Honor your father and your mother, that you may long endure on the land that your ETERNAL God is assigning to you.

HONOR THY FATHER. Having finished all that we are obligated towards the Creator Himself and His glory, He turns now to command us about those matters which concern created beings. He begins with the father, for in relation to his offspring, he is akin to a creator, being partner with Him in the forming of the child.⁴⁷¹Kiddushin 30 b: “There are three partners in man: the Holy One, blessed be He, his father and his mother.” G-d is our first Father, and he who begets it [i.e., the child] is our last male parent. This is why He said in the Book of Deuteronomy, [Honor thy father… as the Eternal thy G-d commanded thee].⁴⁷²Deuteronomy 5:16. That is, “just as I have commanded you concerning My honor, so do I command you concerning the honor of those who have joined Me in your formation.” Now Scripture has not explained [the nature of the honor we are to give our parents], for it may be derived from the honor mentioned above that we owe to our first Father, blessed be He. Thus, one is to acknowledge [his male parent] as his father and not deny him, saying of another man that he is his father. Nor should he serve him because of his estate or any other benefit he hopes to derive from him. Nor should he take his father’s name and swear “by the life of my father” in vain or falsely. There are other matters which are included within the term “honor,” for we are commanded in every aspect thereof, and they are explained in the words of our Rabbis.⁴⁷³“What is honoring [one’s parents? It entails] providing them with food and drink, raiment and warmth, and guiding their footsteps [when they are old and infirm]” (Kiddushin 31 b). The Sages have already said⁴⁷⁴Ibid., 30b. that honoring parents has been likened to honoring G-d.
Now since this commandment refers to creatures on the earth, He has designated its reward to be prolongation of life on earth which He will give us. But in the opinion of our Rabbis,⁴⁷⁵Ibid., 39b. the purport of the verse is “that thy days may be long and upon the Land.” [It thus expresses two declarations]: He promises that our lives will be prolonged by observing this commandment — i.e., that G-d will fulfill our days in this world and they will be prolonged in the World to Come, which is unending — and that our dwelling will forever be on the good earth⁴⁷⁶A reference to eternal life. which He will give us. And in the Book of Deuteronomy, He expressly stated it: that thy day may be long, and that it may go well with thee, upon the Land which the Eternal thy G-d giveth thee.⁴⁷²Deuteronomy 5:16. Thus they are two promises.

You shall each revere your mother and your father, and keep My sabbaths: I the ETERNAL am your God.

ואת שבתותי תשמורו, just as in the Ten Commandments the command to honour parents appeared next to the commandment to observe the Sabbath, honouring parents is almost on a par with honouring the Creator Himself, the Torah placed these two commandments next to one another here too. This is the plain meaning of the text.

“Say to wisdom: You are my sister, and call understanding your kinswoman” (Proverbs 7:4), which indicates that one should be as knowledgeable in the Torah as in the identity of his sister. And it states: “Bind them upon your fingers, you shall write them upon the tablet of your heart” (Proverbs 7:3). And it states: “As arrows in the hand of a mighty man, so are the children of one’s youth” (Psalms 127:4). And it states: “Sharp arrows of the mighty” (Psalms 120:4). And it states: “Your arrows are sharp, the peoples fall under you” (Psalms 45:6). And it states: “Happy is the man who has his quiver full of them; they shall not be put to shame when they speak with their enemies in the gate” (Psalms 127:5). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase “enemies in the gate” with regard to Torah study? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says: Even a father and his son, or a rabbi and his student, who are engaged in Torah together in one gate become enemies with each other due to the intensity of their studies. But they do not leave there until they love each other, as it is stated in the verse discussing the places the Jewish people engaged in battle in the wilderness: “Therefore it is said in the book of the wars of the Lord, Vahev in Suphah [beSufa], and the valleys of Arnon” (Numbers 21:14). The word “vahev” is interpreted as related to the word for love, ahava. Additionally, do not read this as “in Suphah [beSufa]”; rather, read it as “at its end [besofa],” i.e., at the conclusion of their dispute they are beloved to each other. The Sages taught: “And you shall place [vesamtem] these words of Mine in your hearts” (Deuteronomy 11:18). Read this as though it stated sam tam, a perfect elixir. The Torah is compared to an elixir of life. There is a parable that illustrates this: A person hit his son with a strong blow and placed a bandage on his wound. And he said to him: My son, as long as this bandage is on your wound and is healing you, eat what you enjoy and drink what you enjoy, and bathe in either hot water or cold water, and you do not need to be afraid, as it will heal your wound. But if you take it off, the wound will become gangrenous. So too the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Israel: My children, I created an evil inclination, which is the wound, and I created Torah as its antidote. If you are engaged in Torah study you will not be given over into the hand of the evil inclination, as it is stated: “If you do well, shall it not be lifted up?” (Genesis 4:7). One who engages in Torah study lifts himself above the evil inclination. And if you do not engage in Torah study, you are given over to its power, as it is stated: “Sin crouches at the door” (Genesis 4:7). Moreover, all of the evil inclination’s deliberations will be concerning you, as it is stated in the same verse: “And to you is its desire.” And if you wish you shall rule over it, as it is stated in the conclusion of the verse: “But you may rule over it” (Genesis 4:7). The Sages taught: So difficult is the evil inclination that even its Creator calls it evil, as it is stated: “For the inclination of a man’s heart is evil from his youth” (Genesis 8:21). Rav Yitzḥak says: A person’s evil inclination renews itself to him every day, as it is stated: “And that every inclination of the thoughts in his heart was only evil all day [kol hayyom]” (Genesis 6:5). “Kol hayyom” can also be understood as: Every day. And Rabbi Shimon ben Levi says: A person’s inclination overpowers him every day, and seeks to kill him, as it is stated: “The wicked watches the righteous and seeks to slay him” (Psalms 37:32). And if not for the fact that the Holy One, Blessed be He, assists each person in battling his evil inclination, he could not overcome it, as it is stated: “The Lord will not leave him in his hand” (Psalms 37:33). A Sage from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: My son, if this wretched one, the evil inclination, encounters you, pull it into the study hall, i.e., go and study Torah. If it is a stone it will melt, and if it is iron it will break, as it is stated with regard to the Torah: “Is not My word like fire, says the Lord, and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces?” (Jeremiah 23:29). Just as a stone shatters a hammer, so too one can overcome his evil inclination, which is as strong as iron, through Torah study. With regard to the second part of the statement: If it is a stone it will melt, this is as it is stated with regard to the Torah: “Ho, everyone who thirsts, come for water” (Isaiah 55:1), and it states: “The water wears the stones” (Job 14:19), indicating that water is stronger than stone. § The baraita (29a) teaches that a father is commanded to marry his son to a woman. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this matter? As it is written: “Take wives and bear sons and daughters, and take wives for your sons and give your daughters to men” (Jeremiah 29:6). The Gemara analyzes this verse: Granted with regard to his son, this is in his power, i.e., he can instruct him to marry a woman, as a man is the active agent in a marriage. But with regard to his daughter, is this in his power? She must wait for a man to marry her. The Gemara answers: This is what Jeremiah was saying to them in the aforementioned verse: Her father should give her something for her dowry, and he should dress and cover her with suitable clothing so that men will leap to marry her. § The baraita further states that a father is commanded to teach his son a trade. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Ḥizkiyya said: As the verse states: “Enjoy life with the wife whom you love” (Ecclesiastes 9:9). If this verse is interpreted literally, and it is referring to an actual woman, then one can derive as follows: Just as a father is obligated to marry his son to a woman, so too, he is obligated to teach him a trade, as indicated by the term: Life. And if the wife mentioned in this verse is allegorical, and it is the Torah, then one should explain the verse in the following manner: Just as he is obligated to teach him Torah, so too, he is obligated to teach him a trade. § The baraita adds: And some say that a father is also obligated to teach his son to swim in a river. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? It is necessary for his life, i.e., this is potentially a lifesaving skill. § The baraita further teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: Any father who does not teach his son a trade teaches him banditry. The Gemara asks: Can it enter your mind that he actually teaches him banditry? Rather, the baraita means that it is as though he taught him banditry. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of the first tanna and that of Rabbi Yehuda? Both state that a father must teach his son a trade. The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case where the father teaches him to engage in business. According to the first tanna this is sufficient, whereas Rabbi Yehuda maintains that he must teach him an actual trade. § The mishna teaches: With regard to all mitzvot of a father with regard to his son, both men and women are obligated to perform them. The Gemara inquires: What is the meaning of the expression: All mitzvot of a father with regard to his son? If we say that this is referring to all of the mitzvot that a father is required to perform for his son, are women obligated in these? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: A father is obligated with regard to his son to circumcise him, and to redeem him? This indicates that his father, yes, he is obligated to do these, but his mother, no, she is not obligated to perform these mitzvot for her son. Rav Yehuda said that this is what the mishna is saying: With regard to each mitzva for the father that is incumbent upon the son to perform for his father, both men and women are obligated in them. The Gemara comments: We already learned this, as the Sages taught in a baraita, with regard to the verse: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3). I have derived only that a man is obligated in this mitzva; from where do I derive that a woman is also obligated? When it says in the same verse: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), employing the plural form of the verb, this indicates that there are two that are obligated here, both a man and a woman. If so, that both of them are obligated, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Man”? In the case of a man, it is in his power to perform this mitzva; whereas with regard to a woman, it is not always in her power to perform this mitzva, because she is under the authority of another person, i.e., her husband. As she is obligated to her husband to maintain her household, she is not always able to find time for her parents. Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav says: Consequently, if a woman is divorced, then both of them, a daughter and a son, are equal with regard to honoring and fearing their father and mother. The Sages taught that it is stated: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11), and it is stated: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9). In this manner, the verse equates the honor of one’s father and mother to the honor of the Omnipresent, as the term “honor” is used in both cases. Similarly, it is stated: “A man shall fear his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), and it is stated: “You shall fear the Lord your God and Him you shall serve” (Deuteronomy 6:13). The verse equates the fear of one’s father and mother to the fear of the Omnipresent. Likewise, it is stated: “He who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:17), and it is stated: “Whoever curses his God shall bear his sin” (Leviticus 24:15). The verse equates the blessing, a euphemism for cursing, of one’s father and mother to the blessing of the Omnipresent. But with regard to striking, i.e., with regard to the halakha that one who strikes his father or mother is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, it is certainly not possible to say the same concerning the Holy One, Blessed be He. And so too, the equating of one’s attitude toward his parents to his attitude toward God is a logical derivation, as the three of them are partners in his creation. As the Sages taught: There are three partners in the forming of a person: The Holy One, Blessed be He, who provides the soul, and his father and his mother. When a person honors his father and mother, the Holy One, Blessed be He, says: I ascribe credit to them as if I dwelt between them and they honor Me as well. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is revealed and known before the One Who spoke and the world came into being that a son honors his mother more than he honors his father, because

The commandment to honor father and mother: To honor father and mother, as it is stated (Exodus 20:12), “You shall honor your father and your mother.” And the explanation (Kiddushin 31b) comes to [define it], “What does it mean to ‘honor’? To feed, give drink, dress, bring in, and take out.” From the roots of this commandment is that it is fitting for a person to acknowledge and return kindness to people who were good to him, and not to be an ungrateful scoundrel, because that is a bad and repulsive attribute before God and people. And he should take to heart that the father and the mother are the cause of his being in the world; and hence it is truly fitting to honor them in every way and give every benefit he can to them, because they brought him to the world, and worked hard for him when he was little. And once he fixes this idea in his soul, he will move up from it to recognize the good of God, blessed be He, Who is his cause and the cause of all his ancestors until the first man (Adam), and that He took him out into the world’s air, and fulfilled his needs every day, and made his body strong and able to stand, and gave him a mind that knows and learns — for without the mind that God granted him, he would be “like a horse or a mule who does not understand.” And he should think at length about how very fitting it is to be careful in his worship of the Blessed be He. The laws of this commandment — for example, whose property should be spent on this honor, the child’s or the parent’s, and the ruling (Kiddushin 32a) is that it is out of the parent’s if the parent has assets, but if not, the child must even beg door to door (see Talmud Yerushalmi Kiddushin 1:7) in order to feed his parent; which takes priority, honoring the father or the mother; if [the parent] waives that honor [if it is effective]; if the child sees the parent violating the Torah’s words, with what words should he stop them; if his father commands him to violate the Torah’s words, that he should not believe him about it; that the child is obligated to honor [the parent] in life and in death, and how is the honor in death; and the rest of its details — are [all] elucidated in Tractate Kiddushin and in a few other places in the Gemara. (See Tur, Yoreh Deah 240.) And [it] is practiced in every place and at all times by males; and by females (Kiddushin 31a) any time it is possible for them — meaning to say when their husbands do not prevent them. And one who transgressed it violated a positive commandment, and his punishment is very great; for he is like one who ignores his Heavenly Father. And if the court has the power, they coerce him; as we wrote above (in Sefer HaChinukh 6) that the court coerces with regards to the negation of a positive commandment.

What is the purpose of emphasizing: To the place where her mother lives? Conclude from here that a daughter lives with her mother; it is no different if she is an adult woman, and it is no different if she is a minor girl. § It was taught in the mishna that if two men are obligated to support this girl, both of them may not jointly say that they will be partners in her support. Rather, each one fulfills his obligation independently. The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who rented out a millstone to another for the price of grinding, i.e., the one who rented the millstone was to pay the cost of the rental by grinding whatever the owner needed to be ground. In the end, the owner of the millstone became rich, and he purchased another millstone and a donkey, and he no longer required the services of the renter to grind things for him. The owner of the millstone said to the renter: Until now I would have what I needed ground by you, and the service that you provided was in place of payment for the rental of the millstone. Now, since I no longer require this service, give me payment for the millstone. The renter said back to him: I will grind for you because that is what I agreed to, but I did not agree to have to pay money. Ravina thought to say that this is the same as the mishna that states that both of them may not jointly say: We will sustain the girl as one in a partnership. Rather, one sustains her, providing her with food, while the other gives her the monetary value of the sustenance. In that case, although the original condition was to provide the girl with support in the form of food, when circumstances changed, the previous husband became obligated to pay her support in the form of money. So too here, due to the change in circumstances, the renter should pay the owner of the millstone with money. Rav Avira said to Ravina: Are the two cases comparable? There, in the case of the girl, she has only one stomach; she does not have two stomachs. Therefore, it is impossible for both of them to support her with food. Here, in the case of the millstone, the renter is able to say to him: Grind and sell, grind and store for later use, i.e., the owner of the millstone can use his new millstone to grind for others at a profit, and at the same time the renter will continue grinding the owner’s grain as per their agreement. Therefore, the renter is not obligated to change the terms of the original agreement. The Gemara notes: We said this only in a case where the renter does not have any other grinding to do with the millstone and without the grinding that the renter does for the owner the mill will remain inoperative. However, if he has other grinding to do with the millstone, i.e., instead of grinding the owner’s grain he can grind the grain of others for a fee and thereby pay money for his rental, in a case such as this one forces him to cease his conduct characteristic of Sodom and to pay his rental fee in the form of money. MISHNA: In the case of a widow who said: I do not want to move from my husband’s house, but instead I wish to remain there, the heirs are not able to say to her: Go to your father’s house and we will sustain you. Rather, they sustain her in her husband’s house and they give her living quarters befitting her dignity. However, if she said: I do not want to move from my father’s house, and you should bring me my support there, the heirs are able to say to her: If you are living with us, you will have sustenance from us, but if you are not living with us, you will not have sustenance from us. If she argued that she does not wish to live in her deceased husband’s house because she is young, and they, the heirs, are also young, and it is improper for them to be living in the same house together, then they sustain her and she stays in her father’s house. GEMARA: The Sages taught: A widow that remains in her husband’s house uses the living quarters in the same manner that she would use them in her husband’s lifetime. She uses the slaves and the maidservants in the same manner that she would use them in her husband’s lifetime, the pillows and the sheets in the same manner that she would use them in her husband’s lifetime, and the silver utensils and gold utensils in the same manner that she would use them in her husband’s lifetime. She maintains all the rights she had during her husband’s lifetime because this is what he wrote to her in the text of the marriage contract: And you will reside in my house and be sustained from my property all the days that you live in my house as a widow. Rav Yosef taught: The husband stipulated in the marriage contract: You will reside in my house, with the implication: And not in my hut. Therefore, if the house is too small, she cannot obligate the heirs to allow her to live in the house with them. Rav Naḥman said: Orphans who sold the living quarters of a widow did not do anything, i.e., the sale is invalid. The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from that which Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said? As Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to orphans who preemptively sold from the small quantity of property left to them by their father before the court appropriated it for the purpose of providing for female children, who do not inherit, what they sold is sold, even though they acted improperly. Why, then, is the sale of a widow’s living quarters invalid? The Gemara answers: There, in the case of orphans selling property that according to halakha should be retained in order to support the orphaned daughters, the property is not mortgaged to the orphaned daughters from the lifetime of their father, since the lien on the property arising from the obligation to provide support for the daughters occurs only after the father’s death. Here, in the case of the widow’s living quarters, the property is mortgaged to her from the lifetime of her husband, who was obligated even while he was alive to provide her with a place to live. Abaye said: We hold on the authority of tradition that in the case of a widow’s living quarters that collapsed, the heirs are not obligated to rebuild it, since they are obligated to maintain her in the residence that was mortgaged to her and are not required to provide her with a place to live. This is also taught in a baraita: In the case of a widow’s living quarters that collapsed, the heirs are not obligated to rebuild it. And not only this, but even if she says: Leave me be and I will rebuild it from my own funds, one does not listen to her, and the heirs do not have to let her rebuild it. Abaye raised a dilemma: If she repaired the house, what is the halakha? Is it as though the house collapsed and was rebuilt, in which case she no longer has rights to it, or may she stay in the house as long as it remains standing? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved. § We learned in the mishna: If she said: I do not want to move from my father’s house and you should bring me my support there, the heirs are not obligated to support her. The Gemara asks: And why is this so? They should give her support just as they would if she were living there, i.e., in her husband’s house. The Gemara answers: This supports the view of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: The blessing of the house is in its abundance of residents. This means that the amount of blessing in a home is proportionate to the number of people who live there. When there are many people living together in one home, the expenses per capita are decreased. The heirs can say to her that if she stays with them in the house, the expense of her upkeep will be less than if she lives on her own. The Gemara asks: And they should give her the support in her father’s house according to the blessing of the house, i.e., according to the amount they would be required to pay if she lived with them. The Gemara answers: Indeed, the intent of the mishna is that they may pay her this amount, not that they may entirely avoid supporting her. Rav Huna said: The language of the Sages teaches blessing, the language of the Sages teaches wealth, and the language of the Sages teaches healing. One can learn important lessons about these matters from the manner in which the Sages formulated their halakhic rulings. How is this so? With regard to blessing, it is that which we said above about the blessings of the home. The language of the Sages teaches about wealth, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 84b): One who sells produce to another, if the buyer pulled the produce as an act of acquisition but did not measure it, he has acquired the produce. If he measured the produce but did not pull it, he has not acquired it. And if the buyer was perspicacious and wanted to ensure that the seller would not back out of the deal, he would rent the place where the produce was located, and he would thereby acquire the produce immediately from the time he measures it. This mishna teaches good counsel in money-related matters. The language of the Sages teaches about healing, as we learned in a mishna (Pesaḥim 39b): A person should not chew wheat and then place it on his wound during Passover because the wheat will become leavened as a result. This comment of the Sages indicates that chewed wheat is beneficial for treating a wound. § The Sages taught: At the time of the passing of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he said: I need my sons. His sons entered his room. He said to them as a last will and testament: Be careful with the honor of your mother. He said further: My lamp should be lit in its usual place, my table should be set in its usual place, and the bed should be arranged in its usual place. Yosef Ḥeifani and Shimon Efrati; they served me during my lifetime and they will serve me in my death. The Gemara clarifies the various requests that he made of his sons: Be careful with the honor of your mother. The Gemara asks: Why would he need to say this? After all, this is required by Torah law, as it is written: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11)? The Gemara answers: She was their father’s wife. She was not their mother, but their stepmother, and he therefore needed to caution them concerning her honor. The Gemara asks: Honoring a father’s wife is also required by Torah law, as it is taught in a baraita: Honor your father [et avikha] and your mother [ve’et immekha]. The preposition et in the phrase: Your father; this teaches that you must honor your father’s wife. Similarly, the preposition et in the phrase: And your mother; this teaches that you must honor your mother’s husband. And the extra letter vav, which is appended as a prefix in the phrase “ve’et immekha” is included in order to add your older brother to those who must be honored. The Gemara answers: This halakha, that one is obligated by Torah law to respect his father’s wife, applies only during his father’s lifetime. While the father is alive, out of respect for him, his wife must also be treated with respect. However, following his death, no, there is no longer any obligation to honor a stepmother. It was for this reason that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi had to caution his sons in this matter. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi commanded his sons: My lamp should be lit in its usual place, my table should be set in its usual place, and the bed should be arranged in its usual place. The Gemara asks: What is the reason he made these requests? The Gemara explains: Every Shabbat eve, even after his passing, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would come to his house as he had done during his lifetime, and he therefore wished for everything to be set up as usual. The Gemara relates the following incident: It happened on a certain Shabbat eve that a neighbor came by and called and knocked at the door. His maidservant said to her: Be quiet, for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is sitting. When he heard his maidservant reveal his presence to the neighbor, he did not come again, so as not to cast aspersions on earlier righteous individuals who did not appear to their families following their death. The Gemara elaborates on Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement: Yosef Ḥeifani and Shimon Efrati, they served me during my lifetime and they will serve me in my death. It was understood from this statement that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was speaking of this world, that these two should serve him in his death and administer his burial. However, when they saw that their biers preceded his bier, i.e., they died before him, they said: Conclude from here that he was speaking of that world. They will attend to him in the World-to-Come. And the reason he said this was so that people should not say: There was something wrong with them, and until now, too, it was the merit of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that benefited them and prevented them from dying due to their sins. Now that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is dying, his merit no longer protects them. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi therefore clarified that the reason for their deaths was in order to enable them to escort him in death as in life. § Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said further to his attendants: I need the Sages of Israel. The Sages of Israel entered his room. He said to them: Do not eulogize me in the small towns

A person is obligated to honor his older brother, whether he is his brother from his father or whether he is his brother from his mother. (And even if the younger one is a Torah scholar and greater in Torah than the older one.) (And so was it understood by him from the Responsa of the Rosh in the paragraph after [the one discussing the law above].) (B. Z.)

What is the purpose of emphasizing: To the place where her mother lives? Conclude from here that a daughter lives with her mother; it is no different if she is an adult woman, and it is no different if she is a minor girl. § It was taught in the mishna that if two men are obligated to support this girl, both of them may not jointly say that they will be partners in her support. Rather, each one fulfills his obligation independently. The Gemara relates that there was a certain man who rented out a millstone to another for the price of grinding, i.e., the one who rented the millstone was to pay the cost of the rental by grinding whatever the owner needed to be ground. In the end, the owner of the millstone became rich, and he purchased another millstone and a donkey, and he no longer required the services of the renter to grind things for him. The owner of the millstone said to the renter: Until now I would have what I needed ground by you, and the service that you provided was in place of payment for the rental of the millstone. Now, since I no longer require this service, give me payment for the millstone. The renter said back to him: I will grind for you because that is what I agreed to, but I did not agree to have to pay money. Ravina thought to say that this is the same as the mishna that states that both of them may not jointly say: We will sustain the girl as one in a partnership. Rather, one sustains her, providing her with food, while the other gives her the monetary value of the sustenance. In that case, although the original condition was to provide the girl with support in the form of food, when circumstances changed, the previous husband became obligated to pay her support in the form of money. So too here, due to the change in circumstances, the renter should pay the owner of the millstone with money. Rav Avira said to Ravina: Are the two cases comparable? There, in the case of the girl, she has only one stomach; she does not have two stomachs. Therefore, it is impossible for both of them to support her with food. Here, in the case of the millstone, the renter is able to say to him: Grind and sell, grind and store for later use, i.e., the owner of the millstone can use his new millstone to grind for others at a profit, and at the same time the renter will continue grinding the owner’s grain as per their agreement. Therefore, the renter is not obligated to change the terms of the original agreement. The Gemara notes: We said this only in a case where the renter does not have any other grinding to do with the millstone and without the grinding that the renter does for the owner the mill will remain inoperative. However, if he has other grinding to do with the millstone, i.e., instead of grinding the owner’s grain he can grind the grain of others for a fee and thereby pay money for his rental, in a case such as this one forces him to cease his conduct characteristic of Sodom and to pay his rental fee in the form of money. MISHNA: In the case of a widow who said: I do not want to move from my husband’s house, but instead I wish to remain there, the heirs are not able to say to her: Go to your father’s house and we will sustain you. Rather, they sustain her in her husband’s house and they give her living quarters befitting her dignity. However, if she said: I do not want to move from my father’s house, and you should bring me my support there, the heirs are able to say to her: If you are living with us, you will have sustenance from us, but if you are not living with us, you will not have sustenance from us. If she argued that she does not wish to live in her deceased husband’s house because she is young, and they, the heirs, are also young, and it is improper for them to be living in the same house together, then they sustain her and she stays in her father’s house. GEMARA: The Sages taught: A widow that remains in her husband’s house uses the living quarters in the same manner that she would use them in her husband’s lifetime. She uses the slaves and the maidservants in the same manner that she would use them in her husband’s lifetime, the pillows and the sheets in the same manner that she would use them in her husband’s lifetime, and the silver utensils and gold utensils in the same manner that she would use them in her husband’s lifetime. She maintains all the rights she had during her husband’s lifetime because this is what he wrote to her in the text of the marriage contract: And you will reside in my house and be sustained from my property all the days that you live in my house as a widow. Rav Yosef taught: The husband stipulated in the marriage contract: You will reside in my house, with the implication: And not in my hut. Therefore, if the house is too small, she cannot obligate the heirs to allow her to live in the house with them. Rav Naḥman said: Orphans who sold the living quarters of a widow did not do anything, i.e., the sale is invalid. The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from that which Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said? As Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to orphans who preemptively sold from the small quantity of property left to them by their father before the court appropriated it for the purpose of providing for female children, who do not inherit, what they sold is sold, even though they acted improperly. Why, then, is the sale of a widow’s living quarters invalid? The Gemara answers: There, in the case of orphans selling property that according to halakha should be retained in order to support the orphaned daughters, the property is not mortgaged to the orphaned daughters from the lifetime of their father, since the lien on the property arising from the obligation to provide support for the daughters occurs only after the father’s death. Here, in the case of the widow’s living quarters, the property is mortgaged to her from the lifetime of her husband, who was obligated even while he was alive to provide her with a place to live. Abaye said: We hold on the authority of tradition that in the case of a widow’s living quarters that collapsed, the heirs are not obligated to rebuild it, since they are obligated to maintain her in the residence that was mortgaged to her and are not required to provide her with a place to live. This is also taught in a baraita: In the case of a widow’s living quarters that collapsed, the heirs are not obligated to rebuild it. And not only this, but even if she says: Leave me be and I will rebuild it from my own funds, one does not listen to her, and the heirs do not have to let her rebuild it. Abaye raised a dilemma: If she repaired the house, what is the halakha? Is it as though the house collapsed and was rebuilt, in which case she no longer has rights to it, or may she stay in the house as long as it remains standing? The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved. § We learned in the mishna: If she said: I do not want to move from my father’s house and you should bring me my support there, the heirs are not obligated to support her. The Gemara asks: And why is this so? They should give her support just as they would if she were living there, i.e., in her husband’s house. The Gemara answers: This supports the view of Rav Huna, as Rav Huna said: The blessing of the house is in its abundance of residents. This means that the amount of blessing in a home is proportionate to the number of people who live there. When there are many people living together in one home, the expenses per capita are decreased. The heirs can say to her that if she stays with them in the house, the expense of her upkeep will be less than if she lives on her own. The Gemara asks: And they should give her the support in her father’s house according to the blessing of the house, i.e., according to the amount they would be required to pay if she lived with them. The Gemara answers: Indeed, the intent of the mishna is that they may pay her this amount, not that they may entirely avoid supporting her. Rav Huna said: The language of the Sages teaches blessing, the language of the Sages teaches wealth, and the language of the Sages teaches healing. One can learn important lessons about these matters from the manner in which the Sages formulated their halakhic rulings. How is this so? With regard to blessing, it is that which we said above about the blessings of the home. The language of the Sages teaches about wealth, as we learned in a mishna (Bava Batra 84b): One who sells produce to another, if the buyer pulled the produce as an act of acquisition but did not measure it, he has acquired the produce. If he measured the produce but did not pull it, he has not acquired it. And if the buyer was perspicacious and wanted to ensure that the seller would not back out of the deal, he would rent the place where the produce was located, and he would thereby acquire the produce immediately from the time he measures it. This mishna teaches good counsel in money-related matters. The language of the Sages teaches about healing, as we learned in a mishna (Pesaḥim 39b): A person should not chew wheat and then place it on his wound during Passover because the wheat will become leavened as a result. This comment of the Sages indicates that chewed wheat is beneficial for treating a wound. § The Sages taught: At the time of the passing of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he said: I need my sons. His sons entered his room. He said to them as a last will and testament: Be careful with the honor of your mother. He said further: My lamp should be lit in its usual place, my table should be set in its usual place, and the bed should be arranged in its usual place. Yosef Ḥeifani and Shimon Efrati; they served me during my lifetime and they will serve me in my death. The Gemara clarifies the various requests that he made of his sons: Be careful with the honor of your mother. The Gemara asks: Why would he need to say this? After all, this is required by Torah law, as it is written: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11)? The Gemara answers: She was their father’s wife. She was not their mother, but their stepmother, and he therefore needed to caution them concerning her honor. The Gemara asks: Honoring a father’s wife is also required by Torah law, as it is taught in a baraita: Honor your father [et avikha] and your mother [ve’et immekha]. The preposition et in the phrase: Your father; this teaches that you must honor your father’s wife. Similarly, the preposition et in the phrase: And your mother; this teaches that you must honor your mother’s husband. And the extra letter vav, which is appended as a prefix in the phrase “ve’et immekha” is included in order to add your older brother to those who must be honored. The Gemara answers: This halakha, that one is obligated by Torah law to respect his father’s wife, applies only during his father’s lifetime. While the father is alive, out of respect for him, his wife must also be treated with respect. However, following his death, no, there is no longer any obligation to honor a stepmother. It was for this reason that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi had to caution his sons in this matter. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi commanded his sons: My lamp should be lit in its usual place, my table should be set in its usual place, and the bed should be arranged in its usual place. The Gemara asks: What is the reason he made these requests? The Gemara explains: Every Shabbat eve, even after his passing, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would come to his house as he had done during his lifetime, and he therefore wished for everything to be set up as usual. The Gemara relates the following incident: It happened on a certain Shabbat eve that a neighbor came by and called and knocked at the door. His maidservant said to her: Be quiet, for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is sitting. When he heard his maidservant reveal his presence to the neighbor, he did not come again, so as not to cast aspersions on earlier righteous individuals who did not appear to their families following their death. The Gemara elaborates on Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s statement: Yosef Ḥeifani and Shimon Efrati, they served me during my lifetime and they will serve me in my death. It was understood from this statement that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was speaking of this world, that these two should serve him in his death and administer his burial. However, when they saw that their biers preceded his bier, i.e., they died before him, they said: Conclude from here that he was speaking of that world. They will attend to him in the World-to-Come. And the reason he said this was so that people should not say: There was something wrong with them, and until now, too, it was the merit of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that benefited them and prevented them from dying due to their sins. Now that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is dying, his merit no longer protects them. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi therefore clarified that the reason for their deaths was in order to enable them to escort him in death as in life. § Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said further to his attendants: I need the Sages of Israel. The Sages of Israel entered his room. He said to them: Do not eulogize me in the small towns

A son is obligated to honor his father even after his death. What is implied? If he repeats a teaching in his father's name, he should not say: "This is what my father said." Instead, he should say: "This is what my father, and teacher - may I serve as atonement for him - said."
When does the above apply? Within twelve months of his passing. After twelve months, he says of him: "May he be remembered for the life of the world to come."

and this action brings him to the life of the World-to-Come. Rabbi Abbahu said: One such as Avimi, my son, properly fulfilled the mitzva of honoring his parents. The Gemara relates: Avimi had five sons during his father’s lifetime who were ordained to issue halakhic rulings, and he too was ordained. And yet when Rabbi Abbahu, his father, came and called at the gate to enter, Avimi would himself run and go to open the door for him. And before he arrived there, he would already say: Yes, yes, so that his father would not think that he was being ignored. One day Rabbi Abbahu said to Avimi his son: Give me water to drink. Before he brought him the water, Rabbi Abbahu dozed off. Avimi bent over and stood over him until his father awoke. The performance of this mitzva aided him, i.e., as a reward God helped him in his studies, and Avimi succeeded in homiletically interpreting the psalm: “A song to Asaph” (Psalms 79). Rav Ya’akov bar Avuh said to Abaye: With regard to one such as I, so beloved by my parents that before I return from the study hall my father brings me a cup and my mother pours for me, how should I act? Is it disrespectful to accept this honor from them? Abaye said to him: Accept it from your mother, but do not accept it from your father, as, since he is a Torah scholar he will be disheartened if his son does not show him the proper level of respect. The Gemara relates: Rabbi Tarfon had a certain manner of treating his mother, that whenever she wished to ascend into her bed he would bend over and help her to ascend, and whenever she wished to descend from the bed, she would descend onto him. He came and praised himself in the study hall for performing the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother so thoroughly. They said to him: You still have not reached even half of the honor due to her. Has it ever happened that she threw a purse into the sea in front of you, and you did not embarrass her? When Rav Yosef heard his mother’s footsteps, he would say: I will stand before the arriving Divine Presence. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Fortunate is one who never saw his father and mother, as it is so difficult to honor them appropriately. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yoḥanan himself never saw his parents. When his mother was pregnant with him, his father died; and when she gave birth to him, his mother died. And the same is true of Abaye. The Gemara asks: Is that so, that Abaye never saw his mother? But didn’t Abaye say on many occasions: My mother told me? The Gemara answers: That mother was actually his foster mother, not his birth mother. Rav Asi had an elderly mother. She said to him: I want jewelry, and he made jewelry for her. She said to him: I want a man whom I can marry, and he said to her: I will seek one for you. She said to him: I want a husband who is as handsome as you. At this point, he realized that she was senile, and that he would be unable to fulfill all her requests. Therefore, he left her and went to Eretz Yisrael. Rav Asi heard that she was following him to Eretz Yisrael. He came before Rabbi Yoḥanan and said to him: What is the halakha with regard to leaving Eretz Yisrael to go outside of Eretz Yisrael? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: It is prohibited. Rav Asi further asked: If one is going to greet his mother, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: I do not know. Rav Asi waited a little while, and then came back to him. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Asi, you are evidently determined to leave. May the Omnipresent return you in peace, and he said no more. Rav Asi came before Rabbi Elazar, because he did not know how to interpret Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement. He said to Rabbi Elazar: God forbid, perhaps he is angry with me that I wished to leave? Rabbi Elazar said to him: What exactly did he say to you? Rav Asi said to him: May the Omnipresent return you in peace. Rabbi Elazar said to him: If it is so that he was angry, he would not have blessed you. Rabbi Yoḥanan certainly gave you permission to leave. In the meantime, while he was traveling to meet her, Rav Asi heard that her coffin was coming, i.e., his mother had died and her coffin was being brought to Eretz Yisrael. He said: Had I known I would not have left, as after his mother’s death he was not obligated to leave Eretz Yisrael to honor her. The Sages taught: One honors his father in his life and honors him in his death. How does he honor him in his life? One who goes to a place on the command of his father should not say to the people to whom he has been sent, to hurry them along: Send me on my journey on my own behalf, or: Hurry up on my own behalf, or: Allow me to take leave of this business on my own behalf. Rather, he should say all of the above in the following manner: Act in this manner on Father’s behalf, as a mark of respect for his father. How does he honor him in his death? If he says a matter he heard from his father’s mouth, he should not say: So said Father. Rather, he should say: So said Father, my teacher, may I be an atonement for his resting soul. And this halakha applies within twelve months of his death. From this time onward he says: May his memory be for a blessing, for the life of the World-to-Come. The Sages taught: A Sage who lectures in public must change the name of his father, i.e., when he quotes his father he should not mention him by name. And similarly, he changes the name of his teacher. The disseminator, who explains the statements of a Sage to the audience, changes neither the name of his father nor the name of his teacher. The Gemara asks: To whose father is this referring? If we say it is referring to the father of the disseminator, whom the Sage mentioned in his lecture, is that to say that the disseminator is not obligated to observe the mitzva of honoring one’s father? How can a disseminator mention his own father by name? Rather, Rava said: This is referring to the name of the Sage’s father and the name of the Sage’s teacher. This is like that which Mar bar Rav Ashi would do, as when he would teach Torah at his regular lecture and would mention a halakha in the name of his father, Rav Ashi, he would say: So said my father, my teacher; and his disseminator would say: So said Rav Ashi. Although a son may not mention his father’s name, the disseminator of his lecture may do so. The Sages taught: What is fear and what is honor? Fear of one’s father includes the following: One may not stand in his father’s fixed place, and may not sit in his place, and may not contradict his statements by expressing an opinion contrary to that of his father, and he may not choose sides when his father argues with someone else. What is considered honor? He gives his father food and drink, dresses and covers him, and brings him in and takes him out for all his household needs. A dilemma was raised before the Sages:

“Say to wisdom: You are my sister, and call understanding your kinswoman” (Proverbs 7:4), which indicates that one should be as knowledgeable in the Torah as in the identity of his sister. And it states: “Bind them upon your fingers, you shall write them upon the tablet of your heart” (Proverbs 7:3). And it states: “As arrows in the hand of a mighty man, so are the children of one’s youth” (Psalms 127:4). And it states: “Sharp arrows of the mighty” (Psalms 120:4). And it states: “Your arrows are sharp, the peoples fall under you” (Psalms 45:6). And it states: “Happy is the man who has his quiver full of them; they shall not be put to shame when they speak with their enemies in the gate” (Psalms 127:5). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase “enemies in the gate” with regard to Torah study? Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says: Even a father and his son, or a rabbi and his student, who are engaged in Torah together in one gate become enemies with each other due to the intensity of their studies. But they do not leave there until they love each other, as it is stated in the verse discussing the places the Jewish people engaged in battle in the wilderness: “Therefore it is said in the book of the wars of the Lord, Vahev in Suphah [beSufa], and the valleys of Arnon” (Numbers 21:14). The word “vahev” is interpreted as related to the word for love, ahava. Additionally, do not read this as “in Suphah [beSufa]”; rather, read it as “at its end [besofa],” i.e., at the conclusion of their dispute they are beloved to each other. The Sages taught: “And you shall place [vesamtem] these words of Mine in your hearts” (Deuteronomy 11:18). Read this as though it stated sam tam, a perfect elixir. The Torah is compared to an elixir of life. There is a parable that illustrates this: A person hit his son with a strong blow and placed a bandage on his wound. And he said to him: My son, as long as this bandage is on your wound and is healing you, eat what you enjoy and drink what you enjoy, and bathe in either hot water or cold water, and you do not need to be afraid, as it will heal your wound. But if you take it off, the wound will become gangrenous. So too the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Israel: My children, I created an evil inclination, which is the wound, and I created Torah as its antidote. If you are engaged in Torah study you will not be given over into the hand of the evil inclination, as it is stated: “If you do well, shall it not be lifted up?” (Genesis 4:7). One who engages in Torah study lifts himself above the evil inclination. And if you do not engage in Torah study, you are given over to its power, as it is stated: “Sin crouches at the door” (Genesis 4:7). Moreover, all of the evil inclination’s deliberations will be concerning you, as it is stated in the same verse: “And to you is its desire.” And if you wish you shall rule over it, as it is stated in the conclusion of the verse: “But you may rule over it” (Genesis 4:7). The Sages taught: So difficult is the evil inclination that even its Creator calls it evil, as it is stated: “For the inclination of a man’s heart is evil from his youth” (Genesis 8:21). Rav Yitzḥak says: A person’s evil inclination renews itself to him every day, as it is stated: “And that every inclination of the thoughts in his heart was only evil all day [kol hayyom]” (Genesis 6:5). “Kol hayyom” can also be understood as: Every day. And Rabbi Shimon ben Levi says: A person’s inclination overpowers him every day, and seeks to kill him, as it is stated: “The wicked watches the righteous and seeks to slay him” (Psalms 37:32). And if not for the fact that the Holy One, Blessed be He, assists each person in battling his evil inclination, he could not overcome it, as it is stated: “The Lord will not leave him in his hand” (Psalms 37:33). A Sage from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: My son, if this wretched one, the evil inclination, encounters you, pull it into the study hall, i.e., go and study Torah. If it is a stone it will melt, and if it is iron it will break, as it is stated with regard to the Torah: “Is not My word like fire, says the Lord, and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces?” (Jeremiah 23:29). Just as a stone shatters a hammer, so too one can overcome his evil inclination, which is as strong as iron, through Torah study. With regard to the second part of the statement: If it is a stone it will melt, this is as it is stated with regard to the Torah: “Ho, everyone who thirsts, come for water” (Isaiah 55:1), and it states: “The water wears the stones” (Job 14:19), indicating that water is stronger than stone. § The baraita (29a) teaches that a father is commanded to marry his son to a woman. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this matter? As it is written: “Take wives and bear sons and daughters, and take wives for your sons and give your daughters to men” (Jeremiah 29:6). The Gemara analyzes this verse: Granted with regard to his son, this is in his power, i.e., he can instruct him to marry a woman, as a man is the active agent in a marriage. But with regard to his daughter, is this in his power? She must wait for a man to marry her. The Gemara answers: This is what Jeremiah was saying to them in the aforementioned verse: Her father should give her something for her dowry, and he should dress and cover her with suitable clothing so that men will leap to marry her. § The baraita further states that a father is commanded to teach his son a trade. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this? Ḥizkiyya said: As the verse states: “Enjoy life with the wife whom you love” (Ecclesiastes 9:9). If this verse is interpreted literally, and it is referring to an actual woman, then one can derive as follows: Just as a father is obligated to marry his son to a woman, so too, he is obligated to teach him a trade, as indicated by the term: Life. And if the wife mentioned in this verse is allegorical, and it is the Torah, then one should explain the verse in the following manner: Just as he is obligated to teach him Torah, so too, he is obligated to teach him a trade. § The baraita adds: And some say that a father is also obligated to teach his son to swim in a river. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? It is necessary for his life, i.e., this is potentially a lifesaving skill. § The baraita further teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: Any father who does not teach his son a trade teaches him banditry. The Gemara asks: Can it enter your mind that he actually teaches him banditry? Rather, the baraita means that it is as though he taught him banditry. The Gemara asks: What is the difference between the opinion of the first tanna and that of Rabbi Yehuda? Both state that a father must teach his son a trade. The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them in a case where the father teaches him to engage in business. According to the first tanna this is sufficient, whereas Rabbi Yehuda maintains that he must teach him an actual trade. § The mishna teaches: With regard to all mitzvot of a father with regard to his son, both men and women are obligated to perform them. The Gemara inquires: What is the meaning of the expression: All mitzvot of a father with regard to his son? If we say that this is referring to all of the mitzvot that a father is required to perform for his son, are women obligated in these? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: A father is obligated with regard to his son to circumcise him, and to redeem him? This indicates that his father, yes, he is obligated to do these, but his mother, no, she is not obligated to perform these mitzvot for her son. Rav Yehuda said that this is what the mishna is saying: With regard to each mitzva for the father that is incumbent upon the son to perform for his father, both men and women are obligated in them. The Gemara comments: We already learned this, as the Sages taught in a baraita, with regard to the verse: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3). I have derived only that a man is obligated in this mitzva; from where do I derive that a woman is also obligated? When it says in the same verse: “A man shall fear [tira’u] his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), employing the plural form of the verb, this indicates that there are two that are obligated here, both a man and a woman. If so, that both of them are obligated, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Man”? In the case of a man, it is in his power to perform this mitzva; whereas with regard to a woman, it is not always in her power to perform this mitzva, because she is under the authority of another person, i.e., her husband. As she is obligated to her husband to maintain her household, she is not always able to find time for her parents. Rav Idi bar Avin says that Rav says: Consequently, if a woman is divorced, then both of them, a daughter and a son, are equal with regard to honoring and fearing their father and mother. The Sages taught that it is stated: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11), and it is stated: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9). In this manner, the verse equates the honor of one’s father and mother to the honor of the Omnipresent, as the term “honor” is used in both cases. Similarly, it is stated: “A man shall fear his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), and it is stated: “You shall fear the Lord your God and Him you shall serve” (Deuteronomy 6:13). The verse equates the fear of one’s father and mother to the fear of the Omnipresent. Likewise, it is stated: “He who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death” (Exodus 21:17), and it is stated: “Whoever curses his God shall bear his sin” (Leviticus 24:15). The verse equates the blessing, a euphemism for cursing, of one’s father and mother to the blessing of the Omnipresent. But with regard to striking, i.e., with regard to the halakha that one who strikes his father or mother is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, it is certainly not possible to say the same concerning the Holy One, Blessed be He. And so too, the equating of one’s attitude toward his parents to his attitude toward God is a logical derivation, as the three of them are partners in his creation. As the Sages taught: There are three partners in the forming of a person: The Holy One, Blessed be He, who provides the soul, and his father and his mother. When a person honors his father and mother, the Holy One, Blessed be He, says: I ascribe credit to them as if I dwelt between them and they honor Me as well. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is revealed and known before the One Who spoke and the world came into being that a son honors his mother more than he honors his father, because she persuades him with many statements of encouragement and does not treat him harshly. Therefore, in the mitzva of: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11), the Holy One, Blessed be He, preceded the mention of the honor due one’s father before mentioning the honor due one’s mother. The verse emphasizes the duty that does not come naturally. Similarly, it is revealed and known before the One Who spoke and the world came into being that a son fears his father more than his mother, because his father teaches him Torah, and consequently he is strict with him. Therefore, in the verse: “A man shall fear his mother and his father” (Leviticus 19:3), the Holy One, Blessed be He, preceded the mention of fear of the mother before the mention of fear of the father. A tanna taught a baraita before Rav Naḥman: When a person causes his father and mother suffering, the Holy One, Blessed be He, says: I did well in not dwelling among them, for if I had dwelled among them they would have caused Me suffering as well, as it were. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: Anyone who transgresses in private, it is considered as though he is pushing away the feet of the Divine Presence, i.e., he distances God from him, so to speak. As it is stated: “So says the Lord: The heaven is My throne and the earth is My footstool” (Isaiah 66:1). When someone sins in secret, he demonstrates that he thinks God is absent from that place, and it is as though he pushes His feet away from the earth. With regard to the same issue, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: It is prohibited for a person to walk even four cubits with an upright posture, which is considered an arrogant manner, as it is stated: “The entire world is full of His glory” (Isaiah 6:3). One who walks in an arrogant manner indicates a lack of regard for the glory and honor of God that is surrounding him, and thereby chases God from that place, as it were. The Gemara relates: Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, would not walk four cubits with an uncovered head. He said: The Divine Presence is above my head, and I must act respectfully. The son of one widow asked Rabbi Eliezer: If my father says to me: Give me water to drink, and my mother also says to me: Give me water to drink, which of them should I honor first? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Set aside the honor of your mother, and perform the honor of your father, as you and your mother are both obligated in the honor of your father. He came before Rabbi Yehoshua and asked him the same question, and Rabbi Yehoshua said this same answer to him. The man said to him: My teacher, if one’s mother is divorced, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: From your eyelashes, which are filled with tears, it is evident that you are the son of a widow, and you have no father. Why, then, are you asking this question as though it were relevant for you? Consequently, Rabbi Yehoshua answered him sarcastically: Pour water for them into a pitcher and squawk at them as one does to summon chickens. In other words, if one’s mother is divorced, the same honor is due to both parents, and neither takes precedence. § Ulla the Great interpreted a verse homiletically at the entrance to the house of the Nasi. What is the meaning of that which is written: “All the kings of the earth shall give You thanks, O Lord, for they have heard the words of Your mouth” (Psalms 138:4)? It is not stated: The word of Your mouth, in the singular. Rather, the verse uses the expression: “The words of Your mouth,” in the plural. To what is this phrase referring? When the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: “I am the Lord your God” (Exodus 20:2), and, in the same verse: “You shall have no other gods before Me,” the nations of the world said: He teaches this for His own honor, as both statements entail respect for God. Once He said: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11), they returned and conceded the truth of the first statements, which is why the verse uses the plural expression: “Words of Your mouth,” i.e., all the words of God’s mouth. Rava said: This can be derived from here: “The beginning of Your word is truth” (Psalms 119:160). Is the beginning of Your word truth but not the end of Your word? Rather, from the end of Your word it is apparent to everyone that the beginning of Your word is truth. The Sages raised a dilemma before Rav Ulla: How far must one go to fulfill the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother? Rav Ulla said to them: Go and see what one gentile did in Ashkelon, and his name was Dama ben Netina. Once the Sages sought to purchase merchandise [perakmatya] from him for six hundred thousand gold dinars’ profit, but the key for the container in which the merchandise was kept was placed under his father’s head, and he was sleeping at the time. And Dama ben Netina would not disturb his father by waking him, although he could have made a substantial profit. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: They asked Rabbi Eliezer: How far must one go to fulfill the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Go and see what one gentile did for his father in Ashkelon, and the name of the son was Dama ben Netina. Once the Sages wished to purchase precious stones from him for the ephod of the High Priest for six hundred thousand gold dinars’ profit, and Rav Kahana taught that it was eight hundred thousand gold dinars’ profit. And the key to the chest holding the jewels was placed under his father’s head, and he would not disturb him. The next year the Holy One, Blessed be He, gave Dama ben Netina his reward, as a red heifer was born in his herd, and the Jews needed it. When the Sages of Israel came to him he said to them: I know, concerning you, that if I were to ask for all the money in the world you would give it to me. But I ask only that money that I lost due to the honor of Father. And Rabbi Ḥanina says: And if this is related about one who is not commanded by the Torah to honor his father, as Dama was a gentile, and nevertheless when he performs the mitzva he is given this great reward, all the more so is one rewarded who is commanded to fulfill a mitzva and performs it. As Rabbi Ḥanina says: Greater is one who is commanded to do a mitzva and performs it than one who is not commanded to do a mitzva and performs it. Rav Yosef, who was blind, said: At first I would say: If someone would tell me that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: A blind person is exempt from fulfilling the mitzvot, I would make a festive day for the rabbis, as I am not commanded and yet I perform the mitzvot. This means my reward is very great. Now that I have heard that which Rabbi Ḥanina says: Greater is one who is commanded to do a mitzva and performs it than one who is not commanded to do a mitzva and performs it, on the contrary: If someone would tell me that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and a blind person is obligated in mitzvot, I would make a festive day for the rabbis. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: Once Dama ben Netina was wearing a fine cloak [sirkon] of gold, and was sitting among the nobles of Rome. And his mother came to him and tore his garment from him and smacked him on the head and spat in his face, and yet he did not embarrass her. Avimi, son of Rabbi Abbahu, taught: There is a type of son who feeds his father pheasant [pasyonei] and yet this behavior causes him to be removed from the World, i.e., the World-to-Come; and there is one who makes him grind with a millstone, which is difficult work,

The commandment of the reverence of father and mother: To be in reverence of parents — meaning to say that a person act with his mother and his father as he would with someone for whom he has reverence, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:3), “His mother and father shall a man revere.” And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 1:10 (also Kiddushin 31b) is “Which is reverence? He shall not sit in his place, and he shall not speak in his place, and he shall not contradict his words.” I have written from the roots of the commandment on the commandment of honoring parents in Parashat Vayishma Yitro (Sefer HaChinukh 33). From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Kiddushin 31a). “To what point is the reverence of father and mother? That even if they strike him and they spit in his face, he does not embarrass them.” And even so, the Sages commanded (Moed Katan 17a) a person not to strike his adult son, since there is in the thing [a possible violation of], “do not put a stumbling block in front of the blind” (Sefer HaChinukh 232) — (lest he kick his father, and it will be he that made him stumble — Rashi there). And we excommunicate someone for that. And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Kiddushin 31b) about the stringency of this commandment that even if the father or mother lose their mind, the son must make efforts to behave in a way of honor towards them, according to their perception. But if they become extremely insane, he is able to leave them and command others over them to treat them as is fit, if he has [this possibility]. And a mamzer is obligated in the honor of parents and their reverence (Yevamot 22b), even though they are exempted from the statute of hitting them or cursing them. And they, may their memory be blessed, taught us about this matter (Bava Metzia 32a) that if the parents command to transgress words of Torah — and even a rabbinic commandment — we do not listen to them. [These] and the rest of its details are in [scattered] places in the Gemara, but the most are in Kiddushin, according to my opinion. (See Tur, Yoreh Deah 240.) And it is practiced in every place and at all times by males and females. And [if] he transgresses it and treats their reverence lightly, he has violated this positive commandment; unless he does it with the agreement of his father and his relinquishment — as the honor of a father who relinquishes it, is relinquished (it is effective).

Those two, the wife of a father’s father’s brother and the sister of a father’s father, are similar to each other and are counted as a single case, and so there are sixteen. The Gemara restates Rav Hillel’s challenge to Ameimar’s opinion: But in any case I myself saw them written as prohibited. Rav Ashi said to Rav Hillel: And according to your reasoning, if in the list it was written that they were permitted, would you have relied on that? Is the signature of Mar, son of Rabbana, signed on it? Although you saw the list, you don’t know for certain who wrote it. Now too, that it is written that they are prohibited, the same holds true; the signature of Mar, son of Rabbana, is not signed on it, and so it cannot be relied upon to reject the opinion of Ameimar. § One of the Sages of the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: The third generation from one’s son and one’s daughter, i.e., one’s great-grandchildren, and the third generation from his wife’s son and his wife’s daughter, i.e., one’s wife’s great-grandchildren, are all forbidden as secondary forbidden relationships. So too, the fourth generation from his father-in-law and from his mother-in-law, i.e., his wife’s great-grandmothers, are prohibited as secondary forbidden relationships. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: What is different between the generations above, referring to his wife’s great-grandmothers, such that the Sage counts his wife as one of the generations and refers to them as the fourth generation, and what is different with regard to the generations below, referring to his great-granddaughters, such that he did not count his wife and referred to them as only the third generation? The Gemara answers: When counting above, the prohibition stems from his wife, as they are not his blood relatives but his wife’s. Therefore, she is counted. When counting below, however, the prohibition does not stem from his wife, as they are his own blood relatives, and so she was not counted. The Gemara objects: But he includes the granddaughter of his wife’s son and his wife’s daughter in his list of those forbidden due to his wife, yet he does not count her and refer to this as the fourth generation. The Gemara answers: Since he already taught three generations below himself, i.e., his own great-granddaughter, and there he did not count from his wife because it is his own blood relative, he taught three generations below his wife and did not count her. Instead, he referred to her great-granddaughter also as three generations below to maintain the uniform style of his words. Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: Do those secondary forbidden relationships taught by one of the Sages of the school of Rabbi Ḥiyya have a conclusion, or do they not have a conclusion? Are those specified cases alone forbidden, or are all generations above and below also forbidden? Come and hear that which Rav said: Four women have a conclusion. This implies that it is only these four and no more. The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps when Rav said this he was referring only to the relationships listed in the baraita and not to all cases of secondary relationships. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear from the baraita itself, which states: The third generation from his son and his daughter and the fourth generation from his father-in-law and mother-in-law. This implies that with regard to the third and the fourth generations, yes, they are forbidden; but more than that, no. The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps this means from the third onward and from the fourth onward. The Gemara does not resolve this issue. § Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Did the Master see this one of the Sages who came from the West, Eretz Yisrael, who said: In the West they asked whether the Sages issued a decree prohibiting secondary forbidden relationships for converts, or whether they did not issue a decree prohibiting secondary forbidden relationships for converts? Rav Naḥman did not answer whether he had seen this Sage, but said to him: Now, with regard to all the forbidden relationships themselves, were it not for the fact that if converts would find that as Jews they were permitted to enter into relationships that were forbidden to them as gentiles and would say that they went from a state of more stringent sanctity as gentiles to a state of lesser sanctity as Jews, then the Sages would not have decreed to prohibit these relationships. Without the rabbinic decree it would have been permitted for a convert to marry even a close female relative, even his twin sister, who also converted. This is because a convert has the legal status of a newborn, with no family ties. Is it necessary to state that the Sages did not extend that decree to include secondary forbidden relationships? The purpose of the rabbinic prohibitions is to protect the Torah prohibitions, but in the case of converts this particular Torah prohibition does not apply. Rav Naḥman said: Since the issue of converts and their relatives has come to hand and is the topic of discussion, let us say a matter of halakha: Maternal half brothers who both convert may not testify together as a pair of witnesses before the court, but if they did testify, their testimony is valid. Although blood relatives are invalid as witnesses, converts are considered as though they have no relations. Paternal half brothers who both convert may testify together ab initio, since the halakha does not consider paternal half brothers of gentiles to be true relatives. Ameimar said: Even maternal half brothers may also testify together ab initio. In what way is this case different from forbidden relations, where a convert may not marry his maternal sister due to rabbinic decree? The halakhot of forbidden relations are handed over to all, and every individual chooses his own wife. Therefore, the Sages issued a decree to prevent confusion between the status of a convert and that of a born Jew. However, testimony is handed over to the court, and the court knows to distinguish between the status of a born Jew and that of a convert. And the legal status of a convert who just converted is like that of a child just born, and all previous family ties become irrelevant. MISHNA: In the case of anyone who has a brother of any kind, that brother creates a levirate bond causing his yevama to be required to perform levirate marriage if the first brother dies childless. And he is his brother in all respects, except for one who has a brother born from a Canaanite maidservant or from a gentile woman, as these do not have the legal status of brothers. Similarly, in the case of anyone who has a child of any kind, that child exempts his father’s wife from levirate marriage, since his father did not die childless. And that child is liable to receive capital punishment if he strikes his father or curses him. And he is his child in all respects, except for whoever has a child born from a Canaanite maidservant or from a gentile woman, as these do not have the halakhic status of children. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: With regard to the statement that a brother of any kind causes his yevama to be required to perform levirate marriage, what additional case does this come to add? Rav Yehuda said: This adds the case of a mamzer, who, notwithstanding his status, is considered a brother. The Gemara wonders: But isn’t that obvious? He is his brother. The Gemara explains: This is necessary lest you say: Let us derive a verbal analogy between the word “brother” stated in the verse with regard to levirate marriage and “brother” stated with regard to the children of Jacob. Just as there, Jacob’s children are of unflawed lineage and not of flawed lineage and are not mamzerim, so too here, one might think that only brothers of unflawed lineage and not brothers of flawed lineage, i.e., mamzerim, obligate the yevama in levirate marriage. Therefore, this teaches us that a mamzer is considered a brother for the purposes of levirate marriage. The Gemara asks: And say that is indeed the halakha. Perhaps a brother who is a mamzer does not obligate his yevama in levirate marriage. The Gemara answers: Since with regard to levirate marriage, if the husband had a child who was a mamzer he would exempt the wife from levirate marriage,

Some said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, but Shmuel himself does not hold accordingly. The Gemara continues the discussion of acquisition of a stolen item due to a change it underwent. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: By Torah law, a stolen item that has changed is returned as is, as it is stated: “And he shall restore that which he took by robbery” (Leviticus 5:23). This indicates that he shall return it in any case, even if it has been changed. And if you say: In our mishna it is stated that if the stolen item is changed the robber gives monetary compensation rather than returning the item, that policy was instituted by the Sages due to the ordinance instituted for the penitent. The Gemara asks: But did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say that? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: The halakha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna, and we learned in a mishna with regard to first of the sheared wool (Ḥullin 135a): If the owner of the sheep did not manage to give the sheared wool to the priest before he dyed it, he is exempt from giving it to the priest. This indicates that dyeing the wool is a significant change. One of the Rabbis, whose name was Rabbi Ya’akov, said to them: It was explained to me directly by Rabbi Yoḥanan that he was referring to a case where he robbed another of sanded wood and fashioned it into vessels, which is a change in which the item can revert to its original state. Consequently, the robber does not acquire the item by Torah law, but rather due to the ordinance instituted for the penitent. § Having mentioned the ordinance instituted for the penitent, the Gemara discusses other details of this ordinance. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Shevi’it 8:11): With regard to robbers or usurers that returned either the stolen item or the interest to the one from whom they took it, one should not accept it from them. And with regard to one who does accept it from them, the Sages are displeased with him, since by doing so he discourages those who wish to repent. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: This mishna, i.e., the statement of the Tosefta, was taught in the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it is taught in a baraita: There was an incident with regard to one man who desired to repent after having been a thief for many years. His wife said to him: Empty one [reika], if you repent you will have to return all the stolen items to their rightful owners, and even the belt that you are wearing is not yours, and he refrained and did not repent. At that time, the Sages said: With regard to robbers or usurers that returned either the stolen item or the interest to the one from whom they took it, one should not accept it from them. And concerning one who does accept it from them, the Sages are displeased with him. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: With regard to children whose deceased father left them money paid as interest, although they know that it is interest, they are not obligated to return it. The Gemara infers: They, the children, are the ones that are not obligated to return it, but their father would have been obligated to return it, and his victims may accept his money. The Gemara responds: By right, the baraita should have taught that their father also would not have been obligated to return it. And the fact that the baraita teaches this halakha with regard to the children is because of the fact that the baraita wants to teach a halakha in the latter clause: If their deceased father left them a cow, or a garment, or any other specific item he had stolen or taken as interest, they are obligated to return it due to the honor of their father, so that the item not serve as a reminder to all that their father transgressed. Since this halakha needs to be stated specifically with regard to the children, the first clause of the baraita is also taught with regard to them. The Gemara asks: But is it true that due to the honor of their father they are obligated to return the item or money? I will read here the verse: “You shall not revile God, nor curse a ruler of your people” (Exodus 22:27), from which the Sages inferred that the prohibition against cursing a ruler is in effect only with regard to a ruler that acts as a member of your people, i.e., in accordance with Torah law. One who curses a wicked ruler does not violate this prohibition. Similarly, if one’s father is wicked, the mitzva to honor him should not apply. Why would his children have to return items that he stole due to his honor? The Gemara responds: It is like that which Rav Pineḥas said concerning a different case: This is a case where he repented. Here too, it is a case where the father repented, and since he is no longer wicked, his children are obligated to honor him. The Gemara asks: If he repented, what was the stolen item or interest doing with him? He should have returned it while he was still alive. The Gemara responds: It is a case where he did not manage to return it before he died. Consequently, the children must return the items in order to uphold their father’s honor. The Gemara raises another contradiction: Come and hear the statement of another baraita: With regard to robbers and usurers, although they collected the stolen item or interest, they return it. The Gemara first clarifies the meaning of the baraita: In the case of robbers, what collection is there, i.e., why did the baraita use the term: Collected, in this context? If they robbed, they robbed and did not collect anything; and if they did not rob, they did not rob and cannot be called robbers at all. Rather, emend the text of the baraita to say: With regard to robbers, and who are they, i.e., what is meant by the term: Robbers? It is referring to usurers. The Gemara resumes its citation of the baraita: Although they collected the interest, they must return it. This is contrary to the ruling of the Tosefta that if robbers and usurers return what they have taken, it is not accepted. The Gemara explains: Say that this baraita means that they return it, but one does not accept it from them. The Gemara asks: But why do they return it if it will not be accepted? The Gemara responds: In order to fulfill their obligation to Heaven. In order to fully repent, they must at least offer to return to the debtors the interest they took unlawfully. The Gemara raises a contradiction from another source. Come and hear the statement of another baraita: With regard to shepherds who allow their animals to graze in other people’s fields, thereby stealing from the owners; or tax collectors who are hired to collect taxes on behalf of the government and collect excessive sums; or tax collectors who purchase the right to collect taxes themselves and collect unlawfully, their repentance is difficult, since they steal from the public. It is difficult for them to find every one of their victims in order to pay them restitution, and they must return what they have stolen to whomever they recognize as victims of their theft. This baraita indicates that thieves do return what they have stolen. The Gemara answers: Say that they return it, but one does not accept it from them. The Gemara asks: But why do they return it if it will not be accepted? The Gemara responds: In order to fulfill their obligation to Heaven. The Gemara asks: If so, if they are not actually obligated to return what they have stolen, why is their repentance difficult? And furthermore, say the latter clause of the baraita: And as for the money belonging to those that they do not recognize as their victims, they should use that money for community needs. And Rav Ḥisda says: This means providing pits, ditches, and caves, which benefit the general public. This indicates that a thief actually does pay back what he has stolen. Rather, this contradiction must be resolved differently. It is not difficult: Here, where the baraita states that he must actually return what he has stolen, it is referring to a time before the ordinance for the penitent was instituted. There, where the baraita states that one does not accept the repayment from a robber, it is referring to a time after the ordinance was instituted. The Gemara adds: And now that Rav Naḥman says that when the Sages say that he does not return what he has stolen, they refer only to a case where the stolen item does not exist in its initial form, and you can even say that this and that, both baraitot, are referring to a time after the ordinance was instituted, and it is not difficult.

When a person's father and mother are absolutely wicked and violate transgressions - even if they were sentenced to death and being taken to their execution - it is forbidden for a son to strike them or curse them. If he curses them or wounds them, however, he is not liable. If they repent, even if they are being taken to their execution, he is liable and is executed because of them.
To whom does the above apply? To the convicted person's son. If, however, an unrelated individual struck or cursed a person after he was sentenced to death, even though he repents, he is not liable, for that person will be executed. If, however, he embarrasses him, he is liable to pay a fine for embarrassing him.

A mamzer is obligated to honor and fear his father even though he is not liable for striking him or cursing him until he repents. Even when his father was a wicked person who violated many transgressions, he must honor him and fear him.
If he sees his father violate Torah law, he should not tell him: 'Father, you transgressed Torah law.' Instead, he should tell him: 'Father, is not such-and-such written in the Torah?', as if he is asking him, rather than warning him.

From whose funds must one give his father food and drink? Rav Yehuda says: From the money of the son. Rav Natan bar Oshaya said: From the money of the father. The Sages gave this following ruling to Rav Yirmeya, and some say they gave this following ruling to the son of Rav Yirmeya: The halakha is like the one who says it must be paid from the money of the father. The Gemara raises an objection from the following baraita: It is stated: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11), and it is stated: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9), which teaches the following verbal analogy: Just as there one honors God “with your wealth,” i.e., through monetary loss, so too here one must honor his father through monetary loss. And if you say that one honors him from the money of the father, what difference does it make to the son, i.e., what monetary loss does he suffer? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference to him with regard to the neglect of his work. Although he is not required to spend his own money, the son must leave aside his work to honor his father, which will cause him some financial loss. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: Two brothers, or two partners in the ownership of produce, or a father and son, or a rabbi and his student, may redeem the second tithe for each other without adding one-fifth, as one who redeems the tithe of another, including these individuals, is not required to add one-fifth. And they may feed each other the poor man’s tithe. If one of them is poor, the other may give him the poor man’s tithe that he separated from his produce, and it is not considered as though the pauper ate the poor man’s tithe from his own produce. The Gemara explains the proof from this baraita. And if you say that the obligation to honor one’s father is from the money of the son, one finds that this son repays his obligation from the produce of the poor, as he is taking care of his father with produce that should go to the poor. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where he has covered all of his father’s basic needs with his own money. At this stage, if his father needs surplus money, he may give it to him from the poor man’s tithe. The Gemara asks: If so, consider that which is taught with regard to this baraita. Rabbi Yehuda says: May a curse come upon one who feeds his father the poor man’s tithe. And if this halakha, that one may feed his father the poor man’s tithe, was said with regard to a surplus, what difference is there? Since the son has fulfilled his obligation and simply adds something so that his father will have more, why is this person cursed? The Gemara answers: Even so, it is a disrespectful matter for one to feed his father with money that has been designated as charity for the poor. The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear: They asked Rabbi Eliezer how far one must go in honoring his father and mother. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Such that the father takes a purse and throw it into the sea in front of his son, and the son does not embarrass him. And if you say that the son honors him from the money of the father, what difference does it make to the son? Why would the son care if his father throws away his own purse? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a son who is fit to inherit from him. Since the son thinks that the money will eventually belong to him, he has cause for anger. And this is as reflected in an incident involving Rabba bar Rav Huna, when Rav Huna tore silk garments in front of his son Rabba. Rav Huna had said to himself: I will go and see if he becomes angry or does not become angry, i.e., he wanted to test him and see whether his son Rabba would honor him. The Gemara asks: But perhaps his son would become angry and Rav Huna would thereby violate the prohibition of: “Nor put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14), as by testing his son Rav Huna would have caused him to sin. The Gemara answers: It was a case where the father had forgone his honor from the outset. Consequently, even if the son grew angry with him, he would not have violated the mitzva. The Gemara asks: But by tearing his clothes, he violates the prohibition: Do not destroy (see Deuteronomy 20:19). The Gemara answers that Rav Huna made a tear at the seam, so that the garment could be repaired. The Gemara asks: Perhaps it was due to that reason that the son did not become angry, because he saw that his father caused no actual damage? The Gemara answers: He did this when the son was already angry for some other reason, so that he would not notice this detail. The Gemara cites another story involving the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother. Rav Yeḥezkel taught his son Rami: If people sentenced to be burned became mingled with those sentenced to be stoned Rabbi Shimon says: All of them are judged with the punishment of stoning, as the punishment of burning is more severe. Since the death penalty of each is uncertain, all of them are treated leniently. Rav Yehuda, who was also Rav Yeḥezkel’s son, said to him: Father, do not teach the mishna this way, as, according to this version, why is this the halakha specifically because burning is more severe than stoning? Let him derive it from the fact that the majority are sentenced to be stoned. The wording of the baraita, which states that those who were supposed to be burned became mixed up with those who were to be stoned, indicates that the people sentenced to stoning are the majority. If so, one should simply follow the majority. Rather, I will teach it this way: If those who are sentenced to be stoned became mixed up with those who are sentenced to be burned, they are all judged with the punishment of stoning even though this is the minority, as they are all treated leniently. Rav Yeḥezkel said to him: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: And the Rabbis say that they should be judged with the punishment of burning, as the punishment of stoning is more severe. According to your version, why is this the halakha specifically because stoning is more severe? Let him derive it due to the fact that the majority of people are sentenced to be burned, and one follows the majority. His son Rav Yehuda said to him: The statement of the Rabbis is not difficult, as there the Rabbis are saying to Rabbi Shimon as follows: That which you said, that burning is more severe, is not the case; rather, stoning is more severe. In other words, the Rabbis were specifically responding to Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning, and therefore they stated the opposite claim and ignored the issue of which group is in the majority. Later, Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Big-toothed one, do not speak to your father like that, as it is disrespectful. As it is taught in a baraita: If one’s father was transgressing a Torah matter, he should not say to him explicitly: Father, you transgressed a Torah matter. Rather, he should say to him: Father, so it is written in the Torah. The Gemara asks: If he says to him directly: This is what is written in the Torah, he will cause him suffering. Rather, he should say to him: Father, this verse is written in the Torah, and he should proceed to quote the verse, from which his father will understand on his own that he has acted improperly. § Elazar ben Matya says: If my father says: Give me water, and there is a mitzva for me to perform at the same time, I set aside the honor of my father and perform the mitzva, as my father and I are both obligated in the mitzva. Isi ben Yehuda says: If it is possible for this mitzva to be performed by others, let it be performed by others, and he should go and attend to the honor due to his father, as the honor of his father is his obligation alone. Rav Mattana says: The halakha with regard to this matter is in accordance with the opinion of Isi ben Yehuda. Rav Yitzḥak bar Sheila says that Rav Mattana says that Rav Ḥisda says: With regard to a father who forgoes his honor, his honor is forgone, and his son does not transgress if he does not treat him in the proper manner. By contrast, with regard to a rabbi who forgoes his honor, his honor is not forgone. And Rav Yosef says: Even with regard to a rabbi who forgoes his honor, his honor is forgone, as it is stated: “And the Lord went before them by day” (Exodus 13:21). God Himself, the Teacher of the Jewish people, had forgone the honor due Him and took the trouble to guide the people. Rava said: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to the Holy One, Blessed be He, the world is His and the Torah is His, and therefore He can forgo His honor.

These are the rules that you shall set before them: When you acquire a male Hebrew slave, he shall serve six years; in the seventh year he shall go free, without payment. If he came single, he shall leave single; if he had a wife, his wife shall leave with him. If his master gave him a wife, and she has borne him children, the wife and her children shall belong to the master, and he shall leave alone. But if the slave declares, “I love my master, and my wife and children: I do not wish to go free,” his master shall take him before God.^abefore God In contrast to others “to the judges.” He shall be brought to the door or the doorpost, and his master shall pierce his ear with an awl; and he shall then remain his master’s slave for life. When someone sells their daughter as a slave, she shall not go free as other slaves do. If she proves to be displeasing to her master, who designated her for himself, he must let her be redeemed; he shall not have the right to sell her to outsiders, since he broke faith with her. And if the master designated her for a son, he shall deal with her as is the practice with free maidens. If he takes another to wife, he must not withhold from this one her food, her clothing, or her conjugal rights.^bconjugal rights Or “ointments.” If he fails her in these three ways, she shall go free, without payment. One who fatally strikes another shall be put to death. If it was not by design—it came about by an act of God—I will assign you a place to which that person can flee.^ca place to which that person can flee The case of a female culprit may have been more complex. When one person schemes against another and kills through treachery, you shall take that person from My very altar to be put to death. One who strikes their father or mother shall be put to death. One who kidnaps another—whether having sold or still holding them—shall be put to death. One who insults^dinsults Or “reviles.” their father or mother shall be put to death. When [two] parties quarrel and one strikes the other with a stone or fist, and [the victim] does not die but has to take to bed: if the latter then gets up and walks outdoors upon a staff, the assailant shall go unpunished—except for paying for the idleness and the cure. When someone strikes their slave, male or female, with a rod, who dies there and then,^ethere and then Lit. “under his hand.” this must be avenged. But if [the victim] survives a day or two, this is not to be avenged, since the one is the other’s property. When [two or more] parties fight, and one of them pushes a pregnant woman and a miscarriage results, but no other damage ensues, [the one responsible] shall be fined according as the woman’s husband may exact, the payment to be based on reckoning.^fon reckoning In contrast to others “as the judges determine.” But if other damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise. When someone strikes the eye of their slave, male or female, and destroys it, the slave shall go free on account of the eye. If [the owner] knocks out the tooth of their slave, male or female, the slave shall go free on account of the tooth. When an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall be stoned and its flesh shall not be eaten, but the owner of the ox is not to be punished. If, however, that ox has been in the habit of goring, and its owner, though warned, has failed to guard it, and it kills a man or a woman—the ox shall be stoned and its owner, too, shall be put to death. If ransom is imposed to redeem [the owner’s] life, whatever is imposed must be paid. So, too, if it gores a minor, male or female: it shall be dealt with according to the same rule. But if the ox gores a slave, male or female, [its owner] shall pay thirty shekels of silver to the master, and the ox shall be stoned. When someone opens a pit, or digs a pit and does not cover it, and an ox or a donkey falls into it, the one responsible for the pit must make restitution—paying the price to the owner, but keeping the dead animal. When someone’s ox injures a neighbor’s ox and it dies, they shall sell the live ox and divide its price; they shall also divide the dead animal. If, however, it is known that the ox was in the habit of goring, and its owner has failed to guard it, [that party] must restore ox for ox, but shall keep the dead animal. ^gThis verse is labeled as 22.1 in some editions. When someone steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters it or sells it, five oxen shall be paid for the ox, and four sheep for the sheep.— If the thief is seized while tunneling^atunneling Under a wall, for housebreaking. and beaten to death, there is no bloodguilt in that case. If the sun had already risen, there is bloodguilt in that case.—[The thief] must make restitution, and if lacking the means, shall be sold for the theft. But if what was stolen—whether ox or donkey or sheep—is found alive and in hand, that person shall pay double. When someone who owns livestock lets it loose to graze in another’s land, and so allows a field or a vineyard to be grazed bare, restitution must be made for the impairment^bimpairment Lit. “excellence.” of that field or vineyard. When a fire is started and spreads to thorns, so that stacked, standing, or growing^cgrowing Lit. “field.” grain is consumed, the one who started the fire must make restitution. When one person gives money or goods to another for safekeeping, and they are stolen from that person’s house: if caught, the thief shall pay double; if the thief is not caught, the owner of the house shall depose before God^dbefore God See note at 21.6. and deny laying hands on the other’s property. (In all charges of misappropriation—pertaining to an ox, a donkey, a sheep, a garment, or any other loss, whereof one party alleges, “This is it”—the case of both parties shall come before God: the one whom God declares guilty shall pay double to the other.) When one person gives to another a donkey, an ox, a sheep or any other animal to guard, and it dies or is injured or is carried off, with no witness about, an oath before GOD shall decide between the two of them that the one has not laid hands on the property of the other; the owner must acquiesce, and no restitution shall be made. But if [the animal] was stolen from [the guardian], restitution shall be made to its owner. If it was torn by beasts, [the guardian] shall bring it as evidence—not needing to replace what has been torn by beasts. When one person borrows [an animal] from another and it dies or is injured, its owner not being with it, restitution must be made. If its owner was with it, no restitution need be made; but if it was hired, that payment is due. If a man seduces a virgin for whom the bride-price has not been paid,^ethe bride-price has not been paid So that she is unmarried; cf. Deut. 20.7; 22.23ff. and lies with her, he must make her his wife by payment of a bride-price. If her father refuses to give her to him, he must still weigh out silver in accordance with the bride-price for virgins. You shall not tolerate^ftolerate Lit. “let live.” a sorceress. Whoever lies with an animal shall be put to death. Whoever sacrifices to a god other than the ETERNAL, alone, shall be proscribed.^gproscribed See Lev. 27.29. You shall not wrong or oppress a stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt. You^hYou Addressing the community’s leaders, or perhaps all householders. shall not ill-treat any widow or orphan. If you do mistreat them, I will heed their outcry as soon as they cry out to Me, and My anger shall blaze forth and I will put you to the sword, and your own wives shall become widows and your children orphans. If you lend money to My people, to the poor among you, do not act toward them as a creditor; exact no interest from them. If you take your neighbor’s garment in pledge, you must return it before the sun sets; it is the only available clothing—it is what covers their skin. In what else shall they sleep? Therefore, if [your neighbor] cries out to Me, I will pay heed, for I am compassionate. You shall not revile God, nor put a curse upon a chieftain among your people. You shall not put off the skimming of the first yield of your vats.ⁱput off the skimming of the first yield of your vats Meaning of Heb. uncertain. You shall give Me the male first-born among your children. You shall do the same with your cattle and your flocks: seven days their male first-born^jtheir male first-born Heb. “it.” shall remain with its mother; on the eighth day you shall give it to Me. You shall be holy people to Me: you must not eat flesh torn by beasts in the field; you shall cast it to the dogs. You must not carry false rumors; you shall not join hands with the guilty to act as a malicious witness: You shall neither side with the mighty^amighty In contrast to others “multitude.” to do wrong—you shall not give perverse testimony in a dispute so as to pervert it in favor of the mighty— nor shall you show deference to a poor person in a dispute. When you encounter your enemy’s ox or donkey wandering, you must take it back. When you see the donkey of your enemy lying under its burden and would refrain from raising^braising For this use of the verb ʻzb, cf. Neh. 3.8, 34. For the whole verse, see Deut. 22.4. it, you must nevertheless help raise it. You shall not subvert the rights of your needy in their disputes. Keep far from a false charge; do not bring death on those who are innocent and in the right, for I will not acquit the wrongdoer. Do not take bribes, for bribes blind the clear-sighted and upset the pleas of those who are in the right. You shall not oppress a stranger, for you know the feelings of the stranger, having yourselves been strangers in the land of Egypt. Six years you shall sow your land and gather in its yield; but in the seventh you shall let it rest and lie fallow. Let the needy among your people eat of it, and what they leave let the wild beasts eat. You shall do the same with your vineyards and your olive groves. Six days you shall do your work, but on the seventh day you shall cease from labor, in order that your ox and your donkey may rest, and that your home-born slave and the stranger may be refreshed. Be on guard concerning all that I have told you. Make no mention of the names of other gods; they shall not be heard on your lips. Three times a year you shall hold a festival for Me: You shall observe the Feast of Unleavened Bread—eating unleavened bread for seven days as I have commanded you—at the set time in the month^cin the month See note at 13.4. of Abib, for in it you went forth from Egypt; and none shall appear before Me empty-handed; and the Feast of the Harvest, of the first fruits of your work, of what you sow in the field; and the Feast of Ingathering at the end of the year, when you gather in the results of your work from the field. Three times a year all your males shall appear before the Sovereign, GOD. You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with anything leavened; and the fat of My festal offering shall not be left lying until morning. The choice first fruits of your soil you shall bring to the house of the ETERNAL your God.
You shall not boil a kid in its mother’s milk. I am sending an angel^dan angel Or “a messenger,” namely Moses; cf. Gersonides, Luzzatto. before you to guard you on the way and to bring you to the place that I have made ready. Pay heed to him and obey him. Do not defy him, for he will not pardon your offenses, since My Name is in him; but if you obey him and do all that I say, I will be an enemy to your enemies and a foe to your foes. When My angel^eangel See note at v. 20. goes before you and brings you to the Amorites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Canaanites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites, and I annihilate them, you shall not bow down to their gods in worship or follow their practices, but shall tear them down and smash their pillars to bits. You shall serve the ETERNAL your God, who will bless your bread and your water. And I will remove sickness from your midst. No woman in your land shall miscarry or be infertile. I will let you enjoy the full count of your days. I will send forth My terror before you, and I will throw into panic all the people among whom you come, and I will make all your enemies turn tail^ftail Lit. “back.” before you. I will send a plague^gplague Meaning of Heb. ṣirʻah uncertain. Cf. Deut. 7.20. ahead of you, and it shall drive out before you the Hivites, the Canaanites, and the Hittites. I will not drive them out before you in a single year, lest the land become desolate and the wild beasts multiply to your hurt. I will drive them out before you little by little, until you have increased and possess the land. I will set your borders from the Sea of Reeds to the Sea of Philistia, and from the wilderness to the Euphrates; for I will deliver the inhabitants of the land into your hands, and you will drive them out before you. You shall make no covenant with them and their gods. They shall not remain in your land, lest they cause you to sin against Me; for you will serve their gods—and it will prove a snare to you. Then Moses was told, “Come up to GOD, with Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy elders of Israel, and bow low from afar. Moses alone shall come near GOD; but the others shall not come near, nor shall the people come up with him.” Moses went and repeated to the people all GOD’s commands and all the rules; and all the people answered with one voice, saying, “All the things that GOD has commanded we will do!” Moses then wrote down all GOD’s commands.
Early in the morning, he set up an altar at the foot of the mountain, with twelve pillars for the twelve tribes of Israel. He designated some assistants^aassistants Or “young men.” among the Israelites, and they offered burnt offerings and sacrificed bulls as offerings of well-being to GOD. Moses took one part of the blood and put it in basins, and the other part of the blood he dashed against the altar. Then he took the record of the covenant and read it aloud to the people. And they said, “All that GOD has spoken we will faithfully do!”^bwe will faithfully do Lit. “we will do and obey.” Moses took the blood and dashed it on the people and said, “This is the blood of the covenant that GOD now makes with you concerning all these commands.” Then Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy elders of Israel ascended; and they saw the God of Israel—under whose feet was the likeness of a pavement of sapphire, like the very sky for purity. Yet [God] did not raise a hand against the leaders^cleaders Meaning of Heb. ʼaṣilim uncertain. of the Israelites; they beheld God, and they ate and drank. GOD said to Moses, “Come up to Me on the mountain and wait there, and I will give you the stone tablets with the teachings and commandments that I have inscribed to instruct them.” So Moses and his attendant Joshua arose, and Moses ascended the mountain of God. To the elders he had said, “Wait here for us until we return to you. You have Aaron and Hur with you; let anyone who has a legal matter approach them.” When Moses had ascended the mountain, the cloud covered the mountain. The Presence of GOD settled on Mount Sinai, and the cloud hid it for six days. On the seventh day Moses was called from the midst of the cloud. Now the Presence of GOD appeared in the sight of the Israelites as a consuming fire on the top of the mountain. Moses went inside the cloud and ascended the mountain; and Moses remained on the mountain forty days and forty nights.

From whose funds must one give his father food and drink? Rav Yehuda says: From the money of the son. Rav Natan bar Oshaya said: From the money of the father. The Sages gave this following ruling to Rav Yirmeya, and some say they gave this following ruling to the son of Rav Yirmeya: The halakha is like the one who says it must be paid from the money of the father. The Gemara raises an objection from the following baraita: It is stated: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11), and it is stated: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9), which teaches the following verbal analogy: Just as there one honors God “with your wealth,” i.e., through monetary loss, so too here one must honor his father through monetary loss. And if you say that one honors him from the money of the father, what difference does it make to the son, i.e., what monetary loss does he suffer? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference to him with regard to the neglect of his work. Although he is not required to spend his own money, the son must leave aside his work to honor his father, which will cause him some financial loss. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: Two brothers, or two partners in the ownership of produce, or a father and son, or a rabbi and his student, may redeem the second tithe for each other without adding one-fifth, as one who redeems the tithe of another, including these individuals, is not required to add one-fifth. And they may feed each other the poor man’s tithe. If one of them is poor, the other may give him the poor man’s tithe that he separated from his produce, and it is not considered as though the pauper ate the poor man’s tithe from his own produce. The Gemara explains the proof from this baraita. And if you say that the obligation to honor one’s father is from the money of the son, one finds that this son repays his obligation from the produce of the poor, as he is taking care of his father with produce that should go to the poor. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where he has covered all of his father’s basic needs with his own money. At this stage, if his father needs surplus money, he may give it to him from the poor man’s tithe. The Gemara asks: If so, consider that which is taught with regard to this baraita. Rabbi Yehuda says: May a curse come upon one who feeds his father the poor man’s tithe. And if this halakha, that one may feed his father the poor man’s tithe, was said with regard to a surplus, what difference is there? Since the son has fulfilled his obligation and simply adds something so that his father will have more, why is this person cursed? The Gemara answers: Even so, it is a disrespectful matter for one to feed his father with money that has been designated as charity for the poor. The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear: They asked Rabbi Eliezer how far one must go in honoring his father and mother. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Such that the father takes a purse and throw it into the sea in front of his son, and the son does not embarrass him. And if you say that the son honors him from the money of the father, what difference does it make to the son? Why would the son care if his father throws away his own purse? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a son who is fit to inherit from him. Since the son thinks that the money will eventually belong to him, he has cause for anger. And this is as reflected in an incident involving Rabba bar Rav Huna, when Rav Huna tore silk garments in front of his son Rabba. Rav Huna had said to himself: I will go and see if he becomes angry or does not become angry, i.e., he wanted to test him and see whether his son Rabba would honor him. The Gemara asks: But perhaps his son would become angry and Rav Huna would thereby violate the prohibition of: “Nor put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14), as by testing his son Rav Huna would have caused him to sin. The Gemara answers: It was a case where the father had forgone his honor from the outset. Consequently, even if the son grew angry with him, he would not have violated the mitzva. The Gemara asks: But by tearing his clothes, he violates the prohibition: Do not destroy (see Deuteronomy 20:19). The Gemara answers that Rav Huna made a tear at the seam, so that the garment could be repaired. The Gemara asks: Perhaps it was due to that reason that the son did not become angry, because he saw that his father caused no actual damage? The Gemara answers: He did this when the son was already angry for some other reason, so that he would not notice this detail. The Gemara cites another story involving the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother. Rav Yeḥezkel taught his son Rami: If people sentenced to be burned became mingled with those sentenced to be stoned Rabbi Shimon says: All of them are judged with the punishment of stoning, as the punishment of burning is more severe. Since the death penalty of each is uncertain, all of them are treated leniently. Rav Yehuda, who was also Rav Yeḥezkel’s son, said to him: Father, do not teach the mishna this way, as, according to this version, why is this the halakha specifically because burning is more severe than stoning? Let him derive it from the fact that the majority are sentenced to be stoned. The wording of the baraita, which states that those who were supposed to be burned became mixed up with those who were to be stoned, indicates that the people sentenced to stoning are the majority. If so, one should simply follow the majority. Rather, I will teach it this way: If those who are sentenced to be stoned became mixed up with those who are sentenced to be burned, they are all judged with the punishment of stoning even though this is the minority, as they are all treated leniently. Rav Yeḥezkel said to him: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: And the Rabbis say that they should be judged with the punishment of burning, as the punishment of stoning is more severe. According to your version, why is this the halakha specifically because stoning is more severe? Let him derive it due to the fact that the majority of people are sentenced to be burned, and one follows the majority. His son Rav Yehuda said to him: The statement of the Rabbis is not difficult, as there the Rabbis are saying to Rabbi Shimon as follows: That which you said, that burning is more severe, is not the case; rather, stoning is more severe. In other words, the Rabbis were specifically responding to Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning, and therefore they stated the opposite claim and ignored the issue of which group is in the majority. Later, Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Big-toothed one, do not speak to your father like that, as it is disrespectful. As it is taught in a baraita: If one’s father was transgressing a Torah matter, he should not say to him explicitly: Father, you transgressed a Torah matter. Rather, he should say to him: Father, so it is written in the Torah. The Gemara asks: If he says to him directly: This is what is written in the Torah, he will cause him suffering. Rather, he should say to him: Father, this verse is written in the Torah, and he should proceed to quote the verse, from which his father will understand on his own that he has acted improperly. § Elazar ben Matya says: If my father says: Give me water, and there is a mitzva for me to perform at the same time, I set aside the honor of my father and perform the mitzva, as my father and I are both obligated in the mitzva. Isi ben Yehuda says: If it is possible for this mitzva to be performed by others, let it be performed by others, and he should go and attend to the honor due to his father, as the honor of his father is his obligation alone. Rav Mattana says: The halakha with regard to this matter is in accordance with the opinion of Isi ben Yehuda. Rav Yitzḥak bar Sheila says that Rav Mattana says that Rav Ḥisda says: With regard to a father who forgoes his honor, his honor is forgone, and his son does not transgress if he does not treat him in the proper manner. By contrast, with regard to a rabbi who forgoes his honor, his honor is not forgone. And Rav Yosef says: Even with regard to a rabbi who forgoes his honor, his honor is forgone, as it is stated: “And the Lord went before them by day” (Exodus 13:21). God Himself, the Teacher of the Jewish people, had forgone the honor due Him and took the trouble to guide the people. Rava said: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to the Holy One, Blessed be He, the world is His and the Torah is His, and therefore He can forgo His honor.

By contrast, here, is it his Torah, that the teacher can forgo its honor? Rava then said: Yes, if he studies, it is his Torah, as it is written: “For his delight is the Torah of the Lord, and in his Torah he meditates day and night” (Psalms 1:2). This indicates that at first it is “the Torah of the Lord,” but after he studies, it becomes “his Torah.” The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rava served drinks to the guests at his son’s wedding celebration, and he poured a cup for Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, and they stood before him when he approached them. When he poured a cup for Rav Mari and for Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ḥisda, they did not stand before him. Rava became angry and said: Are these Sages, i.e., Rav Mari and Rav Pineḥas, Sages, and are those Sages, who stood to honor me, not Sages? Do you think you are so great that you are not required to honor a Sage? And furthermore, it happened that Rav Pappa was serving drinks to the guests at the wedding celebration [hillula] of Abba Mar, his son, and he poured a cup for Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, and he did not stand before him, and Rav Pappa became angry. These anecdotes indicate that even when a rabbi forgoes the honor due to him by serving drinks to his guests, his honor is not forgone. The Gemara answers: A rabbi can forgo the full measure of honor due to him, but even so, others are required to perform some act of reverence, such as preparing to stand before him. Rav Ashi said: Even according to the one who says that if a rabbi forgoes the honor due him, his honor is forgone, if a Nasi forgoes the honor due him, his honor is not forgone. The Gemara raises an objection: There was an incident involving Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Tzadok, who were reclining at the wedding of Rabban Gamliel’s son. And Rabban Gamliel, who was Nasi of the Sanhedrin at the time, was standing over them and serving them drinks. He gave the cup to Rabbi Eliezer and he would not accept it; he gave it to Rabbi Yehoshua and he accepted it. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: What is this, Yehoshua? We sit and the esteemed Rabban Gamliel stands over us and serves us drinks? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: We found one greater than him who served his guests, as our forefather Abraham was greater than him and he served his guests. Abraham was the greatest man of his generation and it is written about him: “And he stood over them under the tree, and they ate” (Genesis 18:8). And lest you say: His guests appeared to him as ministering angels, and that is why he honored them, in fact they appeared to him only as Arabs. And if so, should not the esteemed Rabban Gamliel stand over us and serve us drinks? Rabbi Tzadok said to them: For how long will you ignore the honor due to the Omnipresent, and deal with the honor of people? You could cite a proof from God Himself. After all, the Holy One, Blessed be He, makes the winds blow, and raises the clouds, and brings the rain, and causes the earth to sprout, and sets a table before each and every creature. And should not the esteemed Rabban Gamliel stand over us and serve us drinks? This discussion indicates that even a Nasi may forgo the honor due him. Rather, if it was stated, it was stated as follows: Rav Ashi said: Even according to the one who says that if a Nasi forgoes the honor due him, his honor is forgone, if a king forgoes the honor due him, his honor is not forgone. As it is stated: “You shall set a king over you” (Deuteronomy 17:15), which indicates that his fear should be upon you. The people are commanded to fear a king, and therefore it is not permitted for him to forgo the honor due to him. § The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “Before the hoary head you shall stand and you shall revere the face of an elder, and you shall fear your God” (Leviticus 19:32): One might have thought that it is obligatory to stand before a simple [ashmai] elder. Therefore, the verse states: “elder,” and an “elder” means nothing other than a wise man, as it is stated: “Gather unto Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel, whom you know to be the Elders of the people” (Numbers 11:16). Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An “elder [zaken]” means nothing other than one who has acquired wisdom. He interprets the word zaken as a contraction of the phrase zeh kanna, meaning: This one has acquired. Elsewhere the word kanna is used in reference to wisdom, as it is stated that wisdom says: “The Lord acquired me [kanani] at the beginning of His way” (Proverbs 8:22). The baraita continues: One might have thought that one must stand before an elder as soon as he sees him, even from a distance. Therefore the verse states: “You shall stand and you shall revere” (Leviticus 19:32), which teaches: I said that one is obligated to stand only in a place where there is reverence. If he stands while the elder is still far away, it is not clear that he is doing so in his honor. The baraita continues: One might have thought that he should revere him through money, i.e., that one is required to give an elder money in his honor. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall stand and you shall revere.” Just as standing includes no monetary loss, so too, reverence is referring to an action that includes no monetary loss. One might have thought that one should also stand before him in the lavatory or in the bathhouse. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall stand and you shall revere,” which indicates: I said the mitzva of standing only in a place where there is reverence. It is inappropriate to show respect for someone in places of this kind. The baraita continues: One might have thought that one may close his eyes like one who does not see the elder. Therefore, the verse states: “Before the hoary head you shall stand and you shall revere the face of an elder, and you shall fear your God” (Leviticus 19:32). With regard to any matter given over to the heart, it is stated: “And you shall fear your God.” This phrase is referring to a situation where it is impossible to prove whether one purposefully made it appear as if he were not aware that he was obligated to perform a mitzva, as only that individual and God know the truth. The baraita continues: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: From where is it derived that an elder should not trouble others to honor him? The verse states: “And you shall revere the face of an elder, and you shall fear your God.” The phrase “an elder, and you shall fear,” read by itself, without the rest of the verse, indicates that an elder is also commanded to fear God, and not purposefully act in a manner to cause others to have to honor him. In conclusion, the baraita cites another opinion. Isi ben Yehuda says that the verse: “Before the hoary head you shall stand,” indicates that even any person of hoary head is included in this mitzva, not only a Sage. The Gemara analyzes this baraita. Apparently the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is the same as that of the first tanna, as they both say that an elder is a Torah scholar. What does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili add? The Gemara answers: There is a difference between them with regard to one who is young and wise. The first tanna maintains: One who is young and wise is not considered an elder, as the mitzva applies only to one who is both elderly and wise. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintains: It is even a mitzva to honor one who is young and wise. According to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the mitzva is not referring to old age at all, but only to wisdom. The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? He could have said to you that if it enters your mind to explain as the first tanna says, that for the obligation to honor another to be in effect that person must be both elderly and wise, if so, let the Merciful One write: Before the hoary head of an elder you shall stand and you shall revere. What is the difference between the two terms “hoary head” and “elder,” that the Merciful One separates them? This serves to say that this term is not the same as that one, and that term is not the same as this one, i.e., an elder is not required to have a hoary head. Learn from the verse that even one who is young and wise is called an elder. And the first tanna would say that the verse is written this way because the Torah wants to juxtapose “elder” with “and you shall fear,” in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s statement above that an elder should not trouble others to honor him. The Gemara asks: And what is the reasoning of the first tanna? Why does he maintain that one is obligated to stand only before an elder, wise man? The Gemara answers: The first tanna maintains that if it enters your mind to explain as Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says, let the Merciful One write: Before the hoary head of an elder you shall stand and revere; you shall stand and revere the face of an elder. From the fact that the Merciful One did not write this and thereby divide the two concepts, learn from it that “elder” and “hoary head” are together referring to one type of person. The Master said previously in the baraita: One might have thought that he should revere him through money, i.e., he is required to give him money in his honor; therefore, the verse states: “You shall stand and you shall revere” (Leviticus 19:32). Just as standing includes no monetary loss, so too, reverence is referring to an action that includes no monetary loss. The Gemara asks: And does standing include no monetary loss at all? Are we not dealing with a case where he was piercing pearls, a highly remunerative task, and in the meantime he must stand for the elder and thereby neglect his work, which causes him a loss? Rather, the verse juxtaposes standing to reverence: Just as reverence does not include neglect of work, so too, standing does not include neglect of work; therefore, one who is engaged in work is not obligated to stand before an elder. And the verse also juxtaposes reverence to standing: Just as standing includes no monetary loss, as standing applies only when it does not entail neglect of work, as explained previously, so too, reverence is referring to an action that includes no monetary loss. From here the Sages stated: Craftsmen are not permitted to stand before Torah scholars when they are engaged in their work. The Gemara asks: And are craftsmen not required to stand before Torah scholars? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Bikkurim 3:3): When farmers bring their first fruits to Jerusalem, all craftsmen stand before them, and greet them, and say to them: Our brothers from such and such a place, welcome! Since craftsmen would stand even for those engaged in a mitzva, all the more so should they stand for Torah scholars. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: There is no difficulty here, as indeed they stood before those bringing first fruits, and yet they would not stand before Torah scholars. Based on this Rabbi Yosei bar Avin says: Come and see how beloved is a mitzva performed in its proper time, as the craftsmen stood before those who were fulfilling a mitzva, whereas they did not stand before Torah scholars. The Gemara responds: This does not prove that the same applies to all mitzvot performed in their proper times, as perhaps it is different there, with regard to the bringing of the first fruits; for if so, i.e., if one does not treat those who bring first fruits with such honor, they will not want to come at all, and you will cause them to stumble and sin in the future. Consequently, the Sages instituted that those bringing first fruits should be treated with special honor. This reasoning does not apply to people performing other mitzvot. The Master said previously: One might have thought that one should also stand before an Elder in the lavatory or in the bathhouse; therefore, the verse said: “You shall stand and you shall revere,” which indicates that the mitzva of standing applies only in a place where there is reverence. The Gemara asks: And does one not show honor in a lavatory? But Rabbi Ḥiyya was sitting in a bathhouse and Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi passed by, and he did not stand before him. And Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi became angry and went and said to his father, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: I taught Rabbi Ḥiyya two of the five parts of the book of Psalms, and yet he did not stand before me. This indicates that a display of honor is appropriate even in a bathhouse. And furthermore, bar Kappara, and some say it was Rabbi Shmuel bar Rabbi Yosei, was sitting in a bathhouse. Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi entered and passed by, and he did not stand before him. Rabbi Shimon became angry and went and said to his father: I taught him two of the nine parts of Torat Kohanim, the halakhic midrash on Leviticus, and yet he did not stand before me. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Rabbi Shimon: Perhaps he was sitting and contemplating what you taught him and did not see you come in. The Gemara explains the proof: The fact that the reason he might have been exempt was that he was sitting and pondering the lessons indicates that if that were not so, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would not have justified such behavior. One must stand before a Sage even in a bathhouse. The Gemara answers that this is not difficult: This halakha, that one is not required to stand in a bathhouse, applies to the inner rooms, where everyone is naked; standing in a place of this kind certainly does not bestow honor. That halakha, that one is obligated to stand in a bathhouse, applies to the outer rooms, where people are still dressed. Standing is a sign of respect in these rooms. The Gemara comments: So too, it is reasonable that this is the correct explanation, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is permitted to contemplate matters of Torah everywhere, except for the bathhouse and the lavatory. Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi suggested that the student might have been sitting and pondering his studies, it can be assumed that the episode occurred in a location where only some of the halakhot governing one’s behavior in a bathhouse apply, i.e., the outer rooms. The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps one whose studies are beyond his control is different; it is possible he was so absorbed in Torah study that he forgot that he was in a place where it is prohibited to think about sacred matters. It is taught in the same baraita: One might have thought that one may close his eyes like one who does not see the elder; therefore, the verse states: “Before the hoary head you shall stand, and you shall revere the face of an elder, and you shall fear your God” (Leviticus 19:32). The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: Is that to say that we are dealing with wicked people who would intentionally act this way to avoid fulfilling a mitzva? Rather, this means: One might have thought that one may close his eyes before the obligation to stand arrives, i.e., when the elder is still far off. This would mean that when the obligation does arrive he will not see him, such that he would be required to stand before him. In this manner he thinks that he can avoid the obligation altogether. Therefore the verse states: “You shall stand…and you shall fear,” i.e., one should fear He who knows the secrets of one’s heart. § A Sage taught: What is the type of standing that indicates reverence? You must say that this applies when it is clear that one is standing in the elder’s honor, which is within four cubits of him. Abaye said: We said this halakha, that one must stand within four cubits of the elder, only with regard to one who is not his primary teacher; but for his primary teacher he must stand when he is within his range of vision, i.e., as soon as he sees him, even if he is more than four cubits away. The Gemara likewise reports that Abaye would stand as soon as he saw the ear of Rav Yosef’s donkey coming toward him. The Gemara relates: Abaye was riding a donkey along the bank of the Sagya River. Rav Mesharshiyya and other rabbis were sitting on the other bank of the river, and they did not stand before him. Abaye said to them: Am I not your primary teacher? You are therefore required to stand before me, despite the fact that I am far away. They said to him: That did not enter our minds, i.e., we did not see you at all. § It was further stated in the baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: From where is it derived that an elder should not trouble others to honor him? The verse states: “And you shall revere the face of an elder, and you shall fear your God.” Abaye said: We have a tradition that if a Sage circumnavigates an area so that people will not have to stand before him, he will live a long life. The Gemara relates that Abaye would circumnavigate an area, and likewise Rabbi Zeira would circumnavigate an area. The Gemara cites another incident involving honor one demonstrates for his teacher. Once, when Ravina was sitting before Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti, a certain man passed before him and did not cover his head. Ravina said: How rude is this man, who does not show respect by covering his head in honor of a rabbi. Rabbi Yirmeya of Difti said to him: Perhaps he is from the city of Mata Meḥasya, where rabbis are common and the people living there are consequently not as careful to display honor as those in other places. § It was stated previously that Isi ben Yehuda says that as the verse states: “Before the hoary head you shall stand,” it indicates that even anyone of hoary head is included, not only a Torah scholar. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Isi ben Yehuda. The Gemara relates: Rabbi Yoḥanan himself would stand before Aramean, i.e., gentile, elders. He said: How many experiences [harpatkei] have occurred to these individuals. It is appropriate to honor them, due to the wisdom they have garnered from their long lives. Rava would not stand before them, but he displayed reverence to them. Abaye would extend a hand to elders so that they could lean on him. Rava would send his agent to help them. Rav Naḥman would send officers [goza’ei], his servants, to assist elders. He said: If not for the Torah, how many people named Naḥman bar Abba would there be in the marketplace? In other words, I am not permitted to treat my Torah study lightly by assisting them myself, as I can perform this mitzva through others. Rabbi Aivu says that Rabbi Yannai says:

The Gemara answers: This Sage does not interpret the word “et” as a means to derive new halakhot. He considers the word “et” to be an ordinary part of the sentence structure and not a source for exegetical exposition. As it is taught in a baraita: Shimon HaAmasoni, and some say that it was Neḥemya HaAmasoni, would interpret all occurrences of the word “et” in the Torah, deriving additional halakhot with regard to the particular subject matter. Once he reached the verse: “You shall fear the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 6:13), which is written with the added word “et,” he withdrew from this method of exposition, as whose fear could be an extension of the fear of God? His students said to him: Our teacher, what will be with all the occurrences of the word “et” that you interpreted until now? He said to them: Just as I received reward for the exposition, so I received reward for my withdrawal from using this method of exposition. The word “et” in this verse was not explained until Rabbi Akiva came and expounded: “You shall fear the Lord your God”: The word “et” serves to include Torah scholars, i.e., that one is commanded to fear them just as one fears God. In any event, Shimon HaAmasoni no longer derived additional halakhot from the word et. § The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with a heifer whose neck is broken, she is not betrothed. The Gemara clarifies: From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a heifer whose neck is broken? The school of Rabbi Yannai said: An expression of atonement was written with regard to it. The verse: “Atone for Your people Israel” (Deuteronomy 21:8), was written with regard to a heifer whose neck was broken, as was also written with regard to sacrificial animals. Therefore, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from it, just as one may not benefit from an offering. § The mishna teaches that if a man betroths a woman with the leper’s birds, she is not betrothed. The Gemara clarifies: From where do we derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a leper’s birds? As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: A mitzva that enables is stated in the verses with regard to a leper, and the Torah also discusses a mitzva that atones, both of which are performed inside the Temple. Here, a mitzva that enables is a reference to the leper’s guilt-offering, which enables him to partake of offerings; and a mitzva that atones is a reference to all other offerings. And a mitzva that enables is stated in the verses with regard to a leper, and the Torah also discusses a mitzva that atones, both of which are performed outside the Temple. Here, a mitzva that enables is a reference to the leper’s birds, which permit him to reenter the camp; and a mitzva that atones is a reference to the heifer whose neck is broken, which atones for the inhabitants of the city nearest to an unsolved murder. Just as in the case of the enabling and atoning rites stated in the Torah that are performed inside the Temple the Torah made the item of the enabling rite, i.e., the leper’s guilt-offering, from which one is prohibited from deriving benefit, like the item of the atoning rite, i.e., offerings in general, so too, in the case of the enabling and atoning rites stated in the Torah that are performed outside the Temple the Torah made the item of the enabling rite, i.e., the leper’s birds, from which one is prohibited from deriving benefit, like the item of the atoning rite, i.e., the heifer whose neck is broken. It was stated that the amora’im disputed the following issue: From when is one prohibited from deriving benefit from the leper’s birds? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From the moment of their slaughter; and Reish Lakish says: From the moment they are taken and designated to be a leper’s birds. The Gemara explains their respective opinions: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: From the moment of their slaughter, because it is the slaughter that prohibits them, since they are not consecrated beforehand. Reish Lakish says: From the moment they are taken, since this halakha is derived from the heifer whose neck is broken. Just as one is prohibited from deriving benefit from a heifer whose neck is broken during its lifetime, so too, one is prohibited from deriving benefit from the leper’s birds during their lifetime. The Gemara asks: And with regard to it, the heifer whose neck is broken, itself, from when is it a forbidden item? Rabbi Yannai said: I heard the boundary, i.e., stage, beyond which it is forbidden, but I have forgotten what it is. But the group of scholars were inclined to say that its descent to a hard valley, where its neck is broken, is the action that renders it forbidden. The Gemara asks: If so, just as with a heifer whose neck is broken, it is not forbidden from the moment it is taken but only afterward, so too, the leper’s birds should also not be forbidden from the moment they are taken. The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of the heifer, it has another boundary that can render it forbidden, namely its descent to the valley; here, in the case of the leper’s birds, does it have another boundary? It is taken and immediately slaughtered. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish from a baraita: The verse states: “Of all clean birds you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:11). The superfluous word “all” is stated to include one of the leper’s birds, which is sent away to freedom, while the words: “But these are they of which you shall not eat” (Deuteronomy 14:12), are stated to include in the prohibition the other, slaughtered bird. Rabbi Yoḥanan asks: And if it enters your mind to say that the bird is forbidden from when it is alive, is a verse necessary to teach that it is forbidden after its slaughter? The Gemara answers: The verse is necessary, lest you say: Just as it is in the case of sacrificial animals, where one is prohibited from deriving benefit from them when they are alive, and the act of slaughter comes and renders them fit to be eaten, so too with regard to the bird. The verse teaches us that with regard to the leper’s bird this is not the case, and it remains forbidden even after it has been slaughtered. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to Reish Lakish: The mishna (Nega’im 14:5) teaches that if one slaughtered one of the leper’s birds and it was found to be a bird with a condition that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa], a partner is taken for the second, i.e., remaining, bird, while with regard to the first bird, i.e., the tereifa, one is permitted to derive benefit from it. And if it enters your mind that the bird is forbidden from when it is alive, why is one permitted to derive benefit from the first one, if the prohibition took effect before it was slaughtered? Reish Lakish said to him: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the slaughtered bird was found to be a tereifa in its inner organs, so that the consecration did not take effect at all, as the bird was not fit to be used for this purpose. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised another objection to Reish Lakish from a baraita (Tosefta, Nega’im 8:8): If he slaughtered the bird without bringing a hyssop, or without bringing cedar wood, or without bringing a scarlet thread, which were all used in the rite, Rabbi Ya’akov says: Since the bird was set aside for its mitzva, it is forbidden anyway. Rabbi Shimon says: Since it was not slaughtered in accordance with its mitzva, it is permitted. Rabbi Yoḥanan infers from this: They disagree only with regard to this issue, that one Sage, Rabbi Ya’akov, holds that an act of slaughter that is not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter, and the bird is therefore forbidden; and one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that an act of slaughter that is not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is not considered an act of slaughter at all, and therefore one is permitted to derive benefit from the bird. But everyone agrees at least that one is not prohibited from deriving benefit from it when it is alive, but only after it has been slaughtered. Reish Lakish replied: I concede that this baraita does not accord with my opinion, but this issue is a dispute between the tanna’im. As the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: A mitzva that enables is stated in the verses with regard to a leper, and the Torah also discusses a mitzva that atones, both of which are performed inside the Temple. And a mitzva that enables is stated in the verses with regard to a leper, and the Torah also discusses a mitzva that atones, both of which are performed outside the Temple. The baraita continues: Just as in the case of the enabling and atoning rites stated in the Torah that are performed inside the Temple the Torah made the item of the enabling rite like the item of the atoning rite, so too, in the case of the enabling and atoning rites stated in the Torah that are performed outside the Temple, the Torah made the item of the enabling rite like the item of the atoning rite. The baraita of the school of Rabbi Yishmael compares the leper’s birds to a heifer whose neck is broken, and therefore would also prohibit one from deriving benefit from the birds before they are slaughtered. The opinion of Reish Lakish is therefore in accordance with that baraita. With regard to the matter itself, the baraita teaches: The verse states: “Of all clean birds you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:11). The superfluous word “all” is stated to include one of the leper’s birds, which is sent away to freedom, while the words: “But these are they of which you shall not eat” (Deuteronomy 14:12), are stated to include in the prohibition the other, slaughtered bird. The Gemara questions this interpretation: And I will reverse the exposition, and say that one may derive benefit from the slaughtered bird and not from the one that was sent away. Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: The reason to expound the verse as the baraita does is that we have not found kosher living creatures that are permanently forbidden with regard to eating. Therefore, it stands to reason that the slaughtered bird is forbidden, not the living one. Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak objects to this explanation: But haven’t we found kosher living animals that are permanently forbidden? But there are

From whose funds must one give his father food and drink? Rav Yehuda says: From the money of the son. Rav Natan bar Oshaya said: From the money of the father. The Sages gave this following ruling to Rav Yirmeya, and some say they gave this following ruling to the son of Rav Yirmeya: The halakha is like the one who says it must be paid from the money of the father. The Gemara raises an objection from the following baraita: It is stated: “Honor your father and your mother” (Exodus 20:11), and it is stated: “Honor the Lord with your wealth” (Proverbs 3:9), which teaches the following verbal analogy: Just as there one honors God “with your wealth,” i.e., through monetary loss, so too here one must honor his father through monetary loss. And if you say that one honors him from the money of the father, what difference does it make to the son, i.e., what monetary loss does he suffer? The Gemara answers: It makes a difference to him with regard to the neglect of his work. Although he is not required to spend his own money, the son must leave aside his work to honor his father, which will cause him some financial loss. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a baraita: Two brothers, or two partners in the ownership of produce, or a father and son, or a rabbi and his student, may redeem the second tithe for each other without adding one-fifth, as one who redeems the tithe of another, including these individuals, is not required to add one-fifth. And they may feed each other the poor man’s tithe. If one of them is poor, the other may give him the poor man’s tithe that he separated from his produce, and it is not considered as though the pauper ate the poor man’s tithe from his own produce. The Gemara explains the proof from this baraita. And if you say that the obligation to honor one’s father is from the money of the son, one finds that this son repays his obligation from the produce of the poor, as he is taking care of his father with produce that should go to the poor. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, it is necessary to state this halakha in a case where he has covered all of his father’s basic needs with his own money. At this stage, if his father needs surplus money, he may give it to him from the poor man’s tithe. The Gemara asks: If so, consider that which is taught with regard to this baraita. Rabbi Yehuda says: May a curse come upon one who feeds his father the poor man’s tithe. And if this halakha, that one may feed his father the poor man’s tithe, was said with regard to a surplus, what difference is there? Since the son has fulfilled his obligation and simply adds something so that his father will have more, why is this person cursed? The Gemara answers: Even so, it is a disrespectful matter for one to feed his father with money that has been designated as charity for the poor. The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear: They asked Rabbi Eliezer how far one must go in honoring his father and mother. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Such that the father takes a purse and throw it into the sea in front of his son, and the son does not embarrass him. And if you say that the son honors him from the money of the father, what difference does it make to the son? Why would the son care if his father throws away his own purse? The Gemara answers: This is referring to a son who is fit to inherit from him. Since the son thinks that the money will eventually belong to him, he has cause for anger. And this is as reflected in an incident involving Rabba bar Rav Huna, when Rav Huna tore silk garments in front of his son Rabba. Rav Huna had said to himself: I will go and see if he becomes angry or does not become angry, i.e., he wanted to test him and see whether his son Rabba would honor him. The Gemara asks: But perhaps his son would become angry and Rav Huna would thereby violate the prohibition of: “Nor put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14), as by testing his son Rav Huna would have caused him to sin. The Gemara answers: It was a case where the father had forgone his honor from the outset. Consequently, even if the son grew angry with him, he would not have violated the mitzva. The Gemara asks: But by tearing his clothes, he violates the prohibition: Do not destroy (see Deuteronomy 20:19). The Gemara answers that Rav Huna made a tear at the seam, so that the garment could be repaired. The Gemara asks: Perhaps it was due to that reason that the son did not become angry, because he saw that his father caused no actual damage? The Gemara answers: He did this when the son was already angry for some other reason, so that he would not notice this detail. The Gemara cites another story involving the mitzva of honoring one’s father and mother. Rav Yeḥezkel taught his son Rami: If people sentenced to be burned became mingled with those sentenced to be stoned Rabbi Shimon says: All of them are judged with the punishment of stoning, as the punishment of burning is more severe. Since the death penalty of each is uncertain, all of them are treated leniently. Rav Yehuda, who was also Rav Yeḥezkel’s son, said to him: Father, do not teach the mishna this way, as, according to this version, why is this the halakha specifically because burning is more severe than stoning? Let him derive it from the fact that the majority are sentenced to be stoned. The wording of the baraita, which states that those who were supposed to be burned became mixed up with those who were to be stoned, indicates that the people sentenced to stoning are the majority. If so, one should simply follow the majority. Rather, I will teach it this way: If those who are sentenced to be stoned became mixed up with those who are sentenced to be burned, they are all judged with the punishment of stoning even though this is the minority, as they are all treated leniently. Rav Yeḥezkel said to him: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: And the Rabbis say that they should be judged with the punishment of burning, as the punishment of stoning is more severe. According to your version, why is this the halakha specifically because stoning is more severe? Let him derive it due to the fact that the majority of people are sentenced to be burned, and one follows the majority. His son Rav Yehuda said to him: The statement of the Rabbis is not difficult, as there the Rabbis are saying to Rabbi Shimon as follows: That which you said, that burning is more severe, is not the case; rather, stoning is more severe. In other words, the Rabbis were specifically responding to Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning, and therefore they stated the opposite claim and ignored the issue of which group is in the majority. Later, Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: Big-toothed one, do not speak to your father like that, as it is disrespectful. As it is taught in a baraita: If one’s father was transgressing a Torah matter, he should not say to him explicitly: Father, you transgressed a Torah matter. Rather, he should say to him: Father, so it is written in the Torah. The Gemara asks: If he says to him directly: This is what is written in the Torah, he will cause him suffering. Rather, he should say to him: Father, this verse is written in the Torah, and he should proceed to quote the verse, from which his father will understand on his own that he has acted improperly. § Elazar ben Matya says: If my father says: Give me water, and there is a mitzva for me to perform at the same time, I set aside the honor of my father and perform the mitzva, as my father and I are both obligated in the mitzva. Isi ben Yehuda says: If it is possible for this mitzva to be performed by others, let it be performed by others, and he should go and attend to the honor due to his father, as the honor of his father is his obligation alone. Rav Mattana says: The halakha with regard to this matter is in accordance with the opinion of Isi ben Yehuda. Rav Yitzḥak bar Sheila says that Rav Mattana says that Rav Ḥisda says: With regard to a father who forgoes his honor, his honor is forgone, and his son does not transgress if he does not treat him in the proper manner. By contrast, with regard to a rabbi who forgoes his honor, his honor is not forgone. And Rav Yosef says: Even with regard to a rabbi who forgoes his honor, his honor is forgone, as it is stated: “And the Lord went before them by day” (Exodus 13:21). God Himself, the Teacher of the Jewish people, had forgone the honor due Him and took the trouble to guide the people. Rava said: How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to the Holy One, Blessed be He, the world is His and the Torah is His, and therefore He can forgo His honor.

It is written: “If you see the donkey…collapsed under its burden” (Exodus 23:5). The baraita infers that this obligation to unload a burden applies with regard to an animal that is “collapsed,” but not with one that is a habitual collapser; “collapsed,” but not standing; “under its burden,” but not when it is unloaded; and “under its burden,” meaning a burden that is not excessive, that the animal can bear. The Gemara reasons: And if you say that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, what is it to me if the animal is collapsed; and what is it to me if the animal is a habitual collapser; and what is it to me if the animal is standing? One should be obligated to unload its burden in any case, if the animal is suffering. The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by rabbinic law, and the ordinance does not apply in these circumstances. The Gemara supports its answer: So too, it is reasonable to explain the baraita in this manner, as it is taught in the baraita cited above: “Under its burden” indicates a burden that the animal can bear. About whom did you hear that he holds that line of reasoning? It is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. The Gemara affirms: Learn from it that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. The Gemara asks: And can you establish the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? But isn’t it taught in the latter clause of the baraita: “Under its burden,” but not when it is unloaded? What is the meaning of: Not when it is unloaded? If we say that it means that when it is unloaded there is no obligation at all, isn’t it written in that case: “You shall lift them with him” (Deuteronomy 22:4), teaching that there is a mitzva to load an animal? Rather, it is obvious that the meaning is that when it is unloaded, one is not obligated to load it for free; rather, he may do so for remuneration. About whom did you hear that he holds that line of reasoning? It is the Rabbis. Apparently, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and not the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. The Gemara answers: Actually, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, and in the matter of loading he holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Sages taught in a baraita: It is written: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden…you shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5). I might have thought one is obligated even if he sees the animal from a distance; therefore the previous verse states: “If you encounter your enemy’s ox or his donkey going astray, you shall return it to him” (Exodus 23:4). If the Torah had written only: “If you encounter,” I might have thought that one is obligated to unload the burden only if there was an actual encounter; therefore, the verse states: “If you see.” And what is seeing in which there is an element of encounter? The Sages calculated it as one of seven and a half portions, i.e., two-fifteenths, of a mil, and that is the measure of a ris. It is taught in a baraita: After loading the burden onto the animal, one walks with it up to one parasang [parsa] to ensure that the burden will not fall again. Rabba bar bar Ḥana says: And he takes remuneration for accompanying the animal, as that is not included in the mitzva. MISHNA: If one finds his lost item and his father’s lost item, tending to his own lost item takes precedence. Similarly, if one finds his lost item and his teacher’s lost item, tending to his own lost item takes precedence. If one finds his father’s lost item and his teacher’s lost item, tending to his teacher’s lost item takes precedence, as his father brought him into this world, and his teacher, who taught him the wisdom of Torah, brings him to life in the World-to-Come. And if his father is a Torah scholar, then his father’s lost item takes precedence. If his father and his teacher were each carrying a burden and he wants to assist them in putting down their burdens, he first places his teacher’s burden down and thereafter places his father’s burden down. If his father and his teacher were in captivity, he first redeems his teacher and thereafter redeems his father. And if his father is a Torah scholar, he first redeems his father and thereafter redeems his teacher. GEMARA: With regard to precedence in the return of lost items, the Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rav Yehuda says that Rav says that the verse states: “Only so that there shall be no needy among you” (Deuteronomy 15:4). This verse can be understood as a command, indicating that it is incumbent upon each individual to ensure that he will not become needy. Therefore, your property takes precedence over the property of any other person. And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Although that is the halakha, anyone who fastidiously fulfills this principle with regard to his property at the expense of others’ property ultimately comes to experience that fate. He will become impoverished, and others will prioritize their interests at his expense. § The mishna teaches: If his father and his teacher were each carrying a burden, he first places his teacher’s burden down and thereafter places his father’s burden down. The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 2:30): His teacher, with regard to whom the tanna’im stated in the mishna that his burden takes precedence, is his teacher who taught him wisdom, i.e., the profound analysis of the Torah that constitutes the Talmud, and not his teacher who taught him Bible or Mishna; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The reference is to any teacher from whom one learned most of his knowledge, be it Bible, Mishna, or Talmud. Rabbi Yosei says: Even if he enlightened him in the understanding of only one mishna, that is his teacher. Rava said: For example, Rav Seḥora is my teacher with regard to these matters, as he explained to me the meaning of the term in a mishna (Kelim 13:2) zuhama listeron, a utensil with a spoon on one end and a fork on the other. Shmuel rent his garment in mourning over the passing of one of the Sages who explained to him the meaning of a mishna (Tamid 3:6) that describes the two keys that opened the compartment through which the priest would enter the Sanctuary each morning: One is the key with which the priest would open the inside lock. He would insert his arm up to his armpit through a small opening in the door and reach down and open the lock that was at the bottom of the door on the inside, and he would go through that door into a compartment. And the other one is the key with which the priest opened the lock on the inner door of the compartment, through which he entered the Sanctuary, and he opened that lock directly. Ulla says: The Torah scholars who are in Babylonia rise in deference before one another and rend their garments in mourning over one another’s passing. In contrast to Eretz Yisrael, where the preeminent Torah scholars and teachers served at the heads of the Torah academies, in Babylonia most scholars studied Torah with peers and there was no preeminent teacher. But with regard to returning a lost item in a case where both one’s father and one’s teacher lost an item, he returns the lost item only to his preeminent teacher before returning that of his father, and not to his peer or to one who taught him the meaning of one mishna or one term. Rav Ḥisda raised a dilemma before Rav Huna: If there is a student, and his teacher needs him because he serves as his peer and study partner, what is the halakha with regard to precedence in a case where he finds a lost item belonging to his father and one belonging to his teacher? As Rav Ḥisda was Rav Huna’s disciple-colleague, Rav Huna assumed that Rav Ḥisda was referring to himself and said to him: Ḥisda, Ḥisda, I do not need you. On the contrary, you need me until you complete forty years of study before me. They grew angry with each other over the perceived insult and the harsh reaction, and each did not enter to visit the other. Rav Ḥisda was contrite and observed forty fasts due to the fact that Rav Huna was offended, although it had not been his intention to offend him. Rav Huna observed forty fasts due to the fact that he had erroneously suspected that Rav Ḥisda was referring to the relationship between them. It was stated that Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that returning the teacher’s lost item takes precedence only in the case of his preeminent teacher. Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna says that Rav Sheshet says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who says that returning the teacher’s lost item takes precedence even if the teacher enlightened him with regard to only one mishna. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan say that? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: The halakha is always in accordance with the opinion cited in an unattributed mishna; and we learned an unattributed opinion in the mishna that returning the teacher’s lost item takes precedence in the case of: His teacher, who taught him the wisdom of Torah. The ruling of the unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of wisdom in this context? It means the majority of his wisdom. The Sages taught in a baraita: For those who engage in the study of Bible, it is a virtue but not a complete virtue. For those who engage in the study of Mishna, it is a virtue and they receive reward for its study. For those who engage in the study of Talmud, you have no virtue greater than that. And always pursue study of the Mishna more than study of the Talmud. The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult, as the baraita is self-contradictory. You said: For those who engage in the study of Talmud, you have no virtue greater than that. And then you said: And always pursue study of the Mishna more than study of the Talmud. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: