, ὁ.. He told them, be careful to eat (the wood-chips)(the sticks) [the artichokes]³²⁵The first alternative is the conjectured meaning of the word in the Leiden text in Šabbat, the second word that of the Leiden text in Beṣah, the probably correct choice is the third, from the Genizah text, Greek κινάρα. If this reading is accepted, following S. Liebermann, then the statement is that on a holiday it is permitted to select anything for immediate consumption, even if there are no remainders, and eat a different dessert at the end. at the end. It was stated: One does neither select, nor grind, nor sift. He who selects, or grinds, or sifts, on the Sabbath is stoned. On a holiday he absorbs the 40³²⁶The 39 lashes which are the standard punishment for breaking biblical prohibitions for which no other biblical punishment is specified. The Babli disagrees and declares these activities only rabbinically prohibited on a holiday, cf. Tosaphot 95a, s. v. והרודה.
While preparing food is biblically permitted on a holiday as shown later in the paragraph, there is a dispute between the anonymous majority and R. Jehudah whether this includes preparations which could have been made the day before without impairing the quality of the food, which the majority prohibits and R. Jehudah and Rabban Gamliel permit. It is stated here that for the majority the prohibition is biblical, at least concerning preparations for baking.. But did we not state³²⁷Mishnah Beṣah 1:9. This is the version of the Mishnah always quoted in Halakhot.: “he selects normally, on his chest, or from a pot”? Rebbi Ḥanina from Antonia said, this is Rabban Gamliel’s, for “Rabban Gamliel says, also he puts them in water and scoops off.” And (did we not state) [was it not stated]³²⁸The text in parentheses from the Leiden ms. is inferior to that of the other two sources in brackets., in the household of Rabban Gamliel they were grinding pepper in their mills³¹⁴This and the following paragraphs are from Beṣah 1:10 (י) and refer to Mishnah Beṣah 1:9: “The House of Shammai say, he who selects legumes on a holiday selects the food and eats. But the House of Hillel say, he selects normally, on his chest, or from a basket, or from a pot, but not on a table, nor with a sieve. Rabban Gamliel says, also he puts them in water and scoops off.” The House of Shammai permit only to pick out the edible parts and eat them directly. The House of Hillel hold that separating the beans from the chaff belongs to the activities permitted as preparation of food and in principle permit any kind of selection; they only require that it should not be done in a weekday fashion. They certainly will agree that the restrictions are purely rabbinical.? It is permitted to grind but forbidden to select. Rebbi Yose (in the name of Rebbi Ila) [ben Rebbi Abun]³²⁸The text in parentheses from the Leiden ms. is inferior to that of the other two sources in brackets.: Grinding as a category was not permitted³²⁹Rabban Gamliel will agree that milling flour is biblically forbidden on a holiday; he will hold that grinding pepper in a peppermill is not professionally grinding and not something which may be done the day before without impairing the quality of the spice.. And from where that one may neither select, nor grind, nor sift? Rebbi (Yose) [Aḥa]³²⁸The text in parentheses from the Leiden ms. is inferior to that of the other two sources in brackets. in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: No work shall be done on them up to and you shall guard the unleavened bread³³⁰Ex. 12:16–17. The text omitted by the quote “up to” permits preparation of food on a holiday, as quoted later in the paragraph.. (It was stated.)³³¹This has to be deleted with the other two sources. Rebbi Yose asked, but did one not infer cooking only from there? Rebbi Yose did not say so, but Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Only what can be eaten by every person this alone may be made by you, up to and you shall guard the unleavened bread³³²There is nothing missing between the two quotes, so that the note “up to” seems to be superfluous. The meaning is explained in Tosaphot Beṣah 3a s.v. גזרה (at the end): vv. 16,17 form a unit: what can be eaten by every person this alone may be made by you, and you shall guard the unleavened bread. Any preparation of mazzah which requires guarding against possible leavening is permitted on the holiday, anything preceding this, i. e., mixing flour with water to make dough, is forbidden.. Ḥizqiah stated in disagreement³³³Against the Mishnah where the House of Hillel permit selecting. G ends here.: only, every, person, are diminutions, not to select, nor to grind, nor to sift on a holiday. ³³⁵This text also appears in Chapter 20 (17c line 35, noted 20; the Genizah text of Chapter 20 edited by J. N. Epstein is noted E). The parallel in the Babli is in 138a where the argument of R. Zeˋira is quoted in his name but the introductory statement is in the name of Rav Cahana. In Beṣah, the original author is Rav, not Samuel. This may be a lectio facilior since Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi was a companion of Rav; but if Rav Cahana is Cahana, the stepson of Rav, it would represent a Babylonian tradition. Rebbi Zeˋira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Samuel: One who filters is liable because of selecting. Rebbi Zeˋira said, it is more reasonable that it should be because of sifting. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both said, at the start we were saying that Rebbi Zeˋira said it correctly, since as in sifting the flour is below and the farina³³⁶The coarser pieces. on top, so in filtering wine the wine as at the bottom and the yeast on top; but we were not saying anything. Why? Because the category of selecting was permitted, the category of filtering was permitted³³⁷On a holiday, as shown later from Mishnaiot.
Here starts a new Genizah leaf (Ginzberg, p. 85).. The category of selecting was permitted³²⁷Mishnah Beṣah 1:9. This is the version of the Mishnah always quoted in Halakhot.: “he selects normally, on his chest, or from a pot”. Also the category of filtering was permitted, “on a holiday one puts into one which was hanging³³⁸Mishnah Šabbat 20:1. According to the anonymous majority on a holiday one may not put a filter on top of a barrel because this is an activity not covered by the general permission to prepare food, but if the filter already was in place one may filter wine on a holiday.”. But the category of sifting was not permitted. As Rebbi Ḥanina ben Yaqe said in the name of Rav Jehudah, One does not re-sift the flour but one may pass it through the back of the sieve³³⁹This sentence, while it is at this place in all sources, does not belong here but at the very end of the paragraph where it answers to a question raised there. If flour had been sifted before but the housewife wants to sift it again on the holiday before using if for baking, she may turn the sieve upside down and use it with the sieve instead of being concave downwards being convex upwards. This is unprofessional and therefore not biblically forbidden even according to the opinion stated in the preceding paragraph that all preparations preceding making dough are forbidden on the holiday. Cf. Babli Beṣah 29b.. If you say it is because of sifting, it³⁴⁰Filtering. should be forbidden. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, for it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, (in truth) [also]³⁴¹The text in parentheses is from the Leiden ms.; that of the other sources is in brackets. Both are possible. preparations for making food they permitted³⁴²Tosephta Megillah 1:7.. There is a question about the following: following the rabbis, may one re-sift the flour through the back of the sieve? “And who grinds.” He who pulverizes salt, clay shards, peppers, is liable because of grinding. He who cuts into little pieces chalk, gypsum³⁴³Greek γύψος, ἡ., chaff, sand, dirt, is liable because of sifting. He who kneads chalk, gypsum, dust, eye-salve³⁴⁴Greek κολλύριον, τό., plaster³⁴⁵Greek μάλαγμα, -ατος, τό., drugs, is liable because of making dough. One who makes dough, or kneads dough, or forms dough, all are because of making dough. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked, there³⁴⁶Mishnah Menaḥot 5:2. The shew bread has to be unleavened. Violating this rule at any stage of the preparation of the bread is a separate biblical violation for each stage. you say, “and he is liable for making its dough, and for its forming, and for its baking,” and here you are saying so? But there he has to divide for he is liable for each single one, but here³⁴⁷For the rules of the Sabbath, kneading the dough and forming it into the required shape count only as one liability. he is liable only once. You see that baking is a derivative of cooking, and you are saying so? But it was stated here since we are stating the order of the dough³⁴⁸In Mishnah 2, one would have expected “cooking” to be listed as the name of the category; for it is the more widely applicable notion, and baking as derivative. But since the Mishnah is organized in describing the making of the shew-bread (Note 4) the category of cooking is labelled “baking”. Babli 74b.. He who burns potter’s³⁵⁰Reading קדר “potter” for unexplained קרד. clay, softens glass³⁵¹Following G, reading Greek βῶλος, ἡ, “lump, clod”., melts pitch, melts ³⁵²This word is unexplained. In other contexts, מוסר is “one who delivers; informant”. Cf. Greek μίσυ, -υος and -εως, τό, “copper ore from Cyprus” (E. G.).מוסרין. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: One who melts down lead is liable because of cooking³⁵³Babli 106a, Yebamot 6b.. One who roasts, or who fries, who preserves by cooking, or by smoking, all these because of cooking. If somebody cooked in the hot springs of Tiberias, what³⁵⁴Cooking in hot springs may be forbidden rabbinically; it cannot cause liability. Babli 40b.? Ḥizqiah said, it is forbidden; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is permitted. Rebbi Mana said, I went to Caesarea and heard Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Ḥizqiah; for Ḥizqiah it was a problem: what if the Passover sacrifice was cooked in the hot springs of Tiberias³⁵⁵The question is quite difficult since the Passover must be slaughtered in the Temple and roasted and eaten nearby. The question is really if the Passover was treated by what biblically is not cooking before being roasted, whether this invalidates the sacrifice.? Two Amoraim, one said, it is forbidden; the other said, it is permitted. He who said, it is forbidden, do not eat from it raw, nor cooked in water³⁵⁶Ex. 12:9. The first part of the verse invalidates the sacrifice heated by hot water.. But he who said, it is permitted, but only roasted in fire, its head with its feet and its innards³⁵⁷The second part of the verse validates it if the formal preparation was roasting over an open fire.. All these measures³⁵⁸The general principle underlying the minimal amounts which create liability as explained in the later Mishnaiot of this Chapter and the following Chapters., if for food, in the volume of a dried fig, if for an animal, the mouthful of a kid goat, if to cook, to cook a quick egg³⁵⁹A chicken egg., [ ]³⁶⁰In the Leiden ms. there is no lacuna here, but in G one reads … לתבל ביצ ..… This supports the reading in Or zaruaˋ Šabbat §62: אִם לָתַבֵּל כְּדֵי לָתַבֵּל כֵּיצָה קַלָּה “if to spice, enough to spice a quick egg”., if to weave, the length of a double siṭ³⁶¹Both Mishnah 7:2 and 13:1 state that liability is created if one weaves two threads. The minimal length of a thread is defined here as a double siṭ, but in Mishnah 13:4 as one siṭ (a hand-breadth, the width of four thumbs). The text here cannot be changed since “double” is clearly visible in G and is quoted in Or zaruaˋ., if to spin, the width of a double siṭ. “He who shears wool.” If he shore without specification,³⁶¹Both Mishnah 7:2 and 13:1 state that liability is created if one weaves two threads. The minimal length of a thread is defined here as a double siṭ, but in Mishnah 13:4 as one siṭ (a hand-breadth, the width of four thumbs). The text here cannot be changed since “double” is clearly visible in G and is quoted in Or zaruaˋ. what? Let us hear from the following: If one brought out ink, if it was in a reed³⁶²Greek κάλαμος, -ου, m., Latin calamus,- i, m., in order to write two letters, if to correct, enough to correct one letter³⁶³Writing on the Sabbath creates liability if it may make sense, which means that a word may be formed, or at least two letters. But in correcting, changing a single letter may change the meaning of a word. Therefore if the specific intent was for correcting, the general rule (Mishnah 3) is superseded by a more restrictive one. Similarly here, specific intent in shearing may reduce the amount which creates liability; the absence of specific intent cannot reduce it.. There, we have stated³⁶⁴Mishnah Bekhorot 3:3. Slaughter of a wooly animal cannot be made through thick wool since the fleece might deflect or damage the knife, which would make the slaughter invalid and the animal into carcass meat. Therefore it is necessary to clear some area for the slaughter. It is biblically forbidden to shear a firstling (Deut. 15:19). The Mishnah states that tearing out hairs from the animal’s fleece is not shearing.: “He who slaughters the firstling makes space for the dagger on both sides and tears out the hair, but he should not move it from its place. Similarly, he who tears out hair to see a defect³⁶⁵Which would make the firstling secular property of the Cohen, (Deut. 15:20)..” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: One who tears out hair from a dedicated animal is not liable³⁶⁶As the Sabbath is concerned, this is unprofessional and therefore does not create liability while still being forbidden.. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows his own opinion, as they disagreed: If one tears out hair from a dedicated animal, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is liable³⁶⁷As illegitimate use of dedicated property.; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is not liable. Rebbi Jeremiah asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s reasoning inverted? Since they disagreed³⁶⁸The previously recorded disagreement with R. Joḥanan has to be reconciled with the generally accepted Tosephta which follows.. “One who tears out a wing of a bird, who plucks it, and who cuts it is liable under three [categories].³⁶⁹Tosephta 9:20.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they³⁷⁰The two opinions of R. Simeon ben Laqish, that tearing out hairs from a four-legged animal does not create liability but tearing out feathers from a bird does. do not disagree. He who tears out is liable because of shearing; he who plucks out is liable because of wiping clean; he who cuts it is liable because of hitting with a hammer. But it cannot be compared; for a bird which has no shearing, tearing out is its shearing³⁷¹Babli Bekhorot 25a.. But here³⁷²In the case of the four-legged animal. he is not liable unless he sheared. You should know that this is so since it was stated: If he tore from a dead animal he is liable since tearing is its shearing. “Who bleaches it.” He who impregnates wood for vessels and ropes for a windlass³⁷³For נחבלין אליקה in G one reads חבלין אל יקה. The translation, which is tentative, is based on Liebermann’s emendation to read וחבלין לאליקה reading the last word as Greek ἕλικα, accusative of ἕλιξ (identified by Jastrow).. This woman who painted her face red³⁷⁴In the Babli 95a this is characterized as R. Eliezer’s opinion and is not practice since it is only temporary painting. and painted her spindle red³⁷⁵As advertisement that she was available for prostitution. In all these cases, the statement that she is liable for painting is missing. The full text is quoted by some Medieval authors, e. g. Roqeaḥ Šabbat 68 (but he reads, “she paints her coat red”.. This tailor who took a thread into his mouth³⁷⁶The commentaries explain that he does this to bleach the thread.. Rav Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: Asbestos³⁷⁷Greek ἀμίαντος, -ον, “pure” (adj.); ὁ ἀμίαντος λίθος, Latin amiantus “asbestos”. There is bleaching and dying for mineral material. is liable because of bleaching. “Who cards it.” He who cards date palm fiber, papyrus, is liable because of carding³⁷⁸Even though these are not textiles. Date palm fiber is lifa in Arabic.. “Who dyes it.” What kind of dying was in the Tabernacle? They were clobbering an animal for red skins of rams³⁷⁹Ex. 25:5, 26:14.. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that he is liable who causes a wound which results in echymosis³⁸⁰If the blue spot stays blue more than 24 hours.. He who colors his lips red is liable³⁷⁴In the Babli 95a this is characterized as R. Eliezer’s opinion and is not practice since it is only temporary painting.. He who causes bleeding, because of taking away life force at that place³⁸¹Lev. 17:11. This does not refer to slaughter which is mentioned separately in Mishnah 3, but to a non-lethal wound. Babli 75a/b.. He who makes a shape, the first one is liable because of writing and the second one because of dying³⁸²Assuming that the first person draws an outline and the second fills it with color. The Babli 75b notes that if the object is decoration of the vessel, he also is liable because of “hitting with a hammer”.. If he left out a limb and another came and finished it, he is liable because of hitting with a hammer⁷A name for the formal end of any production process.. Wringing and washing are the same category of work. It was stated: Rebbi Ismael the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, the dyers in Jerusalem made wringing a separate category of work. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa, there are 40 categories of work³⁸³Since it is not listed separately in the Mishnah.. Should we state this? We come to state only items to which everybody agrees. One who makes ropes. The one who twines them is liable because of spinning³⁸⁴The Babli 95a rules that braiding women’s hair is building.. One who makes basket work of reeds³⁸⁵The translation follows Levy; it is tentative., sieves, bast mats, is liable because of weaving. A woman when she prepares the loom, because of preparing. When she fastens the web,³⁸⁶The word in the text is unexplained. The translation follows R. Ḥananel who in his Commentary to 75a reads קירומה, which is interpreted as Greek καίρωμα, -ατος, τό. This is derived from καῖρος, ὁ, “row of thrums in the loom, to which the threads of the warp are attached” and the corresponding verb καιρόω “make fast these threads”; καίρωμα therefoe means “web so fastened”. because of tying threads. When she erects [the loom], because of building. When she hits³⁸⁷She pushes down the threads of the woof; this is the essence of weaving., because of weaving. When she cuts the threads, because of cutting. When she finishes her work, because of hitting with a hammer. One who makes boxes, when he starts, because of preparing. When he tailors³⁸⁸This is the only occurrence of חייט used as a verb. G reads “acting as cutter”, cf. شرط “to cut, to tear”., because of sewing. When he bends, because of building. When he cuts, because of cutting. When he finishes his work, because of hitting with a hammer. One who makes bed-sheets³⁸⁹A conjectured meaning of מלין ערסװן “contents of beds”. Or zaruaˋ Šabbat 64 reads an unexplained ערסמו. G treats מלין and ערסװן as two different objects and has for both of them the full list of operations. J. Sussman reads in G not מלין (Ginzberg’s reading, unidentified as an object) but סַלִּין “baskets”., lengthwise because of preparing, crosswise because of weaving. Grating, because of tying threads. When he cuts, because of cutting. When he finishes his work, because of hitting with a hammer. There are two warp threads per peg and two pegs for each warp thread³⁹⁰The pegs are on top and bottom of the loom, holding the threads of the warp.. “He who weaves two rows, who hits two threads, who ties, and who unties.” ³⁹⁴This paragraph and the next are also in Chapter 15, on Mishnah 15:1 (15), What tying was in the Tabernacle? They were tying down the ropes³⁹⁵Needed to tie the gobelins which formed the lowest part of the roof to the posts. Mentioned Ex. 35:18. Babli 74b.. But was this not temporarily³⁹⁶Tying a knot or untying is a Sabbath violation if the knot is intended to be permanent. Since the ropes had to be untied when the Tabernacle was transported, tying and untying could not be Sabbath violations.? Rebbi Yose says, because they were camping and travelling by the Word³⁹⁷By Divine order. Since tying and untying was not a decision humans could make; it could as well be considered permanent. In 15 this is a declarative sentence; it is the equivalent of being permanent. Babli Eruvin 55b., was it like temporarily? Rebbi Yose [ben Rebbi Abun]³⁹⁸From G and 15, confirmed by Or zaruaˋ Šabbat 67. said, since the Holy One, praise to Him, has promised them that he will bring them into the Land, it is as if it were (temporary) [permanent]³⁹⁹The text in (parentheses) is that of the corrector of the Leiden ms. and the scribe in 15, the one in [brackets] is of the original scribe here, the corrector in 15, and G. Since the Tabernacle was finally fixed at Shilo, there the ties were permanent. The other argument notes that while the times of disassembly of the Tabernacle were not predictable, the fact of future disassembly was a certainty; these ties were not permanent.. Rebbi Phineas said, they learned it from the gobelin sewers. If [a thread] broke, he was tying it. If it broke again, it was impossible to make many knots but he would untie the first one⁴⁰⁰Therefore both tying and untying happened during the construction of the Tabernacle and are correctly mentioned in the list of Sabbath prohibitions.. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, an expert tailor merges the two heads⁴⁰¹The previous argument is not convincing. An expert in invisible mending can connect the threads without a knot being noticeable.. And where was this said? As Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, they learned it from the weavers of the gobelins. What is the reason? The length of one gobelin⁴⁰²Ex. 26:2. To form a single unit, a gobelin could not have a broken thread even temporarily., that it should be an entity⁴⁰³For reasons of chronology, the [reading] of G is to be preferred over that of the (Leiden ms.) here and in Chapter 15.. If [a thread] broke, he was tying it. When he came to the weave, he untied it and brought it in. Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of (Rav) [Rebbi]⁴⁰⁴For the purposes of the construction of the Sanctuary everything had to be perfect; no broken threads to be repaired. The only possible explanation remains the first one. Ḥuna: Even on its warp there was neither knot nor connection⁴⁰⁵A scribal error.. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, a basket of palm leaves for dates or a plate⁴⁰⁷Greek πάτελλα, ἡ. of palm leaves one may tear and open, only one may not tie⁴⁰⁸Chapter 6, Note 41. Here ends the parallel in Chapter 15.. Is this not untying? It is like one who breaks an amphora to eat dried figs⁴⁰⁹It is permitted in Mishnah 22:3 to break a sealed amphora to reach the food contained in it, on condition that one not intend to make a vessel out of the shards.. The handles of a double sack⁴¹⁰Greek δισάκκιον, τό. one may tie and untie. It is as if one opened or locked on the Sabbath. ⁴¹¹This paragraph is from Kilaim 9:7 (Notes 162–167,כ); its topic is kilaim, the prohibition to wear linen and wool together, in particular the problem how many stitches it needs to connect linen and woolen cloth to constitute a violation of the prohibition. Only at the end is a connection made with the laws of the Sabbath. Rebbi Ḥanina said, not until it comes down an entire side⁴¹²For him woolen and linen cloths create kilaim only if a full seam was sown. This contradicts the Mishnah quoted next.. Rebbi Yannai said, say to Rebbi Ḥanina, get out and read! Did we not state⁴¹³Mishnah Kilaim 9:10., “if the two ends appear on the same side”? That means, only if it goes up and down and up. And did we not state, “Rebbi Jehudah says, only if there are three needle stitches”? That means that [the thread] goes down, and up, and down. But so and so⁴¹⁴Either one follows the rabbis or R. Jehudah; in no case does one need more than three stitches.. A thread drawn through by means of a needle, even if it has a knot on each side, is no connection for cloth. The thread is a connection for cloth but not for the needle⁴¹⁵If one stitch has been made and now the needle is sticking in the cloth, this does not count since the needle will eventually be removed. In order to create kilaim, the thread alone must cross the cloth three times, for two stitches.. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, only if it is knotted on both sides. The words of the rabbis disagree since Rebbi Abba, Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: He who straightens out the sides on the Sabbath⁴¹⁶According to Maimonides (Šabbat 10:9), it is the regular procedure in sewing a garment that when a seam is sewn the two sides are stretched to be equal before the thread is knotted. Babli 95a. is liable because of sewing. He should have said, because of sewing and tying knots. Tearing applies to textiles and cutting to hides⁴¹⁷In Mishnah 2, cutting cloth to prepare for sewing is forbidden as “tearing”. In Mishnah 3, cutting hides is forbidden as a different category. What is the rationale behind this double count, and does “tearing” only apply to textiles and cutting to hides and leather?. Tearing in the middle and cutting from the sides. There are some who switch, tearing of hides and cutting of textiles. Tearing of hides, those soft ones, and cutting of textiles, felt. 3⁴¹⁸Here starts discussion of Mishnah 3. Babli 75a.. One who catches a purple snail and crushes it. There are Tannaïm who state that he is liable twice. There are Tannaïm who state that he is liable only once. He who says twice, one because of catching and one because of depriving of life. But he who says once, this is because of depriving of life. Does he not have catching⁴¹⁹The scribe wrote: Does he not have catching? He does not have catching! The second sentence was unnecessarily deleted by the corrector. The only animal hides used for the construction of the Tabernacle were those of rams, which are domesticated and do not need to be caught, and the taḥaš, whose nature is in doubt. It is not quite clear what is being proved here. Either the emphasis on the taḥaš being a pure animal implies that only catching wild pure animals is a violation, or, since the taḥaš was a temporary phenomenon, it does not imply anything for later generations and no catching of wild animals is a Sabbath violation.? ⁴²⁰The following is from Chapter 2, Notes 111–114. It comes like what Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Meïr said: The Holy One, praise to Him, created for Moses in the desert a kind of pure animal. After the work of the Tabernacle had been finished it was hidden. Rebbi Abun said, its name was qereš. Rebbi Hoshaia stated, a unicorn. It is preferable to the Eternal to a cattle ox which sprouts a horn and has split hooves⁴²¹Ps. 69:32.. It is written, it sprouts a horn. “Who slaughters it.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no slaughter here; slaughter is a derivative of wounding. And why was it (not)⁴²²It seems that this word should be deleted; it is not in the quote of the sentence in Or zaruaˋ (II §72). stated with it? Only because we stated the proceedings of a meal it was stated with it. “Who tans it.” What tanning was for the Tabernacle? They were drafting on them. What were they drafting on them? They were drawing lines with a ruler⁴²³Since the hides were used as roofing, there is no indication that they had been shaved off and were tanned. The answer is that in order to be cut to size, they had to be tanned so that at least in the interior lines could be drawn to guide the cutter.. ⁴²⁴It seems that this sentence is misplaced here and belongs to the preceding discussion of the taḥaš, considering the unicorn as a non-kosher animal and stating that nevertheless the Tent of Meeting was covered by its hides. It follows that what Rebbi Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Abbahu, it is permitted to make tents from the hide of an impure animal. “Who rubs it clean⁵To remove both hair outside and remainders of flesh inside to prepare for the tanning process which turns hide into leather..” What kind of erasure was in the tabernacle? Zeˋir bar Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: They were rubbing the hide⁴²⁵The hides used to makes the covers of the Tabernacles, to clean them from all remainders of flesh clinging to the insides. on a pillar. One who rubbed hide clear on a pillar is liable. For what is he liable? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Levi, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Levi, because of rubbing clean. That is, if it is new. But if it be old⁴²⁶And rubbing will not change the nature of anything., it is the disagreement between Rebbi Eliezer and the Sages. Since they disagreed⁴²⁷Tosephta 9:13, Babli 95a.: “One who sweeps, who sprinkles⁴²⁸He sweeps or sprinkles water on a dirt floor. For R. Eliezer it is forbidden since he might fill in uneven spots in the floor. For the Sages representing R. Simeon this would be an unintended consequence which never creates liability., who makes cheese⁴²⁹According to a Geonic commentary quoted in Arukh, “who makes hard cheese.”, who makes butter⁴³⁰Definition of Arukh. Rashi: He makes soft cheese and lets it separate from the whey., who milks, and who takes down honeycombs, is liable for a purification sacrifice. But the Sages say, it is because of Sabbath rest⁴³¹Rabbinic restrictions..” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they do not disagree. He who sweeps, who sprinkles, is liable because of threshing. He who makes cheese, who makes butter, is liable because of kneading. He who milks, and who takes down honeycombs, is liable because of harvesting. He who squeezes budding olives is liable because of harvesting. Who needs this? Rebbi Eliezer⁴³²Since these have no oil, they are squeezed to make them edible as fruit which is permitted for R. Simeon.. He who files off heads of poles is liable because of cutting⁴³³Babli 75b. He who applies salve on a wet bandage⁴³⁴Latin splenium, -ii, n.. is liable because of rubbing clean. “If one erased a big letter where there is space to write in its stead two letters, he is liable. If he wrote one large letter even though there is space to write in its stead two letters, he is not liable. Rebbi Menaḥem ben Rabbi Yose says, this is more serious about him who erases than about him who writes that he who erases in order to correct is liable but he who writes in order to spoil is not liable.^435,Babli 75b, Tosephta 11:9–10.⁴³⁶In general, any action to spoil does not create liability. In this particular case, if a single letter was erased so that there is no longer a recognizable lexeme it is spoiling. But correcting a single letter so that what was not a word now is one creates liability.” It may happen that one writes a single dot and is liable for it because of writing and because of erasing; it may happen that one erases a single dot and is liable for it because of writing and because of erasing. How is this? If it was a ד and he makes it ר ,ר and he makes it ד; he is liable because of writing and because of erasing⁴³⁷If both the words with ד or with ר make sense. Babli 104b. (The original text of the Leiden ms. reads: “one writes a single dot on top”, “one erases a single dot on top”; the words “on top” were erased by the corrector, but they are quoted in Or zaruaˋ II §77, Roqeaḥ 86.). 4. What building was at the Sanctuary? They were putting the planks on top of the bases⁴³⁷If both the words with ד or with ר make sense. Babli 104b. (The original text of the Leiden ms. reads: “one writes a single dot on top”, “one erases a single dot on top”; the words “on top” were erased by the corrector, but they are quoted in Or zaruaˋ II §77, Roqeaḥ 86.). But was this not temporary³⁹⁶Tying a knot or untying is a Sabbath violation if the knot is intended to be permanent. Since the ropes had to be untied when the Tabernacle was transported, tying and untying could not be Sabbath violations.? Rebbi Yose says, because they were camping and travelling by the Word³⁹⁷By Divine order. Since tying and untying was not a decision humans could make; it could as well be considered permanent. In 15 this is a declarative sentence; it is the equivalent of being permanent. Babli Eruvin 55b., it was as though permanent. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, since the Holy One, praise to Him, has promised them that He will bring them into the Land, it is as if it were permanent. This implies, a temporary building is a building. This implies, even from the side⁴³⁸Since the planks were simply put into the bases without either mortar or screws, putting them up was not professional work. “From the side” is a general expression for “nonprofessional”.. This implies even if was put on top of something else. Does it imply that building on implements is building⁴³⁹This would forbid even putting a pot on top of another pot to keep food warm.? The bases are like soil⁴⁴⁰The planks are never put into the bases unless the latter are firmly stuck in the ground; it is as if the walls of the tabernacle were set into the soil.. It was stated⁴⁴¹Tosephta 11:1, Babli 102b, with different attributions.: “If one brings the stone and another one the mortar, he who brings the mortar is liable. Rebbi Yose says, both are liable.” Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that stone without mortar is building⁴⁴²A common Roman building method.. Everybody agrees that if one put up mortar first and someone then brought stone that he is liable. “The builder who set the stone on top of the row⁴⁴³Latin domus, -ūs, f., Greek δὁμος. is liable.⁴⁴⁴Continuation on the Tosephta. The fact that it needs a skilled craftsman to exactly adjust the stone even if no mortar is used makes it forbidden Sabbath work.” For whom is this needed? For the rabbis⁴⁴⁵Who in general require mortar as a sign of building activity, but not in this case.. One who put up planks and one who put up adobe walls is liable because of building⁴⁴⁶As the Mishnah stated, tearing down only creates liability if it is for the purpose of building anew.. “And who tears down,” but only for a need⁴⁴⁶As the Mishnah stated, tearing down only creates liability if it is for the purpose of building anew.. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: he who braids a palm-leaf basket is liable because of building⁴⁴⁷The rule that there is no building with vessels does not mean that there is no building of vessels. The Babli 75b has a completely different understanding of R. Simeon ben Laqish’s statement: “He who decorates a vessel or blows a glass vessel is liable because of “hitting with a hammer.”. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: he who blows a glass vessel is liable because of building. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: There are things which are close but far away; and there are things which are far away but close⁴⁴⁸There are very diverse activities which are classified under the same category for the Sabbath, and there are distinct categories which may be represented by the same abstract definition, as explained in the sequel.. He who braids a palm-leaf basket, and he who blows a glass vessel, and he who makes a vessel in a form⁴⁴⁹Greek τύπος, ὁ. The vessel is cast., all are because of building. He who selects, who filters⁴⁵⁰R. David Fraenckel points out that “filtering” should be replaced by “winnowing” since filtering was reduced to either selecting or sifting (Note 325). But selecting, winnowing, and sifting are three similar activities but listed as three different categories (“close but far away”) whereas the very different activities in fabricating vessels mentioned in the preceding sentence are all classified under the same heading (“far away but close”)., and who sifts, all because of removing waste. Each of them is separately liable⁴⁵¹Since they are separately listed in the Mishnah.. And why was handing over not stated with them⁴⁵²Why were the transactions described in Mishnaiot 1:1–2 not mentioned in the list of forbidden actions?? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of the disagreement of Rebbi Aqiba and the Sages⁴⁵³In Mishnah 11:1, one who throws from one private domain over a public domain into another private domain, R. Aqiba declares liable but the Sages do not. There is no universally accepted definition of “handing from one domain to another.”. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jehudah ben Levi, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Rebbi: In addition, there is handing over. And why was it not stated with them? All categories of work involve one, and this one two⁴⁵⁴Since the numerals are in the feminine, they refer to domains, not to persons, as noted by R. David Fraenckel.. All categories of work have derivatives, but this has no derivative.

with regard to those animals enumerated by the Sages as having skin, since their skin is considered by the Sages to be similar to their flesh. The Gemara asks: On the contrary, those that the Sages enumerated, whose skin and flesh are equated, do not have skins. And Abaye said: This is what the tanna in the baraita is saying: Only those that the Sages did not enumerate have skin discrete from their flesh. Rava said to him: Doesn’t the baraita say the opposite: That those enumerated by the Sages have skin discrete from their flesh? Rather, Rava said: This is what the baraita is saying: Only the skin of those animals enumerated by the Sages transmits impurity like flesh. The Gemara asks: Is that to say by inference that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri holds that even the creeping animals not enumerated by the Sages also transmit impurity? Isn’t the opposite taught, that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: The eight creeping animals have skin that does not transmit impurity? Rav Adda bar Mattana said to resolve it this way: And the Rabbis say: With regard to impurity, those animals enumerated by the Sages do not have skin. According to this explanation, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis disagree only with regard to the laws of impurity. But still, is it clear that they do not disagree with regard to the matter of Shabbat? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: One who traps one of the eight creeping animals mentioned in the Torah on Shabbat is liable, as is one who wounds them, if they are creeping animals that have skins? And what is considered to be an irreversible wound? It is a wound where the blood collects in a single spot beneath the skin, even if it does not emerge. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: The eight creeping animals have skins. Apparently, there is disagreement with regard to Shabbat as well. Rav Ashi said: Who is the first tanna? It is Rabbi Yehuda, who follows the texture of the skin. He does not distinguish between those creeping animals whose skin is considered like flesh and those whose skin is discrete from the flesh as the verses may imply; rather, creeping animals are distinguished based on the texture of their skin, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even though the lizard is mentioned in the verse, it has the same ruling as the weasel because the weasel has skin discrete from its flesh. However, the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yoḥanan with regard to impurity, concede with regard to Shabbat and hold that all creeping animals have skins. The Gemara asks: If so, the phrase in the baraita: This is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, is difficult. It should have said: This is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and those who disagree with him, as the Rabbis who disagree with him with regard to impurity concede to him with regard to the laws of Shabbat. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult. Emend the baraita and teach: The statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and those who disagree with him. Levi raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: From where is it derived that a wound is defined as something irreversible? He answered him that it is derived as it is written: “Can a Cushite change his skin, or a leopard its spots [ḥavarburotav]?” (Jeremiah 13:23). The Gemara explains: What does ḥavarburotav mean? If you say that they are spotted marks on the leopard’s skin, that phrase: Or a leopard its spots, should have been: Or a leopard its colors. Rather, ḥavarburotav means wounds, and they are similar to the skin of a Cushite: Just like the skin of a Cushite will not change its color to white, so too a wound is something that does not reverse. We learned in the mishna: And one who traps other abominations is exempt. The Gemara infers: If one kills them he is liable. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who holds this opinion? Rabbi Yirmeya said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: One who kills lice on Shabbat is akin to one who kills a camel on Shabbat. Apparently, he is the Sage who holds that one is liable for killing any living creature. Rav Yosef strongly objects to this: Perhaps this is not so, as the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer only with regard to lice, which do not procreate. However, with regard to other abominations and crawling things that procreate, they do not disagree with him. And fundamentally they both derived this halakha from the reddened ram skins used to cover the Tabernacle. Rabbi Eliezer holds that liability for killing an animal on Shabbat exists only with regard to animals like rams. Just as rams have their lives taken and die, so too, one is liable for killing any animal whose life is taken, including lice. And the Rabbis also hold that liability for killing an animal on Shabbat exists only with regard to animals like rams. Just as rams procreate, so too, one is liable for killing any creature that procreates. One is not liable for killing lice, which do not procreate. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And lice do not procreate? Didn’t the Master say: The Holy One, Blessed be He, sits and sustains everything from the horns of wild oxen to the eggs of lice? Apparently, lice reproduce by laying eggs. Rav Yosef answered him: There is a species of insect that is called lice eggs, but lice themselves do not actually lay eggs. Again he asked: And wasn’t it taught in the baraita that lists types of creeping animals: Tefuyei, a type of insect, and lice eggs? He answered him: There is a species of insect called lice eggs. Again he asked: And still, there is the issue of a flea, which procreates according to all opinions, and nevertheless, it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who traps a flea on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable and Rabbi Yehoshua deems him exempt. Rav Ashi said: Are you raising a contradiction between trapping with killing? Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree only in that one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that one is liable for trapping even a species that is not typically trapped; and one Sage, Rabbi Yehoshua, holds that one is exempt in that case. However, with regard to killing, even Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that one is liable. We learned in the mishna that one who traps creeping animals for a specific need is liable, but one who traps them for no specific need is exempt. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who holds this way? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who said that for a prohibited labor performed not for its own sake, one is exempt. Some taught the statement of Rav in reference to this: With regard to one who drains an abscess in a boil containing pus on Shabbat, if his intention is to create an opening for it he is liable; if his intention is to remove pus from it he is exempt. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who holds this way? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who said that for a prohibited labor performed not for its own sake, one is exempt. Some teach the statement of Rav as referring to this: With regard to one who traps a snake on Shabbat, if he engages in its trapping so it does not bite him, he is exempt; if he does so for medicinal purposes he is liable. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who holds this way? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is Rabbi Shimon, who said that for a prohibited labor performed not for its own sake, one is exempt. Shmuel said: With regard to one who removes a fish from the sea, when an area on the skin of the fish has dried up the size of a sela, he is liable. A fish in that condition cannot survive, and therefore the individual who removed it from the water is liable for killing it. Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said: That is so as long as the skin that dried is between its fins. Rav Ashi said: Do not say that this halakha applies only in a case where it actually dried. Rather, it applies even if the fish has dried to the extent that mucus has formed, and if one were to touch that area it would stick to his fingers. Mar bar Hamdurei said that Shmuel said: One who reached his hand into the innards of an animal on Shabbat and detached a fetus that was in its womb is liable. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? It does not make sense to consider the fetus as a full-fledged living creature. Rava said: Bar Hamdurei explained this to me. Didn’t Rav Sheshet say: One who detaches hops on Shabbat from the shrubs and thorns on which they are growing is liable for uprooting an object from its place of growth? Here, too, in the case of the fetus, one is liable for uprooting an object from its place of growth. Abaye said: One who detached

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that the primary categories of labor number forty-less-one. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this tally? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who sows, and one who plows. The Gemara asks: Since, after all, in terms of plowing, one plows first and only then sows, let the tanna teach first one who plows, and afterward let him teach one who sows. The Gemara answers: The tanna ordered the mishna based on the practice in Eretz Yisrael, where they sow first and then plow. In Eretz Yisrael, the practice was to plow a second time after sowing to cover the seeds. A baraita is taught with regard to the prohibited labor of sowing: One who sows, and one who prunes the branches of vines to accelerate their growth, and one who plants, and one who bends the branch of a vine or a tree into the ground so that it takes root while still attached to the trunk, and one who grafts the branch of one tree onto another have all performed one type of labor, as they all stimulate plant growth. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us? The Gemara explains: This teaches us that one who unwittingly performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single primary category of labor, like those listed in the baraita, is liable to bring only one sin-offering, since they are considered aspects of the same labor. Rabbi Aḥa said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Ami said: One who prunes is liable for the labor of planting. And one who plants, and one who bends, and one who grafts is liable for the labor of sowing. The Gemara is surprised at this: Is that to say that one who bends and one who grafts a branch, for sowing, yes, he is liable; for planting, no, he is not liable? These labors, performed on trees, are more similar to planting. Rather, say as follows: One is liable even for sowing, as with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat there is no difference between sowing and planting. Rav Kahana said: One who prunes a tree and needs the wood that he hewed from the tree for fuel or some other purpose is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One sin-offering due to the labor of reaping, like anyone who severs an item from the ground for the purpose of harvesting the detached object, and one sin-offering due to the labor of planting, since he thereby stimulates growth of the plant. Similarly, Rav Yosef said: One who reaps alfalfa is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping, since he is cutting the plant for animal feed, and one due to planting, since cutting stimulates the growth of the alfalfa. Similarly, Abaye said: One who cuts beet leaves is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping and one due to sowing. We learned in the mishna among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who plows. A tanna taught in a baraita with regard to the labor of plowing: One who plows, and one who digs, and one who makes a furrow in the ground have all performed one type of labor. Rav Sheshet said: One who had a mound of earth and removed it in the house, thereby evening the surface, is liable due to the labor of building, as he thereby engages in construction of the house. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Similarly, Rava said: One who had a hole and filled it, in the house he is liable due to the labor of building. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat and digs the hole only because he needs its dirt is exempt for that act, which is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law. And even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in general one who performs labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of that action, is liable for it; that ruling applies only to a purpose that is constructive. However, this purpose is destructive, as one performs an act that unnecessarily mars the surface of the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would agree that in this case he is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who reaps. It was taught in a Tosefta with regard to the labor of reaping: One who reaps, and one who picks grapes, and one who harvests dates, and one who collects olives, and one who gathers figs have all performed one type of labor, as they all involve picking fruit. Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of earth at a palm tree and severed dates is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to severing, which is a subcategory of the primary category of reaping; and one for extracting, which is a subcategory of the primary category of threshing, as he removes something edible, the date, from its cover, its cluster. Rav Ashi said: In that case, one is exempt, since that is not the typical manner of severing, and that is not the typical manner of extracting, and one who performs a labor in an atypical manner is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who gathers. Rava said: One who gathers salt from salt pools is liable due to the labor of gathering, as he gathers a substance from the field into a pile. Abaye said: That is not so, as the prohibition of gathering by Torah law applies only to produce that grows from the ground. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who threshes. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: One who threshes, and one who beats flax to remove it from the hard cover of its stalk, and one who strikes a cotton plant to remove the cotton seeds have all performed one type of labor. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who winnows, and one who selects, and one who grinds, and one who sifts. The Gemara asks: The prohibited labor of winnowing is the same as the prohibited labor of selecting, which is the same as the prohibited labor of sifting. They are all identical in the manner in which they are performed and have the same objective: Separating food from the accompanying waste. Why was it necessary to list them all? An answer was provided by Abaye and Rava, who both said and established a principle: Any manner of labor that was performed in the Tabernacle, for the purposes of the Tabernacle,

The measure that determines liability for carrying out a bone is equivalent to that which is used to make a spoon. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a measure equivalent to that which is used to make from it a key. The measure that determines liability for carrying out glass is equivalent to that which is used to scrape and smooth the top of a bobbin, a sharpened stick used by weavers. The measure that determines liability for carrying out a pebble or a stone is equivalent to that which is used to throw at a bird to chase it away. Rabbi Elazar bar Ya’akov says: Equivalent to that which is used to throw at an animal, which is larger.

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that the primary categories of labor number forty-less-one. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this tally? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who sows, and one who plows. The Gemara asks: Since, after all, in terms of plowing, one plows first and only then sows, let the tanna teach first one who plows, and afterward let him teach one who sows. The Gemara answers: The tanna ordered the mishna based on the practice in Eretz Yisrael, where they sow first and then plow. In Eretz Yisrael, the practice was to plow a second time after sowing to cover the seeds. A baraita is taught with regard to the prohibited labor of sowing: One who sows, and one who prunes the branches of vines to accelerate their growth, and one who plants, and one who bends the branch of a vine or a tree into the ground so that it takes root while still attached to the trunk, and one who grafts the branch of one tree onto another have all performed one type of labor, as they all stimulate plant growth. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us? The Gemara explains: This teaches us that one who unwittingly performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single primary category of labor, like those listed in the baraita, is liable to bring only one sin-offering, since they are considered aspects of the same labor. Rabbi Aḥa said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Ami said: One who prunes is liable for the labor of planting. And one who plants, and one who bends, and one who grafts is liable for the labor of sowing. The Gemara is surprised at this: Is that to say that one who bends and one who grafts a branch, for sowing, yes, he is liable; for planting, no, he is not liable? These labors, performed on trees, are more similar to planting. Rather, say as follows: One is liable even for sowing, as with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat there is no difference between sowing and planting. Rav Kahana said: One who prunes a tree and needs the wood that he hewed from the tree for fuel or some other purpose is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One sin-offering due to the labor of reaping, like anyone who severs an item from the ground for the purpose of harvesting the detached object, and one sin-offering due to the labor of planting, since he thereby stimulates growth of the plant. Similarly, Rav Yosef said: One who reaps alfalfa is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping, since he is cutting the plant for animal feed, and one due to planting, since cutting stimulates the growth of the alfalfa. Similarly, Abaye said: One who cuts beet leaves is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping and one due to sowing. We learned in the mishna among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who plows. A tanna taught in a baraita with regard to the labor of plowing: One who plows, and one who digs, and one who makes a furrow in the ground have all performed one type of labor. Rav Sheshet said: One who had a mound of earth and removed it in the house, thereby evening the surface, is liable due to the labor of building, as he thereby engages in construction of the house. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Similarly, Rava said: One who had a hole and filled it, in the house he is liable due to the labor of building. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat and digs the hole only because he needs its dirt is exempt for that act, which is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law. And even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in general one who performs labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of that action, is liable for it; that ruling applies only to a purpose that is constructive. However, this purpose is destructive, as one performs an act that unnecessarily mars the surface of the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would agree that in this case he is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who reaps. It was taught in a Tosefta with regard to the labor of reaping: One who reaps, and one who picks grapes, and one who harvests dates, and one who collects olives, and one who gathers figs have all performed one type of labor, as they all involve picking fruit. Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of earth at a palm tree and severed dates is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to severing, which is a subcategory of the primary category of reaping; and one for extracting, which is a subcategory of the primary category of threshing, as he removes something edible, the date, from its cover, its cluster. Rav Ashi said: In that case, one is exempt, since that is not the typical manner of severing, and that is not the typical manner of extracting, and one who performs a labor in an atypical manner is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who gathers. Rava said: One who gathers salt from salt pools is liable due to the labor of gathering, as he gathers a substance from the field into a pile. Abaye said: That is not so, as the prohibition of gathering by Torah law applies only to produce that grows from the ground. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who threshes. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: One who threshes, and one who beats flax to remove it from the hard cover of its stalk, and one who strikes a cotton plant to remove the cotton seeds have all performed one type of labor. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who winnows, and one who selects, and one who grinds, and one who sifts. The Gemara asks: The prohibited labor of winnowing is the same as the prohibited labor of selecting, which is the same as the prohibited labor of sifting. They are all identical in the manner in which they are performed and have the same objective: Separating food from the accompanying waste. Why was it necessary to list them all? An answer was provided by Abaye and Rava, who both said and established a principle: Any manner of labor that was performed in the Tabernacle, for the purposes of the Tabernacle,

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that the primary categories of labor number forty-less-one. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this tally? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if he performed all of the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who sows, and one who plows. The Gemara asks: Since, after all, in terms of plowing, one plows first and only then sows, let the tanna teach first one who plows, and afterward let him teach one who sows. The Gemara answers: The tanna ordered the mishna based on the practice in Eretz Yisrael, where they sow first and then plow. In Eretz Yisrael, the practice was to plow a second time after sowing to cover the seeds. A baraita is taught with regard to the prohibited labor of sowing: One who sows, and one who prunes the branches of vines to accelerate their growth, and one who plants, and one who bends the branch of a vine or a tree into the ground so that it takes root while still attached to the trunk, and one who grafts the branch of one tree onto another have all performed one type of labor, as they all stimulate plant growth. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us? The Gemara explains: This teaches us that one who unwittingly performs numerous prohibited labors subsumed under a single primary category of labor, like those listed in the baraita, is liable to bring only one sin-offering, since they are considered aspects of the same labor. Rabbi Aḥa said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Ami said: One who prunes is liable for the labor of planting. And one who plants, and one who bends, and one who grafts is liable for the labor of sowing. The Gemara is surprised at this: Is that to say that one who bends and one who grafts a branch, for sowing, yes, he is liable; for planting, no, he is not liable? These labors, performed on trees, are more similar to planting. Rather, say as follows: One is liable even for sowing, as with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat there is no difference between sowing and planting. Rav Kahana said: One who prunes a tree and needs the wood that he hewed from the tree for fuel or some other purpose is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One sin-offering due to the labor of reaping, like anyone who severs an item from the ground for the purpose of harvesting the detached object, and one sin-offering due to the labor of planting, since he thereby stimulates growth of the plant. Similarly, Rav Yosef said: One who reaps alfalfa is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping, since he is cutting the plant for animal feed, and one due to planting, since cutting stimulates the growth of the alfalfa. Similarly, Abaye said: One who cuts beet leaves is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to reaping and one due to sowing. We learned in the mishna among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who plows. A tanna taught in a baraita with regard to the labor of plowing: One who plows, and one who digs, and one who makes a furrow in the ground have all performed one type of labor. Rav Sheshet said: One who had a mound of earth and removed it in the house, thereby evening the surface, is liable due to the labor of building, as he thereby engages in construction of the house. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Similarly, Rava said: One who had a hole and filled it, in the house he is liable due to the labor of building. In the field, he is liable due to the labor of plowing. Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat and digs the hole only because he needs its dirt is exempt for that act, which is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law. And even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in general one who performs labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of that action, is liable for it; that ruling applies only to a purpose that is constructive. However, this purpose is destructive, as one performs an act that unnecessarily mars the surface of the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda would agree that in this case he is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who reaps. It was taught in a Tosefta with regard to the labor of reaping: One who reaps, and one who picks grapes, and one who harvests dates, and one who collects olives, and one who gathers figs have all performed one type of labor, as they all involve picking fruit. Rav Pappa said: One who threw a clod of earth at a palm tree and severed dates is liable to bring two sin-offerings: One due to severing, which is a subcategory of the primary category of reaping; and one for extracting, which is a subcategory of the primary category of threshing, as he removes something edible, the date, from its cover, its cluster. Rav Ashi said: In that case, one is exempt, since that is not the typical manner of severing, and that is not the typical manner of extracting, and one who performs a labor in an atypical manner is exempt. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who gathers. Rava said: One who gathers salt from salt pools is liable due to the labor of gathering, as he gathers a substance from the field into a pile. Abaye said: That is not so, as the prohibition of gathering by Torah law applies only to produce that grows from the ground. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who threshes. A tanna taught in a Tosefta: One who threshes, and one who beats flax to remove it from the hard cover of its stalk, and one who strikes a cotton plant to remove the cotton seeds have all performed one type of labor. And we learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who winnows, and one who selects, and one who grinds, and one who sifts. The Gemara asks: The prohibited labor of winnowing is the same as the prohibited labor of selecting, which is the same as the prohibited labor of sifting. They are all identical in the manner in which they are performed and have the same objective: Separating food from the accompanying waste. Why was it necessary to list them all? An answer was provided by Abaye and Rava, who both said and established a principle: Any manner of labor that was performed in the Tabernacle, for the purposes of the Tabernacle, even though there is a different labor that is similar to it, the mishna enumerated it. Every labor that was performed in the Tabernacle is significant. The Gemara asks: And let him enumerate the labor of pounding as well, as wheat was pounded to remove its outer kernel in the Tabernacle. Abaye said: The labor of pounding is not one of the essential stages in the baking of bread, as paupers eat their bread without pounding the wheat to remove the bran. Therefore, since the tanna enumerated threshing, there was no need to include pounding among the labors enumerated in the breadmaking process. Rava said a different explanation: Who is the tanna of this mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: The primary categories of labor are forty-less-one, a number derived from a textual allusion. Therefore, the list cannot be expanded. And had the tanna enumerated pounding, there would be forty labors rather than thirty-nine. The Gemara asks: And let him take out one of these, selecting or winnowing, and insert pounding, thereby leaving the number intact. Rather, the reason that the tanna did not include pounding is clear, according to the explanation of Abaye. The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the laws of selecting: If there were several types of food before him, and he wants to remove one or more from the mixture, one selects and eats, selects and puts aside. And one may not select, and if one did select, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? The end of this baraita contradicts the beginning. Ulla said: It is saying as follows: One selects and eats if he is doing so for the purpose of that day, Shabbat. And he selects and puts aside food for the purpose of that day. And one may not select for the purpose of the next day. And if one did select for the next day, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Ḥisda strongly objects to this explanation: And is it permitted to bake for that day, and is it permitted to cook for that day? No other labor prohibited on Shabbat may be performed for the purpose of Shabbat, and the same should hold true for selecting. Rather, Rav Ḥisda said it is to be understood as follows: One selects and eats less than the measure of a dried fig-bulk, which is the smallest amount for which one is liable by Torah law. One selects and puts aside less than that measure. And one may not select the measure of a dried fig-bulk, and if one did select that measure, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Yosef strongly objects to this explanation: And is it permitted to bake less than the measure for liability ab initio? Although performing a prohibited labor on a minute measure does not engender liability, it is prohibited. Therefore, the baraita cannot be interpreted as saying that one may ab initio select an amount that is less than the measure for liability. Rather, Rav Yosef said: One selects and eats by hand, selects and put aside by hand. However, with a basket [kanon] or with a plate, both of which are large, flat vessels used for sorting sizeable quantities, one may not select ab initio. And if he did select, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering if he did so unwittingly. If he did so intentionally he is exempt from stoning. However, it is prohibited. And one may not select with a sieve or with a sifter. And if he did select with those utensils, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Hamnuna strongly objects to this: Does the mishna teach anything about a basket or a plate? Rav Yosef’s explanation is based on the addition of details that do not appear in the baraita either. Rather, Rav Hamnuna said: One selects and eats if he is removing food from the waste, and similarly, selects and puts aside if he is removing food from the waste. However, one may not select waste from food, and if he did select in that manner, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The typical method of selecting is the removal of waste from the food. An individual who alters the procedure is not liable. Abaye strongly objects to this: Does the mishna teach anything about food from waste? That detail is not mentioned in the baraita either. Rather, Abaye said: One selects and eats if he is removing food for immediate use, and similarly one selects and puts aside for immediate use. However, one may not select for use later that same day. And if he did select, he is considered like one who selects for storage, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering. This explanation requires no emendation of the mishna. It is merely an interpretation of the phrase: One selects and eats, as referring to selecting for immediate use. The Gemara relates that the Sages stated Abaye’s explanation of the baraita before Rava. He said to them: Naḥmani, Abaye, spoke well. Until this point, the Gemara discussed selecting food from waste. The Gemara proceeds to discuss a different case. If there were two types of foods before him, and he selected and ate one type, and selected and put aside one type, Rav Ashi taught: He is exempt. Rav Yirmeya from Difti taught: He is liable. Rav Ashi taught: He is exempt. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that in that case he is liable? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: This, where Rav Ashi said that he is exempt, is referring to a case where he selects by means of a basket or a plate, as that method of selecting is not considered expert work; and that, where the baraita said he is liable, is in a case where he selects by means of a sieve or a sifter, as that method of selecting is considered expert work. The Gemara relates that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: It was the Shabbat of Rav Beivai to serve food to the students, and Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi happened to come to his house. He placed before them a basket of fruits without removing the leaves and the stems. And I do not know whether he did so because he holds that it is prohibited to select food from waste when it is not for immediate consumption, or whether he did so because he intended to show generosity to his guests by creating the impression that the basket was full. A fruit-filled basket conveys to the guests that there is plenty and that they may take as much as they wish. Therefore, there is no clear proof from this incident. Ḥizkiya said: One who selects lupines from their waste after boiling them is liable for performing the prohibited labor of selecting. The Gemara asks: Let us say, based on this statement, that Ḥizkiya holds that even selecting food from waste is prohibited. The Gemara rejects this proof: Lupines are different,

even though there is a different labor that is similar to it, the mishna enumerated it. Every labor that was performed in the Tabernacle is significant. The Gemara asks: And let him enumerate the labor of pounding as well, as wheat was pounded to remove its outer kernel in the Tabernacle. Abaye said: The labor of pounding is not one of the essential stages in the baking of bread, as paupers eat their bread without pounding the wheat to remove the bran. Therefore, since the tanna enumerated threshing, there was no need to include pounding among the labors enumerated in the breadmaking process. Rava said a different explanation: Who is the tanna of this mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who said: The primary categories of labor are forty-less-one, a number derived from a textual allusion. Therefore, the list cannot be expanded. And had the tanna enumerated pounding, there would be forty labors rather than thirty-nine. The Gemara asks: And let him take out one of these, selecting or winnowing, and insert pounding, thereby leaving the number intact. Rather, the reason that the tanna did not include pounding is clear, according to the explanation of Abaye. The Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the laws of selecting: If there were several types of food before him, and he wants to remove one or more from the mixture, one selects and eats, selects and puts aside. And one may not select, and if one did select, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? The end of this baraita contradicts the beginning. Ulla said: It is saying as follows: One selects and eats if he is doing so for the purpose of that day, Shabbat. And he selects and puts aside food for the purpose of that day. And one may not select for the purpose of the next day. And if one did select for the next day, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Ḥisda strongly objects to this explanation: And is it permitted to bake for that day, and is it permitted to cook for that day? No other labor prohibited on Shabbat may be performed for the purpose of Shabbat, and the same should hold true for selecting. Rather, Rav Ḥisda said it is to be understood as follows: One selects and eats less than the measure of a dried fig-bulk, which is the smallest amount for which one is liable by Torah law. One selects and puts aside less than that measure. And one may not select the measure of a dried fig-bulk, and if one did select that measure, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Yosef strongly objects to this explanation: And is it permitted to bake less than the measure for liability ab initio? Although performing a prohibited labor on a minute measure does not engender liability, it is prohibited. Therefore, the baraita cannot be interpreted as saying that one may ab initio select an amount that is less than the measure for liability. Rather, Rav Yosef said: One selects and eats by hand, selects and put aside by hand. However, with a basket [kanon] or with a plate, both of which are large, flat vessels used for sorting sizeable quantities, one may not select ab initio. And if he did select, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering if he did so unwittingly. If he did so intentionally he is exempt from stoning. However, it is prohibited. And one may not select with a sieve or with a sifter. And if he did select with those utensils, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Rav Hamnuna strongly objects to this: Does the mishna teach anything about a basket or a plate? Rav Yosef’s explanation is based on the addition of details that do not appear in the baraita either. Rather, Rav Hamnuna said: One selects and eats if he is removing food from the waste, and similarly, selects and puts aside if he is removing food from the waste. However, one may not select waste from food, and if he did select in that manner, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The typical method of selecting is the removal of waste from the food. An individual who alters the procedure is not liable. Abaye strongly objects to this: Does the mishna teach anything about food from waste? That detail is not mentioned in the baraita either. Rather, Abaye said: One selects and eats if he is removing food for immediate use, and similarly one selects and puts aside for immediate use. However, one may not select for use later that same day. And if he did select, he is considered like one who selects for storage, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering. This explanation requires no emendation of the mishna. It is merely an interpretation of the phrase: One selects and eats, as referring to selecting for immediate use. The Gemara relates that the Sages stated Abaye’s explanation of the baraita before Rava. He said to them: Naḥmani, Abaye, spoke well. Until this point, the Gemara discussed selecting food from waste. The Gemara proceeds to discuss a different case. If there were two types of foods before him, and he selected and ate one type, and selected and put aside one type, Rav Ashi taught: He is exempt. Rav Yirmeya from Difti taught: He is liable. Rav Ashi taught: He is exempt. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that in that case he is liable? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: This, where Rav Ashi said that he is exempt, is referring to a case where he selects by means of a basket or a plate, as that method of selecting is not considered expert work; and that, where the baraita said he is liable, is in a case where he selects by means of a sieve or a sifter, as that method of selecting is considered expert work. The Gemara relates that when Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: It was the Shabbat of Rav Beivai to serve food to the students, and Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi happened to come to his house. He placed before them a basket of fruits without removing the leaves and the stems. And I do not know whether he did so because he holds that it is prohibited to select food from waste when it is not for immediate consumption, or whether he did so because he intended to show generosity to his guests by creating the impression that the basket was full. A fruit-filled basket conveys to the guests that there is plenty and that they may take as much as they wish. Therefore, there is no clear proof from this incident. Ḥizkiya said: One who selects lupines from their waste after boiling them is liable for performing the prohibited labor of selecting. The Gemara asks: Let us say, based on this statement, that Ḥizkiya holds that even selecting food from waste is prohibited. The Gemara rejects this proof: Lupines are different,

as they are boiled seven times. And, if one does not remove them from the shells, they rot. Therefore, it is considered like removing waste from food. The rotting edible portion of the lupine causes the shell to reek. Removing the edible portion, therefore, has the legal status of removing waste. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who grinds. Rav Pappa said: One who chops beets into small pieces on Shabbat is liable due to the prohibited labor of grinding, as the actions are similar. Rav Menashe said: One who chops wood chips for sawdust (Rambam) is liable due to the prohibited labor of grinding. Rav Ashi said: If he is particular in his chopping with regard to the measurement, i.e., he is careful to cut all the chips to a particular size, he is also liable due to the labor of cutting. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who kneads and one who bakes. Rav Pappa said: Our tanna left out the labor of cooking the spices for dye, which was performed in the Tabernacle, and included the labor of baking, which was not performed in the construction of the Tabernacle. If, as stated above, all the primary categories of labor were derived from the labors in the Tabernacle, why did the tanna omit cooking? The Gemara answers: Our tanna cited the sequence of preparing bread, which was the underlying principle behind his organization of the primary categories of labor. He opened with plowing and concluded with the preparation of bread. Rav Aḥa bar Rav Avira said: One who places a peg into an oven to dry is liable for performing the labor of cooking. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that he intends to strengthen the utensil, as ultimately, the peg is hardened in the oven, in contrast to cooking in which the fire softens the item being cooked. Therefore, he teaches us that initially the wood is softened in the oven, and only afterward it is hardened. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: One who boils pitch is liable for performing the labor of cooking. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since it proceeds to harden afterward, say that it is not considered cooking. One might think that since the pitch was hard before it was cooked and will ultimately be hard after it is cooked, boiling pitch is not considered cooking. Therefore, he teaches us that even a temporary change is considered cooking. Rava said: One who unwittingly crafted an earthenware barrel on Shabbat is liable to bring seven sin-offerings: He crumbles the lumps of dirt; which is (1) grinding; (2) selects the stones from the dirt; (3) kneads the mortar; (4) cuts the mortar into pieces of a suitable size; (5) builds the mold; (6) kindles the fire, and then fires the earthenware vessel, which is (7) baking (ge’onim). One who crafts an oven is liable for eight sin-offerings, since in addition to those seven labors, he spreads another layer of mortar to finish the job, performing the prohibited labor of (8) smoothing. Abaye said: One who unwittingly crafts a receptacle from reeds on Shabbat is liable to bring eleven sin-offerings. In pruning the reeds, he performed both (1) reaping and (2) planting, as he stimulates growth of the remaining reeds. He (3) gathers the reeds; (4) selects them; (5) smooths and levels them; cuts them into small pieces, which is (6) grinding; and (7) cuts them to a particular measurement. When he begins weaving the reeds, he performs the labors of (8) stretching the warp; (9) constructing two meshes; and (10) weaving. Crafting the object as a whole constitutes (11) building (ge’onim). And if he sews the mouth of the receptacle, he is liable to bring thirteen sin-offerings with the added labors of (12) sewing and (13) tying. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, which are labors in the process of shearing and spinning wool. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who unwittingly spins wool still attached on the back of an animal on Shabbat is liable to bring three sin-offerings: One due to shearing, since, in the process, some of the wool is detached from the sheep; and one due to combing the wool; and one due to spinning. Rav Kahana said: This is not a typical manner of shearing, and this is not a typical manner of combing, and this is not a typical manner of spinning. The Gemara asks: And is that not a typical manner of spinning? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita in the name of Rabbi Neḥemya that the verse in the context of the work of the Tabernacle: “And all the women whose hearts lifted them with wisdom spun the goats” (Exodus 35:26) means that they washed the hair on the goats, and they spun it into threads on the goats themselves without first shearing the hair? Apparently, spinning on the back of an animal is considered a typical manner of spinning. The Gemara answers: Extraordinary wisdom is different. Although certain individuals are capable of spinning wool that way, the typical person is not capable of performing that feat. The Sages taught in a Tosefta: One who unwittingly plucks a large feather from the wing of a bird on Shabbat, and who snips the tip of the feather, and who pulls out the thin threads that comprise the feather is liable to bring three sin-offerings. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in explanation: One who plucks the wing is liable due to the labor of shearing. One who snips the tip of the feather is liable due to cutting. And one who pulls out the threads is liable due to smoothing. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who ties and one who unties. The Gemara asks: Where was there tying in the Tabernacle? Rava said: They tied the tents of the Tabernacle to the pegs. The Gemara rejects this: And is that considered performance of the labor of tying? That was tying a knot in order to untie it. When the children of Israel departed from an encampment, they dismantled the Tabernacle, which involved untying all of the knots. One is not liable for tying a temporary knot on Shabbat. Rather, Abaye said: As the weavers of curtains for the Tabernacle, when a thread would rip, they would tie it. Rava said to him: You have resolved the problem with regard to the labor of tying; however, with regard to the labor of untying, what can be said? Where, in the construction of the Tabernacle, was the labor of untying performed? And if you say that it was performed if one found two threads with knots tied next to each other, he untied one and left one tied; now, before a king of flesh and blood one would not do so, as the curtain would look flawed, in the Tabernacle, before the King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, would one do so? Rather, Rava said, and some say that Rav Elai said: The trappers of ḥilazon, whose blood was used in the Tabernacle as a dye, tie and untie their nets. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who sews two stitches. The Gemara asks: That does not endure; two stitches will unravel immediately. A prohibited labor whose result is temporary is not considered a prohibited labor. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That has the legal status of a prohibited labor only in a case where, after sewing the stitches, he tied them. He tied a knot at each of the two ends of the thread so that the stitches would not unravel. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who tears in order to sew two stitches. The Gemara asks: Was there tearing in the construction of the Tabernacle? The Gemara answers that it was Rabba and Rabbi Zeira who both said the following explanation:

A derivative is a labor that resembles one of these categories of [forbidden] labor.⁷In his Commentary on the Mishnah (Shabbat 7:2), the Rambam explains that a derivative is an activity that produces a result similar to that produced by one of the forbidden labors, but differs both in the intent and the nature of the activity. What is implied? A person who cuts a vegetable into small pieces to cook is liable,⁸See Chapter 21, Halachah 18. As mentioned in the notes on that halachah, for the activity to be forbidden as a derivative of grinding, one must have the intent to cook it. for this activity resembles grinding. When a person grinds, he takes one [large] entity, and divides it into smaller parts. Anyone who performs an activity that resembles this is [performing] a derivative of the labor of grinding. Similarly, a person who takes a strip of metal and pulverizes it to use the powder⁹See Chapter 8, Halachah 15. acts as goldsmiths do;¹⁰This phrase emphasizes that to be liable, one's intent in pulverizing the metal must be for a useful purpose. If one's intent is merely destructive in nature, one is not liable. he is [performing] a derivative of the labor of grinding.

Tavi the bird hunter [rishba] that Shmuel said: The decree that growths of teruma, i.e., produce that grows from teruma that was planted in the ground, are considered teruma, the Sages also issued on that day. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this decree? Rabbi Ḥanina said: A decree due to pure teruma in the hand of a non-priest Israelite. One who seeks to avoid giving teruma to a priest would plant it in the ground and thereby negate its teruma status. To prevent him from doing so, the Sages decreed that that which grows from the teruma is also considered teruma. Consequently, one would gain nothing by replanting the teruma. Rava said: If they are suspected of that, let them refrain from separating teruma altogether. Rather, Rava said: We know that with regard to an Israelite, as opposed to a Levite, fundamentally it is possible to perform the mitzva of teruma by separating merely one grain of wheat, in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who said that by Torah law there is no fixed measure for teruma. By separating one grain of wheat as teruma for all the wheat on the threshing floor, one fulfills his obligation. Since he nevertheless did not take advantage of that possibility to exempt himself from the obligation of separating teruma, he is trustworthy, and there is no reason to suspect that he will seek to avoid giving teruma to the priest by planting it. Rather, the reason for the decree is due to impure teruma in the hand of a priest. A priest is forbidden to eat impure teruma and he is required to burn it. However, the priest is permitted to derive benefit from its burning. The Sages were concerned lest he keep the impure teruma with him until the season of sowing and sow his field with it, and, as a result, he encounter a stumbling-block because over time he is liable to forget that the teruma is impure and eat it. With regard to the total of eighteen decrees, the Gemara asks: And what is the other decree? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla: In a case of one who was carrying a purse with money in it on Shabbat eve, and it got dark for him on the way, the Torah law permitted him to carry the purse in increments, each of which is less than four cubits. However, the Sages issued the following decree: It is prohibited to carry in increments; he should give his purse to a gentile accompanying him. This decree was also issued on that day. And the other decree: The Sage Bali said that Avimi of Sanvata said: The decrees with regard to gentiles that prohibit their bread, and their oil, and their wine, and their daughters are all one decree of the eighteen matters. The Gemara asks: This works out well according to Rabbi Meir, as according to his opinion the Gemara already enumerated eighteen decrees. However, according to Rabbi Yosei, who holds that the dispute remains with regard to the matter of vessels in the courtyard, they are only seventeen. The Gemara answers: There is also that statement of Rav Aḥa bar Adda, as Rav Aḥa bar Adda said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said: The Sages issued a decree prohibiting eating their bread due to their oil. And they issued a decree prohibiting their oil due to their wine. Consequently, there are two separate decrees. The Gemara wonders: They issued a decree on their bread because of their oil. In what way is the prohibition on oil stronger than the prohibition on bread? Rather, say that they issued a decree prohibiting their bread and their oil due to their wine. And they issued a decree prohibiting their wine due to the fact that it leads to familiarity, and people will come to marry their daughters. And they issued a decree prohibiting their daughters due to something else, idolatry. And they further issued a decree on something else, idolatry, due to something else. The Gemara asks: What is the something else alluded to here? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: They issued a decree on a gentile baby, according him the legal status that he transmits impurity as one with the legal status of a great zav, who experienced three emissions, even though he did not experience an emission. This was in order to distance Jewish children from gentile children so that a Jewish boy should not be accustomed to be with a gentile in homosexual relations. The Gemara asks: If so, according to Rabbi Meir it is difficult as well, as they are now nineteen decrees. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir counts the decrees of food items and vessels that became impure through contact with liquids as one. Consequently, according to Rabbi Meir, too, there are only eighteen decrees. MISHNA: In this mishna there is a fundamental dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai: Must one begin refraining from actions prohibited on Shabbat on Shabbat eve? Or, may one initiate an action prior to Shabbat, even if he knows that it will continue on its own on Shabbat itself? These are the details of that dispute: Beit Shammai say: One may only soak dry ink in water and dry plants, which produce dyes, in water and vetch for animal food to soften them in water on Shabbat eve, adjacent to Shabbat, if there is clearly sufficient time for them to soak for their designated purpose while it is still day, before Shabbat begins, and their continued soaking on Shabbat will have no effect. And Beit Hillel permit doing so. Beit Shammai say: One may only place bundles of combed flax inside the oven on Shabbat eve if there is sufficient time so that they will be heated while it is still day. And one may only place wool into the dyer’s kettle if there is sufficient time for the wool to absorb the dye while it is still day. And Beit Hillel permit doing so. Beit Shammai say: One may spread traps for an animal and birds and fish only if there is sufficient time remaining in the day for them to be trapped in them while it is still day, and Beit Hillel permit doing so even if there is not sufficient time remaining in the day. Beit Shammai say: One may only sell an item to a gentile on Shabbat eve, and one may only load a burden on his donkey with him, and one may only lift a burden on him if there remains sufficient time for the gentile to arrive to a near place prior to Shabbat, and the Jew will play no role in the performance of a prohibited labor by the gentile on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel permit doing so. Beit Shammai say: One may not give skins to a gentile tanner, nor clothes to a gentile launderer, unless there is sufficient time for work on them to be completed while it is still day, before Shabbat begins. And in all of them Beit Hillel permit doing so with the sun, i.e., as long as the sun is shining on Friday. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: The ancestral house of my father, the dynasty of Nesi’im from the house of Hillel, was accustomed to give its white clothes to a gentile launderer no fewer than three days before Shabbat. And, however, these, Beit Shammai, and those, Beit Hillel, agree that, ab initio, one may load the beam of the olive press on the olives on Shabbat eve while it is still day, so that the oil will continue to be squeezed out of the olives on Shabbat. So too, one may load the circular wine press to accelerate the process of producing wine from the grapes. GEMARA: Before clarifying the matters themselves, the Gemara seeks to determine: Who is the tanna who holds that merely adding water to ink without any additional action constitutes its soaking, and one is liable for doing so on Shabbat, as he performed an act of kneading, one of the primary categories of labor? Rav Yosef said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it was taught in a baraita: In a case where one person adds the flour and another one adds the water into one vessel, the latter one is liable for kneading the dough, which is a prohibited labor on Shabbat, even though he did not actually knead the dough; that is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei says: He is not liable for the prohibited labor of kneading until he actually kneads the dough. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, merely soaking the dough in water is considered a prohibited labor. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: And perhaps Rabbi Yosei only stated that actual kneading is required to be liable for performing the prohibited labor of kneading in the case of flour, which can be kneaded; however, ink, which cannot be kneaded, say that its soaking is considered a full-fledged prohibited labor, and he will therefore be liable, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara rejects this: It should not enter your mind to say so, as it was taught in a baraita: In a case where one places the ashes and one adds the water, the latter one is liable, although he did not knead them. That is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: He is not liable until he actually kneads them. Apparently, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, he is only liable for committing the prohibited labor of kneading on Shabbat if he actually kneads the mixture, as he stated his halakha even with regard to ashes, which cannot be kneaded. The Gemara asks: And perhaps, what is the meaning of ashes [efer] mentioned here? Perhaps it is soil [afar], which can be kneaded. In that case he is not liable until he actually kneads the mixture. However, with regard to ashes, which cannot be kneaded, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, also holds that even if he did not actually knead the mixture he is liable. The Gemara rejects this: Wasn’t the dispute taught in one baraita with regard to ashes, and wasn’t it taught in another baraita with regard to soil? In both cases, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, disagreed. The Gemara rejects this proof: Were they taught next to each other? Had both of these baraitot been taught together, it would have been truly possible to arrive at the conclusion that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, disagrees both in the case of ashes and in the case of soil. However, since the baraita that speaks about ashes was taught elsewhere by a different amora who cited it in the name of Rabbi Yosei, the difference in language does not prove that Rabbi Yosei disagrees in both cases. The Sages taught in a Tosefta: One may open a canal that passes adjacent to a garden on Shabbat eve at nightfall, so that water will flow into a garden and the garden continuously fills with water all day long on Shabbat. Similarly, one may place incense, perfumed herbs placed on coals to produce a fragrance, on coals beneath the clothes on Shabbat eve and the clothes may be continuously perfumed all day long. And, similarly, one may place sulfur beneath the silver vessels on Shabbat eve at nightfall for the purpose of coloring the vessels, and they may be continuously exposed to sulfur all day long. And one may place an eye salve [kilor] on the eye and a bandage [ispelanit] smeared with cream on a wound on Shabbat eve at nightfall, and the wound may continuously heal all day long on Shabbat. However, one may not place wheat kernels into the water mill unless he does so in a way so that they will be ground while it is still day on Friday and not on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that the baraita prohibited a mill and permitted other prohibited labor? Rabba said: Because it makes noise and the public will hear the mill grinding on Shabbat. Although no prohibited labor is being performed, doing so displays contempt for Shabbat. Therefore, the Sages prohibited it. Rav Yosef said to Rabba: And let the Master say a better reason, due to the obligation to ensure the resting of utensils. Even the utensils of a Jewish person may not be used for prohibited labor on Shabbat. As it was taught in halakhic midrash, the Mekhilta: That which is stated: “And in all that I said to you, take heed” (Exodus 23:13), is an allusion to matters mentioned in the Oral Torah. It comes to include the resting of utensils on Shabbat. Rather, Rav Yosef said: The reason for the prohibition of the mill on Shabbat is due to the resting of utensils. Since the obligation of resting utensils on Shabbat was mentioned, the Gemara says: Now that you said that Beit Hillel also hold that resting utensils on Shabbat is required by Torah law, with regard to sulfur and incense on coals that are placed under silver vessels and clothes, respectively, what is the reason that the Sages permitted this on Shabbat? Isn’t that performed on Shabbat in utensils? The Gemara answers: Because the utensil itself does not perform an action when the incense or sulfur is burning. With regard to the bundles of flax, what is the reason that they permitted placing them in the oven on Shabbat eve at nightfall to dry, even though the oven is performing a prohibited labor on Shabbat? Because it does not perform an action; rather, on the contrary, it sits idle in its place and the prohibited labor occurs on its own. However, with regard to traps of an animal, and a bird, and a fish, which perform a bona fide action of trapping, what is the reason that they permitted spreading them on Shabbat eve at nightfall? The Gemara explains: There too, it is referring to a fish hook and nets [kokrei], which perform no action. They stand in place, and the fish comes to them and is trapped. Indeed, a trap that performs an action is prohibited. And now that Rav Oshaya said that Rav Asi said: Who is the tanna who states that the obligation of resting utensils on Shabbat is by Torah law? The tanna is Beit Shammai and not Beit Hillel. Consequently, according to Beit Shammai, whether the utensil performs an action or whether it does not perform an action, it is prohibited. And according to Beit Hillel, even though it performs an action, it is nevertheless permitted. The Gemara asks: And now that you said that according to Beit Shammai even though the utensil does not perform an action it is prohibited, if so,

Because it is only made to enhance the color of the food. That does not negate the egg-white as significant food in the sense that it would be considered waste, and therefore, no actual selection is performed. It is stated: With regard to mustard that one kneaded on Shabbat eve, on the following day, Shabbat, Rav said: One may dissolve it in wine or water with a vessel, but not with his hand, as using a vessel diverges from the normal method of preparation. Shmuel said to him: Why may he not dissolve it with his hand? Is that to say that he dissolves it with his hand every day? If it is prepared in that manner, it is donkey food. Certainly dissolving by hand is not the manner in which mustard is prepared during the week. Therefore, dissolving mustard with a vessel should not be permitted on Shabbat. Rather, Shmuel said the opposite: He may dissolve it with his hand as a divergence from the typical method of preparation, but he may not dissolve it in the usual manner, with a vessel. It is stated that amora’im from Eretz Yisrael also disputed this issue, as Rabbi Elazar said: Both this and that, dissolving by hand and with a vessel, are prohibited; while Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Both this and that are permitted. Abaye and Rava both said: The halakha is not in accordance with the lenient opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. Subsequently, Rabbi Yoḥanan stood and adopted the opinion of Rabbi Elazar and prohibited both methods of dissolving. Rabbi Elazar stood and adopted the opinion of Shmuel, who prohibited using a vessel but permitted it by hand. Given these stances, Abaye and Rava both said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who prohibited both methods. The Gemara relates: Abaye’s mother, actually his foster mother, prepared mustard for him, and he did not eat it. Ze’eira’s wife prepared mustard for Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi, her husband’s student, and he did not eat it. She said to him: I made this for your rabbi and he ate it, and you do not eat it? Rava bar Shabba said: I was standing before Ravina, and they stirred mustard for him with the inner part of the garlic, and he ate it. Mar Zutra said: The halakha is not in accordance with any of these statements. Rather, it is in accordance with this one, as it was stated: Mustard that one kneaded on Shabbat eve, on the following day he may dissolve it either by hand or with a vessel, and he may place honey in it. And when he dissolves it he may not beat it forcefully as would a craftsman, but he may mix it gently. Cress that one ground on Shabbat eve, on the following day he may place oil and vinegar in it, and add amita into the mixture, and he may not beat it, but he may mix it. Similarly, garlic that one crushed on Shabbat eve, on the following day, he may place beans and grits in it, and he may not pound, but mix, and he may add amita into the mixture. The Gemara asks: What is amita? The Gemara answers: It is mint. Abaye said: Learn from this that adding mint is beneficial for cress. We also learned in the mishna: One may prepare anumlin on Shabbat. The Sages taught in a baraita: One may prepare anumlin on Shabbat. However, one may not prepare aluntit. The baraita explains: And what is anumlin and what is aluntit? Anumlin is a drink, which is a mixture of wine, honey, and pepper. Aluntit is a mixture of aged wine and clear water and balsam, which they prepare for use after bathing in a bathhouse to cool down from the heat of the bathhouse. It is prohibited to prepare it on Shabbat because it is a form of remedy. Rav Yosef said: On one occasion, I followed Mar Ukva into a bathhouse. When I exited, he came and gave me one cup of this wine to drink, and I felt its chill from the hairs on my head down to the toenails on my feet. And if he had given me another cup to drink, and if I would have survived it, I would have feared a reduction of my merit in the World-to-Come. The Gemara asks: Didn’t Mar Ukva drink this wine every day? How was he not harmed? The Gemara answers: Mar Ukva was different, as he grew accustomed to it. MISHNA: One may not soak asafoetida in lukewarm water to prepare a medicinal drink from it; however, one may place it into vinegar like a standard spice. And one may not soak vetches in water in order to separate them from their chaff, nor rub them by hand so as to remove their chaff. However, one may place them into a sieve or into a basket, and if the chaff gets removed, so be it. One may not sift straw in a sieve, and similarly, one may not place it on a high place so that that the chaff blows away in the wind; however, one may take the straw in a sieve and place it into the trough of an animal, and one need not be concerned if the chaff is removed in the process. GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If one unwittingly soaked asafoetida on Shabbat, what is the halakha? Rav Adda from the city of Naresh interpreted it before Rav Yosef: If one soaked it, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Abaye said to him: But if that is so, if one soaked a piece of meat in water, would you also say that he is liable? No cooking was performed at all. Rather, Abaye said: It is prohibited by rabbinic decree, so that one will not conduct himself on Shabbat in the manner in which he conducts himself during the week. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yannai: What is the halakha with regard to soaking asafoetida in cold water on Shabbat? Rabbi Yannai said to him: It is prohibited. Rabbi Yoḥanan asked: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: One may not soak asafoetida in lukewarm water, indicating that it is permitted to soak it in cold water? Rabbi Yannai said to him: If so, that is the difference between my knowledge and yours, as I am able to analyze the halakha more profoundly. In this case, the mishna is not a reliable source, as the mishna expresses an individual opinion. As it was taught in the Tosefta: One may neither soak asafoetida in hot water nor in cold water. Rabbi Yosei says: In hot water it is prohibited; in cold water it is permitted. The mishna that does not prohibit cold water is in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Yosei, but the halakha is not ruled based on that opinion. The Gemara asks: For what purpose is soaked asafoetida prepared? The Gemara answers: As a cure for heaviness of the heart. One who feels a pain in his heart drinks asafoetida. The Gemara relates: Rav Aḥa bar Yosef felt heaviness in his heart. He came before Mar Ukva to ask his advice. Mar Ukva said to him: Go drink the weight of three shekels of asafoetida in three days. He went and drank on Thursday and Shabbat eve. In the morning, he went and asked in the study hall if he could drink it on Shabbat. They said to him: The Sage from the school of Rav Adda taught, and others say, that the Sage from the school of Mar bar Rav Adda taught: A person may drink asafoetida on Shabbat, even a kav or two kav, and he need not be concerned about the decree prohibiting medicine, because asafoetida is drunk by healthy people as well. Rav Aḥa bar Yosef said to them: With regard to drinking, I have no dilemma. When I raised a dilemma, it is with regard to soaking asafoetida; what is the halakha? Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said to them: There was an incident that happened with me, and I came and asked that question to Rav Adda bar Ahava, and he did not have an answer for it. I came and asked Rav Huna, and he said that this is what Rav is saying: One may soak asafoetida in cold water and place it in the sun to warm it so it will be fit to drink. The Gemara asks: Was Rav’s ruling according to the opinion of the one who permitted soaking asafoetida in cold water? The Gemara answers: His ruling could be even according to the opinion of the one who prohibited doing so; this prohibition applies only when he had not drunk asafoetida at all; however, here, since he drank it on Thursday and on Shabbat eve, if he does not drink on Shabbat he would thereby be endangered. Therefore, he is permitted even to soak the asafoetida. The Gemara relates another incident involving Rav Aḥa bar Yosef: Rav Aḥa bar Yosef was walking and leaning on the shoulder of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak, his sister’s son. Rav Aḥa said to him: When we arrive at Rav Safra’s house, bring me in. When they arrived, Rav Naḥman brought him in. Rav Aḥa then raised a dilemma before Rav Safra: What is the halakha pertaining to rubbing and thereby softening a linen shirt that is hard after being laundered on Shabbat? Does one intend to soften the shirt, and one may well do so? Or perhaps he intends to generate whiteness in the shirt, and it is prohibited? Rav Safra said to him: He intends to soften, and one may well do so. When Rav Aḥa emerged and came from Rav Safra’s house, Rav Naḥman said to him: What dilemma did the Master raise before Rav Safra? Rav Aḥa said to him: I raised the following dilemma before him: What is the halakha pertaining to rubbing and thereby softening a linen shirt on Shabbat, and he said to me: One may well do so. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak asked: And let the Master raise the same dilemma with regard to rubbing a scarf. He replied: I did not raise the dilemma with regard to a scarf, as I raised it before Rav Huna. And he resolved it for me and said that it is permitted (Rif). Rav Naḥman asked him: And let the Master resolve the dilemma with regard to a shirt from Rav Huna’s ruling with regard to a scarf. Rav Aḥa said to him: There is a difference between the cases: There, in the case of a shirt, it appears that one is generating whiteness, whereas here, in the case of a scarf, it does not appear that one is generating whiteness, as people are not so particular with the whiteness of a scarf, and one’s intention is undoubtedly to soften it. Rav Ḥisda said: With regard to this linen shirt,

as they are boiled seven times. And, if one does not remove them from the shells, they rot. Therefore, it is considered like removing waste from food. The rotting edible portion of the lupine causes the shell to reek. Removing the edible portion, therefore, has the legal status of removing waste. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who grinds. Rav Pappa said: One who chops beets into small pieces on Shabbat is liable due to the prohibited labor of grinding, as the actions are similar. Rav Menashe said: One who chops wood chips for sawdust (Rambam) is liable due to the prohibited labor of grinding. Rav Ashi said: If he is particular in his chopping with regard to the measurement, i.e., he is careful to cut all the chips to a particular size, he is also liable due to the labor of cutting. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who kneads and one who bakes. Rav Pappa said: Our tanna left out the labor of cooking the spices for dye, which was performed in the Tabernacle, and included the labor of baking, which was not performed in the construction of the Tabernacle. If, as stated above, all the primary categories of labor were derived from the labors in the Tabernacle, why did the tanna omit cooking? The Gemara answers: Our tanna cited the sequence of preparing bread, which was the underlying principle behind his organization of the primary categories of labor. He opened with plowing and concluded with the preparation of bread. Rav Aḥa bar Rav Avira said: One who places a peg into an oven to dry is liable for performing the labor of cooking. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that he intends to strengthen the utensil, as ultimately, the peg is hardened in the oven, in contrast to cooking in which the fire softens the item being cooked. Therefore, he teaches us that initially the wood is softened in the oven, and only afterward it is hardened. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: One who boils pitch is liable for performing the labor of cooking. The Gemara asks: That is obvious. The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since it proceeds to harden afterward, say that it is not considered cooking. One might think that since the pitch was hard before it was cooked and will ultimately be hard after it is cooked, boiling pitch is not considered cooking. Therefore, he teaches us that even a temporary change is considered cooking. Rava said: One who unwittingly crafted an earthenware barrel on Shabbat is liable to bring seven sin-offerings: He crumbles the lumps of dirt; which is (1) grinding; (2) selects the stones from the dirt; (3) kneads the mortar; (4) cuts the mortar into pieces of a suitable size; (5) builds the mold; (6) kindles the fire, and then fires the earthenware vessel, which is (7) baking (ge’onim). One who crafts an oven is liable for eight sin-offerings, since in addition to those seven labors, he spreads another layer of mortar to finish the job, performing the prohibited labor of (8) smoothing. Abaye said: One who unwittingly crafts a receptacle from reeds on Shabbat is liable to bring eleven sin-offerings. In pruning the reeds, he performed both (1) reaping and (2) planting, as he stimulates growth of the remaining reeds. He (3) gathers the reeds; (4) selects them; (5) smooths and levels them; cuts them into small pieces, which is (6) grinding; and (7) cuts them to a particular measurement. When he begins weaving the reeds, he performs the labors of (8) stretching the warp; (9) constructing two meshes; and (10) weaving. Crafting the object as a whole constitutes (11) building (ge’onim). And if he sews the mouth of the receptacle, he is liable to bring thirteen sin-offerings with the added labors of (12) sewing and (13) tying. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who shears wool, and one who whitens it, which are labors in the process of shearing and spinning wool. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who unwittingly spins wool still attached on the back of an animal on Shabbat is liable to bring three sin-offerings: One due to shearing, since, in the process, some of the wool is detached from the sheep; and one due to combing the wool; and one due to spinning. Rav Kahana said: This is not a typical manner of shearing, and this is not a typical manner of combing, and this is not a typical manner of spinning. The Gemara asks: And is that not a typical manner of spinning? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita in the name of Rabbi Neḥemya that the verse in the context of the work of the Tabernacle: “And all the women whose hearts lifted them with wisdom spun the goats” (Exodus 35:26) means that they washed the hair on the goats, and they spun it into threads on the goats themselves without first shearing the hair? Apparently, spinning on the back of an animal is considered a typical manner of spinning. The Gemara answers: Extraordinary wisdom is different. Although certain individuals are capable of spinning wool that way, the typical person is not capable of performing that feat. The Sages taught in a Tosefta: One who unwittingly plucks a large feather from the wing of a bird on Shabbat, and who snips the tip of the feather, and who pulls out the thin threads that comprise the feather is liable to bring three sin-offerings. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in explanation: One who plucks the wing is liable due to the labor of shearing. One who snips the tip of the feather is liable due to cutting. And one who pulls out the threads is liable due to smoothing. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who ties and one who unties. The Gemara asks: Where was there tying in the Tabernacle? Rava said: They tied the tents of the Tabernacle to the pegs. The Gemara rejects this: And is that considered performance of the labor of tying? That was tying a knot in order to untie it. When the children of Israel departed from an encampment, they dismantled the Tabernacle, which involved untying all of the knots. One is not liable for tying a temporary knot on Shabbat. Rather, Abaye said: As the weavers of curtains for the Tabernacle, when a thread would rip, they would tie it. Rava said to him: You have resolved the problem with regard to the labor of tying; however, with regard to the labor of untying, what can be said? Where, in the construction of the Tabernacle, was the labor of untying performed? And if you say that it was performed if one found two threads with knots tied next to each other, he untied one and left one tied; now, before a king of flesh and blood one would not do so, as the curtain would look flawed, in the Tabernacle, before the King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, would one do so? Rather, Rava said, and some say that Rav Elai said: The trappers of ḥilazon, whose blood was used in the Tabernacle as a dye, tie and untie their nets. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: And one who sews two stitches. The Gemara asks: That does not endure; two stitches will unravel immediately. A prohibited labor whose result is temporary is not considered a prohibited labor. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That has the legal status of a prohibited labor only in a case where, after sewing the stitches, he tied them. He tied a knot at each of the two ends of the thread so that the stitches would not unravel. We learned in the mishna, among those liable for performing primary categories of labor: One who tears in order to sew two stitches. The Gemara asks: Was there tearing in the construction of the Tabernacle? The Gemara answers that it was Rabba and Rabbi Zeira who both said the following explanation: