When Abram was ninety-nine years old, GOD appeared to^aappeared to Or “made contact with,” via an agent; see at 12.7 and below, v. 22. Abram and said to him, “I am El Shaddai.^bEl Shaddai Traditionally rendered “God Almighty.” Walk in My ways and be blameless. I will establish My covenant between Me and you, and I will make you exceedingly numerous.” Abram threw himself on his face; and God spoke to him further, “As for Me, this is My covenant with you: You shall be the father of a multitude of nations. And you shall no longer be called Abram, but your name shall be Abraham,^cAbraham Understood as “father of a multitude.” for I make you the father of a multitude of nations. I will make you exceedingly fertile, and make nations of you; and kings shall come forth from you. I will maintain My covenant between Me and you, and your offspring to come, as an everlasting covenant throughout the ages, to be God to you and to your offspring to come. I assign the land you sojourn in to you and your offspring to come, all the land of Canaan, as an everlasting holding. I will be their God.” God further said to Abraham, “As for you, you and your offspring to come throughout the ages shall keep My covenant. Such shall be the covenant between Me and you and your offspring to follow that you shall keep: every male among you shall be circumcised. You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and that shall be the sign of the covenant between Me and you. And throughout the generations, every male among you shall be circumcised at the age of eight days. As for the homeborn slave and the one bought from an outsider who is not of your offspring, they must be circumcised, homeborn and purchased alike. Thus shall My covenant be marked in your flesh as an everlasting pact. And if any male who is uncircumcised fails to circumcise the flesh of his foreskin, that person shall be cut off from kin; he has broken My covenant.” And God said to Abraham, “As for your wife Sarai, you shall not call her Sarai, but her name shall be Sarah.^dSarah I.e., “princess.” I will bless her; indeed, I will give you a son by her. I will bless her so that she shall give rise to nations; rulers of peoples shall issue from her.” Abraham threw himself on his face and laughed, as he said to himself, “Can a child be born to a man a hundred years old, or can Sarah bear a child at ninety?” And Abraham said to God, “O that Ishmael might live by Your favor!” God said, “Nevertheless, Sarah your wife shall bear you a son, and you shall name him Isaac;^eIsaac Heb. Yiṣḥaq, from ṣaḥaq, “laugh.” and I will maintain My covenant with him as an everlasting covenant for his offspring to come. As for Ishmael, I have heeded you.^fI have heeded you Heb. shemaʻtikha, play on “Ishmael.” I hereby bless him. I will make him fertile and exceedingly numerous. He shall be the father of twelve chieftains, and I will make of him a great nation. But My covenant I will maintain with Isaac, whom Sarah shall bear to you at this season next year.” Done speaking with him, God^gGod This label may refer to an agent, as having spoken on God’s behalf (cf. first note at v. 1); so Ibn Ezra. was gone from Abraham. Then Abraham took his son Ishmael, and all his homeborn slaves and all those he had bought, every male in Abraham’s household, and he circumcised the flesh of their foreskins on that very day, as God had spoken to him. Abraham was ninety-nine years old when he circumcised the flesh of his foreskin, and his son Ishmael was thirteen years old when he was circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin. Thus Abraham and his son Ishmael were circumcised on that very day; and all his household,^hall his household I.e., its males, being the applicable members. his homeborn slaves and those that had been bought from outsiders, were circumcised with him.

GOD spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the Israelite people thus: When a woman at childbirth^aat childbirth Heb. tazriaʻ, lit. “brings forth seed.” bears a male, she shall be impure seven days; she shall be impure as at the time of her condition of menstrual separation.— On the eighth day the flesh of his foreskin shall be circumcised.—

THE precepts of the fourteenth class are those which we enumerated in the Section on Women, the Laws concerning forbidden sexual intercourse, and cross-breeding of cattle (Sefer nashim, Hilkot issure biah ve-kaleë behemah). The law concerning circumcision belongs also to this class. The general purpose of these precepts has already been described by us. We will now proceed to explain them singly. It is well known that man requires friends all his lifetime. Aristotle explains this in the ninth book of his Nikomachean Ethics. When man is in good health and prosperous, he enjoys the company of his friends; in time of trouble he is in need of them; in old age, when his body is weak, he is assisted by them. This love is more frequent and more intense between parents and children, and among [other] relations. Perfect love, brotherhood, and mutual assistance is only found among those near to each other by relationship. The members of a family united by common descent from the same grandfather, or even from some more distant ancestor, have towards each other a certain feeling of love, help each other, and sympathize with each other. To effect this is one of the chief purposes of the Law. Professional harlots were therefore not tolerated in Israel (Deut. 23:18), because their existence would disturb the above relationship between man and man. Their children are strangers to everybody; no one knows to what family they belong; nor does any person recognize them as relatives. And this is the greatest misfortune that can befall any child or father. Another important object in prohibiting prostitution is to restrain excessive and continual lust; for lust increases with the variety of its objects. The sight of that to which a person has been accustomed for a long time does not produce such an ardent desire for its enjoyment as is produced by objects new in form and character. Another effect of this prohibition is the removal of a cause for strife; for if the prohibition did not exist, several persons might by chance come to one woman, and would naturally quarrel with each other; they would in many cases kill one another, or they would kill the woman. This is known to have occurred in days of old, “And they assembled themselves by troops in a harlot’s house” (Jer. 5:7). In order to prevent these great evils, and to effect the great boon that all men should know their relationship to each other, prostitutes (Deut. 23:17) were not tolerated, and sexual intercourse was only permitted when man has chosen a certain female, and married her openly; for if it sufficed merely to choose her, many a person would bring a prostitute into his house at a certain time agreed upon between them, and say that she was his wife. Therefore it is commanded to perform the act of engagement by which he declares that he has chosen her to take her for his wife, and then to go through the public ceremony of marriage. Comp. “And Boaz took ten men,” etc. (Ruth 4:2). It may happen that husband and wife do not agree, live without love and peace, and do not enjoy the benefit of a home; in that case he is permitted to send her away. If he had been allowed to divorce her by a mere word, or by turning her out of his house, the wife would wait for some negligence [on the part of the husband], and then come out and say that she was divorced; or having committed adultery, she and the adulterer would contend that she had then been divorced. Therefore the law is that divorce can only take place by means of a document which can serve as evidence, “He shall write her a bill of divorcement” (Deut. 24:1). There are frequently occasions for suspicion of adultery and doubts concerning the conduct of the wife. Laws concerning a wife suspected of adultery (sotah) are therefore prescribed (Num. v.); the effect of which is that the wife, out of fear of the “bitter waters,” is most careful to prevent any ill-feeling on the part of her husband against her. Even of those that felt quite innocent and safe most were rather willing to lose all their property than to submit to the prescribed treatment; even death was preferred to the public disgrace of uncovering the head, undoing the hair, rending the garments and exposing the heart, and being led round through the Sanctuary in the presence of all, of women and men, and also in the presence of the members of the Synhedrion. The fear of this trial keeps away great diseases that ruin the home comfort. As every maiden expects to be married, her seducer therefore is only ordered to marry her; for he is undoubtedly the fittest husband for her. He will better heal her wound and redeem her character than any other husband. If, however, he is rejected by her or her father, he must give the dowry (Exod. 22:15). If he uses violence he has to submit to the additional punishment, “he may not put her away all his days” (Deut. 22:29). The reason of the law concerning marrying the deceased brother’s wife is stated in the Bible (Deut. 25:5). It was a custom in force before the Law was given, and the Law perpetuated it. The ceremony of haliẓah (ibid. 6, seq.), “taking off the shoe,” has been introduced, because in those days it was considered disgraceful to go through that ceremony, and in order to avoid the disgrace, a person might perhaps be induced to marry his deceased brother’s wife. This is evident from the words of the Law: “So shall it be done unto that man that will not build up his brother’s house. And his name shall be called in Israel, The house of him that hath his shoe loosed” (Deut. 25:9). In the action of Judah we may perhaps notice an example of a noble conduct, and uprightness in judgment. He said: “Let her take it to her, lest we be shamed: behold, I sent this kid, and thou hast not found her” (Gen. 38:23). For before the Lawgiving, the intercourse with a harlot was as lawful as cohabitation of husband and wife since the Lawgiving; it was perfectly permitted, nobody considered it wrong. The hire which was in those days paid to the harlot in accordance with a previous agreement, corresponds to the ketubah which in our days the husband pays to his wife when he divorces her. It is a just claim on the part of the wife, and the husband is bound to pay it. The words of Judah, “Let her take it to her, lest we be shamed,” etc., show that conversation about sexual intercourse, even of that which is permitted, brings shame upon us; it is proper to be silent about it, to keep it secret, even if the silence would lead to loss of money. In this sense Judah said: It is better for us to lose property, and to let her keep what she has, than to make our affair public by inquiring after her, and bring still more shame upon us. This is the lesson, as regards conduct, to be derived from this incident. As to the uprightness to be learned therefrom, it is contained in the words of Judah when he wanted to show that he had not robbed her, that he has not in the least departed from his agreement with her. For he said, “Behold, I sent this kid, and thou hast not found her.” The kid was probably very good, therefore he points to it, saying, “this kid.” This is the uprightness which he had inherited from Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: that man must not depart from his given word, nor deviate from what he agreed upon; but he must give to others all that is due to them. It makes no difference whether he holds a portion of his neighbour’s property as a loan or a trust, or whether he is in any other way his neighbour’s debtor, owing him wages or the like. The sum which the husband settles upon his wife (ketubah) is to be treated in the same way as the wages of a hired servant. There is no difference whether a master withholds the wages of a hired servant, or deprives his wife of that which is due to her; whether a master wrongs a hired servant, and brings charges against him with the intention to send him away without payment, or a husband treats his wife in a manner that would enable him to send her away without the payment of the promised sum. The equity of the statutes and judgments of the Law in this regard may be noticed in the treatment of a person accused of spreading an evil report about his wife (Deut. 22:13, seq.). There is no doubt that the man that did this is bad, does not love his wife, and is not pleased with her. If he desired to divorce her in a regular manner, there is nothing to prevent him, but he would be bound to give her what is due unto her; but instead of this, “he gives occasion of speech against her” (ibid. 22:14), in order to get rid of his wife without paying anything; he slanders her, and utters falsehood in order to keep in his possession the fifty shekels of silver, the dowry fixed in the Law for maidens, which he is obliged to pay unto her. He is therefore sentenced to pay one hundred shekels of silver, in accordance with the principle, “Whom the judges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbour” (Exod. 22:9). The Law is also analogous to that about false witnesses, which we have explained above (chap. xli. p. 195). For he intended to cheat her of her fifty shekels of silver, he must therefore [add fifty, and] pay her a hundred shekels. This is his punishment for withholding from her her due, and endeavouring to keep it. But in so far as he degraded her, and spread the rumour that she was guilty of misconduct, he was also degraded, and received stripes, as is implied in the words, “and they shall chastise him” (Deut. 22:15). But he sinned besides in clinging to lust, and seeking only that which gave pleasure to him: he was therefore punished by being compelled to keep his wife always, “he may not put her away all his days” (ibid. 19); for he has been brought to all this only because he may have found her ugly. Thus are these bad habits cured when they are treated according to the divine Law; the ways of equity are never lost sight of; they are obvious and discernible in every precept of the Law by those who consider it well. See how, according to the Law, the slanderer of his wife, who only intended to withhold from her what he is bound to give her, is treated in the same manner as a thief who has stolen the property of his neighbour; and the false witness (Deut. 19:16, seq.) who schemes to injure, although the injury was in reality not inflicted, is punished like those who have actually caused injury and wrong, viz., like the thief and the slanderer. The three kinds of sinners are tried and judged by one and the same law. See how wonderful are the divine laws, and admire His wonderful deeds. Scripture says: “The Rock, His work is perfect; for all His ways are judgment” (Deut. 32:4), i.e., as His works are most perfect, so are His laws most equitable; but our mind is too limited to comprehend the perfection of all His works, or the equity of all His laws; and as we are able to comprehend some of His wonderful works in the organs of living beings and the motions of the spheres, so we understand also the equity of some of His laws; that which is unknown to us of both of them is far more than that which is known to us. I will now return to the theme of the present chapter. The law about forbidden sexual intercourse seeks in all its parts to inculcate the lesson that we ought to limit sexual intercourse altogether, hold it in contempt, and only desire it very rarely. The prohibition of pederasty (Lev. 18:22) and carnal intercourse with beasts (ibid. 73) is very clear. If in the natural way the act is too base to be performed except when needed, how much more base is it if performed in an unnatural manner, and only for the sake of pleasure. The female relatives whom a man may not marry are alike in this respect—that as a rule they are constantly together with him in his house: they would easily listen to him, and do what he desires; they are near at hand, and he would have no difficulty in procuring them. No judge could blame him if found in their company. If to these relatives the same law applied as to all other unmarried women, if we were allowed to marry any of them, and were only precluded from sexual intercourse with them without marriage, most people would constantly have become guilty of misconduct with them. But as they are entirely forbidden to us, and sexual intercourse with them is most emphatically denounced unto us as a capital crime, or a sin punishable with extinction (karet), and as there is no means of ever legalizing such intercourse, there is reason to expect that people will not seek it, and will not think of it. That the persons included in that prohibition are, as we have stated, at hand and easily accessible, is evident. For as a rule, the mother of the wife, the grandmother, the daughter, the granddaughter, and the sister-in-law, are mostly with her; the husband meets them always when he goes out, when he comes in, and when he is at his work. The wife stays also frequently in the house of her husband’s brother, father, or son. It is also well known that we are often in the company of our sisters, our aunts, and the wife of our uncle, and are frequently brought up together with them. These are all the relatives which we must not marry. This is one of the reasons why intermarriage with a near relative is forbidden. But according to my opinion the prohibition serves another object, namely, to inculcate chastity into our hearts. Licence between the root and the branch, between a man and his mother, or his daughter, is outrageous. The intercourse between root and branch is forbidden, and it makes no difference whether the male element is the root or the branch, or both root and branch combine in the intercourse with a third person, so that the same individual cohabits with the root and with the branch. On this account it is prohibited to marry a woman and her mother, the wife of the father or of the son; for in all these cases there is the intercourse between one and the same person on the one side and root and branch on the other. The law concerning brothers is like the law concerning root and branch. The sister is forbidden, and so is also the sister of the wife and the wife of the brother; because in the latter cases two persons who are considered like root and branch, cohabit with the same person. But in these prohibitions brothers and sisters are partly considered as root and branch and partly as one body; the sister of the mother is therefore like the mother, and the sister of the father like the father, and both are prohibited: and since the daughter of the parent’s brother or sister is not included in the number of prohibited relatives, so may we also marry the daughter of the brother or the sister. The apparent anomaly, that the brother of the father may marry a woman that has been the wife of his brother’s son, whilst the nephew must not marry a woman that has been the wife of his father’s brother, can be explained according to the above-mentioned first reason. For the nephew is frequently in the house of his uncle, and his conduct towards the wife of his uncle is the same as that towards his brother’s wife. The uncle, however, is not so frequent in the house of his nephew, and he is consequently less intimate with the wife of his nephew; whilst in the case of father and son, the familiarity of the father with his daughter-in-law is the same as that of the son with the wife of his father, and therefore the law and punishment is the same for both [father and son]. The reason why it is prohibited to cohabit with a menstruous woman (Lev. 18:19) or with another man’s wife (ibid. 20), is obvious, and requires no further explanation. It is well known that we must not indulge in any sensual enjoyment whatever with the persons included in the above prohibitions: we must not even look at them if we intend to derive pleasure therefrom. We have explained this in “the laws about forbidden sexual intercourse” (Hilkot issure bïah, 21:1-2), and shown that according to the Law we must not even engage our thoughts with the act of cohabitation (ibid. 19) or irritate the organ of generation; and when we find ourselves unintentionally in a state of irritation, we must turn our mind to other thoughts, and reflect on some other thing till we are relieved. Our Sages (B. T. Kidd 30b), in their moral lessons, which give perfection to the virtuous, say as follows: “My son, if that monster meets you, drag it to the house of study. It will melt if it is of iron; it will break in pieces if it is of stone: as is said in Scripture, ‘Is not my word like a fire? saith the Lord, and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces?’” (Jer. 23:29). The author of this saying thus exhorts his son to go to the house of study when he finds his organ of generation in an irritated state. By reading, disputing, asking, and listening to questions, the irritation will certainly cease. See how properly the term monster is employed, for that irritation is indeed like a monster. Not only religion teaches this lesson, the philosophers teach the same. I have already quoted verbatim the words of Aristotle. He says: “The sense of touch which is a disgrace to us, leads us to indulge in eating and sensuality,” etc. He calls people degraded who seek carnal pleasures and devote themselves to gastronomy: he denounces in extenso their low and objectionable conduct, and ridicules them. This passage occurs in his Ethics and in his Rhetoric. In accordance with this excellent principle, which we ought strictly to follow, our Sages teach us that we ought not to look at beasts or birds in the moment of their copulation. According to my opinion, this is the reason why the cross-breeding of cattle is prohibited (Lev. 19:19). It is a fact that animals of different species do not copulate together, unless by force. It is well known that the low class of breeders of mules are regularly engaged in this work. Our Law objected to it that any Israelite should degrade himself by doing these things, which require so much vulgarity and indecency, and doing that which religion forbids us even to mention, how much more to witness or to practise, except when necessary. Crossbreeding, however, is not necessary. I think that the prohibition to bring together two species in any kind of work, as included in the words, “Thou shalt not plow with an ox and an ass together” (Deut. 22:10), is only a preventive against the intercourse of two species. For if it were allowed to join such together in any work, we might sometimes also cause their intercourse. That this is the reason of the commandment is proved by the fact that it applies to other animals besides ox and ass; it is prohibited to plow not only with ox and ass together, but with any two kinds. But Scripture mentions as an instance that which is of regular occurrence. As regards circumcision, I think that one of its objects is to limit sexual intercourse, and to weaken the organ of generation as far as possible, and thus cause man to be moderate. Some people believe that circumcision is to remove a defect in man’s formation; but every one can easily reply: How can products of nature be deficient so as to require external completion, especially as the use of the fore-skin to that organ is evident. This commandment has not been enjoined as a complement to a deficient physical creation, but as a means for perfecting man’s moral shortcomings. The bodily injury caused to that organ is exactly that which is desired; it does not interrupt any vital function, nor does it destroy the power of generation. Circumcision simply counteracts excessive lust; for there is no doubt that circumcision weakens the power of sexual excitement, and sometimes lessens the natural enjoyment: the organ necessarily becomes weak when it loses blood and is deprived of its covering from the beginning. Our Sages (Beresh. Rabba, 100:80) say distinctly: It is hard for a woman, with whom an uncircumcised had sexual intercourse, to separate from him. This is, as I believe, the best reason for the commandment concerning circumcision. And who was the first to perform this commandment? Abraham, our father! of whom it is well known how he feared sin; it is described by our Sages in reference to the words, “Behold, now I know that thou art a fair woman to look upon” (Gen. 12:11). There is, however, another important object in this commandment. It gives to all members of the same faith, i.e., to all believers in the Unity of God, a common bodily sign, so that it is impossible for any one that is a stranger, to say that he belongs to them. For sometimes people say so for the purpose of obtaining some advantage, or in order to make some attack upon the Jews. No one, however, should circumcise himself or his son for any other reason but pure faith; for circumcision is not like an incision on the leg, or a burning in the arm, but a very difficult operation. It is also a fact that there is much mutual love and assistance among people that are united by the same sign when they consider it as [the symbol of] a covenant. Circumcision is likewise the [symbol of the] covenant which Abraham made in connexion with the belief in God’s Unity. So also every one that is circumcised enters the covenant of Abraham to believe in the unity of God, in accordance with the words of the Law, “To be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee” (Gen. 17:7). This purpose of the circumcision is as important as the first, and perhaps more important. This law can only be kept and perpetuated in its perfection, if circumcision is performed when the child is very young, and this for three good reasons. First, if the operation were postponed till the boy had grown up, he would perhaps not submit to it. Secondly, the young child has not much pain, because the skin is tender, and the imagination weak; for grown-up persons are in dread and fear of things which they imagine as coming, some time before these actually occur. Thirdly, when a child is very young, the parents do not think much of him; because the image of the child, that leads the parents to love him, has not yet taken a firm root in their minds. That image becomes stronger by the continual sight; it grows with the development of the child, and later on the image begins again to decrease and to vanish. The parents’ love for a new-born child is not so great as it is when the child is one year old; and when one year old, it is less loved by them than when six years old. The feeling and love of the father for the child would have led him to neglect the law if he were allowed to wait two or three years, whilst shortly after birth the image is very weak in the mind of the parent, especially of the father who is responsible for the execution of this commandment. The circumcision must take place on the eighth day (Lev. 12:3), because all living beings are after birth, within the first seven days, very weak and exceedingly tender, as if they were still in the womb of their mother; not until the eighth day can they be counted among those that enjoy the light of the world. That this is also the case with beasts may be inferred from the words of Scripture: “Seven days shall it be under the dam” (Lev. 22:27), as if it had no vitality before the end of that period. In the same manner man is circumcised after the completion of seven days. The period has been fixed, and has not been left to everybody’s judgment. The precepts of this class include also the lesson that we must not injure in any way the organs of generation in living beings (ibid. 22:24). The lesson is based on the principle of “righteous statutes and judgments” (Deut. 4:8); we must keep in everything the golden mean; we must not be excessive in love, but must not suppress it entirely; for the Law commands, “Be fruitful, and multiply” (Gen. 1:22). The organ is weakened by circumcision, but not destroyed by the operation. The natural faculty is left in full force, but is guarded against excess. It is prohibited for an Israelite “that is wounded in the stones, or hath his privy member cut off” (Deut. 23:2), to marry an Israelitish woman; because the sexual intercourse is of no use and of no purpose; and that marriage would be a source of ruin to her, and to him who would claim her. This is very clear. In order to create a horror of illicit marriages, a bastard was not allowed to marry an Israelitish woman (ibid. 23:3); the adulterer and the adulteress were thus taught that by their act they bring upon their seed irreparable injury. In every language and in every nation the issue of licentious conduct has a bad name; the Law therefore raises the name of the Israelites by keeping them free from the admixture of bastards. The priests, who have a higher sanctity, are not allowed to marry a harlot, or a woman that is divorced from her husband, or that is profane (Lev. xxi 7); the high-priest, the noblest of the priests, must not marry even a widow, or a woman that has had sexual intercourse of any kind (ibid. 21:14). Of all these laws the reason is obvious. If bastards were prohibited to marry any member of the congregation of the Lord, how much more rigidly had slaves and handmaids to be excluded. The reason of the prohibition of inter-marriage with other nations is stated in the Law: “And thou take of their daughters unto thy sons, and their daughters go a whoring after their gods, and make thy sons go a whoring after their gods” (Exod. 34:16). Most of the “statutes” (ḥukkim), the reason of which is unknown to us serve as a fence against idolatry. That I cannot explain some details of the above laws or show their use is owing to the fact that what we hear from others is not so clear as that which we see with our own eyes. Thus my knowledge of the Sabean doctrines, which I derived from books, is not as complete as the knowledge of those who have witnessed the public practice of those idolatrous customs, especially as they have been out of practice and entirely extinct since two thousand years. If we knew all the particulars of the Sabean worship, and were informed of all the details of those doctrines, we would clearly see the reason and wisdom of every detail in the sacrificial service, in the laws concerning things that are unclean, and in other laws, the object of which I am unable to state. I have no doubt that all these laws served to blot out wrong principles from man’s heart, and to exterminate the practices which are useless, and merely a waste of time in vain and purposeless things. Those principles have turned the mind of the people away from intellectual research and useful actions. Our prophets therefore describe the ways of the idolaters as follows: “(They go) after vain things which cannot profit nor deliver; for they are vain” (1 Sam. 12:21); “Surely our fathers have inherited lies, vanity and things wherein there is no profit” (Jer. 16:19). Consider how great the evil consequences of idolatry are, and say whether we ought with all our power to oppose it or not! Most of the precepts serve, as has been stated by us, as a mere fence against those doctrines [of idolatry], and relieve man from the great and heavy burdens, from the pains and inflictions which formed part of the worship of idols. Every positive or negative precept, the reason of which is unknown to thee, take as a remedy against some of those diseases with which we are unacquainted at present, thank God. This should be the belief of educated men who know the true meaning of the following divine dictum: “I said not unto the seed of Jacob, Seek me in vain” (Isa. 45:19). I have now mentioned all the commandments of these fourteen classes one by one, and pointed out the reason of each of them, with the exception of a few for which I was unable to give the reason, and of some details of less importance; but implicitly we have given the reason even of these, and every intelligent reader will easily find it. The reasons of the Precepts are now complete.

The Gemara asks: But let him render the leaven null and void during the sixth hour, when he burns it. The Gemara answers: Since there is a rabbinic prohibition that takes effect on the leaven, as it is prohibited to derive benefit from it after the fifth hour, its legal status is like that of leaven prohibited by Torah law, and therefore it is not in his possession and he is unable to nullify it. The Gemara continues: There is proof that the Sages were stringent with regard to leaven prohibited by rabbinic law, as Rav Giddel said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said: With regard to a man who betroths a woman on the fourteenth of Nisan from the beginning of the sixth hour and onward, even if he does so with wheat from the mountains [kurdanaita], which is particularly hard and there is no certainty that it will ferment even if water falls on it, nevertheless, as it is possible that the wheat leavened, its legal status is that of leaven. Consequently, it is prohibited to derive benefit from this wheat, which is legally worthless. Therefore, if a man gives the wheat to a woman for the purpose of betrothal, one need not be concerned that it is a betrothal. The reason is that a betrothal is effective only if the man gives the woman an object worth at least a peruta. In this case the Sages disqualify the betrothal and allow the woman to marry another man, despite the fact that by Torah law she is betrothed to the first man, as the leaven with which he betrothed her is prohibited only by rabbinic law. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And is it indeed the case that after the leaven has become prohibited one is unable to render it null and void? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: If one was sitting in the study hall and he remembered that there is leavened bread in his house, he should render it null and void in his heart, both on Shabbat and on the Festival? The Gemara analyzes this statement: Granted, on Shabbat you can find this case, as one can nullify the leaven before it becomes prohibited, in a case where the fourteenth of Nisan occurs on Shabbat and he remembers to nullify the leaven before the prohibition takes effect. However, if he remembered on the Festival itself, it is after the prohibition has taken effect, as the Festival has already begun, and yet the baraita says that one may render the leaven null and void. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Here we are dealing with a student sitting before his teacher, and he remembers that there is kneaded dough in his house, and he is afraid lest it leaven before he can return home to warn the members of his household. Since the dough has not yet leavened and is not yet prohibited, he can take earlier action and render it null and void before it becomes leavened. The Gemara comments: The language of the baraita is also precise in accordance with this explanation, as the baraita teaches: If one was sitting in the study hall. This indicates that the dough has not yet risen, and the problem is that he cannot arrive home in time to prevent it from rising. However, if it had already become leavened, rendering it null and void will not remedy the situation even if he were home. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this proof that Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov’s interpretation is correct. Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: With regard to a vessel that contains several loaves in which there was bread that became moldy, and it is not evident whether it is leaven or matza, once there was more matza than leaven in the vessel, it is permitted. The Gemara first analyzes the case itself: What are the circumstances? If you say that he knows that this loaf is leavened bread, even if there were more matza, what of it? What difference does it make that most of the food is matza, if it is clear that this loaf is leaven? Rather, Rav must be speaking of a case where we do not know whether it is leavened bread or whether it is matza. However, in that case, why discuss specifically a situation where there was more matza in the vessel? Even in a case where there was not more matza in the vessel as well, the questionable loaf is likely to be matza, as let us follow the last item placed in the vessel, which even on the first day of Passover would be matza. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: With regard to coins that were found before animal merchants in Jerusalem, they are always assumed to be money of the second tithe, as most of the animals purchased in Jerusalem were bought with that money. This halakha applies both during a Festival and throughout the year, as people would purchase animals for meat with their second-tithe money, and it can therefore be assumed that these coins have the status of second tithe. However, if the money was found on the Temple Mount it is non-sacred money, even during a Festival. It can be assumed that one who enters the Temple Mount has already purchased all the animals that he required beforehand. Any coins in his possession are non-sacred money, not tithes. If the money was found elsewhere in Jerusalem during the Festival, when many people came to Jerusalem with their second-tithe money, the coins are presumed to be second-tithe money. However, if the coins were found during the rest of the year, it is non-sacred money. The Gemara explains the proof. And Rav Shemaya bar Zeira said: What is the reason that during the rest of the year the coins are considered non-sacred money, even on the day after the Festival? Since the markets of Jerusalem tend to be cleaned every day, any money left there would already have been found by the street cleaners. Consequently, any coins found there were left there recently. Apparently, we say that the first ones are gone and these objects are later ones. Here too, with regard to moldy bread, let us say: The first ones have been eaten and are gone, and this food is from now and is undoubtedly matza. The Gemara rejects this proof: It is different here, as the mold proves about the loaf that it is leaven, as food does not become moldy unless it has been sitting for a long time. The Gemara retorts: If its mold proves about the loaf that it is leaven, if there was more matza in the vessel, what of it? Even in that case, the very fact that it is moldy proves that it is leaven. Rabba said: Do not say there was more matza than leaven in the vessel; rather, say that several days of eating matza have passed over the vessel. In other words, several days of the Festival, during which matza is consumed, have passed. Therefore, it is more likely that the moldy loaf is matza. The Gemara asks: If so, it is obvious that the moldy loaf is matza, not leaven. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha with regard to a situation where its mold is extensive. Lest you say: Since its mold is extensive the matter is revealed that it is certainly leavened bread, therefore Rav teaches us that one cannot be entirely sure that this is the case. The Gemara explains the reason for the uncertainty. Since several days of eating matza have passed over the vessel, we say: Each and every day he baked warm loaves, which he placed upon the previous days’ matza, causing it to grow moldier. Therefore, it is possible that even though only a brief time has passed, the matza has grown very moldy, due to the moisture and heat inside the vessel. In regard to the aforementioned principle, the Gemara asks: And do we, in general, follow the last item in determining the identity of the item in question? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: With regard to a box that people used for both non-sacred coins and second-tithe coins, if the majority of its use was for non-sacred money, the coins are considered non-sacred. If the majority of its use was for second-tithe coins, the coins are considered second-tithe money. The Gemara asks: But why is this so? Let us follow the last item placed in the box. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where people used the box for both non-sacred coins and second-tithe coins, and he does not know which of the two kinds of money was placed there last.
Rav Zevid said: The baraita is referring to a case where he used one part of the box for piles of non-sacred coins and another part of the box for piles of second-tithe coins. In this case, there was no definitive most recent use of the box, as a coin may have moved from one side of the box to the other.
Rav Pappa said: We are dealing with a case where the coin was found in a hole in the box. The concern is that this coin might not be of the type last placed into the box. Instead, it is possible that this coin remained from a previous use and was not removed because it was obscured in the hole. Rav Yehuda said: One who searches for leaven must recite a blessing. The Gemara asks: What blessing does he recite, i.e., what is the correct formula of the blessing? Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava that one recites: Who has made us holy through His mitzvot and has commanded us to remove leavened bread. Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: One should recite: Concerning the removal of leavened bread. The Gemara comments: With regard to the formula: To remove, everyone agrees that it certainly refers to the future. This formulation undoubtedly indicates that the person reciting the blessing is about to begin fulfilling the mitzva of removing leaven, and it is therefore an appropriate blessing. Where they disagree is with regard to the formula: Concerning the elimination of leaven. One Sage, Rav Pappi, maintains that it is referring to an act that was performed previously. Since this formula is referring to the removal of leaven as a task already completed, it would be more appropriate for a blessing recited after performance of that mitzva was completed. And the other Sage, Rav Pappa, maintains that this expression refers to the future. The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Pappi’s opinion from the formula of the blessing recited just prior to circumcision: Blessed are You…Who has made us holy through His mitzvot and has commanded us concerning circumcision. Apparently this expression indeed is referring to a future act. The Gemara rejects this contention: That is no proof, as what alternative formula can we recite there? If we say: He, Who has made us holy through His mitzvot and commanded us to circumcise, is there no alternative to he himself, i.e., the boy’s father, circumcising his son? The father is commanded to circumcise his son, and he may appoint one who is not commanded to circumcise his son to act in his stead. Therefore, the more general formula of the blessing is recited: About the circumcision. The Gemara raises a difficulty: In a case where the child’s father himself circumcises his son, what can be said? The Gemara responds: Yes, it is indeed so. If the father himself performs the circumcision he in fact recites the blessing: And has commanded us to circumcise. The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Pappi’s opinion. The blessing recited over ritual slaughter is: Blessed…Who has made us holy through His mitzvot and has commanded us concerning slaughtering. This blessing likewise indicates that this formula is appropriate prior to an action. The Gemara again rejects this claim: There too, what alternative formula can we recite? If we say: Who has commanded us to slaughter, is there no alternative to his slaughtering the animal? There is no mitzva to slaughter an animal. It is merely the necessary preparation before one may eat meat. Therefore, the more general formula of the blessing is recited: Concerning slaughtering. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, with regard to the slaughter of the Paschal lamb and other consecrated animals, what can be said? One is indeed commanded to slaughter these animals. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so. When slaughtering the Paschal lamb or any other offering, one recites: Who has commanded us to slaughter. The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Pappi’s opinion from the Tosefta: One who prepares a lulav for himself recites the blessing: Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time. When he takes it to fulfill with it the obligation to take the lulav, he says: Who has made us holy through His mitzvot and has commanded us concerning the taking of the lulav. Although he has yet to perform the mitzva, he does not recite the formula: To take. The Gemara answers: It is different there, as at the time when he lifts the lulav before he recites the blessing, he already fulfilled his obligation by Torah law. Consequently, the formula: Concerning the taking, is indeed more appropriate for an action that he has already performed. The Gemara raises an objection: If so, the statement that he takes it to fulfill his obligation with it is imprecise, as the tanna should have said that he took the lulav with which he already fulfilled his obligation. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so; the tanna should have formulated the halakha in that manner. But due to the fact that he wants to teach the latter clause of the baraita: One who comes to sit in the sukka, he likewise taught in the first clause: To fulfill his obligation with it. This phrase maintains the consistency of the language of the Tosefta, even though it is imprecise with regard to the halakha of lulav. As it teaches in the latter clause of this baraita: One who erects a sukka for himself recites: Blessed are You, God, Who has given us life, sustained us, and brought us to this time. When he enters to sit in the sukka he says: Blessed…Who has made us holy through His mitzvot and has commanded us to sit in the sukka. In summary, no conclusive proof has been found for either side of this debate. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that one should recite: Concerning the removal of leaven, as that expression is referring to the future as well. The Gemara poses a question: In any event, it is clear from the previous discussion that everyone agrees that one is required to recite a blessing prior to performing a mitzva. From where do we derive this principle? It is as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to all the mitzvot, one recites a blessing over them prior to [over] their performance. The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that the word over is the language of priority? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that the verse said: “And Ahimaaz ran by the way of the plain, and overran [vaya’avor] the Cushite” (II Samuel 18:23), i.e., Ahimaaz overtook the Cushite. Abaye said: It is derived from here: “And he passed [avar] before them” (Genesis 33:3). And if you wish, say instead that the proof is from here: “And their king passed [vaya’avor] before them and God at their head” (Micah 2:13). In the school of Rav they say: One recites a blessing prior to performing all mitzvot, except for the ritual immersion after a nocturnal emission and the blowing of the shofar. The Gemara elaborates: Granted one does not recite a blessing prior to immersion, as this man who has not yet immersed is still unfit to recite a blessing because he is ritually impure. However, with regard to a shofar, what is the reason that one does not recite a blessing before sounding the shofar? And lest you say the reason is due to a concern lest the sounding of the shofar emerge flawed, and the blessing will be in vain, if so, one should not recite a blessing even prior to ritual slaughter and circumcision, as in those cases too one might fail to perform the action in the requisite manner. Rather, Rav Ḥisda said: Except for prior to immersion alone was stated, due to the aforementioned reason. The Gemara adds: That was also taught in a baraita: With regard to one who immersed for ritual purification after a nocturnal emission and emerged, as he emerges he recites: Blessed…Who has made us holy through His mitzvot and commanded us concerning immersion. The mishna states that one searches for leaven by the light of the lamp, etc. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, i.e., that the search should be conducted by the light of the lamp, derived? Rav Ḥisda said: We derive it by the hermeneutic principles of verbal analogy and juxtaposition: The term finding in one context is derived from finding in another context, and finding is derived from the word searching, and this searching is derived from searching elsewhere, and searching there is derived from the word lamps, and lamps is derived from lamp. The Gemara cites the relevant verses included in the above derivation. Finding in one context is derived from finding in another context by verbal analogy, as it is written here: “Seven days leaven shall not be found in your houses” (Exodus 12:19), and it is written there: “And he searched, starting with the eldest, and ending with the youngest; and the goblet was found in Benjamin’s sack” (Genesis 44:12). And the word finding in this verse is connected to searching in that same verse by juxtaposition, as the verse says: “And he searched... and was found.” And searching is derived from lamps by means of juxtaposition, as it is written: “And it shall come to pass that at that time I will search Jerusalem with lamps” (Zephaniah 1:12). And finally, the word lamps is derived from lamp by means of juxtaposition, as it is written: “The spirit of man is the lamp of God, searching all the inward parts” (Proverbs 20:27). Together these verses indicate that the search for leaven must be conducted by the light of the lamp. Similarly, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: On the night of the fourteenth one searches for leavened bread by the light of the lamp. Although there is no absolute proof for this matter, there is an allusion to this matter, as it is stated: “Seven days leaven shall not be found in your houses,” and it says: “And he searched, starting with the eldest, and ending with the youngest; and the goblet was found.” And it says: “At that time I will search Jerusalem with lamps,” and it says: “The spirit of man is the lamp of God, searching all the inward parts.” With regard to this teaching, the Gemara asks a question: What is the reason for the last citation introduced by the final And the verse says? Why doesn’t the previous verse, “At that time I will search Jerusalem with lamps,” provide sufficient proof that the search must be conducted by the light of the lamp? And the Gemara answers: The last verse is necessary, lest you say that this verse: “At that time, etc.” is a leniency, as God is saying: I will not search Jerusalem by the light of a torch, whose light is great, and through which I will expose every sin. Rather, I will search by the light of a small lamp, whose light is smaller, which will ensure that great sins will be discovered and small sins will not be discovered. To counter this argument, the tanna states: Come and hear, “The spirit of man is the lamp of God, searching all the inward parts.” This verse indicates that everything will be found by the light of the lamp, which is the most effective manner of searching. The Sages taught: One does not search for leaven, neither by the light of the sun, nor by the light of the moon, nor by the light of a torch. Rather, the search should be conducted by the light of a lamp, because the light of a lamp is effective for searching. And even though there is no proof for this matter, there is an allusion to this matter, as it is stated: “Seven days leaven shall not be found in your houses” (Exodus 12:19), and it says: “And he searched, starting with the eldest, and ending with the youngest; and the goblet was found in Benjamin’s sack…” (Genesis 44:12). And it says: “At that time I will search Jerusalem with lamps” (Zephaniah 1:12), and it says: “The spirit of man is the lamp of God, searching all the inward parts” (Proverbs 20:27). The Gemara asks a question: This light of the sun, by which one may not conduct the search for leaven, what are the circumstances of this case? If we say it is referring to conducting a search in the courtyard, didn’t Rava say that a courtyard does not require searching, due to the ravens and other birds that are found there, and will certainly eat any leaven there? Rather, perhaps this ruling is referring to a portico, which is not frequented by ravens. However, this cannot be the correct interpretation either, as didn’t Rava say with regard to that case that a portico may be searched by its own light, i.e., one need not use a lamp at all when searching a portico, but one may search it by sunlight? The Gemara answers: No, this statement with regard to sunlight is necessary with regard to the skylight that is in a room. The Gemara asks: And with regard to the area to which the tanna is referring, where in the room is it located? If he is referring to the place opposite the skylight, the legal status of that area is like that of a portico, as its abundant sunlight is adequate to search for leaven. Rather, the tanna is referring to the sides of the room. In those areas, one cannot rely on the sunlight from the skylight. He must search by the light of the lamp. The Gemara asks: And is the light of a torch not bright enough for searching? But didn’t Rava say: What is the meaning of that which is written, “And a brightness appears as the light; He has rays at His side; and there is the hiding of His power” (Habakkuk 3:4), which indicates that God will provide rays of glory for the righteous in the future? The Sages explained this verse by means of a parable: To what are the righteous comparable before the Divine Presence? They are comparable to a lamp in the face of a torch. This statement indicates that the light of a torch is significantly greater than that of a lamp, and consequently a torch should be more effective in the search for leaven. And likewise Rava said: One who uses a torch for the blessing over fire in havdala has performed the mitzva in the optimal manner. Apparently, the light of a torch is greater than that of a lamp. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The baraita does not prohibit the use of a torch due to its failure to provide sufficient light. Rather, it is due to the fact that one can put this lamp into holes and crevices, as it is a small flame, and one cannot put that torch into holes and crevices, as it is a large flame.
Rav Zevid said: This lamp projects its light before it, facilitating the search, and that torch projects its light behind it, on the person conducting the search.
Rav Pappa said: The reason is that when using this torch one fears starting a fire, and when using that lamp he does not fear starting a fire.
Ravina said: This lamp consistently draws light, and the light of that torch fluctuates. Although overall the torch provides greater light than a lamp, it is less effective for use in a search. We learned in the mishna: Any place into which one does not typically take leaven does not require searching. The Gemara asks: What does the inclusive phrase: Any place, come to include? The Gemara answers that it comes to include that which the Sages taught in a baraita: The upper and lower holes in the wall of a house that are difficult to use, as well as a veranda roof, a closet roof, a cowshed, chicken coops, a storehouse for straw, a wine cellar, and a storeroom for oil; all these do not require that a search be conducted. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A bed that divides the area inside a house and space separates the bottom of the bed from the floor requires a search, as there might be leaven beneath it. The Gemara raises a contradiction between this baraita and another: With regard to a hole in a wall that is between a house belonging to one person and a house belonging to another, this neighbor searches to the point that his hand reaches, and that neighbor searches to the point that his hand reaches. And as for leaven found in the rest of the hole, each one renders it null and void in his heart. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A bed that divides the area inside a house, with wood and stones placed under it, and space separates the bottom of the bed from the wood and stones beneath it, does not require searching. This is difficult due to a contradiction between the ruling with regard to a bed in the first baraita, where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that it requires a search, and the ruling with regard to a bed in the second baraita, where he rules that no search is required. Furthermore, it is similarly difficult due to a contradiction between the ruling with regard to holes in the first baraita, that a search is not required, and the ruling with regard to holes in the second baraita, that a search is required. The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between the first ruling with regard to holes and the second ruling with regard to holes is not difficult. This baraita, which rules that one need not search them, is referring to upper and lower holes, which are difficult to use. And that baraita, which rules that one is required to search them, is referring to intermediate holes, whose use is convenient. The apparent contradiction between the first ruling with regard to a bed and the second ruling with regard to a bed is similarly not difficult. This baraita, which rules that one is required to search them, is referring to a bed that is raised off the floor, and that ruling, that one need not search them, is referring to a bed that is low and the space beneath it cannot be used, and presumably, there is no leaven there. With regard to this baraita, the Gemara asks: And do wine storages not require searching? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Wine storages require searching; oil storages do not require searching. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? It is a case where one supplies wine from the storage during the meal. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, then in the case of oil storages, if one supplies oil from the storage during the meal, he should be obligated to search there as well. The Gemara answers: With regard to oil, there is a fixed quantity used for eating a meal. A person knows how much oil he will require before the meal begins, and he will therefore supply himself with any oil that he will need before the meal, and no leaven will enter the storage. However, with regard to wine, there is no fixed quantity used for drinking, as one does not know how much wine he will drink during the meal. Consequently, it is possible that he will descend to his wine cellar with bread in his hand to replenish his supply of wine. Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches: The Sages rendered the legal status of the beer storages in Babylonia like that of wine storages in Eretz Yisrael, with regard to one who supplies wine from the storage during the meal. Any storage from which one replenishes his supply during the meal requires searching for leaven. Rav Ḥisda said: A fish storage does not require searching. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But wasn’t it taught in a baraita that a fish storage requires searching? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; this lenient ruling is referring to large fish, and that stringent ruling deals with small fish. Since one does not know exactly how many small fish he will require for the meal, he might need to replenish his supply during his meal. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: A salt storage and a storage for candles require searching for leaven, as one might have entered those storages during a meal. Rav Pappa likewise said: A wood storage and a storage for dates require searching for the same reason. It was taught in the Tosefta: The Sages do not require one to place his hand into holes and crevices to search for leaven, due to the danger involved. The Gemara asks: Due to what danger? If we say it is due to the danger of a scorpion that might be in this hole, when he made use of the hole in the first place, how did he make use of it if there were scorpions there? If the hole is never used, there is no need to search it in any case. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to search this hole in a case where leaven fell into it unintentionally. The Gemara asks: If the tanna is referring to a case where leaven fell into the hole, again, why do I need to conduct a search? But didn’t we learn in a mishna with regard to leaven upon which a rockslide fell, it is considered removed from the owner’s possession? Here too, any leaven that fell into the hole should be considered removed. The Gemara answers: There, where the tanna said it is as though it were removed, he is referring to a case where the rockslide buries the leaven so that even a dog cannot search for it. Here, it is referring a hole that is not so deep, and therefore a dog can search for it and extract the leaven from the hole. The Gemara questions the halakha in the Tosefta from a different angle. Why is there any concern about danger in this case? But didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: Those on the path to perform a mitzva are not susceptible to harm throughout the process of performing the mitzva? Rav Ashi said: Here we are concerned lest he will also have lost a needle in the same place, and he will look for it while he is searching for the leaven. Since he is not merely searching for leaven, the merit of the mitzva will not protect him. The Gemara asks: And in a case like that, where there is personal interest intermingled with the performance of a mitzva, is it not nevertheless considered a mitzva? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita that one who says: I am contributing this sela to charity so that my son will live, or if he says: I am performing the mitzva so that I will be one destined for the World-to-Come, this person is a full-fledged righteous person as far as that mitzva is concerned? These ulterior motives, e.g., seeking a reward, do not detract from the value of the mitzva. The Gemara answers: There is still concern lest he look for the needle after he searched for leaven and completed the search. There is danger that since he already completed the mitzva, its merit will not protect him when he is searching for the needle. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The danger referred to by the Tosefta is the danger posed by gentiles. And this ruling is in accordance with the opinion of the tanna Pelimu. As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to a hole in a wall located between the residences of a Jew and a gentile, one searches in the hole as far as his hand reaches, and the rest he renders null and void in his heart. Pelimu said: One does not search the entire hole at all, due to the danger involved. The Gemara asks: Due to what danger? If we say it is due to the danger of sorcery, i.e., the gentile will suspect the Jew of casting spells on him and will come to hate him and threaten him, if so, when he made use of the hole in the first place, how did he make use of it without arousing the enmity of his gentile neighbor? If the hole is never used there is no need to search it in any case. The Gemara answers: There, when he made use of the hole, it was during the day and there was light, and the gentile would not raise the suspicion that the Jew was casting spells in his mind. Here, it is during the night and the search is performed with a lamp, and the gentile would raise the suspicion that the Jew was casting spells in his mind. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t Rabbi Elazar say that those on the path to perform a mitzva are not susceptible to harm throughout the process of performing the mitzva? The Gemara responds: In a place where danger is commonplace it is different, as one should not rely on a miracle, as it is stated with regard to God’s command to Samuel to anoint David as king in place of Saul: “And Samuel said: How will I go, and Saul will hear and kill me; and God said: Take in your hand a calf and say: I have come to offer a sacrifice to God” (I Samuel 16:2). Even when God Himself issued the command, there is concern with regard to commonplace dangers. They raised a dilemma before Rav: With regard to those members of the school of Rav who live in the fields [baga] far away from the city, what is the halakha as to whether they may come early before dawn and in the evening after dark to Rav’s school, or should they be concerned about robbers? He said to them: Let them come, and responsibility for their safety is upon me and my neck. They asked him: What is your opinion about returning home? He said to them: I do not know if it is possible to rely on the protection of the mitzva when returning home. On a related note, it was stated that Rabbi Elazar said: Those on the path to perform a mitzva are not susceptible to harm; neither when they go nor when they return. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did he say this? The Gemara answers: It is in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it was taught in a baraita that Isi ben Yehuda says: With regard to that which the Torah said: “And no man shall covet your land, when you go up to appear before God your Lord three times in the year” (Exodus 34:24), this teaches that your cow shall graze in the meadow and no beast will harm it, and your rooster shall peck in the garbage dump and no marten [ḥulda] shall harm it. In other words, your property will be protected while everyone ascends to Jerusalem for the Festival, despite the fact that the farm will not be defended. And are these matters not inferred a fortiori? And if those animals that typically are harmed by other animals are not harmed, due to the protection provided by the mitzva, people who typically are not harmed, as they are capable of protecting themselves, all the more so, will not be harmed due to the protection provided by the mitzva of ascending to Jerusalem for the Festival. I have only derived that one is protected when going to Jerusalem; from where is it derived that one is protected even when returning from the Temple? The verse states: “You shall roast and eat the Paschal lamb in the place which God your Lord shall choose; and you shall turn in the morning and go to your tents” (Deuteronomy 16:7). This teaches that you shall go and upon your return find your tent in peace, unharmed. The Gemara asks: And once we derived that the merit of a mitzva protects a person even when returning, why do I need a source to teach that he is protected when he goes? This teaching could also be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. The Gemara answers: Actually, the first verse is interpreted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami, as Rabbi Ami said: Any person who has land in his possession is obligated to ascend to the Temple for the three pilgrim Festivals. And one who does not have land in his possession is not obligated to ascend for the Festivals, as the verse states: Your land, in the context of the obligation to ascend to Jerusalem for the three Pilgrim Festivals. Apropos the ascent to Jerusalem for a Festival and the performance of a mitzva with ulterior motives, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Avin bar Rav Adda said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Due to what reason are there no fruits of Ginnosar, which were of the highest quality, growing in Jerusalem? Why is Jerusalem not graced with this produce? The reason is so that the pilgrims would not say: If we had ascended only to eat the fruit of Ginnosar, it would have been sufficient for us. The ascent to Jerusalem would then be performed not for its own sake. On a similar note, Rabbi Dostai, son of Rabbi Yannai, said: Due to what reason are the hot springs of Tiberias not located in Jerusalem? It is so that the pilgrims would not say: If we had only ascended to bathe in the hot springs of Tiberias, it would have been sufficient for us. The ascent to Jerusalem would then be performed not for its own sake. We learned in the mishna: And with regard to what did the Sages of previous generations say that one must search two rows of wine barrels in a cellar, etc. The Gemara asks: A cellar, who mentioned anything about that? What led the tanna to begin a discussion of a wine cellar? The Gemara answers that this is what the tanna is saying: Any place into which one does not take leaven does not require searching, and wine storages and oil storages also do not require searching. And with regard to what did the Sages say that one must search two rows in a cellar? This statement is referring to a place into which one brings leavened bread, and where one supplies wine from the storage during the meal. We learned in the mishna that Beit Shammai say that one must search the first two rows across the entire cellar. Rav Yehuda said: The two rows that they stated are two full rows in the front, from the ground up to the ceiling. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: These two rows are one row at a right angle, like the shape of the letter gamma [gam], i.e., the entire length and height of the front row and the entire top row of the barrels along the length and width of the cellar. The Gemara comments: One baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda, and one baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. One baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda: Beit Shammai say that one must search two rows across the entire front of the cellar, and the two rows that were stated are from the ground up to the ceiling. One baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: One must search two rows across the entire cellar, i.e., the outer row that faces the door, and the upper row that faces the ceiling. The rows inward from the outermost one and the rows lower than the uppermost one do not require searching. We further learned in the mishna that Beit Hillel say: It is sufficient to search the two external rows, which are the upper ones. There is an amoraic dispute with regard to this statement. Rav said it is referring to the uppermost row of barrels and the row that is beneath it. And Shmuel said it means the uppermost front row and the next one that is inward into the cellar. What is the reason for the opinion of Rav? He infers from the term: Outer rows, that Beit Hillel mean that both rows face outward. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But doesn’t the mishna also teach: Upper rows, indicating that both rows are adjacent to the ceiling? The Gemara answers: This term comes to exclude the lowest of the lower rows. One must search only the top two rows. And Shmuel said the mishna is referring to the uppermost front row and the next one that is inward into the cellar. What is the reason for the opinion of Shmuel? He infers from the term: Upper rows, that one must search the first two rows on the top level of barrels. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But doesn’t the mishna also teach: Outer row? The Gemara answers that this word comes to exclude the innermost of the inner rows. One must search only the two outermost rows. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and all the other tanna’im, who recite the mishnayot and baraitot by heart, teach in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. MISHNA: After conducting the search, one need not be concerned that perhaps a marten dragged leaven from house to house, or from place to place, placing leaven in a house that was already searched. As if so, one need also be concerned that perhaps leaven might have been dragged from courtyard to courtyard and from city to city. In that case, there is no end to the matter, and it would be impossible to rely on any search for leaven. GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the mishna: The reason that one need not search again is that we did not see the marten drag the leaven from the house; however, if we saw the marten drag leaven from the house, we are indeed concerned that it dragged the leaven into the second house, and it therefore requires searching for leaven. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But why is this so? Let us say that the marten ate the bread it took. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: The residences of gentiles are ritually impure, as their wives may have miscarried, and due to the fact that gentiles would bury their stillborn babies in their houses, all their residences are deemed ritually impure due to the possibility of impurity imparted by a corpse. And how long must a gentile have stayed in a residence for the residence to require searching? He must have lived there for forty days. The reason is that until forty days after conception the miscarried fetus is not classified as a stillborn, as it is not sufficiently developed before that stage. This mishna continues: And this decree applies even though the gentile resident has no wife. In issuing the decree, the Sages did not distinguish between a married couple and a single man, so that people would not err in its application (Me’iri). And any place where a marten or a pig can enter unimpeded need not be searched, as presumably if a stillborn was buried there, one of these animals would have taken it. As this mishna indicates that there is a presumption that martens eat whatever they find, the Gemara suggests that the same should apply to leaven. Therefore, even if one actually saw the marten take the bread, he can assume that the animal ate it, obviating the need for an additional search. Rabbi Zeira said: This is not difficult, as in this case, where no search is required, it is referring to flesh, whereas in that case, where one is required to search again, it is referring to bread. Rabbi Zeira elaborates: With regard to flesh, a marten does not leave remnants behind, and therefore the stillborn would have been entirely consumed. With regard to bread, however, the marten leaves remnants behind, requiring an additional search. Rava said: What is this comparison? These cases are not comparable. Granted, there, with regard to the stillborn, one could say that it was in the house and one could say that it was not in the house. And even if you say it was there, say that the marten ate it. The very presence of the stillborn in the house is based on an assumption, and even if it was there, it was probably consumed. However, here, where one definitely saw the marten take the bread, who will say that the marten ate it? It is a conflict between an uncertainty whether or not the marten ate the bread, and a certainty that the bread was there. The principle is that an uncertainty does not override a certainty. The Gemara raises a difficulty against this principle: And is it so that an uncertainty does not override a certainty? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to a ḥaver who died and left a storehouse filled with produce, even if the produce was there only that day, the fruit has the presumptive status of produce that was ritually prepared, i.e., properly tithed. The assumption is that the owner tithed it himself or commanded others to do so. However, here, this produce was certainly untithed at the outset, and there is uncertainty whether they are tithed or whether they are not tithed. Despite this conflict, the uncertainty whether they were tithed comes and overrides the certainty that they were untithed produce. The Gemara rejects this contention: There, the conflict is between certainty and certainty, as the produce is certainly tithed, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥoza’a. As Rabbi Ḥanina Ḥoza’a said: There is a presumption with regard to a ḥaver that he does not allow produce that is not ritually prepared, to leave his possession. It is therefore certain that the produce is tithed. And if you wish, say instead that in that case the conflict is between uncertainty and uncertainty, as perhaps one could say that the produce was never initially untithed. It is possible that there was never an obligation to tithe this produce, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Oshaya. As Rabbi Oshaya said: A person may employ artifice to circumvent obligations incumbent upon him in dealing with his grain, and bring it into the courtyard in its chaff so that his animal may eat from it. And this grain is exempt from tithes. Although the obligation to tithe produce that has been fully processed applies even to animal fodder, it is permitted to feed one’s animal untithed produce that has not been fully processed. In light of this halakha it is possible that the fruit of the ḥaver in the storehouse may not have been subject to the obligation to be tithed. Consequently, the aforementioned case involving produce is a conflict between two uncertain factors, as it is uncertain whether or not the owner was obligated to tithe the produce in the first place, and even if he was required to do so, it is uncertain whether or not the ḥaver tithed it. The Gemara raises a further difficulty against Rava: And is it so that an uncertainty does not override a certainty? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving the maidservant of a certain violent person in the city of Rimon, who threw a stillborn baby into a pit, and a priest came and glanced at the baby to ascertain whether it is male or whether it is female, as a woman who has just given birth, even to a stillborn, is ritually impure for different lengths of time, depending on whether she gave birth to a male or a female (see Leviticus 12). And the incident came before the Sages, to rule whether or not the priest contracted ritual impurity when standing over the corpse, and they deemed him ritually pure. The basis for this ruling was due to the fact that as a marten and a polecat [bardelas] are found there, it is likely that the baby was dragged away before the priest arrived at the pit. And yet here, where it is certain that she threw the stillborn baby into the pit, and it is uncertain whether a marten or polecat dragged it away and it is uncertain whether it did not drag it away at that time, the Sages nevertheless ruled that an uncertainty comes and overrides a certainty. The Gemara rejects this contention: Do not say in the baraita that she certainly threw a stillborn into a pit; rather, say that she threw an object similar to a stillborn into a pit. Perhaps it was not a stillborn baby; it might have simply been congealed blood, which does not transmit impurity. And therefore, this is a conflict between uncertainty and uncertainty. It is unclear whether there was anything in the pit that could have rendered the priest ritually impure, and even if there was, it might have already been dragged away. The Gemara retorts: But isn’t it taught in the baraita: To ascertain whether it is male or whether it is female, indicating that the only uncertainty was with regard to gender; it was certainly a stillborn baby. The Gemara rejects this proof, as this is what the baraita is saying: The priest sought to ascertain whether she miscarried mere wind, i.e., an amorphous mass, or if she miscarried a stillborn baby. And if you say that she miscarried a stillborn, he sought to ascertain whether it is male or whether it is female. And if you wish, say instead: There it is not a conflict between certainty and uncertainty; rather it is between certainty and certainty. Since a marten and a polecat are found there, they certainly dragged it away at that time, without delay. Although martens leave part of their food, in any case they certainly dragged the baby to their holes at that time. Another version of this answer: Although we do not say that they certainly ate the stillborn, we do say that they certainly dragged it to their holes. Consequently, the ruling in this case does not contradict the general principle that an uncertainty does not override a certainty. The Gemara proceeds to analyze a more fundamental aspect of the mishna: And do we say that one need not be concerned that perhaps a marten dragged the leaven? But isn’t it taught in the last clause, in the next mishna: With regard to the leaven that one leaves after the search, he should place it in a concealed location, so that it will not require searching after it? Apparently, there is concern lest a marten take some of the remaining leaven. Abaye said: This is not difficult; this ruling is referring to the fourteenth of Nisan, whereas that ruling is referring to the thirteenth. The Gemara elaborates: On the thirteenth of Nisan, when bread is still found in every house, the marten does not conceal the leaven, and therefore there is no concern that perhaps the marten dragged the leaven elsewhere and concealed it. However, on the fourteenth of Nisan, when bread is not found in any of the houses, the marten hides the leaven. Rava said in surprise: And is the marten a prophetess that knows that now is the fourteenth of Nisan and no one will bake until the evening, and it leaves over bread and conceals it in its hole? Rather, Rava rejected Abaye’s answer and said: With regard to the leaven that one leaves after the search, he should place it in a concealed location, lest a marten take it before us and it will require searching after it. Only if one actually sees the marten take the leaven, is he required to search after it. It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: One who wishes to eat leavened bread after his search, what should he do? With regard to the leaven that one leaves after the search, he should place it in a concealed location, so that a marten will not come and take it before us, and he will need to search the house after it. Rav Mari said that there is a different resolution of the apparent contradiction between the baraitot: One conceals the leaven that he found, due to a decree lest he place ten pieces of bread and find only nine. Since the tenth piece is missing, he will be obligated to conduct an additional search. Apropos the issue of leaven taken by a rodent, the Gemara analyzes a series of similar cases. In a case where there were nine piles of matza and one pile of leavened bread, and one saw a mouse come and take a morsel from a pile, and we do not know if it took matza or if it took leavened bread, this is akin to the case of nine stores in the mishna cited below. If a portion became separated from one of the piles and we did not know if it was matza or leaven, and one saw a mouse come and take it, that is akin to the case mentioned in the latter clause of that mishna. The Gemara elaborates. As we learned in a baraita: With regard to nine stores in a city, all of which sell kosher meat from a slaughtered animal, and one other store that sells meat from unslaughtered animal carcasses, and a person took meat from one of them and he does not know from which one he took the meat, in this case of uncertainty, the meat is prohibited. This ruling is based on the principle: The legal status of an item fixed in its place is that of an uncertainty that is equally balanced. In this case, when it comes to determining whether or not this meat comes from a kosher store, the two types of stores are regarded as though they were equal in number. This baraita continues: And in the case of meat found outside, follow the majority. If most stores in the city sell kosher meat one can assume that the meat he found is kosher, based on the principle: Any item separated, i.e., not fixed in its place, is presumed to have been separated from the majority. By the same token, if most stores in that city sell non-kosher meat, the meat found is presumed to be non-kosher. These two principles can be applied to the cases involving piles of matza and leaven: If the morsel was separated from the piles when taken by the mouse, follow the majority. However, if the mouse took the morsel from one of the piles, the legal status of the morsel is that of an equally balanced uncertainty concerning whether it was taken from a pile of matza or a pile of leaven, and the owner is required to conduct an additional search. The Gemara discusses another case: There are two piles, one of matza and one of leavened bread, and before them there are two houses, one which was searched and one which was not searched, and two mice came, and in our presence one took matza and one took leavened bread. Each mouse went into a different house, and we do not know which mouse entered this house and which mouse entered that house. It is unclear whether or not the mouse that took the leaven entered the house that was searched. This situation is akin to the case of two baskets. As we learned in the Tosefta: There are two baskets, one filled with non-sacred produce and the other one filled with teruma, and before them are two vessels each containing a se’a of produce, one filled with non-sacred produce and the other one filled with teruma. And these, the contents of each of the baskets, fell into those, each of the se’a vessels. It is possible that the teruma fell into the non-sacred produce, and it is prohibited for non-priests to eat a mixture of teruma and non-sacred produce. Nevertheless, the contents of the se’a vessel containing the non-sacred produce is permitted, as I say that the non-sacred produce fell into the non-sacred produce and the teruma fell into the teruma. Likewise, with regard to leaven, presumably the mouse took the leaven into the house that had not been searched, and there is no need to conduct an additional search of the house that was already searched. The Gemara rejects this comparison: Say that we state and apply the principle: As I say, and assume that everything occurred in a way that preserves the produce in its permitted state only with regard to teruma that in modern times is sacred by rabbinic law, as the Torah obligation to separate teruma was abrogated after the destruction of the First Temple. However, with regard to leavened bread, which is prohibited by Torah law, do we say that this principle applies? The Gemara responds: Is that to say that the search for leavened bread is required by Torah law? It is a rabbinic ordinance, as by Torah law, mere nullification is sufficient. Since the issue at hand is not the Torah prohibition of leaven but the rabbinic ordinance to search one’s house, this halakha is comparable to the case of baskets of teruma and non-sacred produce. The Gemara presents another situation: In a case where there is one pile of leavened bread and before it there are two houses that were searched, and a mouse came and took a morsel from the pile, and we do not know if it entered this house or if it entered that house, this is akin to the case of two paths, as we learned in a mishna: There were two paths, one of which was ritually impure due to a corpse buried there, and one of which was ritually pure. And someone walked on one of them, but he does not remember which, and afterward he engaged in handling items of ritual purity, e.g., teruma or consecrated items; and another person came and walked on the second path, and he too does not remember which path it was, and he also engaged in handling items of ritual purity. Rabbi Yehuda says: If this one asked a Sage by himself, and that one asked a Sage by himself, they are both pure. When considered separately, each person retains his presumptive status of ritual purity. However, if they both came to ask at the same time, they are both ritually impure. Since one of the two certainly passed on the impure path, even though it is uncertain which, both are deemed impure due to that uncertainty. Rabbi Yosei says: One way or another they are both ritually impure. Rava said, and some say it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said: If they came at the same time, everyone agrees that they are ritually impure, as even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that this is the halakha. If they came independently, one after the other, everyone agrees that they are ritually pure. They disagree only with regard to a case where one comes to ask about himself and about the other. Rabbi Yosei likens this case to one where they come to ask at the same time, and Rabbi Yehuda likens it to a case where they come one after the other. The Gemara addresses another case: If one saw a mouse take leaven and there is uncertainty whether the mouse entered a house that was already searched and uncertainty whether the mouse did not enter that house, that is akin to the halakha of ritual impurity in a valley, and is subject to the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna with regard to one who enters a valley during the rainy season, when seeds are sprouting, people do not have permission to wander in the field of another, as they might harm the plants. For the purpose of this halakha a valley in the rainy season is considered a private domain, and there is a general principle that in the case of uncertainty concerning whether or not one contracted ritual impurity in a private domain he is ritually impure. And if there was ritual impurity in a certain field, and one person said: I walked in that place, in the valley, and I do not know whether I entered that field or whether I did not enter, Rabbi Eliezer deems him pure, and the Rabbis deem him impure. Rabbi Eliezer deems him pure, as Rabbi Eliezer would say: Concerning uncertainty with regard to entry, i.e., whether or not he entered the place, he is ritually pure; however, if one certainly entered the place and the uncertainty is with regard to contact with ritual impurity, he is ritually impure. According to this opinion, the principle with regard to uncertain impurity in the private domain applies only in a case where the uncertainty is with regard to contact. The Rabbis, however, do not distinguish between these situations, as they maintain he is impure regardless of whether the uncertainty is with regard to entry or with regard to contact. This dispute applies to the case of whether or not one is required to conduct an additional search for leaven in a case where there is uncertainty whether or not leaven was taken into the house. The Gemara discusses another case: If one saw a mouse enter a house with leaven in its mouth and someone searched and did not find any leaven there, this is akin to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna, Rabbi Meir would say: Any object that has the presumptive status of ritual impurity, i.e., it is certain that an impure object was buried in a particular place, that place forever remains in its ritual impurity, even if it was excavated and the source of impurity was not found, until it becomes known to you where the ritual impurity is. The assumption is that the impurity was not found because the search was not conducted properly. And the Rabbis say in this case: He continues searching until he reaches bedrock or virgin soil, under which there is certainly no ritual impurity. If he searched that extensively and failed to discover any impurity, it is apparently no longer there. This dispute applies to the aforementioned case involving leaven. The Gemara analyzes yet another case: If one saw a mouse enter a house with leaven in its mouth and one searched and found a morsel of leaven there, but there is uncertainty whether or not the morsel that he found is the morsel that the mouse took into the house, this would be akin to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to a field in which a grave was lost, i.e., there is certainly a grave located in the field but its precise location is unknown, one who enters the field is ritually impure, as he might have stepped on the grave. If a grave was later found and marked in the field, one who enters and walks on the other parts of the field is ritually pure, as I say: The grave that was previously lost is the grave that was subsequently found. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The entire field must be searched, as perhaps the grave discovered is not the one that was lost. This dispute applies to the above case of leaven. The Gemara discusses another situation: If a person placed nine morsels of leaven and found ten, indicating that mice had added at least one morsel, this is akin to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis. As it was taught in a baraita with regard to a person who placed a maneh, one hundred dinars, of second tithe, and found two hundred dinars: Since it is evident that someone came and placed at least one extra maneh there whose status is unclear, the pile is presumed to contain non-sacred money and second-tithe money intermingled with each other. The assumption is that the additional money is non-sacred, and it is impossible to determine which is the non-sacred money and which is the second-tithe money. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say: It is all non-sacred money. Since someone else was clearly involved, it is possible that he took the maneh and left behind two hundred other dinars. Consequently, it is impossible to identify any of this money as the original maneh. This same reasoning can be applied to the case of leaven. Since there were undoubtedly mice present, it is possible that the mice took the morsels, moved them, and replaced them with other morsels. As a result, the entire house must be searched again. The Gemara raises the reverse situation. If one placed ten morsels and found nine, this is comparable to the case mentioned in the latter clause of that same baraita, as it was taught in the baraita: If one left two hundred dinars of second-tithe money and found a maneh, presumably, one maneh from the initial two hundred remains placed, and the other maneh is taken and missing. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And the Rabbis say, in keeping with their aforementioned opinion: It is all non-sacred money, as the assumption is that whoever took part of the money actually took it all, and this is a different maneh. Since it is different money, it is presumably non-sacred money, not second-tithe money. This dispute applies to the case where one finds fewer morsels of leaven than he left. The Gemara addresses yet another case: If one placed leaven in this corner and found it in another corner, this is akin to the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to an axe that was lost in a house, the house is impure, as I say that a ritually impure person entered the house and took the axe, touching other items in the process. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The house is ritually pure, as I say that he lent the axe to another person and forgot, or that he took it from this corner and placed it in the other corner and forgot. The Gemara asks: A corner, who mentioned anything about it? The baraita was referring to an axe that was lost, not one that was in a different corner. The Gemara answers: The baraita is incomplete, and is teaching the following: With regard to an axe that was lost in a house, the house is ritually impure, as I say that an impure person entered the house and took the axe, or, if the owner placed it in this corner and later found it in another corner, the house is likewise ritually impure, as I say that an impure person entered the house and took the axe from this corner and placed in another corner. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The house is ritually pure, as I say that he lent it to another person and forgot, or that he took it from this corner and placed it in that corner and forgot about it. When the baraita is interpreted in this manner, the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis applies to the question about leaven. Rava said: If one saw a mouse enter a house with a loaf of bread in its mouth, and he entered after the mouse and found crumbs, the house requires additional searching, due to the fact that a mouse does not typically generate crumbs. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that these crumbs are from the loaf snatched by the mouse. And Rava also said: If one saw a child enter with a loaf in his hand, and he entered after the child and found crumbs, the house does not require additional searching, because a child typically generates crumbs, and one can therefore assume that the crumbs are from that loaf. Although the rulings in these cases were clear to Rava, Rava raised a dilemma with regard to a related case: If one saw a mouse enter with a loaf in its mouth, and he saw a mouse leave with a loaf in its mouth, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Do we say that this mouse that entered is that same mouse that left and there is no more leaven left in the house? Or perhaps it is a different mouse. The Gemara adds: If you say that this mouse that entered was this one that left, another dilemma arises: If one saw a white mouse enter with a loaf of bread in its mouth and a black mouse leave with a loaf of bread in its mouth, what is the halakha? Do I say this is certainly a different mouse, or perhaps the black mouse took the loaf from the white mouse? The Gemara continues to suggest variations on this case: And if you say that mice do not take from each other, as one mouse is generally not significantly stronger than another, if one saw a mouse enter with a loaf of bread in its mouth and a marten leave with a loaf of bread in its mouth, what is the halakha? Do I say that the marten certainly took it from the mouse, as it is larger and stronger? Or perhaps it is a different loaf, for if it is so, that the marten took the loaf from the mouse, the mouse itself would also be found in its mouth, as the marten would presumably take not only the loaf of bread but the mouse as well. And if you say that we accept the contention that if it is so, that if the marten took it from the mouse the mouse itself would be in its mouth, in regard to a case where one saw a mouse enter with a loaf of bread in its mouth and a marten leave with both a loaf of bread and a mouse in its mouth, what is the halakha? Do I say that this is certainly the same mouse and loaf, or perhaps even this conclusion can be disputed: If it is so, that this is the same mouse, the loaf would have been found in the mouse’s mouth rather than in the marten’s mouth. Consequently, this must be a different loaf of bread. Or perhaps the loaf of bread fell from the mouse’s mouth due to its fear and the marten took it separately. No satisfactory answer was found for these dilemmas and the Gemara concludes: Let them stand unresolved. Rava raised a dilemma: If there was a loaf of bread on a high beam in the ceiling, does one need to climb a ladder to take it down or is this effort not necessary? Do we say: The Sages did not obligate one to exert himself that much in his search for leaven, and since the loaf of bread will not fall on its own he will not come to eat it? Or perhaps it can be claimed that sometimes the loaf may fall and he will come to eat it, as objects placed high up occasionally drop. And if you say with regard to a loaf of bread on a beam, sometimes it will fall and he will come to eat it, in a case where the loaf was in a pit, does one need to use a ladder to bring it up, or is this effort not necessary? The Gemara explains the two sides of the dilemma: Here the loaf will certainly not come up on its own, and one can therefore let it remain where it is; or perhaps there is still a concern that sometimes he might go down into the pit to perform some requirement of his, and he will come to eat it. The Gemara continues to discuss the various permutations of this case. And if you say that sometimes one goes down into the pit for some requirement of his, and he will come to eat it, with regard to a loaf that was in the mouth of a snake, is it necessary for him to bring a snake charmer to take the loaf out of the snake’s mouth, or is this effort not necessary? Once again the Gemara explains the two sides of the dilemma: Do I say that with regard to his own body the Sages obligate one to exert himself and search everywhere, but with regard to his money the Sages do not obligate one to exert himself, i.e., he is not required to spend money in order to destroy leaven? Or perhaps, the legal status of his money is no different than that of his body, as one must remove leaven wherever he finds it, in any way he can? This series of dilemmas is also left answered and the Gemara concludes: Let them stand unresolved. MISHNA: Rabbi Yehuda says: One searches for leaven on the evening of the fourteenth of Nisan, and on the fourteenth in the morning, and at the time of the removal of leaven. And the Rabbis say: that is not the case; however, if one did not search on the evening of the fourteenth he should search on the fourteenth during the day. If he did not search on the fourteenth, he should search during the festival of Passover. If he did not search during the Festival, he should search after the Festival, as any leaven that remained in his possession during the Festival is classified as leaven owned by a Jew during Passover, which one is obligated to remove. And the principle is: With regard to the leaven that one leaves after the search, he should place it in a concealed location where it will most likely be left untouched, so that it will not require searching after it if it goes missing. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the statement of Rabbi Yehuda that one must conduct a search three times? The Gemara answers: It is Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna who both say: The requirement to conduct three searches corresponds to the three times that the removal of leaven is mentioned in the Torah. One verse says: “Matzot shall be eaten for seven days, and no leavened bread shall be seen with you, neither shall there be leaven seen with you, in all your borders” (Exodus 13:7), and another verse states: “Seven days shall there be no leaven found in your houses” (Exodus 12:19), while a third verse says: “Seven days shall you eat matzot, yet on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses” (Exodus 12:15). Rav Yosef raised an objection to this explanation, seeking to prove that even according to Rabbi Yehuda one need not conduct three searches for leaven. He explained that Rabbi Yehuda lists the three times when one may conduct a search for leaven. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who did not search at these three times may no longer search. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda does not hold that one must conduct three searches. Rather, in regard to whether or not one may conduct a search for leaven if he failed to conduct a search at one of those three opportunities, it is from this point forward that they disagree. The Rabbis hold that one may conduct the search even after the time of the removal of leaven, and Rabbi Yehuda disagrees. Mar Zutra taught Rav Yosef’s statement in this manner: Rav Yosef raised an objection from that which Rabbi Yehuda says: Anyone who did not search at one of these three times may no longer search. In Mar Zutra’s version, Rabbi Yehuda explicitly states: One of these three times, which reinforces the claim that he obligates one to conduct only one search. The Gemara similarly concludes: Apparently, it is with regard to whether or not one may no longer search that they disagree. Rather, the Gemara concludes that Rabbi Yehuda also said: If one did not search for leaven bread at the first opportunity, he may do so at the second or third opportunities; however, he may not search for leaven after these three times have passed. And here, in the mishna, it is about this that they disagree: One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, maintains that before the prohibition against eating leaven takes effect, yes, one may conduct a search; after the prohibition against eating leaven takes effect, no, one may no longer conduct a search, due to a rabbinic decree lest one come to eat from the leaven while searching for it. And the Rabbis maintain: We do not issue a decree lest one come to eat from the leaven, and he may therefore conduct a search even after the prohibition against eating leaven has taken effect. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And does Rabbi Yehuda issue a decree lest one come to eat from the leaven in whose removal he is engaged? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: Once the omer offering was sacrificed, people would go out and find the markets of Jerusalem filled with flour and toasted grain, all from the new crop. This grain was undoubtedly harvested and processed when the Torah prohibition against eating from the new crop was still in effect. However, with regard to those people who harvest the crop before the omer is sacrificed, they act contrary to the will of the Sages. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The concern is that while working with the grain they might come to eat from it, despite the fact that it is still prohibited. Rabbi Yehuda says: They act in accordance with the will of the Sages. And in that case, Rabbi Yehuda did not issue a decree lest one eat from it. Why, then, does he issue a decree with regard to leaven? Rava said that the prohibition of new grain is different: Since before the omer you permitted one to harvest the crop only by picking it by hand and may not harvest it in the typical manner, he will remember the prohibition and refrain from eating it. That is not the case with regard to leaven. Abaye said to him: This works out well in explaining Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion with regard to the time when one is picking the grain; however, with regard to the time of grinding and sifting, what can be said? Apparently, it is permitted to perform these acts in a typical manner. Why, then, is there no concern lest one eat the grain at that stage? The Gemara responds: This is not difficult, as one also performs grinding in an atypical manner. One must grind the grain before the sacrificing of the omer with a hand mill, not with a mill powered by an animal or by water. Likewise, sifting is performed atypically, not in the interior of the sifter. Instead, it is performed on top of the sifter. Since all of these actions are performed in an atypical manner, there is no concern lest he come to eat the grain. The Gemara raises another difficulty: However, with regard to that which we learned in a mishna: One may harvest grain from a field that requires irrigation and from fields in the valleys, as their grain ripens long before the omer is sacrificed, but one may not pile the produce, and the Gemara adds: And we established that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; what can be said? The use of the term: One may harvest, in this mishna indicates that the grain was harvested in a typical manner, not by hand. Rather, Abaye said: This difference between the cases of the omer and leaven is not based on the manner in which one harvests, grinds, or sifts. Instead, the reason for the different rulings is that from new grain, one distances himself, as it is prohibited to eat the new grain all year until the omer is offered. But from leavened bread one does not distance himself, as it is permitted during the rest of the year. Therefore, he is more likely to unwittingly eat leaven. Rava said: Is the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda difficult, while the contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and the other statement of the Rabbis is not difficult? There is also an apparent contradiction between the opinion of the Rabbis, i.e., Rabbi Meir, who rule that the Sages issued a decree with regard to new grain but did not issue a decree with regard to leaven. Rava explains as follows: The contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as we resolved it above. The contradiction between one ruling of the Rabbis and the other ruling of the Rabbis is also not difficult: The Rabbis maintain that there is no need to issue a decree prohibiting searching for leaven after leaven is prohibited, as, with regard to one who himself is seeking out leaven to burn it, will he eat from that leaven? However, in the case of new grain, he is processing the grain, preparing it for consumption. Therefore, the concern is that he will come to eat it unwittingly. Rav Ashi said: The contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as the difficulty can be resolved in an alternative manner, as we learned in the mishna that the markets of Jerusalem were filled with flour and toasted grain. It is permitted to prepare only these foods before the omer, as they will not be eaten without further preparation. Therefore, there is no concern lest one eat it unwittingly before the omer offering is sacrificed. The Gemara rejects this interpretation: That statement of Rav Ashi is a mistake, as this suggestion can easily be refuted. That works out well with regard to the status of the grain from the point that the grain was processed into flour or toasted grain and forward, as there is no concern lest one come to eat it. However, with regard to its status initially until it became toasted grain, what can be said? There must have been a certain point when the grain kernels were edible before they were transformed into toasted grain. Why is there no concern that one might come to eat the grain at this earlier stage? And lest you say that the grain is distinguished by the atypical manner in which it is harvested, in accordance with the earlier statement of Rava, but with regard to the difficulty raised to Rava’s opinion that one may harvest a field that requires irrigation and a field that is in the valleys in the typical manner and we established that statement in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, what can be said? Rather, the Gemara rejects this explanation and concludes that Rav Ashi’s statement is a mistake. The above conclusion was that Rabbi Yehuda distinguishes between prohibitions involving substances from which people regularly separate themselves and prohibitions involving substances from which people are not used to keeping their distance. The Gemara asks: And anywhere that one does not distance himself from a prohibition, does Rabbi Yehuda issue a decree that one must keep away from a prohibited item to avoid accidentally using it? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: A person may not pierce a hole in an eggshell, and fill it with oil, and place it beside a lamp so that the egg will drip additional oil into the lamp and thereby extend the time that it burns? And this is the ruling even if it is not an actual egg but an earthenware tube, from which most people consider it unsuitable to drink. The concern is lest one forget and take the tube and use the oil for some other purpose, and violate the prohibition against extinguishing a flame on Shabbat. And Rabbi Yehuda permits using a tube in that manner, as he is not concerned lest one remove it. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda does not issue a decree even with regard to an item from which people do not distance themselves, e.g., oil. The Gemara answers: There, due to the stringency of Shabbat, one distances himself, as on Shabbat one is careful to distance himself from a candle or anything placed alongside it. And the Gemara raised a contradiction between this halakha of Shabbat and another halakha of Shabbat, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to the rope of a bucket that was severed on Shabbat, where one needs the rope to draw water from a well, he may not tie it with a regular knot, as by Torah law it is prohibited to tie a permanent knot. Rather, he may tie it into a bow. However, Rabbi Yehuda says: One may wrap a money belt [punda] around it or a sash [pesikya], provided that he does not tie it into a bow, lest he tie a proper knot. This presents a difficulty, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who permits placing a tube of oil beside the lamp, and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits tying a bow to reattach the severed rope of a bucket. There is likewise a difficulty between one statement of the Rabbis, who prohibit placing a tube of oil beside the lamp, and the other ruling of the Rabbis, where they permit tying a bow to reattach the severed rope of a bucket. The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and the other statement of the Rabbis is not difficult, as one usage of oil might be confused with another usage of oil. Given that it is permitted to use oil for other purposes, one is apt to utilize this oil as well. However, tying a bow will not be confused with the dissimilar tying of a knot. Consequently, the Rabbis do not issue a decree in that case. The Gemara continues: Likewise, the contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda and the other statement of Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda is not because he issues a decree to prohibit tying a bow due to the prohibition against tying a knot. Rather, the reason is more fundamental, because Rabbi Yehuda maintains that a bow itself is a full-fledged knot. According to Rabbi Yehuda, tying a bow is included in the prohibition against tying a knot on Shabbat. And the Gemara raised a contradiction between one statement of the Rabbis and another statement of the Rabbis, as we learned in a mishna: One may tie a bucket with a sash, to draw water from a well, but one may not do so with a rope, and Rabbi Yehuda permits the use of a rope. Before addressing the aforementioned contradiction, the Gemara asks: The mishna is referring to a rope of what kind? If you say it is referring to a standard rope, does Rabbi Yehuda permit tying a knot in this rope? It is a permanent knot, as in tying the rope to the bucket he certainly comes to negate any other use of the rope. He performs a primary category of prohibited labor by tying a permanent knot. Rather, it is obvious that the mishna is speaking about a rope used in the work of a weaver [gardi]. The legal status of this rope differs from that of an ordinary rope, as the weaver will certainly not leave his rope attached to a bucket and thereby negate any other use. Consequently, this knot is a temporary one. The Gemara asks: And did the Rabbis issue a decree prohibiting the rope of a weaver due to a standard rope but they did not issue a decree prohibiting a bow due to a knot? The Gemara explains: Yes, the Rabbis indeed issued a decree prohibiting the rope of a weaver, as one rope may be interchanged with another rope, leading one to mistakenly tie a knot with a different rope. However, a bow is not interchanged with a knot. The Gemara asks: And anywhere that one distances himself from the prohibition, does Rabbi Yehuda not issue a decree? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: What should one do if he has an unblemished firstborn kosher animal whose blood circulation is constricted, and it can be healed only through bloodletting? This situation is problematic, as an unblemished firstborn animal is consecrated, and wounding it is prohibited. Even if it dies due to this condition, one may not let its blood at all; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: One may let the animal’s blood, provided that he does not inflict a blemish on the firstborn animal. In this case Rabbi Yehuda issues a decree with regard to a firstborn animal, despite the fact that its use is generally prohibited and people distance themselves from consecrated items. The Gemara answers: There, in the case of a firstborn animal, since a person is agitated and anxious about his property, as the priest who is watching the firstborn wants to slaughter it before it dies, as if it dies, eating it would be prohibited. Therefore, we say: If you permit him to let blood in a place that does not cause a blemish in the animal, he will come to do so in a place that causes a blemish in it, to save his animal. And the Rabbis respond that if that is the case, all the more so should it be permitted to let blood in a manner that will not cause a blemish, for if you do not permit him to take any steps to save the animal at all, he will come to act in a prohibited manner and cause a blemish. If there is a legitimate alternative, he will not cause a blemish in the firstborn. The Gemara challenges this explanation: And do we say that according to Rabbi Yehuda a person is agitated about his property? But didn’t we learn in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: One may not scrape an animal on a Festival with a fine-tooth comb, because in doing so he inflicts a wound, which is prohibited on Festivals? However, one may scratch an animal with a wide-tooth comb, as this does not inflict a wound. And the Rabbis say: One may neither scrape nor even scratch, for if one were permitted to scratch an animal he might come to scrape it as well. And it was taught in the Tosefta: What is scraping and what is scratching? Scraping is performed with a comb with small teeth and with which one inflicts a wound. Scratching is performed with a comb that has large teeth and with which one does not inflict a wound. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda does not issue a decree to prohibit scratching lest one come to scrape, even though he is agitated over his property. The Gemara rejects this contention: There, with regard to a firstborn, it is different, for if he leaves it and does nothing the animal will die, and therefore we say that a person is agitated over his property. In his agitated state he will overlook the details of permitted and prohibited actions and violate a prohibition. Here, however, if he leaves his animal and does not comb it, it will merely suffer pain from the stinging insects. In that case we do not say that a person is agitated about his property. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, what is different with regard to leavened bread that he issued a decree lest a person come to eat the prohibited food, and what is different with regard to scraping that he did not issue a comparable decree? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda maintains that unleavened bread might be interchanged with leavened bread, whereas scraping would not be interchanged with scratching. Since one uses a completely different utensil in the performance of the prohibited action, interchanging the two actions is unlikely. MISHNA: The tanna’im disagree regarding until what time leaven may be eaten and at what time it must be removed on Passover eve. Rabbi Meir says: One may eat leaven the entire fifth hour of the fourteenth of Nisan, and one must burn it immediately afterward at the beginning of the sixth hour. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may eat the entire fourth hour and one places it in abeyance for the entire fifth hour, and one burns it at the beginning of the sixth hour. And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: Two disqualified loaves of a thanks-offering are placed on the bench in the colonnade in the Temple as an indicator. There was a specially designated place for these loaves in the Temple. As long as the loaves are placed there, the entire nation continues to eat leaven. When one of the loaves was taken away, the people know that the time had come to place the leaven in abeyance, meaning that they neither eat nor burn their leaven. When they were both taken away, the entire nation began burning their leaven. Rabban Gamliel says that the times are divided differently: Non-sacred foods are eaten the entire fourth hour, and teruma may be eaten during the entire fifth hour. Since it is a mitzva to eat teruma and burning it is prohibited, additional time was allocated for its consumption. And one burns all leaven including teruma at the beginning of the sixth hour. GEMARA: The Gemara seeks to draw a comparison between this dispute of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda and a dispute between them on a different topic. We learned in a mishna there: If one witness says that an incident occurred on the second day of the month and one other witness says that it happened on the third day of that month, their testimony is valid. This minor contradiction does not invalidate the testimony. The mishna explains: The reason is that this witness knows about the addition of an extra day to the previous month. Since he knows that the court added a day to the previous month, which lasted thirty days, he testifies that the incident occurred on the second day of the month. And that witness does not know about the addition of an extra day to the previous month, and he therefore thinks that the incident in question occurred on the third of the month. If one says that the incident occurred on the third day of the month and one says it happened on the fifth, their testimony is void, as there is no way to rationalize this contradiction. Similarly, if one says the incident occurred at two hours of the day and one says it happened at three hours, their testimony is valid, as that discrepancy could be the result of the lack of precision. However, if one says it occurred at three hours and one says it took place at five hours, their testimony is void. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: In the last case, their testimony is valid, as it could be that one is slightly mistaken. However, if one says it happened at five hours and one says at seven hours, everyone agrees that their testimony is void. That is a clear contradiction that cannot be rationalized as a miscalculation, as at five hours of the day the sun is in the east, and at seven hours the sun is already in the west. It is impossible to confuse the fifth hour with the seventh. Abaye said: When analyzing the matter, you will find that you can say that according to the statement of Rabbi Meir a person does not err at all, as Rabbi Meir assumes that people know the exact time of day. According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda a person errs up to half an hour. Abaye elaborates: According to the statement of Rabbi Meir, a person does not err at all, and the reason that in the case where one says two hours and one says three the testimony is valid is that the incident actually occurred as the second hour ended and the third hour began. And when this witness said it happened in the second hour he was referring to the end of the second hour. When that witness said the third hour he was referring to the beginning of the third hour. It is possible that both witnesses spoke the truth. Abaye continues his explanation: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs by half an hour, as when the incident occurred, it occurred at the midpoint of the fourth hour, at three and a half hours of the day. And this witness, who says three hours, means the end of the third hour, and he errs by saying that it occurred half an hour before the incident actually occurred. And that witness, who says five hours, means the beginning of the fifth hour, i.e., the end of the fourth hour, and he errs by saying that it occurred half an hour after the incident actually occurred. Since it is possible that their testimonies do not conflict, their testimony is valid. Some say a different version of this statement. Abaye said: When analyzing the matter, you will find that you can say that according to Rabbi Meir a person errs a bit, and according to Rabbi Yehuda a person errs by an hour and a bit. Abaye elaborates: According to Rabbi Meir, a person errs a bit, as when the incident occurred, it occurred either at the end of the second hour or at the beginning of the third hour, and one of the two witnesses errs a bit. According to Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs by an hour and a bit, as when the incident occurred, it occurred either at the end of the third hour or at the beginning of the fifth hour, and one of them errs by an hour and a bit. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehuda, went and said the halakha of Abaye before Rava. Rava said to him that Abaye’s explanation must be rejected: And were we to closely examine the statements of these witnesses and ask them when precisely the incident occurred, and find that the one who says at three hours means that it occurred at the beginning of the third hour, and the one who says at five hours means that it occurred at the end of the fifth hour, it would be contradictory testimony and we would not kill the accused on the basis of this testimony; and will we arise and kill based on uncertainty? Although their testimony could be valid, it could also be void. Can the court execute the accused based on that uncertainty? And consider that the Merciful One says in the Torah: “And the congregation shall judge…and the congregation shall deliver” (Numbers 35:24–25), from which it is derived that judges must do everything in their power to save an accused from the death penalty. Rather, Rava said: In fact, according to the statement of Rabbi Meir, a person errs by two hours less a bit; according to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs by three hours less a bit. The Gemara elaborates: According to the statement of Rabbi Meir, a person errs by two hours less a bit. How so? When the incident occurred, it was either at the beginning of the second hour or at the end of the third hour and one of the witnesses erred by two hours less a bit, as that is a reasonable discrepancy. According to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, a person errs by three hours less a bit. How so? When the incident occurred, it was either in the beginning of the third hour or at the end of the fifth hour, and one of them errs by three hours less a bit. According to Rabbi Yehuda, that is a reasonable discrepancy. We learned in a mishna: The judges of the court would examine witnesses with seven forms of interrogation: In which seven-year Sabbatical cycle of the Jubilee did the incident occur, in which year of the seven-year Sabbatical cycle, in which month of that year, on which date of that month, on which day of the week, at which hour of the day, at which place did the incident occur? And it was taught in a baraita: What is the difference between interrogations and examinations? With regard to each of the forms of interrogation, if one of the witnesses said: I do not know, their testimony is void. However, with regard to examinations, even if they both say: We do not know, their testimony is valid. The Gemara continues. And we discussed this baraita: In what way are interrogations different and in what way are examinations different? Why is the testimony of a person who cannot answer one of the interrogations void, but his testimony is valid if he cannot answer one of the examinations? And we said in response: With regard to interrogations, if one of them says: I do not know, their testimony is void, as this is testimony that you cannot render as false, conspiring testimony. Witnesses are determined to be false, conspiring witnesses when other witnesses arrive in court and testify that the first pair of witnesses could not possibly have witnessed the incident in question, as they were at a different place at that time together with them. If a witness says he does not know when the incident occurred or where it occurred, it would be impossible to testify that he was elsewhere and render him a false, conspiring witness. The Torah disqualifies the testimony of a witness who cannot be rendered a false, conspiring witness. However, with regard to examinations, even if the witness cannot remember every detail, it remains testimony that you can render as false, conspiring testimony. Even without that detail, the second pair of witnesses can still testify that the first pair of witnesses was with them in a different place at that time. Based on the above, the Gemara returns to discuss the matter of discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses with regard to the hour that the incident occurred. And if you say that a person errs by that much, e.g., several hours, with regard to the interrogations of what time of day the incident occurred, this is also testimony that you cannot render as false, conspiring testimony, for if other witnesses claim that they were elsewhere at that time, the witnesses can say: We are mistaken, and the incident did not actually occur at that time, but a few hours earlier or later. Consequently, it is impossible to prove that they are false, conspiring witnesses. The Gemara explains that we give leeway to the first pair of witnesses for the entire duration of the potential margin of their error. In order to render them false, conspiring witnesses, the second pair of witnesses must testify that the first witnesses were with them for the entire period during which their testimony would be accepted, despite the discrepancy with regard to the hour in which it occurred. According to Rabbi Meir, we give the witnesses who testified that the incident occurred at two or three hours of the day, from the beginning of the first hour until the end of the fifth hour. If they testified that the incident occurred in the second hour or the third hour, the court must take into account a mistake of two hours in either direction. And by right we should give them even more leeway at the beginning. Since one errs by two hours less a bit, if the witnesses testified that the incident occurred at approximately two hours of the day, they might have erred by roughly two hours and the incident actually occurred before sunrise. However, since between day and night people do not err, and as the witnesses testify that the incident occurred during the second or third hour of the day, it could not have occurred before sunrise. And according to Rabbi Yehuda, we give the witnesses a margin of error from the beginning of the first hour until the end of the sixth hour. And by right we should give them even more leeway at the beginning, as according to his opinion one errs by three hours less a bit, and therefore the margin for error should be greater. However, between day and night people do not err, and therefore there is no concern that they might have erred in this regard. And similarly, by right we should give them even more leeway at the end of the period. However, this too is not a reasonable discrepancy, as at five hours of the day the sun is in the east and at seven hours the sun is in the west. No one confuses the morning with the afternoon. In light of the above conclusions, the Gemara returns to address the issue of leaven. We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Meir says: One may eat leaven the entire fifth hour of the fourteenth of Nisan, and one must burn it immediately afterward at the beginning of the sixth hour. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may eat the entire fourth hour, and one places it in abeyance for the entire fifth hour, and one burns it at the beginning of the sixth hour. The Gemara raises a difficulty: According to Abaye’s explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that he said a person does not err about the time at all, let him eat leaven for the entire sixth hour, as by Torah law it is permitted to eat until the end of the sixth hour, i.e., midday. The Sages issued a decree prohibiting the consumption of leaven from the beginning of the sixth hour, lest one unwittingly come to eat after midday. However, according to Rabbi Meir, people do not err in this regard at all and that concern is unfounded. And according to that version of Rabbi Meir’s opinion, that he said a person errs a bit, let him eat leaven until just before the end of the sixth hour. And according to Abaye’s explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that he said: A person errs by half an hour; let him eat leaven until the midpoint of the sixth hour. And even according to the version of Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, that he said: A person errs by an hour plus a bit; let him eat leaven until just before the end of the fifth hour. From the fact that this is not the ruling of these Sages, apparently Abaye’s assessment of the amount of time that a person errs is incorrect. Rather, Abaye said: There is a difference between the issues of testimony and leaven, as testimony is entrusted to the vigilant. One comes to testify only if he thoroughly scrutinized the subject of his testimony. Therefore, he will not err significantly with regard to the time in question. However, the prohibition against eating leavened bread is a halakha entrusted to all, and not everyone is able to correctly determine the time. Consequently, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda both extend the margin for error, so that people will not unwittingly eat leaven after the time that it is prohibited to do so. The Gemara raises another difficulty: And according to Rava’s explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that he said: A person errs by two hours less a bit; from the beginning of the fifth hour let one no longer eat leaven. After all, one could confuse the fifth hour with the seventh hour, when it is prohibited to eat leaven by Torah law. The Gemara answers: Since at five hours the sun is in the east and at seven hours the sun is in the west, no one confuses morning with afternoon. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, during the sixth hour let him eat leaven as well, as one distinguishes between the sixth hour and the seventh hour since the sun tends westward only during the seventh hour. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: In the sixth hour, the day, i.e., the sun, stands at the meridian, equidistant between east and west, and it is unclear toward which direction it tends. Therefore, confusion between the sixth and seventh hours is possible. The Gemara asks: And according to Rava’s explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that he said: A person errs by three hours less a bit; from the beginning of the fourth hour let one no longer eat leaven. The Gemara answers: If, since at five hours the sun is in the east and at seven hours the sun is in the west, one does not confuse the morning with the evening, and all the more so one will not confuse seven hours of the day with four hours of the day, when the sun is further east. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, i.e., there is no concern lest one confuse morning and afternoon, during the fifth hour let him eat leaven as well. Abaye interpreted it in accordance with the opinion of Rava: Testimony is entrusted to the vigilant, and therefore a witness is less likely to err, whereas the prohibition against eating leavened bread is entrusted to all. Since a common person is more likely to err, the Sages were more stringent with regard to leaven than with regard to testimony. And Rava said: That is not the reason for the added hour in the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as he is not concerned lest people err. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he said: The removal of leaven can be performed only by burning it, and therefore by prohibiting the consumption of leaven, the Sages provided him with one hour during which to gather wood to burn the leaven. Ravina raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from a baraita. Rabbi Yehuda said: When is it that the elimination of leaven can be performed only by burning it? It is only when one removes the leaven not at the time designated for its removal. Then, one should seek out the preferred method of removal and implement it in the ideal manner. However, when one removes the leaven at the time designated for its removal, at the end of the sixth hour when he must remove the leaven immediately, the removal of leaven may be performed in any manner, and one need not seek wood for burning. Why, then, was it necessary for the Sages to provide him with an hour to gather wood? Rather, Rava reconsidered the previous explanation and said: It is a rabbinic decree due to a cloudy day, when one is unable to observe the precise position of the sun, increasing the likelihood of confusion. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, then even at fourth hour let one no longer eat leaven, as according to Rabbi Yehuda a person errs by three hours less a bit. Rav Pappa said: The fourth hour is mealtime for everyone, and therefore everyone is aware of that hour and will not confuse it with another. In light of Rav Pappa’s statement, the Gemara discusses the topic of mealtimes. The Sages taught in a baraita: Eating in the first hour of the morning is the time of eating for Ludim, who are members of a nation of cannibals, and they are ravenous and in a hurry to eat. The second hour is the time of eating for robbers [listin]. Since they spend the night stealing, they eat early in the morning. The third hour is the time of eating for heirs, i.e., people who inherited a lot of money and do not work for their sustenance. Their only preoccupation in the early hours of the morning is eating. The fourth hour is the time of eating for workers. The fifth hour is the time of eating for Torah scholars. The sixth hour is the time of eating for all people. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t Rav Pappa say that the fourth hour is the time of eating for all? Rather, reverse the fourth, fifth, and sixth hours: The fourth hour is mealtime for all people, the fifth hour is the time of eating for workers, and the sixth hour is the time of eating for Torah scholars. One who eats from this point forward does not benefit from eating, as he is like one who throws a stone into a leather bottle, i.e., it does not contribute to his health. Abaye said: We only said that eating from the sixth hour onward is not beneficial, when he did not taste anything in the morning; however, if he tasted something in the morning we have no problem with it. Rav Ashi said: Like the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda with regard to testimony, so too is their dispute with regard to leavened bread. The Gemara comments: This is obvious, as this is precisely that which we said. The Gemara explains: Rav Ashi comes to teach us that the answers that we answered, distinguishing between the cases of testimony and leaven, are legitimate answers. And do not say that the different rulings in the two cases reflect a dispute between tanna’im with regard to the opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda and the answers are merely forced attempts to resolve the contradiction but not legitimate answers. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: They taught that the court does not reject testimony due to a discrepancy over time only with regard to testimony ascribed to different hours of the day. However, if one witness says that the incident occurred before sunrise and the other one says it occurred after sunrise, their testimony is void. The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case, as a blatant contradiction of this kind could not possibly be the result of miscalculation. Rather, emend the previous statement: If one witness says the incident occurred before sunrise and one says it occurred during sunrise, their testimony is void. The Gemara asks: That too is obvious, as the difference between those times is similarly conspicuous. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach this halakha, lest you say that both of the witnesses are saying one matter, and the fact that one witness says that the incident occurred during sunrise is because he was standing out in the open and they were mere rays of light that he saw which he mistook for sunrise. In actuality, he too is testifying to an incident that occurred before sunrise, and the testimony of the two witnesses is therefore compatible testimony. Rav Shimi bar Ashi therefore teaches us that there is no concern that it transpired in that manner. Rav Naḥman said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rava said to Rav Naḥman: And let the Master say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that one may eat during the entire fifth hour, as the tanna taught an unattributed mishna in accordance with his opinion, indicating that this is the halakha. As we learned in a mishna: For the entire time that one is permitted to eat leaven himself, he feeds it to his animal. It can be inferred from this mishna that there is no intermediate period when it is prohibited for a person to eat leaven but he may feed it to his animal. This unattributed mishna must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as Rabbi Yehuda maintains that during the fifth hour it is prohibited to eat leaven but one may feed it to an animal. The Gemara rejects this contention: That mishna is not classified as unattributed, as it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, due to the fact that had the mishna been in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the term: Permitted, is difficult. Instead, the mishna should have been formulated: When one eats he may feed. Rava raised an additional difficulty to Rav Naḥman: And let the Master say that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel, as he is the decisor in this dispute, and there is a general principle that the halakha is always in accordance with the decisor who states an opinion that compromises between two opinions cited previously. He said to him: Rabban Gamliel is not a decisor; he is stating a reason of his own. Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir disagree with regard to consumption of any type of leaven; they do not distinguish between teruma and non-sacred food. Since Rabban Gamliel distinguishes between the time one must desist from eating teruma and the latest time that one may eat non-sacred food, his is evidently an unrelated opinion that is in no way a compromise between the other two rulings. And if you wish, say instead: When Rav said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, he ruled in accordance with the opinion of this tanna, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to the fourteenth of Nisan that occurs on Shabbat, one does not remove leaven on Passover eve in the usual manner. Rather, one removes everything leavened before Shabbat, and one burns ritually impure teruma: Teruma in abeyance, whose purity is uncertain, and even any pure teruma that he does not require for his Shabbat meals. And one leaves from the pure leaven food for two meals, the meal at night and the one in the morning, in order to eat and finish until four hours of Shabbat morning. This is the statement of Rabbi Elazar ben Yehuda of Bartota, who said it in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua. The Sages said to him: One should not burn pure teruma, as perhaps those who can eat it will be found on Shabbat, and he will have retroactively violated a Torah prohibition by burning pure teruma unnecessarily. Instead, one places the teruma aside, and if no one is found to eat it, he feeds it to the dogs or renders it null and void in his heart. He said to them: They already sought people to eat the teruma and they did not find any other priests in the city to eat it. They said to him: Perhaps those priests who could eat the teruma on that Shabbat slept outside the wall of the city and will enter the city on Shabbat morning, at which point they could eat the teruma. He said to the Sages: According to your statement, that you take into account this unlikely scenario, one should not even burn teruma in abeyance, as perhaps Elijah the Prophet will come on Shabbat and establish prophetically that the teruma is not ritually impure, and render it ritually pure. They said to him: That possibility is no source of concern, as the Jewish people have already been assured that Elijah will come neither on a Friday nor on the eve of a Festival, due to the exertion involved preparing for the upcoming holy day. Consequently, Elijah will certainly come neither on Friday, nor on Shabbat itself, which is Passover eve. They said: They did not move from there until the Sages voted and they established the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Yehuda of Bartota, who said it in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua. Apropos the previous statement that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, what, is it not that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion even with regard to eating? Rav’s ruling indicates that one may eat leaven until the end of the fourth hour, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava: No, the aforementioned ruling applies only to the obligation to remove leaven, i.e., the Sages agreed that it is permitted to remove pure teruma on Friday only if there is no one available to eat it. The Gemara notes: And even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with this statement of Rav Naḥman, and rules that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As Ravin bar Rav Adda said: There was an incident that occurred involving a certain person who deposited a saddlebag [disakkayya] filled with leavened bread with Yoḥanan Ḥakuka’a, and mice bore a hole in the bag, and leavened bread was spilling out of the sack. And he came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi on Passover eve to ask what he should do. In the first hour of the day Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Wait, as the owner of the bag might yet return to take it from you and eat the leaven. In the second hour he said to him: Wait. In the third hour he said to him: Wait. In the fourth hour he said to him: Wait. In the fifth hour, concluding that the person was not coming, he said to him: Go and sell it in the market. What, did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi not mean that Yoḥanan Ḥakuka’a should sell this leaven to gentiles, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that it is prohibited for a Jew to eat leaven during the fifth hour? Rav Yosef said: No, it could be that he meant to sell it to a Jew, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir that one may eat leaven during the fifth hour. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was simply advising him to sell the leaven quickly before the sixth hour begins, at which point it would be prohibited for Jews to eat it. Abaye said to him: If it is permitted for a Jew to eat leaven, let him take it for himself and pay the owner back later. Why trouble him to sell it to someone else? The Gemara responds: Eating it himself is not an option due to the potential of suspicion. As it was taught in a baraita with regard to a similar situation: Collectors of charity who have no poor people to whom they can distribute the money, change the money with other people and do not change it themselves, i.e., with their own coins. Likewise, collectors of food for the charity plate, who would collect food in large vessels for the poor to eat, who do not have poor people to whom to distribute the food, sell the food to others and do not sell it to themselves, as it is stated: “And you shall be clear before God and before Israel” (Numbers 32:22). It is not sufficient that a person is without sin in the eyes of God. He must also appear upright in the eyes of other people so that they will not suspect him of wrongdoing. Rav Adda bar Mattana said to Rav Yosef: You told us explicitly that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi meant: Go and sell it to gentiles, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rav Yosef took ill late in life and forgot his studies, and therefore his student would remind him that he also agreed with that version of the incident. Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion, i.e., the opinion of which tanna, is that halakha which was taught by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, that one should sell leaven deposited with him in order to prevent the depositor from losing his possession? Rav Yosef explains: It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who deposits produce with another, even if the produce will be ruined by insects or mold, he should not touch them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He should sell them in court, due to the obligation to restore lost property. Just as one is required to return a lost item, he is likewise required to prevent loss of another’s property for which he assumed responsibility. Abaye said to him: Wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The Rabbis taught that one may not touch them only if their decrease in value is at the standard rate of stored produce, due to rot and rodents. However, if their decrease in value is beyond the standard rate, everyone agrees that one sells them in court; and all the more so in the case here, with regard to leavened bread, as the bread will be entirely lost. Once the leaven is prohibited, it remains prohibited even after Passover. Consequently, everyone agrees that one is obligated to sell the leaven. We learned in the mishna: And furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: Two disqualified loaves of a thanks-offering are placed on the pillars surrounding the Temple as an indicator. The tanna who recited mishnayot in the study hall taught a baraita before Rav Yehuda: The loaves were placed on [al gav] the bench in the Temple. He said to him: And does he need to conceal them? No one would see them if they were placed there. Rather, teach the baraita: On the roof of [al gag] the colonnade, where everyone could see them. Raḥava said that Rabbi Yehuda said: The Temple Mount was a double colonnade, i.e., surrounded by two rows of columns. That was also taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says it was called an istevanit and it was a colonnade within a colonnade. We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says these two loaves placed outside were disqualified. The Gemara asks: Why were they disqualified? What caused their disqualification? Rabbi Ḥanina said: Since the thanks-offerings brought that day are numerous, and the priests are unable to eat their portions from the loaves of all the offerings, the remaining loaves are disqualified by virtue of their being left overnight. The Gemara explains that so many loaves were brought that day, as it was taught in a baraita: One may not bring a thanks-offering on the festival of Passover due to the leavened bread included with it, as ten of the forty loaves brought with a thanks-offering are loaves of leavened bread. The Gemara raises a difficulty: It is obvious that one may not bring this offering on Passover, as it contains leaven. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: Here this baraita is not referring to the prohibition against bringing the offering on Passover itself. Rather, we are dealing with the issue of sacrificing a thanks-offering on the fourteenth of Nisan, and this tanna maintains: One may not bring consecrated offerings to a situation where the time that they may be eaten is restricted, thereby increasing the likelihood of disqualification. Although it is permitted to eat leavened bread until the sixth hour of the fourteenth of Nisan, one may not bring a thanks-offering on Passover eve. The reason is that a thanks-offering may be eaten for one full day and the following night, and if it is brought on the eve of Passover, the time available before disqualification is reduced. And therefore, everyone who ascended on the pilgrimage to Jerusalem and were obligated to bring thanks-offerings brought them on the thirteenth of Nisan. And since these thanks-offerings are numerous, they are disqualified by virtue of their being left overnight, as priests are unable to eat their portions from the loaves of all the offerings brought that day. They said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: The loaves placed as an indicator were not disqualified by being left overnight. Rather, why did the tanna call them disqualified? It was due to the fact that no animal offering was slaughtered together with them to consecrate them, but they were consecrated as thanks-offering loaves independently. They could not be eaten until the offering with which they were brought was slaughtered. The Gemara asks: And let us slaughter the thanks-offering to render the loaves permitted. The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to a case where the animal for the offering was lost. The Gemara raises a further difficulty: And let us bring another animal to replace the first one for sacrifice and let them slaughter it. The Gemara answers: This is a case where the one who consecrated the thanks-offering said: This is a thanks-offering and these are its loaves. He consecrated the animal and the loaves together, and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, as Rabba said: If the loaf of a thanks-offering is lost, its owner brings another loaf to complete the offering. However, if the thanks-offering was lost and the loaves remain, one may not bring another thanks-offering. What is the reason for this? The loaves are brought due to the thanks-offering but the thanks-offering is not brought on account of the loaves. The animal sacrificed is the primary component of the offering while the loaves are subordinate to it. The Gemara asks: And let us redeem the loaves from their consecrated status and render them non-sacred, and there will be no need to burn the loaves. Rather, the Gemara explains that actually the case is one where the animal offering was indeed slaughtered over the loaves to permit them, but the animal’s blood spilled before it could be sprinkled on the altar. Once the animal has been slaughtered, the loaves are fully consecrated and cannot be redeemed, but in this case, neither can they be eaten, as the blood was not sprinkled on the altar. And in accordance with whose opinion is this statement that the slaughter of the animal consecrates the loaves and from that point they can no longer be redeemed? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Each of two factors that are indispensable in permitting the sacrifice of an offering, elevates the subordinate components of the offering to consecrated status, without the other. In this case, the loaves are consecrated when the animal to be sacrificed is slaughtered, even if the blood was not sprinkled, as it was taught in a baraita: The lambs sacrificed on the festival of Assembly, i.e., Shavuot, consecrate the loaves that accompany them only by means of their slaughter. How so? If one slaughtered the lambs for their own sake, i.e., as lambs for Shavuot, in the appropriate manner, and the priest sprinkled their blood for their own sake, the loaves are consecrated. However, if one slaughtered them not for their own sake, and the priest sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, the loaves are not consecrated, as the factors indispensable in rendering the offering permitted were not properly performed. If one slaughtered them for their own sake, and he sprinkled their blood not for their own sake, the fact that the lambs were properly slaughtered renders the loaves partially consecrated. Therefore, the loaves are consecrated to the extent that they cannot be redeemed, but they are not consecrated to the extent that they may be eaten. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: Actually, the loaves are consecrated only when one slaughters the offerings for their own sake and sprinkles their blood for their own sake, i.e., only if both factors indispensable in rendering the offering permitted were properly performed. The previous answer in the Gemara is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara adds: Even if you say that the previous answer is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, it is understood, as with what case are we dealing here? It is in a unique case where after the slaughter, the blood was received in the cup and it only then spilled before it was sprinkled. And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with the opinion of his father, Rabbi Shimon, who stated a principle: The legal status of any blood that is about to be sprinkled and prepared for sprinkling is like that of blood that had already been sprinkled. Therefore, the loaves are consecrated when the blood is received in the vessel and thereby prepared to be sprinkled. They may not be eaten until the blood is actually sprinkled. It was taught in the Tosefta that they said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: These loaves were entirely fit. As long as the loaves were placed there, the entire nation continued to eat leaven. When one of the loaves was taken away, the people knew that the time had come to place the leaven in abeyance, meaning that they neither eat nor burn their leaven. When both of the loaves were taken away, they all began burning their leaven. It was taught in a baraita that Abba Shaul says: Two cows would plow on the Mount of Olives on Passover eve. As long as both of them are plowing, the entire nation continues to eat leavened bread. When one of the cows is taken away, the people know that the time has come to place their leaven in abeyance, meaning that they neither eat nor burn it. When both of them were taken away, the entire nation began burning their leaven. MISHNA: Apropos the removal of leaven on Passover eve, including the consecrated loaves of thanks-offerings and teruma, the mishna cites a related halakha. Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest says: In all the days of the priests, they did not refrain from burning meat that became ritually impure by coming into contact with a secondary source of ritual impurity, i.e., an object that had come into contact with a primary source of impurity, together with meat that became ritually impure by contact with a primary source of impurity. They would do so even though they would thereby add a degree of impurity to the impurity of the first piece of meat, which was previously impure to a lesser degree. Rabbi Akiva added to the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest and said: In all the days of the priests, they did not refrain from lighting teruma oil that was ritually disqualified by coming into contact with one who immersed himself during that day and who does not become completely purified until nightfall in a lamp that became ritually impure with first-degree impurity through contact with one who became ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. They did so even though they would thereby add impurity to the impurity of the oil. A person who immersed himself during that day assumes the status of second-degree ritual impurity. His contact renders the oil ritually impure with third-degree ritual impurity. The lamp with first-degree ritual impurity renders the oil ritually impure with second-degree impurity. Rabbi Meir said: From their statements we learned that one may burn ritually pure teruma with impure teruma when removing leaven on Passover eve. The rationale that applies to the two previous cases applies here as well. Since both items are being burned, one may disregard the fact that one item will assume a higher degree of ritual impurity in the process. Rabbi Yosei said: That is not the inference from which the halakha in the case of ritually pure and ritually impure teruma can be learned. In those first two cases, the two items are both ritually impure, albeit at different degrees of ritual impurity. Rabbi Meir is referring to the combination of impure teruma with pure teruma, which would render pure teruma ritually impure. And in fact Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, who disagree with regard to the burning of leavened teruma, nevertheless concede that one burns this ritually pure teruma by itself and that impure teruma by itself. With regard to what did they disagree? They disagreed with regard to whether one may burn teruma in abeyance, i.e., teruma whose purity is uncertain, and definitely impure teruma together, as Rabbi Eliezer says: This teruma in abeyance should be burned by itself, and that impure teruma should be burned by itself; and Rabbi Yehoshua says: In that case, both of them may be burned as one. GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the mishna’s first statement: Now consider, what is the status of meat that became ritually impure by coming into contact with a secondary source of impurity? It assumes second-degree ritual impurity status. When one burns that meat together with meat that became ritually impure by coming into contact with a primary source of ritual impurity, what is the status of that first piece of meat? It assumes second-degree ritual impurity status. Meat that touches a primary source of impurity assumes first-degree ritual impurity status, which transmits second-degree impurity to other meat. The Gemara continues: Since when the first piece of meat is placed next to the meat that came into contact with a primary source it assumes second-degree impurity, this is a case where the meat is with second-degree status, and through contact with the primary source it would assume second-degree status. In what sense is there a case of adding impurity to its impurity here? There is no change in the status of the first piece of meat at all. Rav Yehuda said: The above interpretation is incorrect, as here we are dealing with the secondary source of a secondary source of ritual impurity, i.e., meat that came in contact with second-degree ritual impurity. The statement in the mishna: That became ritually impure by coming into contact with a secondary source of ritual impurity, should not be understood as saying that it came into contact with meat with first-degree ritual impurity status, as in this case, the meat came into contact with meat with second-degree ritual impurity status and is impure with third-degree ritual impurity. And Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest maintains that it is permitted to render impure with second-degree impurity an object with third-degree ritual impurity by burning it with meat that came into contact with a primary source of ritual impurity. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Isn’t there a principle that food does not transmit ritual impurity to other food, as it was taught in a baraita: I might have thought that food transmits impurity to other food; therefore, the verse states: “And if water is placed upon the seed, and any part of a carcass falls upon it, it is impure” (Leviticus 11:38). The Sages derived from this verse: It, the food exposed to the source of impurity, is impure, but it does not render similar foods impure. Apparently, food does not transmit impurity to other food. This works out well according to the opinion of Abaye, who said: They taught this principle that food does not transmit ritual impurity to other food only with regard to non-sacred food; however, with regard to teruma and consecrated food, food transmits impurity to other foods it touches, and it renders the teruma or consecrated food similar to it in terms of impurity. And this is also the case according to the opinion stated by Rav Adda bar Ahava in the name of Rava, who said: They taught this principle, that food does not transmit ritual impurity to other food, only with regard to non-sacred food and teruma; however, with regard to consecrated food, food transmits impurity to other foods it touches, and it renders the consecrated food similar to it in terms of impurity. According to this opinion, it works out well. As the mishna is dealing with a case of consecrated meat, impurity can be transmitted from one food item to another. However, this is not the case according to the opinion stated by Ravina in the name of Rava, who said: The Torah stated this principle in a categorical verse, without any exceptions, meaning it is no different with regard to non-sacred food, and it is no different with regard to teruma, and it is no different with regard to consecrated food, as in all of these cases one type of food does not render other food similar to it in terms of impurity. According to this opinion, what can be said in terms of understanding the statement in the mishna: Even though they thereby add impurity to its impurity? The Gemara answers in defense of this opinion: With what are we dealing here? It is with a case where there are liquids with the meat when it comes into contact with the primary source of ritual impurity. Since the other piece of meat comes into contact with the liquid on that meat, it becomes impure due to contact with the liquid. Although food does not transmit impurity to food, liquid transmits impurity to food. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, this phrase: With meat that became ritually impure by contact with a primary source of impurity, is imprecise. The tanna should have said: With meat and liquids, as the liquids are essential for the transmission of impurity. Rather, the Gemara explains: Although food does not transmit impurity to other food by Torah law, in any event, by rabbinic law, food transmits impurity to other food. The mishna is based on the rabbinic decree that food transmits impurity to other food. It was stated in the mishna that Rabbi Akiva added: In all the days of the priests, they did not refrain from lighting teruma oil that was ritually disqualified by coming into contact with one who immersed himself during that day, in a lamp that was rendered ritually impure with first-degree impurity through contact with one who became ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. The Gemara asks: Now consider, what is the status of oil that was disqualified by one who immersed himself during that day? As one who immersed himself during that day assumes second-degree impurity, the oil that he touches assumes third-degree ritual impurity status. And when he lights it in a lamp that was rendered ritually impure through contact with one who became ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, who has first-degree impurity status, what is the impurity status of the oil? It assumes second-degree ritual impurity status. If so, what is Rabbi Akiva teaching us by this halakha? This statement apparently teaches us that with regard to an object that is ritually impure with third-degree impurity status, it is permitted to render it impure with second-degree impurity status. Yet this is the same halakha as that which was taught by Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest. What is novel about the halakha taught by Rabbi Akiva? Rav Yehuda said: Here, we are dealing with a metal lamp, which has a unique halakhic status. As the Merciful One states: “And whoever touches one who is slain with a sword in the open field, or one who dies on his own, or a bone of a man, or a grave, shall be unclean seven days” (Numbers 19:16). The Sages derived from the phrase: One who is slain with a sword, that the legal status of a metal sword in terms of its degree of impurity is like that of one who is slain. Any metal vessel that becomes impure through contact with a corpse assumes the impurity status of a corpse, the ultimate primary source of ritual impurity. The same is true with regard to a metal vessel that came into contact with a person or vessel that became impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. In that case the metal vessel assumes the impurity status of that person or vessel, and therefore, this metal lamp is a primary source of impurity. And yet Rabbi Akiva maintains that it is permitted to render this oil, which is impure with third-degree impurity, impure with first-degree impurity through contact with the metal lamp. The Gemara asks: And what impelled Rav Yehuda to establish the mishna as referring specifically to the case of a metal lamp? Let him establish it as referring specifically to the case of an earthenware lamp. And if so, what does Rabbi Akiva’s statement add? The Gemara answers: Whereas there, in Rabbi Ḥanina’s testimony, he is referring to a case where one piece of ritually impure meat came into contact with another piece of impure meat, here, in Rabbi Akiva’s testimony, he is referring to a case where oil that is disqualified came into contact with a lamp with first-degree impurity status, rendering the oil impure. Oil with second-degree ritual impurity status disqualifies teruma, as teruma with third-degree ritual impurity status does not transmit ritual impurity to other teruma. In that case, the novelty in Rabbi Akiva’s statement is that a disqualified item is burned together with an impure item even though it is thereby rendered impure. Rava said: The mishna was difficult for Rav Yehuda: Why did the tanna specifically teach the case of a lamp that became ritually impure with first-degree impurity through contact with one who became ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse? Let it teach that the lamp became impure by contact with a creeping animal, which is a much more common primary source of impurity. Rather, what is the substance with regard to which there is a distinction between its impurity when exposed to impurity imparted by a corpse and its impurity when exposed to impurity imparted by a creeping animal? You must say that the substance is metal. A metal vessel that comes into contact with a creeping animal assumes first-degree ritual impurity status, whereas if it comes into contact with a person or a vessel that came into contact with a corpse, it becomes a primary source of impurity. Rava said: Learn from this statement that Rabbi Akiva holds: The ritual impurity of liquids with regard to transmitting impurity to other objects is by Torah law, contrary to those tanna’im who hold that liquids transmit impurity only by rabbinic decree. As, if it enters your mind that this type of impurity is by rabbinic law, now, this lamp, what effect does this lamp have on that oil? If it is to disqualify the oil itself, it is already disqualified from the outset. Rather, Rabbi Akiva evidently maintains that through contact with the lamp this oil becomes impure and transmits impurity to food by Torah law. The Gemara raises a difficulty: From where do you know that this is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion? Perhaps Rabbi Akiva holds that through contact with the lamp, the oil will be able to transmit ritual impurity to other objects by rabbinic law. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If the oil confers impurity by rabbinic law, why does Rabbi Akiva refer particularly to a case where the oil became impure by contact with a primary source of impurity? If Rabbi Akiva sought to cite an example of rabbinic impurity, he could have cited even a case where the oil came into contact with an object with first-degree impurity status, or an item with second-degree impurity status. By rabbinic law, in those cases too, the oil is impure with first-degree ritual impurity and transmits impurity to food. The Gemara cites the source for that halakha. As we learned in a mishna: Any item that disqualifies teruma, e.g., anything with second-degree ritual impurity status, transmits impurity to liquids, conferring upon them first-degree ritual impurity status. These liquids assume a higher degree of impurity than the item that rendered them impure. This rabbinic decree applies to anything with second-degree ritual impurity status except for one who was impure and immersed himself during that day and the sun has not yet set. If such a person touches liquids, he does not confer upon them first-degree impurity status. Instead, that case conforms to the standard process of transmission of ritual impurity, and he confers upon them third-degree ritual impurity status and invalidates them. The Gemara concludes: Rather, learn from the fact that Rabbi Akiva did not cite the example of oil that became impure through contact with an item with first or second-degree ritual impurity that Rabbi Akiva holds that the halakha that liquids transmit impurity to other items is by Torah law. It was taught in the mishna that Rabbi Meir said: From their statements we learned that one may burn ritually pure teruma with impure teruma when removing leaven on Passover eve. The Gemara asks: From whose statements was this conclusion inferred? If you say that this conclusion is inferred from the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, is Rabbi Meir’s statement comparable to that case? There, Rabbi Ḥanina said that one may burn one ritually impure item and another ritually impure item together, whereas here, Rabbi Meir is referring to burning pure and impure teruma together. But rather, Rabbi Meir’s conclusion is inferred from the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Is it comparable to that case? There, Rabbi Akiva said that a disqualified item and an impure item may be burned together, whereas here, Rabbi Meir is referring to burning a pure item and an impure item together. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Rabbi Meir maintains that the mishna is referring to an object that is a primary source of impurity by Torah law and an object that is a secondary source of impurity by rabbinic law, which by Torah law is entirely pure. Since the teruma is pure by Torah law, the novelty of Rabbi Meir’s statement is that although by Torah law one of the foods is pure and the other is impure, due to the rabbinic decree of impurity, one may burn the two items together. And what did Rabbi Meir mean when he said: From their statements? He meant: From the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest. Reish Lakish said another explanation of the mishna in the name of bar Kappara: The case in the mishna is one involving a primary source of ritual impurity by Torah law and a secondary source of impurity by Torah law. And what did Rabbi Meir mean by the phrase: From their statements? He was not referring to the tanna’im in this mishna, but rather: From the statements of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua cited elsewhere. The Gemara asks: To which statement of Rabbi Yehoshua is Rabbi Meir referring? If you say he is referring to this statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna: In the case of a barrel of teruma produce with regard to which uncertainty developed with regard to its impurity, and which therefore may not be eaten, Rabbi Eliezer says that one must nevertheless safeguard the teruma from ritual impurity. Therefore, he maintains: If the barrel was resting in a vulnerable place, where it may come into contact with impurity, one should place it in a concealed place, and if it was exposed, he should cover it. Rabbi Yehoshua says: That is not necessary. Rather, even if it was placed in a concealed place, he may place it in a vulnerable place if he chooses. And if it was covered, he may expose it, as he need no longer safeguard this teruma from impurity. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, as teruma whose impurity status is uncertain, may be used only for lighting a fire, there is no requirement to prevent it from contact with ritual impurity. The same reasoning applies to pure leaven: One is not required to safeguard it from impurity in the process of its removal. The Gemara rejects the comparison: Is this dispute with regard to the placement of doubtfully impure teruma comparable to the case of burning ritually pure and impure items together? There, Rabbi Yehoshua permits mere passive causation of impurity; however, he does not permit one to actively render teruma whose impurity status is uncertain, impure. Here, however, in the statement of Rabbi Meir, he actively renders leavened teruma impure with his hands. Rather, Rabbi Meir did not infer his opinion from that statement; instead, he inferred it from this other statement of Rabbi Yehoshua. As we learned in a mishna: With regard to a barrel of teruma wine that broke in the upper area of a winepress, where grapes are pressed, and there is impure, non-sacred wine in the lower area of the press, where the wine flows from the upper area, the following dilemma arises: If the teruma wine flows into the non-sacred wine, the teruma will be rendered ritually impure. The result will be significant financial loss, as the legal status of all the wine in the lower press will be that of impure teruma, which is prohibited even for priests to drink. In that case, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua concede that if one is able to rescue even a quarter-log from the barrel that broke by receiving the teruma wine in a vessel before it becomes impure, and thereby keep the wine in a state of ritual purity, he should rescue it. And if one cannot receive the wine in a pure vessel, as only impure vessels are available, such that if he uses them to receive the wine or to seal the upper press he will render the teruma impure, Rabbi Eliezer says: The teruma wine should be allowed to descend and become impure on its own, but one should not actively render it impure with his hand. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One may even render it impure with his hand. Since it will become impure on its own regardless of his actions, there is no objection to rendering the teruma impure preemptively in order to prevent greater financial loss. Apparently, according to Rabbi Yehoshua, it is permitted to render an item impure if it will be lost in any case. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, that Rabbi Meir is referring to the above dispute, this expression: From their statements, is imprecise, as his ruling is not based on Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion at all. Instead, Rabbi Meir should have said: From his statement, as he learns his ruling solely from the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. The Gemara answers that this is what Rabbi Meir is saying: We learned this ruling from the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua. Since the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, this is a substantive source. The Gemara comments: The language of the mishna is also precise, as the continuation of the mishna teaches: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua concede. This indicates that Rabbi Meir is referring to their opinions. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this is the correct interpretation of Rabbi Meir’s statement. And likewise, Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: The case in the mishna is one involving a primary source of ritual impurity by Torah law and a secondary source of impurity by Torah law. And what is the meaning of the phrase: From their statements? It means from the statements of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua in the dispute cited above. Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from the Tosefta that elaborates on the mishna. Rabbi Yosei said to Rabbi Meir: The inferred conclusion of burning pure and impure leaven together is not similar to the case from which you cited proof. When the Sages testified, about what did they testify? If your source is the testimony of Rabbi Ḥanina, the deputy High Priest, he testified about the meat that became ritually impure through contact with a secondary source of impurity, saying that one may burn it together with the meat that became impure through contact with a primary source of impurity. In that case, this meat is impure and that meat is similarly impure. If your source is the testimony of Rabbi Akiva, he testified about teruma oil that was ritually disqualified by coming into contact with one who immersed himself during that day, saying that one may kindle it in a lamp that became ritually impure with first-degree impurity through contact with one who became ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse. That is a case where this oil is disqualified and that lamp is impure. We also concede with regard to teruma that became impure through contact with a secondary source of impurity that one may burn it with teruma that became impure through contact with a primary source of impurity. However, how will we burn teruma in abeyance, whose impurity status is uncertain, together with ritually impure teruma? Perhaps Elijah the Prophet will come and establish prophetically that the teruma is not ritually impure, and he will render it ritually pure. The legal status of teruma in abeyance is uncertain. How can one actively render it impure when it might ultimately be determined that it is pure? The Tosefta continues: Piggul is an offering disqualified by the improper intention during the performance of the four sacrificial rites to sacrifice it or eat it after its appropriate time; and notar is the flesh of a sacrifice that is left over beyond its allotted time. The Sages decreed ritual impurity on both, and both, as well as sacrificial meat deemed ritually impure by Torah law, may not be eaten and must be burned. Beit Shammai say: They may not be burned together, as in doing so the piggul and notar, which are impure by rabbinic law, will come into contact with meat impure by Torah law, adding impurity to their impurity. And Beit Hillel say: They may be burned together. The Gemara returns to the issue under discussion: And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Meir is saying that he derives his opinion from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, why does Rabbi Yosei respond to him from the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest? Rav Naḥman said to him: Rabbi Yosei did not have Rabbi Meir’s reasoning in mind, as he did not understand Rabbi Meir’s reasoning. As Rabbi Yosei maintains that Rabbi Meir is saying to him proof from the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest, and Rabbi Meir said to him: I am stating my proof from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua. And Rabbi Yosei said to Rabbi Meir in response: And even according to Rabbi Yehoshua, that is not the inference from which the halakha of burning pure and impure leavened teruma together can be learned, as Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua concede that one should burn this meat by itself and that meat by itself, as stated in the mishna. From an analysis of the mishna and the Tosefta, it is possible to reconstruct the original dispute. The Gemara raises a difficulty with regard to the above statement: But why does Rabbi Yosei say: That is not the inference from which it can be learned? On the contrary, it is a perfectly legitimate inference. In both cases the dispute is the same: Is one permitted to actively render an object impure preemptively if it will ultimately be destroyed regardless? The Gemara rejects this contention: The case there, of the broken barrel in the upper press, where according to Rabbi Yehoshua it is permitted to actively render the teruma impure, is different, as in that case there is the potential loss of non-sacred produce. If one does not render the teruma in the upper press impure by receiving it in impure vessels, it will flow down and render the impure, non-sacred wine in the lower press impure teruma. However, in the case of leaven, no loss will be incurred. Why, then, shouldn’t each teruma be burned independently? Rav Yirmeya strongly objects to this claim: In the mishna, too, there is the loss of wood, as one requires additional wood to kindle a second fire and burn the impure teruma separately. A certain Elder said to him: With regard to this and similar issues, the Sages were concerned about a great loss; however, they were not concerned about the minimal loss of several pieces of wood. Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei refers to the sixth hour, when leaven is prohibited by rabbinic decree. However, in the seventh hour, when leaven is prohibited by Torah law, everyone agrees that one may burn ritually pure leavened teruma together with impure leavened teruma. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Let us say that Rabbi Yoḥanan maintains that the mishna is referring to an object that is a primary source of impurity by Torah law and an object that is a secondary source of impurity by rabbinic law. And what is the meaning of Rabbi Meir’s statement: From their statements? He meant from the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest, as explained above. The dispute refers to a rabbinic prohibition, e.g., a secondary source of impurity or the obligation to burn leaven during the sixth hour. In a case where the leaven is not yet prohibited by rabbinic law, e.g., in the fourth or fifth hour, even Rabbi Meir agrees that one may not burn ritually pure and impure teruma together. Rabbi Asi said to him: Yes, Rabbi Yoḥanan indeed interprets the mishna in this manner. It was also stated explicitly that this is the case, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The mishna is referring to an object that is a primary source of impurity by Torah law and an object that is a secondary source of impurity by rabbinic law. And what is the meaning of: From their statements? It means from the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest. And the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei is with regard to the sixth hour, when leaven is prohibited by rabbinic law. However, everyone agrees that in the seventh hour one may burn them together, as both pieces of leavened teruma are prohibited by Torah law. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the end of the baraita supports Rabbi Yoḥanan’s assertion that even Rabbi Yosei agrees that it is permitted to burn together two objects prohibited by Torah law. As the baraita states with regard to piggul, notar, and ritually impure sacrificial meat that Beit Shammai say: They may not be burned together, and Beit Hillel say: They may be burned together. All of these items are prohibited by Torah law, and Rabbi Yosei would agree that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. The Gemara rejects this contention: It is different there, as piggul and notar are ritually impure by rabbinic law, and therefore Rabbi Yosei would agree that they may be burned together in that case. That is not true in the case of leaven in the seventh hour, which is not impure even by rabbinic law, although it is prohibited by Torah law. As we learned in a mishna: Piggul and notar, leftover sacrificial flesh, render one’s hands impure by rabbinic decree. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: With regard to bread that became moldy and is no longer fit for a person to eat, but a dog can still eat it, this bread can become impure with the ritual impurity of food if it is the size of an egg-bulk, as it is still classified as food. If it is pure leavened teruma, it is burned with impure teruma on Passover eve. Since the moldy bread is no longer edible, it is not necessary to refrain from burning it together with impure items. Apparently, this is Rabbi Yosei’s opinion, as Rabbi Meir maintains that pure and impure teruma are burned together even if neither is moldy. Since Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case of moldy bread, the same should apply to leavened teruma after the seventh hour, which is prohibited by Torah law. The Gemara rejects this contention: It is different there, in the case of moldy bread, as it is for all intents and purposes mere dust, and its legal status is no longer that of food. The Gemara asks: If so, that Rabbi Meir’s proof is based on the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest, why does the mishna mention that Rabbi Eliezer concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying to Rabbi Meir: Even according to Rabbi Yehoshua, who rules leniently in this case, when he rules leniently it is with regard to burning teruma in abeyance together with impure teruma; however, with regard to burning pure teruma and impure teruma together, no, he does not permit doing so. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, that Rabbi Meir’s proof is based on the statement of Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest, why did Rabbi Yosei say: That is not the inference from which it can be learned? On the contrary, it is a perfectly legitimate inference. According to Rabbi Meir, pure teruma is prohibited during the sixth hour by rabbinic law. Just as Rabbi Ḥanina holds that one may actively transmit impurity to an object that is impure by rabbinic law by burning it together with an object that is impure by Torah law, so too, according to Rabbi Meir one may transmit impurity to an item prohibited by rabbinic law by burning it together with an item that is impure by Torah law. Rabbi Yirmeya said: Here, the mishna is referring to meat that became ritually impure through contact with a secondary source of impurity by means of liquids that became impure due to contact with a creeping animal and thereby assumed second-degree ritual impurity. And Rabbi Meir conforms to his standard line of reasoning, and Rabbi Yosei conforms to his standard line of reasoning. Rabbi Meir conforms to his standard line of reasoning with regard to this issue, as he said: The ritual impurity of liquids with regard to transmitting impurity to other objects is by rabbinic law. The meat that became impure through contact with a secondary source of impurity is in fact entirely pure by Torah law. Therefore, he learns from the mishna that it is permitted to burn pure and impure items together. And Rabbi Yosei conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he said: The ritual impurity of liquids with regard to transmitting impurity to other objects is by Torah law. Accordingly, the meat that Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest referred to in the mishna was impure by Torah law. Therefore, this case cannot serve as a precedent for the claim that it is permitted to burn pure and impure teruma together on Passover eve. As it was taught in a baraita: If there is uncertainty whether or not a certain liquid has become ritually impure, it is presumed impure. It is an uncertainty with regard to Torah law, and the halakha is stringent in such cases. However, if the uncertainty is with regard to rendering other items impure, they are pure, as liquids transmit impurity by rabbinic law, and the halakha is lenient with regard to uncertainties of that kind. These are the statements of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Elazar would say likewise in accordance with his statements. Rabbi Yehuda says: When there is uncertainty with regard to these liquids, the item is impure in all cases, even in terms of transmitting impurity to other items, as he maintains that the impurity of liquids is by Torah law. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: In cases of uncertainty as to whether or not these liquids transmitted impurity to foods, the ruling is that the foods are impure, in accordance with the principle that when there is uncertainty in cases of Torah law, the halakha is stringent. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon maintain that liquids transmit impurity to food by Torah law. However, when there is uncertainty as to whether or not these liquids transmitted impurity to vessels, the halakha is lenient, and they are pure. Even Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon concede that liquids transmit impurity to vessels only by rabbinic law. This baraita clearly indicates that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei indeed dispute whether or not the impurity of liquids applies by Torah law. With regard to the Tosefta, the Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Elazar maintain that liquids have ritual impurity by Torah law at all? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar says: There is no impurity for liquids at all by Torah law. Know that this is so, as Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida testified about the grasshopper called eil kamtza that it is kosher and may be eaten; and he testified about liquids in the slaughterhouse in the Temple that they were ritually pure, as there was no decree of impurity issued with regard to them. The fact that these liquids are ritually pure indicates that by Torah law liquids cannot transmit impurity at all. Instead, that type of impurity is by rabbinic law, and rabbinic decrees of impurity were not in effect in the Temple. The Gemara adds: This works out well according to the opinion of Shmuel, who said that in this context the term ritually pure means that they do not transmit impurity to other items; however, they themselves can become impure. If that is Rabbi Elazar’s opinion, he indeed holds in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir that liquids transmit impurity by rabbinic law but themselves become impure by Torah law, as stated in the baraita above. However, according to Rav, who said that Yosei ben Yo’ezer holds that the liquids are actually ritually pure and they themselves cannot be rendered impure, what can be said? According to Rav, Rabbi Elazar maintains that there is no impurity at all by Torah law with regard to liquids. In what sense does he hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said that liquids themselves can become impure by Torah law? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: When the baraita said that Rabbi Elazar agreed with Rabbi Meir, it was with regard to one of Rabbi Meir’s opinions. Rabbi Elazar agrees with Rabbi Meir that in a case where there is uncertainty with regard to rendering other items impure, they are pure, as liquids transmit impurity by rabbinic law. However, Rabbi Elazar maintains that the impurity of liquids themselves is also not by Torah law, and therefore in a case of uncertainty with regard to impurity of the liquids themselves, the ruling is that they are pure. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t the baraita saying: And Rabbi Elazar would say in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s statements, in the plural, indicating that the points of agreement are many? And furthermore, the baraita is teaching: Likewise. This term also indicates that Rabbi Elazar agrees completely with Rabbi Meir. Since no resolution was found for this contradiction, the Gemara concludes that it is indeed difficult to understand the baraita according to Rav. After citing the testimony of Yosei ben Yo’ezer and the associated amoraic dispute, the Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rav said: Yosei ben Yo’ezer said that the liquids in the Temple are actually ritually pure and neither become impure nor transmit impurity. And Shmuel said that the liquids are ritually pure in the sense that they do not transmit impurity to other items; however, they themselves can become impure. The Gemara elaborates: Rav said that liquids are actually pure, as he maintains that the ritual impurity of liquids is by rabbinic law, and when the Sages issued this decree they did so only with regard to ordinary liquids. However, with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple, they did not issue the decree. And the Gemara elaborates on the opinion of Shmuel: Shmuel said that the liquids are ritually pure in the sense that they do not transmit impurity to other items; however, they themselves can become impure, as Shmuel maintains that the ritual impurity of liquids themselves is by Torah law, whereas their capacity to transmit impurity to other objects is by rabbinic law. And when the Sages issued this decree, they did so only with regard to ordinary liquids. However, with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple they did not issue the decree. And when Shmuel said that the Sages did not issue their decree with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse, he meant that they did not do so with regard to their capacity to transmit impurity to other items; however, as far as their own impurity is concerned, they become impure like other liquids. Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana said to his son: When you enter before Rav Pappa, raise the following contradiction before him: Did Shmuel actually say that the liquids are ritually pure in the sense that they do not transmit impurity to other items but they themselves are susceptible to impurity? Is there anything that by Torah law can itself become impure but does not transmit impurity to other items? Read here a verse that clearly states that any item that is itself impure, including liquids, transmits impurity to other items: “And the flesh that touches anything impure shall not be eaten; it shall be burnt in fire” (Leviticus 7:19). Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The legal status of liquids is just as it is in the case of fourth-degree ritual impurity in a consecrated item, with regard to which everyone agrees that it becomes impure but does not transmit impurity to other items. Rav Ashi strongly objects to this contention: How is it possible to compare these two cases? Fourth-degree impurity in a consecrated item is not called impure; it is disqualified. However, this liquid is called impure. Therefore, the two halakhot are not comparable. No resolution is found for this contradiction, and the Gemara concludes that it is indeed difficult. The Gemara cites several sources to decide the dispute between the tanna’im and between Rav and Shmuel with regard to whether or not the impurity of liquids is by Torah law. Come and hear: “And all drink that may be drunk in any vessel shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34). This verse clearly indicates that liquids can become impure. The Gemara rejects this contention: What is the meaning of the term: Shall be impure, in this context? It means that the liquid renders produce susceptible to ritual impurity. The Gemara retorts: Does it in fact mean that the liquid renders produce susceptible to ritual impurity? That cannot be as you already learned that from the beginning of this verse: “From all food that may be eaten, on which water has come shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34). The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, the second part of the verse is also necessary: One part of the verse, the latter part, is referring to water detached from its source, in vessels, and one part, the former part, is referring to water still attached to its source in the ground. And both derivations are necessary, as neither halakha could have been derived from the other. As, had the Torah taught us only about the halakha of water detached from its source, one might have thought that this water renders food susceptible to ritual impurity due to the fact that he ascribed significance to the water by drawing it from its source. However, with regard to water still attached to its source, say that it does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity. And had the Torah taught only the halakha of water still attached to its source, one might have thought that due to the fact that it stands in its place this water is significant; however, with regard to water detached from its source, say no, it does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity, as it is disconnected from its source. It was therefore necessary for the Torah to mention both cases. The Gemara cites another proof. Come and hear: “However, a spring or a cistern, a gathering of water shall be pure, but he who touches their carcass shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:36). It can be inferred from this verse that all water can be rendered impure, with the exception of spring water and water in a cistern, which are in the ground. The Gemara rejects this contention: What is the meaning of the phrase: “Shall be pure”? This phrase means that one who immerses in this water is purified from his ritual impurity, and does not refer to the impurity of liquids at all. The Gemara stated that both water detached from its source and water still attached to its source render food susceptible to ritual impurity. The Gemara asks: And does water detached from its source render food susceptible to contract impurity? Didn’t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, say: With regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse in the Temple, not only are they pure, but neither do they render produce susceptible to ritual impurity? Apparently, water detached from its source does not render food susceptible to impurity by Torah law. The fact that the Sages suspend the capacity of certain liquids to render produce susceptible to impurity indicates that the fact that water removed from its source renders food susceptible to impurity must be by rabbinic decree. Otherwise, that capability could not have been suspended in the Temple. The Gemara rejects this contention: Explain this statement as referring to blood. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina was not referring to all liquids in the Temple, but only to blood. As Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived with regard to blood of consecrated offerings that it does not render produce susceptible to impurity? As it is stated: “You shall surely not eat the blood; you shall pour it upon the earth like water” (Deuteronomy 12:16). The Sages derived from this verse: Blood that is poured like water, i.e., blood from a non-sacred domesticated animal that pours out when it is slaughtered and is not received in a vessel as sacrificial blood assumes the legal status of water and renders produce susceptible to ritual impurity. Conversely, blood that is not poured out like water but is received in a vessel to be sprinkled on the altar does not render produce susceptible to contract impurity. Rav Shmuel bar Ami strongly objects to this: There is the blood squeezed from an animal after slaughter once the initial spurt of blood has concluded, which is poured like water, as it is unfit for sprinkling upon the altar. And nevertheless, this blood does not render produce susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Zeira said to him: Leave aside the blood squeezed after the initial spurt, which is an exceptional case, as even from non-sacred animals it does not render produce susceptible to ritual impurity either. With regard to the halakha that blood renders produce susceptible to ritual impurity, the legal status of blood squeezed after the initial spurt is not that of blood at all. The Gemara comments: Rav Shmuel bar Ami accepted this statement from Rabbi Zeira and cited a verse that supports it. As the Merciful One states: “Only be strong not to eat the blood; for the blood is the soul” (Deuteronomy 12:23). This verse indicates: Blood with regard to which the soul leaves the body when it is spilled is called blood; however, blood with regard to which the soul does not leave the body when it is spilled, but which is squeezed out afterward, is not called blood. The Gemara cites an additional proof that the impurity of liquids is by Torah law. Come and hear: With regard to blood that became ritually impure, and a priest sprinkled it on the altar, the following distinction applies: If he did so unwittingly, the offering is accepted. If he sprinkled the blood intentionally, the offering is not accepted. Apparently, blood becomes ritually impure by Torah law, even if it does not transmit impurity to other items. The Gemara rejects this contention: This impurity is by rabbinic law, and this ruling is not in accordance with Rav’s explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida, as he maintains that sacrificial blood does not become impure at all. The Gemara cites a proof from another mishna. Come and hear: For what does the frontplate of the High Priest atone and thereby allow the blood of the offering to be sprinkled? It atones for the blood, and for the meat, and for the fat that became impure, whether one caused it to become impure unwittingly or intentionally, whether due to circumstances beyond his control or willfully, and whether it is the offering of an individual or that of a community. Apparently, the blood of an offering can become impure. The Gemara rejects this proof: The mishna is referring to blood that is impure by rabbinic law, and here too, it is not in accordance with the opinion of Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida, who says that consecrated blood does not become impure at all. The Gemara cites an additional proof: Come and hear another verse written about the frontplate: “And it shall be upon Aaron’s forehead, and Aaron shall bear the sin committed with the consecrated objects, which the children of Israel shall hallow, even all their sacred gifts; and it shall be always upon his forehead, that they may be accepted before God” (Exodus 28:38). And the Sages expounded: Which sin does it bear? If you say it atones for the sin of piggul, an offering disqualified by the intention to sacrifice or eat the offering after the permitted time, it is already stated: “And if it is eaten at all on the third day, it is piggul; it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 19:7). If you say it atones for notar, i.e., meat of an offering left after the time that one was permitted to eat it, it is already stated: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings is eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be credited to he who offered it” (Leviticus 7:18). Evidently, the frontplate bears only the sin of impurity in the offering of an individual, as in some circumstances, impurity was exempted from its general prohibition on behalf of the community. It was permitted to sacrifice communal offerings in the Temple in a state of impurity. What, does this not apply to impure blood as well? Apparently, blood can also become impure. Rav Pappa said: No, the reference is not to impure blood but to the impurity of handfuls of flour separated by the priest from a meal-offering. The handful of flour renders the meal-offering permitted to be eaten by the priests, parallel to the blood of an animal offering. The Gemara cites an additional proof. Come and hear that which was said to the prophet Haggai: “Thus said the Lord of Hosts: Ask now the priests with regard to the Torah, saying: If a person bears hallowed flesh in the corner of his garment, and with his garment he touches bread, or stew, or wine, or oil, or any food, shall it be sacred? And the priests answered and said: No” (Haggai 2:11–12). This question is asked with regard to the flesh of a creeping animal and whether or not the substances that come into contact with it become impure. And Rav said: The priests erred in this regard, as those substances are actually impure. This source indicates that along with the meat, the stew, wine, and oil, which are liquids, also become ritually impure. The Gemara rejects this proof. This difficulty is reasonable only according to Rav, and Rav teaches that the testimony of Yosei ben Yo’ezer was that the liquids of the slaughterhouse, blood and water associated with the slaughter of offerings, do not become ritually impure. However, Rav agrees that the liquids of the chamber of the altar, wine and oil that accompany the offering on the altar, can become impure. The rabbinic decree that liquids can become impure is not in effect with regard to the liquids of the Temple slaughterhouse, but it is in effect with regard to the liquids offered on the altar. Therefore, the liquids listed by Haggai can become impure and transmit impurity by rabbinic law. Apropos Rav’s statement with regard to Haggai’s exchange with the priests, the Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rav said: The priests erred, as they should have said the oil is rendered impure. And Shmuel said: The priests did not err. The Gemara elaborates: Rav said that the priests erred, as Haggai raised the dilemma before them whether or not consecrated items become impure with fourth-degree ritual impurity. The question in the verse pertains to the following case: One is carrying a dead creeping animal in the corner of his garment and bread comes into contact with it, conferring upon the bread first-degree ritual impurity status; and stew comes in contact with the bread, conferring upon the stew second-degree ritual impurity status; and wine comes in contact with the stew, conferring upon the wine third-degree ritual impurity status; and oil comes into contact with the wine. The question is: In that case, does the wine confer upon the oil fourth-degree ritual impurity? And when the priests said to him that it is pure, they erred. In fact, the oil is disqualified with fourth-degree ritual impurity, because it is a consecrated item. And Shmuel said: The priests did not err, as Haggai raised the dilemma before them whether or not consecrated items become impure with fifth-degree ritual impurity. According to Shmuel’s explanation, the case is as follows: The corner of the garment comes into contact with a dead creeping animal, conferring upon the garment first-degree ritual impurity status; bread comes into contact with the garment, conferring upon the bread second-degree ritual impurity status; stew comes in contact with the bread, conferring upon the stew third-degree ritual impurity status; and wine comes in contact with the stew, conferring upon the wine fourth-degree ritual impurity status; and oil comes into contact with the wine. In that case, does the wine confer upon the oil fifth-degree ritual impurity? And the priests correctly said to him that the oil is pure. The Gemara analyzes this dispute: Granted, according to the opinion of Rav, that is the reason that it is four items that are written in the dilemma raised in the verse: Bread, stew, wine, and oil, as the dilemma pertains to fourth-degree ritual impurity. However, according to Shmuel, from where does he learn that the dilemma involves five items? The Gemara explains Shmuel’s opinion. Is it written in the verse: And its corner touched the bread, indicating that the primary source of impurity that was in the corner of the garment touched the bread? It is actually written in the verse: “And it touched the corner of his garment,” meaning the bread came into contact with that which touched the primary source of ritual impurity that was in the corner of his garment. The bread came into contact with the corner of the garment, not with the primary source of impurity itself. Accordingly, the garment assumes first-degree ritual impurity status, which confers upon the bread second-degree ritual impurity status, which confers upon the stew third-degree ritual impurity status, which confers upon the wine fourth-degree ritual impurity status. Since the wine cannot confer fifth-degree ritual impurity status upon the oil, the oil remains pure. The Gemara cites proof from the subsequent verse. Come and hear: “And Haggai said: If one who is impure with impurity imparted by a corpse touches any of these, shall he be impure? And the priests answered and said: He shall be impure” (Haggai 2:13). Granted, according to Shmuel, from the fact that here, with regard to a dead creeping animal, the priests did not err, as Shmuel maintains that the dilemma was with regard to fifth-degree ritual impurity, there too they did not err. However, according to Rav, what is different here, concerning the impurity of a creeping animal, such that the priests erred, and what is different there, with regard to impurity imparted by a corpse, such that they did not err? Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: The priests of Haggai’s era were experts with regard to the severe ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, as they knew that the impurity of a dead body confers upon a consecrated item fourth-degree ritual impurity status. However, they were not experts with regard to the lesser impurity of a creeping animal. Ravina said that the distinction between the cases is different. There, the first dilemma addressed fourth-degree ritual impurity, whereas here, the dilemma addressed third-degree ritual impurity. Haggai’s second dilemma does not begin with contact with an item that came into contact with a corpse; rather, it begins with contact with the corpse itself. Since a corpse is the ultimate primary source of impurity, the fourth item is impure with third-degree ritual impurity. The priests knew that halakha. Come and hear a resolution to this matter from the next verse: “And Haggai answered and said: So is this people, and so is this nation before me, said God; and so is all the work of their hands; and that which they offer there is impure” (Haggai 2:14). Granted, according to the opinion of Rav that the priests erred, that is the reason that it is written: “That which they offer there is impure,” as the priests’ lack of familiarity with the halakhot of impurity increase the likelihood that all of their Temple service is ritually impure. However, according to Shmuel, why does the verse say that their offerings are ritually impure? The Gemara answers: According to Shmuel, this is not a statement. Rather, the verse is a rhetorical question expressing bewilderment: Is all the Temple service of the priests really impure? Apparently, they are familiar with the halakhot of impurity. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But isn’t it written in that verse: “And so is all the work of their hands,” which is a statement, not a question? Mar Zutra, and some say it was Rav Ashi, said: Since they corrupted their deeds by sinning in general, the verse ascribes to them wrongdoing as if they sacrificed offerings in a state of impurity. Apropos the two versions of Yosei ben Yo’ezer’s testimony that the liquids in the Temple are ritually pure, the Gemara addresses the matter itself. Rav teaches that Yosei ben Yo’ezer spoke of the liquids of the slaughterhouse, blood and water, and Levi taught that this halakha applies to the liquids of the altar, which include the wine of libations and oil of meal-offerings in addition to blood and water. The Gemara comments: According to the opinion of Levi, this works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, who said that Yosei ben Yo’ezer testified that the liquids are ritually pure in the sense that they do not transmit impurity to other items but they themselves can become impure. In that case, you can find a scenario for Haggai’s second question; all the substances mentioned made contact with an object with first-degree ritual impurity status. Levi can explain that the prophet’s dilemma is not in a case where the different items came into contact with each other, as he is of the opinion that liquids do not transmit impurity. Rather, the stew, wine, and oil each came in contact with an object with first-degree impurity, in accordance with Shmuel’s opinion that consecrated liquids themselves can become impure. Accordingly, the priests answered that these objects are impure. However, if Levi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav that the liquids are actually ritually pure, under what circumstances can a scenario in which wine and oil, liquids offered on the altar, can become ritually impure be found? Rather, perforce you must say that he holds in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel with regard to the meaning of the term pure in this context. The Gemara continues: And according to Shmuel, this works out well if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who taught that the decree to which Yosei ben Yo’ezer testified was issued with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse, but the other liquids of the altar transmit impurity as well. If that is Shmuel’s opinion he can explain Haggai’s dilemma, as it is only an item with fourth-degree impurity status that does not render another item impure with fifth-degree ritual impurity. However, an item with third-degree impurity status renders another item impure with fourth-degree ritual impurity. However, if he holds in accordance with the opinion of Levi, who taught that the liquids of the altar, including wine and oil, do not transmit impurity, why does Haggai specifically state that a liquid with fourth-degree impurity status does not render another liquid impure with fifth-degree ritual impurity? Even if these liquids had first- or second-degree ritual impurity status, they do not render another item impure with second- and third-degree ritual impurity, as Levi maintains that consecrated liquids do not transmit impurity at all. Rather, perforce he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rav with regard to the object of Yosei ben Yo’ezer’s decree. The Gemara cites a source in support of each version, as it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav, and it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Levi. The Gemara elaborates: It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Levi: With regard to the blood, the wine, the oil, and the water, in the case of all liquids of the altar that became ritually impure inside the Temple and one took them outside, they are pure in the sense that they do not transmit impurity to other objects. This is because when they were within the Temple confines that more stringent form of impurity did not take effect. However, if they became impure outside the Temple and one took them inside the Temple, they are impure even in terms of transmitting impurity to other items, as they too retain their prior level of impurity. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Is that so? Didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: With regard to the liquids of the altar, the Sages said they are ritually pure only in their place. What, does this statement not come to exclude liquids that became impure inside the Temple and one took them outside, as in that case once they left the Temple they would be retroactively impure in terms of transmitting impurity? This contradicts the Gemara’s previous assertion. The Gemara responds: No, the statement comes to exclude liquids that became impure outside the Temple and one brought them inside. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Didn’t Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi say: In their place, indicating that these liquids are pure in terms of transmitting impurity only if they remain inside the Temple? The Gemara answers that this is what Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is saying: The Sages said they are pure only with regard to those liquids that became impure in their place, not with regard to those that became impure elsewhere and were brought into the Temple. In any case, the language of the baraita clearly indicates that the legal status of wine and oil is like that of other sacred liquids, in accordance with the opinion of Levi. And it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav: The blood and the water, the liquids of the slaughterhouse, that became ritually impure, whether they were in vessels or on the ground, are pure. Rabban Shimon says: If the liquids were in vessels, they are ritually impure; however, if they were in the ground, they are ritually pure, as explained below. Rav Pappa said: Even according to the one who says that in general the ritual impurity of liquids is by Torah law, the purity of the liquids of the Temple slaughterhouse is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, which the Sages learned through tradition. Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: But with regard to that which Rabbi Eliezer said: There is no impurity for liquids at all by Torah law, know that this is so, as Yosei ben Yo’ezer of Tzereida testified about liquids in the slaughterhouse in the Temple that they were ritually pure. This statement indicates that liquids become impure only by rabbinic decree, a decree that is not in effect in the Temple. Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, continued: And if they learned the ritual purity of liquids of the slaughterhouse as a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai through tradition, do we derive other halakhot from it? There is a principle that one cannot derive halakhic principles from halakhot transmitted to Moses from Sinai. How, then, could Rabbi Eliezer cite this halakha as a proof for his opinion? Furthermore, Ravina said to Rav Ashi, also in rejection of Rav Pappa’s statement: Isn’t it Rabbi Shimon, who said that in general the ritual impurity of liquids is by Torah law? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: With regard to vessels that came into contact with impure liquid, the vessels are pure, as by Torah law liquids do not transmit impurity to vessels. However, with regard to foods that came into contact with impure liquid, the foods are impure, as by Torah law liquids transmit impurity to foods. Ravina continues: And yet here, with regard to the liquids in the Temple, Rabban Shimon said: Liquids in vessels are ritually impure, and liquids in the ground are pure. And if you say that the purity of the liquids of the Temple slaughterhouse is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, what difference is there to me if the liquids are in vessels and what difference is there to me if the liquids are in the ground? If there is an accepted halakhic tradition that ritual impurity does not apply to these liquids, there should be no difference whether the liquid is in vessels or in the ground. The Gemara comments: Indeed, it is difficult according to Rav Pappa’s opinion. Rav Pappa said: That which you said, that the liquids in the Temple are ritually pure when in the ground, the Sages taught this halakha only with regard to water, but with regard to blood, no, it does not apply. According to Rabbi Shimon, blood can become impure even in the ground. And even with regard to water, we said that it is ritually pure only when it is a quarter-log, which is a suitable measure in which to immerse needles and hooks. By Torah law, a quarter-log of water collected in one place can serve as a ritual bath in which one can immerse objects that can be completely immersed in that amount of water. Because it has the status of a ritual bath, it too does not become ritually impure. Although the Sages decreed that one should not immerse vessels in a quarter-log of water, the water is pure by Torah law. Therefore, the Sages did not extend their decree to this measure of water inside the Temple. However, if the water is less than a quarter-log, it is ritually impure even in the ground, as that water cannot be used as a ritual bath. The Master said in the baraita cited above, with regard to uncertainty about contact with impure liquids, that Rabbi Yehuda says: They are impure in all cases. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the impurity of liquids in terms of their capability to transmit impurity to vessels is by Torah law? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: With regard to all vessels that have an exterior that can be used and an interior that serves as a receptacle, such as cushions, blankets, sacks, and leather grain sacks, if the interior of one of these vessels became ritually impure, its exterior is impure as well. However, if its exterior became impure, its interior is not impure, because the primary use of these vessels is as a receptacle. Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the vessels became impure due to contact with impure liquids. However, if they became impure due to contact with a creeping animal, then if the interior became impure the exterior is impure, and likewise, if the exterior became impure the interior is also impure. The Gemara explains the difficulty posed by Rabbi Yehuda’s statement in this mishna: And if it enters your mind that the ritual impurity of liquids with regard to their capacity to transmit impurity to vessels is by Torah law, what difference is there to me if the vessel is rendered impure due to liquids, and what difference is there to me if the vessel is rendered impure due to a creeping animal? Rather, Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the impurity of liquids is by rabbinic law, and the Sages distinguished between the impurity of the exterior and interior of a vessel to distinguish between impurity by Torah law and impurity by rabbinic law and prevent the burning of teruma that is impure with impurity by rabbinic law. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Yehuda retracted his previous statement in the baraita and accepted the ruling that the impurity of liquids is only by rabbinic decree. Ravina said: Actually, it is possible that Rabbi Yehuda did not retract his previous statement, as this case, where he distinguishes between impurity on the interior and the exterior of vessels, was stated with regard to liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with impure hands that did not undergo ritual washing. Unwashed hands are impure by rabbinic decree, and therefore the impurity of such liquid is likewise rabbinic. Conversely, that case, where the impurity of liquids is by Torah law, was stated with regard to liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a creeping animal. As that impurity is by Torah law, no distinction is made between the interior and exterior of vessels. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, instead of teaching: In what case is this statement said? In a case where the vessels were rendered impure due to contact with liquids, as opposed to the other case in which the vessels became impure due to contact with creeping animals, let him distinguish and teach the distinction within the case itself: In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where these vessels became impure by contact with liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with impure hands. However, in a case where these vessels became impure by contact with liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a creeping animal, if the interior became impure, the exterior is impure, and if the exterior became impure, the interior is likewise impure. Rather, the Gemara rejects Ravina’s explanation and states that it is clear as we initially answered, that Rabbi Yehuda retracted his previous ruling. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Was it only from his ruling with regard to liquids that transmitted ritual impurity to vessels by Torah law that Rabbi Yehuda retracted his opinion, but with regard to foods he still holds in accordance with the opinions of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon, that liquids transmit impurity to foods by Torah law? Or perhaps he completely retracted his previous opinion, and Rabbi Yehuda in fact holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who rules that there is no Torah basis for the impurity of liquids. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a mishna: With regard to a cow that drank purification waters in which the ashes of the red heifer were mixed and which were to be sprinkled on one who was ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, and the cow was slaughtered before it digested the water, its flesh is impure due to contact with this water. Pure items that come in contact with the purification waters become impure, as derived from a verse. Rabbi Yehuda says: The purification waters are nullified in its innards and do not impurify the meat of the cow. And if it enters your mind that it was from his ruling with regard to liquids transmitting impurity to vessels by Torah law that Rabbi Yehuda retracted his opinion, but with regard to foods he holds in accordance with the opinions of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon that liquids transmit ritual impurity to food by Torah law, why does he say that the purification waters are nullified in its innards entirely and no longer transfer impurity at all? The Gemara elaborates: Although these waters do not transmit a severe form of ritual impurity to a person or vessel that comes into contact with them, in any event let them transmit a lesser form of impurity to food that comes into contact with them. Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling with regard to the purification waters indicates that he retracted his previous opinion entirely and he maintains that there is no impurity of liquids by Torah law at all. Since this impurity is by rabbinic law, the Sages did not extend their decree to the uncommon circumstance of the purification waters. The Gemara rejects this contention: What, too, is the meaning of Rabbi Yehuda’s phrase: They are nullified in its innards? It means that they are nullified only from a severe form of impurity. However, according to Rabbi Yehuda, the purification waters transmit a lesser form of impurity. This proves by inference that the first tanna maintains that the purification waters also transmit a severe form of impurity to people and vessels. This is a problematic conclusion, as the first tanna teaches: Its flesh is impure, which clearly indicates that its flesh alone is impure, whereas the purification waters swallowed by the cow do not transmit impurity to people or vessels. The result is that according to this approach, there is no difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda and the first tanna. The Gemara answers: The entire mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and the mishna is incomplete and is teaching the following: With regard to a cow that drank the purification waters, its flesh is impure. In what case is this statement said? It is said with regard to a lesser form of impurity, but with regard to a severe form of purity, no, its flesh is not impure, as Rabbi Yehuda says: The waters are nullified in its innards and their status is no longer that of purification waters. Instead, their impurity is by rabbinic law, like any other liquid. Rav Ashi said: Actually, it is possible to explain that the waters are nullified in its innards entirely from any type of impurity, as this issue is unrelated to the question of whether the impurity of liquids is by Torah law or rabbinic law. Rather, this halakha is due to the fact that purification waters become a foul liquid when ingested, and the principle is that offensive liquid can neither be rendered impure itself nor transfer impurity to other items. It was taught in the baraita about uncertainty as to the impurity of liquids that Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: With regard to foods that came into contact with impure liquid, the foods are impure. However, with regard to vessels that came into contact with impure liquid, the vessels are pure. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Reish Lakish said: Rabbi Yosei said this halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, his teacher, who interpreted the term yitma, which is an intransitive verb in the simple conjugation meaning: It shall be impure, as though it were written yetamme, a transitive verb in the intensive conjugation meaning: It shall render impure, i.e., it transmits impurity to other items. As we learned in a mishna: On that day, when they appointed Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya the Nasi, Rabbi Akiva taught: “And every earthenware vessel into which any of them falls, whatever is in it shall be impure [yitma], and you shall break it” (Leviticus 11:33). The verse does not say: It is impure [tameh]; rather, it says: It shall be impure [yitma], indicating that an item in an impure earthenware vessel transmits impurity to other items. This verse teaches about a loaf with second-degree ritual impurity status, i.e., ritual impurity imparted through contact with a vessel impurified by a creeping animal, that the loaf renders other items impure with third-degree ritual impurity, even non-sacred items. The Gemara inquires: And here, with regard to the ritual impurity of liquids, how does Rabbi Yosei interpret the verses? The Gemara cites the verse: “From all food which may be eaten, upon which water has come, shall be impure; and all drink that may be drunk in every vessel, shall be impure [yitma]” (Leviticus 11:34). Rabbi Yosei interprets the end of the verse as: Shall render impure [yetamme], indicating that liquid also transmits impurity to foods. The Gemara discusses this derivation: Do you say that this expression teaches that liquid transmits ritual impurity to foods, or perhaps the verse is teaching only that it transmits impurity to other liquids, but not to food? You said in response: That was not the correct interpretation. The Gemara wonders about the unusual expression. What is the meaning of the phrase: That was not the correct interpretation? How can this difficulty be dismissed so easily? Rav Pappa said: It means that we did not find any case of ritual impurity that renders a similar item impure. Therefore, it must be that the verse teaches that this liquid transmits impurity to food. Ravina said: From an analysis of the verse itself you also cannot say that the term: Shall be impure, means that the liquid transmits ritual impurity only to liquids. As, if it enters your mind to say that the term: Shall be impure, in the latter portion of the verse means that it transmits ritual impurity only to liquids, then the term: Shall be impure, in the first portion of the verse, in reference to food, should also mean that it transmits ritual impurity only to liquids. And if that is so, let the verse combine the two cases and write them together as follows: From all food which may be eaten, upon which water has come, and all drink that may be drunk in every vessel, shall be impure. Ravina concludes his proof: Why do I need the term: Shall be impure, twice? Rather, it must be that the term: Shall be impure, in the first portion of the verse teaches that food transmits ritual impurity to liquids, while the term: Shall be impure, in the latter portion of the verse teaches that liquid transmits ritual impurity to food. The Gemara asks: And say that the term teaches that liquid transmits ritual impurity to vessels. The Gemara rejects this contention: And isn’t it an a fortiori inference? Just as an impure vessel, which transmits impurity to liquid that comes into contact with it, nevertheless does not transmit impurity to another vessel, so too, liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a vessel, is it not right that they should not transmit impurity to vessels? The Gemara suggests: And say that when liquids do not transmit ritual impurity to a vessel, that is in the case of liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with an impure vessel, as the vessel itself does not transmit impurity to another vessel. However, with regard to liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a creeping animal, a more severe form of impurity, indeed, they should transmit impurity even to vessels. The Gemara rejects this contention: Are liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a creeping animal stated explicitly in the Torah? The impure liquids mentioned in the verse became impure by contact with a vessel that came into contact with a dead creeping animal. The Gemara asks: And doesn’t the impurity of liquids that came into contact with a creeping animal come from an a fortiori inference: Just as liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a vessel, which itself became impure due to contact with a creeping animal, transmit impurity, with regard to liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a creeping animal, all the more so is it not clear that they transmit impurity to a vessel? The Gemara answers: Since the basic halakha of these liquids is derived by means of an a fortiori inference, no stringencies are added to it, in accordance with the principle: It is sufficient [dayyo] for the conclusion that emerged from the a fortiori inference to be like the source of the inference. In other words, a halakha derived by means of an a fortiori inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived. In this case, liquid that became impure through contact with a creeping animal transmits impurity to the same extent that liquid that became impure through contact with a vessel does. The Gemara asks: How does Rabbi Akiva interpret the term: Shall be impure, in the first portion of the verse: “From all food which may be eaten, upon which water has come, shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34)? He interprets the term: Shall be impure, as: Shall render impure. Food transmits ritual impurity to liquids. Do you say that the term teaches that food transmits impurity to liquids, or perhaps the term teaches only that food transmits impurity to a vessel? The Gemara answers: You can say an a fortiori inference that negates this possibility: Just as liquid, which transmits impurity to food, does not transmit impurity to a vessel, with regard to food, which does not transmit impurity to food, is it not right that it should not transmit impurity to a vessel? If so, how then do I establish the meaning of the term: Shall be impure, which in this context indicates that food impurifies other items? This term indicates that food transmits impurity to liquids, which are susceptible to contracting impurity. The Gemara asks: Why did Rabbi Akiva mention specifically that food impurifies liquids due to the fact that they are susceptible to contracting impurity? Let him derive this proof from the simple fact that there is no other item that food could render impure. As food does not transmit impurity to food, the only remaining alternative is that food impurifies liquids. The Gemara answers that this is what Rabbi Akiva is saying: And lest you say that the impurity of food is severe, as evidenced by the fact that it transmits ritual impurity to liquids despite the fact that liquids do not transfer impurity to other liquids, and therefore let food transmit impurity to a vessel, despite the fact that liquid does not transmit impurity to a vessel; therefore, the Gemara states that the fact that food transmits impurity to liquids is actually a stringency characteristic of liquids, not of food. The impurity of food is not more severe than that of liquids; rather, food transmits impurity to liquids due to the fact that liquids are susceptible to contracting impurity. And in what manner is their susceptibility manifest? It is manifest in the fact that they become ritually impure without being first rendered susceptible to impurity. Foods can become impure only after first coming into contact with one of seven liquids. Liquids do not require any preparatory stage before becoming impure. Is the principle: Shall be impure teaches that ritual impurity does not render a similar item impure, e.g., that food does not transfer ritual impurity to other food, derived from here? It is derived from there: “But if water is put upon the seed, and any of their carcass falls upon it, it is impure for you” (Leviticus 11:38), from which it is inferred: It is impure; however, it does not transmit impurity to a similar item. Why is an additional source necessary to teach this same principle? The Gemara explains: Both verses are necessary, as one refers to liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a creeping animal, while one verse refers to liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with an impure vessel. The Gemara adds: And both verses are necessary, as neither of the halakhot could have been derived from the other. As, had the verse taught us only the halakha with regard to liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a vessel, one might have thought that liquids do not transfer impurity to similar items only due to the fact that their impurity is not severe, as it did not result from contact with a primary source of impurity; however, with regard to liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a creeping animal, which are impure with a severe form of impurity that resulted from contact with a primary source of impurity, say that they transmit impurity to a similar item. The Gemara asks: And let the verse teach us that liquids do not transmit impurity with regard to liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a creeping animal, and all the more so will that be the case with regard to liquids that come to a state of impurity due to contact with a vessel. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as at times with regard to a matter that could be derived by means of an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless unnecessarily wrote it explicitly. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: But didn’t Rava say that Rabbi Yosei does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to the third-degree ritual impurity status of non-sacred items? Contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, Rabbi Yosei maintains that an item with second-degree ritual impurity does not confer third-degree impurity status upon non-sacred items by Torah law. And similarly, Rabbi Akiva does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei with regard to the fourth-degree impurity of consecrated property. The relevance of these observations to the issue at hand is that if Rabbi Yosei maintains that the impurity of liquids is by Torah law, he evidently interprets the verse as: Yetamme, just as Rabbi Akiva does. However, in that case, he would also hold that second-degree ritual impurity confers upon another non-sacred item third-degree impurity status, as that halakha is also derived from the term: Yetamme. Rav Ashi said to him: Rabbi Yosei said this halakha that liquids transmit impurity by Torah law in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, his teacher; however, he himself does not hold accordingly, as Rabbi Yosei is of the opinion that liquids do not transmit impurity to other items by Torah law. Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana with regard to Rava’s statement: Granted, Rabbi Yosei does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei said: From where is it derived with regard to a consecrated item with fourth-degree ritual impurity that it is only disqualified and does not transfer impurity to other objects? The baraita continues: And this halakha is a logical a fortiori inference: Just as one who lacks atonement, e.g., a zav or leper who immersed at the conclusion of his period of impurity but has not yet brought an offering for his atonement, who is permitted to eat teruma, disqualifies a consecrated item if he comes into contact with it, with regard to third-degree ritual impurity, which disqualifies teruma, and in that way is more severe than one who lacks atonement, is it not right that it should confer fourth-degree ritual impurity status upon a consecrated item? The status of an item with third-degree ritual impurity should be no less severe than that of a person who lacks atonement. The Gemara notes: And we derived third-degree impurity with regard to consecrated items from the Torah, and fourth-degree impurity of consecrated items by means of the above a fortiori inference. In light of the dayyo principle, one might have thought that this a fortiori inference cannot serve as the basis of the halakha that consecrated property can assume fourth-degree impurity status. Since the source of this inference is third-degree impurity status, the conclusion that emerges can be only that consecrated objects can assume third-degree impurity status, like teruma itself. The Gemara explains that the dayyo principle does not apply in this case. If the a fortiori inference is rendered moot as a result of applying that principle, the principle is not applied. Because the fact that consecrated objects can assume third-degree impurity status is derived from the verse, if that which emerges from the inference is that halakha itself, the a fortiori inference is moot. Therefore, the principle does not apply and the fact that consecrated objects can assume fourth-degree impurity status is derived from the inference. The Gemara elaborates. The fact that consecrated objects can assume third-degree impurity status is derived from the Torah, as it is written: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 7:19). Are we not dealing even with a case where meat touched an object that was ritually impure with second-degree ritual impurity? And nevertheless, the verse states explicitly that it is impure and assumes third-degree ritual impurity status. No other source is needed to teach that consecrated objects can assume third-degree ritual impurity status. Therefore, fourth-degree impurity status can be derived by means of the a fortiori inference, as we stated above. The Gemara returns to its previous point: And if it enters your mind that Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva that non-sacred objects can assume third-degree impurity status, let him also teach the halakha of the fourth degree of impurity with regard to teruma, and the fifth degree with regard to consecrated items, on the basis of that same a fortiori inference. The fact that he does not extend the a fortiori inference to include these halakhot proves that Rabbi Yosei does not agree with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion on this issue. However, with regard to the fact that Rabbi Akiva does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, from where do we derive this? Perhaps he accepts Rabbi Yosei’s a fortiori inference and holds that teruma assumes fourth-degree impurity status and consecrated items assume fifth-degree impurity status. Rav Kahana said to Rav Ashi that there is indirect proof that this is the case. As it is not possible to avoid finding at least one tanna who teaches fourth-degree impurity with regard to teruma and fifth-degree impurity with regard to consecrated items, and says that this is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who derived it from the a fortiori inference of Rabbi Yosei. In response to this claim, the Gemara asks: And will we stand and rely on that proof? Can proof for Rabbi Akiva’s opinion be cited from the fact that no such tanna was found? Perhaps there is some source for that halakha. Rav Ashi, and some say it was Rav Kahana, left the study hall to examine this matter. He analyzed the issue and found proof positive that Rabbi Akiva does not hold that there is fifth-degree impurity with regard to consecrated items. He proved this from that which we learned in a mishna: A vessel joins that which is in it into a single unit. For example, if there are fruits in a vessel between which there is no contact and one of them became ritually impure, all of the fruits are impure, as they are joined by the vessel. This principle applies with regard to consecrated property, but not with regard to teruma. And the fourth degree of impurity disqualifies consecrated items but does not transmit impurity, while third-degree impurity disqualifies teruma. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is from the testimony of Rabbi Akiva that this mishna is taught, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Akiva added in his testimony with regard to the fine flour, the incense, the frankincense, and the coals on the altar, which are not foods and do not ordinarily become impure, that if a person who immersed during that day, who disqualifies consecrated items, touches some of them, he disqualifies all of them, as the vessel joins them into one unit. This baraita, which is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, states that with regard to fourth-degree impurity, yes, consecrated objects assume that status; however, with regard to fifth-degree impurity, no, consecrated objects do not assume that status. With regard to third-degree impurity, yes, teruma assumes that status; however, with regard to fourth-degree impurity, no, teruma does not assume that status. The Gemara comments: Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that joining in a single vessel, of frankincense, incense, or coals, is a halakha by rabbinic law, not by Torah law, as the ritual impurity of frankincense and coals is by rabbinic law. And Rabbi Yoḥanan disputes that statement of Rabbi Ḥanin, who said: Joining in a vessel is a halakha by Torah law, as it is stated: “One golden spoon of ten shekels, filled with incense” (Numbers 7:20). The verse rendered everything in the spoon, i.e., all the incense, as one entity. Apropos ritual purity and impurity in the Temple, the Gemara cites that we learned in a mishna there: The Sages testified about the case of a needle that was found in the meat of an animal that was led through water, that the knife and the hands that touched the needle are ritually pure but the meat is impure, as the needle might have been impure. If the needle was found in the secretions of the animal’s stomach, everything is pure, as secretions do not transfer impurity to the meat. Rabbi Akiva said: We were privileged to learn a novel halakha from here, which is that there is no impurity of hands in the Temple as in this case the hands did not become impure upon contact with the needle. The Gemara asks: And let us say that Rabbi Akiva says that we learn from here that there is no ritual impurity of hands and vessels in the Temple, as the mishna says that the knife which touched the needle is also pure. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina: The testimony that there is no ritual impurity for hands was taught prior to the decree of impurity for vessels that came in contact with impure liquids outside the Temple. Therefore, there was no novelty in the fact that there is no ritual impurity of vessels in the Temple. Rava said: But weren’t both decrees issued on the same day? As we learned in a mishna: The impurity of a Torah scroll and other sacred scrolls, and the impurity of hands that were not washed or immersed, and the impurity of one who immersed himself during that day, and the impurity of foods and vessels that became impure by contact with impure liquids, all these are included in the eighteen matters with regard to which decrees were issued on the same day. Rather, Rava said: Leave the impurity of the knife, as even outside the Temple in non-sacred circumstances it does not become impure. As in the case of this knife, what did it touch that could transmit impurity? If you say that it touched the meat, food does not transmit impurity to a vessel. If you say, rather, that it touched the needle, a vessel does not transmit impurity to another vessel. With regard to this needle, the Gemara asks: What is its impurity status? If we say that there is uncertainty with regard to the impurity of the needle, wasn’t it stated that there is a dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina? One said: The Sages did not issue a decree in the case of uncertainty with regard to the impurity of spittle that is found in Jerusalem. Any spittle found outside of Jerusalem might have come from a zav or from a gentile, whose legal status in this regard is like that of a zav. The Sages decreed that any contact with this spittle should be treated as uncertain contact with a primary source of ritual impurity. That decree was not issued with regard to spittle found in Jerusalem. And one said: The Sages did not issue a decree in the case of uncertainty with regard to the impurity of vessels in Jerusalem. As opposed to the situation outside of Jerusalem, there is no presumption of impurity with regard to vessels found in Jerusalem, including a needle. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: This is referring to a case where one lost a needle that became impure through contact with a person or vessel impure with ritual impurity imparted by a corpse. Since the needle is a metal utensil, it assumes the same degree of impurity as the source of its impurity, in this case a primary source of impurity. And he then recognized the needle in the meat of the offering. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Avin, said: This is referring to a case where the cow was muzzled as it came from outside of Jerusalem. The needle is clearly from outside of Jerusalem, and in all cases of uncertainty with regard to vessels outside of Jerusalem the ruling is that they are impure. The Gemara analyzes the dispute with regard to the decree that was not issued in Jerusalem itself. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, disagreed. One said: The Sages did not issue a decree in the case of uncertainty with regard to the impurity of spittle that is found in Jerusalem. And one said: The Sages did not issue a decree in the case of uncertainty with regard to the impurity of vessels in Jerusalem. The Gemara asks: We already learned the halakha of spittle, and similarly, we already learned the halakha of vessels. What do these amora’im add to the earlier tannaitic rulings? The Gemara elaborates: We already learned the halakha of spittle, as we learned in a mishna: Any spittle found in Jerusalem is pure, except for the spittle that is found in the upper market, an area frequented by gentiles (Rambam). The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary for the amora to teach that this halakha applies even in a case where there is a presumption that there had been a zav in the area where the spittle was found. Even in that case, no decree of impurity was issued with regard to spittle in Jerusalem. Likewise, we already learned the halakha of vessels, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to all the vessels found in Jerusalem, if they were found on the path leading down to the ritual bath they are presumed ritually impure. These vessels were probably not yet immersed, as people typically bring impure vessels to the ritual bath. By inference, all other vessels found elsewhere are presumed pure. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And according to your reasoning, say the latter clause of the mishna as follows: If the vessels were discovered on the path up from the ritual bath, they are presumed ritually pure. One can learn by inference from this statement the diametric opposite: All other vessels are presumed ritually impure. Rather, the first clause of the mishna is precise in its formulation, and therefore inferences may be drawn with regard to other vessels. And the latter clause is not precise in this way, and it comes to exclude only the small passageways near the ritual bath, where it is unclear whether the vessels there were being taken to the bath for immersion or from the bath after being immersed. Since the vessels were certainly impure when brought to the ritual bath, and it is uncertain whether or not they were immersed, they retain the presumptive status of impurity. However, in cases where the uncertainty is whether or not the vessels were impure at all, then where the impurity is by rabbinic decree, that decree is not in effect in Jerusalem, and the vessels are ritually pure. And the Gemara suggests that according to Rav, who said this is referring to a case where one lost a needle that became impure through contact with a person or vessel impure with ritual impurity imparted by a corpse, and he recognized the needle in the meat of the offering, the conclusion should be different. Since the Master said that the verse: “One who is slain with a sword” (Numbers 19:16) teaches that the legal status of a metal sword is like that of one who is slain in terms of its degree of impurity, not only the meat, but a person and vessels as well should become ritually impure by touching the needle. Just as a sword that comes into contact with a corpse assumes its status as an ultimate primary source of ritual impurity, so too, any metal vessel that comes into contact with a person or vessel that is impure with impurity imparted by a corpse assumes its status as a primary source of ritual impurity. Rav Ashi said: That is to say that the Temple courtyard is a public domain with regard to the halakhot of uncertain impurity. And therefore, the ruling in this case is that of uncertainty with regard to impurity in a public domain, as there is no proof that either the vessels or one’s hands came into contact with the ritually impure needle. And the guiding principle in any case of uncertainty with regard to impurity in a public domain is that its uncertainty is ruled to be ritually pure. Therefore, the meat, which definitely came into contact with the needle, is impure, while everything else is ritually pure. The Gemara asks: One can learn by inference that if this uncertainty developed in the private domain, its uncertainty is ruled to be ritually impure. Why would that be the case? Since this needle is an item that does not have knowledge to be asked, as an inanimate object cannot be consulted with regard to how it became impure or whether it became impure at all, the following principle is in effect: With regard to any item or person that does not have knowledge to be asked, the person referring to one who lacks the competence to answer the question, whether the uncertainty developed in the public domain or whether it was in the private domain, its uncertainty is ruled to be ritually pure. The Gemara responds: Although a needle does not have knowledge to be asked, it is nevertheless impure due to the fact that its uncertainty is uncertainty with regard to impurity that comes about by means of a person. The knife did not come into contact with the needle on its own; rather, a person was holding the knife. And Rabbi Yoḥanan stated another principle: In a case of uncertainty with regard to impurity that comes about by means of a person, its owners will have no choice but to consult a Sage about it to determine whether or not it is ritually pure, as even with regard to a vessel that is placed upon the ground, which is certainly not capable of providing an answer if asked, its legal status is like that of an item that has knowledge to be asked. The fact that the knife is an inanimate object is not reason enough to rule it ritually pure. It was therefore necessary to say that the knife is ritually pure because the Temple courtyard is a public domain. If it was a private domain, the knife would be deemed impure. It was taught that if an impure needle were found in an animal, the meat is ritually impure. The Gemara asks: With what liquid was this meat rendered susceptible to impurity? A food can become impure only if it were rendered susceptible to impurity through contact with a liquid; how, then, could the sacrificial meat become impure immediately after the animal was slaughtered? If we say that it was rendered susceptible to impurity by the blood that flowed when it was slaughtered, didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived with regard to blood of consecrated offerings that it does not render produce susceptible to impurity? As it is stated: “You shall surely not eat the blood; you shall pour it upon the earth like water” (Deuteronomy 12:16). The Sages derived from this verse: Blood that is poured like water, i.e., blood from a non-sacred domesticated animal that is poured out when it is slaughtered and not received in a vessel like sacrificial blood, assumes the legal status of water and renders food susceptible to ritual impurity. Blood that is not poured out like water, but is received in a vessel to be sprinkled on the altar, does not render food susceptible to impurity. Rather, say that this meat was rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by the other liquids of the slaughterhouse, e.g., the water that was kept near the altar for washing the offerings. But didn’t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, say with regard to the liquids of the slaughterhouse: Not only are they ritually pure, as noted in the testimony of Yosei ben Yo’ezer, but they do not even render meat susceptible to impurity? Rather, say that the meat is rendered susceptible to ritual impurity by the esteem for sacred objects. According to this principle, certain items that cannot become impure by Torah law become susceptible to impurity by rabbinic law due to their extreme sanctity. The Gemara rejects that possibility: Say that the esteem for sacred objects is effective to disqualify the meat itself despite the fact that it was not rendered susceptible to receive impurity, but does it also transmit impurity to the extent that one counts first- and second-degree impurity from contact with that meat? Can impurity based on the esteem for sacred objects be transmitted to other objects like standard impurity? If so, resolve from here that which Reish Lakish raised as a dilemma: With regard to a mass from meal-offerings, does one count first- and second-degree impurity from contact with it or not? Due to the esteem for sacred objects, the offering itself can become impure without having been rendered susceptible through contact with liquid; however, the dilemma is whether or not it transmits impurity to other objects. The Gemara responds: Perhaps the dilemma with regard to the status of ritual impurity due to esteem for sacred objects has not in fact been resolved. In the case of meat, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is referring to a case where the meat was from a cow brought as a peace-offering sacrifice, whose hide and meat belong to its owner, and the owner led it through the river to clean it, and he slaughtered it while liquid was still moist upon it. While the animal was being flayed, water fell on the meat, rendering it susceptible to impurity. We learned in a mishna cited above: If the needle was found in the secretions of the animal’s stomach, everything, meat, knife, and hands, is pure. The Gemara raises a difficulty: And let these secretions, which are liquid, return and transmit impurity to the meat itself. Like any other liquid, the secretions assume first-degree ritual impurity by rabbinic decree. Rav Adda bar Ahava said: It is referring to thick, solid secretions, which are not liquid. Rav Ashi said: Even if you say that it is referring to soft secretions, it does not transfer impurity because it is an offensive liquid, which does not transmit impurity. The tanna who recited mishnayot and baraitot in the study hall taught a baraita before Rav Sheshet. Based on the verses, it is possible to create the following scenario: The carcass of a creeping animal transmits impurity to liquids, the liquids transmit impurity to a vessel, the vessel transmits impurity to foods, and the foods transmit impurity to liquids. And we have thereby learned that there are three successive levels of impurity with regard to a dead creeping animal. The Gemara notes: These are four levels, not three. The Gemara answers: Cut the liquids of the first clause, so that the baraita reads: The carcass of a creeping animal transmits impurity to a vessel and the vessel to foods, etc. The Gemara asks: On the contrary, cut the liquids of the latter clause, which states that foods transmit impurity to liquids. The Gemara explains: The only tanna that we find who said that liquids transmit impurity to a vessel is Rabbi Yehuda. And even he retracted this statement. And your mnemonic to remember the order of the transfer of impurity in this baraita is a brewing vat, as the order is similar to the production of beer. First one brings the vessel, then one places barley, the food, in it, and then the water. That is the order of the transmission of impurity in the baraita. We learned in a mishna there: With regard to the carcass of a creeping animal that was found in an oven, the bread inside it is impure with second-degree ritual impurity. This is due to the fact that the oven is impure with first-degree impurity and transmits impurity to the bread. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: And let us view that oven as one filled with impurity, as an earthenware vessel is rendered impure by a creeping animal in the airspace of the oven even without making contact with it. And consequently this bread should be impure with the first-degree of impurity. The oven should be considered as if it were filled with carcasses of creeping animals and the bread should assume first-degree impurity status as though it became impure directly from a creeping animal. He said to him: This suggestion cannot enter your mind, as it was taught in a baraita: I might have thought that all the vessels found in an earthenware oven become impure from the airspace of an impure earthenware vessel. Therefore, the verse states with regard to creeping animals: “And every earthenware vessel into which any of them falls, whatever is in it shall be impure, and you shall break it” (Leviticus 11:33). And juxtaposed to it is the verse: “From all food in it which may be eaten, upon which water comes, shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:34). This indicates that food is rendered impure by the airspace of an earthenware vessel, but not all vessels are rendered impure by the airspace of an earthenware vessel. This baraita proves that the earthenware vessel itself is not considered to be filled with carcasses of creeping animals, and therefore it does not render everything inside it impure with first-degree impurity. Were the earthenware vessel indeed considered as if it were filled with impurity, vessels inside it would also assume first-degree ritual impurity. Rav Ḥisda raised a contradiction between one statement with regard to Passover and another statement with regard to Passover, and he resolved this contradiction himself. The Gemara elaborates: Did Rabbi Yehoshua actually say that both of them may be burned as one, teruma whose purity is uncertain, and definitely impure teruma, on Passover eve? And he raised a contradiction from the Tosefta, as Rabbi Yosei said: The inferred conclusion of burning pure and impure leaven together is not similar to the case from which you cited proof. When Rabbi Meir said that the Sages, Rabbi Ḥanina the deputy High Priest and Rabbi Akiva, testified, about what did they testify? If you assert that Rabbi Meir said with regard to meat that became ritually impure through contact with a secondary source of impurity, that one may burn it together with meat that became impure through contact with a primary source of impurity, that is a case where both this meat is impure and that meat is impure, albeit not at the same level of impurity. Rabbi Yosei continues: If you say that Rabbi Meir is referring to the statement of Rabbi Akiva, with regard to oil that was disqualified by one who immersed himself during that day, that one may kindle it in a lamp that became ritually impure with first-degree impurity through contact with one who became ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, that is a case where this substance is disqualified and that object is impure. We also concede with regard to teruma that became impure from a secondary source of impurity, that one may burn it with teruma that became ritually impure from a primary source of impurity, even though the first teruma will assume a greater degree of impurity. However, how will we burn teruma in abeyance, i.e., teruma whose impure status is uncertain, together with ritually impure teruma? Perhaps Elijah the Prophet will come and establish prophetically that the teruma is not ritually impure, and render it ritually pure. And Rav Ḥisda himself resolved the contradiction: This statement that was taught in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua, that one burns teruma in abeyance together with ritually impure teruma, is the ruling of Rabbi Shimon and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, whereas that statement, that one may not burn them together, is the ruling of Rabbi Yosei and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. The Gemara cites the source of this tannaitic dispute with regard to Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion. As it was taught in a baraita: If the fourteenth of Nisan occurs on Shabbat, one may not remove the leaven on Passover eve in the usual manner, and therefore one removes everything before Shabbat, and he burns all teruma together, impure teruma, teruma in abeyance, and pure teruma. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: One burns pure teruma by itself, teruma in abeyance by itself, and impure teruma by itself. Rabbi Shimon said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree about ritually pure teruma and about impure teruma. They agree that one may not burn them together. And neither did they disagree about teruma in abeyance and about pure teruma. They agree that one may burn them together. Since the teruma is not definitely impure, he does not appear to be directly impurifying the teruma. With regard to what did they disagree? They disagree with regard to burning teruma in abeyance and impure teruma together, as Rabbi Eliezer says: This teruma should be burned by itself and that teruma by itself. Since this case involves teruma that is definitely impure, if the teruma in abeyance is actually pure, by burning them together he will have rendered it impure. And Rabbi Yehoshua says: One may burn both of them as one. The Gemara raises a difficulty: Isn’t the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? How can Rabbi Yosei’s statement be attributed to Rabbi Shimon? The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Yosei is saying to Rabbi Meir: Even according to Rabbi Shimon in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who is lenient, where he rules leniently it is only with regard to burning teruma in abeyance and impure teruma together. However, with regard to ritually pure teruma and impure teruma together, no, even he does not permit burning them together. Similarly, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raised a contradiction between the previous statement with regard to teruma and a halakha of Passover, and he resolved it himself. The Gemara clarifies: Did Rabbi Yehoshua actually say that both teruma in abeyance and impure teruma may be burned together? And he raised a contradiction from a mishna: In the case of a barrel of teruma produce with regard to which uncertainty developed about its impurity, Rabbi Eliezer says: If the barrel was resting in a vulnerable place, where it may come into contact with impurity, one should place it in a concealed place, and if it was exposed he should cover it. Rabbi Yehoshua says: If it was placed in a concealed place he may place it in a vulnerable place. And if it was covered he may expose it. The Gemara infers from this mishna: In any case, passive causation of teruma whose impurity is uncertain to become definitely impure, yes, it is permitted. However, to actively render teruma impure with one’s hands, no, it is prohibited. This ruling contradicts the previous halakha that one may burn teruma in abeyance and impure teruma together. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, resolved this apparent contradiction himself: This statement, that one is permitted to burn teruma in abeyance together with ritually impure teruma, is the ruling of Rabbi Shimon in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, whereas that statement, that one may cause this impurity only passively, is the ruling of Rabbi Yosei in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. Similarly, Rabbi Elazar raised a contradiction between one halakha with regard to teruma and another halakha with regard to teruma, and resolved the contradiction himself. The Gemara explains: Did Rabbi Yehoshua actually say that passive causation of teruma whose impurity is uncertain to become definitely impure, yes, it is permitted; however, to actively render teruma impure with his hands, no, it is prohibited? And he raised a contradiction against this from a mishna: With regard to a barrel of teruma wine that broke in the upper area in a winepress, where grapes are pressed, and there is impure, non-sacred wine in the lower area of the press, where the wine flows from the upper area, if the teruma wine would flow into the non-sacred wine, the teruma wine would be rendered ritually impure. The result would be significant financial loss, as the legal status of all the wine in the lower press would be that of impure teruma, which is prohibited even for priests to drink. Rabbi Eliezer concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua that if one is able to rescue even a quarter-log from the barrel that broke and keep the wine in a state of ritual purity, by receiving the teruma wine in a vessel before it becomes impure, he should rescue it. And if one cannot receive the wine in a pure vessel, as only impure vessels are available, so that if he uses them to receive the wine or to seal the upper press he will render the teruma impure, Rabbi Eliezer says: The teruma wine should be allowed to descend and become impure on its own, but one should not actively render it impure with his hand. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One may even actively render it impure with his hand, by stopping the pipe connecting between the upper and lower presses with an impure vessel or by receiving the wine in impure vessels. Evidently, Rabbi Yehoshua allows one even to actively impurify pure teruma. And Rabbi Elazar resolved this contradiction himself: There, with regard to the broken barrel, it is different, as, in that case, there is the potential loss of non-sacred produce, when the teruma wine descends to the lower press. The non-sacred wine will become prohibited due to the mixture with impure teruma. Rava strongly objects to this claim: In the mishna too there is a loss of wood, as one requires additional wood to kindle a second fire and burn the impure teruma separately. Abaye said to him: With regard to this and similar issues, the Sages were concerned about a great loss. However, they were not concerned about the minimal loss of several pieces of wood. And from where do you say that the Sages were concerned about a great loss and they were not concerned about a minimal loss? As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to a barrel of teruma oil that broke in the upper area of the olive press, and in the lower area of the press there is impure, non-sacred produce, Rabbi Eliezer concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua that if one can rescue even a quarter-log of the oil in a state of purity from the barrel, he should rescue it. And if one cannot receive the oil in a pure vessel, the teruma oil should be allowed to descend and become impure on its own, but one should not actively render it impure with his hand. The Gemara answers: What is different about oil that, as opposed to wine, everyone agrees may not be actively rendered impure? If you say the reason is that even if the teruma falls into the lower press and is intermingled with impure teruma, it is still suitable for lighting and not entirely lost, if so, wine is also fit for sprinkling in one’s house to provide a pleasant fragrance. Impure teruma wine could be used for that purpose. And lest you say that sprinkling wine is not a significant matter, and would be tantamount to destroying the teruma, didn’t Shmuel say in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: One drinks from wine valued at a log for a sela, and one sprinkles from wine valued at a log for two sela. Apparently, sprinkling is a more significant use than drinking. The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to new wine still in the press, which does not have a strong fragrance and cannot be used for sprinkling. The Gemara raises an objection: But isn’t the wine fit to be aged, at which point it could be used for sprinkling, and would not be entirely lost. The Gemara answers: One may thereby come to encounter a stumbling block, as he might, with the passage of time, forget that it is ritually impure and come to drink it. The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to oil too, one may thereby come to encounter a stumbling block, in the same way. The Gemara answers: The Gemara answers: Ritually impure teruma oil is permitted because he places it in a repulsive vessel, so that people will be disinclined to consume it and will use it only for lighting. The Gemara suggests: With regard to wine, too, he can place it in a repulsive vessel. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: That is not possible. Is it reasonable that one who wants the wine for sprinkling will place it in a repulsive vessel? One sprinkles wine to add a pleasant odor, which would not be the case if the wine has been left in a disgusting vessel. The Gemara comments: And concern for a stumbling block by keeping prohibited items is itself subject to a dispute between tanna’im. As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to a barrel of teruma wine that became ritually impure, Beit Shammai say: It should be poured out all at once, and Beit Hillel say: One should wait until it ages, at which stage it may be used for spraying. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: I will decide this dispute. If the barrel was in a field, it should be poured out all at once, lest the ritual impurity of the barrel be forgotten by the time it is brought inside the house. However, if the barrel was in the house, where it could be used immediately, it may be used for sprinkling. Some say that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, decided: In the case of new wine, it should be poured out all at once; but in the case of old wine, it should be used for spraying. They said to him: The decision of the third opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, is not considered a decision in this case, as the other two Sages do not raise the issue of a stumbling block at all. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: The dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua with regard to a barrel of teruma that broke in an upper press and was flowing down into the lower press applies only to a case where one se’a of teruma fell into less than one hundred se’a of impure, non-sacred wine in the lower press. However, if the teruma wine fell into one hundred se’a of ritually impure, non-sacred produce, everyone agrees that the wine should be allowed to descend and become ritually impure by itself, and one should not actively render it impure with his hand. The reason is that if teruma falls into non-sacred produce one hundred times greater in quantity than itself, the teruma is nullified by the non-sacred produce, and therefore, it would be permitted for a non-priest to eat it. Although it becomes ritually impure, the legal status of the nullified teruma is that of non-sacred produce. The Gemara comments: That was also taught in a baraita: With regard to a barrel of teruma wine that broke in the upper winepress, and in the lower press there is one hundred times that amount of ritually impure, non-sacred wine, Rabbi Eliezer concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua that if one is able to rescue even a quarter-log from the barrel that broke and keep the wine in a state of ritual purity, he should rescue it. And if not, one should let the teruma wine descend and become impure on its own, but he should not actively render it impure with his hand. After citing proof for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, from this source, the Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita itself. This expression: Rabbi Eliezer concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua, is puzzling, as Rabbi Eliezer ruled that one may never directly render the barrel impure. The baraita should say the opposite: Rabbi Yehoshua concedes to Rabbi Eliezer, as it is Rabbi Yehoshua who concedes that one may not render impure the barrel of teruma in the upper vat. Rava said: Reverse the names, so that it is Rabbi Yehoshua who concedes to Rabbi Eliezer. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Actually, do not reverse the names. Rather, with what are we dealing here? We are referring to a case where it is possible to collect the wine only in a vessel whose interior is ritually pure and whose exterior is impure by rabbinic law, having become impure through contact with impure liquids. Lest you say that we should issue a decree that one may not rescue even a quarter-log, lest the vessel’s exterior touch the teruma and render it impure, the baraita teaches us that Rabbi Eliezer concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua that despite that concern, it is permitted to rescue a quarter-log of pure teruma. MISHNA: For the entire time that it is permitted to eat leavened bread, one may also feed it to his domesticated animals, to non-domesticated animals, and to birds; and one may sell it to a gentile; and it is permitted to derive benefit from it. After its time passes, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it, and one may not even light an oven or a stove with leavened bread. With regard to the manner of removal of leavened bread, Rabbi Yehuda says: The removal of leavened bread is to be accomplished only through burning. And the Rabbis say: Burning is not required, as one may even crumble it and throw it into the wind or cast it into the sea. GEMARA: The Gemara reads the mishna precisely: For the entire time that it is permitted to eat leavened bread, one may feed it to his animals. However, apparently, for the entire time that it is not permitted to eat leavened bread, one may not feed his animals. Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, isn’t there the fifth hour, when one may not eat leavened bread but one may feed it to his animals? As we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Meir says: One may eat leavened bread on the morning of the fourteenth day of Nisan for the entire fifth hour, and he burns it at the beginning of the sixth hour. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may eat it for the entire fourth hour, he suspends his consumption of it for the entire fifth hour, and he burns it at the beginning of the sixth hour. Apparently, there is an hour in which it is prohibited to eat leavened bread, but it is permitted to feed it to one’s animals. The Gemara asks: Rather, what can be said? This mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir. If so, this statement: For the entire time that it is permitted to eat leavened bread one may feed, is imprecise. It should have said: For the entire time that one eats leavened bread he may feed. As it stands, there is no parallel between the phrase: It is permitted to eat, and the phrase: One may feed. Therefore, it appears that the mishna is referring to two different people or cases. Rabba bar Ulla said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Gamliel. As we learned in a mishna that Rabban Gamliel says: Non-sacred leavened bread may be eaten on the fourteenth of Nisan during the entire fourth hour, leavened bread that is teruma may be eaten during the entire fifth hour, and one burns the leavened bread at the beginning of the sixth hour. And this is what the mishna is saying: For the entire time that it is permitted for a priest to partake of teruma, although an Israelite may not eat leavened bread at that time, an Israelite may feed non-sacred food to his domesticated animals, to non-domesticated animals, and to birds. The Gemara continues to read the mishna precisely. The mishna states that one may feed his leavened bread to his domesticated animals, to non-domesticated animals, and to birds. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to teach about the case of domesticated animals, and why do I need it to teach about non-domesticated animals as well? The halakha should be the same for both cases. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach us both cases, as had it taught only about domesticated animals, one would have said that it is permitted feed them because if the animal leaves over some leavened bread one will see what is left over and dispose of it. However, with regard to a non-domesticated animal, if it leaves over any of the leavened bread, it hides it to save for later. Therefore, one could say that it is not permitted to feed it so close to the time when leavened bread is prohibited. And had it taught only the case of a non-domesticated animal, one might say that it is permitted to feed leavened bread to such an animal because if it leaves over any food in any case it will hide it, and the owner will not violate the prohibition: It shall not be seen. However, with regard to a domesticated animal, sometimes it leaves over food, and it does not enter his mind that the animal will do so. And in that case both prohibitions: It shall not be seen and it shall not be found, would apply to him. Consequently, one could say that it would not be permitted for him to feed a domesticated animal. Therefore, it was necessary to teach both cases. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to mention birds as well? The Gemara answers: There is no inherent need to mention birds; however, since the mishna taught the cases of domesticated animals and non-domesticated animals, it also taught the case of birds, as these are normally grouped together. It was stated in the mishna that whenever it is permitted to eat leavened bread, one may also sell it to a gentile. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious, as the mishna already taught that one may benefit from it? The Gemara answers: This is stated to exclude the opinion of this tanna, as it was taught in a baraita that Beit Shammai say: A person may not sell his leavened bread to a gentile unless he knows that the leavened bread will be consumed before Passover. According to Beit Shammai, a person retains some responsibility for his leavened bread even when it is no longer in his possession. And Beit Hillel say: For the entire time that it is permitted for a Jew to eat leavened bread, it is also permitted for him to sell it to a gentile. The Jew ceases to be responsible for leavened bread sold to a gentile from the moment it is sold. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, who agrees in principle with Beit Shammai’s opinion, says: With regard to kutaḥ, a dip that contains leavened breadcrumbs, and all types of kutaḥ, it is prohibited to sell it to a gentile thirty days before Passover. Because kutaḥ is spicy, people use only a bit at a time, so it will likely last until Passover. It was stated in the mishna that as long as leavened bread may be eaten, it is permitted to derive benefit from it. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach this in a case where one charred the leavened bread with fire before its time, i.e., before it became prohibited, rendering it inedible. And it teaches us that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rava. As Rava said: If one charred leavened bread before its time, it is permitted to derive benefit from it even after its time, since it no longer has the legal status of leavened bread. It was stated in the mishna: After its time passes, it is prohibited to benefit from it. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the mishna to teach that it remains prohibited to benefit from leavened bread during additional hours that are delineated by rabbinic law. As Rav Giddel said that Rav Ḥiyya bar Yosef said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to one who takes wheat grains that may have come into contact with water and become leavened and betroths a woman with the leaven from the beginning of the sixth hour, when the leaven is prohibited by rabbinic law, and onward on Passover eve, even if he betrothed her with wheat from the mountains, which is especially hard and unlikely to become leavened, nonetheless, we are not concerned that this betrothal is valid. This is because when performing a betrothal with money one must give the woman an object worth as least the value of a peruta, and leaven from which one is prohibited to benefit is considered worthless. It was stated in the mishna: And one may not even light an oven or a stove with leavened bread once it becomes prohibited. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious, as this is also a type of benefit? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach this due to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that the removal of leavened bread is to be performed only through burning. Otherwise, it could enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Yehuda said that its mitzva is performed through burning, while one is burning it let him benefit from it. Therefore, it teaches us that it is prohibited to benefit from leavened bread even while burning it. Ḥizkiya said: From where is it derived in the mishna that it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread on Passover? As it is stated: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten” (Exodus 13:3). Since the verse uses the passive, it should be understood as follows: There shall be no permitted consumption of it at all, even deriving benefit, as benefit could be exchanged for money, which could be used to buy food. The Gemara reads precisely: The reason deriving benefit is prohibited is that the Merciful One writes in the Torah: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten.” Had the Torah not written: “Shall not be eaten,” and instead used the active form: You shall not eat, I would have said that the prohibition of eating is implied but that the prohibition of deriving benefit is not implied. The Gemara comments: And this conclusion disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu, as Rabbi Abbahu said that wherever it is stated: “It shall not be eaten,” “You, singular, shall not eat,” or “You, plural, shall not eat,” both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit are implied, unless the verse specifies that one may benefit, in the manner that it specified with regard to an unslaughtered animal carcass. As it was taught in a baraita: “You shall not eat of any unslaughtered animal; you may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates, that he may eat it; or you may sell it to a foreigner; for you are a sacred people to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:21). I have derived only that it is permitted to a resident alien through giving and to a gentile through selling. From where do I derive that it is permitted to a resident alien through selling? The verse states: “You may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates…or you may sell it,” meaning that one has the option to do either of these. From where is it derived that it is permitted to a gentile through giving and one is not required to sell it to him? The verse states: “You may give it…that he may eat it, or you may sell it to a foreigner.” Therefore, you may say that he may transfer it to both a resident alien and a gentile, both through giving and through selling. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The baraita concludes: Rabbi Yehuda says: These matters are meant to be understood as they are written; he may transfer an unslaughtered animal carcass to a resident alien only through giving and to a gentile only through selling. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara answers: If it could enter your mind to understand the verse in accordance with that which Rabbi Meir said, then let the Merciful One write: You may give it to the resident alien who is within your gates that he may eat it and sell it to a foreigner. Why do I need the word “or” between these two options? Learn from it that the matters are to be understood as they are written. The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Meir explain the formulation of the verse? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Meir would explain that the word “or” teaches one to give precedence to giving to a resident alien over selling to a gentile. The Gemara asks: And from where does Rabbi Yehuda derive this halakha? According to Rabbi Yehuda, this matter does not need a verse, since you are commanded to sustain a resident alien, as it is a mitzva for one to sustain a resident alien who has renounced idol worship, and you are not commanded to sustain a gentile. There is no need for a verse to teach this; it is based on a logical inference. The Gemara applies this discussion to the previously mentioned topic. Granted, Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion is reasonable according to Rabbi Meir, who said that one may transfer an animal carcass to both a convert and a gentile, both through selling and through giving. From the fact that a verse was necessary to permit one to derive benefit from an animal carcass, one can learn that with regard to all other prohibitions in the Torah about which it states only that one may not eat an item, it is prohibited both to eat it and to derive benefit from it. However, according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that the word “or” comes to teach that the matters are to be understood as they are written, from where does he derive with regard to all prohibitions of eating mentioned in the Torah that it is prohibited to derive benefit as well? The Gemara answers: He derives it from another verse. It is stated with regard to an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa]: “And you shall be sacred men to Me, therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field; you shall cast it to the dogs” (Exodus 22:30). The Gemara concludes: It, i.e., a tereifa, you may throw to a dog, but you may not throw all other items prohibited by Torah law to a dog, as both eating and deriving benefit are prohibited. The Gemara asks: And what halakha does Rabbi Meir learn from this verse? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Meir draws the following inference: It, you may throw to a dog, but you may not throw the meat of a non-sacred animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard to a dog, as it is prohibited to benefit from it. And from where does the other Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, learn this halakha about non-sacrificial meat that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard? The Gemara answers: He holds that the prohibition of deriving benefit from the meat of a non-sacrificial animal that was slaughtered in the courtyard is not by Torah law; rather, the Sages decreed that it is prohibited. Since it is not prohibited by Torah law, no verse is necessary. Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa raised an objection: And yet there is still the prohibition of the sciatic nerve, as the Merciful One says: “Therefore the children of Israel may not eat the sciatic nerve” (Genesis 32:33), and we learned in a mishna: A person may send the thigh of an animal to a gentile as a gift with the sciatic nerve inside it, he is not required to remove it. This is due to the fact that its place is clear, and it is obvious that this nerve has not been removed. Therefore, there is no concern that another Jew will assume that the first Jew removed this portion of the animal, which might cause him to accidentally eat the sciatic nerve. Apparently, one may benefit from this prohibited portion of the animal even though the verse says that one may not eat it. The Gemara rejects this: Rabbi Abbahu holds that when it was permitted by the Torah to derive benefit from an animal carcass, it, its fats, and its sinews, such as the sciatic nerve, were all permitted. Therefore, the sciatic nerve is included in this exception and one may benefit from it. The Gemara challenges: It works out well according to the one who said that sinews give flavor, meaning that they have the taste of meat and therefore have the legal status of meat of an animal carcass. However, according to the one who says that sinews do not give flavor and are not categorized as meat, what can be said? If they are not considered to be meat, why are they included in the exception made for an animal carcass? The Gemara answers: Whom did you hear that said that sinews do not give flavor? It is Rabbi Shimon, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who eats the sciatic nerve from a non-kosher domesticated animal, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to receive two sets of lashes: One for eating the sciatic nerve and one for eating the meat of a non-kosher animal. And Rabbi Shimon exempts him entirely, since according to his opinion the prohibition to eat the sciatic nerve applies only to a kosher animal. In addition, one violates the prohibition of eating from a non-kosher animal only when it has the flavor of meat. And it indeed follows logically that just as Rabbi Shimon exempts one who eats the sciatic nerve in that particular case, so too here, Rabbi Shimon prohibits deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve. As it was taught in a baraita: It is permitted to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon prohibits it. Since Rabbi Shimon holds that the sciatic nerve does not give flavor, it cannot be included in the exception of the animal carcass. Therefore, from the verse that prohibits eating the sciatic nerve he learns that one may not benefit from it either, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu. Rabbi Abbahu’s position fits according to both opinions. However, the mishna that indicates that it is permitted to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as he holds that the sciatic nerve gives flavor and is therefore included in the exception of the animal carcass. The Gemara further challenges Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition of eating blood, as the Merciful One says: “Therefore I said to the children of Israel: No soul of you shall eat blood, neither shall any convert that dwells among you eat blood” (Leviticus 17:12). According to Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion, one may derive from this verse that in addition to the prohibition against eating blood, it is prohibited to benefit from it as well. And we learned in a mishna: Both these and these, the remnants of the blood from sin-offerings brought on the altar and other blood sprinkled on it, descend and mix in the canal from which water leaves the Temple. They then exit to the Kidron Valley and are sold at a special price to gardeners as a fertilizer. And one who does not first purchase the blood from the Temple misuses consecrated property. Apparently, under certain circumstances, one may benefit from blood which it is prohibited to consume. The Gemara answers: Blood is different, as it is juxtaposed in the Torah to water. As it is written with regard to blood: “You shall not eat it; you shall pour it out upon the earth like water” (Deuteronomy 12:24). From here it is derived: Just as it is permitted to benefit from water, so too, it is permitted to benefit from blood. The Gemara asks: And say instead that blood is meant to be like water offered as a libation on the altar, which is consecrated and from which one is prohibited to benefit. Rabbi Abbahu said: The comparison to permitted water can be deduced from that which the verse says: “Like water [kamayim],” meaning, like most water; and one is permitted to benefit from most types of water. The Gemara asks: And is it written: Most water? The Torah wrote: “Like water,” which could indicate a comparison to any type of water. Rather, Rav Ashi said that the verse should be understood as follows: Like water that is poured out, from which one may benefit, and not like water that is offered as a libation. Water offered on the altar is described using the term libation, and not using the term poured as found in the verse. The Gemara asks: And say that blood is meant to be like water poured before idolatry, from which one may not benefit. The Gemara rejects this: There, that is also called a libation and not pouring, as it is written: “Who did eat the fat of their sacrifices, and drink the wine of their libations” (Deuteronomy 32:38). The Gemara asks: According to Ḥizkiya, who says that: You shall not eat, indicates only that eating is prohibited but that benefit is permitted, for what halakha is blood juxtaposed to water? According to his opinion, there is no need for the verse to teach that one may benefit from blood. The Gemara answers that he needs this verse to derive that which was taught by Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From where is it derived that the blood of sacrifices does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity? As it is stated: “You shall not eat it; you shall pour it out upon the earth like water” (Deuteronomy 12:24). Blood that is poured out like water, such as that of a slaughtered, non-sacrificial animal, renders food susceptible to ritual impurity. However, sacrificial blood, which is not poured out like water and is instead sprinkled on the altar, does not render food susceptible to ritual impurity. The Gemara further challenges Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition against eating a limb cut from a living animal, as it is written: “Only be steadfast in not eating the blood; for the blood is the life; and you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23). And it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that a person may not offer a cup of wine to a nazirite, who is prohibited from drinking wine, and that he may not offer a limb cut from a living animal to a descendant of Noah, who is prohibited by Noahide law from eating a limb from a living animal? The verse states: “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). Causing another person to sin is like placing a stumbling block before a blind person; one who does so violates this prohibition. The prohibition of giving a limb from a living animal to a gentile is apparently due only to the prohibition of placing a stumbling block. However, it is permitted for one to throw it to dogs. Therefore, despite the fact that the verse says: “You shall not eat it,” apparently there is no prohibition against benefiting from this prohibited item. This challenges Rabbi Abbahu’s principle. The Gemara answers: A limb from a living animal is different, as it is juxtaposed in the Torah to blood. As it is written: “Only be steadfast in not eating the blood; for the blood is the life; and you shall not eat the life with the flesh” (Deuteronomy 12:23). Just as it is permitted to benefit from blood, it is likewise permitted to benefit from a limb torn from a living animal. The Gemara asks: And according to Ḥizkiya, in order to teach what halakha is the prohibition against eating a limb from a living animal juxtaposed to the prohibition against eating blood? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that the juxtaposition comes to teach the opposite. It is blood that is juxtaposed to a limb from a living animal to teach the following: Just as a limb from a living animal is prohibited, so too, blood of a living being is prohibited. And to which blood is this referring? This is referring to blood spilled in the process of bloodletting, through which the soul departs. That is considered to be blood from a living being, and even the descendants of Noah are prohibited from eating it (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). The Gemara asks: And yet there is the prohibition against eating the meat from an ox that is stoned, as the Merciful One says: “And if an ox gores a man or a woman to death, the ox shall be surely stoned, and of its flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be clear” (Exodus 21:28). And it was taught in a baraita: By inference from that which is stated: “The ox shall surely be stoned,” in which case it is not to be slaughtered properly, don’t I know that it is an animal carcass, and it is prohibited to eat an animal carcass? What does it mean when the verse states: “Its flesh shall not be eaten”? The verse is telling you that even if one slaughtered the ox after its verdict had been reached but before it had been carried out, it is still prohibited. The baraita continues: I have derived only that one is prohibited from eating this ox; from where do I derive that one is prohibited from deriving benefit from it as well? The verse states: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear [naki].” The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that one may not benefit from this ox? Shimon ben Zoma says: This is like a person who says to his fellow: So-and-so was left clear [naki] of his property, and he has no benefit from it at all. Similarly, “But the owner of the ox shall be clear” means that he has no benefit from the ox. The Gemara infers from the verse that the reason that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the ox is that the Torah specifically wrote: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear.” As, if this prohibition were derived from: “It shall not be eaten,” apparently the prohibition of eating would be implied, but the prohibition of deriving benefit would not be implied. This presents a challenge even for Ḥizkiya, who agrees that the passive formulation: “It shall not be eaten,” indicates that in addition one may not benefit from the item. The Gemara answers: Actually, the phrase: “It shall not be eaten” indicates both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit. And the phrase: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear,” comes to prohibit deriving benefit from the hide of the ox that has been stoned. And it is necessary to mention this explicitly, as it could enter your mind to say that since it is written: “Its flesh shall not be eaten,” with regard to its flesh, yes, it is prohibited, but with regard to its hide, no, it is not. Therefore, the verse teaches us that it is prohibited to benefit from its hide as well. The Gemara asks: And according to those tanna’im who expound this verse: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear,” for another interpretation, namely, to teach that the owner of an innocuous ox, i.e., one that is not known to cause damage with the intent to injure, is exempt from the payment of half of the indemnity if that ox killed a person, or that he is exempt from payment for offspring if his ox gores a pregnant woman and causes her to miscarry; from where do they derive this prohibition against benefiting from the ox’s hide? The Gemara answers: They derive this halakha from the wording: “Of [et] its flesh.” The verse could have been formulated: And its flesh shall not be eaten. The addition of the word et comes to include that which is secondary to the flesh, i.e., the hide. The Gemara asks: And the other tanna, who derives the prohibition against benefiting from the hide from the verse: “But the owner of the ox shall be clear,” what does he learn from the additional word et? The Gemara answers: This Sage does not interpret the word et as a means to derive new halakhot. He considers the word et to be an ordinary part of the sentence structure and not a source for exegetical exposition. As it was taught in a baraita: Shimon HaAmmassoni, and some say that it was Neḥemya HaAmmassoni, would interpret all occurrences of the word et in the Torah, deriving additional halakhot with regard to the particular subject matter. Once he reached the verse: “You shall be in awe of [et] the Lord your God; you shall serve Him; and to Him you shall cleave, and by His name you shall swear” (Deuteronomy 10:20), he withdrew from this method of exposition, as how could one add to God Himself? His students said to him: Rabbi, what will be with all the etim that you interpreted until now? He said to them: Just as I received reward for the interpretation, so I shall receive reward for my withdrawal from using this method of exposition. The word et in this verse was not explained until Rabbi Akiva came and expounded: “You shall be in awe of [et] the Lord your God”: The word et comes to include Torah scholars, and one is commanded to fear them just as one fears God. In any case, Shimon HaAmmassoni no longer derived additional halakhot from the word et. The Gemara further challenges: And yet there is the prohibition of fruit that grows on a tree during the first three years after it was planted [orla], as the Merciful One says: “And when you come into the land, and you shall plant all types of trees for food, then you shall count the fruit thereof as prohibited; three years shall it be prohibited [arelim] to you; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 19:23). And it was taught in a baraita: “Shall it be prohibited to you; it shall not be eaten”: I have only derived a prohibition to eat it. From where do I derive that one may not even benefit from it, e.g., that he may not paint with the dye that can be extracted from the fruit, nor may he light a lamp with its oil? The verse states: “You shall count the fruit thereof [orlato] as prohibited [araltem]; three years shall it be prohibited [arelim] to you; it shall not be eaten.” This repetition of the term arel comes to include all forms of benefit. The Gemara reads precisely: The reason that all forms of benefit are prohibited is that the Merciful One writes: “You shall count the fruit thereof as prohibited [araltem]; three years shall it be prohibited [arelim].” The double use of the word arel indicates a two-fold prohibition. However, were that not the case, I would have said: The prohibition of eating is indicated here; however, the prohibition to derive benefit is not indicated. This is a challenge even to Ḥizkiya’s opinion, as the verse says: “It shall not be eaten,” indicating that it is prohibited to derive benefit as well. The Gemara rejects this. Actually, in general, “it shall not be eaten” indicates both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition to derive benefit. However, it is different there, with regard to orla, as it is written: “Three years shall it be prohibited [arelim] to you.” And, therefore, it was necessary for the verse to repeat the prohibition using several terms, as it could enter your mind to say that since it wrote “to you” it means that it shall be yours, namely that one is permitted to benefit from it. Therefore, it teaches us that it is prohibited to derive benefit. The Gemara asks: However, now that these words in the verses are written, indicating the prohibition to derive benefit from orla, why do I need the words “to you,” i.e., what does this phrase teach us here? The Gemara answers: As it was taught in a baraita: That which is stated: “To you,” comes to include that which is planted for the public; all the details of the prohibition of orla apply to a tree planted for public purposes. Rabbi Yehuda says: This verse comes to exclude a tree planted for the public, i.e., it is exempt from the laws of orla. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the opinion of the first tanna? As it is written: “And you shall plant.” That the mitzva applies to an individual is indicated, since planting a tree is ordinarily an individual activity; however, that the mitzva of orla applies to a tree planted for the public is not indicated by the verse. Therefore, the Merciful One writes “for you” in the plural, to include within this prohibition that which is planted for the public. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the phrase “and you shall plant” indicates that orla applies both to a tree planted for the public and for an individual; and the phrase “for you” also indicates that orla applies both to a tree planted for an individual and for the public. If so, then this is one amplificatory expression after another, and there is a principle that one amplificatory expression after another is restrictive. Therefore, the term: “For you” comes to exclude from this prohibition a tree planted for the public. The Gemara further challenges Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition that a non-priest shall not eat teruma, as the Merciful One says: “No stranger shall eat of the sacred food; a tenant of a priest, or a hired servant, shall not eat of the sacred food” (Leviticus 22:10). And we learned in a mishna: One may establish an eiruv, such as a joining of Shabbat boundaries, on behalf of a nazirite with wine, even though he may not drink it. And one may establish an eiruv on behalf of an Israelite with teruma, although it is prohibited for him to eat it. Apparently, it is permitted for an Israelite to derive benefit from the teruma even though the verse says: “He shall not eat.” This appears to be a challenge to the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu. Rav Pappa said: It is different there, with regard to teruma, as the verse said: “And your teruma shall be reckoned unto you, as though it were the grain of the threshing floor, and as the fullness of the winepress” (Numbers 18:27). The Sages derived from the inclusion of the possessive pronoun “your” that the teruma shall be yours; therefore, it is permitted for an Israelite to benefit from teruma. The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage, Ḥizkiya, derive from this phrase, as he holds that: “He shall not eat” already indicates that it is permitted to benefit from teruma? The Gemara answers: According to his opinion the phrase: “Your teruma” is referring to all of the teruma of the entire Jewish people. This is common biblical vernacular, and nothing may be derived from it. The Gemara continues to challenge Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition against the nazirite eating grape products, as the Merciful One says: “All the days of his naziriteship he shall eat nothing that is made of the grapevine, from the seeds to the grape skin” (Numbers 6:4). And we learned in the mishna: One may establish an eiruv on behalf of a nazirite with wine even though he may not drink it. Apparently, a nazirite may derive benefit from wine despite the fact that the verse says that he may not drink it. Mar Zutra said: It is different there, as the verse said: “His naziriteship.” He derives from this verse that it shall be his; in other words, the nazirite may continue to own wine and to benefit from it. Rav Ashi said: This halakha is derived from another source. As the verse says: “He shall be sacred, he shall let the locks of the hair of his head grow long” (Numbers 6:5). Rav Ashi reads the verse precisely to indicate that the growth of the nazirite’s hair is sacred and must be burned, but no other element of his naziriteship is sacred. In other words, he may derive benefit from the other elements prohibited to him during his naziriteship, i.e., from grape products. The Gemara challenges: And is it written: No other element of his naziriteship? There is no indication that this statement means that the prohibition against deriving benefit is limited to this one element. Rather, it is clear that the derivation of this halakha is in accordance with the explanation of Mar Zutra. The Gemara continues to challenge Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion: And yet there is the prohibition of new grain, which was harvested before the bringing of the omer offering, as the Merciful One says: “And you shall eat neither bread, nor parched grain, nor fresh stalks until this day itself, until you have brought the offering of your God; it is a statute forever throughout your generations in all your dwellings” (Leviticus 23:14). And we learned in a mishna: One may harvest grain before the omer as fodder and feed it to his animal. Apparently, one may derive benefit from this grain even though the verse says: “You shall not eat.” Rav Shemaya said: It is different there, as the verse said: “Your harvest” (Leviticus 23:10), indicating that your harvest will be yours. In other words, one may benefit from it, as it is still considered to be his. The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage, Ḥizkiya, derive from this phrase? The Gemara answers that according to his opinion, “your harvest” is referring to the harvest of the entire Jewish people. This is common biblical vernacular, and nothing may be derived from it. The Gemara challenges both opinions. And yet there is the prohibition against eating creeping animals, as the Merciful One says: “And every creeping thing that swarms upon the earth is a detestable thing; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 11:41). And we learned in a mishna: If hunters of undomesticated animals, birds, and fish happen to catch non-kosher species that they did not intend to trap, it is permitted for them to sell them to gentiles. Apparently, one may derive benefit from non-kosher species even though the verse says: “It shall not be eaten.” The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the verse said: “For you” (Leviticus 11:10), indicating that they will be yours, that one may derive benefit from them. The Gemara asks: If so, that it is permitted to derive benefit from these creeping animals, then even if one intends to catch them it should also be permitted to sell them to gentiles ab initio. However, the mishna indicates that this is prohibited. The Gemara answers: It is different here, in the case of creeping animals, as the verse said: “They shall be” (Leviticus 11:11). It is derived from this that they shall be as they are. In other words, they should remain in their detestable state, and one should stay away from them. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Ḥizkiya, why do I need the verse to write: “It shall not be eaten,” to teach that one may not derive benefit from them, and afterward to say: “For you,” to permit deriving benefit from them? Let the Merciful One not write: “It shall not be eaten,” and it will not need to say: “For you.” Ḥizkiya could have said to you: My reason is also derived from here, as this verse is a central source for my opinion. Since the verse needed to say explicitly: “For you,” it is evident that when the Torah writes only: “It shall not be eaten,” it is indicating that it is prohibited to benefit from the item as well. The Gemara further challenges the opinions of Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Abbahu: And yet there is the prohibition of leavened bread, as the Merciful One says: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten,” and it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Be astounded with yourself; how is it prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread for all seven days? Apparently, he holds that it is permitted for one to derive benefit from leavened bread for all seven days of Passover and certainly afterward. The Gemara answers: It is different there, as the verse said: “Matzot shall be eaten throughout the seven days; and no leavened bread shall be seen with you, neither shall there be leaven seen with you, in all your borders” (Exodus 13:7). The phrase “with you” indicates that it is yours, i.e., it is still considered to be in one’s possession, and it is permitted for him to derive benefit from it. The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis, who say that it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread, learn from the phrase “with you”? The Gemara answers: They derive that you may not see your own leavened bread; however, you may see that of others and that which is consecrated to God but remained in one’s possession. The Gemara asks: And what does the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, say about this halakha? The Gemara answers: There are two occurrences of the phrase “with you” written. One indicates that it is permitted to see leavened bread that belongs to a gentile, and the other indicates that one may derive benefit from leavened bread. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of the other Sages, the Rabbis, why is the phrase “with you” written twice? They explain: One is written with regard to a gentile whom he has conquered, i.e., who is under his control. And the other is written with regard to a gentile whom he has not conquered. In either case, one is permitted to keep the gentile’s leavened bread in his possession on Passover. And from where does the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, derive this halakha that one may see even the leavened bread of a gentile who is under his control? He points out that there are three occurrences of the phrase “with you” written. And what do the other Sages, the Rabbis, learn from the extra instance of the phrase “with you”? They learn that it is used once to teach about leaven, and once to teach about leavened bread. And they are both necessary and must be mentioned explicitly, as one cannot derive this principle with regard to leavened bread from leaven or vice versa. The Gemara suggests: Let us say this dispute between Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Abbahu with regard to the implication of the phrase: It shall not be eaten, is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. The verse states: “And the fat of the animal carcass, and the fat of that which is torn of beasts, may be used for any other service; but you shall surely not eat of it” (Leviticus 7:24). What does it mean when the verse states: “For any other service”? I might have thought that with regard to the Temple service it should be permitted to use this fat for the following reason: Because fats may generally be offered on the altar, it is as though it is permitted to consume them; therefore, they may be used for other sacred purposes as well. However, I might have thought that with regard to common use it should be prohibited to use them, as the verse states: “You shall surely not eat of it.” Therefore, the verse states: “For any other service,” meaning that its use is permitted in all contexts. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: Although its use is clearly permitted, I might have thought that despite the fact that an animal carcass is impure, with regard to common use its fat should be ritually pure; however, with regard to the Temple service it should be ritually impure. Therefore, the verse states: “For any other service,” meaning that it is considered pure in all contexts. The Gemara explains their dispute: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that with regard to purity and impurity no verse is necessary, as there is no reason to assume that the fat of an animal carcass is impure. The verse is necessary to establish the prohibited or permitted status of this fat. And Rabbi Akiva holds that to teach whether this fat is prohibited or permitted no separate verse is necessary; it is necessary to establish its status with regard to ritual purity or impurity. The Gemara asks: What, is it not that they disagree about this, the following issue? Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds: “You shall not eat” indicates both the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of deriving benefit; therefore, one may not derive benefit from an animal carcass. And when the verse came and said: “For any other service,” it came to permit one to derive benefit from an animal carcass. And Rabbi Akiva holds: “You shall not eat” indicates that there is only a prohibition of eating; it does not indicate a prohibition of deriving benefit. Therefore, no verse is necessary to learn that it is permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass. When the verse came and said: “For any other service,” it came to teach about the halakhot of ritual purity and impurity. Apparently, there is a tannaitic dispute about the meaning of the words: “You shall not eat.” The Gemara rejects this assumption. No, it is possible to say that everyone holds that “You shall not eat” indicates both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit. And here, they disagree about this: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that when it was permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass, the carcass itself was permitted; however, its fat and its sinews were not permitted. And the phrase “for any other service” in the verse is necessary to permit one to derive benefit from this fat. However, Rabbi Akiva holds: When it was permitted to derive benefit from an animal carcass, it was also permitted to derive benefit from its fat and sinews. Therefore, the phrase “for any other service” in the verse is necessary for the issue of purity and impurity. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, we find that the Merciful One explicitly permits one to derive benefit from fat; however, let us say that the sinew of the sciatic nerve is prohibited. The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that it is indeed so that it is prohibited to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve. And if you wish, say instead that one is permitted to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve, and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives that the sciatic nerve is permitted through an a fortiori inference: If with regard to forbidden fat, for which one is punished with karet if he eats it intentionally, it is permitted to derive benefit, with regard to the sciatic nerve, for which the punishment for one who eats it is not karet, all the more so is it not clear that it is permitted to derive benefit? The Gemara asks: And why does Rabbi Shimon, who prohibits deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve, not accept this a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: This inference can be refuted, as it is possible to say: What is unique to fat? It is that it is released from its general prohibition with regard to non-domesticated animals, as the prohibition only applies to the fats of kosher domesticated animals. Can you say the same with regard to the sciatic nerve, which is not released from its general prohibition with regard to non-domesticated animals and remains prohibited? Apparently, in some ways the prohibition of the sciatic nerve is more stringent than that of fat. The Gemara asks: And how does the other Sage, Rabbi Yosei, who permits one to derive benefit from the sciatic nerve based on this a fortiori inference, respond? The Gemara says: When we state this a fortiori inference, it is with regard to a domesticated animal; in any case, with regard to a domesticated animal its fat is not permitted. Since with regard to a domesticated animal the prohibition of fat is more stringent than that of the sciatic nerve, the a fortiori inference is valid. After discussing numerous cases that involve prohibitions of eating and deriving benefit, the Gemara asks: Since we raised objections from all of these verses and answered them, and in every case it is apparent that despite the fact that the verse said: “You shall not eat” there was no dispute as to whether or not one may derive benefit from these items, then with regard to what issue do Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Abbahu disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree with regard to leavened bread on Passover, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who prohibit one to derive benefit from it; and they disagree with regard to an ox that is stoned, in accordance with everyone. The Gemara explains: Ḥizkiya derived that it is prohibited to derive benefit in this case from the words: “It shall not be eaten,” and Rabbi Abbahu derived that it is prohibited from the fact that the Torah explicitly had to permit one to derive benefit in the case of an animal carcass. The Gemara asks: Now, both according to the one Master and according to the other Master, it is prohibited to derive benefit from these items. The fact that they disagree about the source of this halakha notwithstanding, what is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to non-sacrificial animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. Ḥizkiya holds: “It shall not be eaten” comes to exclude these cases of leavened bread and the ox that is stoned. Although in most cases a prohibition against eating does not extend to a prohibition against deriving benefit, the language of the verse in these cases indicates that there is a prohibition against deriving benefit as well. Furthermore, “It shall be thrown to the dog” comes to exclude non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, indicating that it is prohibited to derive benefit from them. However, Rabbi Abbahu holds that according to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintained that the prohibition against eating an animal carcass cannot be used to derive the prohibition against deriving benefit: “It shall be thrown to the dog” comes to exclude these two cases, leavened bread and an ox that is stoned, where deriving benefit is prohibited. And the prohibition to derive benefit from non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is not by Torah law, as there is no source from which to derive this prohibition. Therefore, the only practical difference between them is whether the prohibition of deriving benefit from non-sacrificial animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is by Torah law or by rabbinic law. The Gemara relates: One of the Sages sat before Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani, and he sat and said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: From where is it derived with regard to all the prohibitions in the Torah that just as it is prohibited to eat them, so too, it is prohibited to benefit from them? And what are the prohibited objects to which this statement refers? They are leavened bread on Passover and an ox that is stoned. The Gemara asks: Why ask from where? Derive the prohibition from the phrase: “It shall not be eaten.” The Gemara answers that he derived a prohibition of eating this item from: “It shall not be eaten”; however, he did not derive a prohibition of deriving benefit from this phrase. The Gemara challenges: Derive this general prohibition against deriving benefit from the fact that the Torah had to explicitly permit one to benefit from an animal carcass. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said with regard to an animal carcass: The matters are as they are written, and the words in the verse do not indicate anything beyond their simple meaning. The Gemara challenges: If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, then let him derive this halakha from where Rabbi Yehuda derives it, i.e., from the verse: “And you shall be sacred men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field; you shall cast it to the dog” (Exodus 22:30). Rabbi Yehuda expounded that one may throw it to a dog, but one may not throw any of the other prohibited items mentioned in the Torah to a dog. From this he infers that it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread on Passover or from other similar items. The Gemara responds: This Sage holds that the prohibition to derive benefit from non-sacrificial animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is by Torah law, and that it is the word “it” in the verse that indicates they are prohibited. And from where is it derived that this prohibition against deriving benefit applies to leavened bread and to an ox that is stoned as well? As it is written: “And no sin-offering, of which any of the blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to make atonement in the sacred place, shall be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire” (Leviticus 6:23). As there is no need for the verse to state: “It shall be burnt with fire”; And for what purpose then does the verse state: “It shall be burnt with fire”? If it does not apply to the subject matter itself in its context, as it is already written: “And Moshe diligently inquired about the goat of the sin-offering, and, behold, it was burnt” (Leviticus 10:16), apply it to the matter of all the prohibitions in the Torah. And if it does not apply to the matter of the prohibition against eating, as the prohibition against eating these items has already been mentioned, apply it to the matter of the prohibition of deriving benefit. The Gemara continues: Lest one say that the verse indicates that just as here, the sin-offering is disposed of with burning, so too, all the prohibited items in the Torah must be disposed of with burning, therefore the verse said: “In the sacred place…shall be burnt with fire” (Leviticus 6:23). This indicates that only that which is disqualified in the sacred place is disposed of with burning, but all other prohibited items in the Torah need not be disposed of with burning. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani asked: And did this verse: “In the sacred place…shall be burnt with fire,” come to teach this halakha? It is needed to teach in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: “In the sacred place…shall be burnt with fire”; this taught that one must burn a disqualified sin-offering in the sacred place, and not outside the Temple. And I have only derived this, meaning the sin-offering. From where do I derive that disqualified offerings of the most sacred order and portions consumed on the altar, such as the fats of offerings of minor sanctity that become impure, are burned in the Temple courtyard? The verse states: “In the sacred place…shall be burnt with fire.” This indicates that any disqualified offering must be burned in the sacred place. The Sage who taught this halakha to Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said to him: Rabbi Yonatan, your teacher, said that same halakha from this verse: “And if the flesh of the consecration offering, or of the bread, remains until the morning, then you shall burn the leftover with fire; it shall not be eaten, because it is sacred” (Exodus 29:34). As there is no need for the verse to state: “It shall not be eaten,” what is the meaning when the verse states: “It shall not be eaten”? If it does not refer to the subject matter itself, as it is already written explicitly: “Then you shall burn the leftover with fire,” which indicates that one may not eat it, refer it to the matter of the other prohibitions in the Torah. And if it does not refer to the matter of the prohibition against eating, as eating these items is explicitly prohibited, refer it to the matter of the prohibition of deriving benefit. This indicates that it is prohibited for one to derive benefit from any item that it is prohibited for him to eat. The Gemara continues: Lest one say that the verse indicates that just as here, the sin-offering is disposed of with burning, so too, all the prohibited items in the Torah, from which one may not benefit, must be disposed of with burning, therefore the verse said: “You shall burn the leftover,” indicating that the leftover sacrificial meat must be disposed of with burning; however, all other prohibitions in the Torah need not be disposed of with burning, despite the fact that it is prohibited to derive benefit from them. The Gemara challenges: And did this phrase: “It shall not be eaten,” come to teach this prohibition against deriving benefit? This phrase is needed to teach in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said with regard to the statement in the verse: “It shall not be eaten, because it is sacred,” that the verse comes to place a negative mitzva of eating on whatever has been rendered disqualified in the sacred place. In other words, this verse teaches a general halakha that one who eats from offerings that have been disqualified in the Temple transgresses a negative mitzva and is liable to be flogged. It teaches nothing with regard to a prohibition against deriving benefit. Abaye said: Actually, derive this halakha from the first verse cited by Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: “And any sin-offering, of which any of the blood is brought into the tent of meeting to make atonement in the sacred place, shall not be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire” (Leviticus 6:23). And reverse the construct of his exposition. Let the verse write: “It shall be burnt with fire,” and it will not need to write: “Shall not be eaten.” For what purpose then does the verse state: “It shall not be eaten”? If it does not apply to the subject matter itself, as that was already derived from the statement of Rabbi Elazar that whatever has been rendered disqualified in the sacred place may not be eaten, apply it to all other prohibitions in the Torah, including leavened bread on Passover and a stoned ox. And if it does not apply to the prohibition against eating, which is written explicitly, then apply it to the prohibition of deriving benefit. The Gemara asks: Lest one say that the verse indicates that just as here, the leftover sacrificial meat is disposed of with burning, so too, all the prohibited items in the Torah, from which one may not benefit, must be disposed of with burning, therefore the verse said: “You shall burn the leftover,” indicating that the leftover sacrificial meat must be disposed of with burning; however, all other prohibited items in the Torah need not be disposed of with burning. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: And why do you hold that the phrase: “You shall not eat,” describing the sin-offering that was sacrificed inside the Sanctuary, is not needed for other purposes? Say that this expression comes in order to designate a negative mitzva for this prohibition itself. As, if this prohibition were derived only from the source quoted by Rabbi Elazar, there will be a prohibition to eat the meat of the sin-offering whose blood was brought into the sanctuary; however, one would not be liable to be flogged for violating it, because one is not flogged for violating a negative mitzva stated in general terms. One is not flogged for violating a negative mitzva that contains several different prohibitions, such as this one, which refers to all disqualified offerings. This is because the negative mitzva is formulated too broadly. Therefore, it is possible to say that when the Torah states: “You shall not eat” with regard to this issue, it is teaching that there is a particular prohibition here and that one is flogged for violating it. If so, the verse cannot indicate a general prohibition against deriving benefit. Rather, this suggestion should be rejected, and Rav Pappa said that one derives this halakha from here: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire. And as for the flesh, every one that is pure may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:19). As there is no need for the verse to state: “It shall not be eaten,” what does it mean when the verse states: “It shall not be eaten”? If it does not refer to the subject matter itself, as that can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference from the second tithe, the halakhot of which are more lenient than those of offerings, then it must refer to something else. As it is possible to say: If with regard to the second tithe, which is more lenient because it does not have the status of an offering, the Torah said that when one recites the confession over the tithes, when destroying the tithes remaining in one’s possession that had not yet been given to the appropriate recipient, he says: “I have not eaten from it in my mourning, neither have I removed it while impure” (Deuteronomy 26:14), indicating that it is prohibited for one to remove tithes while impure, then with regard to consecrated meat, which is more stringent, all the more so is it not clear that it may not be eaten while a person is impure? And if you say that there is a general principle that we do not warn, i.e., we may not deduce a prohibition, through logical derivation alone, then one could respond that his issue is not only derived through an a fortiori inference; rather, it is also derived from an analogy based on a juxtaposition. As it is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows which you have vowed, nor your voluntary offerings, nor the offering of your hand” (Deuteronomy 12:17). Since the verse itself juxtaposes tithes to offerings, it indicates that there is a prohibition with regard to offerings just as there is with regard to tithes. The Gemara continues explaining Rav Pappa’s opinion: For what purpose then does the verse state: “It shall not be eaten” with regard to impure consecrated meat? If it does not apply to the subject matter of this verse itself, as that prohibition is derived from the second tithe, then apply it to the matter of all prohibited items in the Torah. And if it does not apply to the prohibition against eating, since that is clear, apply it to the prohibition of deriving benefit. And if you say: Lest one say that the verse indicates that just as here, the meat that became impure in the Temple is disposed of with burning, so too, all the prohibited items in the Torah must be disposed of with burning, therefore the verse said: “The leftover,” indicating that the leftover sacrificial meat must be disposed of with burning; however, all other prohibited items in the Torah need not be disposed of with burning. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And say that this expression: “It shall not be eaten,” comes to teach not the prohibition against deriving benefit, but rather that one who transgresses this negative mitzva violates two prohibitions. And there is precedent for such an explanation, as didn’t Abaye say with regard to a parallel case: If one ate a small water creature [putita], he is flogged with four sets of lashes because one violates four prohibitions when eating such a creature? Two of these prohibitions are found in the verse that discusses all types of creeping animals: “You shall not make yourselves detestable with any swarming thing that swarms, neither shall you make yourselves impure with them, that you should be defiled by them” (Leviticus 11:43). A third prohibition applies to creeping animals that live in the water, as the verses say: “And all that have neither fins nor scales…They shall be a detestable thing unto you; you shall not eat of their flesh” (Leviticus 11:10–11). A fourth prohibition is cited in the verse: “And whatever does not have fins and scales you shall not eat; it is impure unto you” (Deuteronomy 14:10). Similarly, if one ate an ant, he is flogged with five sets of lashes, two sets for the previously mentioned prohibitions of eating a creeping animal, a third based on the verse: “And every creeping thing that swarms upon the earth is a detestable thing; it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 11:41), and a fourth based on the verse: “All creeping things that swarm upon the earth, them you shall not eat; for they are a detestable thing” (Leviticus 11:42). A fifth prohibition is stated in the verse: “You shall not make yourselves impure through every creeping thing that swarms upon the earth” (Leviticus 11:44). If one ate a hornet, he is flogged with six sets of lashes. Since a hornet creeps along the ground, all of the previously mentioned prohibitions with regard to an ant apply to it as well. An additional prohibition is stated in the following verse: “And all flying insects are impure to you; they shall not be eaten” (Deuteronomy 14:19). Based on this precedent, it is possible to say that the addition of the phrase “It shall not be eaten” with regard to impure meat indicates merely an additional negative mitzva for which one would be punished; however, it does not necessarily indicate a prohibition to derive benefit. Rav Ashi said to him: Anywhere that it is possible to expound a new halakha, we expound, and we do not establish the verse as containing additional negative mitzvot with regard to that same prohibition. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the beginning of the verse: “And the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 7:19)? The Gemara explains: This comes to include wood and incense; although they are not eaten, they are susceptible to ritual impurity of foods. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the end of this verse: “And as for the flesh, every one that is pure may eat of it” (Leviticus 7:19)? The Gemara answers: This comes to include the sacrificial parts of the animal offered on the altar, such as the fats; they, too, have the legal status of meat and are susceptible to ritual impurity of foods. If these portions become ritually impure and one eats them, even if he is pure, he is liable to be flogged. The Gemara challenges: The halakha that these sacrificial parts can become impure and are then prohibited to be eaten is derived from there, i.e., from another source, as it was taught in a baraita: “But the soul that eats from the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings, which belong to the Lord, having his impurity upon him, that soul shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 7:20). The added words “which belong to the Lord” come to include these sacrificial parts, which are meant to be offered to God and not eaten by other people, within this prohibition against eating sacrificial meat when it is impure. The Gemara rejects this: There, it is referring to a case of impurity of the body; if one who is ritually impure eats sacrificial parts he is punishable with karet. Here, it is referring to a case of impurity of the flesh, where the meat is impure but the person eating it is pure; one who does so is merely in violation of a negative mitzva. After discussing the prohibitions against eating and deriving benefit from certain items, the Gemara cites that which Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to all prohibitions against eating in the Torah, one may be flogged for violating them only if he eats the prohibited item in its usual manner of consumption. The Gemara asks: To exclude what case did Rabbi Yoḥanan say this? Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: To exclude a case where one eats raw fat; he teaches that one who does so is exempt, since this is not the usual manner of eating it. Some say that this is what Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to all prohibitions against deriving benefit in the Torah, one is flogged for violating them only if he derives benefit from the prohibited item in the usual manner. The Gemara asks: To exclude what case did Rabbi Yoḥanan say this? Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: To exclude a case where one placed the fat of an ox that is stoned on his wound to help it heal. He teaches that, although one generally may not derive benefit from forbidden fats, in this case he is exempt because these fats are not normally used for medicinal purposes. And all the more so one who eats raw fat is exempt, as this is certainly not an ordinary way to benefit from fat. It was also stated that Rav Aḥa bar Avya said that Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one placed the fat of an ox that is stoned on his wound for medicinal purposes, he is exempt, because with regard to all prohibitions against deriving benefit in the Torah, one is flogged for violating them only if he derives benefit from the prohibited item in its usual manner. Rabbi Zeira said: We, too, have also learned in a mishna that the Rabbis said: One absorbs the forty lashes due to drinking the juice squeezed from orla fruits only for that which seeps from olives, oil, and from grapes, wine. In contrast, for drinking the juice that seeps from mulberries, figs, and pomegranates one is not flogged, despite the fact that it is prohibited to consume those juices. What is the reason for this? Is it not because he is not eating them in their usual manner of deriving benefit? Generally, these fruits are eaten and not squeezed for their juice. Abaye said to him that this mishna does not necessarily prove this same point: Granted, had the mishna taught us the case of the fruit itself, as he is not eating it in its usual manner of deriving benefit, it would work out well. However, here, where the case is with regard to their juice, the reason he is not flogged is because it is merely moisture that drips from the fruit, which is not considered to be an essential part of the fruit. Abaye said: All concede with regard to prohibited mixtures of diverse kinds planted in a vineyard that one is flogged for deriving benefit from them even if he does not benefit from them in their usual manner. What is the reason for this? It is because no prohibition against eating is written about them explicitly in the Torah. Therefore, the verse is interpreted to mean that it is prohibited to benefit from them in any manner; rather, one must burn them immediately. The Gemara raises an objection. Isi ben Yehuda says: From where is it derived that it is prohibited to eat meat that has been cooked in milk? It is stated here: “For you are a sacred people unto the Lord your God. You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” (Deuteronomy 14:21). And it is stated there: “And you shall be sacred men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field [tereifa]; you shall cast it to the dogs” (Exodus 22:30). Just as there, with regard to a tereifa, it is prohibited to eat it, so too here, with regard to meat in milk, it is prohibited to eat it. From the above comparison I have derived only that it is prohibited to eat it, as it is prohibited to eat a tereifa; from where do I derive that it is prohibited to derive benefit from it as well? You may state an a fortiori inference: If with regard to orla, through which no sin has been committed, as it is part of the ordinary growth process of the tree to produce fruit during the first three years, yet still it is prohibited to deriving benefit from it; then with regard to meat in milk, through which a sin has been committed, as the two were illicitly cooked together, is it not right that it should be prohibited to derive benefit from it? The Gemara rejects this inference: What comparison can be made to orla, which is more stringent than meat in milk, as it never had a time when it was fit? Can you say the same with regard to meat in milk, which had a time when it was fit? Unlike orla fruits, which were prohibited from the beginning of their existence, both meat and milk were permitted on their own before they were cooked together. Therefore, the Gemara brings other proofs: Let leavened bread on Passover prove that this issue is not a factor, as it had a time when it was fit, before Passover, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. The Gemara rejects this: What comparison can be made to leavened bread on Passover, which is a stringent prohibition, as one who eats it is punished with karet? Can you say the same with regard to one who eats meat in milk, who is not punished with karet? The Gemara answers: Let the case of diverse kinds planted in the vineyard prove that this is not relevant, as one who violates that prohibition is not punished with karet, and yet it is prohibited to derive benefit from the resulting mixtures. The Gemara returns to the issue of Abaye’s statement with regard to the unique stringency of diverse kinds planted in a vineyard: And if it is so that one is flogged for deriving benefit from diverse kinds planted in a vineyard, even if one derives benefit from them in an unusual manner, we can challenge this last proof: How can one compare meat in milk to diverse kinds in a vineyard, as with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard, one is flogged even if he derives benefit from them in an unusual manner? And how would Abaye respond to this question? When one draws this challenge to its logical conclusion with the phrase: Can you say, and explains in detail how the prohibition of meat in milk differs from that of diverse kinds in a vineyard, with regard to what difference would the challenge be raised? You may say that with regard to meat in milk one is flogged only for deriving benefit in the usual manner, as opposed to the halakha with regard to diverse kinds, according to which one is flogged even for deriving benefit in an unusual manner. However, is that to say that the term eating is written in the Torah with regard to meat in milk? The basis for this halakha with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard is the lack of the term eating in the verse; however, the prohibition of meat in milk is also missing that term. Therefore, there are no grounds for this challenge: If the lack of the word eating leads to the conclusion that one is flogged even when deriving benefit in an unusual manner, logically that punishment should apply to both diverse kinds and meat in milk. The Gemara asks: And the other Sage, who raised this objection, holds that for this reason Isi ben Yehuda derives this aspect of the prohibition from the case of an animal carcass. Just as with regard to an animal carcass one is flogged only when deriving benefit in the usual manner, as the verse that prohibits it uses the term eating, so too, with regard to meat in milk, one is flogged only when deriving benefit in the usual manner. Despite what is written in the Gemara, the fact that one is flogged only for deriving benefit from the animal in the usual manner is not derived from the carcass of an unslaughtered animal but from tereifa, an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months. With regard to tereifa it is written: “And you shall be holy men unto Me; therefore you shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beasts in the field [tereifa]; you shall cast it to the dogs” (Exodus 22:30). From the fact that one may cast it to the dogs it can be derived that one may derive benefit in any manner other than the usual manner, i.e., eating. And Abaye holds that for this reason it did not write the term eating in the verse itself with regard to the prohibition of meat in milk: In order to say that one is flogged even when deriving benefit in an unusual manner. The Gemara continues. Let Isi ben Yehuda challenge: What comparison can be made to diverse kinds in a vineyard, as the forbidden produce had no time that it was fit because the prohibition came into effect as soon as the produce began to grow? Rabbi Adda bar Ahava said: Apparently, since this question was not asked, that is to say that with regard to diverse kinds in a vineyard, their roots are forbidden as well, including the seeds and saplings from which the mature plants grow. Therefore, no challenge can be raised, since they had a time when they were fit, before taking root. Rav Shemaya raised an objection based on what was taught in a mishna: With regard to one who transfers a perforated pot with seeds in it into a vineyard, if the size of the seeds growing in the pot increases by one two-hundredth of their previous size, such that the permitted portion is not two hundred times the forbidden, newly grown portion, then the mixture is prohibited due to the prohibition against planting diverse kinds in a vineyard. The forbidden portion is nullified only if it comprises less than one two-hundredth of the mixture. The Gemara reads precisely: If it increases, yes, it is prohibited; if it does not increase, no, it is not prohibited. Apparently, only additional growth is prohibited, and not the seeds themselves. Rava said: Two verses are written about this halakha, i.e., two separate terms in one verse indicate two separate prohibitions. The verse states: “You shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds of seed; lest the fullness of the seed which you have sown be forfeited together with the increase of the vineyard” (Deuteronomy 22:9). It is written: “The seed,” indicating that it is prohibited once it is planted and takes root, and it is written: “The fullness,” indicating that it is prohibited only if it has grown. How can these two terms be reconciled? If it were planted initially in the vineyard, it becomes prohibited immediately upon taking root. If it were planted elsewhere and brought into the vineyard later, such as in a perforated pot, then the following distinction applies: If its size increases in the vineyard, yes, it is prohibited; if its size does not increase, no, it is not prohibited. The Gemara discusses another matter pertaining to deriving benefit. Rabbi Ya’akov said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said with regard to objects from which it is prohibited to derive benefit: One may heal oneself with any substance except for wood of a tree designated for idolatry [asheira]. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say it is a case in which there is danger to a person’s life, then it is permitted to use even the wood of an asheira. And if it is a situation where there is no danger, then all the prohibited substances in the Torah also may not be used, as one may not derive benefit from them. The Gemara answers: Actually, it is referring to a case where there is danger, and even so, one my not derive benefit from the wood of an asheira. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If it is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul,” why is it stated: “And with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5)? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it stated: “With all your soul”? One of these statements appears to be superfluous. Rather, it is to tell you that if there is a person whose body is more beloved to him than his property, therefore it is stated: “With all your soul.” The verse teaches that one must be willing to sacrifice his life to sanctify God’s name. And there is a person whose property is more beloved to him than his body, therefore it is stated: “With all your might.” Rabbi Eliezer understands the phrase: “With all your might,” to mean: With all your possessions. Apparently, there are circumstances in which a person must be prepared to die rather than be healed with a prohibited substance. When Ravin came from the Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One may heal oneself with any substance from which one may not derive benefit, except for idolatry or forbidden sexual relations or bloodshed. That one may not heal oneself with idolatry even when his life is in danger is learned from that which we just said, based on the verse: “With all your soul and with all your might.” From where is this halakha derived with regard to forbidden sexual relations and murder? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse says about one who rapes a betrothed woman: “But you shall do nothing to the young woman; the young woman has committed no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor, and slays him, so too with this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). What does a murderer have to do with a betrothed young woman who was raped? Why would the verse mention murder in this context? Rather, the mention of murder comes in order to teach a halakha about the betrothed young woman, and it turns out that, in addition, it derives a halakha from that case. The Torah juxtaposes a murderer to a betrothed young woman to indicate that just as in the case of a betrothed young woman one may save her by taking the rapist’s life, so too, one may save a potential murder victim by taking the pursuer’s life. Conversely, it is possible to learn about the case of a young betrothed woman from the case of a murderer. Just as with regard to a potential murderer the halakha is that if one is being forced to murder someone else, he should allow himself to be killed and not transgress that prohibition, so too, with regard to a betrothed young woman the halakha is that she should allow herself to be killed and not transgress the prohibition of forbidden relations. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive this halakha with regard to murder itself? The Gemara answers: It is based on logical reasoning that one life is not preferable to another. The Gemara relates an incident to demonstrate this: This is similar to a certain man who came before Rava and said to him: A local official said to me: Go kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you. Rava said to him: It is preferable that he should kill you and you should not kill. What did you think, that your blood is redder and more precious than his? Perhaps that man’s blood is redder. Apparently, one may not save his own life by taking someone else’s. The Gemara relates: Mar bar Rav Ashi found Ravina rubbing his daughter with unripe olives [guharkei] of orla for medicinal purposes. Mar bar Rav Ashi said to him: Say that the Sages said that one may derive benefit from such a prohibited item at a time of danger; however, who says that one is permitted to do so when it is not a time of danger? Ravina said to him: A high fever is also deemed a time of danger, and one may derive benefit from a prohibited item it such a situation. Some say that Ravina said to him as follows: Am I deriving benefit in a usual manner? The usual way to derive benefit from these olives is to use them after they have become ripe, so that their oil can be drawn out. Since Ravina was not deriving benefit in the usual manner, he was permitted to do so, although his daughter’s life was not in danger. The Gemara continues to discuss various halakhot that apply to prohibited items. It was stated: With regard to deriving benefit from a prohibited item that comes to a person against his will, i.e., one’s circumstance results in his deriving benefit although he did not place himself in that circumstance in order to derive benefit, Abaye said: Deriving benefit in this manner is permitted, and Rava said: It is prohibited. The Gemara explains: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from the prohibited object, or where it is not possible to avoid it and he intends to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, because he intended to derive benefit that was prohibited. And when it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit, everyone agrees that it is permitted, as one had no choice in the matter. Where they disagree is in a case where it is possible for him to avoid the prohibition, and he does not intend to derive benefit from it. The Gemara limits the dispute further: And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is prohibited, everyone agrees that it is prohibited, as Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one’s action is more significant than his intent. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said that an unintentional prohibited act is permitted. Apparently, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And Rava would say: Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion only with regard to a case where it is not possible to avoid the prohibition. However, in a case where it is possible to avoid the prohibition, no, he did not permit one to derive benefit from such a prohibition even unintentionally. This is one version of the dispute. Some say that the dispute should be understood as follows: In a case where it is possible to avoid deriving benefit and he does not intend to derive benefit, this is the case of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. Where it is not possible to avoid it and he does not intend to derive benefit from the prohibited item, everyone agrees that it is permitted to do so. Where they disagree is in a case where it is not possible to avoid deriving benefit and he intends to derive benefit from it. The Gemara limits the dispute further: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who follows one’s intent, everyone agrees that it is prohibited. Where they disagree is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: There is no difference whether one intends or does not intend; the issue is whether he can avoid it or not. Therefore, if it is possible to avoid deriving benefit, it is prohibited. Based on this understanding of the dispute, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. In other words, in a case where it is not possible to avoid the situation completely, even if one has intent it is permitted. And Rava could have said to you: Rabbi Yehuda stated that one who lacks intent has the same legal status as one who has intent only with regard to a stringency. In other words, a lack of intent does not negate the fact that the prohibited act has been performed and one is liable. However, to say that one who has intent has the same legal status as one who lacks intent such that it leads to a leniency, no. There is no evidence that Rabbi Yehuda would agree that it would ever be permitted for one who has intent to derive benefit from an otherwise prohibited object, even if he could not avoid the situation. Abaye said: From where do I say my opinion? As it was taught in a baraita: They said about Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai that he would sit in the street adjacent to the Temple Mount in the shade of the Sanctuary and expound to a large number of people all day long. And here, isn’t it a case where it was not possible to act differently, as there was no other place where so many people could congregate, and he certainly intended to derive benefit from the shade of the Sanctuary, and yet it was permitted? Apparently, when it is not possible to avoid the situation and one intends to derive benefit, it is permitted to do so. And Rava said in response: The Sanctuary is different, as it was constructed for its interior. It is prohibited to derive benefit only from the interior of the Sanctuary walls, because it was constructed for the use of its internal space; there is no prohibition at all to benefit from its shade when on the outside. Rava said: From where do I say this? As it was taught in a baraita: There were openings in the loft of the Holy of Holies through which they would lower artisans in containers into the Holy of Holies, so that their eyes would not gaze upon the Holy of Holies itself when they were renovating it. And here, isn’t it a case where it was not possible to act differently? It was necessary to renovate the Holy of Holies periodically, and it is impossible to do so without entering the chamber. And since it is plausible that the artisan will intend to enjoy the appearance of the Holy of Holies, it should be prohibited. The Gemara rejects this: And how can you understand the baraita as a proof? Didn’t Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi say that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: The sound of the musical instruments in the Temple, and the sight and smell of the incense are not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property? This is because the prohibition of deriving benefit from a consecrated object applies only to its tangible use. Rather, they established a higher standard of stringency with regard to the Holy of Holies and decreed that one may not even gaze upon it. Therefore, no principle can be derived from the case. Some say this statement differently. Rava said: From where do I say this? As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: The sound of the musical instruments in the Temple and the sight and smell of the incense are not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. The implication is that there is no violation of the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property by Torah law in this case. However, there is a violation of the prohibition by rabbinic law. What, is it not referring to those standing inside the Sanctuary, for whom it is not possible that they will not hear these sounds or they will not observe the sight and smell of the incense? And in such a case, if they intend to derive benefit, it is prohibited. The Gemara rejects this: No, it is referring to those who are standing outside. Since they are not required to be there at that time, it is a case where it is possible to avoid the situation and one intends to derive benefit, which is prohibited according to all opinions. Apropos this halakha, the Gemara discusses the matter itself. Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of Bar Kappara: The sound of the musical instruments in the Temple and the sight and smell of the incense are not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara asks: Isn’t smell subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: One who prepares the incense mixture in order to teach himself how to prepare it or to transfer it to the community is exempt from punishment. However, if one prepares it in order to smell it, he is liable to receive punishment, as it states in the Torah: “He who makes it in order to smell it shall be cut off from his people” (Exodus 30:38). And one who actually smells the incense mixture is exempt from the punishment of karet and from bringing a sin-offering; however, he has misused consecrated property. Apparently, the halakha of misuse of consecrated property applies to smelling. Rather, Rav Pappa said: Sound and sight are not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, because they have no substance. And with regard to the smell of the spices themselves, the following distinction applies: The smell of the incense that is emitted when the spices are placed on the coals is subject to the prohibition, since this is the way the mitzva is performed; however, the smell that is emitted after the flame catches and the column of smoke rises is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, since its mitzva has already been performed. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that in any case where its mitzva has already been performed, the object is not subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property? And the daily removal of ashes of the offerings from the altar occurs after its mitzva has been performed, and the ashes are subject to the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as it is written: “And the priest shall put on his linen garment, and his linen breeches shall he put upon his flesh; and he shall take up the ashes of what the fire has consumed of the burnt-offering on the altar, and he shall put them beside the altar” (Leviticus 6:3). The Sages derive from the phrase: “And he shall put them” that he may not scatter these ashes; rather, they should be placed gently. “And he shall put them” also indicates that one may not derive benefit from these ashes. The Gemara answers: This case does not prove a principle, because the halakhot of removal of ashes from the altar and of the priestly garments worn by the High Priest on Yom Kippur are two verses that come as one. The principle is that two verses that come as one do not teach a principle. In other words, if a halakha is stated twice, with regard to two individual cases in the Torah, the understanding is that this halakha applies only to those cases. Had this halakha applied to all other relevant cases as well, it would not have been necessary for the Torah to teach it twice. The fact that two cases are mentioned indicates that they are the exceptions rather than the rule. The Gemara delineates the two cases: The halakha of the removal of ashes is that which we said. Where is this halakha stated with regard to the priestly garments? As it is written: “And Aharon shall come into the Tent of Meeting, and shall take off the linen garments, which he put on when he went into the sacred place, and he shall leave them there” (Leviticus 16:23). The phrase: “And he shall leave them” teaches that they require burial. Although their use for the mitzva has been completed, it is prohibited to derive benefit from them. The Gemara comments: It works out well that there are two cases according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that this verse teaches that they require burial. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, who disagrees with them and says: These priestly clothes may no longer be used by the High Priest on Yom Kippur, but they are fit for use by a common priest, since these garments are similar to those worn by common priests every day. And what is the meaning of: “And he shall leave them there”? This indicates that the High Priest may not use them on another Yom Kippur. According to this opinion, what can be said? According to the opinion of Rabbi Dosa, there is only one verse that teaches about misuse of consecrated property with an item that has already been used for performing its mitzva. Therefore, it should be possible to derive a principle from the verse dealing with the removal of ashes. The Gemara answers: A principle cannot be based on this verse, because removal of ashes and the heifer whose neck is broken, from which one may not derive benefit after the ceremony, are two verses that come as one. And two verses that come as one do not teach a principle. The Gemara asks: It works out well according to the one who said that they do not teach a principle, i.e., according to the Rabbis. However, according to the one who said that they do teach a principle, i.e., Rabbi Yehuda in tractate Sanhedrin, what can be said? The Gemara answers: Two phrases indicating exclusions are written with regard to these halakhot, limiting this rule to them. With regard to the removal of ashes it is written: “And he shall put it.” The word “it” limits the halakha to this particular circumstance. With regard to the heifer whose neck is broken it is written: “The heifer which had its neck broken” (Deuteronomy 21:6). The word “the” indicates that this halakha applies only to this type of heifer and not to any other similar case. After this tangential discussion of the laws of misuse of consecrated property, the Gemara returns to Abaye and Rava’s dispute about the status of unintended benefit, seeking to prove one side or the other. Come and hear a proof based on what was taught: If one brought the heifer whose neck is to be broken or the red heifer into a cow pen, and it threshes grain while walking with other cows, then it is valid. Under normal circumstances, had one used the heifer for work, it would be disqualified from use in its ceremony. However, in this case, the red heifer may still be burned, and the heifer is still fit to have its neck broken in the ritual. Apparently, the verses “Upon which a yoke has not been placed” (Numbers 19:2) and “Which has not been used for work” (Deuteronomy 21:3) still apply to it, because the owner did not intend for it to work. If he brought it in so that it may nurse from its mother and so it will thresh grain, then it is disqualified from use in these rituals. And here, isn’t it a case where it was not possible to act differently, as the heifer needs to nurse, and he intended that it thresh the grain? And it is teaching that the heifer is disqualified from use. This proves that when one intends to derive benefit, even if there is no other way to act, it is prohibited to derive benefit. The Gemara rejects this: It is different there, as it is written: “Which has not been used for work” in any case. Therefore, while the heifer is disqualified from use even if the situation was unavoidable, no general conclusion can be drawn from this case. The Gemara challenges: If so, that this verse means that it has not performed any work at all, then it should apply even to the first clause. Even when it threshes the grain against the will of the owner, it has still done work and should be rendered disqualified. The Gemara answers. This case is comparable only to that other case: If a bird landed on the red heifer it remains valid, since this is not considered to be like bearing a yoke. If a male animal mounted it to mate with it, it is unfit and may not be used for the ritual. The same applies in this case: When the owner moves the heifer into a pen and it threshes, since the owner is uninterested in this action, it is like the case of the bird and the heifer remains valid. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the difference between the case where a bird lands on it and where a male animal attempts to mate with it? Rav Pappa said that the verse says: “And the elders of that city shall take a heifer of the herd, which has not been used for work, and which has not drawn in the yoke” (Deuteronomy 21:3). If it were written: “He worked [avad],” and we read: “He worked [avad],” this word choice would indicate that the heifer could still be used until he, the owner of the heifer himself, used it willingly for labor. If it were written: “It was worked [ubbad],” and we read: “It was worked [ubbad],” it would indicate that even if it performed labor on its own it is also prohibited to use it, since some form of labor had been done with it. Now that it is written: “He worked [avad],” but we read this word as: “It was worked [ubbad],” both meanings are intended: It is prohibited if it is worked in a similar manner to the way he works. In other words, just as the owner works the animal in a way that is beneficial to him, so too, the animal becomes prohibited only when it is worked in a way that causes him to derive benefit from this labor. Therefore, it still may be used if a bird lands on it, because the owner does not derive benefit from this in any way. However, if a male bull mates with this heifer it is rendered unfit, since the owner generally has an interest in this occurring. The Gemara cites an additional proof. Come and hear from that which is taught: If one finds a lost item, he may not spread it out over a bed or over a frame for his own purposes, since this is deriving benefit from an object that does not belong to him. However, he may spread it out over a bed or a frame for its own sake if it requires airing. If guests happen to come to him, he may not spread it out, neither for its sake nor for his own purpose. Apparently, the benefit is unavoidable and intended, as there is no other way for him to care for the lost object, and he benefits from having his guests see the item; nonetheless, it is still prohibited. This seems to prove that Rava’s opinion is correct. The Gemara rejects this conclusion: It is different there, as he risks damaging it, either due to the evil eye that he casts upon it or due to the thieves who will now know that this valuable item is in his possession and will attempt to steal it. It is not prohibited because of the benefit; rather, it is prohibited due to the concern that he may damage the item. The Gemara offers a final proof. Come and hear a proof based on the following mishna: Clothing merchants who sell garments made of diverse kinds, a prohibited mixture of wool and linen, may sell them as they normally would to gentiles. A merchant may place the garments he is selling on his shoulders and need not be concerned about the prohibition against wearing diverse kinds, provided he does not intend to benefit from the garments in the sun as protection from the sun, or in the rain as protection from the rain. However, the modest people, those who are meticulous in their performance of mitzvot, suspend the wool and linen garments on a stick behind them. And here, isn’t it a case where it is possible for all clothing merchants to act like the modest people and not derive benefit from the mixture of wool and linen? Nonetheless, the mishna states that when one does not intend to benefit from the prohibited item, it is permitted to do so. This presents a conclusive refutation to he who taught the first version of Rava’s statement. According to this version, one is prohibited from deriving benefit when it is possible to avoid doing so and he does not intend to derive benefit. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation. It was taught in the mishna that one may not even light the oven with leavened bread. The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to an oven that one lit with the peels of orla fruit, or with straw of grain that was planted in a prohibited mixture of diverse kinds in a vineyard, if it was a new oven, and by lighting it he hardened the oven and made it stronger for use in the future, then it must be shattered. Since prohibited items were used in the process of forming the oven, one may not derive benefit from the use of the prohibited items. However, if it was an old oven, it may be cooled, and it is prohibited to use the oven only while it is still hot. With regard to one who baked bread in the oven while it was heated or strengthened by the prohibited items, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is prohibited to eat or derive benefit from the bread, since prohibited items were involved in the process of preparation. And the Rabbis say: It is permitted to eat and derive benefit from the bread. If he cooked the bread over the coals that remained from prohibited wood, everyone agrees that it is permitted. The Gemara asks. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Whether it was an old oven or a new oven it may be cooled; there is never a need to shatter the oven? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This baraita, which states that one is required to shatter the oven, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And that baraita, which states that it is sufficient to let the oven cool, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. Since the prohibited objects merely strengthen the oven, the Rabbis hold that it is enough to let the oven cool. By cooling the oven one no longer derives benefit from the prohibited items used to light it, and there is no need to shatter the oven. The Gemara challenges this answer: Say that you heard that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi prohibits one from deriving benefit from bread baked using the prohibited objects as kindling because there is improvement from the wood used to light the oven in the bread, and therefore, it is prohibited. However, in a different case, namely, when both this and that cause it, i.e., both permitted and prohibited items contribute to the result, such as when one subsequently bakes in this oven and benefit is derived both from the prohibited wood that strengthened the oven and from permitted wood that is used in subsequent baking, did you hear him say that it is prohibited as well? Rather, reject this explanation and say: This is not difficult. This stringent baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says that in a case where both this and that cause it, it is prohibited. And that lenient baraita is in accordance with the Rabbis, who disagree with regard to that principle. The Gemara asks: Which statement of Rabbi Eliezer serves as the basis for this explanation? If you say that it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to leaven, as we learned in a mishna: In a case where non-sacred leaven and leaven of teruma fell into non-sacred dough, and neither one alone is potent enough to cause the dough to become leavened bread, and they were joined together and caused the dough to become leavened bread, there is a dispute as to whether this dough is considered to be teruma or non-sacred bread. Rabbi Eliezer says: I follow the final element that fell into the dough. If the teruma fell in last, the dough is prohibited to non-priests. And the Rabbis say: Whether the prohibited item, i.e., the teruma, fell in first or the prohibited item fell in last, it never renders the dough prohibited until there is enough of the prohibited leaven to cause the dough to become leavened bread. And Abaye said: Rabbi Eliezer taught that when the permitted leaven fell in last, the mixture is permitted only when he first removed the prohibited leaven before the permitted leaven fell into the dough and made it rise. However, if he did not first remove the prohibited leaven, the dough is prohibited even if the permitted leaven fell in last. Apparently, when both this and that cause the dough to become leavened bread, it is prohibited. The Gemara rejects this statement: And from where is it apparent that the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is in accordance with Abaye’s explanation? Perhaps the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is due to the following, which Rabbi Eliezer said explicitly: I follow the final element. And it is no different if he first removed the prohibited item and it is no different if he did not first remove the prohibited item. However, if they both fell in at once it should be permitted, because where both this and that cause the dough to become leavened bread Rabbi Eliezer rules that the mixture is permitted. Rather, the reference is to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer with regard to wood from an asheira. As we learned in a mishna: If one took wood from an asheira, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. With regard to one who lit an oven with the wood, if it was a new oven, it must be broken. If it was an old oven, it may be cooled. If one baked bread with asheira wood as the fuel, it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. If this bread was mixed together with other bread, and that other bread was mixed with other bread, it is prohibited to derive benefit from all of this bread. Rabbi Eliezer says: He casts the benefit into the Dead Sea [Yam HaMelaḥ]. In other words, one is not required to destroy the entire mixture when the prohibited bread is mixed with a large quantity of other bread. Instead one should designate money equal in value to the value of the original wood from the asheira, and he should destroy this money to offset the benefit he derived from the prohibited wood. The first tanna said to him: Idolatry cannot be monetarily redeemed. Once the bread becomes prohibited, it cannot be redeemed by having its value cast into the Dead Sea. Apparently, the opinion of both Sages, including Rabbi Eliezer, is that when both this permitted object and that prohibited object cause a change to another item, the latter item is prohibited. The Gemara rejects this conclusion: Say that you heard that Rabbi Eliezer and the first tanna are stringent in this matter with regard to idolatry, whose prohibition is stringent. However, with regard to other prohibitions in the Torah, which are less stringent, did you hear him express this opinion? The Gemara responds to this question: Rather, if it is so that Rabbi Eliezer does not hold the same opinion with regard to other prohibitions, to whom will you attribute this baraita? If it is not Rabbi Eliezer who says this, then who is it? And furthermore, wasn’t it taught explicitly in a baraita: And, similarly, Rabbi Eliezer would prohibit these types of mixtures with regard to all prohibitions in the Torah. Abaye said: If you say, based on the previously stated opinions, that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that when both this and that cause, it is prohibited, then the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is identical to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as both state that it is prohibited for this same reason. And if you say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that when both this and that cause, it is permitted, and here, where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rules that it is prohibited, it is because there is improvement from the wood in the bread itself, then in that case, deriving benefit from any of these earthenware bowls, cups, and flasks that were made in such an oven should also be prohibited, since the improvement from the wood is in them as well. If one were to use such utensils he would be deriving benefit from a prohibited item. When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Sages disagree is in a case where an oven and a pot were formed using prohibited wood. According to the one who says that when both this and that cause it is prohibited, it is prohibited to derive benefit from these as well, since the prohibited item was a contributing factor in the initial formation of the object. However, according to the one who says that when both this and that cause, it is permitted, it is permitted to derive benefit from them. This is because one derives benefit from the prohibited oven and pot only once they have been subsequently heated by permitted wood. Therefore, the influence on the pot of the prohibited item is only one component in the preparation of this food. Some say that even according to the one who says that when both this and that cause, it is permitted, the pot made through the use of prohibited wood is prohibited, since it holds the food inside it before the permitted wood is placed in the oven. Therefore, one derives benefit from the prohibited vessel itself without any contribution from a permitted source. Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to an oven that one lit with peels of orla fruit, or with straw of grain that was planted in a prohibited mixture of diverse kinds in a vineyard, if it is a new oven, it must be shattered. If it is an old oven, it may be cooled. If one baked bread in it, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The bread is permitted, and the Rabbis say: The bread is prohibited. The Gemara challenges: Wasn’t the reverse taught in the baraita? The Gemara answers: Shmuel teaches the reverse, that it is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi who permits one to derive benefit from this bread even in the previously mentioned baraita. And if you wish, say: Shmuel accepts the original text of the baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is the one who prohibits deriving benefit from the bread. And generally, Shmuel holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi over his individual colleague who disagrees; however, the halakha does not follow him over several of his colleagues who disagree. And in this particular case, the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi even over his colleagues. And Shmuel holds: I will reverse the two sides presented here, in order to establish the Rabbis’ opinion as a prohibition. Therefore, the conclusion will be to rule that it is prohibited, in accordance with the majority opinion. Although in Shmuel’s version the attributions of the opinions are technically inaccurate, the benefit is that when people see that the Rabbis rule that it is prohibited in this case, they will be inclined to accept their majority opinion, which is the correct halakha. It was taught as part of the previously stated halakha that if one cooked the bread over coals produced from an asheira, everyone agrees that the bread is permitted. The Gemara records a dispute: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said one opinion, and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said another opinion. One of them said: They taught this leniency only when one cooks with dim coals, whose heat is merely a remnant of the earlier lighting; however, when one cooks with glowing coals, the bread is prohibited. And one of them said: Even when the coals are glowing, the bread is also permitted. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who said that baking with glowing coals renders the bread prohibited, this is because there is improvement from the prohibited wood in the bread. However, according to the one who said that even when baking with glowing coals the bread is permitted, since they are no longer considered to be wood, where do you find the case where Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems bread to be prohibited because there is improvement from the prohibited wood in it? Why should there be a difference between glowing coals and actual burning wood? Rav Pappa said: The case is when a flame is directly opposite the bread. When he cooks the bread directly in front of the wood, it is improved directly by the wood. When the coals are merely glowing, there is no direct benefit from the wood. The Gemara asks: Does this prove by inference that the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi permit one to eat this bread even when the flame is opposite it? But if this is the case, where do you find the case where it is prohibited according to the Rabbis to derive benefit from wood? Rav Ami bar Ḥama said: It is found in the case of a stool made from the wood. Although they hold that it is permitted to derive indirect benefit from the wood, even the Rabbis agree that one may not derive benefit from a stool that is made from the wood itself. Rami bar Ḥama raised a dilemma before Rav Ḥisda: With regard to an oven that one kindled with consecrated wood and baked bread in it, according to the Rabbis, who permitted the bread in the first case where it was baked with orla wood, what is the halakha? He said to him: The bread is prohibited. He responded: What is the difference between this bread and bread baked with orla peels? Rava said: How can these cases be compared? Orla is nullified in a mixture of one part in two hundred; it is possible that less than this amount of orla was absorbed by the bread. However, consecrated wood is not nullified even in a mixture of one part in one thousand. Therefore, even when there is only a miniscule amount of the consecrated matter in the bread it is still prohibited. Rather, Rava said: If it was difficult for Rami bar Ḥama, this is what he found difficult: Didn’t the kindler of the fire transgress the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property, as anyone who unwittingly uses consecrated property for a non-sacred use violates this prohibition? And any case where the kindler of an oven misuses consecrated property by doing so, the wood is transferred to non-sacred status. The wood loses its sanctity when misused, and the one who misused it must donate other wood to the Temple in its place. In that case, the wood used to heat the oven is non-sacred wood and the bread should be permitted. Rav Pappa said: Here, we are dealing with wood which had been set aside for purchasing peace-offerings. This wood, while sanctified, has a lesser status of sanctity and does not become fully consecrated until the blood of the offering has been sprinkled. And this dilemma was raised in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: If one unwittingly misused consecrated property, it becomes desecrated and loses its elevated status. However, if one used the object intentionally, it is not desecrated and remains consecrated. Since the act here is intentional, the consecrated wood does not lose its status. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that when one intentionally uses this object it does not lose its status? Since it is not subject to the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, as one is liable to bring an offering only for unwitting misuse of consecrated property, it is not transferred to non-sacred status. The same halakha applies to the wood set aside for peace-offerings as well. Since at that stage it is not subject to the halakha of misuse of consecrated property, as that applies only after the animal’s blood has been sprinkled, then according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, even if one unwittingly uses this wood, it is not transferred to non-sacred status; rather, it remains prohibited. The Gemara asks: And anywhere the kindler of an oven transgresses the prohibition of misuse of consecrated property by using consecrated wood, is it transferred to non-sacred status? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to all prohibited items that must be burned, their ashes are permitted after the burning, except for wood from an asheira? And consecrated ash is prohibited forever. Therefore, it is possible that when one kindles an oven with this consecrated wood, although he misuses consecrated property, the ash remains prohibited. Rami bar Ḥama said: That baraita is discussing a case where a fire began on its own among consecrated wood and there is no one who misused consecrated property. Since this is the case, even the ash that is left from this wood remains consecrated property and one may not benefit from it. Rav Shemaya said: This baraita is dealing with those types of consecrated ash that require burial, such as the ash removed from the altar. As it was taught in a baraita: “And he shall take up the ash from where the fire has consumed the burnt-offering on the altar, and he shall put it beside the altar” (Leviticus 6:3). The phrase “And he shall put it” indicates that he must do so gently; “and he shall put it” also indicates that he must place all of it; “and he shall put it” also indicates that he may not scatter the ashes. Apparently, even after the offering has been burned it remains sacred, and one may not derive benefit from it. However, when it was burned it was not subject to misuse of consecrated property, as its burning is a necessary step in the process of sacrificing the offerings. It was taught in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: The removal of leavened bread is to be accomplished only through burning. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: The removal of leavened bread is to be accomplished only through burning. And a logical derivation leads to this conclusion: Just as that which is left over from an offering after the time period in which it may be eaten, which is not subject to the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, requires burning, so too, with regard to leavened bread, which is more stringent as it is subject to the prohibitions of: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, all the more so is it not clear that it requires burning? The Rabbis said to him: Any logical derivation that you derive whose initial teaching is stringent but whose subsequent consequences are lenient is not a valid logical derivation. According to Rabbi Yehuda, if one did not find wood to burn his leavened bread, must he sit idly and not remove it? And the Torah said: “You shall remove leaven from your houses” (Exodus 12:15), indicating that this must be done in any manner which you can remove it. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda’s logical derivation leads to a leniency. Then Rabbi Yehuda presented a different logical derivation based on the principle of: What do we find with regard to, rather than on an a fortiori inference (Rashash). It is prohibited to eat the leftover of offerings and it is prohibited to eat leavened bread. Based on this similarity, one can conclude that just as the leftover of offerings requires burning, so too, leavened bread requires burning. They said to him: The case of an animal carcass can prove that eating the leftover of offerings is not a factor in determining whether or not leavened bread requires burning, as eating an animal carcass is prohibited and it does not require burning. Therefore, there is no clear connection between the prohibition to eat a particular object and a requirement to burn it. He said to them: There is a difference between these cases, as it is explicitly stated that one may benefit from an animal corpse. Therefore, the following comparison can be made: It is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from the leftover of sacrificial meat, and it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from leavened bread. Just as the leftover of sacrificial meat requires burning, so too, leavened bread requires burning. The Rabbis said to him: The case of an ox that is stoned can prove that this is not a clear factor, as it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from such an ox and it does not require burning. He said to them: There is a difference between leavened bread and an ox that is stoned, as there is an additional factor that is not relevant to the ox. It is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from the leftover of sacrificial meat, and one who does so is punished with karet. And it is prohibited to eat and derive benefit from leavened bread, and one who does so is punished with karet. Just as the leftover of sacrificial meat requires burning, so too, leavened bread requires burning. They said to him: If so, the fats of an ox that is stoned can prove that this too is an insignificant factor, as it is prohibited to eat the fats and derive benefit from them, and one who eats them is punished with karet, and they do not require burning. Then Rabbi Yehuda presented a different logical derivation: The prohibition against eating and deriving benefit from leftover sacrificial meat is clearly included in the prohibition of: And you shall not leave over. And leavened bread is also included, in a sense, in the prohibition of: And you shall not leave over, as once the time it may be eaten expires, one violates the prohibitions of: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, by owning it. Just as leftover sacrificial meat is subject to burning, so too, leavened bread is subject to burning. They said to him: According to your opinion, an uncertain guilt-offering and a bird sacrificed as a sin-offering in a case of doubt will prove that this comparison is not valid, as they are also included in the prohibition of: And you shall not leave over, since these offerings are prohibited after the time in which they may be eaten has expired. As we say that they are subject to burning, but you say that an uncertain guilt-offering is subject to burial. Rabbi Yehuda was silent, as he had no response. Rav Yosef said: This is as people say: In the spoon that the carpenter made, the mustard will burn his palate. In other words, one can be harmed by his own actions. Similarly, in this case the strongest proof against Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is the one based on Rabbi Yehuda’s own statement. Abaye said another folk expression: He who made the stocks [saddana] shall sit in the stocks; he is repaid through his own handiwork. Rava said another similar saying: He who made the arrows shall be killed with his own arrows; he is repaid through his own handiwork. It was taught in the mishna: And the Rabbis say that leavened bread need not be burned; rather, one may even crumble it and throw it into the wind or the sea. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to what case are they speaking? Do they mean that he must specifically crumble it and throw it into the wind or crumble it and throw it into the sea? Or perhaps one may crumble it and throw it into the wind, but he may cast it into the sea in its pure, unadulterated form, without crumbling it first. We also learned in a mishna with regard to idolatry in a case like this that Rabbi Yosei says: He may grind the idol and throw the dust into the wind or cast it into the sea. And a dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to what case are they speaking? Must one specifically grind it and throw it into the wind or grind it and throw it into the sea? Or perhaps he may grind it and throw it into the wind; however, he may throw it into the sea in its pure, unadulterated form. Rabba said: It stands to reason that since idols are thrown into the Dead Sea, they do not need grinding, as there is no concern that they will be removed and used again. However, leavened bread that may be thrown into other rivers, needs crumbling before being cast away. Rav Yosef said to him: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable. Idols, which do not normally disintegrate in the water, need grinding. However, leavened bread, which disintegrates in the water on its own, does not need crumbling. A baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabba and a baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef. The Gemara explains: A baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabba: If one was walking in the desert with leavened bread in his hand and the time came on the eve of Passover to remove it, then he must crumble the leavened bread and throw it into the wind. If he was traveling on a ship, he must crumble the leavened bread and throw it into the sea. And a baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef: If one was walking in the desert and found an idol, he must grind it and throw it into the wind. If he was traveling on a ship, he must grind it and throw it into the sea. The Gemara comments: The requirement of grinding in one baraita is difficult for Rabba, since according to his opinion there is no need to grind idols before throwing them into the sea. And the requirement of crumbling leavened bread mentioned in the other baraita is difficult for Rav Yosef, as in his opinion leavened bread need not be crumbled before it is thrown into the sea. The Gemara answers: The requirement of grinding is not difficult for Rabba. This case, where one is not required to grind it, is where he throws it into the Dead Sea. That case, where he is required to grind it before throwing it, is where he throws it into other rivers. Similarly, the requirement of crumbling is not difficult for Rav Yosef. This case is dealing with a bag of wheat that became leavened. Since wheat does not disintegrate on its own, one must grind it up and scatter it into the water. That case is referring to bread. Since bread will disintegrate in the water on its own, there is no need to crumble it. MISHNA: It is permitted for a Jew to derive benefit from leavened bread of a gentile over which Passover has elapsed, i.e., leavened bread that remains after the conclusion of Passover. However, it is prohibited to derive benefit from leaven of a Jew over which Passover has elapsed, as it is stated: “And no leavened bread shall be seen with you, neither shall there be leaven seen with you, in all your borders” (Exodus 13:7). GEMARA: The Gemara begins by asking: Who is the author of the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. The Gemara clarifies this question: What is the case about which these Sages disagree, and what are their opinions on this issue? The Gemara explains: As it was taught in a baraita: One who eats or derives benefit from leavened bread, whether before its time, starting at midday on Passover eve, or after its time, i.e., leavened bread over which Passover has elapsed, transgresses a negative mitzva. During its time, on Passover itself, one who eats leavened bread transgresses a negative mitzva and is liable to receive karet. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon says: One who eats or derives benefit from leavened bread, both before its time and after its time, does not transgress any prohibition. During its time one is liable to receive karet and transgresses a negative mitzva for eating or deriving benefit from leavened bread. And from the time that it is prohibited to eat leavened bread, beginning at midday on Passover eve, it is also prohibited to derive benefit from it. The Gemara comments: With this last sentence we have come to the opinion of the first tanna, as this statement appears to present Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion and not that of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: Be astounded with yourself. How can it be prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread for all seven days? In other words, he disagrees with the premise that it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavened bread even during the seven days of Passover. The baraita discusses a related issue: From where is it derived that one who eats leavened bread on Passover eve from the sixth hour and onward transgresses a negative mitzva? As it is stated: “And you shall sacrifice the Paschal lamb to the Lord your God, of the flock and the herd, in the place which the Lord shall choose to cause His name to dwell there. You shall eat no leavened bread with it; for seven days you shall eat matzot, the bread of affliction” (Deuteronomy 16:2–3). The juxtaposition of the Paschal lamb with the prohibition of leavened bread teaches that the prohibition to eat leavened bread begins from the time that the Paschal lamb is slaughtered, namely, the afternoon of the fourteenth of Nisan. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon said to him: Is it possible to say this? Isn’t it already stated: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; for seven days you shall eat matzot”? Since the verse links the prohibition of leavened bread to the mitzva of eating matza, one should also say that one must eat matza on the fourteenth of Nisan. If so, what does it mean when the verse states: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it”? The verse indicates that at a time when he is under the obligation to get up and eat matza, he is subject to the prohibition of: You shall eat no leavened bread. And at a time when he is under no obligation to get up and eat matza, he is not subject to the prohibition of: You shall eat no leavened bread. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The Gemara explains: There are three verses that are written with regard to this prohibition, and in Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion each one teaches that the prohibition applies at a different time. One verse states: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten” (Exodus 13:3). Another verse states: “And all that which is leavened you shall not eat; in all your habitations you shall eat matzot” (Exodus 12:20). And a third verse states: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it” (Deuteronomy 16:3). One verse indicates that there is a prohibition against eating leavened bread even before its time, on Passover eve. One verse indicates that there is a prohibition against eating leavened bread after its time as well, if a Jew owned it during Passover. And one verse indicates that the prohibition applies during Passover itself. The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Shimon interpret these three verses? The Gemara explains: One verse is required to teach about the prohibition during its time. The verse: “And all that which is leavened you shall not eat” is required for another halakha, as it was taught in a baraita: I have derived that leavened bread is prohibited only if it became leavened on its own, through its own natural process. From where do I derive that if it became leavened due to another substance it is considered to be leavened bread as well? The verse states: “All that which is leavened you shall not eat.” This indicates that all leavened bread, no matter how it became so, is forbidden during Passover. The verse “Leavened bread shall not be eaten” is also required for another halakha. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: From where is it derived that the prohibition against eating leavened bread during the first Passover in Egypt applied for only one day? The verse states: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten,” and this is juxtaposed to the verse that states: “This day you go forth in the month of spring” (Exodus 13:4). This indicates that the prohibition against eating leavened bread during the first Passover in Egypt applied for only that one day. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda, from where does he derive that leavened bread that became leavened due to another substance is prohibited? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the fact that the Merciful One expresses this halakha with the general term: “That which is leavened”; no additional amplification is required. The Gemara asks: And this teaching of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili with regard to the Passover in Egypt, from where does Rabbi Yehuda derive it? The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that he derives it from the fact that the phrase “this day” is juxtaposed to it. In Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, the entire verse: “Leavened bread shall not be eaten” is not required to make this point; instead, this verse indicates that there is an additional time when leavened bread is prohibited. Nonetheless, the juxtaposition with the following phrase does indicate something significant, namely, that the prohibition in Egypt was limited to one day. If you wish, say instead that Rabbi Yehuda does not employ the homiletic method of juxtaposition of verses, except in limited circumstances. Accordingly, Rabbi Yehuda does not accept Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion at all and holds that the prohibition against eating leavened bread during the Passover in Egypt applied for all seven days. The Master said in the aforementioned baraita: From where is it derived that one who eats leavened bread from the sixth hour and onward transgresses a negative mitzva? As it is stated: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it”; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon said to him: And is it possible to say this? Isn’t it already stated: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; for seven days you shall eat matzot,” linking the time of the prohibition against eating leavened bread with the time of the mitzva to eat matza? The Gemara asks: And indeed, Rabbi Shimon is saying well to Rabbi Yehuda, so how does Rabbi Yehuda use this verse to support his opinion? The Gemara answers that Rabbi Yehuda could have said to you: That verse comes to establish it as an obligation even nowadays. One might have assumed that after the destruction of the Temple, when the Paschal lamb can no longer be brought, the obligation to eat matza no longer applies either. Therefore, the verse links the prohibition against eating leavened bread to the obligation to eat matza in order to teach that just as it is prohibited to eat leavened bread even in the absence of the Temple, so too, there remains an obligation to eat matza as well. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon, from where does he derive the need to establish it as an obligation even after the destruction of the Temple? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the following verse: “In the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month in the evening, you shall eat matzot, until the twenty-first day in the evening” (Exodus 12:18). This verse connects the obligation to eat matza to the date of Passover and not only to the Paschal lamb. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda, what does he derive from this verse? The Gemara answers: He requires it to teach that there remains an obligation for one who is ritually impure or on a distant journey and cannot bring the Paschal lamb. It could enter your mind to say that since he will not eat the Paschal lamb, he is also not obligated to eat matza and bitter herbs. Therefore, the verse teaches us that he is obligated to eat them. And Rabbi Shimon, from where does he derive this halakha? In his opinion, a verse is not necessary to teach that one who is ritually impure or on a distant journey is obligated to eat matza and bitter herbs, as he is no worse than an uncircumcised man or a resident alien. As it is written: “And no uncircumcised man shall eat of it” (Exodus 12:48). The added emphasis in “of it” indicates that only it, the Paschal lamb, he does not eat; however, he must eat matza and bitter herbs. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yehuda, how would he respond? The Gemara answers: Granted, the Torah did not need to add this verse. Nonetheless, it is written in this context that one who is impure or on a distant journey is obligated to eat matza and bitter herbs. And it is written in that context with regard to the uncircumcised man and the resident alien as well. After clarifying the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, the Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is the mishna taught? If one suggests that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, this cannot be, as Rabbi Yehuda said leavened bread without stipulation that the leavened bread belong to a Jew, indicating that one may not even benefit from leavened bread of a gentile over which Passover elapsed. Therefore, since this opinion contradicts the statement made in the mishna discussed here, Rabbi Yehuda can be ruled out as its author. And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Shimon also permits one to derive benefit from leavened bread after Passover even if it was owned by a Jew. And if the mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, he would permit one to derive benefit from it even during Passover. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: Actually, it is possible to explain that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and he derives the restrictions pertaining to the eating of leaven from the restrictions relating to seeing leaven. The prohibition against seeing leaven is worded: “It shall not be seen by you.” It is understood to mean that you should not see your own or another Jew’s leaven. But you may see leaven that belongs to others, i.e., gentiles, and leaven consecrated to God. Similarly, with regard to the prohibition against eating leaven that was owned by a Jew during Passover after Passover, you may not eat your own leavened bread, but you may eat the leavened bread of others or the leaven consecrated to God after Passover. And by right it should have taught that even the eating of leavened bread belonging to a gentile is permitted after the conclusion of Passover, but since the tanna taught that it is forbidden to derive benefit from leavened bread belonging to a Jew after Passover, he also taught that it is permitted to derive benefit from leavened bread belonging to a gentile. However, one should understand that it is permitted to eat this leavened bread as well. And similarly, by right it should have taught that even during Passover it is permitted to derive benefit from leavened bread that belongs to gentiles. But since the tanna taught about the leavened bread belonging to a Jew after Passover, he also taught about the leavened bread belonging to a gentile after Passover. Thus, one should not infer halakhot from the exact formulation of these details in the baraita, but rather understand that the mishna follows Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. Rava said: This is not so. Actually, our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. However, this is difficult, as Rabbi Shimon states that it is permitted for a Jew to derive benefit from leavened bread that had been owned by another Jew during Passover, while our mishna explicitly states that this is forbidden. This can be resolved by explaining that Rabbi Shimon argues that it is permitted only according to Torah law. However, one who intentionally commits such a transgression incurs a penalty. Since he transgressed the prohibition it shall not be seen and the prohibition it shall not be found, the Sages decreed that it is forbidden for him to derive benefit from this leavened bread. The Gemara comments: Granted, according to the opinion of Rava, this explanation is consistent with that which was taught in the mishna: Leavened bread that belonged to a Jew is forbidden because it is stated: “It shall not be seen” (Exodus 13:7). According to this explanation, the connection between the prohibition against deriving benefit from leavened bread that was owned by a Jew during Passover and the verse prohibiting seeing leaven during Passover is clear. The prohibition against deriving benefit from this leavened bread is a rabbinically instituted fine for transgressing the Torah prohibition of “It shall not be seen.” But according to the opinion of Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, which states that our mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and which renders forbidden by Torah law deriving benefit from leavened bread that was owned by a Jew during Passover, why is this verse cited? The mishna should have said that it is forbidden due to the verse “Leavened bread shall not be eaten” (Exodus 13:3), as that is the verse from which Rabbi Yehuda derives this prohibition. The Gemara answers: Do you hold that this proof is referring to the latter clause of the mishna, where the prohibition against deriving benefit from leavened bread owned by a Jew is discussed? It is referring to the first clause of the mishna, which discusses permission to derive benefit from leavened bread owned by a gentile, and this is what it is saying: Leavened bread of a gentile, over which Passover has elapsed, i.e., that remains after the conclusion of Passover, it is permissible to derive benefit from it, due to the verse where it is stated: “It shall not be seen by you.” This indicates that you may not see your own leaven, but you may see leaven that belongs to others and leaven consecrated to God. And he derives the details about the prohibition of eating leaven from the prohibition of seeing leaven. The verse “It shall not be seen by you” should be understood as an explanation of what is permitted and not as an explanation of what is forbidden. The Gemara comments that Rava and Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov follow their line of reasoning. For it was stated that they dispute this issue: With regard to one who eats leaven of a gentile over which Passover has elapsed, i.e., that remains after the conclusion of Passover, according to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, Rava said: He is flogged, as he has violated a Torah prohibition. And Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: He is not flogged. The Gemara explains: Rava said that according to Rabbi Yehuda, he is flogged, as Rabbi Yehuda does not derive the prohibition against eating leaven from the prohibition against seeing leaven. Instead, he derives the prohibition from a verse that does not use the words “to you,” and therefore leavened bread owned by a gentile over Passover is forbidden in all circumstances. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: He is not flogged, as Rabbi Yehuda learns the prohibition against eating leaven from the prohibition against seeing leaven, and thus it is limited to leavened bread owned by a Jew. The Gemara notes: Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov retracted that position on this matter. As it was taught in a baraita: One who eats consecrated leavened bread during the festival of Passover is guilty of misuse of consecrated items. If one performed this action unintentionally, then he must offer a guilt-offering to atone for using a consecrated item for non-sacred purposes. And some say: He is not guilty of misuse of consecrated items. The Gemara asks: To whom is the phrase in the baraita: Some say, referring? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana. As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana would render the status of Yom Kippur the same as that of Shabbat with regard to payment for damage caused by a person in violation of the prohibitions of that day. Just as one who desecrates Shabbat by intentionally causing damage to his fellow’s property, e.g., by lighting his stack of grain on fire, is liable to receive the death penalty, since one who intentionally desecrates Shabbat is punished by stoning and is therefore exempt from payment, the basis for this exemption being the principle that after committing multiple transgressions, one is punished only with the most severe punishment; so too, one who causes damage by desecrating Yom Kippur is liable to receive the death penalty, as this violation is punished with karet, i.e., spiritual death at the hand of Heaven, and is therefore exempt from payment. According to this position, one who eats leavened bread during Passover and is deserving of karet should also be exempt from other punishments, including the penalty for misuse of consecrated items. In any case, it is clear that both Sages mentioned in the baraita agree that leavened bread has monetary value. This must be due to the fact that one is permitted to derive benefit from it after Passover. Therefore, it appears that they both accept Rabbi Shimon’s position. Rav Yosef said: The dispute mentioned in this baraita should be understood differently. Both tanna’im in the baraita accept the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, which states that one may derive benefit from leavened bread during Passover, and thus, in principle, one should be permitted to derive benefit from this consecrated leavened bread. Yet, unlike non-sacred leavened bread, which one may sell to gentiles or feed to dogs, it is prohibited to use consecrated leavened bread in this way. Therefore, the question whether this leavened bread has any monetary value depends on the question whether one may redeem consecrated items in order to feed them to dogs, and it is about this point that the tanna’im disagree. The one who said that he misused consecrated items by using this leavened bread during Passover holds that one may redeem consecrated items in order to feed them to dogs. Because the food may be redeemed for this purpose, the consecrated leavened bread does have some monetary value, and therefore using it is considered misuse of consecrated items. And the one who said that he did not misuse consecrated items holds that consecrated property may not be redeemed for this purpose, but only in order to provide food for a Jewish person. In this case, since it is forbidden to eat this leavened bread during Passover, the consecrated leavened bread has no value at all at this time. Therefore, one who eats such leavened bread is not guilty of misuse of consecrated items. The Gemara comments: Rav Aḥa bar Rava taught this halakha in the name of Rav Yosef with the following formulation: Everyone agrees that one may not redeem consecrated items in order to feed them to dogs. And here, they disagree with regard to the question of whether an item that can cause a financial loss is considered to be of monetary value. The Sages disagree about the status of an object that does not have any present value but if lost or destroyed will cause the owner financial loss. In other words, they disagree as to whether such an item is considered to have inherent value. This dispute can be applied to our discussion of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who states that one is permitted to eat leavened bread after Passover even if it was owned by a Jew. The Gemara explains: The one who said that he misused consecrated property by using consecrated leavened bread during Passover holds that an item that can cause a financial loss is considered to be of monetary value. Although the leavened bread is currently worthless, it can be eaten after Passover and will have some value at that time. It is therefore considered to have monetary value now, such that one who uses it is guilty of misuse of consecrated items. And the one who said that he did not misuse consecrated property holds that an item that can cause a financial loss is not considered to be of monetary value. Therefore, since the leavened bread is currently worthless, one who uses it would not be guilty of misuse of consecrated property. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov explains the issue as follows: Everyone agrees that an item that can cause a financial loss is considered to be of monetary value, and here they disagree with regard to the same point of dispute as Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. The opinion of the one who said that he did not misuse consecrated items is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that one may not derive benefit from leavened bread that was owned by a Jew during Passover. Thus, the consecrated leavened bread is worthless, since it will remain prohibited after Passover as well. And the one who said that he misused consecrated items is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that one may derive benefit from leavened bread after the conclusion of Passover even if it was owned by a Jew during Passover. Therefore, the consecrated leavened bread is considered to be of monetary value, and one who uses it is guilty of misuse of consecrated items. The Gemara raises a challenge: But isn’t it Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov who said that Rabbi Yehuda derives the details of the prohibition against eating leaven from the details of the prohibition against seeing leaven? Just as it is permitted to see the leavened bread of a gentile or of God, so too, it is permitted to eat this type of leavened bread after Passover. Therefore, consecrated leavened bread would be permitted after Passover even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rather, it should be understood that Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov retracted that explanation of Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, and agrees with Rava, who explains that Rabbi Yehuda maintains that any leavened bread in existence during Passover is forbidden afterward. Rav Ashi said that everyone agrees that one does not redeem consecrated property in order to feed it to dogs, and similarly, everyone agrees that an item that can cause a financial loss is not considered to be of monetary value. And here, in this baraita, they disagree with regard to the same point of dispute as do Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis. The opinion of the one who said that he misused consecrated items by eating the consecrated leavened bread is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who maintains that one may derive benefit from leavened bread that belongs to a Jew even during the seven days of Passover. Therefore, since the leavened bread has some value, one is guilty of misuse of consecrated items by using it. And the opinion of the one who said that he did not misuse consecrated items is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that one may not derive benefit from leavened bread during Passover, thus rendering the consecrated leavened bread worthless. Although it may have some value after Passover, an item that can cause a financial loss is not considered to be of monetary value, and therefore it is presently considered to be worthless. Rav said: With regard to leavened bread that becomes mixed with permitted food, the following distinction applies. During its time of prohibition, i.e., during the seven days of Passover, leavened bread is forbidden whether it is mixed with its own type, for example, when leavened flour is mixed with matza flour or when unleavened matza is mixed with leavened matza, or it is mixed with another type of substance. Not during its time of prohibition, but rather after Passover, if it is mixed with its own type of substance, then it is prohibited. However, if it is mixed with another type of substance, then it is permitted. The Gemara asks: With what are we dealing? If you say that there is enough leavened bread such that it gives flavor to the mixture, i.e., at least one part in sixty, then if it is not during its time and mixed with another type of substance, why is it permitted? Doesn’t it give flavor to the mixture, and, as one who eats this mixture will distinguish the forbidden flavor, the entire mixture is forbidden? Rather, this case is dealing with any amount, a minimal quantity of leavened bread that has been mixed with a large quantity of matza. The halakha in this case is that leavened bread during its time of prohibition is forbidden, whether it is mixed with its own type of substance or with another type of substance. This statement of Rav conforms to his line of reasoning as follows: As it is Rav and Shmuel who both say: With regard to any foods forbidden by the Torah that become mixed with permitted foods, if the permitted food is of its own type, such that it is impossible to distinguish one from another, then even any amount of the prohibited substance renders the entire mixture prohibited. However, if the forbidden food was mixed with another type of substance, then the mixture becomes prohibited only when there is enough of the forbidden item to give flavor to the mixture. Rav rendered an additional decree prohibiting leavened bread during its time of prohibition, when that leavened bread is mixed with another type of food even when only a small bit of it is mixed in, due to the prohibition against consuming a comparable mixture with its own type of substance. Owing to the severity of the prohibition against consuming leavened bread during Passover, Rav thought it necessary to render this additional decree. Rav’s statement that leavened bread is forbidden not during its time, when it is mixed with its own type of substance, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says that according to the Torah, leavened bread is forbidden even after Passover, and thus even a mixture of it is prohibited. But if it is mixed with another type of substance it is permitted, because there is no need to go so far as to render a decree with regard to a mixture with another type of substance not during its time, due to the prohibition of a mixture with the same type of substance. Rav maintains that when any prohibited item falls into a mixture of a different type of substance, it is nullified, unless it gives flavor to the new mixture. Therefore, the same principle should apply to leavened bread after Passover, and a small amount should be nullified once the more serious prohibition no longer applies to it. In contrast, Shmuel said that if leavened bread becomes mixed with permitted food during its time of prohibition, then the following distinction applies: If it becomes mixed with its own type of food it is forbidden, but if it becomes mixed with another type of food it is permitted. If it becomes mixed together not during its time of prohibition, but after Passover, then regardless of whether it becomes mixed with its own type or with another type of substance, it is permitted. With regard to the statement that leavened bread mixed with the same type of substance during its time of prohibition is forbidden, Shmuel conforms to his line of reasoning below: As it is Rav and Shmuel who both say: With regard to any foods prohibited by the Torah that become mixed with permitted foods, if the permitted food is of its own type, such that it is impossible to distinguish one from another, then even any amount of the prohibited substance renders the entire mixture prohibited. However, if the prohibited food is mixed with another type of substance, then the mixture becomes prohibited only when there is enough of the forbidden item to give flavor to the mixture. And Shmuel did not render a decree prohibiting a mixture with another type of substance, due to the prohibition against consuming a mixture with its same type. However, not during its time, but rather after Passover, the mixture is permitted, regardless of whether it was mixed with its own type or with another type. And this statement is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who states that after Passover one may derive benefit from leavened bread that was owned by a Jew during Passover. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to leavened bread that falls into a mixture during its time of prohibition, whether it is mixed with its own type of substance or another type of substance, it becomes prohibited only when there is enough of the forbidden item to give flavor to the mixture. However, not during its time of prohibition, but rather after Passover, it is always permitted, regardless of whether it falls into a mixture of its own type of substance or whether it falls into a mixture of another type of substance. The Gemara explains this position: With regard to the statement that leavened bread that falls into a mixture during its time of prohibition, whether with its own type of food or with another type of food, then it is prohibited only when it gives flavor to the mixture, Rabbi Yoḥanan conforms to his line of reasoning below. As it is Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish who both say: With regard to any foods forbidden by the Torah that fall into a mixture, whether of its own type of food or another type of food, the mixture is prohibited when there is enough of the forbidden item to give flavor to the mixture. If less than this amount falls into the mixture, it is nullified by the large majority of permitted food. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement that not during its time of prohibition, but rather after Passover, it is permitted, regardless of whether it falls into a mixture of its own type of food or into a mixture of another type of food, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that leavened bread owned by a Jew during Passover is not prohibited afterward. Rava said: The halakha is that with regard to the prohibition against eating a mixture of leavened bread during its time of prohibition, i.e., during Passover, regardless of whether it is mixed with its own type or with another type, it is forbidden, even if any amount becomes mixed in, in accordance with the opinion of Rav. Not during its time of prohibition, but rather after the conclusion of Passover, regardless of whether the leavened bread was mixed with its own type or with another type, it is permitted, even when it gives flavor to the mixture. This is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who states that leavened bread owned by a Jew during Passover is permitted after Passover. The Gemara asks: Did Rava actually say this, that according to Rabbi Shimon, leavened bread owned by a Jew on Passover is permitted after Passover? But didn’t Rava himself say that Rabbi Shimon imposed a penalty forbidding one from deriving benefit from leavened bread owned by a Jew during Passover, since he transgressed the prohibition it shall not be seen and the prohibition it shall not be found? The Gemara resolves this challenge: This penalty applies only to leavened bread that is in its pure unadulterated form, but with regard to a mixture, no, one does not impose a penalty, even though the leavened bread is still extant. The Gemara adds: And Rava follows his line of reasoning, stated elsewhere, that indicates that he rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rava said: While we were studying in Rav Naḥman’s house, on the evening when the seven days of Passover had passed, he said to us: Go and buy leavened bread from the gentiles who baked it on that day, the last day of Passover. Based on this story, it is clear that he maintained that one may eat leavened bread that was owned by a gentile during Passover. Rav said: Earthenware pots in which leavened bread was cooked during Passover should be broken, as some small quantity of the flavor of the leavened bread was absorbed into the pot. It is therefore prohibited to cook in them again, as the forbidden flavor of this leavened bread would be transmitted to the new food. The Gemara asks: And why was Rav so stringent with regard to these pots? Let him retain the pots until after the conclusion of Passover and prepare mixtures of another type of food in them. Even Rav maintains that when a small bit of leavened bread is mixed with another type of food after Passover, the mixture is permitted. The Gemara explains that he did not allow this due to a rabbinic decree that perhaps one will come to prepare a mixture of the same type in these pots, causing their contents to become prohibited. He therefore instructed that one destroy these pots in order to avoid this pitfall. And Shmuel said: They need not be broken. Rather, he should retain them until after its time, i.e., the conclusion of Passover, and then he may prepare food of either the same type or another type in them. And Shmuel follows his line of reasoning, stated elsewhere, as Shmuel said to the pot merchants, who would dramatically raise their prices after Passover: Level the prices for your pots. And if you do not bring your prices down, I will teach you that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that one is permitted to derive benefit from leavened bread after Passover. This ruling would lead people to retain their vessels and desist from purchasing new vessels after Passover, and consequently the merchants would lose business. The Gemara asks: Let him indeed teach this ruling to them, for Shmuel holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as was previously mentioned. As such, why did he not publicize his opinion on the matter? The Gemara answers: It was Rav’s locale, and therefore it would not be appropriate for Shmuel to publicly present a position with which Rav did not agree. However, when he saw the merchants raising their prices in an unfair manner, he nevertheless threatened to make his opinion on the matter public. The Gemara recounts: There was a certain oven that they smeared with grease from meat, and consequently the flavor of meat was absorbed into it, and then they used it to bake bread. Rava bar Ahilai prohibited eating this bread even with salt, and not just with milk. This status would apply forever to bread baked in this oven, even during subsequent baking, lest one eat such bread with kutaḥ, a dairy-based seasoning, which would be a violation of the prohibition against eating meat with milk. The Gemara raises an objection to this statement: It was taught that one may not knead the dough with milk, and if he did knead the dough with milk, then all of the bread is prohibited due to concern that he will commit a habitual transgression. As one habitually eats bread with meat, there is a concern that one will come to eat this bread with meat as well, unwittingly transgressing the prohibition against eating meat with milk. Similarly, one may not smear the inside of an oven with the fat tail [alya] of a sheep, because it is meat. And if one did smear it over the oven, then all of the bread baked in it is prohibited, lest one accidentally eat this bread with milk. However, this applies only until one kindles the oven and burns off this fat. The Gemara infers from this baraita that if the oven was kindled afterward then it is permitted in any case. This would seem to present a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rava bar Ahilai who maintains that the bread cooked in this oven is prohibited forever, even after the oven is rekindled. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation of his opinion. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Since the statement of Rava bar Ahilai was refuted, why did Rav say that pots that were used for leavened bread on Passover should be broken? Presumably, their status could be remedied in the same way as was that of this oven, by heating them on a fire until the flavor of the leavened bread absorbed in them was removed. Rav Ashi said to him: There is a distinction between these two cases. There, it is referring to a metal oven, which can be cleansed through an additional kindling, while here, it is referring to an earthenware pot, where additional kindling is insufficient, as the earthenware has the capacity to absorb more of the flavor of the leavened bread and it cannot be purged by fire. If you wish, say instead that both this, the oven, and that, the pot, are earthenware, but that the following distinction applies. This, the oven, is kindled from the inside, and as the fire is kindled inside the oven itself, it consumes the absorbed flavor of the leavened bread. While that, the pot, is kindled from the outside, such that the flavor of the prohibited material absorbed in the pot is not purged by the fire. And if you say, so too here, in the case of the pot, he should perform the kindling procedure on the pots from the inside to remove that which has been absorbed, this is not reasonable. Presumably, the owner of the pot will be concerned lest it burst if he makes the pot too hot. Therefore, he will not use sufficient heat to ensure that the leavened bread that has been absorbed will be completely purged. The Gemara concludes: Therefore, based on this principle, this griddle made from earthenware tiles that was used to bake bread is a type of oven where the kindling is from the outside and therefore prohibited. But if he fills it with burning coals, then it seems well and it can be used afterward. Because this vessel is often subject to a high level of heat, the owner will not be concerned that it will break when heated. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: With regard to these knives, how do we prepare them for use during Passover? Rav Ashi said to him: For me, personally, we craft new ones. Ravina said to him: It works out well for Master, as you are able to afford new knives. However, what should one who is unable to purchase new knives do? He said to him: I was speaking of making them like new by thoroughly cleaning them in the following manner: One should cover the wooden handles in mud, so that they will not be burned, and heat the metal with fire until it is white-hot. And then I place the handles of the knives in boiling water in order to remove anything that had been absorbed into the wood. And the halakha is that with regard to both this, the blade, and that, the handle, it is sufficient to immerse them in boiling water, so long as this water is still in a primary vessel. The water must still be in the original pot in which it was boiled and not poured from another pot. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: A wooden ladle should be purged in boiling water in a primary vessel in order to remove the flavor of the forbidden food that it absorbed. The Gemara states: He holds in accordance with the principle: As it absorbs the flavor of the forbidden substance, so it emits it. The same cooking method and level of heat that caused the flavor of the forbidden substance to be absorbed in the vessel suffices to discharge the flavor of that substance from the vessel. Therefore, a ladle that absorbed flavor of leavened bread from a pot of boiling water which was over a fire will discharge the flavor of leavened bread once it is placed in the boiling water again. They raised a dilemma before Ameimar: Concerning certain glazed [konya] earthenware vessels, what is the halakha with regard to using them during Passover? The Gemara explains: With regard to green vessels, the dilemma need not even be raised, as they are certainly prohibited as their coating does not prevent them from absorbing the flavor of leavened bread. Let the dilemma be raised with regard to black and white vessels: What is the halakha here? And furthermore, the dilemma need not be raised when they have cracks; as the leavened bread will remain stuck in these cracks, they are certainly prohibited. Let the dilemma be raised with regard to smooth vessels: What is the halakha in that case? Ameimar said to him: I saw that some of the liquid is expelled [demidayeti]? from the outside of the vessel. Apparently they absorb and are therefore prohibited, as they cannot be prepared for use on Passover through cleansing, and the Torah testified about earthenware vessels that when they absorb the flavor of a prohibited substance, they will never leave their defective status and they remain permanently prohibited. The Torah states that a person may cleanse other vessels by scouring and rinsing them, whereas it states that earthenware vessels must be broken. The Gemara asks: What is different about wine used for a libation, with regard to which the halakha of earthenware vessels is more lenient? As Mareimar taught: A glazed earthenware vessel is permitted whether it is black, white, or green if it was used to store wine belonging to gentiles. Any wine that came in contact with gentiles is suspected of having been poured as a libation offering to idolatry. And if you say that it is possible to distinguish between the prohibition of wine used for a libation, which is a rabbinic prohibition, and that of leavened bread, which is forbidden by Torah law, this is difficult, as all ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted similar to Torah law. Once they have declared that this item is prohibited, the principles applicable to Torah prohibitions apply to it as well. Ameimar said to him: The distinction between the two cases is that with regard to this vessel, which is used for cooking during Passover, its primary use is with hot foods, and therefore the flavor of the leavened bread has become absorbed within its walls. But with regard to this vessel, which is used to store wine, its primary use is with cool liquids, which are not absorbed to the same degree. The Gemara continues discussing the ways that a vessel must be cleansed so that it can be used during Passover. Rava bar Abba said that Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Shmuel said: Any vessel that was used for leavened bread only while cool can be used for matza, because no flavor of the leavened bread was absorbed by the vessel. The exception to this rule is the leaven container where the yeast was stored, since its leavening is more potent, and it can be assumed that the flavor from the yeast has entered the walls of the vessel even without heat. Rav Ashi said: And the spice container, in which potent spices that contained flour were stored, has the same status as the leaven container whose leavening is potent. Rava said: With regard to certain bowls of Meḥoza, since it is common to knead leavened bread in them and then store the leavened bread in them, they are considered to be like a leaven container whose leavening is potent. The Gemara asks: Why did Rava find it necessary to make this statement? Isn’t it obvious that these bowls are the same as a leaven container? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that since these bowls are spacious, the air dominates them and they do not absorb the leavened bread in the same way as does a leaven container, therefore, he teaches us that no such distinction applies. MISHNA: If a gentile lent money to a Jew, and the Jew gave him leavened bread as collateral until after Passover, and after Passover the gentile retains this leavened bread in lieu of payment, then one is permitted to derive benefit from this leavened bread. Since the leavened bread was retained by the gentile based on the transfer that took place prior to Passover, the leavened bread is considered to have belonged to the gentile during Passover. Whereas if a Jew lent money to a gentile, and leavened bread was given as collateral during Passover in the same manner as in the previous case, then after Passover it is forbidden to derive benefit from this leavened bread. Since this leavened bread was considered to be in the Jew’s property during Passover, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it afterward. GEMARA: It was stated that the amora’im disagree about the rights of a creditor with regard to collateral. Abaye said: He retroactively collects the property. In a case where the creditor had a lien on the property of the debtor and the debtor defaults on the loan, it is considered as if the creditor acquired rights to the collateral at the time of the loan and not at the time of collection. And Rava said: This is not the case, but rather, he acquires the collateral from that point forward, and has rights to the collateral only from the time that the loan was due. This dispute has ramifications for the status of the property, and actions undertaken with regard to it, during the intervening period. The Gemara sets several limitations on the scope of this dispute: Anywhere that the debtor consecrated or sold the field that was serving as collateral, everyone agrees that the creditor can come and seize this property and override the sale, because its status as collateral preceded its sale. Or if the debtor consecrated the property, the creditor can come and redeem it through a symbolic payment to the Temple. As we learned in a mishna: The creditor may add an additional dinar to the amount of the loan and redeem this property. Although strictly speaking he need not redeem it, this payment was instituted so that it would not appear as though property were removed from the consecrated Temple jurisdiction without a payment. When they disagree is in a case when the creditor sold or consecrated the property in the interim between the giving of the collateral and the time the loan was due. Abaye said: He retroactively acquires the collateral. Since the time arrived and he did not repay his loan, it has become clear retroactively that it was in the creditor’s jurisdiction at the outset. Therefore, he did well to consecrate or sell it. However, Rava said: He collects it from that point forward, since if the borrower had money he would remove the creditor’s lien with this money and the lender would not acquire the property. It is found that the creditor acquires the property now, at the time when the loan is due, and consequently he did not have the right to consecrate or sell it before this time. Before bringing proofs for either side of this dispute, the Gemara attempts to clarify Rava’s position. Did Rava actually say this? A statement he makes in a different context appears to contradict the one made in his name here. But didn’t Rami bar Ḥama say: Reuven sold a field to Shimon with a guarantee that if the field is repossessed, Reuven will compensate Shimon for his loss. Shimon did not pay for the purchase, and instead set up the value of the field as a loan. In the meantime, Reuven died and a creditor of Reuven’s came to collect for a loan that Reuven had taken before he sold the field, as Reuven had no other land remaining, and he seized the land from Shimon, since it was mortgaged to this loan. And Shimon went and appeased the creditor with money so the creditor would allow him to keep this field. By right, Reuven’s sons can come and say to Shimon that he must pay them the money that he owes for the field. And they are not required to pay Shimon if he demands compensation for the repossession of his field. They can say that our father left us movable property in your hands, i.e., the money you owe us for the field, and, as a general rule, movable property that has been left to orphans is not mortgaged to a creditor. The orphans can claim that the field belongs to Shimon, and as there is no land left for the orphans, there is no way for Shimon to recover the compensation that he is owed. The money he owes Reuven is considered movable property, and therefore he cannot recover his losses from these funds. And Rava said with regard to this case: If Shimon is clever he will pay them what he owes with real estate and not with money. Since they now have real estate received from their father’s estate, Shimon can then collect the field from them as compensation for the original field that Reuven sold to Shimon. As Rav Naḥman said: When orphans collect real estate for a debt owed to their father from one person, another creditor can come and seize this land from them in order to repay the father’s debt. The Gemara applies this discussion to our original case. Granted, if you say that a creditor collects retroactively, and the field is considered as though it belonged to the creditor from the time of the loan, due to this reason, he can then collect the money from them, because it is considered as though he collected it during their father’s lifetime. Because the field given by Shimon to repay his debt retroactively belonged to Reuven from the time that Shimon agreed to pay for the field, therefore Shimon can now claim this land from Reuven’s heirs. However, if you say that he collects it from this point forward, why can he then collect this land from them? It is as though the orphans purchased this property. And if orphans buy property, does it become indebted to a creditor of their father? Only property that belonged to the father can be seized in order to pay back his debt, and therefore Rava’s statement in the case appears to contradict his statement with regard to the transfer of ownership of collateral. The Gemara resolves this contradiction: It is different there, in this case, as Shimon could have said to Reuven’s children that just as I am indebted to your father, so too, I am indebted to your father’s creditor. And this principle can be learned from the statement of Rabbi Natan that one who lends to one person and borrows from another can be considered as a middleman between his creditor and his borrower. As it was taught in a baraita, Rabbi Natan says: From where is it derived that when one lends one hundred dinar [maneh] to his fellow, and that fellow lends a similar sum to a third fellow, that we take the money from this one, the second debtor, and give it to that one, the first creditor, without going through the middleman, who is both the first debtor and the second creditor? The verse states: “And he shall give it to him whom he has wronged” (Numbers 5:7), which indicates that the loan should be repaid to the creditor to whom the money is ultimately owed. Therefore, payment is made to the original creditor regardless of the issue of retroactive acquisition of the collateral. The Gemara proceeds to bring proofs for the two sides of the question of retroactive acquisition. We learned in the mishna: If a gentile lent money to a Jew, and the Jew gave him leavened bread as collateral during Passover, and after Passover the gentile attained this leavened bread in lieu of payment, then one is permitted to derive benefit from the leavened bread. The Gemara attempts to clarify this position: Granted, if you say that he retroactively collects this property, and the leavened bread was acquired retroactively by the gentile, it is due to this that one is permitted to derive benefit from it after Passover. But if you say that he collects it from this point forward, then why should one be permitted to derive benefit from this leavened bread? The leavened bread was in the possession of a Jew during Passover, and therefore it should be forbidden. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? With a case where he deposited [hirhin] the leavened bread with the gentile in his home, and since the leavened bread was in the gentile’s possession during Passover, it is considered as if it belonged to the gentile, provided the gentile ultimately retains ownership of the leavened bread when the Jew defaults on the loan. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. As it was taught: If a Jew lends money to a gentile and the gentile gives him leavened bread as collateral, then the Jew does not commit any transgression after Passover. They said in the name of Rabbi Meir that he commits a transgression. What, isn’t it that they disagree about this, that one Sage, Rabbi Meir, holds that the Jew transgresses by owning leavened bread because he retroactively collects the leavened bread and has therefore owned it during Passover, and one Sage, who states that the Jew does not commit a transgression, holds that he collects it from this point forward, and therefore it was not considered to be in his possession during Passover? The Gemara rejects this explanation: And how can you understand it that way? Say the latter clause of that baraita: However, if a gentile lends money to a Jew with leavened bread as collateral, then after Passover everyone agrees that he commits a transgression. However, if the preceding explanation is correct, it needed to state the opposite of what it said in the first clause, as the case in the latter clause is the reverse of that in the first clause. Namely, according to the one who said there, in the first clause of the baraita, that he does not commit a transgression, he should say that here, in this case, he does commit a transgression. And according to the one who said there, in the first clause of the baraita, that he does commit a transgression, he should say that here, in the latter clause, he does not commit a transgression. For if the creditor retroactively acquires the collateral, then it is as though it belonged to a gentile during Passover, and therefore the Jew would not have committed a transgression by owning it. Rather, with what are we dealing here? With a situation where he, the gentile debtor, deposited the leavened bread that was serving as collateral with him, the Jewish creditor, and they disagree with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak. As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: From where is it derived that a creditor acquires collateral given to him, and is considered its owner so long as the item is in his possession? As it is stated: “You shall surely return the pledge to him when the sun goes down, that he may sleep in his garment, and bless you; and it shall be a righteousness for you before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 24:13). Rabbi Yitzḥak infers: If the creditor does not acquire the collateral, then from where is the righteousness involved in returning it? In this case, the creditor would not be giving up anything of his own. From here it is learned that a creditor acquires the collateral. The Gemara applies this principle to the explanation of the baraita: The first tanna holds that this applies only when a Jew takes collateral from a fellow Jew, such that I would read and apply the verse “It shall be righteousness for you” and establish that the collateral becomes the property of the lender. However, the verse does not speak about the case where a Jew takes collateral from a gentile, and therefore he does not acquire the collateral; it still belongs to the gentile. Therefore, when a Jew has leavened bread as collateral from a gentile to whom he lent money on Passover, he does not violate any prohibition, as the collateral still belongs to the gentile. However, Rabbi Meir holds that one can derive an a fortiori inference: If a Jew acquires collateral from another Jew, all the more so is it not clear that he will he acquire collateral from a gentile? However, with regard to a gentile who lends money to a Jew with leavened bread as collateral, everyone agrees that he transgresses this prohibition after Passover. There, in that case, the gentile certainly does not acquire collateral from the Jew, and such a transaction could be completed only via the usual modes of acquisition. We learned in the mishna: If a gentile lent money to a Jew, and the Jew gave him leavened bread as collateral until after Passover, and after Passover he retains this leavened bread in lieu of payment, then one is permitted to derive benefit from this leavened bread. Even granted that this is referring to a case where he deposited the leavened bread with him, the gentile, didn’t you say that a gentile does not acquire collateral from a Jew, and if this is the case, then why is it permissible to derive benefit from this leavened bread? According to the previously stated principle, this leavened bread remains Jewish property. The Gemara resolves this question: This is not difficult, for this case, where the gentile acquires the leavened bread and therefore it is permitted to derive benefit from it, is when the gentile said to him that if he does not repay his loan, then the collateral will be acquired from now, i.e., from the time of the loan. And that case, where it is forbidden to derive benefit from the leavened bread, is when he did not say that it would be acquired from now by the gentile. From where do you say that he distinguishes between a case where he said that the collateral would be acquired from now and a case where he did not say that it would be acquired from now? As it was taught in a baraita: If a gentile deposited with a Jew bread baked in an oven [purni] as collateral for a loan, then he, the Jew, does not transgress the prohibition it shall not be seen and the prohibition it shall not be found. However, if he said to him: I have made them yours from now if I do not repay my loan, then it is considered as though the bread belonged to the Jew, and he transgresses this prohibition. If one assumes that there is no difference between a case where the debtor says: From now, and a case where he doesn’t say: From now, then what is different in the first clause of the baraita and what is different in the latter clause? Rather, must one not conclude from it that there is a difference between a case where he says to him that he will acquire it from now and a case where he does not say to him that he will acquire it from now? The Gemara concurs: Indeed, conclude from it that this is the case. The Sages taught in the Tosefta: With regard to the case of a store owned by a Jew and whose contents belong to the Jew, and gentile workers would enter there periodically, then it is forbidden to derive benefit from the leavened bread that is found there after Passover, and needless to say, it is forbidden to eat this leavened bread, for it is presumed to belong to the Jewish owner. Conversely, if a store is owned by a gentile and its contents belong to the gentile, and Jewish workers enter and exit the store, then it can be presumed that the leavened bread that is found there after Passover belonged to the gentile, and therefore one is permitted to eat it after Passover. And needless to say, it is permitted to derive benefit from this leavened bread. MISHNA: Leavened bread upon which a rockslide has fallen is considered as though it has been eliminated, and it is not necessary to dig it up in order to burn it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Any leavened bread that has been covered to such an extent that a dog cannot search after it is considered to have been eliminated. GEMARA: Rav Ḥisda said: Although it is not necessary to dig up the leavened bread, one is nevertheless required to nullify the leavened bread in his heart lest it become exposed during Passover. Although it may not be visible at the moment, this leavened bread may be uncovered during Passover, and he will transgress a prohibition by its being seen. It was taught in the Tosefta: How much, how deep, will a dog search? It will search three handbreadths deep. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Yosef, said to Rav Ashi: With regard to that which Shmuel said, that deposited money is considered to be guarded securely by an unpaid bailee, who would nonetheless not be responsible if it were stolen, only when it is buried in the ground, is it necessary to bury this deposited money three handbreadths deep, comparable to leavened bread, or not? He said to him: Here, with regard to Passover, the concern is that the dog will find the food due to its smell, and therefore three handbreadths are required. There, in the case of money, it is necessary to bury the money in order to conceal it from view. Therefore, it is not required to bury it three handbreadths deep, as animals will not search for it and people will not see it. The Gemara asks: If this is the case, then how deep is one required to bury it? Rafram bar Pappa from the city of Sikhra said: One handbreadth is sufficient for the money to be considered concealed. MISHNA: If one unwittingly eats teruma of leavened bread on Passover, not realizing that the food was teruma, then he must pay the principal and an additional fifth. This is because one who unwittingly eats teruma must compensate the priest for the value of the teruma and add a fifth of the value, even though the teruma is considered to be valueless on Passover. If he intentionally ate the teruma then he is exempt from payment; as he is liable to receive the severe punishment of karet, he is therefore exempt from the lesser punishment of payment. If he ate impure teruma in this manner then he is not even required to pay its monetary value in wood, for one who derives benefit from impure teruma calculates its value by treating it as though it were fuel for burning. While impure teruma can be used in this manner during the rest of the year, one may not derive any benefit from leavened bread on Passover, and therefore such teruma is worthless. GEMARA: We learned in a mishna there, in Terumot: One who unwittingly eats teruma pays the principal and an additional fifth, both one who eats it, and one who drinks it. And even with regard to one who anoints himself with the teruma oil, both in a case of ritually impure teruma as well as in a case of ritually pure teruma, he must pay an additional fifth if he unwittingly consumes this teruma. If he unwittingly consumes this fifth then he must pay an additional fifth of the fifth. The original fifth has a status comparable to teruma itself, and therefore one is required to pay an additional fifth for consuming it. A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the laws of teruma: When he pays for this teruma, does he pay according to the measure of the teruma or according to its monetary value? The Gemara explains the question in greater detail: Anywhere that the teruma is worth four zuz at the outset, i.e., at the time he consumed the teruma, and is worth only one zuz at the end, at the time of payment, do not raise a dilemma, for in that case he is certainly required to pay according to the monetary value at the outset. The rationale behind this ruling is that he is no worse than a thief, and therefore the law in this case is the same as if he had stolen property from another person. As we learned in a mishna: All thieves must repay what they have stolen according to the value of the stolen object at the time it was stolen, even if its value subsequently goes down. You can raise the dilemma, however, with regard to a case where it was worth one zuz at the outset, when it was consumed, and at the end, at the time of the payment, it was worth four zuz. What is the ruling in that case? Does he pay according to the measure of teruma, as the treasurer of the consecrated property can say to him: You ate a se’a and you must pay a se’a, even if the value of the teruma has increased, or perhaps he must repay according to the monetary value, and if he ate a zuz worth of teruma then he must pay a zuz? Rav Yosef said: Come and hear an answer to this question from what was taught in a baraita: One who ate dried figs that were teruma and paid the priest with dates, may a blessing rest upon him, as dates are worth more than dried figs. Granted, if you say that one must repay according to the measure of teruma he ate, it is due to this that a blessing should rest upon him, as he ate a se’a of dried figs that are worth one zuz and gave in return a se’a of dates worth four zuz. However, if you say that he must repay according to the monetary value of the teruma, then why should a blessing rest upon him? He ate a zuz worth of teruma and he paid a zuz worth as compensation; what is laudatory about his payment? Abaye said: Actually, one can explain that he must repay according to the monetary value of the teruma, and why is it stated that a blessing should rest upon him? This is because he ate an item that buyers don’t jump at, i.e., it is undesirable to buyers, but paid with an item that buyers jump at. Consequently, although the produce he gives is worth no more than the produce he ate, the priest still prefers this type of payment, as he can more easily resell this produce. The Gemara seeks proof with regard to this dispute: We learned in the mishna: One who unwittingly eats teruma of leavened bread on Passover must pay the principal and an additional fifth. Granted, if you say that he must pay according to the measure of teruma that he ate, it is well. As he ate a se’a of teruma he must also repay a se’a. However, if you say that he must pay according to the monetary value of the teruma, this is difficult, for is leavened bread on Passover of any monetary value? Certainly it is not worth anything, given that it is forbidden to benefit from this food. The Gemara answers: Yes, this leavened bread does indeed have monetary value. In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who said that it is permissible to derive benefit from leavened bread on Passover. The Gemara challenges this suggestion: If that is so, then say the latter clause of the mishna, where it is stated: If he consumes the teruma intentionally, then he is exempt from payment and from paying the priest for its monetary value as wood. But if this follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, then why is he exempt from payment to the priest for the value of the teruma and for its monetary value in wood? Although he is exempt from paying the additional fifth as he acted intentionally, he nonetheless should be required to compensate the priest for the financial loss he caused him, as in any other case of theft. The Gemara answers: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana rendered the status of Yom Kippur the same as that of Shabbat with regard to payment. In his opinion, not only a person who committed a transgression punishable by a court-administered capital punishment, like one who desecrated Shabbat, is exempt from monetary payment incurred at the time of the transgression. Even one who is deserving of a divinely administered capital punishment, such as one who desecrates Yom Kippur and is punished with karet, is exempt from monetary payment for property he damaged in the course of such an act. Therefore, since one who consumes another person’s leavened bread during Passover is deserving of karet, he is exempt from monetary payment incurred by this act. The Gemara comments: The question of whether one must repay according to the measurement or the monetary value of the teruma is like a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in the Tosefta: If one eats teruma of leavened bread on Passover, whether intentionally or unwittingly, then he is exempt from payment and for its monetary value in wood; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri deems him liable to pay. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri: What benefit can he derive from this? What benefit could the priest have derived from this teruma as it is prohibited to benefit from this teruma and the teruma is therefore worthless? Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said to Rabbi Akiva: What benefit can one derive from eating ritually impure teruma on the rest of the days of the year, and yet nevertheless the non-priest is still obligated to pay for what he has taken. Despite the fact that a priest may not eat impure teruma, a non-priest must reimburse the priest for the principal of the teruma and add an additional fifth if he eats it. Rabbi Akiva said to him: No, a distinction can be made between these two cases: If you say that he is obligated to pay in a case of ritually impure teruma on the rest of the days of the year, that although it is not permissible to eat it, the priest is nevertheless permitted to burn it and derive benefit from the heat generated as a result of this burning, shall you also say the same with regard to this, teruma of leavened bread during Passover, that is not permitted to be eaten or burned? Rather, to what may this be compared? It is similar to teruma of berries and grapes that became ritually impure, which is not permitted to be eaten or burned, as berries and grapes are unfit for firewood. The Tosefta adds: In what case is this statement said, that these tanna’im disagree about the reimbursement for teruma? It was said with regard to a case where he separated teruma in a permitted manner and it became leavened during Passover. However, if he separated the teruma from leavened bread during Passover, then everyone agrees that it is not consecrated, as it is worthless. It was taught in another baraita: With regard to the verse “And if a man eats a sacred thing in error, then he shall add a fifth part in addition to it, and shall give to the priest the sacred item” (Leviticus 22:14), the Sages expound as follows: He must give the priest an item that is fit to be consecrated, to the exclusion of one who eats teruma of leavened bread on Passover, who is exempt from payment of the teruma and even from paying its monetary value as wood; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Rabbi Elazar Ḥisma deems him liable to reimburse the priest for these items. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said to Rabbi Elazar Ḥisma: What benefit can the priest derive from this teruma of leavened bread, as it is prohibited to benefit from it? Rabbi Elazar Ḥisma said to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov: What benefit can one derive from eating ritually impure teruma on the rest of the days of the year, and yet a non-priest who eats it must pay the priest. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said to him: No, a distinction can be made between these two cases: If you say he is obligated to pay in a case of ritually impure teruma on the rest of the days of year, that although it is not permissible to eat it, the priest is nonetheless permitted to burn it and derive benefit from the heat generated as a result of this burning, shall you say the same with regard to this, teruma of leavened bread during Passover, that is not permitted to be eaten or burned? Rabbi Elazar Ḥisma said to him: Even teruma of leavened bread on Passover is permitted to be burned, for if the priest wishes, he may throw it before his dog or burn it under his food, for Rabbi Elazar Ḥisma agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili that one may derive benefit from leavened bread during Passover. Abaye said: Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri all hold that it is forbidden to derive benefit from leavened bread during Passover. And they disagree with regard to the following issue: Rabbi Akiva holds that one pays according to the monetary value, and therefore he need not pay anything for consuming teruma of leavened bread during Passover. And Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri holds that one pays according to the measure of teruma that he consumed, such that even if he ate teruma of leavened bread on Passover he must repay this amount. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? There does not seem to be another way to explain these opinions. The Gemara rejects this question: This statement is necessary lest you say that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva that states that one must pay according to the monetary value of the teruma. And there, in the case of leavened bread, this is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri deems him liable to pay for the teruma because he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who said: It is permissible to derive benefit from leavened bread during Passover. Therefore, he teaches us that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri agrees that one may not derive benefit from leavened bread during Passover. The Gemara suggests: And say it is indeed so, that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri accepts Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s position. The Gemara rejects this possibility: If this was the case, then Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri should have responded to Rabbi Akiva in the same way that Rabbi Elazar Ḥisma responded to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, by saying that this leavened bread may be fed to a dog thus deriving benefit from it. Since he did not offer this answer, it is clear that he agrees that deriving benefit from leavened bread during Passover is forbidden. After mentioning cases where a person damages teruma, the Gemara continues with a discussion of this topic. The Rabbis taught: A non-priest who eats an olive-bulk of teruma must pay the principal value of the teruma itself and an additional fifth. Abba Shaul says: He is not required to pay unless the teruma he ate is worth a peruta. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the opinion of the first tanna? It is because the verse states: “And if a man eats a sacred item in error, then he shall add a fifth part in addition to it, and he shall give to the priest the sacred item” (Leviticus 22:14). The minimal amount that is halakhically considered eating is an olive-bulk. And what is the reason for the opinion of Abba Shaul? The verse states: “And he shall give,” and giving less than the value of a peruta is not legally considered to be giving. The Gemara asks: And according to the other one, Abba Shaul, too, isn’t it written: “Eats,” implying that there must be at least an olive-bulk portion? The Gemara answers: That verse comes to exclude one who damages teruma without deriving benefit from it, such that he is exempt from the requirement to add an additional fifth. This is derived from the fact that the verse specifies that only one who eats is required to add a fifth. And according to the first tanna, one can ask: Isn’t it written “And he shall give”? The Gemara answers: That phrase is necessary to teach the requirement that teruma must be an item that is fit to be consecrated, as an item cannot become teruma unless it is has some value. This is meant to exclude one who eats teruma of leavened bread on Passover, since it is worthless and therefore cannot be designated as teruma. The Sages taught in a baraita: One who eats less than an olive-bulk of teruma must pay the principal, but is not required to pay the additional fifth. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case? If there was not the value of a peruta of teruma, then he should also not be required to pay for the principal either, because that is less than the amount for which one is obligated to pay. But if there was the value of a peruta of teruma, then he should be required to pay the additional fifth as well. The Gemara explains the case: Actually, it should be understood that there was the value of a peruta of teruma, and nonetheless, since the food was not at least an olive-bulk, he is required to pay only the principal, but he does not pay the additional fifth. The Sages said before Rav Pappa that this halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul. As, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, didn’t he say: One is obligated to pay because there is the value of a peruta, even if it is not at least an olive-bulk? Rav Pappa said to them: This is no proof, as even if you say that this halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, Abba Shaul requires two conditions: That the teruma be at least an olive-bulk in volume, and that it be worth at least a peruta. The Gemara asks: Does Abba Shaul actually require two conditions? Didn’t we learn in the mishna that Abba Shaul says: For that food which is at least the value of a peruta of teruma, one is liable to pay compensation to the priest, but for that food which does not contain the value of a peruta of teruma, he is not liable to pay compensation to the priest? The Rabbis said to Abba Shaul: They said that the item must be worth a peruta only with regard to misuse of consecrated items; however, with regard to teruma, one is liable to reimburse the priest only when he eats an olive-bulk or more. And if it is so, that Abba Shaul requires both conditions, and this is a case where there is an olive-bulk, then the Rabbis should have worded their objection differently. They should have said: Since it is at least an olive-bulk, he is liable to pay, even though it is not worth a peruta. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, this is a conclusive refutation, and Rav Pappa’s position is rejected. The Gemara notes that Rav Pappa himself also retracted this explanation. As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “If any one commits a trespass, and sins through error, in the sacred items of the Lord, then he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord, a ram without blemish from the flock, according to your valuation in silver shekels, after the shekel of the sanctuary, for a guilt-offering” (Leviticus 5:15), the baraita explains: The phrase “and sins through error” excludes one who sins intentionally through misuse of consecrated property. Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: Just as with regard to other mitzvot for which one is liable to receive karet the verse exempts one from bringing an offering when the transgression was committed intentionally, is it not right that with regard to misuse of consecrated property, which does not incur the punishment of karet, it should exempt one who acts intentionally? The baraita rejects this claim: No, if you say that this is true with regard to the rest of the mitzvot, even those for which one is liable to receive karet, for which one is not liable to receive the death penalty if he violates them, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to misuse of consecrated items, for which one is liable to receive the death penalty, as this offense is punishable by death at the hand of Heaven? Since one cannot logically deduce this principle, the verse states “through error” to exclude one who acted intentionally. And Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin in wonderment with regard to this baraita: This tanna initially considers the punishment of karet to be stronger by assuming that misuse of consecrated property was less severe because it was not punished by karet, and subsequently he considers the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven to be stronger by stating that one cannot deduce this principle from other sins whose punishment is not death at the hand of Heaven. And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said to him that it is possible to maintain the accepted position that karet is more stringent by explaining that this is what he is saying: No, these are incomparable for the following reason: If you say that one is exempt from an offering when he violates the rest of the mitzvot, for which one is not liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven if he eats less than an olive-bulk of a forbidden substance, shall you also say that this is the case with regard to misuse of consecrated property, for which one is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven if he eats less than an olive-bulk? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: May your mind be settled, as you have settled my mind and put it at ease by answering this question that was troubling me. Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said to him: What is settling about this explanation? Rabba and Rav Sheshet threw an axe at my answer; i.e., they reject my explanation, as follows: Who did you hear that said that one who intentionally misuses consecrated items is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who intentionally misuses consecrated items, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that he is liable to receive death at the hand of Heaven. The Rabbis say: he violates a warning, a standard prohibition, and is flogged. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi? From where does he derive his opinion? Rabbi Abbahu said: He derives it by means of a verbal analogy between the word sin stated with regard to misuse of consecrated items and the word sin stated with regard to teruma. With regard to misuse of consecrated items, the verse states: “If any one commits a trespass, and sins through error, in the sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15); with regard to teruma, the verse states: “Lest they bear sin for it, and die due to it, if they profane it” (Leviticus 22:9). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi makes the following comparison: Just as eating teruma is punishable by the death penalty, so too, misusing consecrated items is punishable by the death penalty. From this verbal analogy, the comparison between teruma and misuse of consecrated property can be extended to other issues as well: Just as one is punished only for eating at least an olive-bulk of teruma, so too, one is punished for misusing consecrated items only if there is at least an olive-bulk of consecrated items. This indicates that the baraita cannot be explained in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, who requires that the item be worth at least a peruta. Rav Pappa strongly objects to Rav Sheshet and Rabba’s rejection of the explanation of the baraita: From where do you know that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that one is only punished after eating an olive-bulk of teruma? Perhaps he holds in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, who said one is liable for eating teruma provided the food contains the value of a peruta of teruma, even if it is less than an olive-bulk. As the halakhot of misuse of consecrated items are derived from teruma, one is liable for eating both teruma and consecrated items only if the object is worth at least a peruta. As such, Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin’s explanation of the baraita should not be rejected. With regard to the issue mentioned previously, the Gemara asks: But isn’t Rav Pappa the one who said that Abba Shaul said that it requires two conditions, that the object be worth a peruta and that it be an olive-bulk in volume? Rather, learn from this that Rav Pappa retracted his statement with regard to Abba Shaul’s opinion. Mar, son of Rabbana, said the following to resolve the difficulty in the baraita: This is what it is saying: No, if you say that one is exempt from an offering with regard to the rest of the mitzvot, where acting without intent is not treated as though one acted with intent, i.e., if one intended to cut something that is detached from the ground on Shabbat, which is not prohibited by Torah law, and mistakenly cut something that is attached to the ground, then he is exempt because he acted without intent; shall you also say the same with regard to misuse of consecrated items, about which the halakha is stringent, such that if one intended to warm himself with non-sacred wool shearings, and owing to an error or lack of information he warmed himself with shearings from a burnt-offering, then he has misused consecrated property? Thus, misuse of consecrated property is more stringent than other commandments, in that one violates it even when acting without intent, and one cannot deduce the halakha in the case of misuse of consecrated property from the halakha in the case of the rest of the mitzvot. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that the baraita should be understood differently, and this is what it is saying: No, if you say this leniency with regard to rest of the mitzvot, where one who is acting unawares is not liable in the same way as one who is acting aware of his actions, such as in a case where one intended to perform a permitted act and mistakenly performed a prohibited one, i.e., if one intended to lift something that is detached from the ground, but his knife happened to cut something that is attached to the ground, in violation of the act of harvesting on Shabbat, then he is exempt; shall you also say the same with regard to misuse of consecrated items, where if one places his hand in a vessel to take an object and unknowingly places his hand in consecrated oil then he has misused consecrated items? Therefore, misuse of consecrated items is more stringent than other commandments, as one commits the sin of misusing consecrated property even if he uses the consecrated object while attempting to perform a different action and is unaware that he is performing a prohibited act. The Master said above in the baraita: In what case is this statement said that the tanna’im disagree with regard to the obligation to pay for teruma of leavened bread? It is said with regard to a case where one separated teruma in a permitted manner and it became leavened during Passover. However, if he separated teruma from leavened bread during Passover, everyone agrees that it is not consecrated since it is worthless. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived, that a worthless item cannot be designated as teruma? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that the verse states: “The first fruits of your grain, your wine, your oil, and the first of the fleece of your sheep, shall you give to him” (Deuteronomy 18:4), and not to his fire. One must give the priest something that he can use for any purpose, and not something that the priest will be forced to burn as fuel. Even those who permit one to derive benefit from leavened bread during Passover agree that it may not be eaten, and therefore leavened bread cannot be consecrated as teruma in this case. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raised an objection based on that which was taught in a mishna: One may not separate teruma from ritually impure produce for ritually pure produce, but if one unwittingly separated it in this manner then his teruma is valid teruma. And why should this be valid teruma? Let the priest say: The verse requires that the teruma be given “to him” and not to his fire, and this ritually impure teruma must be burned. In that case, why should this produce actually become teruma? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. There, in the case of impure teruma, it had a period of fitness, and it could have been given as teruma before it became impure. Here, in the case of leavened bread, it did not ever have a period of fitness, and therefore it cannot be consecrated as teruma. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances in which this leavened bread did not have a period of fitness even on Passover? This could have happened only in a case where it became leavened while it was still attached to the ground and could not yet become teruma. However, if it became leavened after being detached from the ground, then can this leavened bread indeed become consecrated as teruma, even though the baraita indicates that no leavened bread can be designated as teruma during Passover? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzhak said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: Yes, this is indeed the case despite this puzzling limitation, and the biblical expression can be applied homiletically: “The matter is by the decree of the watchers, and the sentence by the word of the sacred ones” (Daniel 4:14). The Sages, who are compared to celestial beings, agree with my statement. And so too, in the study hall, they teach in accordance with my opinion, despite the puzzling nature of this ruling. When Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came, he said that the verse states: “The first fruits of your grain, your wine, your oil, and the first of the fleece of your sheep, shall you give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4), implying that its remnants are recognizable for an Israelite, as the notion of a first part indicates that there is another portion remaining which is fit to be consumed by the Israelite. This teruma is excluded as there is no recognizable remnant left that may be consumed by the Israelite, because it is leavened bread. Since even after this portion has been separated the remainder of the produce may not be eaten, that which was separated does not become teruma. Rav Aḥa bar Rav Avya sat before Rav Ḥisda, and he sat and said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to grapes that became ritually impure, one should tread on them less than an egg-bulk at a time, and the wine that comes from them is kosher even for libations because it is ritually pure. Apparently Rabbi Yoḥanan holds: The liquid is stored inside the grape, as the juice is not considered to be part of the grape itself but rather stored in the grape as though contained in a receptacle. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion, when do these liquids become ritually impure? This occurs only when one squeezes them, and prior to this the juice remains pure even if the grape was impure. And when one squeezes them, there is less than the minimum measure of grape flesh that would transfer ritual impurity, as food can impart ritual impurity only if it is at least an egg-bulk in size. The Gemara challenges this statement: If that is so, then even if he squeezes an egg-bulk of grapes, the juice will still not become impure. Didn’t we learn in a mishna: In the case of one who is ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse and who squeezed olives or grapes in the exact amount of an egg-bulk, the liquid is ritually pure. Once the first drop of liquid is squeezed out, less than an egg-bulk of food remains, and it cannot render the liquid impure. In that case, why did Rabbi Yoḥanan permit squeezing only less than an egg-bulk? The Gemara answers: There, it was speaking of a case where the ruling was after the fact; however, here, it is discussing the ruling ab initio, and the mishna states that one may press juice only from less than an egg-bulk of grapes due to a rabbinic decree lest one come to perform the act of squeezing on more than an egg-bulk, causing the liquid to become impure. Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Aḥa bar Rav Avya: Who will listen to you and to Rabbi Yoḥanan your teacher with regard to this issue? As, where did the impurity that was in the grape juice go? The Gemara notes that apparently Rav Ḥisda holds: Liquids are absorbed within the fruit and are therefore considered to be part of the grape itself. And since the flesh of the grape became ritually impure, the liquid became ritually impure as well. Rav Aḥa said to him: Do you not hold that liquids are stored inside the grape? Didn’t we learn in the mishna: In the case of one who is ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse and who squeezed olives or grapes in the exact amount of an egg-bulk, using a flat wooden utensil without touching the liquid itself, the liquid is ritually pure. Granted, if you say that the juice is stored inside the grapes, then it is due to that reason that the liquid is pure. But if you say that the liquid is absorbed within the grapes, why is the juice pure? According to this opinion, once the grape itself becomes impure, the juice, which is attached to it and absorbed in it, becomes impure as well. Rav Ḥisda said to him: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the grapes have not been rendered susceptible to ritual impurity, since they have not come in contact with liquids. When do they become susceptible to ritual impurity? This is only once one presses them and they become wet with their own juice. However, when he presses them, they decrease in volume and are lacking the measure of volume required to become impure. This must be the explanation, for if you do not say so, it is difficult to reconcile this mishna with that which was taught in the baraita cited above: To what may this case of teruma of leavened bread be compared? It may be compared to teruma of berries, olives, and grapes that became impure, which can neither be eaten nor burned. However, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement they may even be eaten, as if one wishes he may tread less than an egg-bulk at a time. Rava said: It is possible to reject this proof, as even if this action is permitted in principle, there is a rabbinic decree prohibiting it lest he encounter a stumbling block. If one keeps ritually impure fruit of teruma in order to press it for its juice, it is possible that he will forget its status and accidentally eat it. Abaye said to him: Are we concerned about this type of stumbling block? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: One may light a fire with bread and oil of teruma that became ritually impure? It can be deduced from this baraita that there is no concern that a person will forget and eat these foods. Rava said to him: Bread is only permitted when one throws it among the wood used for fuel so that it is ruined and no longer considered edible. Teruma oil is permitted only when one puts it into a repulsive vessel so that no one will drink it. With regard to the matter itself, it was taught: One may light with bread and oil of teruma that became ritually impure. The Sages limited the application of this halakha, as Abaye said in the name of Ḥizkiya and Rava said in the name of the Sages from the school of Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Marta that Rav Huna said: They taught that one may use impure teruma as firewood only with regard to bread; however, with regard to wheat, no, one may not light a fire with it, lest one encounter a stumbling block and eat it, because wheat will not become inedible by being placed among the firewood. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even wheat may be used as fuel. The Gemara asks: And why does he permit this? Let us be concerned lest he encounter a stumbling block. The Gemara answers based on what Rav Ashi said with regard to a different issue: This is referring to boiled and repulsive wheat, i.e., wheat that one boiled and then placed in a repulsive area, in which case he need not be concerned that this wheat will accidentally be eaten; so too here, it is referring to boiled and repulsive wheat. The Gemara asks: Where was Rav Ashi’s explanation stated? It was stated with regard to this: As Rabbi Avin bar Rav Aḥa said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Abba Shaul was the dough kneader of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s house, and they would heat water for him, to make dough, with wheat of ritually impure teruma, which was purchased from priests at a low price, in order to knead dough in ritual purity. The Gemara asks: Why did they do this? Let us be concerned lest they encounter a stumbling block by accidentally eating this wheat. With regard to this Rav Ashi said that it was only done when the wheat was boiled and repulsive and could only be used for lighting a fire. After mentioning ways in which impure teruma was used, the Gemara mentions other halakhot pertaining to this issue. Abaye bar Avin and Rav Ḥananya bar Avin taught the tractate of Terumot in the school of Rabba. Rava bar Mattana met them and said to them: What novel idea can you say has been taught with regard to Terumot in the school of our Master, Rabba? They said to him: What is difficult for you? There must be some issue troubling you that has caused you to ask this question. He said to them: The following statement that we learned in the mishna in Terumot is unclear: Saplings of teruma that became ritually impure and were planted are pure such that they do not impart ritual impurity once they have been planted, but they are prohibited to be eaten as teruma. The question arises: If they do not impart ritual impurity, why is it prohibited to eat them? If their impurity has been eliminated then it should be permitted to eat them, like other ritually pure teruma. Abaye bar Avin and Rav Ḥananya bar Avin said to Rava bar Mattana: This is what Rabba said in explaining this mishna: What does it mean that they are prohibited to be eaten? It means that they are prohibited to be eaten by non-priests, but a priest may eat them. Once these saplings are planted, they lose their ritual impurity but retain their status as teruma. Rava bar Mattana challenged this answer: If this is the case, what is the mishna teaching us with this statement? Is it teaching us that growths of teruma are considered teruma? It is unnecessary to teach this principle, as we already learned: Growths of teruma, i.e., produce that grows from teruma that was planted in the ground, are considered teruma. Why, then, is it necessary to teach this principle again? And if you say as follows: This case is referring to the growths of growths of teruma, i.e., plants that grew from the original growths of teruma, and what is it teaching us? It is teaching that an item whose seed does not disintegrate when planted in the ground maintains its teruma status. While most seeds will disintegrate, other plants, such as onions and garlic, merely continue growing when planted. In that case, this mishna would be informing us that even the growths of growths of such plants retain their teruma status. However, we already learned that as well. As the mishna states: With regard to untithed produce [tevel], its growths, the produce that grows from it, are permitted in the case of items whose seed disintegrates; however, in the case of items where the seed does not disintegrate, it is prohibited to eat even the growths of growths unless they are tithed. There would be no need for the mishna to teach us this halakha a second time. They were silent and did not have an answer to this question. They said to Rava bar Mattana: Have you heard something in this regard? He said to them: This is what Rav Sheshet said: What is the meaning of the word prohibited in this context? It means that it is prohibited for priests, since it has been disqualified for them due to the diversion of attention. Teruma and other consecrated property must be guarded, and when one fails to do so, it is treated as though it were impure. Therefore, these teruma saplings are treated as though they have become impure once the priest diverts attention from them, and they remain prohibited to him even after another generation grows from them. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who says that a diversion of attention constitutes an inherent disqualification, it works out well. According to this opinion, a diversion of attention does not disqualify teruma due to a concern that it became impure. Instead, there is an independent rabbinic decree rendering teruma that has not been watched impure even when this teruma could not possibly have become impure. According to this opinion, one can understand why this growth may not be eaten by a priest. But according to the one who says that a diversion of attention is a disqualification due to a concern about ritual impurity, what is there to say? It is stated in the mishna that by planting these saplings they become pure, even if they were certainly ritually impure prior to being planted. If this is the case with regard to teruma that is certainly impure, all the more so should it apply to a case where there is only a chance that the teruma is ritually impure. Apropos the discussion of diversion of attention, the Gemara cites a dispute between amora’im with regard to this issue, as it was stated: What is the nature of the disqualification of diversion of attention? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is a disqualification due to a concern about ritual impurity that may have been contracted while one’s attention was diverted. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: It is an inherent disqualification. The Gemara discusses the ramifications of this dispute: According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said it is a disqualification due to a concern about ritual impurity, if Elijah comes and renders it ritually pure then we will listen to him, because it was treated as impure only due to a doubt with regard to its actual status. However, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said that it is an inherent disqualification, even if Elijah comes and renders it pure we will not listen to him. The reason for this is that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish believes that this decree is unrelated to the question of whether the object actually became impure. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish based on what is taught in the Tosefta: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: There was a small gap between the ramp and the altar on the western side of the ramp, where they would throw disqualified birds that had been designated as sin-offerings. If birds became disqualified for any reason, such as a diversion of attention, they were left there until their form decayed, i.e., until the next morning, at which point they would be definitively disqualified due to remaining in the Temple overnight and could be taken out to the place designated for burning. Granted, if you say that a diversion of attention is a disqualification due to a concern for ritual impurity, for this reason it requires decay of form to ensure that the bird is certainly disqualified. Currently the bird is disqualified only due to uncertainty, and Elijah may come and render it ritually pure. However, if you say that it is an inherent disqualification, then why do I need to leave it until it has decay of form? It should be definitively disqualified once there has been a diversion of attention. But didn’t we learn in the mishna that this is the principle: Any offering that has a disqualification in the body of the animal, i.e., it has a definite disqualification with regard to the meat itself, should be burned immediately. If it has a disqualification in the blood of the animal, e.g., if the blood was spilled, or a disqualification of its owner, e.g., if the owner became impure, then it should be left until its form is decayed and taken out to the place designated for burning. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said to him: This tanna, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, is of the same opinion as the tanna who taught in the school of Rabba bar Avuh, who said: Even piggul, an offering that was invalidated due to inappropriate intent while being offered, requires decay of form. Even with regard to an inherent disqualification in the meat of the offering, where the Torah says explicitly that the offering should be burned, as is the case with regard to piggul, the animal should be set aside until the next day, when its form has decayed. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a further objection to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish based on another baraita, where it is taught: If the meat became impure or disqualified, or if it was taken out of the walls that delineate its permitted area, Rabbi Eliezer says: He sprinkles the blood of these offerings nonetheless, as in his opinion the blood may be sprinkled regardless of the status of the meat of the offering. Rabbi Yehoshua says: He does not sprinkle the blood unless the meat is fit to be brought as an offering. And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes that if the blood was sprinkled, the offering is accepted. The Gemara clarifies: To what type of disqualification is the baraita referring? Is it not disqualification on account of a diversion of attention? It cannot be a case where it was disqualified due to impurity or being taken outside of the walls, since these are mentioned explicitly. Granted, if you say that a diversion of attention is a disqualification based on a concern about ritual impurity, this is how you can find a case that the offering is accepted because the frontplate atones for cases where there is a disqualification related to ritual impurity. But if you say that it is an inherent disqualification, why is the offering accepted according to Rabbi Yehoshua, given that it is a disqualified offering? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish rejects this interpretation of the baraita: No, this is not a case where the offering was disqualified due to a diversion of attention. In what way was the offering disqualified? It was disqualified due to contact with one who immersed himself during the day. One who immersed himself during the day invalidates items due to ritual impurity. Although these items themselves are invalidated, they cannot in turn render other items ritually impure. The Gemara asks: If that is so, this is the same as the disqualification of ritual impurity. What, then, is the difference between this disqualification and that of ritual impurity previously mentioned by the baraita? The Gemara answers that two types of ritual impurity are mentioned here: One type of impurity can also impart impurity to other objects, and a second type can invalidate another object but will not impart impurity. When Ravin ascended to Eretz Yisrael, he stated this halakha of Rav Sheshet before Rabbi Yirmeya. And Rabbi Yirmeya said: Foolish Babylonians! Because you dwell in a dark land, you state halakhot that are dim. Have you not heard this statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish in the name of Rabbi Oshaya? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: With regard to the water used for the water libation during the festival of Sukkot which was drawn over the course of the day in order to be poured the next day and consequently became impure, the following distinction applies: If it was brought into contact with a ritual bath of pure water and was then consecrated, it is ritually pure. However, if it was consecrated and was then brought into contact with the ritual bath, it is ritually impure. The question arises: Since this type of purification is similar to planting, as when the impure water came in contact with the water of the ritual bath, it is considered as though the water was planted in the ground and thereby purified, what does it matter if it was brought into contact and then consecrated or consecrated and then brought into contact? Apparently planting is not effective with regard to consecrated items, i.e., such items are not purified through this process. Therefore, here too, planting is not effective with regard to teruma. Despite the fact that planting is generally effective in removing the impure status of the water, the Sages imposed higher standards with regard to consecrated items. Similarly, the Sages imposed higher standards for removing the teruma status of the plants. One can explain that the produce grown from teruma mentioned in the baraita remains prohibited for non-priests because it is still considered teruma. Rav Dimi sat and said this halakha that was stated by Rav Oshaya with regard to principle of bringing liquid into contact with a ritual bath. Abaye said to him: Did Rav Oshaya state his ruling that bringing a liquid into contact with a ritual bath is not effective for consecrated items with regard to a case where he consecrated the water by placing it in a sacred vessel, but if he consecrated it through speech then the Sages did not impose a higher standard, in which case the water can be purified by being brought into contact with a ritual bath? Or perhaps the Sages imposed a higher standard in a case where one consecrates it through speech as well? Rav Dimi said to him: I did not hear the halakha with regard to this case; however, I heard the halakha with regard to a similar case. As Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to grapes that became ritually impure, if one trod on them and afterward consecrated them, they are pure. According to this opinion, the wine inside the grape does not become impure from the grape itself. However, if he consecrated the grapes and afterward pressed them, they are impure, because the halakha is especially stringent with regard consecrated items. And yet with regard to grapes which are only consecrated through speech, as the wine/grapes offered on the altar are not brought in a sacred vessel, even so, the Sages imposed a higher standard such that these grapes become impure after they have been consecrated. Rav Yosef said: This case does not serve as a proof since you spoke of grapes, and here we are dealing with grapes of teruma, whose consecration through speech is comparable to consecration in a sacred vessel, as teruma cannot be consecrated by being placed in a sacred vessel. However, with regard to those items that require a sacred vessel in order to be fully consecrated, such as water used for a libation, the Sages did not impose a higher standard in a case where one consecrated it through speech. Therefore, this case cannot be used to resolve Abaye’s question. The Gemara asks about Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement with regard to wine pressed from impure grapes: The phrase if one tread upon them is stated without qualification, indicating that the wine is ritually pure even if he pressed many grapes at once. And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: With regard to grapes that became ritually impure grapes, one should tread on them less than an egg-bulk at a time. When there is less than an egg-bulk of grapes, they do not impart ritual impurity. The Gemara answers: If you wish, say this answer: Here, too, it is to be understood that one must tread on less than an egg-bulk at a time. And if you wish, say this answer instead: There, where the Gemara requires less than an egg-bulk, it is a case where the grapes came into contact with an item that was impure with first-degree ritual impurity, such that they became impure with second-degree ritual impurity. When a liquid touches an object that is impure with second-degree ritual impurity, it becomes impure by rabbinic decree with first-degree ritual impurity. Therefore, in that case one must be careful to tread only on less than an egg-bulk at a time. Here, it is speaking of a case where they came into contact with an item that was impure with second-degree ritual impurity, such that they became impure with third-degree ritual impurity. In that case, the liquid that comes out of the grapes would not become ritually impure at all. Rava said: We, too, have learned that the Sages created higher standards with regard to consecrated items. As it was taught that the verse says with regard to the red heifer: “And for the impure they shall take the ashes of the burning of the sin-offering, and he shall put flowing water into a vessel” (Numbers 19:17), which teaches that the flowing water from the spring should flow directly into the vessel in which it will be sanctified. On the other hand, the verse says “and he shall put,” meaning that the water should be poured into the vessel. Apparently the water is detached, but it is clearly attached to the spring, as it was previously stated that the water must flow directly into the vessel. Rather, this is merely a higher standard, as by Torah law the water may be drawn with one vessel and sanctified in another vessel. The Sages added that this water must be sanctified in the same vessel in which it was drawn from the spring, and they found support for their opinion in the Torah. Here too, the Sages established a higher standard for a consecrated object that became ritually impure, as they decreed that it cannot be ritually purified through insertion in the ground. Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: We, too, learned a similar statement in a baraita: When the period of ritual impurity of a zav or leper has been completed, and he immersed during the day and emerged, he may eat tithes immediately. Once the sun set for him, he may eat teruma. Rav Shimi bar Ashi infers from this statement: With regard to teruma, yes, he may eat it; however, with regard to consecrated food, no, he may not. Given that conclusion, Rav Shimi bar Ashi asks: Why is there a difference between teruma and consecrated foods? After all, he is ritually pure. Rather, the Sages established a higher standard for consecrated food, and permitted one to eat them only after sacrificing the requisite purification offering. Here too, the Sages established a higher standard for the ritual purity of consecrated liquids. Rav Ashi said: We, too, learned another case where the Sages established a higher standard. The verse says: “And the flesh that touches any ritually impure thing shall not be eaten; it shall be burnt with fire. And as for the flesh, anyone who is ritually pure may eat from it” (Leviticus 7:19). And the flesh comes to include the wood in the Temple and the frankincense. The Gemara asks: Do wood and frankincense have the capacity to become ritually impure, given that they are neither food nor drink? Rather, the Sages established a higher standard for these objects due to their sanctity; here too, the Sages established a higher standard for the ritual purity of consecrated liquids. MISHNA: These are the types of grain with which a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover: With wheat, with barley, with spelt [kusmin], with rye [shifon], and with oats [shibbolet shu’al]. And one fulfills his obligation by eating not only matza made from properly tithed grains, but even with matza made from doubtfully tithed produce, and matza made with first tithe from which its teruma was already taken, or second tithe and consecrated food that were redeemed. And priests may eat matza prepared from ḥalla, the portion of dough that is given to priests, or with teruma, as priests are permitted to eat these portions. However, one may not fulfill one’s obligation to eat matza made with untithed produce, nor with matza made from the first tithe from which its teruma was not separated, nor with matza made either from the second tithe, nor from consecrated grain that was not redeemed. With regard to one who prepared loaves of matza that are brought with a thanks-offering, or to the wafers brought by a nazirite, the Sages drew the following distinction: If he prepared them for himself, then he does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza with them. However, if he prepared them to sell them in the market to those who require these loaves or wafers, one fulfills the obligation to eat matza with them. GEMARA: The Gemara identifies the species mentioned in the mishna. One of the Sages taught in the Tosefta: Spelt is a type of wheat, while oats [shibbolet shu’al] and rye [shifon] are a type of barley. The Gemara translates the lesser-known species into the vernacular Aramaic: Spelt is called gulba; rye is dishra; and oats are shevilei ta’ala. The Gemara infers: These species, yes, they may be used for matza; however, rice [orez] and millet [doḥan], no, they may not be used. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, that matza cannot be prepared from rice or millet, derived? Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said, and likewise a Sage of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, and likewise a Sage of the school of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov taught that the verse states: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat with it matza, the bread of affliction” (Deuteronomy 16:3). This verse indicates that only with substances which will come to a state of leavening, a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza with them, provided he prevents them from becoming leavened. This excludes these foods, i.e., rice, millet, and similar grains, which, even if flour is prepared from them and water is added to their flour, do not come to a state of leavening but to a state of decay [siraḥon]. The Gemara notes: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, who said: Rice is a full-fledged type of grain, and one is liable to receive karet for eating it in its leavened state, like other types of grain. As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri prohibits eating cooked rice and millet on Passover, due to the fact that they are close to being leavened. A dilemma was raised before the scholars who were studying this issue. What is the meaning of the expression: That it is close to becoming leavened? Does this mean that it will be leavened even quicker than wheat or barley? Or does it perhaps mean that it is only close to being leavened, i.e., it resembles leavened bread, but it is not full-fledged leavened bread. In other words, perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri maintains that these grains cannot in fact become full-fledged leavened bread, and one is not punished with karet for eating them on Passover. However, he rules that one should nevertheless avoid eating them, due to their similarity to leavened bread. The Gemara responds: Come and hear a resolution to this question, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: Rice is a full-fledged type of grain. Therefore, one is liable to receive karet for eating it in its leavened state, and a person can fulfill his obligation to eat matza with it on Passover. This baraita clearly indicates that, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, rice becomes leavened like other grains, and the expression: It is close to becoming leavened, means that it becomes leavened quicker than other grains. And so too, Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri would say: One who has prepared bread from keramit, a type of wild wheat, is obligated to separate ḥalla, just as he must separate ḥalla from dough prepared of other types of grain. The Gemara asks: What is keramit? Abaye said: It is a plant called shitzanita. Since this name was not widely known either, the Gemara asks: What is shitzanita? Rav Pappa said: This is the wild grain that is found between papyrus reeds. Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Reish Lakish said: With regard to dough that was kneaded with wine, oil, or honey, one is not liable to receive karet for eating it in its leavened state, since these liquids will not cause the dough to be leavened. Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, were sitting before Rav Idi bar Avin, and Rav Idi bar Avin was sitting and dozing as his students conversed. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: What is the reason of Reish Lakish, who maintains that one is not liable to receive karet for this type of leavening? Rav Pappa said to him: The verse states: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat with it matza” (Deuteronomy 16:3). In light of the juxtaposition of leavened bread and matza, Reish Lakish compares these two types of bread: With regard to those substances through which a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza, one is liable to receive karet for eating them in their leavened state. And with regard to this dough, which was kneaded with wine, oil, or honey, since a person does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza with it, as it is called rich, i.e., enhanced, matza, one is not liable to receive karet for eating it in its leavened state on Passover. Matza is called the bread of affliction, or the poor man’s bread, a description that does not apply to dough prepared with wine, oil, or honey. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raised an objection to Rav Pappa: We learned with regard to one who took a baked item, dissolved it in water, and swallowed this mixture on Passover: If the baked item is leavened bread, he is punished with karet; and if it is matza, a person does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza on Passover with this food. The reason one does not fulfill the obligation to eat matza is because swallowing in this manner is not considered an act of eating. But here this is a case where a person does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza with this dissolved food, and nevertheless he is liable to receive karet for eating it in its leavened state. This ruling conflicts with Rav Pappa’s general principle. At this point Rav Idi bar Avin woke up, due to their discussion, and said to them: Children, this is the reasoning of Reish Lakish: One is not liable to receive karet for eating dough kneaded with oil or honey, because oil and honey are considered fruit juices, and fruit juice does not cause dough to be leavened. Therefore, dough prepared with these liquids is not considered full-fledged leavened bread. The Gemara turns to the cases of the mishna. The mishna taught that one can fulfill his obligation to eat matza with doubtfully tithed produce and with produce of the first tithe, from which teruma has been separated. The Gemara asks: Can one really fulfill his obligation with doubtfully tithed produce? It is not suitable for him to eat. The Sages prohibited the eating of doubtfully tithed produce that has not been tithed. The Gemara answers: Since, if one so desires he may renounce all his property, thereby becoming a poor person who is permitted to eat doubtfully tithed produce, now too it is suitable for him, even though he did not declare his property ownerless. Consequently, if he used doubtfully tithed produce as matza, he has fulfilled the mitzva after the fact. As we learned in a mishna: One may feed the poor doubtfully tithed produce, and he may also feed Jewish soldiers [akhsanya] who lodge with him doubtfully tithed produce. And Rav Huna said that it was taught that Beit Shammai say: One may neither feed the poor doubtfully tithed produce, nor feed soldiers doubtfully tithed produce. And Beit Hillel say: One may feed these groups doubtfully tithed produce. This mishna indicates that doubtfully tithed produce is not prohibited to the same extent as entirely untithed produce, as in certain situations the prohibition pertaining to doubtfully tithed produce does not take effect. The mishna taught that one can fulfill the obligation to eat matza with produce of the first tithe from which its teruma, the teruma of the tithe, was taken and given to a priest. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious, as, since its teruma has been taken, it is non-sacred food? What novel element is taught by this statement? The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach the halakha in a case where a Levite preceded the priest while the grain was still on its stalks. Ordinarily, the Levite would be given his first tithe only after the priest had taken the teruma gedola; however, in this case the Levite took his portion before the priest. And the teruma of the tithe was taken by the Levite from his tithe so that he would be permitted to eat the tithe; however, the teruma gedola was not taken from the produce at all. And the novel element of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Abbahu. As Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: First tithe in which the Levite preceded the priest while the grain was still on the stalks is exempt from teruma gedola, even though the Levite thereby reduces the amount of grain the priest receives. As it is stated: “Moreover you shall speak to the Levites and say to them: When you take from the children of Israel the tithe which I have given you from them as your inheritance, and you shall set apart from it a gift for the Lord, a tithe from the tithe” (Numbers 18:26). This verse teaches that the Levite is obligated to set apart a tithe from the tithe, i.e., the teruma of the tithe, and not teruma gedola and the teruma of the tithe from the tithe. Rav Pappa said to Abaye: However, if that is so, even if the Levite preceded the priest after the kernels of grain were removed from the stalks and placed in a pile, the Levite should not have to separate teruma gedola in this case either. Abaye said to him: With regard to your claim, the verse states: “From all that is given to you, you shall set apart all of that which is the Lord’s teruma, of all the best of it, even its consecrated portion” (Numbers 18:29). This verse teaches that the Levites must designate a portion of the gifts they receive and give it to the priests. The Gemara asks: And what did you see to lead you to require the separation of teruma gedola from first tithe that was taken from grain in piles and not from first tithe that was taken from grain on stalks? Abaye answers: This produce, after being threshed and placed into piles, is completely processed and has become grain; and that produce on the stalk did not yet become grain, and the Levite is therefore exempt from separating teruma gedola from it. Produce that has been arranged in a pile is called grain by the Torah and is given to the priest. Once it is classified as grain, the right of the priest takes effect and the Levite is required to separate teruma gedola from it. The mishna taught that one can fulfill his obligation to eat matza with second-tithe grain and with consecrated grain that was redeemed. The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case, as consecrated grain that has been redeemed is non-sacred produce. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the consecrated property was not completely redeemed, i.e., where one gave payment for the principal, the value of the tithe, but he did not give payment for the additional fifth due when redeeming consecrated items. And the mishna teaches us that failure to add the fifth does not invalidate the redemption. Although there is an obligation to pay this additional fifth, the neglect of this duty does not prevent the grain from becoming non-sacred. And the mishna further taught that priests can fulfill their obligation with matza of ḥalla and with teruma. The Gemara again asks: It is obvious that this is the case. Since a priest is permitted to eat ḥalla and teruma, he can fulfill his obligation to eat matza with them. The Gemara responds: This ruling is nevertheless necessary, lest you say that we require matza that may be eaten equally by anyone, which would mean that matza that may not be eaten by regular Israelites is prohibited to priests as well. The mishna therefore teaches us that the repetition of the words “matzot,” “matzot” (Deuteronomy 16:3, 8) comes to amplify, i.e., one can fulfill one’s obligation to eat matza even with foods that may be eaten only by specific people. We learned in the mishna: However, one may not fulfill this obligation with untithed produce. The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case, as it is always prohibited to eat tevel. The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to teach this halakha in a case where it is considered untithed produce by rabbinic law, and by Torah law the produce is permitted. For instance, this is the case with regard to grain that one sowed in an unperforated flowerpot. Anything grown disconnected from the ground is not defined as produce of the ground, and its owner is exempt by Torah law from tithing it. However, by rabbinic law, grain sowed in an unperforated flowerpot is considered untithed. It was also taught in the mishna: And one does not fulfill his obligation with matza from produce of the first tithe, whose teruma, teruma of the tithe, was not taken. The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case, as this produce may not be eaten. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for the mishna to teach this with regard to a case where the Levite preceded the priest after the kernels of grain were placed in a pile but before teruma gedola was separated from the produce. The Gemara elaborates: Lest you say, as Rav Pappa said to Abaye, that in that case too, the Levite should be exempt from the requirement to separate teruma gedola from this produce, the tanna of the mishna teaches us, as Abaye responded to Rav Pappa, that there is a difference between a case when the grain was on the stalks and when it was collected in a pile. Therefore, one may not eat this produce before separating teruma gedola from it. It was further taught in the mishna: And one does not fulfill his obligation to eat matza with second-tithe produce or consecrated grain that was not redeemed. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that, too, obvious, as it is prohibited to eat these foods? The Gemara answers: Actually, this is speaking of a case where they were redeemed, and what is the meaning of the expression: They were not redeemed? It means that they were not redeemed properly, e.g., second-tithe grain that was redeemed with an unminted coin [asimon]. As the Merciful One says with regard to the redemption of the second tithe: “And you shall turn it into money, and bind up the money in your hand, and go to the place which the Lord your God shall choose” (Deuteronomy 14:25). The phrase “and bind up [ve’tzarta] the money” indicates that the produce must be exchanged for an object that has a form [tzura], not unminted metal. And with regard to consecrated property, we are dealing with a case where he redeemed it by exchanging it for land instead of money, as the Merciful One says: “And he will give the fifth part of the money of your valuation unto it and it shall be assured to him” (see Leviticus 27:19). If one redeemed consecrated property with land rather than money, the consecrated status is not transferred to the land. The Sages taught: I might have thought that a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza with untithed produce that was not amended with regard to tithes. The Gemara analyzes the apparently redundant phrase untithed produce that was not amended. But isn’t all untithed produce also not amended, by definition? Rather, this baraita is referring to untithed produce that was incompletely amended. How so? For example, produce from which teruma gedola was taken, but the teruma of the tithe was not taken from it. Alternatively, the first tithe was separated from the produce, but not the second tithe; or, it is referring even to grain from which all the tithes were separated, apart from the poor man’s tithe. Although no sanctity applies to the poor man’s tithe, which is simply a monetary gift to the poor, until this tithe has been separated the grain remains untithed. From where is it derived that these types of grain cannot be used for matza? The verse states: “You shall not eat leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat with it matza” (Deuteronomy 16:3). One fulfills his obligation to eat matza with food whose prohibition is solely due to the prohibition: Do not eat leavened bread with it, if it was not preserved in an unleavened state. This command excludes this grain, which is not prohibited due to the prohibition: Do not eat leavened bread, but rather due to the prohibition: Do not eat untithed produce. The Gemara expresses surprise at this baraita. And the prohibition of leavened bread, where did it go? In other words, doesn’t the prohibition: “You shall not eat leavened bread” apply to untithed produce as well? Rav Sheshet said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: One prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists. No additional prohibitions can apply to an object that is already prohibited, e.g., untithed grain. Consequently, the prohibition of leavened bread does not take effect on untithed produce. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: One who unwittingly eats an unslaughtered animal carcass on Yom Kippur is exempt from bringing a sin-offering to atone for this consumption. The prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur does not apply to the already prohibited meat of an animal carcass, which means only the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered animal carcass is violated by this act. Ravina said: Even if you say that this baraita is in accordance with the Rabbis, who maintain that a prohibition can take effect where another prohibition already exists, it can be explained as follows: One fulfills his obligation to eat matza with food whose prohibition is solely due to the commandment: Do not eat leavened bread, which excludes this grain, which is forbidden not only due to the prohibition: Do not eat leavened bread, but also due to the prohibition: Do not eat untithed produce. The Gemara raises a difficulty against this explanation: Is the word: Only, written in the baraita? This word, which is critical for Ravina’s explanation, does not appear in the baraita at all. Rather, it is clear that this must be explained in accordance with the explanation of Rav Sheshet, who maintains that the baraita should be attributed to Rabbi Shimon. The Sages taught: I might have thought that a person can fulfill his obligation to eat matza on Passover with matza of second tithe in Jerusalem. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat with it matza, the bread of affliction [leḥem oni]” (Deuteronomy 16:3), oni with the letter ayin, i.e., poor man’s bread. As this is similar to the phrase: Bread of acute mourning [leḥem oni], oni with an alef, it can be inferred that this mitzva must be fulfilled with matza that can be eaten during a period of acute mourning, on the day one’s close relative has died. This excludes this second tithe, which cannot be eaten during a period of acute mourning but only in a state of joy, as the Torah states: “I have not eaten from it in my acute mourning” (Deuteronomy 26:14). This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: The repetition of matzot matzot serves to amplify, and teaches that all types of matza may be eaten on Passover. The baraita asks: If so, what is the meaning when the verse states leḥem oni, poor man’s bread? The baraita answers: This phrase excludes dough that was kneaded with wine, oil, or honey, which is not classified as poor man’s bread and therefore cannot be used for this mitzva. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Akiva? The Gemara explains: Is it written in the consonantal text leḥem oni with a vav? That would allude to the comparison of matza to food eaten by an onen, an acute mourner, as onen is also spelled with a vav. Actually, it is written leḥem oni without a vav, meaning poor man’s bread. And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili could respond: Do we vocalize the word as ani, as would be appropriate for a phrase meaning a poor man’s bread? In fact, we vocalize it oni, which means oppression, affliction, or mourning. And Rabbi Akiva could retort: The fact that we vocalize the word as oni is in accordance with a statement of Shmuel. As Shmuel said: The expression leḥem oni means bread over which many matters are recited [onin], an allusion to the Passover Seder, at which one recites the Haggadah and eats matza. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Akiva maintain with regard to dough that was kneaded with wine, oil, or honey, that it may not be used for matza? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: One may not knead dough on Passover with wine, oil, or honey? And if one kneaded dough in this manner, Rabban Gamliel says: The dough must be burned immediately, as it is leavened faster than other types of dough. And the Rabbis say that although it is leavened quickly, one can still prevent it from being leavened, and if he does so it may be eaten. And Rabbi Akiva said: It was my Shabbat to serve before Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua during Passover (Rav Yehuda ben Rav Binyamin HaRofeh), and I kneaded for them dough with wine, oil, and honey, and they said nothing to me by way of objection. The baraita continues: And although one may not knead dough with these ingredients, one may spread these substances on the surface of the dough. The Gemara comments: With regard to this latter statement, we have come back to the opinion of the first tanna, who said that one may not knead bread with wine, oil, or honey. And the Rabbis say: With regard to dough into which one may knead wine, oil, or honey, one may likewise spread them on the dough, whereas concerning dough into which one may not knead these ingredients, one may not spread them on the dough either. And everyone agrees that one may not knead the dough with warm water, as this will cause it to be leavened quickly. In any case, it is evident from here that Rabbi Akiva himself prepared matza with wine, oil, and honey. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this statement of Rabbi Akiva’s, which maintains that one does not fulfill his obligation with matza prepared with wine, oil, and honey, is referring to the first day of the Festival, during which there is a special commandment to eat matza. However, that second baraita, in which Rabbi Akiva states that he prepared this type of dough himself, pertains to the second day of Passover, when no special requirement to eat matza is in effect. On the second day, there is no mitzva to eat matza. It is only forbidden to own or eat leavened bread; consequently, so-called rich, or enhanced matza, prepared from fruit juices, is permitted. The Gemara adds that this is as Rabbi Yehoshua said to his sons: On the first night of Passover, do not knead for me dough with milk, but from the first night onward, knead my dough for me with milk. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Throughout the whole year one may not knead dough with milk, and if he kneaded dough with milk, the entire bread is prohibited, due to the fact that one will become accustomed to sin, by unwittingly eating it with meat? Rather, this is what he is saying: On the first night of Passover do not knead me dough with honey; however, from then onward, knead me dough with honey. And if you wish, say instead that actually Rabbi Yehoshua said: With milk, as Ravina said: If this bread, kneaded with milk, is prepared in the shape of an ox’s eye, it is permitted. In other words, if one forms this dough in a unique shape, e.g., the eye of an ox, one may eat it, as it is clearly distinguishable from ordinary bread. Therefore, there is no concern that it will be eaten with meat. Here too, the baraita is speaking about a case where he told them to prepare this matza in the shape of an ox’s eye. It was incidentally mentioned in the previous baraita: And everyone agrees that one may not knead dough with warm water. The Gemara asks: In what way is this case different from that of meal-offerings? As we learned in a mishna: All meal-offerings are kneaded with warm water and are watched so that they will not be leavened. The Gemara explains that there is a distinction between these two cases: If they say it is permitted for diligent priests to bake with warm water, shall they also say the same with regard to those who are not diligent? The priests are diligent and expert in the Temple service and are able to take extreme care, but not everyone can be relied upon to guard the dough unfailingly. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, if we rely on the diligence of the priests, let them also soak the grains in water to help them remove the husks. Why did Rabbi Zeira say that Rabba bar Yirmeya said that Shmuel said: With regard to the wheat used in the meal-offerings, one may not soak it? The Gemara answers: The kneading of the dough is performed by diligent priests; however, the act of soaking is not performed by diligent priests. Instead, this soaking is performed outside of the Temple confines by less reliable non-priests. The Gemara asks: And with regard to kneading, is it performed only by diligent priests? But isn’t it written: “And when any one brings a meal-offering to the Lord, his offering shall be of fine flour; and he shall pour oil upon it, and place frankincense upon it. And he shall bring it to Aaron’s sons the priests; and he shall take from it his handful of its fine flour, and of its oil, together with all its frankincense” (Leviticus 2:1–2). These verses indicate that from the scooping of a handful and onward, the mitzva must be performed by members of the priesthood. This teaches about the pouring of the oil and the stirring of the mixture that they are valid even if they are performed by any person, even a non-priest. The Gemara answers: With regard to kneading, although it is not performed by diligent priests, it is nevertheless performed in the place of the diligent. Kneading may be carried out by a non-priest, but it must still be performed in the Temple courtyard. As the Master said: Mixing is valid if performed by a non-priest; however, if it is conducted outside the walls of the courtyard, it, the meal offering, is disqualified. This serves to exclude soaking, which is neither performed by the diligent nor performed in the place of the diligent. The Gemara asks: And in what way is this case different from that of the omer meal-offering, which must also be guarded from leavening? As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to the omer offering, one soaks it and gathers it, without concern that it will become leavened. The Gemara answers: An act performed by the community is different, as the Great Sanhedrin supervises these operations, and those executing them no doubt proceed with great caution. The Sages taught in another baraita: I might have thought that one can fulfill his obligation by eating matza prepared from the wheat of first fruits; therefore, the verse states: “In all of your habitations you shall eat matzot” (Exodus 12:20). This verse indicates that one fulfills his obligation only with matza that may be eaten “in all of your habitations.” This expression excludes first fruits, which may not be eaten in all of your habitations, but only in Jerusalem. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: That verse is not the source for this halakha; rather, the fact that one cannot fulfill his obligation with matza of first fruits is derived from the juxtaposition of matza and bitter herbs: Just as bitter herbs are not first fruits, as they are not included in the seven species to which the mitzva of first fruits applies, so too matza may not be from first fruits. If you will claim: Just as bitter herbs are from a species that are not brought as first fruits, so too matza must be prepared from a species that are not brought as first fruits, e.g., spelt, I would then think this comparison excludes wheat and barley, which are from a species that are brought as first fruits and should therefore not be used for the mitzva of matza. Therefore, the verse states: “Matzot,” “matzot” (Deuteronomy 16:3, 8) to amplify and teach that any matza is acceptable for this mitzva. The Gemara asks: If the repetition of matzot matzot comes to amplify this halakha that any matza is fit for Passover use, it should also include matza prepared from first-fruit wheat. The Gemara answers: This is indeed true, and Rabbi Akiva retracted his statement. He too derives the halakha from the verse: “In all of your habitations.” As it was taught in a baraita: I might have thought that a person can fulfill his obligation with matza from first fruit; therefore the verse states: “In all of your habitations you shall eat matzot” (Exodus 12:20). The verse indicates that one can fulfill his obligation with matza that may be eaten in all habitations. It excludes first fruits, which may not be eaten in all habitations, but only in Jerusalem. I might have thought that I should also exclude second-tithe produce as fit for matza; therefore the verse states: “Matzot,” “matzot.” As stated above, this repetition serves to amplify, and it includes second tithe in the materials that may be used in the preparation of matza. The Gemara asks: And what did you see that led you to include second-tithe produce due to the words matzot matzot but to exclude first fruits? The Gemara explains: I include the second tithe, which has a means by which it may be permitted to be eaten in all habitations, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as will be explained. And I exclude first fruits, which do not have, under any circumstances, a manner by which it is permitted to eat them in all habitations. The Gemara explains: As Rabbi Eliezer said: From where is it derived with regard to second-tithe produce that became ritually impure, that one may redeem it even in Jerusalem? Second-tithe produce that has been redeemed may be removed from the city. The verse states: “And if the way is too long for you, so that you are not able to carry it [se’eto], because the place is too far from you, which the Lord your God shall choose to set His name there, when the Lord your God shall bless you” (Deuteronomy 14:24). And it is derived by means of a verbal analogy that this carrying [se’et] is nothing other than eating, as it is stated: “And portions [masot] were taken to them from before him” (Genesis 43:34). In light of this parallel language, the Gemara understands the phrase “so that you are not able se’eto” to mean: So that you are not able to eat it. Like second-tithe produce that has not yet been taken into Jerusalem, second-tithe produce in the capital that cannot be eaten due to ritual impurity can be redeemed and taken out of the city. Consequently, second tithe can indeed be considered food that may be eaten “in all of your habitations.” The Gemara applies this discussion to the issue at hand: Who did you hear that said: One can fulfill his obligation to eat matza with second tithe? It is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and yet he excludes first fruits due to the expression: “In all of your habitations.” Learn from this that Rabbi Akiva retracted his opinion and accepted Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s derivation. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, why does he learn this halakha from the phrase: “In all of your habitations”? Let him derive it from the phrase: Leḥem oni (Deuteronomy 16:3). Rabbi Yosei HaGelili derives from this expression that matza must be prepared from produce that can be eaten in a state of acute mourning; that excludes this second tithe, which may be eaten only in a state of joy. This exposition should apply to first fruits as well, as they must also be eaten in a state of joy. The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintains in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says that an acute mourner may eat first fruits. As it was taught in a baraita: First fruits are prohibited to an acute mourner, and Rabbi Shimon permits an acute mourner to eat first fruits. The Gemara explains this dispute: What is the reason for the Rabbis’ opinion, which maintains that an acute mourner may not eat first fruits? As it is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your corn, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstlings of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows which you vow, nor your free-will offerings, nor the offering of your hand” (Deuteronomy 12:17). And the Master said: “The offering of your hand,” these are first fruits, as this verse compares first fruits to the second tithe: Just as the second tithe is prohibited to an acute mourner, as stated explicitly in the Torah, so too are first fruits prohibited to an acute mourner. And Rabbi Shimon says in response to this contention: First fruits are called teruma by the Merciful One and therefore their status is like that of teruma: Just as teruma is permitted to an acute mourner, so too first fruits are permitted to an acute mourner. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Shimon, although he does not accept this juxtaposition of first fruits and second tithe, in any case the word joy is written with regard to first fruits, as it is written: “And you shall rejoice in all the good that the Lord has given you and your household” (Deuteronomy 26:11). In light of this, how can Rabbi Shimon permit an acute mourner to eat first fruits? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Shimon does not learn from that verse that one must eat first fruits while he is personally happy; rather, it comes to teach us that first fruits should be eaten during the period of rejoicing. As we learned in a mishna: From Shavuot until Sukkot, one brings first fruits and recites the prayers of thanks to God that appear in the Torah. From Sukkot until Hanukkah one may bring first fruits, but he does not recite the portion from the Torah. This mishna states that the ideal time for bringing first fruits to the Temple is during the joyous harvest season, from which it may be inferred that this verse is not referring to personal joy of the one bringing the first fruits, but rather to the period of communal joy. The Sages taught that the phrase poor man’s bread [leḥem oni] excludes matza that was boiled [ḥalut] in hot water after it was baked, which is considered to be a relative delicacy; and this expression also excludes matza that was baked as a large cake [ashisha]. I might have thought that a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza only with coarse [hadra’a] bread; therefore, the verse states: “Matzot,” “matzot,” which serves to amplify and include matza prepared with fine-grade flour. And in fact, one could fulfill his obligation even with matzot like those of King Solomon, which were prepared from the finest sifted flour. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states: “Poor man’s bread”? This phrase comes to exclude boiled matza and large cakes, but it does not exclude matza prepared from refined flour. The Gemara asks: From where may it be inferred that ashisha is an expression that indicates importance? As it is written with regard to King David’s celebration after he brought the Ark of the Covenant to Jerusalem: “And he dealt among all the people, among the whole multitude of Israel, both to men and women, to every one a cake of bread, and an eshpar, and an ashisha, and all the people departed, every one to his house” (II Samuel 6:19). And Rav Ḥanan bar Abba said: The word eshpar refers to a portion of meat equivalent to one-sixth of an ox, and the word ashisha refers to a cake prepared from one-sixth of an eipha of flour. And this interpretation disputes the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: Ashisha means a jug of wine, as it is written: “And those who love the jug [ashishei] of grapes” (Hosea 3:1). The Sages taught: One may not bake thick bread on the Festival, on Passover, as it might be leavened before it has a chance to bake; this is the statement of Beit Shammai. And Beit Hillel permit one to bake bread in this manner. The Gemara asks: And how much thickness is required for the matza to be considered thick bread? Rav Huna said: This category includes matza that is a handbreadth thick. The proof is as we found by the shewbread, which could not be leavened and which was a handbreadth thick. Rav Yosef strongly objects to this explanation: If the Sages said that it is permitted to bake bread a handbreadth thick for the shewbread, which was prepared by diligent priests who ensured that the dough did not become leavened, will they say the same with regard to other people who are not as diligent? Furthermore, if they said this with regard to well-kneaded bread, will they say the same with regard to bread that is not well kneaded? Rav Yosef continues: If they said that bread a handbreadth thick is permitted in a case where the bread was cooked with dry wood, which was brought to the Temple during the dry summer months, as the heat generated from this type of wood would cause the bread to cook quickly before it leavened, will they say the same with regard to ordinary people who cook with moist wood? If they said this with regard to a hot oven in the Temple, will they also say it is permitted with regard to a cool oven? Finally, if they said so with regard to the shewbread, which was baked in a metal oven that could be heated quickly, will they say the same with regard to a clay oven? Clearly, these two cases are different, and no comparison can be drawn between the shewbread and ordinary matza. Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: I asked my special Rabbi, and who is this? Rav. Some say that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said that Rav said: I asked my special Rabbi, and who is this? Our holy Rabbi, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: What is the meaning of the expression: Pat ava? He explained that it means: A large quantity of bread, a large batch of dough prepared in one session. And why did they call it: Pat ava, thick bread? It is referred to by this name due to the fact that it requires a large amount of kneading. And if you wish, say instead that in the place where this tanna lived, a large quantity of bread was simply called pat ava, thick bread. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this prohibition against preparing a large batch? If the reason is due to the unnecessary exertion that is required to knead a large amount of dough, which is an improper activity on a Festival, why discuss particularly the application of this halakha to Passover? The same halakha should apply also to other Festivals. The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so; it is prohibited to prepare a large quantity of dough during any Festival. And while this tanna was referring to the festival of Passover, he incidentally mentioned a halakha that actually applies to other Festivals as well. The Gemara comments: That opinion was also taught in a baraita, which states that Beit Shammai say: One may not bake pat ava on a Festival, and Beit Hillel permit baking bread in this manner on a Festival. The Sages taught: One fulfills the obligation to eat matza on Passover with fine bread, with coarse bread, and after the fact with matza shaped in figures, although they said that one should not bake matza shaped in figures on Passover ab initio. Rav Yehuda said that Baitos ben Zonin asked the Sages about this matter: Why did the Sages say that one may not prepare matza shaped in figures on Passover ab initio? They said to him: The reason is because a woman will tarry over it as she prepares the bread, so that she can form the figure before it is baked, and she will thereby cause it to become leavened. He said to them: It is possible for a woman to prepare this matza with a mold, and she could set it immediately, without delaying the baking process. They said to him: People would fail to understand the distinction, and they would say that all shaped matza is prohibited, and yet Baitos’ shaped matza is permitted. Consequently, the Sages rejected this distinction, and prohibited all forms of matza shaped in figures on Passover. Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said: Once I followed my father, Rabbi Tzadok, into Rabban Gamliel’s home, and they brought before him matza shaped in figures on Passover. I said: Father, didn’t the Sages say that one may not prepare matza shaped in figures on Passover? He said to me: My son, they did not say this prohibition for the matza of all ordinary people; rather, they said so in regard to the matza of bakers, who are under pressure to enhance the appearance of their products in order to increase sales. The dough could leaven, since bakers might take too much time to ensure that the shape of their matza is exactly right. Some say that this is what Rabbi Tzadok said to his son: The Sages did not say that this practice is prohibited with regard to the matza of bakers, who are expert and efficient in their work and will do it quickly, but rather this prohibition applies to the matza of all ordinary people. According to both versions of this exchange, it is permitted to eat this matza after the fact. Rabbi Yosei said: One may prepare matzot shaped as thin wafers, but one may not prepare matzot shaped as thick loaves, as the latter is more likely to be leavened. The Sages taught: Sponge-like cakes, honey cakes, spiced cakes [eskeritin], pan-fried bread [ḥallat hamasret], and bread prepared from a mixture of permitted grain and teruma, their owners are all exempt from ḥalla. The Gemara clarifies these obscure terms. What is pan-fried bread? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: This is boiled bread baked by ordinary homeowners in a deep frying pan. Reish Lakish said: These dishes are pot-boiled stew [ilpas], not bread. Since this food is prepared in a pot and not in an oven, it has been boiled rather than baked, and its owner is therefore exempt from ḥalla. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even the owner of bread prepared like a pot-boiled stew is obligated in ḥalla, but the owners of these pan-fried breads and the other baked goods listed are exempt, as these breads were baked in the sun. Since they were not baked over a fire, they are not classified as bread with regard to the mitzva of ḥalla. The Gemara raises an objection to the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish statement from a baraita: With regard to sponge-cakes, honey cakes, or spiced cakes, if one prepared them in a pot, he is obligated to separate ḥalla. However, if he prepared them in the sun, he is exempt from this mitzva. This is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish. Ulla said: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one heated the pot over the fire and afterward pasted the dough to the sides of the hot pot. This is considered like baking in an oven, and one is therefore obligated to separate ḥalla from the dough. The Gemara asks: However, if one pasted the dough to the sides of the pot and afterward heated it, what is the halakha? So too, you will say that is he is exempt from the mitzva of ḥalla? If so, rather than teach in the latter clause of that baraita that the owner of the bread is exempt if it was baked in the sun, let the tanna distinguish and teach this halakha within the presentation of this case itself: In what case is this statement, that one who prepares this bread in a pot is obligated to separate ḥalla, said? For example, when one heated the pot and afterward pasted the bread to its sides; but if he placed the bread in the pot and then boiled it, he is exempt. Why didn’t the baraita formulate the halakha in this manner? The Gemara answers: The text of the baraita is incomplete and is teaching the following: In what case is this statement said? In a case where one heated the pot and afterward pasted the bread to its sides. However, if one placed the bread inside the pot and afterward boiled it, it is considered as though it had been cooked in the sun, and he is exempt from separating ḥalla. Come and hear a difficulty from a baraita: One can fulfill the obligation to eat matza with half-baked matza and pot-boiled matza. Apparently, dough baked in a pot is classified as bread. The Gemara answers: Here too, the baraita is referring to a case where one heated the pot like an oven, and afterward he pasted the dough to the sides of the pot. The Gemara asks: What is half-baked matza? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This refers to any matza that is sufficiently baked so that when it is broken no strands of dough emerge from its sides. Rava said: And likewise the loaves of the thanks-offering may be used if they have been baked to this extent. The Gemara asks: It is obvious that this is the case, as here, with regard to matza, “bread” is written, and there, with regard to the loaves of the thanks-offering, “bread” is also written (Leviticus 7:13). Since both loaves are called bread, it is obvious that the same criteria should apply to both cases. The Gemara rejects this assertion: This statement is necessary, lest you say the following: Since it is written with regard to a thanks-offering: “And he shall present from it one out of each offering for a gift to the Lord; it shall belong to the priest who sprinkles the blood of the peace-offerings” (Leviticus 7:14), and the word “one” indicates that it must be a whole loaf, i.e., that one should not take a broken piece, and here the bread has not been properly baked, it might therefore have been thought that it is considered as though it were broken. Consequently, the baraita teaches us that this is nevertheless classified as bread. The Gemara raises an objection: With regard to me’isa, dough that was boiled in water, Beit Shammai exempt one from separating ḥalla, and Beit Hillel obligate one to do so. As for dough that has undergone the process of ḥalita, Beit Shammai obligate one to separate ḥalla from it, and Beit Hillel exempt. The Gemara asks: What is me’isa and what is ḥalita? The Gemara explains: Me’isa is dough prepared by pouring flour on boiling water [muglashin], whereas ḥalita is formed by pouring boiling water on flour. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said in the name of his father: From both this, me’isa, and that, ḥalita, one is exempt from separating ḥalla. And some say that he said: With regard to both this and that, one is obligated to separate ḥalla. And the Rabbis say: With regard to both this and that, if one prepared them in a pot, he is exempt from the mitzva of ḥalla; however, if he prepared the bread in an oven, he is obligated to separate ḥalla. The Gemara asks: And according to the first tanna, who taught that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree with regard to these two cases, what is different about me’isa and what is different about ḥalita? Why do Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel reverse their opinions with regard to these types of bread? Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said, and likewise Rabbi Yehuda said, and some say it was Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi who said: As is the dispute with regard to this type of bread, so is the dispute with regard to that one; i.e., Beit Hillel are either lenient or stringent in both cases. And the variation in the baraita is due to a break in its text, which is actually a combination of two sources, because he who taught this baraita did not teach that one, as the two statements were taught by different Sages. The Gemara now states the objection: In any event, the baraita is teaching that the Rabbis say: With regard to both this and that, me’isa and ḥalita, if one prepared them in a pot he is exempt from the mitzva of ḥalla, but if he prepared them in an oven he is obligated to separate ḥalla. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who claims that one is obligated to separate ḥalla from bread cooked in a pot. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: It is a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: I might have thought that one is obligated to separate ḥalla from me’isa and ḥaluta; therefore, the verse states “bread” to inform us that this is not the case. Rabbi Yehuda says: Bread is nothing other than that which is baked in an oven. The Gemara asks: The opinion of Rabbi Yehuda is the same as that of the first tanna. Rather, is it not the case that the practical difference between them is in the case of bread prepared as pot-boiled stew? The first tanna maintains that one is obligated to separate ḥalla from bread prepared as pot-boiled stew, unlike bread prepared by me’isa and ḥalita. And Rabbi Yehuda maintains: Similar to me’isa and ḥalita, one is exempt from separating ḥalla from bread prepared as pot-boiled stew, as it was not baked in an oven. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it is possible to say that everyone agrees that the owner of bread prepared as pot-boiled stew is exempt from ḥalla, and here they disagree with regard to a case where one subsequently baked it in the oven. The first tanna maintains that since one subsequently baked it in the oven, it is called bread, and one must separate ḥalla from it. And Rabbi Yehuda maintains that bread is nothing other than that which is initially baked in an oven, and since this food was not initially baked in an oven, it is not classified as bread. Rava said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda? As it is written: “And ten women shall bake your bread in one oven” (Leviticus 26:26). Rava learns from this verse that bread baked in one oven is called bread, and that which is not baked in one oven, but rather in several different vessels, is not called bread. Rabba and Rav Yosef sat behind Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Zeira sat before Ulla to hear him teach Torah. Rabba said to Rabbi Zeira: Raise the following dilemma of Ulla: If one pasted bread inside a pot and heated it from the outside, what is the halakha? Is one obligated to separate ḥalla from this bread? He said to him: Why should I say this question to Ulla? For if I say this to him, he will say to me: What is the halakha with regard to bread prepared as pot-boiled stew? In other words, he will reply that my question is effectively the same as that well-known case. Rav Yosef further said to Rabbi Zeira: Raise the following dilemma of Ulla: If one pasted bread inside a pot and lit a torch opposite it, what is the halakha? He again said to him: Why should I say this question to Ulla? As if I say this to him, he will say to me: The majority of poor people do this when they use a pot for cooking, and therefore this too should be considered the same as bread prepared like pot-boiled stew. Rav Asi said: With regard to dough of second-tithe produce, in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir, one is exempt from separating ḥalla from it. The reason is that Rabbi Meir considers second tithe to be consecrated property, which means that although its owner is entitled to use this produce, it does not in fact belong to him. By contrast, in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, who maintain that second-tithe produce is the property of its owner, one is obligated to separate ḥalla from it. With regard to matzot of second-tithe produce: In accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir, a person cannot fulfill his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with this matza. Rabbi Meir considers it consecrated property, and one must eat matza that belongs to him, not consecrated property. In accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, one can fulfill his obligation with this type of matza on the first night of Passover. The same dispute applies to a citron of second-tithe produce: In accordance with the statement of Rabbi Meir, one cannot fulfill his obligation to take the four species on the first day of the festival of Sukkot with this citron. In accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, a person can use this citron to fulfill his obligation on the first day of the festival of Sukkot. Rav Pappa strongly objects to this statement: Granted, one must separate ḥalla from this dough, as it is written: “Of the first of your dough you shall give to the Lord a portion [ḥalla] for a gift throughout your generations” (Numbers 15:21). This verse can be read in a very precise manner, so that the expression “your dough” indicates that ḥalla is separated only from dough that belongs to you. With regard to a citron too, a similar conclusion can be drawn, as it is written: “And you shall take for yourselves on the first day a fruit of goodly trees, branches of palm trees, and boughs of thick trees and willows of the brook” (Leviticus 23:40). Here too, the expression “for yourselves” indicates that what you take must belong to you. However, with regard to matza, is it written that you must use your own matza? Since there is no such requirement, it stands to reason that even consecrated matza is valid for this mitzva. Rava said, and some say Rav Yeimar bar Shelamya said: This principle can be derived by means of a verbal analogy between “bread” and “bread.” It is written here, with regard to matza: “Poor man’s bread” (Deuteronomy 16:3), and it is written there, with regard to ḥalla: “And it shall be that when you eat of the bread of the land, you shall set apart a portion for a gift to the Lord” (Numbers 15:19). Just as there, in the case of ḥalla, it must be separated only from food that belongs to you, so too here, with regard to matza, it must be prepared only from produce that belongs to you. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the following baraita supports Rav Asi: With regard to dough of second-tithe produce, one is exempt from separating ḥalla from it; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: One is obligated in this mitzva. Since this is a conclusive proof, the Gemara expresses surprise at the formulation: Let us say that it supports him. This statement is identical to that one; i.e., the ruling of the baraita is identical to Rav Asi’s opinion. The Gemara explains: This is what the statement: Let us say, is saying: Let us say from the fact that they disagree with regard to dough, so too, they disagree with regard to these other issues. Or perhaps it is different there, with regard to ḥalla, as it is written: “Your dough,” “your dough,” twice. This repetition might indicate that the mitzva of ḥalla applies only to one who maintains full ownership of the dough. Although Rabbi Meir contends that one need not separate ḥalla from second-tithe produce, he does not necessarily issue a similar ruling with regard to matza or a citron, as there is no explicit proof to this effect. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised a dilemma: What is the halakha with regard to the possibility that a person can fulfill his obligation to eat matza with ḥalla separated from second-tithe dough in Jerusalem? The Gemara clarifies this dilemma: In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, do not raise this dilemma. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili maintains that one can fulfill his obligation to eat matza only with food that may be eaten in a state of acute mourning. The Gemara explains why the dilemma does not arise according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: Now that it has been mentioned that one cannot fulfill his obligation with the non-sacred portion of second-tithe produce, i.e., with that which was not sanctified as ḥalla, is it necessary to mention that one cannot fulfill his obligation with its ḥalla? When you raise the dilemma, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara explains: Unlike Rabbi Yosei, Rabbi Akiva does not interpret the phrase “poor man’s bread [leḥem oni]” as though it were written with an alef, which indicates that it is referring to the bread of acute mourning [aninut], i.e., the period of mourning on the day of the death of a close relative. Consequently, the following dilemma arises: It can be suggested that it is with the non-sacred portion of the second-tithe produce that one can fulfill his obligation, for if the produce becomes ritually impure it can be permitted to be eaten in any habitation in Israel after it has been redeemed. Rabbi Akiva agrees that any food that can be eaten in an unrestricted manner in certain circumstances can also be used for the obligation to eat matza. However, with regard to ḥalla, which, if it becomes ritually impure, cannot be permitted to be eaten in any habitation, but goes, i.e., it is slated for burning, this ḥalla cannot be used to fulfill one’s obligation. Or perhaps we say: Since, if one had not designated the produce as ḥalla and it had become ritually impure, it could be redeemed and be permitted to be eaten in any habitation, and one could fulfill the obligation of matza with it, now too, one can fulfill his obligation with it, despite the fact that it has been designated as ḥalla. Since the sanctity is not inherent in the dough itself, it does not undermine its status as fit for matza. Some say a different version of this analysis: With regard to this case, certainly do not raise the dilemma, as here we certainly apply the principle of: Since, as stated above. In other words, there is no doubt that ḥalla taken from second-tithe produce can be used for matza, as its sanctity is not inherent. Rather, when you raise the dilemma, it is with regard to ḥalla that was purchased with second-tithe money, as this type of food can be ritually purified if it becomes ritually impure. And furthermore, in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, do not raise this dilemma, since they say that it can be redeemed for a second time; this case is identical to the case of second-tithe produce itself. In this regard, the Rabbis do not distinguish between the money with which the second tithe was redeemed and the second-tithe produce itself. Rather, when you raise the dilemma, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said that an object that was purchased with second-tithe money and that became ritually impure must be buried. As we learned in a mishna with regard to food that was purchased with second-tithe money that became ritually impure, this ritually impure food should be redeemed for money, with which one must purchase other food. Rabbi Yehuda says: It should be buried. Since this food was merely purchased with second-tithe money, it does not have the same degree of sanctity as the tithe itself. Therefore, its status as a second-tithe object cannot be transferred to yet a third object. Consequently, if it becomes impure, it cannot be redeemed for money but must be buried as an item for which there is no use. The Gemara clarifies the aforementioned dilemma: Do we say the following: Since, if it were not purchased with second-tithe money, and furthermore, since, if one had not designated it as ḥalla and it became ritually impure, this produce would be permitted to be eaten in any habitation, one can therefore fulfill his obligation with it even after its status has changed by being purchased with second-tithe money and designated as ḥalla? Or perhaps we say one of these logical arguments starting with: Since, but we do not say two arguments of: Since. If so, one cannot fulfill his obligation with matza of ḥalla separated from second tithe. Rava said: It stands to reason that the category of tithe is a single designation. In other words, provided that the food is included in the general framework of second tithe, it can be used for matza, and this applies even to the ḥalla separated from second tithe. We learned in the mishna that if one prepared the loaves of a thanks-offering or a nazirite’s wafers for himself, he cannot use them to fulfill his obligation to eat matza on Passover. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? Rabba said: As the verse states: “And you shall guard the matzot” (Exodus 12:17). This verse teaches that one may use only matza that has been guarded from becoming leavened for the purpose of matza, i.e., with the intention of fulfilling one’s obligation of matza with it. This explanation excludes this matza, which was prepared for a nazirite or a thanks-offering and which was not guarded for the purpose of matza but for the purpose of a sacrifice. Rav Yosef said a different reason: One may not use matza prepared for a nazirite or a thanks-offering because the verse states: “Seven days you shall eat matzot” (Exodus 12:15), which indicates that one can fulfill his obligation only with matza that can be eaten for all seven days. This requirement excludes this matza, which is of nazirite’s wafers or the loaves of a thanks-offering and which cannot be eaten for seven days, but only for one day and one night. The Gemara comments: It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, and it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef. The Gemara elaborates: It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabba: I might have thought that one can fulfill his obligation to eat matza with the loaves of a thanks-offering or a nazirite’s wafers; therefore, the verse states: “And you shall guard the matzot,” indicating that one must use matza that has been guarded from becoming leavened for the purpose of matza on Passover. This requirement excludes this matza, which was not guarded for the purpose of matza but for the purpose of a sacrifice. It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef: I might have thought that a person can fulfill his obligation to eat matza with the loaves of a thanks-offering or a nazirite’s wafers; therefore, the verse states: “Seven days you shall eat matzot,” from which it is inferred that one must fulfill this obligation with matza that can be eaten for all seven days. This requirement excludes this matza, as it cannot be eaten for seven days but only for a day and a night. The Gemara asks a question of both opinions: And let him derive this halakha, that one cannot fulfill his obligation to eat matza with the loaves of a thanks-offering or a nazirite’s wafers, from the phrase “bread of affliction [leḥem oni]” (Deuteronomy 16:3). According to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, this phrase means: One can fulfill his obligation to eat matza only with food that may be eaten in a state of acute mourning. This requirement excludes this matza, i.e., the loaves of the thanks-offering and the nazirite wafers, which is not eaten in a state of acute mourning but in a state of joy, as an acute mourner is prohibited from eating sacrificial foods. The Gemara answers: Rabba and Rav Yosef both maintain in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that since oni, meaning poverty, is written, the matza must be bread of poverty. According to Rabbi Akiva, this phrase does not teach the halakha pertaining to consumption by acute mourners. The Gemara asks another question: And let him derive this halakha, that one cannot fulfill his obligation to eat matza with the loaves of a thanks-offering or a nazirite’s wafers, from the fact that it is matza ashira, enhanced matza, as both the loaves of the thanks-offering and the nazirite’s wafers contain oil. Matza that contains ingredients besides flour and water is classified as matza ashira and cannot be used for the mitzva of eating matza on the first night of Passover. Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: This is an incorrect definition, as the total amount of oil in these loaves or wafers is only a quarter-log, and as this small amount of oil is divided between several loaves, it is nullified in the mixture. Consequently, the loaves of the thanks-offering and the nazirite’s wafers are not matza ashira. The Gemara again asks: And let him derive this halakha, that one cannot fulfill his obligation to eat matza with the loaves of a thanks-offering or a nazirite’s wafers from that fact that these types of bread cannot be eaten in every habitation. It was previously stated that the obligation to eat matza can be fulfilled only with food that can be eaten anywhere in Israel, whereas offerings may be eaten only in Jerusalem. Reish Lakish said: That is to say, the loaves of the thanks-offering and the nazirite’s wafers may be eaten in Nov and Givon. In other words, the omission of this reason indicates that offerings could have been sacrificed on the communal altars during the period when improvised altars were permitted, before the Temple was built. These offerings are not among those that can be sacrificed only: “In the place that the Lord shall choose” (Deuteronomy 12:5). This means that during that period the loaves of the thanks-offering and the nazirite’s wafers could indeed have been eaten anywhere, as improvised altars were built in any place. Consequently, even after the Temple was built, the loaves of the thanks-offering and the nazirite’s wafers are still considered fit to be eaten anywhere in Israel. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Ilai said: I asked Rabbi Eliezer ben Hyrcanus: What is the halakha with regard to the possibility that a person can fulfill the obligation to eat matza with the loaves of a thanks-offering or a nazirite’s wafers? He said to me: I did not hear anything about this issue. I went and asked Rabbi Yehoshua, who said to me: They said, concerning loaves for a thanks-offering or a nazirite’s wafers that one prepared for his own offering, that a person cannot fulfill his obligation with them. However, if one baked them to sell in the market, he can fulfill his obligation with them. When I returned and recited these matters to Rabbi Eliezer, he said to me in excitement: By the covenant, these are the very matters that were stated to Moses on Mount Sinai. Rabbi Eliezer swore that this halakha had been transmitted over the generations going back to Moses on Mount Sinai. Some say he spoke in astonishment: By the covenant! Are these in fact the matters that were stated to Moses on Mount Sinai? And doesn’t this halakha require a reason? Since there is no explicit tradition in this regard, it is necessary to provide a reason for this distinction. The Gemara asks: And indeed, what is the reason for this distinction between these loaves one prepared for himself and those he intended to sell in the market? Rabba said: With regard to anything sold in the market, the merchant may change his mind about it. He might say: If it is sold, it is sold; but if it is not sold for an offering, I will fulfill my obligation to eat matza with it. Since the merchant had in mind from the outset that these matzot might be used for the mitzva on Passover, he is permitted to use them to fulfill his obligation. MISHNA: And these are the vegetables with which a person can fulfill his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover: One can fulfill his obligation with ḥazeret, with chervil [tamkha], and with field eryngo [ḥarḥavina], and with endives [olashin], and with maror. One fulfills his obligation with them whether they are fresh or whether they are dry. However, one does not fulfill his obligation if they are pickled in water or vinegar, nor if they are over-boiled [shaluk] in hot water, nor if they are boiled [mevushal]. The mishna adds: And all these different types of vegetables join together to the measure of an olive-bulk, i.e., it is not necessary to eat this amount from one specific type of vegetable. And one fulfills his obligation by eating their stalk, as it is not necessary to eat the leaves. And one fulfills the obligation with doubtfully tithed produce, with first-tithe produce whose teruma has been taken and given to a priest, and with both second-tithe produce and consecrated property that were redeemed. GEMARA: The Gemara identifies the plants mentioned by the mishna by their Aramaic names. Ḥazeret is lettuce. Olashin is called hindevi. With regard to tamkha, Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: It is called temakhta in Aramaic. As for ḥarḥavina, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: This is the plant that grows around the palm tree. The mishna taught: And with maror. The Gemara explains: This is a plant called merirata. Bar Kappara teaches: These are the vegetables with which a person can fulfill his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover: With endives, chervil, ḥarḥallin, field eryngo, and ḥazeret. Rav Yehuda says: Also wild endives, garden endives, and ḥazeret. The Gemara asks: Why does Rav Yehuda mention garden endives and ḥazeret? These were already taught in the first clause. The Gemara explains that this is what Rav Yehuda is saying: Even wild endives are equivalent to garden endives and ḥazeret and may be used as bitter herbs on Passover. Rabbi Meir says: The plants asvas, and tura, and sweet myrrh [mar yero’ar] can also be used to fulfill this obligation. Rabbi Yosei said to him: Asvas and tura are two names for one plant, and mar is the same plant as yero’ar. A Sage of the school of Rabbi Samuel teaches: These are the vegetables with which a person can fulfill his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover: With ḥazeret, endives, chervil, field eryngo, ḥarginnin, and hardofannin. Rabbi Yehuda says: One can also fulfill his obligation with ḥazeret yolin and ḥazeret gallin, as they are similar to the aforementioned vegetables. Rabbi Ile’a said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: One can also fulfill his obligation with arkablim. And I went around all of Rabbi Eliezer’s students looking for a colleague who agreed with me that Rabbi Eliezer said this, but I did not find anyone who remembered this ruling. But when I came before Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, he conceded to my statement. Rabbi Yehuda says: Any plant that has white sap when it is cut may be used as bitter herbs. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: Anything whose surface is light green may be used as bitter herbs. Aḥerim say: Any bitter herb that has sap and whose surface is light green is fit for this mitzva. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From the statements of all these Sages, we can learn that a bitter green herb has sap and its surface is light green. Rav Huna said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Aḥerim. Ravina found Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, searching for merirata to use as bitter herbs. He said to him: What is your opinion, that you seek this particular herb? If you are looking for that which is most bitter, but we learned ḥazeret first in the mishna, which indicates that this is the preferred choice. And likewise, a Sage of the school of Shmuel taught ḥazeret first, before the other types of bitter herbs. And Rabbi Oshaya said: The optimal fulfillment of the mitzva is with ḥazeret, and Rava said: What is ḥazeret? It is lettuce [ḥassa]. The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of lettuce [ḥassa]? It refers to the fact that God has mercy [ḥas] on us. And Rabbi Samuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Why are the Egyptians likened to bitter herbs in the verse: “And they embittered their lives” (Exodus 1:14)? This comparison serves to tell you that just as these bitter herbs are soft at first and harsh in the end, so too, the Egyptians were soft at first, when they paid the Jews for their work, but were harsh in the end, as they enslaved them. This idea applies solely to ḥazeret, which has a bitter aftertaste, but not to other types of bitter herbs, which are bitter from the beginning. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Ravina: I retract my position and concede that it is preferable to use ḥazeret for bitter herbs. Rav Reḥumi said to Abaye: From where is it known that this bitter herb that must be eaten on Passover night is a type of vegetable? Perhaps one could say that the mitzva should be performed with the bile of a kufya fish, which is very bitter, but not necessarily with a type of plant? He answered: Bitter herbs are similar to matza; just as matza must be prepared only from food that grows from the ground, so too, bitter herbs must be from food that grows from the ground. The Gemara asks: How do we know that a bitter herb is specifically a vegetable rather than the bitter oleander bush? The Gemara answers: Bitter herbs are similar to matza; just as matza is prepared from a type of plant, but not including a tree, so too, bitter herbs must be from a type of plant that is not a tree. The Gemara asks a similar question: Perhaps I can say that one may use harzipu, a vegetable that poisons animals, as the bitter herb. The Gemara answers: It must be similar to matza; just as matza is prepared from plants that are fit for human consumption and can be purchased with second-tithe money, so too, bitter herbs must be from a species that can be purchased with second-tithe money. Rabba bar Rav Ḥanin said to Abaye: I can say that the bitter herb mentioned in the Torah includes merely one species, i.e., only the bitterest plant can be used for this obligation. Abaye responded: For this reason it is written: “Bitter herbs” (Exodus 12:8) in the plural, indicating that many types of bitter herbs are fit for this purpose. Rabba retorted: But one can say that “bitter herbs” refers to two different species, but no more. Abaye explained: Bitter herbs are similar to matza; just as matza can be prepared from many types of grain, so too, bitter herbs can be taken from many different types of vegetables. Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: With regard to the vegetables that the Sages said a person can fulfill with them his obligation to eat bitter herbs on Passover, they may all be planted in one garden bed. The Gemara concludes: That is to say that the prohibition against planting diverse kinds of seeds does not apply to them? Rav’s statement indicates that all these species are so similar that they may be planted together without violating the prohibition against planting different species of crops in one area of a field. Rava raised an objection from a mishna: Ḥazeret and ḥazeret gallin; endive and wild endive; leek and wild leek; coriander and wild coriander; mustard and Egyptian mustard; and Egyptian gourd and harmutza, a type of gourd, are not considered a mixture of diverse kinds when planted together. This indicates that ḥazeret and ḥazeret gallin, yes, they may be planted together; however, ḥazeret and endives, no, they may not be planted together. And lest you say that all these species are taught together, and the mishna is actually saying that any of these species may be planted together, but didn’t Rav himself say that these plants were taught in pairs, i.e., one may plant each plant only with its pair that is listed in the mishna, due to their similarity; however, one may not, e.g., plant lettuce and endive together. It therefore remains unclear what Rav meant when he said that vegetables fit for use as bitter herbs may be planted in a single garden bed. The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the term planted, which Rav said? It means that these plants may be properly planted. In other words, they may be planted together provided that there is an appropriate amount of space between them, so that there is no violation of the prohibition against planting diverse kinds of seeds. The Gemara asks: If he wishes to inform us about planting them properly, we already learned this in a mishna: With regard to a garden bed that is six by six handbreadths in area, one may plant in it five different types of seeds, four types on the four sides of the bed and one type in the middle. This mishna teaches that it is permitted to plant different types of seeds in one garden bed, provided that one maintains the appropriate distance between them. The Gemara explains: Rav’s statement is nevertheless necessary. Lest you say that that applies only to seeds, but with regard to vegetables, no, it is prohibited to plant them in a single garden bed even if this separation is maintained, Rava teaches us that it is permitted to plant in this manner with vegetables as well. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that vegetables are stronger in the level of their prohibition than seeds? But didn’t we learn in a mishna in Kilayim: With regard to multiple types of seeds, one may not plant them together in one garden bed, even if there is space between them; however, with regard to multiple types of vegetables, one may plant them together in one bed? This mishna apparently indicates that the halakha is stricter concerning seeds. The Gemara answers: Rav’s statement is necessary. Lest you say that these bitter herbs are a type of seed, not a vegetable, and therefore it is prohibited to plant them in a bed with other seeds, Rav teaches us that all the various bitter herbs are classified as types of vegetables. The Gemara asks: Could it even enter your mind that bitter herbs are types of seeds? But didn’t we learn the word vegetables in a mishna? And bar Kappara likewise taught: Vegetables. And furthermore, the Sage of the school of Shmuel taught: Vegetables. The Gemara explains: It was necessary for Rav to mention the status of ḥazeret. It could enter your mind to say that since ḥazeret ultimately hardens into a type of seed, one must therefore give it more space in a garden bed than other vegetables. Rav’s statement indicates that this is not the case. The Gemara offers support for this contention: Didn’t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, say: With regard to a stalk of cabbage that has hardened, one must allow a beit rova of space for it, in which no other seeds may be planted. Apparently, since it will ultimately harden, one must give it more space. Here too, in the case of the ḥazeret, it might have been thought that one is required to give it more space. Therefore, Rava teaches us that all types of bitter herbs, even lettuce, may be planted together in one bed without leaving additional space between each species. The mishna taught that one can fulfill his obligation to eat bitter herbs with these types of vegetables, whether they are fresh or whether they are dried. Rav Ḥisda said: They taught this halakha only with regard to the stem. However, with regard to the leaves, if they are moist, yes, they may be used as bitter herbs, but if they are dry, no, they may not serve as bitter herbs. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that it is taught in the last clause of the mishna: In their stems, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna refers to the leaves. The Gemara answers: The tanna is explaining his statement in the first clause of the mishna: When he taught that one may eat herbs whether they are fresh or whether dried, the tanna was referring to the stem, not the leaves. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: One can fulfill the obligation with the bitter herbs themselves or with their stems, whether they are fresh or whether they are dried; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: With regard to fresh bitter herbs, one can fulfill his obligation with them; however, with regard to dry bitter herbs, one cannot fulfill the obligation with them. And everyone agrees that one can fulfill his obligation with them if they are withered and are no longer fresh. However, one may neither use bitter herbs that have been pickled, nor over-boiled, nor boiled. The baraita continues: The principle is: Anything that has the taste of bitter herbs, one can fulfill his obligation with it; but anything that does not have the taste of bitter herbs, one cannot fulfill his obligation with it. This baraita indicates that neither Rabbi Meir nor the Rabbis distinguish between the leaves of these herbs and their stems. The Gemara answers: Interpret Rabbi Meir’s statement, that one can fulfill the obligation with both fresh and dried bitter herbs, as referring to the stem but not to the leaves. The Sages taught: One cannot fulfill the obligation with them when they are withered. They said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Tzadok: One can fulfill his obligation with them even when they are withered. Rami bar Ḥama raised a dilemma: What is the halakha with regard to the possibility that a person can fulfill his obligation with bitter herbs of second-tithe produce in Jerusalem? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who permits one to fulfill the obligation to eat matza with second-tithe produce because it can be eaten anywhere if it becomes ritually impure, do not raise this dilemma. Now that it has been mentioned that in the case of matza, where the obligation applies by Torah law, one can fulfill his obligation with second tithe in this manner, is it necessary to mention that one can use second tithe for bitter herbs, which nowadays applies by rabbinic law, as there is no Paschal lamb? When you raise the dilemma, it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who maintains that one cannot fulfill his obligation with matza of second-tithe produce. What is the halakha with regard to bitter herbs? The Gemara explains the two sides of this dilemma: Does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili say it is only with regard to matza of second-tithe produce, where the obligation applies by Torah law, that one does not fulfill the mitzva; however, with bitter herbs, a mitzva that applies by rabbinic law, one can fulfill his obligation with this second-tithe produce? Or perhaps, everything that the Sages instituted, they instituted in a manner similar to the model provided by Torah law. If this principle is accepted, it would mean the following: Just as one may not use second-tithe produce for matza, so too, one may not use second tithe as bitter herbs, despite the fact that the obligation to eat them is rabbinic. Rava said: It stands to reason that since the verse juxtaposes matza and bitter herbs, similar restrictions apply to both mitzvot. Consequently, just as according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili one cannot use second-tithe produce for matza, so too, one cannot use this produce for bitter herbs. MISHNA: One may not soak coarse bran for feeding chickens, lest it be leavened. However, one may pour boiling water onto the bran before feeding it to the chickens, as it will not become leavened from this brief exposure to water. A woman may not soak coarse bran to bring by hand to the bathhouse for use as a cleanser; however, she may rub coarse bran on her dry skin. Likewise, the Sages said: A person may not chew wheat and place it on his wound, due to the fact that the wheat will be leavened from the saliva and his chewing. GEMARA: The Sages taught: The following foods do not come to a state of leavening: Foods that have already been baked, or boiled, or over-boiled in hot water. With regard to the statement that boiled food will not become leavened, the Gemara asks: Why not? When it is boiled it will become leavened. The Gemara answers that Rav Pappa said: The tanna merely said that if it was first baked and afterward boiled, it will not be leavened; however, if it was initially boiled it will become leavened. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: In the case of flour into which water is dripping, even if the water drips the entire day the flour will not come to a state of leavening, as the ceaseless dripping prevents fermentation. Rav Pappa said: And that is the case only if one drop drips into the other, i.e., the dripping is continuous, preventing the mixture from settling. The school of Rabbi Sheila say: Vatika, a pastry prepared from a mixture of different liquids, is permitted on Passover. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But wasn’t it taught in a baraita that vatika is forbidden? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This baraita, which states that vatika is permitted, is referring to a case in which it was prepared with oil and salt, whereas that baraita forbade vatika prepared with water and salt, as that dish will become leavened. Mar Zutra said: A person should not line the edge of a pot with roasted flour, lest some of the flour was not properly roasted and it will come to a state of leavening in the pot. Rav Yosef said: A person should not scald two wheat grains in boiling water at the same time, lest one move and rest in the slit [tzirya] of the other, thereby preventing the column [dikkula] of boiling water from entering all four sides of the grain, and the grain will come to a state of leavening. And Abaye said: A person may not roast two stalks together, lest water leave one and be absorbed by the other, and it come to be leavened. Rava said to him: If so, one should not even roast one stalk, lest the liquid leave one end of the stalk and be absorbed by its other end. Rather, Rava said: One need not be concerned about this possibility, as it is considered fruit juice, and fruit juice does not leaven grain. The Gemara adds: And Abaye retracted his opinion with regard to that halakha of stalks, as he maintains that anything that is absorbing liquid will not become leavened unless it is fully soaked in water. As Abaye said: With regard to this jug used for drying the stalks by means of roasting, if it is inverted it is permitted, as the liquid that is discharged from one stalk will not be absorbed by the other stalks. However, if the vessel is upright it is prohibited, as the liquid retained in the vessel might be absorbed by the other stalks and leaven them. Rava said: Even if the jug is upright, it is also permitted. This liquid is considered fruit juice, and fruit juice does not leaven grain. The Sages taught: One may not soak barley in water on Passover to make it easier to remove the chaff from the grain. And if one did soak barley grain and it split, it is prohibited. If it did not split, it is permitted. Rabbi Yosei says: If one sees that the grain is expanding, he should soak it in vinegar, and the vinegar will cause the grain to contract, thereby preventing leavening. However, Shmuel said: The halakha in not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: When the Sages were referring to a case where the barley grain split, the prohibition does not apply only if it actually split and a crack is visible. Rather, this is referring even to a case where if the barley grains were placed on a barrel of wine they would split by themselves, due to the effect of the wine. And by contrast, Shmuel said: This halakha applies only if it actually split. The Gemara relates: Shmuel took action in accordance with his ruling, when he was in the village of bar Ḥashu’s house. He prohibited only barley grains that had actually split, but permitted those that were about to split. Rabba said: A pious person will not soak wheat at all during Passover. The Gemara asks: Why discuss particularly a pious person? This halakha should apply to everyone as well, as it was expressly taught in a baraita: One may not soak barley on Passover. The Gemara answers that this is what Rabba is saying: A pious person will not even soak wheat, which is firmer than barley and less likely to split, due to the concern that it might become leavened. Rav Naḥman said to Rabba: Anyone who listens to Abba, Rabba’s first name, will eat moldy bread during Passover, as flour cannot be properly prepared without soaking, and therefore matza should not be prepared from this flour. As in Rav Huna’s house they would soak the grain, and in Rava bar Avin’s house they would likewise soak their grain. But Rava said: Soaking grain should not be avoided merely for reasons of piety; rather, it is absolutely prohibited to soak grain. The Gemara asks: Rather, that which is taught in a baraita: One may not soak barley on Passover, indicates that it is barley that one may not soak; however, it is permitted to soak wheat, how will Rava explain this baraita? The Gemara explains: The baraita is speaking employing the didactic style of: Needless to say. It should be understood as follows: Needless to say, wheat may not be soaked, since wheat grains have a slit through which water will enter, and the wheat will therefore expand quickly when left to soak. However, in the case of barley, which is smooth and no water will enter the grain, one might say that this seems well, i.e., it is permitted, to soak barley. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that it is prohibited to soak even barley. Rava reconsidered and then said: This is not the case. Rather, it is permitted to soak grain, as it was taught in a baraita: One can fulfill his obligation with a matza loaf prepared from refined flour and with matza baked from coarse flour. And it is impossible to produce refined matza without soaking the grain, as this is the only way to remove the chaff completely from the grain. Rav Pappa raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from a baraita: With regard to flour and refined flour that belong to gentiles, in villages they are ritually pure, and in cities they are ritually impure. It is assumed that grain in cities is soaked before it is ground into flour. Once water comes in contact with this grain, it becomes susceptible to ritual impurity, and it subsequently becomes impure when touched by gentiles. As for flour in villages, what is the reason that it is ritually pure? Is it not due to the fact that they do not soak the flour, and therefore it does not become liable to ritual impurity? And yet their flour is nonetheless called refined flour. It can be inferred from this that it is possible to prepare refined flour without soaking the grain. Rava answered: You should interpret the distinction of the baraita as referring only to ordinary flour, not refined flour, which is invariably susceptible to ritual impurity due to the soaking. After Rava left, Rav Pappa said: What is the reason that he did not say a proof from this statement that Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Yirmeya said that Shmuel said: With regard to wheat that will be used for meal-offerings, one may not soak it, and yet it is nonetheless called refined flour? The Torah insists that the flour used for meal-offerings be prepared from refined flour. Rava reconsidered and then said: It is not only permitted to soak the grains; it is actually a mitzva to soak them, as it is stated: “And you shall guard the matzot” (Exodus 12:17). The Gemara explains this statement: If it is not the case that grain requires soaking, for what purpose is guarding necessary? If you claim that this verse is referring to guarding when kneading, that cannot be the case, as guarding grain while kneading is not considered guarding. If one failed to protect the wheat from becoming leavened up to that point, it is of no use to be careful while kneading it. Consequently, this mitzva to guard the dough cannot be referring to the kneading stage. As Rav Huna said: In the case of dough prepared by gentiles, if one knows that it has not become leavened, a person may fill his stomach with them on Passover night, provided that he eats an olive-bulk of matza in the end, to fulfill the obligation to eat matza. The Gemara infers from this statement: With regard to the matza that he eats in the end, yes, he fulfills his obligation with this matza. But with regard to the matza he ate in the beginning, no, he does not fulfill the mitzva with dough prepared by gentiles. What is the reason that one cannot fulfill his obligation to eat matza with dough prepared by gentiles? It is because he did not perform his duty to guard this dough. But one can perform his duty to guard it from the time of baking and onward. Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from this baraita that the grain must be guarded from the beginning, i.e., from the time it is soaked, which proves that soaking the grain is part of the process of preparing matza? The Gemara rejects this: And from where do we know that this conclusion is correct? Perhaps it is different there, as at the time when guarding is required, i.e., when water was added to the flour, he did not perform his duty to guard it properly. However, in a case where at the time when guarding is required, when water is added the flour, he properly performed his duty to guard it, so too, it is possible that guarding flour at the time of kneading is considered proper guarding. Therefore, this question cannot be resolved based on the case of dough prepared by gentiles. And although this proof was rejected, Rava did not retract his statement that guarding grain must begin before kneading. For he would say to those who cut and tied the stalks [kifei] of grain in the field: When you cut the grain, cut it for the purpose of the mitzva. Apparently, Rava maintains that it is necessary to guard the grain from the outset, i.e., from the beginning of its preparation until its end. The Gemara relates with regard to Mar, son of Ravina, that his mother would bring him wheat in a trough. In other words, she would guard the wheat grains from when they were harvested by placing them in vessels and guarding them until Passover. The Gemara relates that there was a certain boat carrying wheat, which capsized before Passover in the Ḥishta River. Rava permitted its owners to sell the recovered grain to gentiles before Passover. Rabba bar Levai raised an objection to the opinion of Rava from a baraita: With regard to a garment in which diverse kinds, a prohibited mixture of wool and linen, has been lost, i.e., a wool garment into which a linen thread was sewn or vice versa, one may not sell it to a gentile; and one may not even fashion it into a saddlecloth for a donkey. It is prohibited to do so lest one remove a piece of this garment and sew it onto his own clothing. However, one may fashion it into a shroud for a dead body, as there is no concern that he will remove it from the dead. The Gemara clarifies this issue: What is the reason that one may not sell it to a gentile? Is it not due to the concern that the gentile will resell it to a Jew? Since the mixture of wool and linen is not visible, it is possible for a Jew to use this cloth unawares. The same concern applies to grain: It is not apparent that the grain that capsized in the river is prohibited. It should therefore be prohibited to sell this wheat to gentiles, lest they resell it to Jews. Rava reconsidered and then said: He should sell this wheat one kav at a time, i.e., in small measures, each to a different Jew, but not to any one Jew in large quantities, so that all of this wheat will be used before Passover. By selling it in this manner, all the grain will be used quickly and no one will unwittingly eat these leavened grains on Passover. The Sages taught: One may not stir flour into a pot of food on Passover to absorb the foam that has accumulated during the cooking process. And one who wishes to stir flour should add the flour and afterward add vinegar, which will prevent the flour from becoming leavened. And some say: One may even add vinegar and afterward add the flour, as vinegar prevents flour from becoming leavened even after the flour is diluted in water. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna whose opinion is introduced by the phrase some say? Rav Ḥisda said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to a stew pot or a pot of food that one removed from the fire when it was seething, one may not add spices to them on Shabbat. However, one may add spices to a dish or to the large plate into which the food is poured from the pot. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may add spices to any food that has been removed from the fire, except to a dish that contains vinegar or brine, as this food is considered as though it were still seething, due to the pungency of the vinegar or brine. Since Rabbi Yehuda maintains that vinegar has the same effect as boiling, he would agree that vinegar, like boiling water, prevents flour from becoming leavened. The Gemara asks: And let us establish the opinion of: Some say, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Yosei says, with regard to wheat grains that were soaked in water: One should soak them in vinegar, and this vinegar will cause the wheat to contract and prevent it from becoming leavened. The Gemara answers: When we learn the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, this applies only to a situation where the vinegar is in its pure, unadulterated form, in which case its pungency prevents the wheat from becoming leavened. However, if the vinegar is added by means of a mixture, no, Rabbi Yosei’s statement does not apply to a case of this kind. Ulla said: In both of these cases, whether the vinegar is added first or afterward, its use is prohibited, as one must avoid scenarios that might lead to a prohibition, as per the well-known adage: Go around, go around, and do not approach the vineyard, they say to the nazirite. Since a nazirite is prohibited from drinking wine and eating grapes, it is preferable for him to avoid a vineyard entirely. A similar principle applies to other prohibitions. The Gemara relates: Rav Pappi permitted the cooks [burdikei] of the household of the Exilarch to mash roasted grains into a pot of food, to dissolve the accumulated foam. Rava said: Is there anyone who permits this matter in a place where servants are found? Servants are unlikely to be careful with regard to these prohibitions. They will use raw flour for this purpose, which will lead to a violation of the prohibition against leavened bread on Passover. Some say that Rava himself would add roasted grains into his own pot. MISHNA: One may not add flour to ḥaroset, a seasoned, pungent food, or to mustard, to dull the sharp taste. In both cases, the pungency of these foods might accelerate the leavening of the flour. And if one added flour to either of these, the mixture may be eaten immediately before it is leavened; and Rabbi Meir prohibits this, lest the food be leavened immediately. The mishna continues: One may not boil the Paschal lamb in ordinary liquids or in fruit juices, as the Torah explicitly states that it must be roasted. However, one may baste it while it is roasting and dip it into liquid while eating it. The tanna further states: Water that has been used by a baker for cooling his hands or washing dishes should be poured out, because this water leavens the dough, as the water probably contains a small quantity of flour and dough. GEMARA: Rav Kahana said: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis concerns a case where one adds flour to mustard, which is extremely pungent and will not leaven the flour immediately. But in a case where flour is added to the less pungent ḥaroset, which will leaven the flour quickly, everyone agrees that the mixture must be burned immediately. And that opinion was also taught in a baraita: One may not add flour to ḥaroset, and if one did add flour it should be burned immediately. With regard to flour that was added to mustard, Rabbi Meir says: It should be burned immediately, and the Rabbis say: It should be eaten immediately, before it is leavened. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehuda, said that Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis concerning this issue. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehuda: Did the Master say this statement with regard to ḥaroset, or did the Master say it with regard to mustard? He said to him: What is the practical difference whether he was referring to ḥaroset or mustard? Both of these are mentioned together, and the same halakha applies to both. He said to him: There is a difference with regard to that which was stated by Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana said: The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis concerns a case in which flour was added to mustard. However, if flour was added to ḥaroset, everyone agrees that it must be burned immediately. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak was asking Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehuda, whether he disagrees with Rav Kahana and maintains that the Rabbis dispute the halakha in the case of ḥaroset as well. He said to him: I did not hear about this statement; that is to say, I do not hold in accordance with it. I do not distinguish between these two cases, as in my opinion the Rabbis permit one to eat even this ḥaroset. Rav Ashi said: It is reasonable to rule in accordance with the opinion of Rav Kahana, from the fact that Shmuel said that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who maintains that vinegar will prevent grain from becoming leavened. What, isn’t it correct to infer from here that vinegar added to flour does not shrink the grain and will even leaven it? According to this explanation, food that contains vinegar, e.g., ḥaroset, is likely to be leavened immediately, as claimed by Rav Kahana. The Gemara rejects this interpretation: No, this is no proof, as perhaps Shmuel meant that, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, vinegar will neither cause the wheat to shrink nor leaven it. Consequently, this statement cannot serve as a proof of the opinion of the Rabbis with regard to ḥaroset. The mishna taught that one may not boil the Paschal lamb in liquid. To explain this issue, the Gemara cites a baraita that interprets the verse: “You shall not eat it partially roasted, nor boiled in any way in water, but roasted with fire; its head with its legs, and with the innards in it” (Exodus 12:9). The Sages taught: “In water”; I have derived nothing other than the prohibition against boiling the Paschal lamb in water. From where do I know that it is likewise prohibited to boil it in other liquids? You said that this can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference: And just as water, which does not temper the taste of the food boiled in it, is prohibited for boiling the Paschal lamb, with regard to other liquids, which do temper the taste of the food boiled in them, is it not all the more so that it is prohibited to boil the Paschal lamb in them? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi provides a different derivation and says: From the phrase “In water,” I have derived nothing other than the prohibition against boiling the Paschal lamb in water. From where do I learn that it is likewise prohibited to boil it in other liquids? The verse states: “Nor boiled in any way,” which means: In any case, i.e., boiling the Paschal lamb in any type of liquid is prohibited. The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two derivations? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to meat that is roasted in a pot without the addition of any liquid, but is cooked in its own juices. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, it is prohibited to prepare the Paschal lamb in this manner, as this is considered boiling, whereas the Rabbis maintain that an action is classified as boiling only if one adds liquid to the meat. The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, with regard to that phrase, “boiled in any way,” what do they do with it? The Gemara answers: It is required for that which was taught in a baraita: If one boiled the Paschal lamb and afterward roasted it, or roasted it and afterward boiled it, he is liable to receive lashes for boiling the Paschal lamb. The Gemara asks: Granted, if one boiled the Paschal lamb and afterward roasted it, he is liable, as he boiled it first and is punished for this act. However, if he roasted it and afterward boiled it, and it is a food that has been roasted by fire, why is he liable? Rav Kahana said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who maintains that boiling after roasting nullifies the previous act of roasting. As it was taught in a baraita: One can fulfill his obligation to eat matza with a wafer that has been soaked in water or with a boiled wafer that has not yet dissolved; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: One can fulfill his obligation with a wafer that has been soaked in a cooked dish but not with a boiled wafer, even if it has not dissolved. Evidently, Rabbi Yosei maintains that food that was initially baked and subsequently boiled is no longer categorized as baked, and the same presumably applies to meat that was roasted and then boiled. Ulla said: Even if you say that the halakha with regard to boiled matza is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, there is no difficulty, as the cases of matza and the Paschal lamb are dissimilar in this regard. Here, with regard to the Paschal lamb, it is different, as the verse states: “Nor boiled in any way,” which indicates that it is prohibited to boil it in any case. No restriction of this kind is stated with regard to matza. The Sages taught: I might have thought that if one roasted the Paschal lamb fully, he should be liable. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not eat it partially roasted, nor boiled in any way in water” (Exodus 12:9). This verse teaches that I, God, said to you that the Paschal lamb is prohibited if it is partially roasted or boiled in any way, but not if it is fully roasted. One who roasts the Paschal lamb fully has not violated a prohibition. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this case that render it necessary for a verse to teach that roasting the Paschal lamb fully is not a violation of a prohibition? Rav Ashi said: This is referring to a situation where one burned it. The verse indicates that even one who entirely burns the Paschal lamb does not violate this prohibition. The Sages taught: I might have thought that one who ate an olive-bulk portion of the Paschal sacrifice raw should be liable for violating a prohibition. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not eat it partially roasted [na], nor boiled in any way in water.” This verse teaches that I, God, said to you that it is prohibited to eat the Paschal lamb partially roasted or boiled, but there is no prohibition against eating it raw. I might have thought that it is permitted to eat it raw ab initio. Therefore, the verse states: “But roasted with fire” (Exodus 12:9). This teaches that the mitzva is to roast the Paschal lamb with fire, ab initio. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of cooking that are defined as na, partially roasted? Rav said: As the Persians say: Avarnim, half roasted. Rav Ḥisda said: One who cooks food in the hot springs of Tiberias on Shabbat is exempt. One violates the Shabbat prohibition of cooking only if he uses a fire. In the case of a Paschal lamb that was cooked, i.e., boiled, in the hot springs of Tiberias, one is liable for boiling the offering. The Gemara asks: What is different with regard to Shabbat, that one is not punished for cooking in this manner? The reason is that a fire, or a fire derivative, is required for an act to be defined as cooking on Shabbat, but there is no fire here, as the hot springs are not generated by fire. If so, with regard to the Paschal lamb as well, it is not a fire derivative, and it should not be considered boiling with regard to this prohibition either. Rava said: What is the meaning of the word liable that Rav Ḥisda taught? It means that in doing so one violated the positive mitzva, due to that which is written: “Roasted with fire.” In other words, one who boils the Paschal lamb in the hot springs of Tiberias did not in fact violate the prohibition of boiling the Paschal lamb, but he has also not fulfilled the positive mitzva to roast the offering. Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Natan, teaches this interpretation of Rav Ḥisda’s statement explicitly, i.e., that Rav Ḥisda himself said: One who cooks in the hot springs of Tiberias on Shabbat is exempt, and with regard to a Paschal lamb that was cooked in the hot springs of Tiberias, one is liable to receive punishment for this act. In doing so, he violated a positive mitzva, due to that which is written: “Roasted with fire.” Rava said: One who ate the Paschal lamb partially roasted, he receives two sets of lashes, for violating the prohibitions: “You shall not eat it partially roasted” (Exodus 12:9) and: “You shall only eat it…roasted with fire” (Exodus 12:9). One who ate it boiled receives two sets of lashes, for the prohibitions: “Nor shall it be boiled in any way in water” (Exodus 12:9), and “You shall only eat it…roasted with fire.” One who ate the Paschal lamb after it had been partially roasted and then boiled receives three sets of lashes, for eating the Paschal lamb partially roasted, for eating it boiled, and for failing to eat it roasted. Abaye said: One does not receive lashes for a prohibition stated in general terms. The prohibition inferred from the verse "You shall only eat it...roasted in fire" includes many types of cooking, and one is not punished with lashes for violating this mitzva, as it is a general prohibition that includes meat cooked in several different ways. Some say that Abaye said: It is two sets of lashes that he does not receive, as the mitzva that the Paschal lamb be roasted with fire does not add to the specific prohibitions against eating it partially roasted or cooked. However, at any rate one set of lashes he does receive. Therefore, one who prepared a Paschal lamb without properly cooking it but without roasting it is punished with lashes for failing to roast it “with fire.” Some say that one does not receive even one set of lashes for violating this prohibition, as the prohibition he transgressed is not specific to one matter, like the prohibition against muzzling. The principle that one is liable to receive lashes for violating a prohibition is derived from the juxtaposition of the mitzva: “You shall not muzzle an ox while it treads out the corn” (Deuteronomy 25:4) with the verses that deal with lashes. It is inferred from this juxtaposition that one is not liable to receive lashes for violating prohibitions that are dissimilar to that of muzzling, e.g., a prohibition that is not specific to one matter. The Gemara cites a parallel dispute with regard to a different halakha. Rava said: If a nazirite ate a grape skin he receives two sets of lashes, as the verse states: “All the days that he is a nazirite he shall eat nothing that is made of the grapevine; from pressed grapes to a grape pit he shall not eat” (Numbers 6:4). He receives two sets of lashes, one for eating food that grew on a grapevine and one for consuming the skin of a grape. Likewise, if he ate a grape pit he receives two sets of lashes, one for eating a grape pit and the other for eating a grape product. If he ate a grape skin and a grape pit he receives three sets of lashes, one for eating the grape skin, one for eating the grape pit, and the third for eating a grape product. Abaye said: As with regard to the Paschal lamb, one does not receive lashes for a prohibition stated in general terms. Some say that according to Abaye, it is two sets of lashes that he does not receive; however, at any rate one set of lashes he does receive. And some say: One does not receive even one set of lashes for transgressing this prohibition, as the prohibition he transgressed is not specific to one matter, like the prohibition against muzzling. The Sages taught: If one ate a partially roasted olive-bulk of the Paschal lamb while it was still day on the fourteenth of Nisan, he is exempt. If he ate a partially roasted olive-bulk after dark, he is liable to receive lashes. If he ate a roasted olive-bulk of the Paschal lamb while it was still day on the fourteenth of Nisan, he has not disqualified himself from his group. Once he has started eating the offering, he may not leave the group he joined that arranged to partake together of a single Paschal lamb. Nevertheless, this case is different, as he began eating before the obligation to eat the Paschal lamb went into effect, and therefore he has not disqualified himself from his group by eating the Paschal lamb of another group. However, if he ate a roasted olive-bulk after dark, when he is obligated to eat the Paschal lamb, he disqualifies himself from the group he had joined. It was taught in another baraita: I might have thought that one who eats a partially roasted olive-bulk of the Paschal lamb while it was still day is liable to receive lashes. And this is a logical derivation by means of an a fortiori inference: If at the time when one is included in the mitzva to arise and eat the roasted Paschal lamb, he is also included in the prohibition not to eat it partially roasted, then at a time when one is not included in the mitzva to arise and eat the roasted Paschal lamb, isn’t it right that he should be included in the prohibition not to eat it partially roasted? Or perhaps this is not the case, as the opposite can be stated: At the time when one is not included in the mitzva to arise and eat the roasted Paschal lamb, he is included in the prohibition not to eat it partially roasted. However, at a time when one is included in the mitzva to arise and eat the roasted Paschal lamb, he is not included in the prohibition not to eat it partially roasted, as the prohibition applies only before one is permitted to eat the Paschal lamb. The Gemara adds: And do not be confounded by this suggestion, as the prohibition against eating from the Paschal lamb is relaxed because of special circumstances with regard to roasted meat. Before nightfall of the fifteenth of Nisan it is prohibited to eat the Paschal lamb regardless of how it was prepared, but once it grows dark it is permitted to eat it roasted. Perhaps the relaxation of this prohibition indicates that one who eats a partially roasted Paschal lamb after nightfall also does not violate a transgression. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not eat it partially roasted, nor boiled in any way [bashel mevushal] in water, but roasted with fire” (Exodus 12:9). As there is no need for the verse to state: “Roasted with fire,” since the previous verse already said: “On this night you shall eat the meat roasted with fire” (Exodus 12:8), what then is the meaning when the second verse states: “Roasted with fire”? This verse comes to tell you that at the time when one is included in the mitzva to arise and eat the roasted Paschal lamb, he is also included in the prohibition not to eat it partially roasted, whereas at a time when one is not included in the mitzva to arise and eat the roasted Paschal lamb, he is not included in the prohibition not to eat it partially roasted either. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: I could have simply read “boiled [bashel],” as this word suffices to teach that eating a boiled Paschal lamb is prohibited after dark. What is the meaning when the verse states the seemingly superfluous word mevushal, which also means boiled? These two words together are translated as “boiled in any way.” As I might have thought that I have only derived that this prohibition applies when it was boiled after dark, when the obligation to eat the Paschal lamb is in effect. From where do I derive that one is liable if he boils it while it was still day? The verse states the inclusive phrase bashel mevushal, which teaches that this prohibition applies in any case. The Gemara asks: But Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi himself derived from the expression “bashel mevushal” the prohibition against roasting the meat of the Paschal lamb in a pot, i.e., cooking the meat in a pot without the addition of liquids, and the prohibition against boiling it with other liquids. How can he derive another halakha from this same phrase? The Gemara answers: If so, i.e., if this verse is referring only to the matter of cooking meat with other liquids or without any liquids, let the verse say either “bashel bashel” or “mevushal mevushal,” and one halakha would be derived from the extraneous word. What is derived from the varied wording “bashel mevushal”? Learn from this verse two halakhot, one with regard to the manner of the cooking of the Paschal lamb, and the other concerning the time of its cooking. The Sages taught: If one ate from a roasted Paschal lamb when it was still day, he is liable to receive lashes, and likewise if one ate after dark an olive-bulk that was partially roasted, he is liable to receive lashes. This baraita taught that the case of roasted meat is similar to the case of partially roasted meat: Just as one who consumes partially roasted meat is in violation of a prohibition, so too, one who consumes this roasted meat while it is still day is in violation of a prohibition. The Gemara asks: Granted, with regard to partially roasted meat, it is written: “You shall not eat it partially roasted” (Exodus 12:9). However, with regard to meat that has been roasted, from where do we derive that one who eats it before the proper time has committed a transgression? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And they shall eat the meat on that night, roasted with fire, and matzot; with bitter herbs they shall eat it” (Exodus 12:8). The Gemara derives from this verse: At night, yes, the Paschal lamb may be eaten; however, by day, no, it may not be eaten in any manner. The Gemara asks: This is a prohibition that comes by inference from a positive mitzva, i.e., it is not stated in the Torah in the form of a prohibition. There is a principle that every prohibition that comes by inference from a positive mitzva is classified as a positive mitzva. One who transgresses a mitzva of this kind is considered to have transgressed a positive mitzva, not a prohibition. The Gemara answers that Rav Ḥisda said: In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as it was taught in a baraita: “Either a bull or a lamb that has anything too long or too short, you may offer it as a free-will offering [to the Temple treasury]; but for a vow [as a sacrifice] it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:23). From here we learn that it, i.e., a blemished animal, you may consecrate for maintaining the Temple, but you may not consecrate unblemished animals for maintaining the Temple. In other words, any animal fit to be sacrificed as an offering may not be consecrated for maintaining the Temple but only as an offering. From here the Sages stated: Whoever consecrates unblemished animals for maintaining the Temple transgresses a positive mitzva. From here I have only derived that he violates a positive mitzva; from where do I derive that he also transgresses a prohibition? The verse states at the beginning of that passage: “And the Lord spoke to Moses saying” (Leviticus 22:17). This introductory statement teaches with regard to the entire portion that a prohibition applies to it. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. The baraita adds that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to Bar Kappara: From where may it be inferred that this is the case? How does Rabbi Yehuda derive his statement that a prohibition applies to the entire portion from the phrase “And the Lord spoke to Moses saying”? He said to him: As it is written: “Saying [leimor].” Rabbi Yehuda expounds this term as though it read: Say no [lo emor]. In other words, the word no, an expression of prohibition, is stated with regard to the subsequent matters, which means that these mitzvot are categorized as prohibitions. In the school of Rav they say a slightly different explanation: The term: Saying, can be expounded as if it were written lav emor, meaning: Say a prohibition. In other words, the verse indicates that Moses was instructed to inform the Jewish people of a prohibition. This teaches that any mitzva introduced by the word leimor should be treated as a prohibition. Since the halakhot of the Paschal lamb are preceded by the phrase: “And the Lord spoke to Moses and to Aaron in the Land of Egypt saying” (Exodus 12:1), it can be inferred that the subsequent mitzvot are also prohibitions. We learned in the mishna: Water that has been used by a baker for cooling his hands or washing dishes must be poured out, as it contains a small, undefined quantity of leavened dough. It was taught in one baraita: One may pour out this water in a place with an incline, and he may not pour it out in a level place where the water collects. And it was taught in another baraita: One may even pour out this water in a level place where the water collects. The Gemara resolves this contradiction: This is not difficult. This baraita, which states that it is prohibited to pour out this water in a level place, is referring to a large amount of water that will collect in one place. Since there is a large amount of water, the flour in the water will not be absorbed into the ground but will leaven. Conversely, that baraita, which states that it is permitted to pour out the water in a level place, is referring to a situation where there was not a large amount of water, so that it will not collect. Instead, this water will be absorbed into the ground before the dough leavens. Rav Yehuda said: A woman may knead matza dough only with water that rested, i.e., water that was left indoors overnight to cool. If water is added to dough immediately after it was drawn, when it is still lukewarm, the dough will leaven at a faster rate. The Gemara relates: Rav Mattana taught this halakha in Paphunya. On the next day, the eve of Passover, everyone brought their jugs to him and said to him: Give us water. They misunderstood his expression mayim shelanu, water that rested, as the near homonym mayim shelanu, our water, i.e., water that belongs to the Sage, and they therefore came to take water from his house. He said to them: I say and meant: Water that rested [devitu] in the house overnight. Rava taught: A woman may not knead dough for matza in the sun, nor with water that has been heated by the sun, nor with water collected [hagerufin] in an urn heated by coals [mulyar] And in addition, she may not remove her hand from the oven, i.e., interrupt her baking, until she finishes forming all the loaves from the dough, so that it should not become leavened in the interim. And she requires two vessels, one in which she mixes the water into the dough and one in which she cools her hands so that the heat from her hands does not cause the dough to leaven. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If she transgressed and kneaded the dough with warm water, what is the halakha? Mar Zutra said: It is permitted after the fact. Rav Ashi said: It is forbidden. Mar Zutra said: From where do I say my opinion on this issue? As it was taught in a baraita: One may not soak barley on Passover, and if one soaked barley and it split, the barley is forbidden. If it did not split, the barley is permitted. This case indicates that even if one violates the principles established by the Sages with regard to adding water to flour on Passover, the product is forbidden only after the fact if it actually leavened. And Rav Ashi said in response: Is that to say that all of them are woven in the same act of weaving? In other words, is the halakha identical in all cases? Where it was stated that the Sages did not punish the violator by rendering his food prohibited, it was stated; and where it was not stated that they refrained from punishing the violator, it was not stated. It is therefore possible that the Sages rendered dough kneaded with warm water forbidden, to punish the woman who prepared it in this manner. MISHNA: And for possessing these one transgresses [overin] the prohibitions of: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, on Passover, although not all of them are considered food: Babylonian kutaḥ, a dip with a sharp flavor that contains flour; Median beer; Edomite vinegar; Egyptian zitom, a type of beer; dyers’ broth [zoman]; bakers’ well-worked dough; and kolan of soferim. Rabbi Eliezer says: The same prohibition also applies to women’s adornments, i.e., cosmetics, that contain leaven. This is the principle: If one possesses any substance that is derived from a type of grain that became leavened, although it is not actually bread, one transgresses the prohibitions of: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, on Passover. These substances are included in the warning, i.e., the biblical prohibition of possessing leaven, but there is no element of karet if one eats them. GEMARA: Since the mishna mentions kutaḥ, the Gemara cites a baraita where kutaḥ is discussed. The Sages taught that three things were said with regard to kutaḥ: It blocks the heart, it blinds the eyes, and it weakens the body. The Gemara explains each statement: It blocks the heart due to the whey. Whey was added to kutaḥ and was considered to be an inferior type of food. It blinds the eyes due to the salt in it, which can be dangerous if it enters the eyes. And it weakens the body due to the mold in the bread, as one of the ingredients of kutaḥ was crumbs from dough that had become leavened to the point that they were nearly spoiled. After mentioning this baraita, the Gemara continues to discuss the nutritional effects of other foods. The Sages taught: Three things increase one’s waste, lower one’s stature, and take one five-hundredth of a person’s vision if he eats them regularly. And they are: Bread from coarse flour, new beer, and raw vegetables. Similarly, the Sages taught in another baraita: Three things decrease one’s waste, straighten one’s stature, and improve one’s vision, and they are: Bread from fine flour, fatty meat, and aged wine. The Gemara explains: Fine bread is made from refined flour; fatty meat refers to meat from a goat that has not yet given birth; and aged wine refers to wine that has been aged significantly, for at least three years. The Gemara states a general principle: Any food or medical treatment that is effective in healing this sickness or this limb is deleterious for that one. And any food or treatment that is deleterious for this one is effective in healing that one, except for moist ginger, long peppers, and bread made of refined flour, and fatty meat, and aged wine, which are effective to heal all limbs of the body. The Gemara returns to its discussion of the details mentioned in the mishna. Why is Median beer prohibited during Passover? It is because the Medians place barley water into it. And Edomite vinegar is prohibited because the Edomites place barley into it. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Initially, when the Temple stood and they would bring wine libations from Judea, the wine would be blessed and would be preserved without any additives. The wine of Judea would not turn to vinegar unless they placed barley into it to achieve this effect. And they would call this vinegar to which barley had been added ordinary vinegar, since wine would not become vinegar without this additive. And now, after the destruction of the Temple, Edomite wine does not turn to vinegar unless one places barley into it. This is called Edomite vinegar, to fulfill that which is stated with regard to Tyre, and the same applies to other enemies of the Jewish people: “Because Tyre has said against Jerusalem: Aha, she is broken that was the gate of the peoples; she is turned unto me; I shall be filled with her that is laid waste” (Ezekiel 26:2). The Sages expound: If this one, Jerusalem, is full, then that one, her enemy, is laid waste; and if this enemy is full, then she, Jerusalem, is laid waste. Therefore, when the Jewish people fall, their enemies can achieve the success that was once attained by the Jews. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: This notion can be derived from here, where the verse states regarding Esau and Jacob: “The one people shall be stronger than the other people” (Genesis 25:23), meaning that when one nation gains power, the other is weakened, because they cannot both be strong at the same time. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: In Judea, initially, one who would purchase vinegar from an am ha’aretz, i.e., one who is not scrupulous in matters of ritual purity and tithes and is therefore suspect of not having tithed his fruit properly, would not need to tithe it due to the fact that it can be assumed that ordinary vinegar was made only from temed, a liquid produced from grape remnants. After filtering the wine from the stems, seeds, and skins, water was poured over these remnants. The liquid was then drained off and allowed to ferment until it became vinegar. This liquid was called temed, and it is not necessary to tithe it. Vinegar was produced in this way because the wine of that time was so strong that it did not turn to vinegar on its own. But now, one who purchases vinegar from an am ha’aretz must tithe it, as the wine nowadays turns to vinegar quickly, and the presumption is that vinegar comes only from wine. The Gemara asks: But does Rabbi Yehuda hold that temed is not subject to tithing? Wasn’t it taught in a mishna: With regard to one who produces temed and adds a measured amount of water and afterward finds a corresponding amount of liquid to that which he measured, he is exempt from tithing this temed because it is clear that the grape produce added only flavor and did not add to the volume of the temed. And Rabbi Yehuda obligates one to tithe the temed even in that case. If this is so, how can Rabbi Yehuda permit a person to purchase temed from an am ha’aretz? According to his opinion in this baraita, temed must be tithed. The Gemara answers: This is what Rabbi Yehuda is saying: One is required to tithe temed; however, amei ha’aretz are not suspected of failing to tithe temed. Because temed is so inexpensive, the assumption is that amei ha’aretz are not sparing with it and are willing to tithe it. If you wish, say instead that even if amei ha’aretz are suspected of failing to tithe temed, and this is not difficult for the following reason: This mishna is referring to a case where the temed was produced with dregs that contain some amount of wine, and therefore Rabbi Yehuda says that a person is required to tithe it. That baraita is referring to a case where the temed was produced with grape pits; because it is assumed that no wine is mixed into the temed, Rabbi Yehuda states that one is exempt from tithing it. It is stated in the mishna that Egyptian zitom is considered leavened food. The Gemara asks: What is Egyptian zitom? Rav Yosef taught from a baraita: It is one-third barley, one-third safflower, and one-third salt. Rav Pappa removes barley from the list of ingredients and includes wheat; he maintains that Egyptian zitom was made with wheat rather than barley. The Gemara comments: Your mnemonic to remember which Sage expressed which version is the word sisanei, meaning a twig basket. Sisanei contains the letter samekh twice, which can help one remember that Rav Yosef, whose name contains a samekh, says that Egyptian zitom is made from se’orim, barley, a word that contains the letter sin, which makes the same sound as samekh. The Gemara describes how Egyptian zitom is prepared: Those who prepare it soak the ingredients together, and then they roast them and grind them together. They drink the mixture from Passover to Shavuot. This drink relaxes the bowels of one who is constipated, and it constipates one whose bowel movements are loose. However, it is dangerous for a sick person or a pregnant woman to drink this mixture. It was taught in the mishna that dyers’ broth is considered leavened. The Gemara explains: Here, in Babylonia, they interpreted that this is bran water [maya deḥivri] that people use to dye leather. It was further stated in the mishna that bakers’ well-worked dough is also considered leavened. The Gemara explains the nature of this substance: It is bread made from grain that was harvested before it was one-third ripe and then made into a loaf. This loaf was placed on top of a pot to draw out the filth from the broth. It was further taught in the mishna that the kolan of soferim, kolan of soferim, is considered leavened. The Gemara explains: Here, in Babylonia, they interpreted that this expression is referring to shoemakers’ glue that is made from flour. Rav Shimi from Ḥozna’a said: This is the depilatory paste of the daughters of the wealthy, of which they would leave a remnant for the daughters of the poor. It was the common practice for women to remove hair from different parts of their bodies by applying various pastes, some of which contained flour. The kolan of soferim mentioned in the mishna was such a substance. It was given this name because wealthy young women would give the paste [kolan] to poor young women whose fathers were schoolteachers [soferim], so that the poor women could utilize it as well. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach a mnemonic by noting that the mishna lists four items that are used by the ordinary people of the state, i.e., kutaḥ, beer, vinegar, and zitom, and three items of artisans, i.e., dyers’ broth, kolan of soferim, and bakers’ well-worked dough? And if you say that kolan of soferim is the depilatory paste of the daughters of the wealthy, then what artisanship is there in that? According to this interpretation, that substance does not belong on the list of artisans’ items. The Gemara answers with another question: Rather what, will you say that this is referring to shoemakers’ glue? If so, why did the authors of the mishna call it bookmakers’ glue [kolan shel soferim]? It should have been called shoemakers’ glue [kolan shel ratzanin]. Rav Oshaya said: Actually, one should explain that kolan is referring to shoemakers’ glue; and why is it called bookmakers’ glue? The reason is that bookmakers also use it to attach their pages. During the time of the mishna, this paste was referred to as bookmakers’ glue. It is stated in the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says that women’s adornments are also prohibited as leavened food. The Gemara asks: Could it enter your mind to say that adornments made from silver, gold, or woven materials contain leaven? Rather, say instead that this means: Even women’s cosmetics or other items used by women to enhance their skin are prohibited if they contain leavened ingredients. As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: With regard to the Jewish women who reached physical maturity, but had not yet reached the age of majority, and women who sought to remove hair for cosmetic purposes: They would smear daughters of the poor with lime; they would smear daughters of the wealthy with fine flour; they would smear daughters of kings with shemen hamor, as it was stated: “For so were the days of their anointing filled, six months with shemen hamor” (Esther 2:12). The Gemara asks: What is shemen hamor? Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya said: Setaket. Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said: It is olive oil extracted from an olive that has not yet reached a third of its growth; the acidic oil is effective as a depilatory. It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says that anpiknin is olive oil from an olive that has not reached a third of its growth. And why is it spread on the body? It is due to the fact that it removes [mashir] the hair and pampers the skin. The mishna states: This is the principle: One violates these prohibitions on Passover with anything that is prepared from a type of grain. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua said: Now that we learned that by possessing anything that is a type of grain one violates the prohibition against leaven during Passover, why did the Sages list these items individually? They could have simply stated the principle. The baraita explains that the Sages provided a list of prohibited foods so that one would become familiar with these items and with their names, so that it would become widely known that these foods contain a small quantity of grain. The Gemara cites an incident that underscores the significance of familiarity with the names of foods: As in this case of that man from the West, Eretz Yisrael, who visited Babylonia, and had meat with him, he said to his hosts: Bring me a dip with which to eat my bread. He heard them saying: Bring him kutaḥ. Since he heard the word kutaḥ, he stopped eating, as he knew that kutaḥ contains milk and may not be eaten with meat. This incident underscores that it is advantageous for one to familiarize himself with the names and ingredients of different foods, so that he will be aware of the nature of the food even if he does not recognize it. It is stated in the mishna: These substances are included in the prohibition but are not punishable by karet. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who maintains that both full-fledged, leavened grain bread in a mixture, and hardened leaven, in its pure, unadulterated form, which is not suitable for consumption, are both included in a prohibition? The Gemara answers that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as it was taught in a baraita: Leavening dough, i.e., dough that is at the beginning of the leavening process and is presently hardened leaven, must be burned, or one gives it to his dog. And one who eats it is flogged with forty lashes. Before analyzing the contents of the baraita, the Gemara addresses an apparent contradiction within the baraita. This baraita itself is difficult. You said that leavening dough must be burned; apparently it is prohibited to derive benefit from hardened leaven. And then it teaches: Or one gives it to his dog; apparently, it is permitted to derive benefit from the leaven. The Gemara answers that this is what the baraita is saying: Leavening dough must be burned, i.e., leavening dough as defined by Rabbi Meir must be burned in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that leavening dough is full-fledged leaven. Alternatively, the baraita may be explained as referring to leavening dough as defined by Rabbi Yehuda, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that it is prohibited to derive benefit from leavening dough. Each tanna maintains that it is prohibited to derive benefit from any dough classified as leavening dough by his definition. When the baraita says that one gives it to his dog, it means: Leavening dough as defined by Rabbi Meir, is only hardened leaven according to Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore one may feed it to his dog. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that it is permitted to derive benefit from this type of leaven. With regard to the final statement of the baraita, that one who eats leavening dough is flogged with forty lashes, we have once again arrived at the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir holds that one who eats this leavening dough, from which it is permitted to derive benefit according to Rabbi Yehuda, is flogged with forty lashes. According to this explanation of the baraita, we have learned that Rabbi Meir maintains that hardened leaven in its pure, unadulterated form, is included in a prohibition, and one who eats this leaven is flogged. And all the more so, one who eats full-fledged, leavened grain bread in a mixture is flogged but does not receive karet, as he is not eating the leaven in and of itself. Nevertheless, the prohibition against eating leavened bread on Passover applies in that case. Rav Naḥman said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, as it was taught in a baraita: For eating full-fledged, leavened grain bread one is punishable by karet, whereas for eating a mixture that contains leaven one is punished merely for violating a prohibition. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: For eating full-fledged, leavened grain bread one is punishable by karet; however, for eating leaven in its mixture one is not punished at all. And we learned according to Rabbi Eliezer, who said that full-fledged, leavened grain bread in a mixture is included in a prohibition, and that is true all the more so with regard to hardened leaven in its pure, unadulterated form. The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Rav Naḥman did not state his opinion in accordance with the explanation of Rav Yehuda, that the mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s ruling? The Gemara answers that Rav Naḥman could have said to you that the following distinction applies: Perhaps Rabbi Meir stated his opinion only there, with regard to hardened leaven in its pure, unadulterated form; however, with regard to full-fledged, leavened grain bread in a mixture, no, one is punished not with mere lashes but with karet. The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Rav Yehuda did not state his opinion in accordance with the explanation of Rav Naḥman, that the mishna is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling? The Gemara answers that Rav Yehuda could have said to you: Rabbi Eliezer stated his opinion only there, with regard to full-fledged, leavened grain bread in a mixture that it is included in the prohibition. However, with regard to hardened leaven in its pure, unadulterated form, he did not state his ruling and perhaps Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it is permitted to eat hardened leaven. The Gemara notes that it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda, who said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s opinion: “You shall eat nothing leavened; in all your dwellings you shall eat matzot” (Exodus 12:20). The Sages taught: This verse comes to include Babylonian kutaḥ, Median beer, Edomite vinegar, and Egyptian zitom. I might have thought that one who eats any of these items will be punishable by karet. Therefore, the verse states: “For whoever eats leavened bread…that soul shall be cut off from Israel” (Exodus 12:15), from which the Sages derived: For eating full-fledged, leavened grain bread one is punished with karet, but for eating its mixture one is only in violation of a prohibition. The Gemara analyzes the above statement: Whom did you hear that said that for eating a mixture which contains leaven one is in violation of a prohibition? It is Rabbi Eliezer. However, the baraita is not stating the halakha of hardened leaven in its pure, unadulterated form. This baraita lists only items that contain leaven in a mixture, but not other substances whose legal status is that of hardened leaven, e.g., broth, worked dough, and glue. Learn from this that Rabbi Eliezer is not of the opinion that hardened leaven is prohibited. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Eliezer, from where does he derive the halakha that leaven in its mixture is included in a prohibition? The Gemara answers that he derives it as it is written: “You shall eat nothing leavened.” The Gemara challenges this derivation: If so, if the expression: Anything leavened, includes leaven in a mixture, let one also be liable to receive karet for eating leaven in a mixture. As it is written: “Seven days no leaven shall be found in your houses; for whosoever eats anything [kol] leavened, that soul shall be cut off from the people of Israel, whether he is a sojourner or one born in the land” (Exodus 12:19). Apparently, one is punished with karet for eating anything that contains leaven. The Gemara answers that Rabbi Eliezer needs that phrase: Anything leavened, in order to derive for that which was taught in a baraita: From the phrase: Anything leavened, I have derived only that an item that became leavened on its own is prohibited. However, from where do I derive that one is punished with karet for eating an item that became leavened due to a different factor? The verse states: “Whosoever eats anything [kol] leavened…shall be cut off,” indicating that food that became leavened due to a different factor is considered leavened bread. The Gemara asks: If so, if the phrase: Anything leavened, is referring to food that became leavened by means of something else, then when this same phrase appears with regard to the prohibition, I should explain that it comes for that purpose as well. Consequently, there should be no violation for eating a mixture that contains leaven, as apparently, the phrase: Anything leavened, does not refer to that case at all. Rather, the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer is that he derives this halakha from the term anything [kol]. He does not derive his opinion from the term leavened; he bases his ruling on the inclusive term anything. The Gemara raises a difficulty: There, too, in the verse that mentions the punishment of karet, isn’t it written: “For whosoever [kol] eats anything leavened, that soul shall be cut off”? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer requires that term to include women who are also punishable by karet for eating leavened bread. The Gemara asks: Is this source necessary to derive this halakha? The fact that women may not eat leavened bread is derived from the statement that Rav Yehuda said that Rav said. As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and similarly, the Sage in the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: The verse said: “Speak to the children of Israel: A man or woman, when they commit any of the sins of men, to commit a trespass against the Lord, and that soul shall be guilty” (Numbers 5:6). The Torah rendered a man equal to a woman for all punishments of the Torah. Since the punishment of karet for eating leavened bread on Passover is included in this general principle, there is no need for a separate source to include women. The Gemara answers: Nonetheless, it is necessary to cite a source that men and women are equal specifically with regard to the punishment of karet for eating leavened bread, as it could enter your mind to say that since it is written: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat with it matzot” (Deuteronomy 16:3), one might have thought that anyone included in the obligation to eat matza is also included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread. And these women, since they are excluded from the obligation to eat matza, as it is a time-bound, positive mitzva from which they are exempt as a rule, I might say they are also excluded from the prohibition against eating leavened bread. Therefore, the verse teaches us that women are also prohibited from eating leavened bread. The Gemara comments: And now that women have been included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread, they should also be included in the obligation to eat matza, even though it is a time-bound, positive mitzva, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As Rabbi Eliezer said: Women are obligated to eat matza by Torah law, as it is stated: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days you shall eat with it matzot” (Deuteronomy 16:3). These two commandments are juxtaposed to teach that anyone included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread is also included in the obligation to eat matza. And these women too, since they are included in the prohibition against eating leavened bread, they are also included in the obligation to eat matza. The Gemara questions this derivation: What did you see that led you to understand that the term anything [kol] comes to include women and to exclude leaven in its mixture? On the contrary, say that it comes to include in the punishment of karet one who eats its mixture. The Gemara answers: It is reasonable to explain that the verse comes to include women since the verse is dealing with those who are obligated in the mitzva not to eat leavened bread, it includes those who eat, as the verse says: “For anyone who eats leavened bread…shall be cut off.” It stands to reason that the expression: Anyone [kol] includes additional people who are punishable by karet, not additional types of leaven. Would a verse that is dealing with those who may not eat leaven come to include additional types of foods that may not be eaten? Rav Natan, father of Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, strongly objects to this: And anywhere that a verse is dealing with those who eat, does it necessarily not come to include additional types of food in the prohibition? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: “For anyone who eats the fat of the domesticated animal, of which men present an offering of fire to God, the soul that eats it shall be cut off from its people” (Leviticus 7:25)? The Sages interpreted this verse: I have derived from this verse that the prohibition applies only to the fats of unblemished animals that are fit to be sacrificed. From where is it derived that it is also prohibited to eat the fats of blemished animals, which may not be offered as sacrifices? The verse states: “Of the domesticated animal.” From where is it derived that it is prohibited to eat the fats of non-sacred animals? The verse states: “For anyone who eats the fat.” Rav Natan explains his objection: Here, isn’t the verse dealing with those who eat fats, and nevertheless, its superfluous phrases come to include types of foods that may not be eaten. The Gemara answers: There, in the verse concerning prohibited fats, where there are no additional people who eat of it to include, as the prohibition already applies to everyone, the superfluous expression comes to include additional foods. Here, in the verse that deals with leavened bread, where there are people who eat of it who can be included, namely women, the verse does not exclude people who eat and include foods that are eaten. Generally, there should be a connection between the content of a verse and that which is derived from it. Only when no other derivation is possible is a less related matter derived. The Gemara explains: And the Rabbis, who are not of the opinion that leaven in a mixture is included in the prohibition, do not interpret that the term: Anything [kol], comes to include other matters; neither with regard to leaven in a mixture nor with regard to karet. The Gemara asks: However, in that case, from where do they derive that it is prohibited for women to eat leavened bread? The Gemara answers: Although they do not derive a halakha from the term: Anything, they derive a halakha from the expression: For anyone [ki kol], in the verse: “For anyone who eats leaven.” The Gemara asks: And if indeed the phrase: For anyone, is a more inclusive expression than the simple word anything, then according to Rabbi Eliezer, another halakha could also be derived from here. Say that the phrase: Anyone who eats leaven, comes to include the women, and the phrase: For anyone who eats, comes to include leaven in its mixture. According to Rabbi Eliezer, then, one would be punishable by karet for eating leaven in a mixture. And lest you say that Rabbi Eliezer does not derive a halakha from the phrase: For anyone [ki kol], as he does not consider this an inclusive expression, the result would be another contradiction. Wasn’t it taught in another baraita: “For no [ki kol] leaven nor any honey shall be offered as a burnt-offering before God” (Leviticus 2:11)? Had the verse stated only: You shall not offer leaven, I would have derived nothing other than the halakha that it is prohibited to sacrifice an entire piece of leaven. From where is it derived that it is also prohibited to sacrifice part of it? The verse states: “No [kol] leaven,” indicating that it is prohibited to sacrifice even part of it. From where is it derived that it is prohibited to sacrifice leaven in a mixture? The verse states: “For no [ki kol] leaven.” The Gemara analyzes this statement: Whom did you hear who derives halakhot from the term: Kol? It is Rabbi Eliezer, and nevertheless, he derives additional details from the expression: Ki kol. The Gemara concludes: This matter remains difficult, as no satisfactory explanation has been found for why Rabbi Eliezer does not derive from the expression ki kol that leaven in a mixture is also prohibited. After discussing leaven in a mixture, the Gemara states a more general principle. Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to all prohibitions of the Torah, a permitted substance does not join together with a prohibited substance. If one eats a permitted food with a prohibited food, and together they constitute the minimum prohibited measure, he is exempt from punishment for this act of consumption. This principle applies to all halakhot except for the prohibitions of a nazirite, who is liable for eating a mixture of that kind, as the Torah said with regard to a nazirite: “He shall abstain from wine and strong drink; he shall drink no vinegar of wine, or vinegar of strong drink, nor shall he drink anything soaked in grapes” (Numbers 6:3). This verse indicates that a nazirite is prohibited from consuming not only wine and vinegar, but also any food that was soaked in these liquids. And Ze’eiri said: Permitted and prohibited substances also combine with regard to the prohibition against offering leaven on the altar, as it states: “For no [kol] leaven and no [kol] honey shall be offered as a burnt-offering before the Lord” (Leviticus 2:11). This indicates that one is also liable for sacrificing leaven in a mixture (Tosafot) in addition to the liability for sacrificing pure leaven. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Ze’eiri issue his ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who derives from the term kol that any mixture that contains any amount of a prohibited substance is not nullified. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, with regard to the matter of leavened bread on Passover one should also be liable for eating a prohibited substance joined together with a permitted substance. The Gemara answers: Yes, indeed it is so, and the prohibition mentioned by Ze’eiri against sacrificing leaven in offerings was only to exclude the statement of Abaye, who said: There is significance to offering less than an olive-bulk of leaven on the altar, and one is flogged for sacrificing an offering of that kind. By noting that one is liable because permitted substances combine with prohibited substances, the baraita teaches us that an offering of less than an olive-bulk is not considered an offering, and therefore sacrificing it is not punishable by lashes. Rav Dimi sat and stated this halakha that a permitted substance does not join together with a prohibited substance to constitute the requisite measure, except in the case of a nazirite. Abaye said to Rav Dimi: And is it true that with regard to all other prohibitions in the Torah, a permitted substance does not join together with a prohibited substance? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: With regard to thick soup prepared with teruma produce whose garlic and oil are of non-sacred produce, and one who immersed himself during that day touched some of the ingredients, he disqualified all the contents of the pot, as they are subsumed within the teruma soup. However, if the thick soup was prepared with non-sacred produce and the garlic and the oil were of teruma, and one who immersed himself during that day touched some of them, he disqualifies only the ingredients in the place that he touched. Abaye continues. And we discussed this issue: Why are the ingredients in the place that he touched disqualified? The spices, i.e., the garlic or oil, are nullified by the majority. Since the major portion of the dish is composed of non-sacred produce, it should not be disqualified by contact with one who immersed himself during that day. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in reply: What is the reason that it becomes disqualified? It is since a non-priest is flogged for eating an olive-bulk of the soup, as anything into which teruma is mixed is considered teruma by Torah law. What are the circumstances of this ruling that a non-priest is flogged? Is it not due to the fact that the permitted substance joins together with the prohibited substance? Rav Dimi rejects this contention: No; what is the meaning of an olive-bulk in this mishna? It means that there is sufficient teruma in the mixture that when one eats from the mixture he will consume an olive-bulk of teruma in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. In that case one is liable for punishment for eating this olive-bulk, as if he ate the teruma alone. Abaye asked him: Is eating an olive-bulk in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread prohibited by Torah law, and one is punished for it? He said to him: Yes. Abaye asked in response: If so, why do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer with regard to eating Babylonian kutaḥ, a dip that contains flour, on Passover? The Rabbis maintain that one is not punished by Torah law for eating a mixture containing leaven. Although the Rabbis do not derive from the word: Anything [kol], that leaven in a mixture is prohibited, they should nonetheless hold one liable for eating an olive-bulk of a prohibited substance in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. Rav Dimi said: Rather, what conclusion must be drawn; the reason that a non-priest is flogged for eating the teruma soup is due to the fact that a permitted substance joins together with a prohibited substance? If so, ultimately, why do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Eliezer with regard to eating Babylonian kutaḥ? Rather, leave Babylonian kutaḥ, as in eating that mixture there is no possibility that one will consume an olive-bulk of the leaven in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. If he eats kutaḥ in its pure, unadulterated form, by swallowing it as food, not as a dip, his intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people. It is unusual for a person to eat a pungent dip by itself, all the more so, for him to eat it so quickly. One receives no punishment for conduct that anomalous. And if he dips other food into the kutaḥ and eats it, he will not consume an olive-bulk in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. Due to the pungency of the dip, one needs to add only a small portion to his food. Abaye raised an objection to Rav Dimi from a baraita: With regard to two pots, one of non-sacred produce and the other one of teruma, before which were two mortars, one in which non-sacred produce was pounded, and one in which teruma produce was pounded, and the contents of these mortars fell into these pots, but it is unknown which produce fell into which pot, it is all permitted. The reason for this ruling is as I say, since there is no definitive proof to the contrary, that the teruma fell into the teruma and the non-sacred produce fell into the non-sacred produce. Abaye explains his objection: And if you say that eating an olive-bulk of a prohibited substance in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread is prohibited by Torah law, why do we say this principle: As I say that the teruma fell into the teruma, etc.? If the teruma produce fell into the pot containing non-sacred produce, one who eats from the mixture will consume an olive-bulk of teruma within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, and he will thereby violate a Torah prohibition. Rav Dimi said to him: Leave teruma separated from spices, which is teruma by rabbinic law. By Torah law one is required to separate teruma only from grain, wine and oil. The Sages are lenient with regard to teruma by rabbinic law. Abaye raised another objection from a similar baraita: In a case where there are two baskets, one filled with non-sacred produce and the other filled with teruma, and before them were two vessels each containing a se’a of produce, one filled with non-sacred produce and the other one filled with teruma, and these, the contents of each of the baskets, fell into those, each of the se’a vessels. It is possible that the teruma fell into the non-sacred produce, and it is prohibited for non-priests to eat a mixture of teruma and non-sacred produce. Nevertheless, the contents of the se’a vessel containing the non-sacred produce are permitted, as I say that the non-sacred produce fell into the non-sacred produce and the teruma fell into the teruma. The obligation to separate teruma from grain is by Torah law, and if you say that eating an olive-bulk of forbidden food in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread is prohibited by Torah law, why do we say the principle: As I say the non-sacred grain fell into the non-sacred grain? Why aren’t the Sages concerned that one might eat an olive-bulk of teruma in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf, which is prohibited by Torah law? He said to him: Leave teruma in modern times, as it is in effect by rabbinic law. Once the Jewish people were exiled from their land, the halakhot of teruma and tithes apply by rabbinic law, not Torah law. This is the basis for the lenient ruling in the case of this mixture. The Gemara returns to its discussion of Rabbi Abbahu’s statement with regard to the meaning of the word soaked in the verse: “He shall abstain from wine and strong drink; he shall drink no vinegar of wine, or vinegar of strong drink, nor shall he drink anything soaked in grapes,” and whether or not a permitted substance combines with a prohibited one. The Gemara asks: And does this word: Soaked, come to teach that mixtures are prohibited in this case? That verse is required to derive that which was taught in a baraita elsewhere: Soaked, comes to establish the principle that the legal status of the taste of a forbidden food is like that of its substance. This term teaches that any food that absorbs the taste of a prohibited item assumes the status of this prohibited item itself. As, in a case where one soaked grapes in water and the water has the taste of wine, a nazirite is liable for drinking this mixture, as it assumes the status of wine. From here you derive the halakha with regard to the entire Torah; in all cases, the legal status of the taste of a forbidden food is like that of its substance. The Gemara elaborates. Just as with regard to a nazirite, whose prohibition against eating grapes is not an eternal prohibition, as he will be permitted to eat grapes once his period of naziriteship is over, and furthermore, his prohibition is not a prohibition against deriving benefit from wine, and there is dissolution for his prohibition against eating grape products by requesting a Sage to release him from his vow, nevertheless, in his case, the Torah rendered the legal status of the taste of food forbidden to him like that of its substance; with regard to a forbidden mixture of diverse kinds, whose prohibition is an eternal prohibition [issuro issur olam] and whose prohibition is a prohibition against deriving benefit, and there is no dissolution for its prohibition, is it not right that the Torah should render the legal status of the taste of its forbidden food like that of its substance? And the same is true of fruit that grows on a tree during the first three years after it was planted [orla], on two of three counts: Although the prohibition of orla is not an eternal prohibition, as one may eat the fruit of this tree after three years have passed, it is prohibited to derive benefit from orla, and this prohibition cannot be dissolved, as the fruits that grow during the first three years remain prohibited. Therefore, based on the same a fortiori inference, the principle: The legal status of its taste is like that of its substance, should apply in this case as well. Similarly, all other prohibitions in the Torah are more severe than the case of a nazirite in one of these aspects, and therefore this principle is universal. In any case, this entire derivation presents a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan, who derives a different halakha from the term: Soaked. The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is the previously cited derivation? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who derive this halakha from the term: Soaked. However, Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that a permitted substance joins together with a prohibited substance, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara asks: To which statement of Rabbi Akiva is the Gemara referring? If you say it is referring to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in the following mishna, as we learned: Rabbi Akiva says, with regard to a nazirite who soaked his bread in wine, and the bread and the wine contain enough to join together to constitute an olive-bulk, that he is liable; from where do we know that Rabbi Akiva means an amount of an olive-bulk taken from the bread and the wine together? Perhaps he meant that the measure is calculated from the wine alone? The Gemara asks: And lest you say that if this amount is from the wine alone, what purpose is there to state this halakha, this statement comes to teach us that even though the prohibited item is in a mixture, one is nonetheless liable for consuming it. Since this mishna can be explained as referring to an olive-bulk from wine alone, it cannot be cited as proof for Rabbi Akiva’s opinion with regard to the combination of a permitted substance with a prohibited substance. The Gemara states: Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in the baraita, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva says: A nazirite who soaked his bread in wine and ate an olive-bulk of the mixture from the bread and the wine is liable. This baraita indicates that according to Rabbi Akiva, a permitted substance joins together with a prohibited substance. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva, from where does he derive the principle: The legal status of the taste is like that of the substance itself? The Gemara answers: He derives this principle from the prohibition of meat cooked in milk. In that case, there is merely the taste of the milk absorbed by the meat, and the mixture is nonetheless forbidden. Here, too, in the case of other prohibitions, it is no different, and the same principle applies. The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, why don’t they derive this principle from meat cooked in milk? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis claim that from meat in milk we do not derive other prohibitions, as that prohibition is a novelty. The Gemara asks: And what is the novelty in that prohibition? If you say that it is unique in that this meat alone and that milk alone are each permitted, and yet together they are forbidden, that characteristic is not unique to meat cooked in milk. In the case of prohibited mixtures of diverse kinds too, this element alone and that element alone are each permitted, and yet together they are prohibited. The Gemara answers: Rather, the novelty is that if one soaks meat in milk all day, it is permitted by Torah law, despite the fact that the meat certainly absorbed some taste of the milk, whereas if one cooked the meat in milk even for a short time, the mixture is prohibited by Torah law. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva too certainly agrees that the halakha of meat in milk is a novelty. How can he derive a general principle from this case? Rather, he derives the principle: The legal status of the taste is like that of the substance itself from the required purging of the vessels of gentiles. In the section of the Torah that deals with the spoils of Midian (Numbers 31:21–24), it states that a vessel used by a gentile to cook food must be purged through fire and purified before it may be used by a Jew. Isn’t the purging of vessels of gentiles necessary only to cleanse them from the mere taste that was absorbed through the process of cooking? Even so, these vessels are prohibited if this cleansing was not performed. Here, too, it is no different; the same reasoning applies in all cases. The Gemara comments: And the Rabbis do not derive this principle from this source, as they maintain that the halakha of purging vessels of gentiles is also a novelty. What is the novelty of this halakha? As in general, anything that contributes taste that renders the food tainted is permitted. If the taste added by the prohibited food does not enhance the permitted food, then as a rule it does not render the permitted substance prohibited. As we derive this principle from the halakha that an unslaughtered animal carcass that is unfit for consumption is not classified as a prohibited animal carcass and is not prohibited. However, here, with regard to the halakha of purging vessels of gentiles, the Torah states that even if they contribute taste that renders the food tainted they are prohibited. If twenty-four hours have passed since food was cooked in a pot, the assumption is that it will contribute a negative taste to any foods cooked in the pot subsequently. Nevertheless, vessels taken from gentiles remain prohibited until they are purged, even though the taste they contribute taints the food. The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Akiva, who derives this principle from the required purging of the vessels of gentiles, respond to the previous claim? The Gemara explains: He holds in accordance with the opinion subsequently cited in the name of Rav Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna, who said: The Torah prohibited unpurged vessels of gentiles only in the case of a pot that was used on that day. Therefore, it is not a case where the pot contributes taste that renders the food tainted. The Gemara asks: And what do the Rabbis say about deriving the halakha from a pot used on that day? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, even in the case of a pot used on that day, it is impossible that the vessel does not slightly taint the food absorbed in the vessel. Consequently, the halakha of purging vessels of gentiles is indeed a novel case from which principles cannot be derived. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: From the opinion of the Rabbis, let us learn the correct interpretation of the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Don’t the Rabbis say that the term soaked teaches that the principle that the legal status of taste is like that of substance applies not only to a nazirite, but that from here you derive the halakha with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah? According to Rabbi Akiva as well, the term soaked teaches that the permitted substance joins together with the prohibited substance with regard to a nazirite, and from here you derive the halakha with regard to all prohibitions of the Torah. This explanation is contrary to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who applies this principle only to a nazirite. Rav Ashi said to him: This cannot serve as a proof, due to the fact that the halakhot of a nazirite and those of a sin-offering are two verses that come as one, i.e., to teach the same principle, and two verses that teach the same principle do not teach that principle by analogy. The Gemara elaborates: The derivation that a permitted substance joins together with a prohibited substance in the case of a nazirite is that which we stated above. With regard to a sin-offering, what is the derivation that permitted material combines with prohibited material? As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Anything that touches in its flesh shall become consecrated” (Leviticus 6:20). I might have thought that non-sacred meat that touched any part of a sin-offering is rendered prohibited even if it did not absorb the taste of the sin-offering it touched. Therefore, the verse states: In its flesh shall become consecrated, to teach that this meat is not consecrated until the taste of the sin-offering is absorbed within its flesh. The baraita continues: Shall become consecrated means that its legal status becomes like that of the sin-offering itself; that is, if the sin-offering is disqualified, this meat will also be disqualified. And if the sin-offering is valid, the meat that touched it may be eaten in accordance with the more stringent standards of a sin-offering as far as when and where it may be eaten. The principle that a permitted substance joins together with a prohibited substance applies in the case of a sin-offering as well. Therefore, the principle cannot be extended to the entire Torah, as a halakha stated in two cases is not applied elsewhere. The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis as well, let the cases of a nazirite and a sin-offering be considered two verses that come as one and they do not teach the principle that the legal status of taste is like that of the substance with regard to the entire Torah. The Gemara answers that the Rabbis say: Both of these cases are necessary as they could not have been derived from each other. Therefore, they are not two verses that come as one and it is possible to derive a principle from these two halakhot. The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva, who does not derive a general principle from these verses, would respond by asking: In what way are they necessary? Granted, if the Merciful One had written this principle only with regard to a sin-offering, one would not derive the halakha of a nazirite from it, as we do not derive halakhot of non-sacred objects from those of consecrated objects. Certain stringencies and strictures apply only to consecrated property. However, let the Merciful One write this principle with regard to a nazirite, and you could bring the case of the sin-offering and derive it from the case of a nazirite, just as the application of this principle to all prohibitions in the Torah is derived from the halakha of a nazirite. Since this principle is stated in both cases unnecessarily, these are two verses that come as one, and one cannot derive a principle from them. The Gemara asks: And the Rabbis, as they maintain that the principle that the legal status of the taste of a prohibited substance is like that of the substance itself is not limited to these two cases, they would say to you that both sources are necessary. The case of the sin-offering is necessary to derive the principle that a permitted substance joins together with a prohibited substance, as one cannot derive the halakhot of non-sacred food from consecrated property. And the term soaked, which appears in the context of the halakhot of a nazirite, teaches the principle that the legal status of taste is like that of the substance. Since both examples are necessary, they are not considered two verses that come as one, and it is therefore possible to derive a principle from them. And consequently from here you derive the halakha with regard to all of the Torah in its entirety. The Gemara asks: And how could Rabbi Akiva respond to this claim? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva would say that both cases teach the principle that a permitted substance joins together with a prohibited substance, and they are indeed two verses that come as one, to teach about the same issue. And the rule is that any two verses that come as one do not teach overarching principles. Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana: But with regard to that which is taught in a baraita: The verse: “He shall eat nothing that is made of the grapevine, from the grape skins to the grape seed” (Numbers 6:4), taught with regard to prohibitions of a nazirite that these substances join together. If the nazirite ate only a small amount of each substance that when joined together constitute the measure that determines liability, he is liable. Now the following question arises: According to Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that prohibited and permitted substances join together, is it necessary to teach that one prohibited substance joins together with another prohibited substance? Apparently, according to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, this derivation is unnecessary. Rav Kahana said to him that this derivation is necessary because the two cases are not identical: Whereas prohibited and permitted substances combine only when they are eaten simultaneously, prohibited and other prohibited substances join together even when eaten one after the other. In other words, if a nazirite eats half an olive-bulk of grape skins and then eats half an olive-bulk of grape seeds, he is liable according to Rabbi Akiva. MISHNA: With regard to dough that is in the cracks of a kneading bowl, if there is an olive-bulk of dough in one place, one is obligated to remove it. And if the dough does not add up to this amount, it is nullified due to its insignificance. And similarly, with regard to the halakhot of immersion to purify the bowl from ritual impurity, if one is particular about the dough that is stuck in the cracks and he plans to remove it and use it, it is a foreign substance that interposes between the kneading bowl and the water of the ritual bath, and invalidates the immersion of the bowl, leaving it ritually impure. And if he wants the dough to remain in place, its status is like that of the kneading bowl itself and is not an interposition. GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They taught that one is obligated to remove a combined olive-bulk of leaven only in a case where the pieces of dough are not in a position where they serve to reinforce the kneading bowl. However, in a case where they serve to reinforce the bowl and they will remain there for this purpose, he is not obligated to remove them; he may simply render them null and void. The Gemara concludes: This proves by inference that with regard to less than an olive-bulk, even in a place where it does not serve to reinforce the bowl, one is not obligated to remove it. Some teach the statement of Rav Yehuda with regard to the latter clause of the mishna: And if the dough is not an olive-bulk, it is nullified due to its insignificance. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: They taught that one is obligated to remove less than an olive-bulk of dough in one place only in a place where it serves to reinforce the bowl; however, in a place where it does not serve to reinforce the bowl, one is obligated to remove it. This proves by inference that if there is an olive-bulk of dough in one place, even in a place where it serves to reinforce the bowl, one is obligated to remove it. The Gemara comments: It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the first version of Rav Yehuda’s statement, and it was taught in a different baraita in accordance with the latter version of his statement. The Gemara elaborates: It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the first version of Rav Yehuda’s statement: With regard to dough that is in the cracks of a kneading bowl in a place where it is serves to reinforce the bowl, it does not interpose and invalidate the immersion for ritual impurity, and one does not violate the prohibition against having leaven in his possession during Passover. And in a case where it does not serve to reinforce the bowl, it interposes, and one violates the prohibition against having leaven in his possession on Passover. In what case is this statement said? It is in the case of an olive-bulk of dough; however, in a case where there is less than olive-bulk, even in a case where it does not serve to reinforce the bowl, it does not interpose and one does not violate a prohibition by having it in his possession. And it was taught in a different baraita in accordance with the latter version of Rav Yehuda’s statement: With regard to dough that is in the cracks of a kneading bowl, in a place where it serves to reinforce the bowl, it does not interpose in the immersion and one does not violate the prohibition against having leaven in his possession during Passover. In a case where the dough does not serve to reinforce the bowl, it interposes in the immersion and one violates the prohibition against owning leaven on Passover. In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the dough is less than an olive-bulk. However, if it is an olive-bulk, even in a case where it serves to reinforce the bowl it interposes in the immersion and one violates a prohibition by having it in his possession during the Festival. The Gemara asks: In any case, these baraitot contradict each other. Rav Huna said: Delete the first, lenient baraita from before the stringent one. Rav Yosef said: Have you removed the tanna’im from the world? It is a dispute between tanna’im. The baraita is in accordance with the ruling of another Sage and is not the result of a flawed baraita, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to bread that grew moldy and is no longer edible, one is obligated to remove it, due to the fact that it is suitable to be ground and to leaven other dough. Apparently, one is obligated to remove even inedible leaven. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: In what case is this statement said? In a case where the bread was maintained for consumption; however, a mass of hardened leaven that one designated for the purpose of sitting upon it, not for consumption, is nullified. Rav Yosef infers from the baraita: From the fact that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said that this leaven is nullified, this proves by inference that the first tanna maintains that in that case, the leaven is not nullified. Apparently, the first tanna maintains that with regard to any olive-bulk of leaven, even though one renders it null and void, it is not nullified. The respective opinions of these two Sages are presented in the two conflicting baraitot with regard to dough in a bowl. Abaye said to him: You resolved the contradiction between the baraitot with regard to an olive-bulk of leaven by establishing it as a tannaitic dispute. According to the first tanna, an olive-bulk of leaven cannot be nullified at all, whereas Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar maintains that it can be nullified. However, did you resolve the contradiction with regard to less than an olive-bulk of leaven? Rather, both this baraita and that baraita are in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and nevertheless it is not difficult. This baraita, where he prohibits the dough in a crack of the bowl, refers to a situation where the dough is in the place in the bowl where kneading takes place, as any dough he later inserts into the bowl will come into contact with the dough in the crack. However, in that case, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar rules leniently, as the dough is not in the place in the bowl where kneading takes place. Rav Ashi said: Do not say that dough not in the place in the bowl where kneading takes place, refers only to the area on the back of, i.e., outside the basin; rather, it also refers to the area on the edge of the basin, as dough does not come into contact with that part of the bowl. The Gemara asks: This is obvious; why was it necessary to make that statement? The Gemara answers: Rav Ashi’s statement is necessary lest you say that dough sometimes drips there and it should therefore be considered the place in the bowl where kneading takes place. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that this is not the case, and one is not obligated to remove leavened dough from that part of the bowl. Rav Naḥman said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar that a mass of leaven designated for the purpose of sitting upon is nullified. The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashi say that Rav said: If one covered the surface of a mass of leaven with mortar, the leaven is nullified? The Gemara infers: If he covered it with mortar, yes, it is nullified; however, if he did not cover it with mortar, no, it is not nullified. In this statement, Rav states that a mass of leaven is nullified only if it is covered with mortar. The Gemara answers: He who teaches this statement does not teach that statement, as there is a dispute between amora’im with regard to Rav’s opinion. Some say an alternative version of the above statement. Rav Naḥman said that Rav said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as Rav Yitzḥak bar Ashi said that Rav said: If one covered the surface of a mass of leaven with mortar, it is nullified. This ruling indicates that if one did not cover the surface with mortar, the leavened dough is not nullified, in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna. Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: With regard to two half-olive-bulk portions of leavened dough with a string of dough connecting between them, one observes: In any case that were the string taken and the portions are taken with it, one is obligated to remove the dough, as the string unites them into an olive-bulk of leaven. And if the portions are not taken with it, one is not obligated to remove them. Ulla said: We stated this leniency that it is not necessary to remove half-olive-bulk portions of leavened dough only when the segments are in a kneading bowl, stuck separately to the sides of the bowl. However, if they are located in a house, one is obligated to remove them even in the absence of a string of dough connecting the two pieces. What is the reason for this? It is because a person will sometimes gather them when cleaning his house and they will fall adjacent to each other. If this occurs, the two portions will form an olive-bulk of leavened dough. Ulla said: The Sages raise a dilemma in the West, Eretz Yisrael: If one piece of leavened bread was in the main area of a house and the other piece was in the upper story, what is the halakha? If one piece is in the house and the other is in a portico, what is the halakha? Similarly, if the two segments are in two houses, one inside the other, what is the halakha? The Gemara states: Let these dilemmas stand unresolved. The Sages taught: With regard to bread that grew moldy and was rendered inedible for consumption by a person, but a dog can eat it, it can become impure with the ritual impurity of foods in the measure of an egg-bulk in size, as it is still considered food. If the moldy bread was ritually pure teruma, it may be burned with ritually impure teruma on Passover. Once the bread is no longer fit for human consumption, the prohibition against actively rendering it impure no longer applies. They said in the name of Rabbi Natan: It cannot become ritually impure. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion is that which we learned in a mishna: The Sages stated a principle with regard to ritual purity: Any food that is designated as food for a person that becomes impure remains ritually impure until it is rendered unfit to be consumed by a dog. The Gemara reiterates: In accordance with whose opinion is that statement? The Gemara answers: It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, as his statement indicates that food designated as food for a person is rendered ritually pure as soon as it becomes unfit to be eaten by a person. The Sages taught: With regard to tanners’ bowls into which one placed flour in the production process of leather, if the flour was placed within three days of the start of Passover, one is obligated to remove it, as it is still considered edible leaven. However, if one added the flour prior to three days before Passover, one is not obligated to remove the contents of the bowl, as the flour will have already been rendered inedible by the odor of the vessel before the beginning of Passover, and is no longer considered edible. Rabbi Natan said: In what case is this statement said? In a case where one did not place animal hides into the bowl; however, if one placed hides into the bowl, even if Passover is within three days of when he placed the flour in the bowl, he is not obligated to remove the flour. Once the foul-smelling hides are placed in the bowl, the flour is certainly no longer edible. Rava said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan with regard to this issue. Consequently, there is no set time at which the flour is considered spoiled, as it is considered inedible even one day or even one hour after hides were added to the bowl. We learned in the mishna: And similarly, with regard to the halakhot of immersion to purify the bowl from ritual impurity, if one is particular about the dough that is stuck in the cracks and he plans to remove it and use it, it is a foreign substance that interposes between the kneading bowl and the water of the ritual bath, and invalidates the immersion of the bowl, leaving it ritually impure. And if he wants the dough to remain in place, its status is like that of the kneading bowl itself and is not an interposition. The Gemara asks: Is it comparable? How can the mishna compare the halakhot of leaven on Passover to the halakhot of interpositions that invalidate an immersion to purify from ritual impurity? There, with regard to leaven, the matter is contingent upon the measure of the dough, as an olive-bulk of leaven is prohibited. Here, with regard to interpositions that invalidate an immersion, the matter is contingent upon whether or not one is particular about the presence of the dough. In other words, with regard to interpositions it is the attitude of the owner of the bowl that is the decisive factor, not the quantity of the dough. The Gemara answers that Rav Yehuda said: Say that the mishna should be read: And with regard to interpositions that invalidate an immersion to purify from ritual impurity, it is not so, as it is not the quantity of the dough but the particularity of the owner that is the decisive factor. Abaye said to him: Doesn’t the mishna teach: And similarly with regard to ritual impurity. The text of the mishna cannot be so drastically emended merely to resolve a difficulty. Rather, Abaye said: This is what the mishna is saying: And similarly with regard to the combination of two pieces vis-à-vis ritual impurity during Passover, when it depends upon their volume. However, during the rest of the year there is a distinction based upon whether the owner is particular about it or not. The Gemara explains: What are the circumstances of the mishna’s case? It is a case where there is less than an egg-bulk of ritually impure food, and it touched this dough in the bowl, and then it came into contact with ritually pure food. During Passover, when the prohibition that applies to the dough causes it to be considered significant although it is a very small quantity, it combines with the first piece of food. Together they are the size of an egg-bulk, which is able to transmit the ritual impurity of foods. However, during the rest of the year, when there is no prohibition that imparts this significance to the dough, the matter is dependent on the owner’s particularity; if he is particular about it, i.e., he does not want the dough to be there, it is considered food rather than part of the bowl, and it combines with the other piece of food. However, if one prefers its continued presence in its current location, it is considered like part of the kneading bowl itself, rather than food. Rava strongly objects to this: Was the language taught in the mishna: Combines? Didn’t the mishna teach that it interposes? Abaye’s explanation does not account for this term. Rather, Rava said that the mishna should be understood as saying: And so too with regard to purifying the kneading bowl via immersion. The Gemara explains: What are the circumstances of the mishna’s case? It is a case where the kneading bowl became ritually impure, and one wishes to immerse it. During Passover, when the prohibition of an olive-bulk of leaven causes it to be considered significant, it interposes between the water and the kneading bowl, and the immersion is ineffective. However, during the rest of the year, the matter depends upon whether or not the owner is particular about it. If he is particular about the dough and wishes to remove it, it interposes between the water and the bowl. However, if the owner desires it to be present, it is considered like part of the kneading bowl itself, and it does not interpose between the water and the bowl. Rav Pappa strongly objects to this: Was the language taught in the mishna: And similarly with regard to ritual purity? Didn’t the mishna teach: And similarly with regard to ritual impurity? Rather, Rav Pappa said the mishna should be understood as saying: And similarly with regard to the transfer of ritual impurity to the kneading bowl via this dough. The Gemara explains: What are the circumstances of the mishna’s case? It is a case where the carcass of a creeping animal touched this dough. During Passover, when its prohibition causes the dough to be considered significant, it interposes between the bowl and the creeping animal, and ritual impurity does not descend to the kneading bowl, i.e., the kneading bowl does not become impure. During the rest of the year, when it depends upon whether one is particular about the presence of the dough, if he is particular about it, it interposes between the bowl and the creeping animal and prevents the bowl from becoming impure. However, if he desires it to be present, it is considered like it is part of the kneading bowl itself. Therefore, the entire bowl becomes ritually impure when the carcass of the creeping animal touches the dough. MISHNA: Deaf dough is dough for which it is difficult to determine if it has been leavened. It is comparable to a deaf-mute, who cannot communicate. If there is dough similar to it in that water was added to both at the same time, which became leavened, the deaf dough is prohibited. Although it has not shown external signs of becoming leavened, it can be presumed that the deaf dough has also become leavened. GEMARA: The Gemara seeks to clarify the ruling of the mishna: If there is no dough similar to it, what is the halakha? Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: According to the Sages, leavening occurs in the time it takes a person to walk the distance from Migdal Nunaya to Tiberias, which is a mil, two thousand cubits. The Gemara asks about this formulation: Why is it necessary to mention the distance between these two places? Let us say that leavening begins after the time it takes a person to walk a mil. The Gemara answers: This statement incidentally teaches us that the length of a mil is the distance from Migdal Nunaya to Tiberias. Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: With regard to a kneader, i.e., one who kneads dough for others and should maintain the ritual purity of the dough; and similarly, with regard to washing one’s hands for prayer (Arukh), and with regard to washing hands before eating, one must search either for a ritual bath to immerse the vessel he is using to knead the dough, or for water to purify his hands, provided that water is accessible within the time it takes to walk four mil, eight thousand cubits. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Ayvu said this halakha, and he said it about four cases, as opposed to the three cases mentioned previously. And one of them pertained to the tanning of hides, which lasts for the time that it takes a person to walk four mil. As we learned in a mishna: And all types of thin, soft hides, which have the status of flesh with regard to ritual impurity because their texture is similar to flesh, that were tanned in order to be made into leather, or that one trod upon for as long as necessary for the leatherworking process, are ritually pure. They are considered to be leather and are no longer considered like the flesh of the animal, except for the skin of a human corpse, which always remains ritually impure. The Gemara asks: How much time must one tread upon a hide for the leatherworking process? Rabbi Ayvu said that Rabbi Yannai said: It is the amount of time it takes to walk four mil. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: They taught that one must search for water to wash one’s hands before eating or prayer for the amount of time it takes to walk four mil only when the water is before him, in the direction that he is traveling. However, when it is behind him, he need not return even a mil. Rav Aḥa said: From this statement one may infer that he need not return a mil, but he must return less than one mil in order to obtain water. MISHNA: How does one separate ḥalla in ritual impurity during the Festival day of Passover? Ordinarily, one may separate ritually pure ḥalla from dough and give it to a priest immediately so that he may eat it. Ritually impure ḥalla is unfit for a priest and must be burned, yet it is prohibited to bake or burn anything that is not fit to be eaten during the Festival day. However, it is also prohibited to wait and burn it after the Festival day, since it will become leavened in the meantime. Rabbi Eliezer says: A woman should not designate it as ḥalla prior to baking; rather, she should refrain from doing so until it is baked. In other words, she should wait until she has baked all of the dough, and there is no risk of it becoming leavened. Only then should she separate ḥalla from it. The portion of ḥalla may then be kept until after the Festival day, when it may be burned. Ben Beteira says: She should separate the ḥalla before it is baked, and place the dough in cold water so that it will not become leavened. Rabbi Yehoshua said: This is not the leavened bread about which we are warned with the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found. These prohibitions do not apply because the ḥalla does not actually belong to the owner of the dough; it is instead considered to be consecrated property. Rather, she should separate the ḥalla and leave it until the evening; and if it becomes leavened, then it will become leavened, but this is of no concern. GEMARA: The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the tanna’im disagree with regard to benefit of discretion, i.e., benefit accrued from the option of giving ḥalla, teruma and tithes to whichever priest or Levite one chooses. The Sages debated whether this benefit has monetary value and would constitute a form of ownership. Rabbi Eliezer holds: Benefit of discretion is considered to have monetary value. Therefore, one owns the ḥalla he separates, and he must be careful to prevent it from becoming leavened. However, Rabbi Yehoshua holds: Benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value. One does not own the ḥalla, and therefore he may allow it to become leavened. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, everyone holds that benefit of discretion is not considered to have monetary value, and here they disagree with regard to the principle of: Since, etc. As Rabbi Eliezer holds: We say that since, if he wants, he can ask to have his separation of the ḥalla voided when he regrets having done so, it is his property. Even if one does not actually revoke the status of the ḥalla, the fact that the potential for such an action exists indicates that he still maintains a form of ownership of this dough. And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: We do not say that since he could theoretically revoke the status of the ḥalla, the dough is considered his. Consequently, he may leave it until the end of the Festival day without being concerned that it will become leavened. Apropos the principle: Since, etc., the Gemara cites a related dispute. It was stated that the amora’im disagree with regard to one who bakes bread on a Festival day for use during the week. Rav Ḥisda said: He is flogged because he has desecrated the Festival. Rabba said: He is not flogged. The Gemara explains the two opinions: Rav Ḥisda said that he is flogged because we do not say that since guests may happen to visit him, the bread is fit for him on the Festival day itself. Rabba said that he is not flogged because we say that since guests may visit him, the bread is considered to have been baked for use on the Festival day itself. Even if guests do not actually come, he has not desecrated the Festival. Rabba said to Rav Ḥisda: According to you, who said that we do not say the principle: Since, etc., how is it permitted to bake on a Festival for Shabbat? He said to him: One is permitted to bake on a Festival for Shabbat due to the joining of cooked foods [eiruv tavshilin] instituted by the Sages. Rabba responded: Due to the practice of the joining of cooked foods, which was instituted by the Sages, may one permit a Torah prohibition? Rav Ḥisda said to him: By Torah law, whatever one needs for Shabbat may be done on a Festival, and the prohibition against performing labor during the Festival does not apply to preparations for Shabbat. It was the Sages who decreed that one may not bake on a Festival for Shabbat, as a decree lest people say that one may bake on the Festival even for use during the week. And since the Sages required a joining of cooked foods, one has a conspicuous marker reminding him that baking on the Festival for Shabbat is permitted but baking on the Festival for a weekday is prohibited. Rabba raised an objection to Rav Ḥisda’s opinion from a baraita: If one wishes to slaughter a dangerously ill animal before it dies on its own and becomes prohibited for consumption, he may not slaughter it on a Festival day unless there is enough time so that he can eat an olive-bulk of it roasted while it is still day. Rabba reads this statement precisely: The baraita stipulates that the slaughter is permitted if one can eat the meat while it is still day, although he is not required to actually eat the meat. Granted, according to my position, that I said that one may rely on the principle: Since, etc., this ruling is reasonable. Since if one wants to eat he may eat, due to that reason alone he may slaughter the animal. But according to you, who said that we do not say the principle of: Since, etc., why may he slaughter such an animal? Rav Ḥisda said to him: He is permitted to slaughter the animal due to the monetary loss that would be incurred by not slaughtering it, and not due to the principle of: Since, etc. Rabba asked rhetorically: Will we permit a Torah prohibition due to monetary loss? Rav Ḥisda said to him: Yes, although this factor on its own does not mitigate the prohibition. Rather, due to the monetary loss that would otherwise be incurred, one decided to eat an olive-bulk of the meat, although he does not need to. And since it is impossible to eat even an olive-bulk of meat without slaughtering the animal, one is permitted to slaughter the animal. Rabba raised another objection to him: The shewbread in the Temple may be eaten on the ninth, tenth, or eleventh days from when it is baked, no less and no more. How so? In its usual manner it is eaten on the ninth day after it was baked, as it is baked on Shabbat eve and it is eaten on the next Shabbat, on the ninth day from when it was baked. If a Festival occurs on Shabbat eve, the shewbread is not baked on the Festival day but rather on Thursday, the eve of the Festival. Consequently, it is eaten on Shabbat of the next week, on the tenth day from when it was baked. If the two Festival days of Rosh HaShana preceded Shabbat, the shewbread is baked on Wednesday, Rosh HaShana eve, and it is eaten on the next Shabbat, on the eleventh day from when it was baked, because baking the shewbread does not override Shabbat or a Festival. Rabba asks: If you say that whatever one needs for Shabbat may be done on a Festival, why doesn’t the baking of this bread override the Festival? Since the shewbread is eaten on Shabbat, it should be considered food that one is permitted to prepare during the Festival. Rav Ḥisda said to him: They permitted one to override the rabbinic decree in the Temple only with regard to baking on a Festival for the proximate Shabbat, i.e., Shabbat that immediately follows the Festival. However, they did not permit one to override the rabbinic decree to prepare for a distant Shabbat, namely Shabbat of the next week. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy High Priest, that the baking of the shewbread overrides a Festival but does not override the fast day of Yom Kippur, what can be said? Apparently, the issue is the subject of a tannaitic dispute between Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy High Priest, who contends that it is permissible to prepare the shewbread during a Festival, and the Rabbis, who prohibit it. The Gemara explains that they do not dispute the basic principle. Rather, this is the point over which they disagree: One Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that they permitted one to override the rabbinic decree only to prepare for the proximate Shabbat, but they did not permit one to override the rabbinic decree to prepare for a distant Shabbat. Therefore, the baking of the shewbread does not override the Festival. And one Sage, Rabbi Shimon, holds that they also permitted one to override the rabbinic decree in order to prepare for a distant Shabbat. Rav Mari raised an objection: The two loaves of bread that are brought as a communal offering on Shavuot are eaten by the priests no sooner than the second day and no later than the third day from when they are baked. How so? They are generally baked on the eve of the Festival and eaten on the Festival, the second day from their baking. If the Festival occurs after Shabbat, they are baked on Friday and they are eaten on the third day from the baking, because the baking of the two loaves does not override Shabbat or the Festival. Rav Mari asks: If you say that whatever one needs for Shabbat may be done on a Festival, now that it is permitted to engage in the necessary preparations for Shabbat on a Festival, is it necessary to mention that it is permitted to bake for the Festival itself on the Festival? As such, why doesn’t the baking of the two loaves override the Festival? The Gemara answers: It is different there, in the case of the two loaves, as the verse says: “No kind of labor shall be done on them, save that which every man must eat, that only may be done for you” (Exodus 12:16). This indicates that it is permitted to cook and bake only “for you,” i.e., for human consumption, and not for the One above, namely for the Temple service. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said in the name of Rabbi Shimon, son of the deputy High Priest, that baking the shewbread overrides the Festival, what can be said? How does he understand the term: For you? The Gemara answers: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Abba Shaul, who said that this verse should be understood in the following manner: Cooking and baking are permitted for you, and not for gentiles; for the sake of the Temple service, however, they are permitted. Rav Ḥisda sent a question to Rabba with Rav Aḥa bar Rav Huna: Do we say the principle: Since, etc.? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: There is a case in which one plows one furrow and is liable for violating eight prohibitions with this single act? The mishna explains that this applies to one who plows with an ox and a donkey, thereby violating the prohibition: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Deuteronomy 22:10), and they were consecrated, in which case plowing with them constitutes misuse of consecrated property. If his plowing aids the growth of food crops in a vineyard, he has transgressed a third prohibition. And he is plowing during the Sabbatical year, when agricultural labor is prohibited, on a Festival. Additionally, the person plowing is a priest and a nazirite, and he is plowing a place of ritual impurity, i.e., a burial site. It is prohibited for a priest and a nazirite to become impure by walking over the burial spot of a corpse. Therefore, the one plowing commits two transgressions simply by traversing the field. And if we say the principle: Since, etc., he should not be liable for plowing on a Festival, since the dirt he loosens is fit for covering the blood of a bird. One who slaughters a bird or a non-domesticated animal is required by Torah law to cover the blood. Since it is possible that one will need to slaughter many such animals or birds and will not have enough dirt to cover their blood, his plowing may end up facilitating covering the blood. Therefore, it should not be considered a prohibited labor on the Festival. The Gemara answers that Rav Pappa bar Shmuel said: The case is one in which a person plowed sharp stones, i.e., clods of dirt that have hardened and are unfit to be used to cover blood. The Gemara asks: Aren’t these clods of dirt fit to be crushed and used to cover blood? The Gemara responds: Is crushing permitted on a Festival? The Gemara counters: But they are fit to be crushed in an unusual manner, which is not prohibited by Torah law. The Gemara answers: The case is one in which a person plowed hard, rocky soil, which cannot be crushed. The Gemara asks: Is hard soil fit for planting? The case under discussion is one in which a person was preparing the ground in order to plant food crops in a vineyard. The Gemara answers: In this case, there was hard soil above and fertile, loose soil underneath, into which seeds could be planted. The Gemara rejects this answer: Derive that the act of plowing would be permitted in that case due to the loose soil, which is suitable for covering blood. Rather, Mar bar Rav Ashi said: The case is one in which a person plowed mud, which is not fit for covering blood. The Gemara asks rhetorically: Is mud fit for planting? The Gemara answers: The case is one in which a person plowed moist earth, which is suitable for planting but which cannot be used to cover blood. Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s acceptance of the principle: Since, etc. One who cooks the sciatic nerve in milk on a Festival and eats it is flogged for five distinct prohibitions. How so? He is flogged due to the prohibition of cooking the sciatic nerve on a Festival, which is prohibited because the sciatic nerve is unfit for consumption; and he is flogged due to the prohibition of eating the sciatic nerve, which is explicitly prohibited by the Torah; and he is flogged due to the prohibition of cooking meat in milk; and he is flogged due to the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk; and lastly, he is flogged due to the prohibition of kindling a fire unnecessarily on a Festival. And if we say the principle: Since, etc., he should not be liable for kindling a fire unnecessarily, since the fire is fit for use in attending to his legitimate Festival needs, e.g., cooking permitted foods. Rabba said to him: Remove the prohibition of kindling a fire from this list and add the prohibition of eating a sciatic nerve from an animal carcass that was not properly slaughtered. Abaye responded: Didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach with regard to this mishna: He is flogged twice for his eating, as he violated the prohibitions of eating the sciatic nerve and eating meat cooked in milk, and three times for his cooking, as he violated the prohibitions of kindling a fire, cooking on a Festival, and cooking meat in milk? And if it is so, that the case is one in which the sciatic nerve was taken from an animal carcass, Rabbi Ḥiyya should have stated that he is flogged three times for his eating, as he violated the prohibitions of eating a sciatic nerve, eating meat cooked in milk, and eating an animal carcass. Rather, Rabba said: Remove the prohibition of kindling a fire and add in its place the prohibition of using wood that has been set aside from use on the Festival. The Gemara asks: Is the prohibition against utilizing set-aside material prohibited by Torah law, such that a person is flogged for violating this prohibition? He said to him: Yes, as it is written: “And it shall come to pass on the sixth day that they shall prepare that which they bring in” (Exodus 16:5). This verse teaches that anything that has not been prepared before the Festival is considered to be set-aside, and it is prohibited to utilize it. This verse indicates that utilizing set-aside objects is prohibited; however, it does not formulate this prohibition as a negative commandment. Therefore, the Gemara adds that the warning indicating that it is a negative commandment is from here: “You shall not perform any labor” (Exodus 20:10). This general statement pertaining to Shabbat includes utilizing objects that were not set aside for use before Shabbat. Abaye said to him: Wasn’t it you who said: I raised a dilemma before Rav Ḥisda, and some say the correct version is: I raised a dilemma before Rav Huna: If one brought a lamb from the meadow, and the lamb is therefore set-aside because it was not designated for use before the Festival, and he slaughtered it as the daily offering on a Festival, what is the halakha? Is it permissible to offer this sacrifice? And you said to us: He said to me about this issue that the answer can be derived from a verse in Ezekiel pertaining to communal offerings. The verse states: “And one lamb of the flock, out of two hundred, from the well-watered pastures of Israel” (Ezekiel 45:15). This verse is expounded in the following manner: The word lamb is referring to either a male or female lamb, but not to a firstborn, as that status applies only to male sheep. The word one indicates that a sacrifice may not be brought from the animal tithe. The lamb must be one that can stand alone. An animal designated as tithe is always part of a group, as it is the tenth animal to leave the pen; therefore, it cannot be offered as a communal offering. The expression: Of the flock indicates that only some animals of the flock may be offered, whereas one may not offer a palges, which is no longer a lamb but is not yet considered a ram. The phrase: Out of two hundred, is expounded with regard to wine brought as a libation: From the remaining two hundred portions that remain in the vat. This is referring to a case where wine prohibited as produce grown during a tree or vine’s first three years [orla] is mixed with permitted wine. The halakha is that this wine mixture may be brought as a libation only if there is two hundred times more permitted wine than prohibited wine. From here it is derived that orla is nullified in a mixture of two hundred. The phrase: From the well-watered pastures of Israel, means that sacrifices may be offered only from that which is permitted to Israel. From here, the Sages stated: One may not offer libations from untithed produce [tevel], since Jews are prohibited from eating tevel. I might have thought that one may not offer an animal that is set-aside on Shabbat or during a Festival; therefore, you have said: Just as tevel is unique in that its inherent prohibition caused it to be prohibited for Jews to eat, so too, anything whose inherent prohibition caused it to be prohibited for Jews to eat is invalid as an offering. This excludes an animal that has been set aside, which does not have an inherent prohibition that caused it to be prohibited for eating; rather, a different prohibition, i.e., the prohibition of utilizing set-aside objects on Shabbat, caused it to be prohibited for eating. And if you say the prohibition of utilizing set-aside material is by Torah law, what difference is there to me if a food is inherently prohibited; and what difference is there to me if it is prohibited due to a different prohibition? If there is a distinction between these prohibitions, it must be that the prohibition of utilizing set-aside material is by rabbinic law, and therefore, like many other rabbinic decrees, it does not apply in the Temple. And furthermore, Abaye said to Rabba: It is possible to challenge your interpretation of the baraita from a different angle. Wasn’t it you who said, as cited in tractate Makkot, that there is division of labors with regard to Shabbat, and therefore one is required to bring two sin-offerings if he performed two prohibited labors of different primary categories in one lapse of awareness, or if he performed a prohibited labor twice, during separate lapses of awareness; however, there is no division of labors with regard to a Festival, and therefore one is not punished with multiple floggings for performing multiple prohibited labors? Consequently, how could one be liable for multiple floggings for the prohibition of utilizing set-aside materials and for cooking the sciatic nerve on a Festival? Rather, in order to make this baraita consistent with Rabba’s opinion, remove the prohibition of kindling a fire and add in its place the prohibition of using the wood of a tree designated for idolatry [asheira]. And the warning, i.e., the source of the negative commandment associated with using this wood, is derived from here, a verse that relates to an idolatrous city that is burned: “Nothing from the spoil shall cling to your hand” (Deuteronomy 13:18). Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Abaye: If this case is referring to using wood from an asheira, one should also be flogged due to having transgressed the prohibition of: “You shall not bring an abominable thing into your home” (Deuteronomy 7:26). However, this would add an extra negative commandment to the list enumerated in the baraita. Rather, remove the prohibition of kindling a fire and add in its place the prohibition of burning consecrated wood. And the warning, i.e., the source of this negative command, is from here: “And you shall burn their asheira trees with fire...you shall not do this to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:3–4). Therefore, one who burns a consecrated item in a destructive manner is punished with lashes. In conclusion, no adequate proof can be adduced from the baraita to reject Rabba’s opinion. Rami bar Ḥama said: This dispute between Rav Ḥisda and Rabba with regard to the principle: Since, etc., is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua in the mishna. As, Rabbi Eliezer, who says that ḥalla should be separated only after the bread has been baked, holds that we say the principle: Since, etc. Since any portion of the dough could potentially be eaten if another part of the dough is designated as ḥalla, therefore, one is permitted to bake bread without separating ḥalla from it ab initio. And Rabbi Yehoshua holds: We do not say the principle: Since, etc. Rav Pappa said that this claim can be rejected in the following manner: Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer only stated that we say the principle: Since, etc., there, in the case of the separation of ḥalla, because at the time that it was placed into the oven, each and every loaf was fit for him, and there was no indication as to which loaf he would designate as ḥalla. However, here, in a case where the bread one is baking on the Festival is fit for guests but is not fit for him, say that so too, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer we do not say the principle: Since, etc. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, rejected Rami bar Ḥama’s statement for a different reason and said: Perhaps that is not so. Rabbi Yehoshua only stated that we do not say the principle: Since, etc., there, where there is one portion of the bread that is not fit for him or for guests, because the piece that is designated as ḥalla cannot be eaten by anyone due to the fact that it is ritually impure. However, here, in the case of one who is baking bread during the Festival so that it can be eaten on a weekday, when it is at least fit for guests, say that so too, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, we say the principle: Since, etc. The Gemara recounts: The Sages said Rami bar Ḥama’s statement before Rabbi Yirmeya and Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Yirmeya accepted it and Rabbi Zeira did not accept it. Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: The following matter has been difficult for us to explain for several years: With regard to what principle did Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree? Now an explanation has been stated in the name of a great man. Shall we not accept it? He said to him: How can I accept it? We already learned in a baraita with regard to their dispute: Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: According to your statement, one violates the prohibition: “You shall not perform any labor” (Exodus 20:9). Rabbi Eliezer could not respond to this claim and was silent. But if it is as Rami bar Ḥama explained, Rabbi Eliezer should have said to him: The reason for my opinion is due to the principle: Since, etc., on the basis of which no prohibited labor has been performed. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: According to your reasoning, with regard to that which we already learned in a baraita, that Rabbi Eliezer said to him: According to your statement, he transgresses the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found, and in response to this challenge Rabbi Yehoshua was silent, did he too not respond to Rabbi Eliezer? He responded to him in the mishna, as we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehoshua said: This is not the leavened bread about which we are warned with the prohibitions: It shall not be seen, and: It shall not be found. Rather, it must be explained in the following manner: He appeared to be silent in the baraita simply because his response was not recorded, but he responded in the mishna. So too, here it is possible to say that he appeared silent in the mishna, but he responded in a different tractate. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The halakha with regard to the separation of ḥalla from impure dough during Passover is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of ben Beteira. The Gemara asks: How much dough may be kneaded at once on Passover without concern that the dough will become leavened in the process? Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: With regard to wheat, one may use the amount of flour that comes from two kav of grain; and with regard to barley, one may use the amount of flour that comes from three kav. Rabbi Natan says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The matters are reversed. One may knead the flour produced from three kav of wheat or two kav of barley without concern that it will become leavened. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a different baraita that Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: With regard to wheat, one may use the amount of flour that comes from three kav of grain, and with regard to barley, one may use the amount of flour that comes from four kav? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this latter baraita is referring to low-quality grain, and that baraita is referring to high-quality grain. One can obtain a higher proportion of flour from high-quality grain than from low-quality grain, which contains a greater amount of chaff. Rav Pappa said: Learn from this that the extent to which low-quality wheat is worse than high-quality wheat is greater than the extent to which low-quality barley is worse than high-quality barley, i.e., the discrepancy between the different levels of quality is more significant with regard to wheat, as there, in the case of wheat, they differ by one-third; and here, in the case of barley, they differ by only one-fourth. Rav said: A kav from the place Melogna is the amount that can be used to prepare dough for Passover. And similarly, with regard to ḥalla, that is the minimum amount of dough from which ḥalla must be separated. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Dough made from five-quarters of a log of flour and a bit more obligates one to separate ḥalla? The Gemara answers that this is what Rav is saying: A kav from Melogna is the same measure as this, as it is not a regular kav but a larger measure, identical to the amount from which one is required to separate ḥalla. Rav Yosef said: These women of our family ordinarily bake kefiza by kefiza, i.e., three-quarters of a log at a time, on Passover, since it is easier to prevent small quantities of dough from becoming leavened. Abaye said to him: What is your opinion? Do you tell them to do this in order to be stringent? That is a stringency that leads to a leniency, as by working with small quantities one removes the dough from the obligation to separate ḥalla. Rav Yosef said to him: They do separate ḥalla from the dough, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: One who removes loaves of bread from an oven and places them in a basket, the basket combines them to reach the quantity from which one is required to separate ḥalla, even if each of the loaves would not attain the necessary measure for separating ḥalla on their own. And Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. Therefore, the women of Rav Yosef’s household would put all the finished matzot into a basket and separate ḥalla from them. Abaye said to him: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that baraita that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: They taught that a basket combines the loaves only with regard to Babylonian loaves that bite from one another. In other words, the loaves are slightly attached, and when one separates them, a bit from one loaf comes off with the other loaf. However, it does not apply to long, rod-like loaves [ke’akhin] that were baked separately. Therefore, that principle cannot be applied to the case discussed here, in which each batch of matza was baked on its own. Rav Yosef answered: Wasn’t it stated with regard to that baraita that Rabbi Ḥanina said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer even with regard to long, rod-like loaves? This indicates that Rav Yosef accepted the view of Rabbi Ḥanina. In light of this discussion, Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma: With regard to a board without a rim [levizbezin], what is the halakha? Is it considered to be a vessel that combines loaves baked separately into one unit with regard to ḥalla? Do we require the inside of the vessel in order to combine the loaves, and that is lacking, since the board is flat rather than concave? Or perhaps we require the airspace of the vessel, and that is present in this case? The Gemara concludes: Let it stand unresolved. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: A basket combines different loaves placed in it with regard to the obligation to separate ḥalla. Rabbi Yehoshua says: An oven combines them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Babylonian loaves that bite from one another are combined; however, if the loaves are connected to any lesser degree, e.g., if they are together in an oven or basket, they are not considered combined for the purpose of separating ḥalla. MISHNA: Rabban Gamliel says: Three women may knead their dough as one, meaning at one time, and bake the batches of dough in one oven, one after the other, and they need not be concerned that their dough will become leavened while they are waiting to use the oven. And the Rabbis say: Three women may be engaged in preparing dough as one, in the following manner: One kneads her dough as another one arranges her own dough so it takes the form of matza, while another one bakes her dough. Rabbi Akiva says: Not all women, not all wood, and not all ovens are the same, and therefore no set rules should be established. Rather, this is the principle: If the dough begins to rise, she should spread cold water in which she immersed her hands, onto the dough, in order to stop the leavening process. GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: When the woman who kneads first completes her kneading, she arranges her dough and another woman kneads in her place. When the first woman finishes arranging her dough, she bakes and another woman arranges her dough in her place, and the third woman kneads her dough. When the first woman finishes baking, she kneads the dough for her next batch, and another woman bakes in her place, and the third woman arranges her dough, and they continue in turn. As long as they are engaged in handling the dough, it will not become leavened. It was taught in the mishna that Rabbi Akiva says that not all women, not all wood, and not all ovens are the same. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva said: I deliberated this matter before Rabban Gamliel, asking: May our master teach us if your statement, cited in the mishna, was said with regard to diligent women or women who are not diligent? Was it said with regard to an oven fueled with moist wood or dry wood? Was it said with regard to a hot oven or a cold oven? Rabban Gamliel himself said to me: You have only what the Sages taught, which is that this is the principle: If the dough begins to rise such that there is a concern that it may become leavened, she should spread cold water onto the dough to prevent it from becoming leavened. MISHNA: Dough at the beginning of the leavening process [siur], must be burned, but one who eats it is exempt from the punishment of karet because the dough had not become fully leavened. Dough that has reached the stage of cracking must be burned, and one who eats it intentionally is liable to receive karet, as he has intentionally eaten leavened bread during Passover. What is considered siur? Dough that has been leavened to the point that it has cracks that look like the antennae of locusts. The stage of cracking occurs later in the leavening process, when the cracks intermingle. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Rabbis say: One who intentionally eats either this or that, dough with cracks like locust antennae or with cracks that have become intermingled, is liable to receive karet, as once dough begins to crack it has certainly become leavened. And what is siur? It is any dough whose surface has becomes pale like the face of a person whose hair stands on end due to fear. GEMARA: The Sages taught: What is siur? It is any dough whose surface has become pale like the face of a person whose hair stands on end due to fear. Cracking is considered to have occurred when cracks like the antennae of locusts appear. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: What is siur? It is when the dough forms cracks like the antennae of locusts, and cracking is when the cracks intermingle. And one who intentionally eats either this or that is liable to receive karet. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that siur must be burned but that one who eats it is exempt from karet; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. The opinion attributed to the Rabbis in the baraita appears to be the same as that which is attributed to Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna, but according to Rabbi Yehuda, one who eats siur is exempt from karet. The Gemara answers: Say that the baraita should be understood in the following manner: According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, whose opinion was mentioned previously, one who intentionally eats either this or that is liable to receive karet, whereas according to the Rabbis he is exempt. Rava said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir? It is that there is no crack above that does not have several cracks below. Therefore, even if only one small crack appears on the surface, it is a sign that the inside of the dough is filled with cracks and has become leavened. MISHNA: With regard to the fourteenth of Nisan that occurs on Shabbat, one removes all leaven from his possession, whether it is teruma or non-sacred food, before Shabbat, except for that which will be eaten during the first part of Shabbat. In that case, one cannot remove leaven from his possession on the fourteenth of Nisan itself as he does in other years. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: One may remove the leaven at its usual time on the fourteenth of Nisan by throwing it away or declaring it ownerless. Rabbi Eliezer bar Tzadok says: Teruma should be removed before Shabbat, as only a few people are permitted to eat it and therefore one can presume that it will remain uneaten during Shabbat. However, non-sacred foods should be removed at their usual time, on the fourteenth of Nisan itself. GEMARA: It was taught in the Tosefta that Rabbi Eliezer bar Tzadok says: One time my father, Rabbi Tzadok, spent Shabbat in Yavne, and the fourteenth of Nisan occurred on that Shabbat. Zonin, who was the appointee of Rabban Gamliel, came and said: The time has come to remove leavened bread; and I went with my father and we removed the leavened bread. This story serves as anecdotal evidence that leaven is removed at the usual time on the fourteenth of Nisan, even on Shabbat. MISHNA: One who is traveling on the eve of Passover to slaughter his Paschal lamb, to circumcise his son, or to eat a betrothal feast in his father-in-law’s house, and he remembers that he has leavened bread in his house, if he is able to return to his house and remove the leaven and afterward return to the mitzva toward which he was traveling, he should return home and remove his leaven. But if there is not enough time for him to go home and remove the leaven, and still complete the mitzva that he already began, he should nullify it in his heart, as by Torah law this is sufficient. If one was traveling to save Jews from an attack by gentiles, from a flooding river, from bandits, from a fire, or from a collapsed building, he should not even attempt to return, and instead he should nullify the leaven in his heart. This applies even if he could remove his leaven and still return to his previous activity. If he went to establish his Shabbat residence in order to adjust his Shabbat limit for an optional purpose, rather than in order to fulfill a commandment, he should return immediately to remove his leaven. And so too, the same halakha applies to one who left Jerusalem and remembered that there was consecrated meat in his hand. Meat that is taken out of Jerusalem becomes disqualified, and one is required to burn it in proximity to the Temple. If he passed the area of Mount Scopus [Tzofim], beyond which one cannot see Jerusalem, he burns the meat at the site where he is located; and if he has not traveled that far, he must return and burn it before the Temple with wood from the arrangement on the altar, which was designated for burning consecrated items that were disqualified. The mishna asks: For how much leaven or consecrated meat is one required to return? Rabbi Meir says: In both this case and that case, one must return for an egg-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda says: In both this case and that case, one must return for an olive-bulk. And the Rabbis say that the amount depends on the case: With regard to consecrated meat, he is required to return if he has an olive-bulk, but in a case where he remembers that he has leavened bread, he required to return only for an egg-bulk. GEMARA: The Gemara raises a contradiction between this mishna and another source. It was taught in a baraita: One who is traveling to eat a betrothal feast in his father-in-law’s house or to establish his Shabbat residence for an optional purpose, must return immediately to remove his leaven. This contradicts the mishna, which states that one who is going to a betrothal feast may nullify the leaven without returning for it, because the meal is considered a mitzva. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is not difficult, as there is a tannaitic dispute with regard to the issue. This source, the baraita, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, while that source, the mishna, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As it was taught in a baraita: A betrothal feast is optional; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: It is a mitzva. And now that Rav Ḥisda said: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei applies to the second betrothal feast, where the groom takes part in an additional meal with the bride’s family, but everyone agrees that the first betrothal feast is a mitzva, the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita can be resolved differently. Even if you say that this mishna and that baraita are both in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, it is not difficult. This mishna, which relates to the meal as a mitzva, is referring to the first meal. That baraita, which assumes that the meal is not a mitzva, is referring to the second meal. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: I heard only that there is a mitzva with regard to a betrothal feast itself, but not with regard to the feast of the gifts [sivlonot], when the groom would present gifts to the bride. While a festive meal was eaten on this occasion, it was not considered to be a mitzva. Rabbi Yosei said to him: I heard that both a betrothal feast and the feast of the gifts are considered mitzvot. Having discussed whether a betrothal feast is a mitzva, the Gemara addresses a related issue. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: A Torah scholar may not derive benefit from partaking in any feast that is not a mitzva. The Gemara asks: In what case does this statement apply? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In a case where the daughter of a priest marries an Israelite, or where the daughter of a Torah scholar marries an ignoramus. Although a wedding feast is generally a mitzva, it is not in this case, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: When the daughter of a priest marries an Israelite their union will not be auspicious, as it is disgraceful for the priesthood when the daughter of a priest marries an Israelite. The Gemara asks: What is meant by this statement that their union will be inauspicious? Rav Ḥisda said: The inauspicious nature of such a marriage can be identified based on the verse describing the return of a daughter of a priest to her father’s house after marrying a non-priest. The verse is understood as mentioning that the marriage will result in one of three possibilities: she will either be a widow, a divorcee, or without children (see Leviticus 22:13). It was taught in a baraita: Either her husband will bury her or she will bury him, because one of them will die young, or she will cause him to become poor. The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan himself say: One who wishes to become wealthy should cling to the descendants of Aaron, and all the more so should the merit of the Torah and the priesthood cause them to become wealthy. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as this case, where he becomes wealthy, refers to a Torah scholar who marries a woman of priestly lineage. In that case their union will be a successful one. That case, where their union will not be auspicious, refers to an ignoramus who marries a woman of priestly lineage. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yehoshua married a daughter of a priest and became ill. He said: Apparently, it is not satisfactory to Aaron the priest that I cling to his descendants, so that he has a son-in-law like me. The Gemara also relates that Rav Idi bar Avin married a daughter of a priest. Two sons who were ordained to decide halakhic matters came from him, namely Rav Sheshet, son of Rav Idi, and Rabbi Yehoshua, son of Rav Idi. Similarly, Rav Pappa said: Had I not married a daughter of a priest, I would not have become wealthy. On the other hand, Rav Kahana, who was not a priest, said: Had I not married a daughter of a priest, I would not have been exiled, as Rav Kahana was forced to flee from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael. They said to him: But you were exiled to a place of Torah, which is not a punishment at all. He answered: I was not exiled as people are generally exiled, i.e., I did not emigrate of my own free will; rather, I was forced to flee from the authorities. Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Anyone who benefits from partaking in an optional feast, which is not a mitzva, will ultimately be exiled, as it is stated: “And eat the lambs of the flock and the calves out of the midst of the stall” (Amos 6:4), and it is written: “Therefore now they shall go into exile at the head of the exiles; and the revelry of those who stretched themselves out shall pass away” (Amos 6:7). The Gemara continues discussing a Torah scholar who benefits from optional feasts. The Sages taught: Any Torah scholar who feasts excessively everywhere degrades himself and brings suffering upon himself. He will ultimately destroy his house, widow his wife, orphan his chicks, i.e., his children, and his studies will be forgotten. Much dispute will come upon him, his words will not be heeded, and he will desecrate God’s name and the name of his master and the name of his father. And he will cause a bad name for himself, his children, and his descendants throughout future generations. The Gemara asks: What is this bad reputation that he causes to himself and his descendants? Abaye said: His son is called the son [bar] of the one who heats ovens, since this person continually heated ovens in order to prepare food for feasts. Rava said: His son will be called the son of the one who dances in inns [bei kuvei], as he seems to be invited to every feast to entertain the guests. Rav Pappa said: His son will be called the son of the one who licks bowls [pinkhei]. Rav Shemaya said: His son will be called the son of the one who folds his garment and crouches, i.e., falls asleep drunk. On the topic of proper marriage partners, the Gemara cites the following discussion. The Sages taught: One should always be willing to sell all he has in order to marry the daughter of a Torah scholar, as if he dies or if he is exiled and he cannot raise his children, he can be assured that his sons will be Torah scholars, since their mother will ensure that they are well educated. And one should not marry the daughter of an ignoramus, as if he dies or is exiled, his sons will be ignoramuses. Furthermore, the Sages taught: One should always be willing to sell all he has in order to marry the daughter of a Torah scholar and in order to marry off his daughter to a Torah scholar. This type of marriage can be compared to grapes of a vine that become intertwined with grapes of a vine, something which is beautiful and acceptable to God and man. And one should not marry the daughter of an ignoramus. This type of marriage can be compared to grapes of a vine that have become intertwined with berries of a bramble, which is something unseemly and unacceptable. The Sages taught: A person should always be willing to sell all he has in order to marry the daughter of a Torah scholar. If he cannot find the daughter of a Torah scholar, he should marry the daughter of one of the great people of the generation, who are pious although they are not Torah scholars. If he cannot find the daughter of one of the great people of the generation, he should marry the daughter of one of the heads of the congregations. If he cannot find the daughter of one of the heads of the congregations, he should marry the daughter of one of the charity collectors. If he cannot find the daughter of one of the charity collectors, he should marry the daughter of one of the schoolteachers. However, he should not marry the daughter of an ignoramus [am ha’aretz] because they are vermin and their wives are similar to a creeping animal, as their lifestyle involves the violation of numerous prohibitions. And with regard to their daughters the verse states: “Cursed is he who lies with an animal” (Deuteronomy 27:21), as they are similar to animals in that they lack any knowledge or moral sense. The Gemara continues its discussion with regard to an ignoramus. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is prohibited for an ignoramus to eat meat, as it is stated: “This is the law [torah] of the beast and of the fowl” (Leviticus 11:46). He expounds: Anyone who engages in Torah study is permitted to eat the meat of animals and fowl, and anyone who does not engage in Torah study is prohibited to eat the meat of animals or fowl. The Gemara proceeds to mention some sharply negative statements of the Sages in which they overstated their negative sentiments with regard to ignoramuses, although these ignoramuses were wicked in addition to being boors (ge’onim). Rabbi Elazar said: It is permitted to stab an ignoramus to death on Yom Kippur that occurs on Shabbat. His students said to him: Master, at least say that it is permitted to slaughter him. He said to them: I intentionally used the word stab, as this term, slaughtering, requires a blessing when one slaughters an animal, and that term, stabbing, does not require a blessing in any context. Rabbi Elazar said: It is prohibited to accompany an ignoramus while traveling on the road due to concern that the ignoramus might try to harm his traveling partner, as it is stated with regard to Torah: “For it is your life and the length of your days” (Deuteronomy 30:20). An ignoramus has not studied any Torah, indicating that he is not concerned about his own life; with regard to another’s life, all the more so. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is permitted to tear open an ignoramus like a fish. Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said: And one may cut him open from his back and thereby cause his immediate death by piercing his spinal cord rather than his stomach. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Akiva said: When I was an ignoramus I said: Who will give me a Torah scholar so that I will bite him like a donkey? His students said to him: Master, say that you would bite him like a dog! He said to them: I specifically used that wording, as this one, a donkey, bites and breaks bones, and that one, a dog, bites but does not break bones. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: Anyone who marries off his daughter to an ignoramus is considered as though he binds her and places her before a lion. Why is this so? Just as a lion mauls its prey and eats and has no shame, so too, an ignoramus strikes his wife and then engages in sexual relations with her without appeasing her first, and has no shame. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If we did not need the ignoramuses for business, they would kill us. The Gemara shifts to a discussion of an ignoramus who has some degree of sensitivity (Me’iri). Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: Anyone who engages in Torah study in the presence of an ignoramus, causing the ignoramus embarrassment and anguish over his inability to study Torah, is considered as though he had sexual relations with the ignoramus’s betrothed bride in his presence, as it is stated: “Moses commanded us the Torah, an inheritance [morasha] for the congregation of Jacob” (Deuteronomy 33:4). Do not read it as inheritance [morasha]; rather, read it as betrothed [me’orasa]. The Torah is compared to the betrothed bride of the Jewish people until one studies it and thereby consummates his marriage with it. Similarly, he said: The hatred which ignoramuses have for a Torah scholar is greater than the hatred that the nations of the world have for the Jewish people. And the wives of the ignoramuses hate Torah scholars more than the ignoramuses themselves. It was taught in the Tosefta that one who studied Torah and left his studies hates Torah scholars more than all of them. The Sages taught: Six statements were made with regard to ignoramuses: One may not entrust them with testimony, i.e., one may not appoint them as witnesses to a particular event or transaction. Additionally, one may not accept testimony from them, as they are not considered trustworthy, and one should not reveal a secret to them, as they will reveal it. One may not appoint them as steward [apotropos] over an estate belonging to orphans, due to concern that they might make improper use of the orphans’ property. Likewise, one may not appoint them as guardian over a charity fund. Finally, one should not accompany them while traveling on the road, due to concern for one’s safety. And there are those who say: One does not even announce their lost items, meaning that if one finds a lost article from such a person, he is allowed to keep it without making an effort to locate the owner (Me’iri). The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the first tanna, who holds that one must announce having found the lost article of an ignoramus? The Gemara explains: Sometimes upstanding offspring will come from him and will consume the property, as it is stated: “He may prepare it but the just shall put it on” (Job 27:17). It is possible for a wicked person to prepare something for himself that will later be used by a righteous person. The Gemara returns to explaining the mishna. It was taught: And so too, one who left Jerusalem with sacrificial meat in his possession must return to Jerusalem to burn it, just as one is required to return in order to remove leaven from his possession. According to Rabbi Meir, this halakha applies with regard to an egg-bulk of sacrificial meat or leaven, whereas Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and says the minimum amount for both is an olive-bulk. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Rabbi Meir holds that an egg-bulk is the minimal amount that is considered significant, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that an olive-bulk is also considered significant? The Gemara raises a contradiction from a mishna in Berakhot: How much food must one eat in order to obligate those with whom he ate in a zimmun? An olive-bulk of food is sufficient according to the unattributed opinion in the mishna, which is generally that of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yehuda says: An egg-bulk is the minimum measure to obligate those with whom one ate in a zimmun. This seems to contradict the opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda stated in the mishna here. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The opinions are reversed in one of these sources, and must be emended. Abaye said: Actually, do not reverse the opinions. There, they disagree with regard to the interpretation of verses, while here, they disagree with regard to logical reasoning. How so? There, with regard to zimmun, they disagree with regard to the interpretation of verses. Rabbi Meir holds that the verse: “And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 8:10) should be understood as follows: “And you shall eat,” that is eating; “and be satisfied,” that is drinking. The standard halakhic principle is that eating is defined as the consumption of an olive-bulk. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: “And you shall eat and you shall be satisfied” refers to eating that includes satisfaction. And what is considered eating with satisfaction? It is consumption of an egg-bulk. However, here, in the cases of leaven and consecrated food, they disagree not with regard to the interpretation of verses but with regard to logical reasoning, as Rabbi Meir holds: The requirement to return consecrated food is analogous to its ritual impurity. Just as its susceptibility to ritual impurity is only when it is the size of an egg-bulk, so too, the requirement to return it is only when it is the size of an egg-bulk. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: The requirement to return consecrated food is analogous to its prohibition. Just as its prohibition is only when it is the size of an olive-bulk, so too, the requirement to return it is only when it is the size of an olive-bulk. Another opinion on this issue was taught in a baraita. Rabbi Natan says: The minimum measure for both this and that, leaven and sacrificial meat, is two egg-bulks of prohibited material, but the Rabbis did not agree with him. Incidental to the discussion of leaving Jerusalem and its surrounding area, the Gemara cites expositions of a prophetic passage, including a statement that God will eventually expand the boundaries of Jerusalem. The verse states: “And it shall come to pass on that day that there shall not be light, but heavy clouds [yekarot] and thickness [vekippaon]” (Zechariah 14:6). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the expression “yekarot vekippaon”? Rabbi Elazar said: This is the light currently provided by the sun, which is significant [yakar] in this world and insignificant [kafuy] in the World-to-Come, when the moon will shine as brightly as the sun does now and the sun will be seven times brighter than it is currently. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This expression refers to the tractates of Nega’im and Oholot, which are weighty [yekarim] owing to their difficulty in this world, as they are among the most complex subjects, but will be easy [kefuyin] in the World-to-Come, when people will be much wiser. And Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: These are people who are considered important [yekarim] in this world and unimportant [kefuyim] in the World-to-Come. This is like the incident involving Rav Yosef, son of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who became ill and was about to expire. When he returned to good health, his father said to him: What did you see when you were about to die? He said to him: I saw an inverted world. Those above, i.e., those who are considered important in this world, were below, insignificant, while those below, i.e., those who are insignificant in this world, were above. He said to him: My son, you have seen a clear world. The world you have seen is the true world, as in that world people’s standings befit them. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi asked: And where are we, the Torah scholars, there? Rav Yosef responded: Just as we are regarded here, so are we regarded there. Rav Yosef added: And I heard that they were saying in that world: Praiseworthy is the one who arrives here with his studies in hand. And I also heard that they were saying: Those executed by the government enjoy such an exalted status that no one can stand in their enclosure. The Gemara asks: And who are these martyrs that Rav Yosef was referring to? If you say that he was referring to Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues, who were martyred, this cannot be: Is their elevated status due only to the fact that they were martyred by the Roman government and nothing more? These men were exceptional in their piety and sanctity during their lives as well. Rather, it is referring to the martyrs of Lod, Pappos and Luliyanos, who gave themselves up to be martyred for the sake of the Jewish people. They falsely admitted to killing the king’s daughter in order to prevent a harsh decree from being issued against the entire community. Although they were not known for exceptional piety before that event, they are considered to be extremely holy due to their martyrdom. The Gemara continues to expound the section of the book of Zechariah cited above. The verse states: “On that day there shall be upon the bells of the horses [metzillot hasus]: Holy unto the Lord” (Zechariah 14:20). The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the expression metzillot hasus? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: In the future the Holy One, Blessed be He, will extend Jerusalem by as much as the distance that a horse can run the entire time it casts a shadow [metzeil]. Jerusalem will be so large that a horse running from one side of the city in the morning will not arrive at the other end of the city until midday, when its shadow will have disappeared. Rabbi Elazar said: All decorative bells [metzillot] that one hangs between the eyes of a horse will be sanctified to God, i.e., they will be consecrated for the Temple treasury. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: All spoils that the Jewish people will take from gentiles who wage war against them, up to the time a horse runs and casts a shadow [metzeil], i.e., half a day, will be sanctified for God. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who said that this expression refers to all spoils that the Jewish people will take, this is as it is written in the continuation of the verse, which mentions additional treasure donated to the Temple: “And the pots in the Lord’s house shall be like the basins before the altar.” However, according to the ones who said these other two explanations, what is the meaning of: “And the pots in the Lord’s house”? The Gemara explains that according to these opinions the verse is saying something else: It is prophesying that in the future the Jewish people will become wealthy and bring donations to the Temple. The Gemara goes on to ask: Granted, according to the one who said that this expression refers to spoils, this is as it is written in the next verse: “And on that day there shall no longer be a merchant [kena’ani] in the house of the Lord of hosts” (Zechariah 14:21), as he will no longer be needed. However, according to the ones who said these other two explanations, what is the meaning of the expression: “There shall no longer be a merchant”? Rabbi Yirmeya said: The word kena’ani is in fact a contraction of the phrase: There is no poor person here [ein kan ani]. In other words, there will no longer be poor people, and therefore the Jews themselves will be able to donate whatever is needed in the Temple (Maharsha). And from where do we derive that a merchant can be called a kena’ani? As it is written: “And Judah saw there the daughter of a certain kena’ani…and he took her, and went in unto her” (Genesis 38:2). What is the meaning of the word kena’ani in this context? If you say it refers to an actual Canaanite, is it possible that Abraham warned Isaac not to marry a Canaanite woman, and Isaac warned Jacob to the same effect, and nonetheless Judah went and married a Canaanite woman? Rather, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: She was the daughter of a merchant, as it is written: “As for the merchant [kena’an], the balances of deceit are in his hand. He loves to oppress” (Hosea 12:8). And if you wish, say instead that this meaning of the word can be understood from the following verse, which describes Tyre: “Whose traders are princes, whose merchants [kinaneha] are the honorable of the earth” (Isaiah 23:8). The Gemara cites another verse from the prophecy at the end of the book of Zechariah: “And the Lord shall be King over all the earth, on that day shall the Lord be one and His name one” (Zechariah 14:9). The Gemara asks: Is that to say that now He is not one? Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina said: The World-to-Come is not like this world. In this world, upon good tidings one recites: Blessed…Who is good and does good, and over bad tidings one recites: Blessed…the true Judge. In the World-to-Come one will always recite: Blessed…Who is good and does good. There will be only one mode of blessing God for tidings. The verse states: “On that day shall the Lord be one and His name one.” The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the word one in this context? Is that to say that now His name is not one? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The World-to-Come is not like this world. In this world, God’s name that is written with the letters yod and heh is read as Adonai, which begins with the letters alef and dalet. God’s name is not pronounced in the same way as it is written. However, in the World-to-Come it will all be one, as God’s name will be both read with the letters yod and heh and written with the letters yod and heh. Rava thought to expound upon the correct punctuation and enunciation of the name of God during his public lecture before one of the Festivals. A certain old man said to him: The word forever is written in the verse: “This is My name forever [le’olam]” (Exodus 3:15) without the letter vav, such that it can be read le’alem, to conceal, meaning that the name should be concealed. Rabbi Avina raised a contradiction: It is written in the verse: “This is My name forever,” implying a requirement to conceal the name of God, and in the very next phrase it states: “And this is My memorial unto all generations” (Exodus 3:15), which indicates that the name of God is to be publicized and remembered by all. Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said: I, i.e., My name, is not read as I am written. I am written with the letters yod and heh, and I am read with the letters alef and dalet. MISHNA: In a place where the people were accustomed to perform labor on Passover eve until midday, one may do so on that day. In a place where the people were accustomed not to perform labor, one may not do so. The performance of labor on the eve of Passover is not prohibited by Torah law, but is dependent on local custom. If one travels from a place where people perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people do not perform labor, or from a place where people do not perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people perform labor, the Sages impose upon him the stringencies of both the place from which he left and the stringencies of the place to which he went. In both cases, he may not perform labor. The Sages stated a principle: And a person may not deviate from the local custom, due to potential dispute. Similarly, one who transports Sabbatical Year produce from a place where a crop has ceased in the fields to a place where it has not yet ceased or from a place where it has not yet ceased to a place where it has already ceased is obligated to remove the produce from his possession, in accordance with the stringencies of both locations. It is permitted for homeowners to eat Sabbatical Year produce in their houses only as long as that species of fruit remains in the field as ownerless property. However, once that particular fruit is no longer available for animals in the fields, one is required to remove what remains of that species from his home. The statement in the mishna is referring to one who transported fruit from a location where it ceased in the fields to one where it did not, and vice versa. Rabbi Yehuda says that he need not remove the produce, as he can say to a local resident: You, too, go out and bring this produce from a place where it remains in the field. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why discuss this prohibition particularly with regard to Passover eves? It is prohibited to perform labor even on Shabbat eves and Festival eves as well, as it was taught in a baraita: One who performs labor on Shabbat eves and Festival eves from minḥa time onward never sees a sign of blessing from this work. The Gemara answers that there is a difference between the two situations: There, in the case of Shabbat and Festivals, performing labor is prohibited from minḥa time onward; it is not prohibited adjacent to minḥa time, i.e., just before it. Here, in the case of Passover eve, it is prohibited from midday. Alternatively, there, on Shabbat eve and Festival eve, it is a sign of blessing that he does not see; however, the Sages do not excommunicate him for performing labor. Here, in the case of Passover eve, the Sages also excommunicate him for performing labor, as it is explicitly prohibited. The Gemara cites the source of the matter itself in its entirety: One who performs labor on Shabbat eves or on Festival eves from minḥa time onward, and similarly one who works immediately upon the conclusion of Shabbat, or the conclusion of a Festival, or the conclusion of Yom Kippur, or on any occasion where there is a trace of sin, which comes to include a communal fast, e.g., the Ninth of Av or a fast for rain, when it is prohibited to perform labor, never sees a sign of blessing from this work. If one performs labor just before Shabbat or immediately after Shabbat, the concern is that even a slight miscalculation could lead to performance of labor on Shabbat itself, when it is prohibited. Apropos reward or lack thereof, the Gemara cites the Tosefta in which the Sages taught: There is one who is diligent and rewarded for his diligence; and there is one who is diligent and penalized due to his diligence; there is one who is lazy and rewarded; and there is one who is lazy and penalized. How so? Diligent and rewarded is referring to one who works the entire week and does not work on Shabbat eve. Diligent and penalized is one who works all week and works on Shabbat eve. Lazy and rewarded is one who does not work the entire week and does not work on Shabbat eve. Lazy and penalized is one who does not work the entire week and works on Shabbat eve to complete the work he neglected to perform during the week. Rava said: With regard to those women of Meḥoza, even though they do not perform labor on Shabbat eve, it is due to excessive pampering, as neither do they work on any other day. Even so, we call them lazy and rewarded. Despite the fact that their laziness is not motivated by piety, their inactivity has a positive aspect to it. On the topic of reward for a mitzva fulfilled without intent, Rava raised a contradiction: It is written: “For Your mercy is great unto the heavens, and Your truth reaches the skies” (Psalms 57:11); and it is written elsewhere: “For Your mercy is great above the heavens, and Your truth reaches the skies” (Psalms 108:5). How so? How can these verses be reconciled? The Gemara explains: Here, where the verse says that God’s mercy is above the heavens, it is referring to a case where one performs a mitzva for its own sake; and here, where the verse says that God’s mercy reaches the heavens, it is referring to a case where one performs a mitzva not for its own sake. Even a mitzva performed with ulterior motives garners reward, as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A person should always engage in Torah study and performance of mitzvot, even if he does so not for their own sake, as through the performance of mitzvot not for their own sake, one gains understanding and comes to perform them for their own sake. The Sages taught: One who anticipates receiving the earnings of his wife or of a mill never sees a sign of blessing from them. The Gemara explains: Earnings of his wife is referring to a case where she spins thread for others and charges by weight on a scale (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). The profit is small and it is demeaning to walk in public to solicit customers. Earnings of the mill is referring to a hand mill for which people pay rent and grind their grain. In that case too, the profits are meager. However, if a woman works and sells the product of her labor, the verse praises her, as it is written about a woman of valor: “She made a cloak and sold it, and delivered a belt to the peddler” (Proverbs 31:24). The Sages taught with regard to a sign of blessing: One who earns a living from selling rods or jugs will never see a sign of blessing from them. What is the reason for this? Since their volume is great, the evil eye dominates them. People believe that one is selling more than he is actually selling. Similarly, the Sages taught: Merchants who sell their wares in an alleyway [simta] adjacent to a thoroughfare, where they are seen by all; and those who raise small livestock, which tend to damage other people’s fields; and those who chop down good fruit trees, even if they were permitted to do so; and those who direct their eyes to the fine portion with the intention of taking that portion for himself when dividing an item with others, will never see a sign of blessing from them. What is the reason for this? It is that due to these actions people wonder about him and pay special attention to his conduct. Due to that attention, his actions will not be blessed. Similarly the Sages taught: In four perutot, payments, there is never a sign of blessing: Wages of scribes of sacred books; wages of disseminators, who repeat and explain the lectures delivered by the Sages on Shabbat; payment of orphans, which one receives when engaging in a partnership with the executor of an orphan’s estate; and money that comes from a country overseas. The Gemara asks: Granted, one will be unsuccessful when receiving wages of disseminators, as it appears as if he is receiving wages for work performed on Shabbat, even though what he is doing is not actually prohibited. And it is also understandable that one will see no blessing from orphans’ money, as minors are not capable of relinquishing property. Minors do not have the legal right to forgive even negligible losses, which partners typically overlook. Therefore, one who in the course of business takes even the smallest amount of money from them beyond the sum to which he is entitled is considered a thief. One sees no blessing from money that comes from a country overseas, because a miracle does not transpire every day. Since the risks involved in shipping cargo on long sea voyages are great, one’s merit is diminished each time his merchandise miraculously arrives intact. However, what is the reason that one sees no blessing from wages of scribes? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The members of the Great Assembly observed twenty-four fasts, corresponding to the twenty-four priestly watches (Maharsha), for scribes who write Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzot, so that they will not become wealthy from their craft, as were they to become wealthy, they would no longer write these sacred items. Similarly, the Sages taught: Scribes who write scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzot; and their merchants, who buy the sacred scrolls from the scribes to sell them; and their merchants’ merchants; and all those engaged in the work of Heaven and earn their living from it, a phrase that comes to include those who sell the sky-blue dye for ritual fringes, never see a sign of blessing from their labor. And if they engage in these activities for their own sake, to ensure that there will be more sacred items available to the public, then they do see blessing from their labor. As the mishna discusses the requirement to observe local customs, the Gemara relates: The residents of Beit She’an were accustomed not to travel from Tyre to market day in Sidon on Shabbat eve. In deference to Shabbat, they adopted a stringency and would not interrupt their Shabbat preparations even for a short sea voyage. Their children came before Rabbi Yoḥanan to request that he repeal this custom. They said to him: Due to their wealth, it was possible for our fathers to earn a living without traveling to the market on Friday; however, it is not possible for us to do so. He said to them: Your fathers already accepted this virtuous custom upon themselves, and it remains in effect for you, as it is stated: “My son, hear your father’s rebuke and do not abandon your mother’s teaching” (Proverbs 1:8). In addition to adhering to one’s father’s rebuke, i.e., halakha, one is also required to preserve his mother’s teaching, i.e., ancestral customs. The Gemara relates additional customs: The residents of the city of Ḥozai were accustomed to separate ḥalla from rice dough. They came and told Rav Yosef about this custom. He said to them: Let a non-priest eat this dough in their presence to show them unequivocally that this custom has no legal basis. Abaye raised an objection to him: With regard to matters that are permitted, but others were accustomed to treat them as a prohibition, you are not allowed to permit these actions in their presence, lest they come to treat other prohibitions lightly, saying: If this previously prohibited activity was permitted, other prohibitions are not particularly stringent either. How did Rav Yosef permit the residents of Ḥozai to eat rice dough? Rav Yosef said to Abaye: And wasn’t it stated about this halakha concerning stringencies that Rav Ḥisda said: This was stated specifically with regard to Samaritans? The Gemara rejects this: What is the reason that this applies to Samaritans? It is due to the fact that they will extend this matter of leniency, and add to it additional, unjustified leniencies. These people of Ḥozai will also extend this matter of leniency, and come to practice additional leniencies in other cases, as they are ignoramuses. Rather, Rav Ashi said: We see, if the majority of people in that place eat rice, do not let a non-priest eat ḥalla in their presence, lest the halakhic category of ḥalla be forgotten from them. And if most of them eat grain, let a non-priest eat ḥalla separated from rice dough in their presence, lest they separate ḥalla from grain, from which separating ḥalla is a requirement, on behalf of rice from which separating ḥalla is an exemption, in which case the priest eating the ḥalla would be eating bread from which ḥalla was not separated; or from that which is an exemption on behalf of that which is a requirement, in which case the person eating the grain bread would be eating bread from which ḥalla was not separated. After mentioning halakhot relating to customs, the Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself. If matters are permitted but others were accustomed to treat them as a prohibition, you are not allowed to permit these actions in their presence. Rav Ḥisda said: We are dealing with Samaritans, not with Jews. The Gemara is surprised at this: And doesn’t this apply to everyone? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita to the contrary? Two brothers may bathe together, and there is no concern that doing so is immodest or will lead to sinful thoughts. However, the custom was that two brothers do not bathe together in the city of Kabul (see I Kings 9:13). And there was an incident involving Yehuda and Hillel, sons of Rabban Gamliel, who bathed together in Kabul, and the entire city denounced them and said: In all our days we have never seen that type of conduct. Hillel stole away and went out to the outer chamber and did not want to tell them: You are permitted to do so. He preferred to obey the city residents rather than rule it permitted for two brothers to bathe together. Similarly, one may go out with wide shoes that resemble slippers on Shabbat; however, one does not go out with wide shoes in the city of Birei. And there was an incident involving Yehuda and Hillel, sons of Rabban Gamliel, who went out with wide shoes in Birei, and the people of the city denounced them and said: In all our days we have never seen that type of conduct. And Yehuda and Hillel removed their shoes, and gave them to their gentile servants, and did not want to tell the residents of the city: You are permitted to go out with wide shoes on Shabbat. Similarly, one may sit on gentiles’ stools on Shabbat, even though these stools are typically used for displaying merchandise. But one may not sit on gentiles' stools on Shabbat in the city of Akko. And there was an incident involving Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel who sat on gentiles’ stools on Shabbat in the city of Akko, and the entire city denounced him. They said: In all our days we have never seen that type of conduct. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel moved onto the ground and did not want to tell them: You are permitted to sit on the stools. The Gemara answers: The legal status of people in the cities, since Sages are not found among them, is like that of the Samaritans. Therefore, it is prohibited to tell them that these activities are permitted. The Gemara proceeds to clarify the reasons for the stringent customs in those communities. Granted, sitting on gentiles’ stools is prohibited because it appears like one is engaged in buying and selling on Shabbat. In the case of wide shoes as well, it is prohibited to wear them due to the concern lest they fall off one’s feet and he come to carry them in his hand four cubits in the public domain, thereby violating a Torah prohibition. However, what is the reason that two brothers may not bathe together? The Gemara answers: The custom to prohibit doing so is based on that which was taught in a baraita: A person may bathe with anyone except for his father, and his father-in-law, and his mother’s husband, and his sister’s husband. Due to the nature of their relation, one might come to ponder how they came to be related and have prohibited thoughts about intimacy between men and women. And Rabbi Yehuda permits one to bathe with his father, due to the honor that he can accord his father by assisting his father while bathing. The same is true for one’s mother’s husband. And the people of Kabul came and issued a decree to prohibit bathing together for two brothers, due to their concern that it is similar to bathing with one’s sister’s husband. It was taught in the Tosefta: A student may not bathe with his teacher, since it is disrespectful to see one’s teacher naked. But if his teacher requires his help when bathing, it is permitted. The Gemara relates: When Rabba bar bar Ḥana came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he ate the fat found over the straight part of an animal’s stomach. The fat along the stomach consists of two parts: The inner, straight portion, which is shaped like a bowstring, and the outer, rounded portion, which is shaped like a bow. With regard to the fat surrounding the inner, straight portion, the custom in Eretz Yisrael was lenient, whereas in Babylonia it was stringent. Rav Avira the Elder and Rabba, son of Rav Huna, entered to see Rabba bar bar Ḥana. When he saw them coming, he concealed from them what he was eating. They came and told Abaye what had happened, and he said to them: Through his conduct, he rendered you Samaritans, as he could have told you that it is permitted but did not do so. The Gemara asks: And is Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who was lenient with regard to a matter that is prohibited, not in agreement with that which we learned in the mishna: When one travels from one place to another, the Sages impose upon him the stringencies of the place from which he left and the stringencies of the place to which he went? Abaye said: That applies when one travels from one place in Babylonia to another place in Babylonia, or from one place in Eretz Yisrael to another place in Eretz Yisrael, or alternatively, from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael. However, when traveling from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, no, this principle does not apply. Since we, the residents of Babylonia, are subordinate to them in terms of halakha, we act in accordance with their custom, but a resident of Eretz Yisrael is not required to follow the Babylonian custom. Rav Ashi said: Even if you say that when one travels from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he is required to act stringently in accordance with the local custom, this applies only when his intent is not to return. One is required to adopt the local customs when permanently settling in a new location. However, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s intent was to return to Eretz Yisrael, his point of origin, he continued to follow the custom of Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara relates that Rabba bar bar Ḥana said to his son: My son, you live in Babylonia. Therefore, do not eat this fat, neither when you are in my presence nor when you are not in my presence. I, who saw Rabbi Yoḥanan eat this fat, can say that Rabbi Yoḥanan is worthy for one to rely upon him both in his presence and not in his presence. You did not see him. Therefore, do not eat it, neither when you are in my presence nor when you are not in my presence, since you may not rely upon my opinion alone in this matter. The Gemara comments: And this statement of his disagrees with another statement of his, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana said: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Elazar told me: Once I followed Rabbi Shimon ben Rabbi Yosei ben Lakonya into the garden next to his house, and he took cabbage after-growths that had grown during the Sabbatical Year, and ate from them and gave some to me. And he said to me: My son, in my presence, you may eat this. But when you are not in my presence, you may not eat cabbage that grew as an after-growth. I, who saw Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai eat, can say that Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai is worthy for one to rely upon him both in his presence and not in his presence. You, who did not see him eat, in my presence, rely on what I saw and eat; however, not in my presence, do not rely on my testimony and do not eat. In this case, Rabba bar bar Ḥana maintained that one who saw a Sage act in a certain way may rely on what he saw, as may his students when they are in the presence of their teacher. The Gemara asks: What is that statement of Rabbi Shimon? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: All after-growths that grow on their own during the Sabbatical Year are prohibited and may not be eaten, except for the after-growths of cabbage, as there is nothing similar to them among the vegetables in the field. The Sages did not extend the decree prohibiting after-growths to cabbage, because it is unlike other vegetables. Rather, it is like fruit of a tree, which may be eaten if it grows wild during the Sabbatical Year. And the Rabbis say: All after-growths are prohibited, including the after-growths of cabbage. The Gemara comments: And both Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis, who disagree in this case, hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. As it was taught in a baraita: The verse states, “And if you shall say: What shall we eat in the seventh year? Behold, we may not sow, nor gather our crops” (Leviticus 25:20). Rabbi Akiva said: And since they cannot sow, from where would they gather? Why does the verse mention gathering? It is derived from here that gathering after-growths that were not planted but grew on their own is prohibited. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle then, do they disagree? The Gemara answers: The Rabbis, who prohibit all after-growths, hold: We issue a decree prohibiting cabbage after-growths due to other after-growths in general. And Rabbi Shimon holds: We do not issue a decree prohibiting cabbage after-growths due to other after-growths in general. We learned in the mishna with regard to refraining from performance of labor on Passover eve: With regard to one who travels from a place where people perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people do not, or from a place where people do not perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people do, the Sages impose upon him the stringencies of the place from which he left and the stringencies of the place to which he went. The Gemara asks: Granted, in the case of one who travels from a place where people perform labor to a place where they do not perform labor, the Sages impose upon him the stringencies of the place to which he went, and a person should not deviate from the standard practice in that place due to potential dispute, and he should not perform labor. However, if one traveled from a place where people do not perform labor to a place where they do perform labor, is the ruling there too, that a person should not deviate from the standard practice in that place due to conflict, and perform labor? That cannot be. Didn’t you say: The Sages impose upon him the stringencies of the place to which he went and the stringencies of the place from which he left? He should not perform any labor. Abaye said: The principle that one should not deviate due to potential dispute is referring to the first clause, that one who arrives at a place where people do not perform labor adopts the local stringency. Rava said: Actually, it is possible to say this halakha is also referring to the latter clause of the mishna, and this is what it is saying: Refraining from labor does not constitute a deviation that causes dispute. What are you saying; one who sees him will say that he is not working because he believes that performing labor is prohibited, contrary to local practice? That is unlikely, as when people see him inactive that will not be their assumption. Instead, they will say: How many idle people there are in the market every day who do not work. In this case, people will assume that this individual was unable to find work that day. After discussing stringencies resulting from customs, the Gemara elaborates on the second day of a Festival observed in the Diaspora. Rav Safra said to Rabbi Abba: Communities in a situation like us, who, based on calculations, already know the determination of the month and are no longer concerned lest the Festival be observed on the wrong day, clearly, on the second day of a Festival, we do not perform labor in the settled area due to the need to avoid deviation that causes dispute, as it is the custom in the Diaspora to refrain from performance of labor on those days. However, in the desert outside the Jewish community, what is the halakha? He said to him that this is what Rav Ami said: In a settled area it is prohibited; in the desert it is permitted. Tangentially, it is reported that Rav Natan bar Asya relied upon his knowledge of the calendar and traveled from Rav’s study hall to Pumbedita on the second day of the festival of Assembly, i.e., Shavuot, and thereby desecrated the second day of the Festival by traveling beyond the town limits. Rav Yosef excommunicated him as punishment for this act. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Let the Master flog Rav Natan bar Asya for this grave sin. Rav Yosef said to him: I punished him more severely, as in Eretz Yisrael they vote to flog a Torah scholar, but do not vote to punish him with excommunication, in deference to the Torah. Apparently, excommunication is a more severe punishment than lashes. Some say: Rav Yosef ordered the court officer to flog him. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Let the Master excommunicate him, as it is Rav and Shmuel who both say that one excommunicates for desecration of the second day of the Festival in the Diaspora. Rav Yosef said to him: That applies to an ordinary person. Here, he is a Torah scholar. I did what was best for him, as in Eretz Yisrael they vote to flog a Torah scholar but do not vote to punish him with excommunication. Rav Yosef did not wish to sentence him to so severe a punishment. We learned in the mishna: Similarly, one who transports Sabbatical Year produce from a place where a crop has ceased in the fields to a place where it has not yet ceased, or from a place where it has not yet ceased to a place where it has already ceased, is obligated to remove the produce from his possession, in accordance with the stringencies of both locations. Rabbi Yehuda says that one need not remove the produce, as he can say to a local resident: You too go out and bring this produce from a place where it remains in the field. Therefore, he may partake of the produce that he brought with him. The Gemara asks: And is Rabbi Yehuda not in agreement with that which we learned in the mishna: The Sages impose upon him the stringencies of both the place from which he left and the stringencies of the place to which he went? Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: Rabbi Yehuda is stating a different matter, and this is what the mishna is saying: Or if one went from a place where a crop has not ceased in the fields to a place where it has also not ceased in the fields, and he heard that it now ceased in the fields in his original location, he is then required to remove the fruits from his possession. Rabbi Yehuda says: He need not remove it and can say to the people of his location of origin: You, too, go out and bring these fruits from a place where they remain in the field, as they have not ceased in the fields here, and I may continue eating this produce. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Rabbi Yehuda is stating his opinion as a leniency in his dispute with the Rabbis? Didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: Rabbi Yehuda stated his opinion as a stringency? Rather, reverse the statements in the mishna: If one travels from a place where a crop has not ceased in the fields to another place where it has not ceased in the fields, and hears that it has ceased in the fields in his original location, he is not required to remove that produce from his house. Rabbi Yehuda says: You, too, go out and bring these fruits from the place where I brought them, and the crop has ceased in the fields there, and therefore he is required to remove the produce from his house. Abaye said: Actually, maintain the dispute in the mishna as it is taught, and this is what the mishna is saying: Or, if he brought it from a place where it has not ceased in the fields to a place where it has ceased in the fields, and he returned the fruits to their original place where they have still not ceased from the fields, he is not required to remove the produce. Rabbi Yehuda says: You, too, go out and bring these fruits from the place where I brought them, and hasn’t the crop ceased from the fields there? When he brought the produce back, he took it from a location where the fruit had ceased to be available, and he is required to remove it. Rav Ashi strongly objects to this: Is that to say that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, did the back of the donkey absorb these fruits? In other words, should this fruit be prohibited just because he transported the fruits on a donkey’s back through a place where it no longer exists in the field, even though it was neither grown there nor is he eating it there? Rather, Rav Ashi said: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda is parallel to the dispute of these tanna’im, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who preserves three types of vegetable preserves in one barrel during the Sabbatical Year, Rabbi Eliezer says: One may eat all three vegetables based on the status of the first. One may eat all three only until the date that the first of those vegetables ceases in the field. Thereafter, he is required to remove all the vegetables because they form a mixture of the prohibited and the permitted. Rabbi Yehoshua says: One may even continue eating all of them based on the status of the final type of those vegetables, until it is no longer present in the field. Rabban Gamliel says: Any of the vegetables whose type has ceased from the field, he will remove its type from the barrel and it may not be eaten; and the halakha is in accordance with his statement. The parallels between the dispute in this mishna and the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda are: The unattributed opinion in the mishna is parallel to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua: As long as there is an element of leniency, it is all permitted. Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is parallel to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer: As long as there is an element of stringency, it is all prohibited (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). Ravina said: The dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda is parallel to the dispute of these tanna’im, as we learned in a mishna: One may eat dates in all of Judea until the last palm tree, which produces the latest dates, in Tzoar, has ceased producing dates. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may continue eating dates based on those that have fallen off the tree and are stuck between the palm branches. But one may not continue eating on the basis of the dates that have fallen between the thorn branches, as animals are unable to reach them there. According to the first tanna in the mishna cited, one may continue eating fruit as long as an animal has access to its type, parallel to the opinion of the Rabbis with regard to removal. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion is parallel to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: If the fruit from a certain place is not available to all, one is required to remove it. Since the Gemara discussed the point when Sabbatical Year produce must be removed in different places, it cites a mishna from tractate Shevi’it that deals with a similar topic. We learned there in a mishna: Eretz Yisrael is divided into three separate lands with regard to removal, Judea, Transjordan, and the Galilee. And there are three lands in each and every one of them: The valley, the mountains, and the plains, in which the halakhot of removal differ. And why did the Sages say that there are three lands with regard to removal if those lands themselves are further divided? It is so that people will eat in each and every one until a certain crop ceases from the field in the last of the regions that comprise it. Therefore, even if a certain fruit is no longer available in a particular region within the land, it may still be eaten there as long as it is available in one of the other regions. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived, that it is permitted to continue eating a type of fruit that has ceased from the fields in a region, as long as it has not ceased elsewhere in the land, but that once it has ceased from the fields in the entire land it is prohibited, despite the fact that it has not ceased from the fields in the other lands? Rav Ḥama bar Ukva said that Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: The verse says with regard to land during the Sabbatical Year: “And for the cattle and the beasts that are in your land, all its produce may be eaten” (Leviticus 25:7), from which it is derived: As long as the undomesticated animals eat a type of produce from the field, one may feed that type to the domesticated animal in his house, as it still remains in the field. Deriving benefit from that type of produce is permitted. However, if that type of produce has ceased for the undomesticated animals in the field, cease providing it to your domesticated animal in the house. And we learned as a tradition that an undomesticated animal in Judea does not develop on the produce of the Galilee, and an undomesticated animal in the Galilee does not develop on the fruits of Judea. In each region there are conditions uniquely suited to the species that live there (Sefat Emet). Animals wander from region to region within Judea or within the Galilee in search of food, but they do not stray beyond the borders of the land of their habitat. The Sages taught: Sabbatical Year fruits that left Eretz Yisrael and went to the Diaspora must be removed in any place that they are located. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: That is not so. Rather, the fruits should return to their place of origin in Eretz Yisrael and be removed there. According to his opinion, removal may not be performed outside Eretz Yisrael because it is stated: “In your land,” indicating that this activity may be performed only in Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara asks: Didn’t you derive from this verse that each of the three lands in Eretz Yisrael has a different halakhic status? The Gemara answers: Read the phrase as both in the land and in your land. It is possible to derive two halakhot from this verse; one halakha is with regard to Eretz Yisrael in general, i.e., one may not perform removal outside of Eretz Yisrael, the land, and one is with regard to the different lands within Eretz Yisrael, your land. Alternatively, the second halakha can be derived from the extraneous words in the expression: “That are in your land,” as the Torah could have sufficed with the phrase: “In your land.” The Gemara relates: Rav Safra left Eretz Yisrael and went to the Diaspora, and he had with him a jug of Sabbatical Year wine. Rav Huna, son of Rav Ika, and Rav Kahana accompanied him. He said to them: Is there anyone who heard from Rabbi Abbahu whether the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar or not? According to his opinion, Rav Safra would be required to return the wine to Eretz Yisrael. Rav Kahana said to him that this is what Rabbi Abbahu said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and one is required to return and perform removal of the Sabbatical Year produce in Eretz Yisrael. Rav Huna, son of Rav Ika, said that this is what Rabbi Abbahu said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and one may perform removal wherever he may be. Rav Safra said: Take that principle of Rav Huna in your hand, i.e., rely on it, as he is scrupulous and he learned the halakha well from the mouth of its originator, as the Sage Raḥava from the city of Pumbedita would do. Raḥava was famous for the precision with which he would transmit material that he learned from his teacher. The Gemara cites an example: Raḥava said that Rav Yehuda said: The Temple Mount was a double colonnade [stav], as there was a colonnade within a colonnade there. Here Raḥava used his teacher’s language in describing the structure of the Temple and the rows of columns. He did not employ the common term used for a colonnade, itztaba, but rather stav, using the language he heard from his teacher. With regard to the case where Rav Safra relied on Rav Huna’s opinion and was lenient, Rav Yosef mockingly read the verse: “My nation ask counsel of their stock, and its staff [maklo] tells to them” (Hosea 4:12) and interpreted it homiletically with regard to Rav Safra: Anyone who is lenient [mekel] tells him the halakha. He listens to the opinion of only the Sage who rules leniently. The Gemara continues to discuss the halakhot of the Sabbatical Year: Rabbi Elai chopped down a palm tree containing unripe dates of the Sabbatical Year. The Gemara asks: How did he do this? The Merciful One says: “And the Sabbatical produce of the land shall be for you to eat” (Leviticus 25:6), from which it is inferred: To eat and not to destroy. It is prohibited to destroy Sabbatical Year produce, and it is permitted only to eat it. And if you say that this restriction applies only in a case where it has reached the status of fruit, but in a case where it has not yet reached the status of fruit, no, it does not apply; didn’t Rav Naḥman say that Rabba bar Avuh said: Those orla date coverings are prohibited like other orla fruit, as their legal status is that of food because they became protection for the fruit? They are not considered part of the tree that may be eaten in the orla years. The Gemara analyzes this: And when do these coverings serve as protection for the fruit? When the fruit is still young and one nevertheless calls them fruit. Dates are considered fruit even when they are undeveloped. Just as it is prohibited to eat these dates during the orla period, it is similarly prohibited to destroy them during the Sabbatical Year. The Gemara answers: It is Rav Naḥman who stated his opinion in accordance with the individual opinion of Rabbi Yosei, contrary to the majority opinion. As we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yosei says: The grape bud, i.e., a cluster of grapes in its earliest stage, immediately after the flowers drop from the vine, is prohibited due to orla because it is already considered a fruit. However, the Rabbis disagree with him, explaining that fruit at that stage is not considered fruit. Rav Shimi of Neharde’a strongly objects to this: Do the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yosei with regard to the fruits of all other trees besides grapes, that even in the very first stage of ripening, they are considered fruit? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: From when may one no longer chop down trees during the Sabbatical Year, as he thereby damages the fruit? Beit Shammai say: In the case of all the trees, from when the blossoms fall and fruit begins to emerge in its earliest stage. And Beit Hillel say: There is a distinction between different types of trees. The carob trees may not be chopped down from when they form chains of carobs; and the vines, from when the grapes form kernels and grow slightly; and olive trees, from when they blossom; and all other trees may not be chopped down from when they produce fruit. And Rav Asi said: It is an unripe grape, it is a grape kernel, it is a white bean, i.e., their legal status is the same. Before this is explained, the Gemara expresses astonishment: Does it enter your mind that the grape is at any stage a white bean? Rather, say: The size of an unripe grape is equivalent to the size of a white bean. In any case, whom did you hear that said: An unripe grape, yes, is considered fruit, while a grape bud, no, it is not considered fruit? Wasn’t it the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yosei? And it is taught that, according to the Rabbis, it is prohibited to chop down all other trees from when they produce fruit. This indicates that unripe dates have the same status as ordinary dates. Rather, the Gemara retracts its previous answer and explains that Rabbi Elai chopped down a palm tree with stunted dates, which never ripen on the tree. It was permitted to chop down the tree because the dates can be ripened only after they are removed from the tree. The Sages taught: One may eat grapes during the Sabbatical Year until the grapes on the vine branches in the place called Okhel have ceased. And if there are grapes elsewhere later than those, one may continue eating grapes on their basis, as the Sages’ statement is merely based on the assumption that the grapes in Okhel are the last to remain in the field, but the halakha is not specific to them. Similarly, one may eat olives until the final olives have ceased on the trees in Tekoa. Rabbi Eliezer says: One may eat olives until the final olives have ceased on the trees in Gush Ḥalav. At what point is the fruit considered to have ceased? At the point that a poor person will go out to search for fruit and find, neither in the tree’s branches nor in the proximity of its trunk, a quarter-kav of olives that have fallen. One may eat dried figs until the unripe figs of Beit Hini have ceased. Rabbi Yehuda said: The unripe figs of Beit Hini were mentioned only with regard to tithes, not with regard to the Sabbatical Year. As we learned in a mishna: The unripe figs of Beit Hini and the dates of Tovyana, both of which never completely ripen but are nonetheless edible, one is obligated to tithe them. We learned in the mishna: One may eat dates in all of Judea until the last palm tree in Tzoar has ceased producing dates. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One may continue eating dates based on those between the palm branches; but one may not continue eating on the basis of those between the thorn branches. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from that which was taught in a different baraita: One may eat from the grapes until Passover; from the olives, until the festival of Assembly, i.e., Shavuot; from the dried figs, until Hanukkah; and from the dates, until Purim. And Rav Beivai said: Rabbi Yoḥanan transposes the last two. According to his version of the baraita, one may eat dried figs until Purim and dates until Hanukkah. This is inconsistent with the previous statement that dates may be eaten until those in Tzoar have ceased. The Gemara resolves this contradiction: Both this time and that time are one period. The first Sage designated the deadline in terms of the place where dates grow, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel designated the deadline in terms of the dates. And if you wish, say instead that it is taught explicitly: And if there are fruits elsewhere later than those, one may continue eating on their basis. This indicates that the places and the times mentioned are merely indicators, but that the prohibition depends on actual conditions in the field. The Gemara continues: It was taught in a baraita that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A good sign for mountains is that gallnut oaks, used in the preparation of ink, grow there. A good sign for valleys is palm trees. A good sign for streams is reeds. A good sign for the plain is a sycamore tree. And although there is no proof for these indicators, there is an allusion to the matter in the verse, as it is stated: “And the king made silver to be in Jerusalem like stones, and he made cedars to be as the sycamore trees in the plain” (I Kings 10:27). The Gemara elaborates on this baraita: A good sign for mountains is gallnut oaks, a good sign for valleys is palm trees. What purpose is served by these signs? The practical difference of these signs pertains to the halakha of first fruits. As we learned in a mishna: One may bring first fruits only from the seven species and only from the highest quality fruit. Therefore, one may not bring first fruits from palm trees that grow in the mountains. Since the mountains are not a suitable location for palm trees, the dates grown there are inferior. Similarly, one does not bring first fruits from produce, i.e., from wheat and barley, that grow in the valleys, because mountain fruits do not grow there properly. A good sign for streams is reeds. The case where this sign makes a practical halakhic difference is with regard to the rough dried-up stream mentioned in the Torah. When a corpse is found between two towns and the murderer cannot be identified, the Torah states that a calf’s neck is broken in a rough stream. The baraita teaches that growing reeds identify the spot as a stream. A good sign for the plain is a sycamore tree. The Gemara explains that the case where this sign makes a practical difference is with regard to buying and selling. If one stipulates that he is buying land in the plains, it is defined as an area where sycamore trees grow. The Gemara notes: Now that you have arrived at this practical halakhic difference with regard to assessing the quality of land for the purpose of transactions, all the signs can be understood as pertaining to buying and selling as well, to identify valleys and mountainous regions. MISHNA: Apropos different local customs discussed in the first mishna in this chapter, this mishna discusses various halakhot with regard to which there are different customs. In a place where the people were accustomed to sell small livestock to gentiles, one may sell them. In a place where the people were not accustomed to sell them due to certain concerns and decrees, one may not sell them. However, in every place, one may sell to gentiles neither large livestock, e.g., cows and camels, nor calves or foals, whether these animals are whole or damaged. The Sages prohibited those sales due to the concern lest the transaction be voided or one side reconsider, creating retroactively a situation where a Jew’s animal performed labor for the gentile on Shabbat in violation of an explicit Torah prohibition. Rabbi Yehuda permits the sale of a damaged animal because it is incapable of performing labor. Ben Beteira permits the sale of a horse for riding, because riding a horse on Shabbat is not prohibited by Torah law. The mishna cites another custom related to Passover. In a place where people were accustomed to eat roasted meat on Passover evenings, outside of Jerusalem or after the Temple was destroyed, one may eat it. In a place where people were accustomed not to eat outside Jerusalem, one may not eat it. GEMARA: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said that it is prohibited for a person to say in modern times: This meat is for Passover, due to the fact that one appears to be consecrating his animal as his Paschal lamb, and he thereby eats consecrated items outside the permitted area. Rav Pappa said: This prohibition against saying: This is for Passover, applies specifically to meat, which is similar to consecrated meat; however, with regard to wheat, no, it does not apply. In that case, it is clear that one is saying that the flour be watched for Passover. The Gemara asks: And with regard to meat is that not the case? Is it really prohibited to say that meat is for Passover? The Gemara raises an objection. Rabbi Yosei said: Theodosius [Todos] of Rome, leader of the Jewish community there, instituted the custom for the Roman Jews to eat kids roasted [mekulas] whole with their entrails over their heads on the evenings of Passover, as was the custom in the Temple. The Sages sent a message to him: If you were not Theodosius, an important person, we would have decreed ostracism upon you, as it appears as if you are feeding Israel consecrated food, which may be eaten only in and around the Temple itself, outside the permitted area. The Gemara asks about the terminology used here: Could it enter your mind that this meat was actually consecrated meat? That was certainly not the case. Rather, say instead: Doing so is akin to feeding Jews consecrated meat outside the permitted area, as due to its resemblance to the Paschal lamb it could be misleading. The Gemara analyzes this statement: A goat roasted whole, yes, it is prohibited; a goat not roasted whole, no, it is not prohibited. This contradicts Rav, who prohibited roasting even ordinary meat. The Sages say that this is the distinction: With regard to a goat roasted whole, there is no difference if one said it is for Passover, and there is no difference if one did not say it is for Passover. In either case, it looks like a sacrifice and it is prohibited. With regard to a goat not roasted whole, if one specified that it is for Passover, yes, it is prohibited because it appears that he is consecrating it as a sacrifice. However, if one did not specify that it is for Passover, no, it is not prohibited, as there is no need for concern. Rav Aḥa teaches this baraita about Theodosius in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Sheshet strongly objected to this: Granted, according to the one who learns it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, it works out well. However, according to the one who teaches it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, does it work out well? Didn’t we learn in a mishna about a dispute with regard to one who consecrated an item for a purpose for which it was unsuited, e.g., a case where one sought to bring a meal-offering of barley, although meal-offerings may be brought only from wheat? In that case, the Rabbis say he is required to bring a meal-offering of wheat because in the first part of his statement he vowed to bring a meal-offering. Rabbi Shimon exempts him from any obligation, as in his opinion, he did not donate in the manner typical of donors. In other words, Rabbi Shimon relates to the statement: A meal-offering of barley, as a single entity. Since no meal-offering of that kind exists, one is not required to bring an offering at all. Similarly, with regard to Passover, since one can consecrate only a living animal as a sacrifice and cannot consecrate meat as a sacrifice, if one declares: This meat is for Passover, it is in no way similar to consecrating an animal, and the meat has no sanctity. Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And according to the one who teaches it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, does it work out well? Didn’t Rava say: With regard to a meal-offering of barley, Rabbi Shimon stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: A person is also held accountable for the conclusion of his statement. The Sages disagreed with regard to the halakhot of consecration in a case where one consecrates an animal for two objectives in the same statement, e.g., as both a burnt-offering and a peace-offering. According to Rabbi Meir, one is held accountable for the beginning of his statement. Since he mentioned the burnt-offering first, the animal assumes the status of a burnt-offering. However, Rabbi Yosei says that one’s entire statement is significant, and that the animal is consecrated for two sacrifices. The owner must wait until the animal becomes blemished, redeem it, and use the money to purchase a burnt-offering and a peace-offering. Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with Rabbi Yosei’s opinion concerning a barley meal-offering. He maintains that one is held accountable not only for his first expression, i.e., that it is a meal-offering, but also for his second expression, i.e., that it is of barley. In that case, the second part of his statement negates the first part. What, is it not concluded from the fact that Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, Rabbi Yosei also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that if one did not donate in the manner typical of donors, his act is meaningless? If that is the case, then any difficulty for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon would be similarly difficult for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara rejects this: No, although Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, Rabbi Yosei does not hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. A dilemma was raised before the Sages with regard to the above incident. Was Theodosius of Rome a great man in terms of his Torah scholarship, and the Sages refrained from ostracizing him in deference to the Torah that he studied? Or, was he a violent man who could not be punished due to his local influence? Come and hear: This was also taught by Theodosius of Rome: What did Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah see that led them to deliver themselves to the fiery furnace for sanctification of the name of God during the rule of Nebuchadnezzar rather than worship idols under duress? They drew an a fortiori inference on their own from the plague of frogs in Egypt. With regard to frogs, which are not commanded concerning the sanctification of the name of God, it is written: “And the river shall swarm with frogs, which shall go up and come into your house, and into your bedchamber, and onto your bed, and into the houses of your servants, and upon your people, and into their ovens and kneading bowls” (Exodus 7:28). When are kneading bowls found near the oven? You must say that it is when the oven is hot. If in fulfilling the command to harass the Egyptians, the frogs entered burning ovens, all the more so, we, who are commanded concerning the sanctification of the name of God, should deliver ourselves to be killed in the fiery furnace for that purpose. Apparently, Theodosius taught Torah in public, which indicates that he was a great man. Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said: Theodosius was one who cast the profits from merchandise into the purse of Torah scholars. He would lend them money and enter into partnership with them so they could open businesses, and that is praiseworthy, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Anyone who casts merchandise into the purse of Torah scholars is rewarded and sits in the heavenly academy, as it is stated: “For in the shadow of wisdom, is the shadow of money” (Ecclesiastes 7:12). One who provides Torah scholars with money will merit being with them in the shadow of wisdom. MISHNA: The mishna discusses additional differences between local customs. In a place where people were accustomed to kindle a lamp in the house on Yom Kippur evenings, one kindles it. In a place where people were accustomed not to kindle a lamp, one does not kindle it. However, even in a place where the custom is not to kindle lamps in houses, one kindles in synagogues and study halls, in deference to these places. Similarly, lamps should be kindled in dark alleyways, so people will not be hurt, and next to the sick. GEMARA: It was taught in the Tosefta: Both in a place where the Sages said to kindle and in a place where they said not to kindle, they both intended to achieve the same objective, i.e., to distance people from sin, as conjugal relations are prohibited on Yom Kippur. Those who said that one kindles a lamp believe that because people do not engage in relations while a lamp is lit, the lamp will discourage intimacy. Those who maintain the opposite believe that spouses who are unable to see each other will not be tempted to engage in conjugal relations, and therefore it is preferable not to have a lamp lit on Yom Kippur. Rav Yehoshua said that Rava taught: “Your people are all righteous, they shall inherit the land forever; the branch of My planting, the work of My hands, in which I glory” (Isaiah 60:21). Both in a place where the Sages said to kindle and in a place where they said not to kindle, they intended only to achieve the same objective, fulfilling a mitzva. Even though different places have different customs, the Jewish people all aspire to sanctity. On the topic of kindling a lamp for Yom Kippur, the Gemara discusses a related point. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One should recite the blessing over fire: Who creates the lights of fire, only at the conclusion of Shabbat, since the conclusion of Shabbat is the time of its original creation. A certain Elder said to him, and some say it was Rabba bar bar Ḥana who said: That is correct; and so said Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara relates: Ulla was riding on a donkey and going along, and Rabbi Abba was going along on his right and Rabba bar bar Ḥana on his left. Rabbi Abba said to Ulla: Is it true that you said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that one recites the blessing over fire only at the conclusion of Shabbat, not at the conclusion of Yom Kippur, since the time of its original creation is the conclusion of Shabbat? Since Ulla never transmitted that statement, he understood that it must have been Rabba bar bar Ḥana who heard it from Rabbi Yoḥanan and transmitted it when he came from Eretz Yisrael. Ulla turned around and looked angrily at Rabba bar bar Ḥana for misquoting Rabbi Yoḥanan. Still, Ulla said nothing. However, Rabba bar bar Ḥana understood what had happened and said to him: I did not say anything about that matter; rather, what I said was about that which the reciter of the tannaitic literature taught in a baraita before Rabbi Yoḥanan in which Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: With regard to Yom Kippur that occurs on Shabbat, even in a place where they said not to kindle a lamp on Yom Kippur, one kindles in deference to Shabbat. Rabbi Yoḥanan answered after him and completed the statement: And the Rabbis prohibit kindling a lamp even when Yom Kippur occurs on Shabbat. Ulla said to Rabbi Abba: Let it be that Rabbi Yoḥanan indeed made this statement. Rav Yosef read the following verse about this event: “Counsel in the heart of man is like deep water; but a man of understanding will draw it out” (Proverbs 20:5). Counsel in the heart of man is like deep water; that is a reference to Ulla, who had a thought but did not articulate it. But a man of understanding will draw it out; that is a reference to Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who understood the allusion even though it was not articulated. The Gemara asks: And in accordance with whose opinion do Ulla and Rabba bar bar Ḥana hold, leading them to reject Rabbi Abba’s statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion? The Gemara answers: They hold in accordance with that which Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefet said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One recites the blessing over fire both at the conclusion of Shabbat and at the conclusion of Yom Kippur. And that is how the people act. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was previously taught: One recites a blessing over fire only at the conclusion of Shabbat and not at the conclusion of Festivals or Yom Kippur, since the conclusion of Shabbat is the time of its original creation. And once he sees it, he recites the blessing immediately. Rabbi Yehuda says: One does not recite the blessing immediately; rather, he waits and arranges and recites the blessings over fire and spices over the cup of wine that accompanies the recitation of havdala. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. How does Rabbi Yoḥanan explain the baraita? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Yoḥanan said that one recites the blessing at the conclusion of Yom Kippur, it is referring to fire that rested on Yom Kippur, i.e., fire for which no prohibition was involved in its kindling, either because it was kindled before Yom Kippur or because it was kindled in a permitted manner, e.g., for a dangerously ill person. There, where Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the blessing is recited only at the conclusion of Shabbat, it is referring to fire generated from wood and from stones after Shabbat, similar to the primordial fire, which was created at the conclusion of Shabbat. It was taught in one baraita: With regard to fire generated from wood and stones, one recites a blessing over it; and it was taught in one other baraita: One does not recite a blessing over it. This apparent contradiction is not difficult. Here, where the baraita states that one recites a blessing, it is referring to the conclusion of Shabbat. There, where the baraita states that one does not recite a blessing, it is referring to the conclusion of Yom Kippur. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would distribute the blessings over the fire and the spices, reciting each when the opportunity arose. Rabbi Ḥiyya would collect them, reciting all the blessings at the same time in the framework of havdala. Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: Even though Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi distributes them and recites each blessing at his first opportunity, he repeats the blessings and arranges and recites them over the cup of wine in order to discharge the obligation of his children and the members of his household. The Gemara stated that fire was originally created at the conclusion of Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Was fire created at the conclusion of Shabbat? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Ten miraculous phenomena were created in heaven on Shabbat eve during twilight, and were revealed in the world only later? They were: Miriam’s well, and the manna that fell in the desert, and the rainbow, writing [ketav], and the writing instrument [mikhtav], and the tablets of the Ten Commandments, and the grave of Moses, and the cave in which Moses and Elijah stood, the opening of the mouth of Balaam’s donkey, and the opening of the earth’s mouth to swallow the wicked in the incident involving Korah. Rabbi Neḥemya said in the name of his father: Even the fire and the mule, which is a product of crossbreeding, were created at that time. Rabbi Yoshiya said in the name of his father: Even the ram slaughtered by Abraham in place of Isaac, and the shamir worm used to shape the stones for the altar, were created at that time. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even the tongs were created at this time. He would say: Tongs can be fashioned only with other tongs, but who fashioned the first tongs? Indeed, the first pair of tongs was fashioned at the hand of Heaven. An anonymous questioner said to him: It is possible to fashion tongs with a mold and align it without the need for other tongs. Indeed, the first tongs were a creation of man. In any event, fire was originally created before Shabbat, not at the conclusion of Shabbat. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This baraita is referring to our fire, and that baraita is referring to the fire of Gehenna. The Gemara explains: Our fire was created at the conclusion of Shabbat, but the fire of Gehenna was created on Shabbat eve. The Gemara proceeds to ask: Was the fire of Gehenna created on Shabbat eve? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Seven phenomena were created before the world was created, and they are: Torah, and repentance, and the Garden of Eden, and Gehenna, and the Throne of Glory, and the Temple, and the name of Messiah. The Gemara provides sources for the notion that each of these phenomena was created before the world was. Torah was created before the world was created, as it is written: “The Lord made me as the beginning of His way, the first of His works of old” (Proverbs 8:22), which, based on the subsequent verses, is referring to the Torah. Repentance was created before the world was created, as it is written: “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever You had formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, You are God,” and it is written immediately afterward: “You return man to contrition; and You say: Repent, children of man” (Psalms 90:2–3). The Garden of Eden was created before the world was created, as it is written: “And God planted the Garden of Eden in the east [mikedem]” (Genesis 2:8). The term: In the east [mikedem] is interpreted in the sense of: Before [mikodem], i.e., before the world was created. Gehenna was created before the world was created, as it is written: “For its hearth is ordained of old” (Isaiah 30:33). The hearth, i.e., Gehenna, was created before the world was created. The Throne of Glory and the Temple were created before the world was created, as it is written: “Your Throne of Glory on high from the beginning, in the place of our Sanctuary” (Jeremiah 17:12). The name of Messiah was created before the world was created, as it is written in the chapter discussing the Messiah: “May his name endure forever; his name existed before the sun” (Psalms 72:17). The name of Messiah already existed before the creation of the sun and the rest of the world. This baraita states that Gehenna was created before the world was created and not during twilight before the first Shabbat. They say in answer: The void of Gehenna was created before the world, but its fire was created on Shabbat eve. The Gemara asks: And was its fire created on Shabbat eve? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: The fire that the Holy One, Blessed be He, created on the second day of the week will never be extinguished, as it is stated: “And they shall go forth, and look upon the carcasses of the men who have rebelled against Me; for their worm shall not die, nor will their fire be extinguished; and they shall be an abhorrence to all flesh” (Isaiah 66:24)? And Rabbi Bana’a, son of Rabbi Ulla, said: Why doesn’t the verse state: That it was good, at the end of the second day of the week of Creation, as it does on the other days? It is because on that day the fire of Gehenna was created. And Rabbi Elazar said that even though: That it was good, was not stated with regard to the creations of the second day, He later included it on the sixth day, as it is stated: “And God saw all that He had done and behold, it was very good” (Genesis 1:31). Rather, the void of Gehenna was created before the world was created, and its fire was created only on the second day of the week. And the thought arose in God’s mind to create our fire on Shabbat eve; however, it was not actually created until the conclusion of Shabbat, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says: The thoughts of two phenomena arose in God’s mind on Shabbat eve, but were not actually created until the conclusion of Shabbat. At the conclusion of Shabbat, the Holy One, Blessed be He, granted Adam, the first man, creative knowledge similar to divine knowledge, and he brought two rocks and rubbed them against each other, and the first fire emerged from them. Adam also brought two animals, a female horse and a male donkey, and mated them with each other, and the resultant offspring that emerged from them was a mule. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and says that the first mule was in the days of Anah, as it is stated: “And these are the children of Zibeon: Aiah and Anah; this is Anah who found the mules in the wilderness, as he fed the donkeys of Zibeon his father” (Genesis 36:24). The interpreters of Torah symbolism [ḥamurot] would say: Anah was the product of an incestuous relationship, and as a result he was spiritually unfit to produce offspring. Therefore, he brought an example of unfitness, i.e., an animal physically unfit to produce offspring, into the world, as it is stated: “These are the sons of Seir the Horite, the inhabitants of the land: Lotan, and Shoval, and Zibeon, and Anah” (Genesis 36:20). And it is also stated: “And these are the sons of Zibeon: Aiah and Anah” (Genesis 36:24). One verse describes both Anah and Zibeon as sons of Seir, meaning that they are brothers, while the other verse describes Anah as Zibeon’s son. Rather, this teaches that Zibeon cohabited with his mother, the wife of Seir, and fathered Anah from her. He is called Seir’s son although in fact he was the offspring of Seir’s son and Seir’s wife. The Gemara asks: And perhaps there were two people named Anah, one the son of Zibeon and the other the son of Seir? Rava said: I will state a matter that even King Shapur did not state. And who is this King Shapur? This cannot be a reference to Shapur, king of Persia; rather, it must be an epithet for someone else. He is Shmuel, whose legal rulings were accepted by the public like the edicts of a king by his subjects. Some say a different version, that it was Rav Pappa who said: I will state a matter that even King Shapur did not state. And who is he that Rav Pappa is referring to by the epithet King Shapur? He is Rava. The verse said: “This is Anah who found the mules,” indicating that he is the same Anah mentioned initially in the earlier verse. The Sages taught: Ten phenomena were created on Shabbat eve during twilight, and they were: Miriam’s well, and manna, and the rainbow, writing, and the writing instrument, and the tablets, the grave of Moses, and the cave in which Moses and Elijah stood, the opening of the mouth of Balaam’s donkey, and the opening of the mouth of the earth to swallow the wicked in the time of Korah. And some say that even Aaron’s staff was created then with its almonds and its blossoms. Some say that even the demons were created at this time. And some say that even the garment of Adam, the first man, was created at this time, as it is stated: “And God made for Adam and his wife garments of skins and clothed them” (Genesis 3:21). Apropos the list of items created during twilight, the Gemara cites that the Sages taught: Seven matters are concealed from people, and they are: The day of death; and the day of consolation from one’s concerns; the profundity of justice, ascertaining the truth in certain disputes; and a person also does not know what is in the heart of another; and a person does not know in what way he will earn a profit; and one does not know when the monarchy of the house of David will be restored to Israel; and when the wicked Roman monarchy will cease to exist. The Sages taught on a similar note: The thoughts of three matters arose in God’s mind to be created, and if they did not arise in His thoughts, by right they should have arisen in His thoughts, as they are fundamental to the existence of the world. God created a world in which a corpse rots, so that it requires burial and the family does not continually suffer by seeing the corpse; that the deceased are forgotten from the heart, and the sense of pain and loss diminishes with time; and that grain will rot so that it cannot be hoarded forever, and therefore one must sell his produce. And some say: He instituted that currency will circulate so that people will accept money as a method of payment. MISHNA: This mishna continues the previous discussion of customs. In a place where people were accustomed to perform labor on the Ninth of Av, one performs labor. In a place where people were accustomed not to perform labor, one does not perform labor. And in all places Torah scholars are idle and do not perform labor on the Ninth of Av, due to the mourning over the Temple’s destruction. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to the Ninth of Av, a person should always conduct himself as a Torah scholar and refrain from performing labor. GEMARA: Shmuel said: The only communal fast in Babylonia during which all the stringencies of a communal fast are observed is the Ninth of Av. The Gemara asks: Is that to say, based on the parallel he drew between them, that Shmuel holds that the Ninth of Av is as stringent as communal fast days, in that during twilight on the Ninth of Av all activities prohibited on the Ninth of Av are prohibited? But didn’t Shmuel say: During twilight of the Ninth of Av all activities prohibited on the Ninth of Av are permitted, and the Sages did not decree any prohibitions during this time? And if you say that Shmuel holds: With regard to every communal fast, during twilight those activities considered to be afflictions are permitted, didn’t we learn in a mishna with regard to a public fast day: One may eat and drink while it is still day? The Gemara analyzes this statement: What does the expression: While it is still day, come to exclude? What, isn’t it to exclude twilight of a communal fast day, when these activities are prohibited? The Gemara rejects this: No, it is to exclude the time after dark, when these afflictions are certainly in effect. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this baraita supports Shmuel’s opinion: The only difference between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur is that with regard to this, Yom Kippur, its uncertainty is prohibited, as eating and drinking on Yom Kippur is prohibited by Torah law, whereas with regard to that, the Ninth of Av, its uncertainty is permitted, as the afflictions of the Ninth of Av are rabbinic decrees. The Gemara explains the support for Shmuel’s opinion: What is the meaning of the expression: With regard to that, the Ninth of Av, its uncertainty is permitted? Is it not referring to twilight, with regard to which there is uncertainty whether it is day or night? Apparently, it is permitted to eat during twilight on the Ninth of Av. The Gemara rejects this: No, it is as Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said in a different context: It is referring to uncertainty with regard to the determination of the first day of the new month, which would require observance of the Festival for two days. Here, too, the baraita is referring to uncertainty with regard to determination of the first day of the new month. Since the Ninth of Av is a fast of rabbinic origin, there is no requirement to observe two days. Rava taught: Pregnant women and nursing women fast and complete the fast on the Ninth of Av in the manner that they fast and complete the fast on Yom Kippur, and during twilight on the Ninth of Av it is prohibited to eat or drink. And they likewise said so in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say that? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: The Ninth of Av is not like a communal fast decreed to pray for rain? What, isn’t it referring to the matter of twilight? Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that it is permitted to eat and drink during twilight on the Ninth of Av. The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to performing labor, which is prohibited on the Ninth of Av, in contrast to other fasts. The Gemara expresses surprise: It is referring to performing labor? We already learned explicitly in the mishna: In a place where people were accustomed to perform labor on the Ninth of Av, one performs labor; in a place where people were accustomed not to perform labor, one does not perform labor. Apparently, the prohibition against performing labor on the Ninth of Av depends on local custom and is not an outright prohibition. And even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel only said that one may conduct himself as a Torah scholar and refrain from performing labor because when one sits and does not perform labor, it does not appear as presumptuousness on his part. It does not create the impression that he actually considers himself a Torah scholar because others may simply think that he has no work to do. However, in terms of prohibiting the performance of labor, he does not prohibit performing labor on the Ninth of Av. Rather, what is the meaning of the expression: The Ninth of Av is not like a communal fast? It was stated with regard to the closing prayer. On a communal fast day there are four prayers, and on Yom Kippur there are five prayers, but on the Ninth of Av there are only three prayers, like an ordinary weekday. But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: If only a person would continue to pray throughout the entire day? This indicates that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, a person may recite additional prayers if he so chooses. The Gemara answers: There, on a communal fast day, it is a requirement to recite four prayers; here, on the Ninth of Av, reciting additional prayers is optional according to Rabbi Yoḥanan. And if you wish, say instead: What is the meaning of the expression: The Ninth of Av is not like a communal fast? It is with regard to the twenty-four blessings that are recited on a communal fast, as six blessings were added to the eighteen blessings of the daily Amida prayer. On the Ninth of Av one recites only the standard eighteen blessings. Rav Pappa said: What is the meaning of the phrase: The Ninth of Av is not like a communal fast? It comes to teach a stringency. There are different types of communal fasts for rain. The first three fasts are the least stringent; the next three are more stringent; and the final seven fasts are the most stringent of all. The statement teaches that the Ninth of Av is not like the first fast days, which are more lenient in several respects; for example, they do not begin during twilight. Rather, it is like the final fast days, when eating and performing labor are prohibited during twilight. The Gemara raises an objection: Didn’t we already learn that the only difference between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur is that with regard to this, Yom Kippur, its uncertainty is prohibited, because eating and drinking on Yom Kippur are prohibited by Torah law, whereas with regard to that, the Ninth of Av, its uncertainty is permitted? What is the meaning of the expression referring to the Ninth of Av: Its uncertainty is permitted? Is it not referring to its twilight, contrary to the statement of Rav Pappa? The Gemara rejects this. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said in a different context: No. It is uncertainty with regard to the determination of the first day of the new month. There is no requirement to observe a second day of the Ninth of Av. By inference, with regard to all other matters this and that are equal. The Gemara comments: This statement supports the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said: It is prohibited for a person to extend his finger into water on the Ninth of Av, just as it is prohibited for him to extend his finger into water on Yom Kippur. The Gemara raises an objection: The only difference between the Ninth of Av and a communal fast is that on this day, a communal fast, performance of labor is prohibited, and on that day, the Ninth of Av, performance of labor is permitted in a place where people are accustomed to perform labor. By inference, with regard to all other matters this and that are equal. However, with regard to a communal fast, it was taught in a baraita: When the Sages said that bathing is prohibited, they said it only with regard to washing one’s entire body, but with regard to washing one’s face, one’s hands, and one’s feet in increments, the Sages did not say that it was prohibited. Apparently, with respect to washing, the Rabbis were stricter with regard to the Ninth of Av than they were with regard to a communal fast. Rav Pappa said: The tanna is teaching a series of leniencies. He taught only those aspects in which the Ninth of Av is more lenient than a communal fast. He did not teach those aspects in which it is more stringent. There was no attempt made to enumerate all the differences. It was stated in the mishna: And in all places Torah scholars are idle and do not perform labor on the Ninth of Av, and according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel one should always conduct himself like a Torah scholar in this regard and refrain from performing labor. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that we are not concerned about presumptuousness when a person conducts himself like a Torah scholar? And conversely, do the Rabbis hold that we are concerned about presumptuousness? Didn’t we hear them say the opposite? As we learned in a mishna: With regard to the recitation of Shema on one’s wedding night, the Rabbis said that if a groom wishes to recite Shema on the first night despite his exemption, he may do so. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not everyone who wishes to assume the reputation of a God-fearing person may assume it, and consequently not everyone who wishes to recite Shema on his wedding night may do so. Their opinions in that mishna appear contrary to their opinions in the current mishna. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed in one of the sources. Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: Do not reverse either text, as it is possible to resolve the difficulty in another manner. The contradiction between the statement of the Rabbis here and the statement of the Rabbis there is not difficult. Here, on the Ninth of Av, since everyone is performing labor and he is not performing labor, his idleness is conspicuous and appears like presumptuousness. However, there, in the case of reciting Shema on one’s wedding night, it does not appear like presumptuousness, as everyone is reciting Shema and he is also reciting it with them. Similarly, the contradiction between the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel here and the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel there is not difficult. There, in the case of reciting Shema on one’s wedding night, it is that we require concentration, and it is clear to all that he is unable to concentrate because of his preoccupation with the mitzva that he must perform. Therefore, if he recites Shema it appears like presumptuousness. It is as though he is announcing: I am able to concentrate although others in my situation are not. However, here, by not performing labor on the Ninth of Av it does not appear like presumptuousness, as people say: It is because he has no labor to perform. Go out and see how many idle people there are in the marketplace, even on days when it is permitted to perform labor. MISHNA: Apropos the discussion of performing labor on Passover eve, differences in other customs were cited. And the Rabbis say: In Judea, people would perform labor on Passover eves until midday, and in the Galilee people would not perform labor on Passover eve at all. With regard to performing labor on the night before Passover eve, the night between the thirteenth and fourteenth of Nisan, Beit Shammai prohibit performing labor, and Beit Hillel permit doing so until sunrise. GEMARA: The Gemara asks with regard to the mishna: Initially, at the beginning of the chapter, the tanna taught that in certain places there is merely a custom not to perform labor, and yet ultimately, in this latest mishna, he taught that according to the opinion of Beit Shammai, it is prohibited to perform labor. Apparently, performance of labor is not dependent on custom but is actually prohibited. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is not difficult, since that first mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and this current mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said: In Judea they would perform labor on Passover eves until midday, and in the Galilee they would not perform labor at all. Rabbi Meir said to him: What proof do you cite from Judea and the Galilee to the discussion here? Rather, in a place where people were accustomed to perform labor, one performs labor, and in a place where people were accustomed not to perform labor, one does not perform labor. The Gemara analyzes this baraita: From the fact that Rabbi Meir is speaking about custom, by inference, Rabbi Yehuda is speaking about a prohibition against performing labor in the Galilee. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda hold that performance of labor on the fourteenth is permitted everywhere other than the Galilee? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to one who is weeding a field on the thirteenth of Nisan and a stalk of grain was uprooted in his hand, he plants it in a muddy place so that it will take root before the omer offering is brought on the sixteenth of Nisan? It will then be permitted to eat the grain after the omer offering is brought. However, one should not plant it in a dry place, as it will not take root there immediately. If it begins to sprout only after the omer offering is brought, that grain will remain prohibited until after the following year’s omer offering is brought. From Rabbi Yehuda’s statement it can be inferred that if a person was weeding on the thirteenth of Nisan, yes, this is the halakha; however, on the fourteenth of Nisan, no, one may not replant the stalk of grain. Now, we learned that Rabbi Yehuda said: Any graft that does not take hold within three days will no longer take hold. If it could enter your mind that performing labor on the fourteenth is permitted, why do I need this halakha to be taught specifically with regard to the thirteenth? It would have been a greater novelty had he taught the halakha with regard to a case that occurs on the fourteenth. Aren’t there three days remaining for grain planted on the fourteenth to take root before the omer offering, i.e., the fourteenth of Nisan, the fifteenth of Nisan, and part of the sixteenth of Nisan? Rava said: They taught this halakha of replanting a stalk of wheat with regard to the Galilee; as mentioned in the baraita, Rabbi Yehuda says that in the Galilee they do not perform labor at all. The Gemara further asks: Isn’t there the night between the thirteenth and the fourteenth of Nisan, during which according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, labor is permitted even in the Galilee, which is the halakha? Rabbi Yehuda could have taught the halakha with regard to weeding on the night before the fourteenth. Rav Sheshet said: Rabbi Yehuda said this in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who prohibit performing labor that night. Rav Ashi said: There is no reason to suggest implausibly that Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, contrary to the accepted halakha. Actually, Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel. However, he did not teach the case about the night before the fourteenth of Nisan because it is not the typical manner of people to weed at night. It is virtually impossible to identify weeds in the dark. Ravina said: Actually, it can be explained that Rabbi Yehuda is referring to Judea. With regard to a plant taking root, we state only once the principle: The legal status of part of the day is like that of the entire day, but we do not state twice the principle: The legal status of part of the day is like that of the entire day. When discussing a plant that was replanted on the fourteenth, in the tally of three days, the legal status of part of both the fourteenth and the sixteenth cannot be like that of entire days. A plant takes root after a fixed amount of time, and this is not affected by formalistic halakhic principles like: The legal status of part of the day is like that of the entire day. MISHNA: Rabbi Meir says: With regard to any labor that one began before the fourteenth of Nisan, he may complete it on the fourteenth before midday. However, one may not begin to perform that labor from the outset on the fourteenth, even if he is able to complete it before midday. And the Rabbis say: The practitioners of only three crafts are permitted to perform labor until midday on Passover eve, and they are: Tailors, barbers, and launderers, whose work is needed for the Festival. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Even shoemakers are permitted to work on the fourteenth. GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Was it with regard to labor for the purpose of the Festival that we learned in the mishna that Rabbi Meir permits completing labor on the fourteenth, but labor that is not for the purpose of the Festival may not even be completed? Or perhaps it was with regard to labor that is not for the purpose of the Festival that we learned that Rabbi Meir permits completing labor on the fourteenth, but with regard to labor that is for the purpose of the Festival, we may even initiate it. Or perhaps, with regard to both labor that is for the purpose of the Festival and labor that is not for the purpose of the Festival, completing, yes, it is permitted, but initiating, no, it is prohibited. Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma from that which we learned: However, one may not begin work from the outset on the fourteenth, even if it is a small belt, or even a small hairnet. What is the meaning of the term even in this context? Isn’t it that even with regard to those items that are for the purpose of the Festival, completing, yes, it is permitted, but initiating, no, it is prohibited? And by inference, with regard to labor that is not for the purpose of the Festival, we may not even complete labor that was begun previously. This supports the first possibility cited above. The Gemara rejects this answer: No; actually this means that even labor that is not for the purpose of the Festival we may also complete, in accordance with the third possibility above. And what is the meaning of the term even? It is that this halakha applies even to these items, a belt and a hairnet, which are small; as it could enter your mind to say: Since they are small and their initiation is their completion, let us even initiate their manufacture on the fourteenth ab initio. Therefore, it teaches us that even with regard to this type of labor, initiating is prohibited. This baraita does not provide an unequivocal resolution to the dilemma. Come and hear the resolution to the dilemma from another source from another source. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to any labor that is for the purpose of the Festival, one completes it on the fourteenth. When is that the case? It is when he initiated the labor prior to the fourteenth. However, if he did not initiate the labor prior to the fourteenth, he should not initiate it on the fourteenth, even if it is only manufacturing a small belt or even a small hairnet. The Gemara analyzes this: When it is for the purpose of the Festival, yes, one may complete this labor. However, when it is not for the purpose of the Festival, no, one may not complete it, in accordance with the third possibility above. The Gemara rejects this analysis: Actually, the same is true; we may also complete the task even when it is not for the purpose of the Festival. And this comes to teach us that even when it is for the purpose of the Festival, completing a labor, yes, one may do so, but initiating a labor, no, one may not, in accordance with the third aforementioned possibility. Come and hear yet another resolution to the dilemma. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to any labor that is for the purpose of the Festival, one may complete it on the fourteenth, and if it is not for the purpose of the Festival, it is prohibited to complete it. And one may perform labor on Passover eves until midday in a place where people were accustomed to do so. The Gemara infers: In a place where people were accustomed to perform labor, yes, one may do so. However, in a place where people were not accustomed to perform labor, no, one may not do so. And learn from it that for the purpose of the Festival, yes, one may perform labor. However, if it is not for the purpose of the Festival, no, one may not do so, in accordance with the first aforementioned possibility. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this is so. It was stated in the mishna that the Rabbis say: The practitioners of only three crafts are permitted to perform labor until midday on Passover eve. It was taught in explanation of their opinion: The tailors may perform labor on Passover eve, as a layperson is permitted to sew in his usual manner during the intermediate days of the Festival. Since this type of labor is permitted during the intermediate days, when the prohibition against labor is more stringent than on Passover eve, one may be lenient on Passover eve as well. Barbers and launderers, may perform labor on Passover eve, as one who arrives from a country overseas or one who leaves prison who did not have time to cut their hair or launder their clothing before the Festival may cut their hair and wash their clothing on the intermediate days of the Festival. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: Shoemakers may also perform their labor, because Festival pilgrims may repair their shoes during the intermediate days of the Festival. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do the Rabbis and Rabbi Yosei disagree? The Gemara answers: One Sage, Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, holds: We learn the halakha with regard to the initiation of labor from the halakha with regard to the conclusion of labor; if it is permitted to repair shoes, it is also permitted to initiate their production. And one Sage, the Rabbis, holds: We cannot learn the halakha with regard to the initiation of labor from the halakha with regard to the conclusion of labor; therefore, although it is permitted to repair shoes, it is prohibited to produce new ones. MISHNA: This mishna continues the discussion of the halakhot of Passover eve. One may place eggs under hens on the fourteenth of Nisan so that the birds will brood until the eggs hatch. And if a hen fled from brooding, one may restore it to its place. And if a brooding hen died, one may place another in its stead. Similarly, one may sweep dung from beneath the legs of an animal on the fourteenth of Nisan. And during the intermediate days of the Festival one may clear it to the sides. Similarly, one may take vessels to the craftsman’s house for repair and bring others from there even though they are not for the purpose of the Festival. GEMARA: Now, the mishna stated that placing a brooding hen to sit on eggs is permitted; is it necessary to mention that restoring a hen to its brooding place is permitted? Abaye said: In the last clause of the mishna we have arrived at the halakhot of the intermediate days of the Festival, when placing a hen to sit on eggs is prohibited, yet one may nevertheless restore a hen that fled, as failure to do so will cause him to incur a loss. On the fourteenth of Nisan, one may even place a hen to brood ab initio. Rav Huna said: They taught this halakha that one may restore the hen to the eggs only when it is within three days of its rebellion, when the hen fled from its place, as the heat has not yet completely dissipated from the hen, so that restoring the hen to its place to resume its brooding will be effective; furthermore, this halakha applies only if it is also at least three days after the hen began sitting, when failure to restore the hen to sit on the eggs will cause the eggs to be totally ruined, as on the one hand they are no longer edible, and on the other hand the chick in the egg is only partially formed. However, if it is more than three days after its rebellion, when its heat has completely dissipated, or within three days from when it began sitting, when failure to restore the hen to sit on the eggs will not yet cause the eggs to be totally ruined, one may not restore the hen to sit on the eggs. Rabbi Ami said: Even within three days from when it began sitting, one may restore the hen to sit on the eggs. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do Rav Huna and Rabbi Ami disagree? The Gemara explains: One Sage, Rav Huna, holds that with regard to a major loss, the Sages were concerned about the eggs being completely ruined, and therefore one may restore the hen to its place only if it had already sat on the eggs for three or more days. With regard to a minor loss of being forced to sell at a discount the unhatched eggs that were incubated for less than three days, they were not concerned. And one Sage, Rabbi Ami, holds that with regard to a minor loss, they were also concerned, and therefore the Sages permitted one to restore the hen to its place during the intermediate days of the Festival. It was stated in the mishna: One may sweep the dung from beneath the legs of an animal on the fourteenth of Nisan. The Sages taught in greater detail in the Tosefta: With regard to the dung in a courtyard, one may clear it to the sides, and with regard to the dung that is in the barn and in a courtyard, one may take it out to the garbage dump. The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult. On the one hand, you said: With regard to the dung in a courtyard, one may clear it to the sides, from which it may be inferred that one may not take it out to the garbage dump. And then it was taught in the Tosefta: With regard to the dung that is in the barn and in a courtyard, one may take it out to the garbage dump. Abaye said: This is not difficult. Here, where the Sages permitted taking out the dung to the garbage dump, it refers to the fourteenth of Nisan. There, where they permitted only moving it to the sides, it refers to the intermediate days of the Festival. Rava said: Both this case and that case refer to the intermediate days, and this is what it is saying: In an ordinary courtyard one may only move the dung to the sides; however, if the courtyard becomes as filthy as a barn, one may take out the dung to the garbage dump. It was stated in the mishna: One may take vessels to the craftsman’s house for repair and bring others from there. Rav Pappa said: Rava tested us. We learned in the mishna: One may take vessels to the craftsman’s house for repair and bring others from there even if they are not for the purpose of the Festival. He raised a contradiction from that which we learned: One may not bring vessels from a craftsman’s house, and if he is concerned lest they be stolen, he may move them to another courtyard belonging to the craftsman, but not to his own house. And we answered: This is not difficult. Here, where one may bring vessels from the craftsman’s house, it is referring to the fourteenth of Nisan. There, where one may not bring them, it is referring to the intermediate days of the Festival. And if you wish, say instead that this and that are referring to the intermediate days, and nevertheless, this is not difficult. Here, where one may not bring them home, it is referring to a case where he trusts that the craftsman will return the items; there, where it is permitted to take the vessels home, it is referring to a case where he does not trust him. As it was taught in the following baraita: One may bring vessels from the house of a craftsman, such as a jug from the house of a potter, or a cup from the house of a glassmaker, but one may bring neither wool from the house of a dyer nor other vessels from the house of a craftsman that are not for the purpose of the Festival. And if the craftsman has nothing to eat, one gives the craftsman his payment on the intermediate days of the Festival and leaves the item with him. And if he does not trust that the craftsman will deliver the items, he leaves them in the adjacent house. And if he is concerned lest the item be stolen, he may bring them to his house surreptitiously. The Gemara asks: You have resolved the issue of bringing items from a craftsman’s house, but taking items to his house is difficult, as it was taught: One may not bring, and all the more so one may not take items to be repaired. Therefore, the Gemara rejects the second answer and concludes: Rather, it is clear as we answered initially, i.e., the baraita refers to the intermediate days and the mishna refers to Passover eve. MISHNA: The mishna continues the discussion of the halakhot of Passover eve, along with other local customs. Six actions were performed by the Jewish residents of Jericho, contrary to common practice. With regard to three, the Sages reprimanded them, and with regard to three, the Sages did not reprimand them. And these are the ones with regard to which they did not reprimand them: The residents of Jericho would graft palm trees the entire day on the fourteenth of Nisan; and they would bundle Shema, as explained in the Gemara; and they would harvest and pile grain before the omer offering was brought. And these are the ones with regard to which the Sages reprimanded them: They would permit the use of consecrated branches of carob or sycamore trees. This refers to trees whose branches were cut and consecrated for Temple upkeep, which subsequently sprouted new branches; and they would eat fallen fruit from beneath palm trees that shed fruit that had fallen on Shabbat; and they would designate the produce in the corner for the poor in a field of vegetables, which is exempt from this obligation even by rabbinic law. And the Sages reprimanded the people of Jericho for doing these three things. GEMARA: Apropos the people of Jericho, who were reprimanded for some of their actions and not reprimanded for others, the Gemara cites a similar baraita. The Sages taught: King Hezekiah performed six actions. With regard to three of them, the Sages of his generation conceded to him; and with regard to three of them, the Sages did not concede to him. Due to King Hezekiah’s father’s wickedness, he dragged the bones of his father Ahaz on a bier of ropes and did not afford him the respect due to a king, and the Sages conceded to him. He ground the copper snake that Moses fashioned in the desert because Israel worshipped it, and the Sages conceded to him. He suppressed the Book of Cures, and they conceded to him. And with regard to three actions, the Sages did not concede to him. He cut off the doors of the Sanctuary and sent them to the King of Assyria, and they did not concede to him because he thereby demeaned the Temple. He sealed the waters of the upper Gihon stream, diverting its water into the city by means of a tunnel, and they did not concede to him, because he harmed the local populace in the process and should have relied upon God (Me’iri). He intercalated the year, delaying the advent of the month of Nisan during Nisan, and they did not concede to him. The Gemara explains that he declared the first of Nisan to be the thirtieth of Adar and only then intercalated the year (see II Chronicles 30:2). We learned in the mishna: They would graft palm trees the entire day of the fourteenth of Nisan. The Gemara asks: How did they perform this grafting? Rabbi Yehuda said: They brought fresh myrtle, strong beer made from the fruit of the laurel tree, and barley flour that was cast into a vessel, and forty days has not passed since it was ground. They boiled them together and poured the mixture into the core of the palm tree. And for any tree standing within four cubits of that tree, if they did not perform this treatment with it, it would immediately wither because the tree that received the treatment would grow faster at the expense of the surrounding trees. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said: They placed a branch of a male palm tree on the female, and by doing so the female tree would yield fruit. We learned in the mishna that the residents of Jericho would bundle Shema. The Gemara asks: What does it mean that they bundled Shema? How did they do so? Rabbi Yehuda said that they recited: “Hear Israel: The Lord is our God, the Lord is One” (Deuteronomy 6:4), and they would not pause between words. Rava said: They would pause between words, but instead of reciting this verse in the proper manner: “That which I command you today, shall be on your heart” (Deuteronomy 6:5), pausing after the word today; they would say: Today shall be on your heart, inferring: Today it will be on your heart, and tomorrow it will not be on your heart. The Sages taught in the Tosefta: How would they bundle Shema? They recited: “Hear Israel, the Lord is our God the Lord is One,” without pausing; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: They paused, but they would not recite: Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom for ever and ever. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that we recite that passage: Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom for ever and ever, even though it does not appear in the Torah? The Gemara answers: We recite it in accordance with that which Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish interpreted homiletically. As Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said that it is written: “And Jacob called his sons and said, Gather around and I will tell you what will occur to you in the end of days” (Genesis 49:1). Jacob wanted to reveal to his sons when the complete redemption would arrive at the end of days (see Daniel 12:13), but the Divine Presence abandoned him, rendering him unable to prophesy. He said: Perhaps the Divine Presence has abandoned me because, Heaven forfend, one of my descendants is unfit, as was the case with my grandfather Abraham, from whom Ishmael emerged, and like my father Isaac, from whom Esau emerged. His sons said to him: Hear Israel, our father, the Lord is our God, the Lord is One. They said: Just as there is only one God in your heart, so too, there is only one in our hearts. At that moment Jacob our father said in praise: Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom for ever and ever, as all his children were righteous. The Rabbis said: What should we do? Shall we recite this verse? But Moses our teacher did not say it in the Torah as part of Shema. Shall we not recite it? But Jacob said it. In order to resolve this dilemma they established that this passage should be recited surreptitiously. Rabbi Yitzḥak said that the school of Rabbi Ami said: This is analogous to the daughter of a king who smelled the fragrance of the dried spices stuck to the bottom of the pot and craved to eat them. What can she do? If she tells her servants to give it to her, she will be disgraced, as the dried spices are a contemptible food. However, if she does not say she wants to eat them, she will endure suffering. Her servants began to bring them to her surreptitiously. One should conduct himself in that manner in similar cases of uncertainty. Rabbi Abbahu said: The Sages instituted that the people should recite it aloud due to the grievance of the heretics. It was instituted to prevent the heretics from claiming that the Jews are surreptitiously reciting inappropriate statements. The Gemara adds: In Neharde’a, where there are no heretics, they recite it surreptitiously even now. The Sages taught a related matter in the Tosefta: The people of Jericho performed six actions, three in keeping with the will of the Sages and three against the will of the Sages. And these are what they did in keeping with the will of the Sages: They would graft palm trees the entire day of the fourteenth of Nisan; and they would bundle Shema; and they would harvest grain before the omer offering was brought. And these are what they did against the will of the Sages: They would pile the harvest before the omer; and they would make breaches in the walls of their gardens and their orchards to feed fallen fruit to the poor during drought years, so that the poor could take the fruit that had fallen on Shabbat and Festivals; and they would permit the use of consecrated branches of carob and of sycamore trees. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: It is inaccurate to formulate it in that manner, as if they acted in keeping with the will of the Sages, all people would do so, not only the residents of Jericho. Rather, formulate it in this manner: Both these three acts and those three were performed against the will of the Sages. With regard to three the Sages reprimanded them; and with regard to three the Sages did not reprimand them. Since one could contend that the latter are permitted and the people of Jericho had already performed them, the Sages chose not to reprimand them. And these are what they did for which the Sages did not reprimand them: They would graft palm trees the entire day; and they would bundle Shema; and they would harvest and pile grain before the omer offering was brought. And these are what they did for which the Sages reprimanded them: They would permit the use of consecrated branches of carob and of sycamore trees; they would make breaches in the walls of their gardens and orchards on Shabbat and Festivals, in order to feed the poor fallen fruit during drought years; and they would designate for the poor the produce in the corner in a field of vegetables. And the Sages reprimanded them for those actions. The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda maintain that this harvest performed by the residents of Jericho was against the will of the Sages? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: The people of Jericho would harvest before the omer, in keeping with the will of the Sages, and they would pile the grain before the omer, against the will of the Sages, but the Sages did not reprimand them? Whom did you hear that said: Reprimanded and did not reprimand? It is Rabbi Yehuda, as Rabbi Meir uses the terminology: In keeping with the will and against the will. And yet, Rabbi Yehuda is teaching in the baraita that they would harvest in keeping with the will of the Sages. The Gemara answers with a question: And according to your reasoning, these three activities listed in the mishna, for which the Sages did not reprimand them, are actually four: Grafting palms, bundling Shema, harvesting, and piling. They are not three activities, as stated. Rather, delete harvest from the mishna here. Harvesting should not be listed with the activities for which the Sages did not reprimand them. It was taught in the baraita: They would permit the use of consecrated branches of carob and of sycamore trees. The Gemara explains the reason: They said: Our fathers consecrated only the tree trunks, and therefore we can permit the consecrated branches that have grown from the branches of carob and of sycamore trees. The Gemara explains that we are dealing with the growth that came afterward, and they hold in accordance with the one who said: There is no misuse of consecrated property with regard to subsequent growth. And the Rabbis hold: Although there is no misuse of consecrated property, in any case, there is a prohibition. It was taught in the baraita that the residents of Jericho created breaches so that during years of famine the poor could take fruit that fell on Shabbat and Festivals. Ulla said that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: This dispute between the residents of Jericho and the Sages is with regard to dates no longer attached to the tree that fell onto the upper palm branches [makhebedot]. The Sages hold: We issue a decree to prohibit taking these dates, lest one climb the tree and pick dates still attached to the tree. And the people of Jericho hold: We do not issue a decree lest one climb the tree and pick dates. However, with regard to dates that fell onto lower palm branches [keifin], everyone agrees that taking fruit from these branches is permitted. Rava said to Ulla: But aren’t they set-aside, as they are not prepared as food before Shabbat, since they fell from the tree on Shabbat itself? Any item prohibited during twilight on Shabbat eve remains prohibited throughout day, even if circumstances change. And if you say: These dates are not set-aside, since they are fit for consumption by domestic ravens, which can fly and gather the dates still attached to the tree, now, an item that is prepared for use for a person is not considered prepared for use for dogs, as we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: If the animal was alive and not a carcass on Shabbat eve, it may not be fed to dogs on Shabbat because it was not expressly prepared for that purpose. Is food prepared for ravens considered prepared for a person? While it was alive, the animal was prepared for human consumption during twilight; nevertheless, it is prohibited to feed its carcass to the dogs. Ulla said to Rava: Yes, an item that is prepared for consumption for a person is not prepared for dogs, as any item that is fit for a person, one does not remove it from his thoughts; it remains exclusively for the use of a person. However, an item that is prepared for ravens is also prepared for the use of a person. Any item that is fit for the use of a person, his thoughts are upon it. Although initially it is available only to ravens, a person is prepared to eat any food that becomes available to him. That is Ulla’s version of the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said a different version of that which Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: This dispute is with regard to dates that fell onto the lower palm branches, as the Sages hold: An item that is prepared for ravens is not prepared for a person. And the people of Jericho hold: An item that is prepared for ravens is prepared for a person. However, with regard to the dates on upper branches, everyone agrees that they are prohibited, as we issue a decree lest one climb the tree and pick dates. We learned in the mishna: And the residents of Jericho would designate for the poor the produce in the corner [pe’a] in a field of vegetables. The Gemara asks: And aren’t the people of Jericho of the opinion of that which we learned in a mishna: A principle was stated with regard to the produce of the corner of the field: Anything that is food, and is protected, and grows from the ground, and is gathered as one, and one brings it in to store for preservation is obligated in the halakhot of the produce in the corner of the field? The Gemara elaborates on each criterion in the mishna. Anything that is food; this comes to exclude the after-growths of woad and safflower. These plants are used as dyes and not for food. Therefore, one need not designate the produce in the corners from them. And is protected; this comes to exclude ownerless crops. And grows from the ground; this comes to exclude truffles and mushrooms, which, unlike other plants, do not draw sustenance from the ground. And is gathered as one; this comes to exclude the fig tree, whose fruit is gathered throughout an extended period, as the figs do not ripen together. And one brings it in to storage for preservation; this comes to exclude vegetables, which cannot be stored for lengthy periods. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Here we are dealing with turnip heads, which can be stored for an extended period of time, and they disagree with regard to bringing it in to storage for preservation by means of another substance. Turnips are not stored alone. In order to store them, one preserves them in vinegar or a similar substance (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). One Sage, the residents of Jericho, holds: Storage by means of another substance such as vinegar is considered storage. And one Sage, i.e., the Sages, holds: It is not considered storage, and therefore one need not designate produce from the corner of the field from turnips. The Sages taught: Initially, they would designate the produce in the corner of the field from turnips and cabbages. Rabbi Yosei says: They would do so even from leeks [kaflot]. And it was taught in another baraita: They would designate the produce in the corner of the field from turnips and leeks. Rabbi Shimon says: They would do so even from cabbages. Let us say that there are three tanna’im who dispute this point: The two unattributed opinions, each of which is referring to two vegetables, and the opinion common to Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon that includes all three vegetables. The Gemara rejects this: No, there are only two tanna’im who dispute the point, and the first tanna whose opinion appears before the opinion of Rabbi Shimon is Rabbi Yosei. And the first tanna whose opinion appears before the opinion of Rabbi Yosei is Rabbi Shimon. And what is the meaning of the word even in both their statements? They agree with regard to the first vegetable, turnips; however, they disagree with regard to the second, and replace it with another vegetable. The Gemara cites an episode from the Tosefta. The Sages taught: The son of a man named Bohayan designated for the poor the produce in the corner in a garden of vegetables, and his father Bohayan found the poor laden with vegetables and standing at the opening of the garden on their way out. He said to them: My sons, cast the vegetables that you have gathered from upon yourselves and I will give you twice the amount in tithed produce, and you will be no worse off. Not because I begrudge you what you have taken. Rather, it is because the Sages say: One does not designate for the poor the produce in the corner in a garden of vegetables. Therefore, the vegetables that you took require tithing. The Gemara asks: Why was it necessary for him to say to them: Not because I begrudge you what you have taken? It would have been sufficient to offer them tithed produce. The Gemara answers that he said it so they would not say: He is putting us off, taking what we collected now, but later he will not fulfill his commitment. Apropos the people of Jericho, the Gemara relates that powerful people would steal wood from them. The Sages taught: Initially, the priests would place the hides that were flayed from animals consecrated as offerings of the most sacred order, which were given to the priests, in the Parva chamber. In the evening, they would distribute them to the members of the family of priests serving in the Temple that day. And the powerful priests among them would take them by force before they could be distributed. The Rabbis decreed that they would distribute them each Shabbat eve, because then all the families of both priestly watches came and took their part together. All the families from both the watch that was beginning its service and the one ending its service were together when they divided the hides. The powerful priests were unable to take the hides by force. Yet still the prominent priests by virtue of their lineage would take them by force. Due to their prominence, the members of the rest of the watch dared not challenge them. When they realized that there was no equitable distribution, the owners of the sacrifices (Me’iri) arose and consecrated the hides to Heaven so the priests could not take them. The Sages said: Not a few days passed before they had plated the entire sanctuary with golden tablets with the proceeds from the redemption and sale of the hides. These plates were one cubit by one cubit and as thick as a golden dinar. And when the people assembled for the Festival pilgrimage they would remove the tablets and place them on a stair of the Temple Mount so that the pilgrims would see that the craftsmanship of the tablets was beautiful and without flaw [dalam]. Afterward they replaced the tablets in the Sanctuary. It was similarly taught that Abba Shaul says: There were sycamore tree trunks in Jericho, and powerful people would take them from their owners by force. The owners stood and consecrated these trunks to Heaven. It was with regard to these trunks and the branches that grew from them that the residents of Jericho acted against the will of the Sages. With regard to the prominent priests and those like them, Abba Shaul ben Batnit said in the name of Abba Yosef ben Ḥanin: Woe is me due to the High Priests of the house of Baitos, woe is me due to their clubs. Woe is me due to the High Priests of the house of Ḥanin; woe is me due to their whispers and the rumors they spread. Woe is me due to the High Priests of the house of Katros; woe is me due to their pens that they use to write lies. Woe is me due to the servants of the High Priests of the house of Yishmael ben Piakhi; woe is me due to their fists. The power of these households stemmed from the fact that the fathers were High Priests, and their sons were the Temple treasurers, and their sons-in-law were Temple overseers [amarkalin]. And their servants strike the people with clubs, and otherwise act inappropriately. Apropos the critique of several prominent priests, the Gemara relates that the Sages taught: The people in the Temple courtyard all cried four cries, as they were in agreement over various issues (Pardes Rimonim). The first cry was: Leave here, sons of Eli, who defiled God’s Sanctuary (see I Samuel 2:22). Subsequently the priesthood was transferred to the house of Zadok. And an additional cry: Leave here, Yissakhar of Kfar Barkai, who honors himself and desecrates the items consecrated to Heaven. Due to his delicate nature and his disrespect for the Temple service, he would wrap his hands in silk [shirai] and perform the service. This would invalidate the service because the silk was an interposition between his hands and the Temple vessels. Furthermore, his conduct demeaned the Temple service, as he demonstrated that he was unwilling to dirty his hands for it. And the people in the Temple courtyard cried additionally: Lift your heads, O gates, and let the righteous Yishmael ben Piakhi, the student of Pinehas ben Elazar the priest, enter and serve as High Priest, although the members of this family were violent. And the people in the Temple courtyard cried additionally: Lift your heads, O gates, and let Yoḥanan ben Narbbai, the student of Pinkai, enter and fill his belly with meat of offerings consecrated to Heaven, as he is worthy to eat offerings. They said about Yoḥanan ben Narbbai that he and his household would eat three hundred calves, and drink three hundred jugs of wine, and eat forty se’a of doves for dessert. They said: Throughout all the days of Yoḥanan ben Narbbai there was no leftover sacrificial meat in the Temple, as he would make certain that someone ate it. The Gemara asks: What ultimately happened to Yissakhar of Kfar Barkai? They said: The king and the queen were sitting and talking. The king said that goat meat is better food, and the queen said lamb meat is better food. They said: Who can prove which one of us is correct? The High Priest can, as he offers sacrifices all day and tastes their meat. The High Priest had the right to take a portion from any sacrifice offered in the Temple, and therefore was well acquainted with the tastes of different meat. Yissakhar of Kfar Barkai came, and when they asked him this question, he signaled contemptuously with his hand and said: If goat is better, let it be sacrificed as the daily offering. The daily offering is a lamb, proving that its meat is preferable to that of a goat. The king said: Since he not only disagrees with me but has no reverence for the monarchy, as evident from his contempt, sever his right hand. He gave a bribe and the official severed his left hand. The king heard that Yissakhar had deceived him and had the official sever his right hand as well. Rav Yosef said: Blessed is God Who took retribution [mitarpesei] from Yissakhar of Kfar Barkai in this world and did not wait to punish him more severely in the next world. His punishment fit the crime; because he would not dirty his hands with sacrificial blood and was overzealous in keeping his hands clean, both his hands were severed. Rav Ashi said: Yissakhar of Kfar Barkai did not study the Mishna and was an ignoramus who did not know that this halakha is stated explicitly in the mishna. As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Shimon says: Lambs take precedence over goats in every place they are mentioned in the Bible. I might have thought that this is because it is a more select species. Therefore, the verse states: “If he brings a lamb as his offering” (Leviticus 4:32). The Torah passage where bringing a lamb as a sin-offering is discussed appears after the passage describing the sin-offering of a goat. The inconsistent order teaches that both these animals are equal. Ravina said: Yissakhar did not even read the Bible properly, as it is written: “If a lamb” (Leviticus 4:32), “if a goat” (Leviticus 3:12), teaching: If one wishes let him bring a lamb; if one wishes let him bring a goat. There is no clear preference. MISHNA: The daily afternoon offering is slaughtered at eight and a half hours of the day, which is two and a half hours after midday, and is sacrificed, i.e., its offering on the altar is completed, at nine and a half hours of the day. On the eves of Passover, when the Paschal lamb must be offered after the daily offering, the daily offering is sacrificed earlier; it is slaughtered at seven and a half hours and sacrificed at eight and a half hours, whether it occurs during the week or on Shabbat. If Passover eve occurs on Shabbat eve, when the Paschal lamb must be offered even earlier to ensure that it will be roasted before the onset of Shabbat, the daily offering is slaughtered at six and a half hours and sacrificed at seven and a half hours, and the Paschal lamb is offered thereafter. GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived, i.e., that the daily afternoon offering is sacrificed between eight and a half hours of the day and nine and a half hours? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: As the verse concerning the daily offering says: “The one lamb you shall offer in the morning and the second lamb you shall offer in the afternoon [bein ha’arbayim]” (Numbers 28:4). He understands this as follows: The term for afternoon in the verse is a Hebrew phrase, the literal meaning of which is “between [bein] the evenings [arbayim].” In this context, it is referring to the period lasting from when the day begins progressing toward the evening, just after midday, until sunset. Divide this period between two evenings. How? Two and a half hours here constitute one evening, and two and a half hours there constitute another evening, and there is one hour in between to perform the ritual of sacrificing the daily offering. Consequently, the time of the daily offering must be during the hour that begins two and a half hours after midday and ends two and a half hours before sunset. That is the time determined in the mishna. Rava raised an objection: We learned in our mishna that on the eves of Passover the daily offering is slaughtered at seven and a half hours and sacrificed at eight and a half hours, both during the week and on Shabbat. And if it could enter your mind to say that the daily offering must be slaughtered at eight and a half hours by Torah law, how can we do it earlier merely for convenience? Rather, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s source is rejected, and instead Rava said: The mitzva of the daily offering is from when the sun begins to descend westward so that the evening shadows slant eastward, shortly after midday. What is the reason for this? It is because the verse states: In the afternoon [bein ha’arbayim], which we understand to mean from the time that the sun begins to descend westward [ma’arav]. Therefore, on the rest of the days of the year, when there are many voluntary vow offerings and free-will offerings that must be sacrificed, these offerings are brought after the daily morning offering. As the Merciful One says with regard to the daily offering: “The fire on the altar shall be kept burning on it, it shall not be extinguished; and the priest shall kindle wood on it every morning; he shall prepare the burnt-offering upon it and shall cause the fats of the peace-offerings to go up in smoke upon it” (Leviticus 6:5). And the Master said that the phrase: “The fats of the peace-offerings upon it” should be interpreted in the following manner: “Upon it,” i.e., after this daily morning burnt-offering; only then should the priest complete all the other offerings. This teaches that all the other offerings must be sacrificed after the daily morning offering and prior to the daily afternoon offering. Since many offerings must be sacrificed prior to the daily afternoon offering, rather than sacrificing the latter at six and a half hours, as soon as it is permitted to do so, we postpone the offering for two hours, and sacrifice it at eight and a half hours of the day. On the eves of Passover, on the other hand, when there is the Paschal lamb that must be brought after the daily afternoon offering, and sufficient time must be left for the slaughter of the numerous Paschal lambs, we advance the daily afternoon offering one hour and sacrifice it at seven and a half hours. When Passover eve occurs on Shabbat eve, when there is also the roasting of the Paschal lamb, which does not override the Shabbat prohibitions and therefore must be completed before Shabbat, we establish its sacrifice at the earliest time that its halakha allows, at six and a half hours. The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to the daily offering, like its arrangement during the week, so is its arrangement on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: Like its arrangement on Passover eve. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? How is it to be understood? Abaye said: This is what it is saying: With regard to the daily offering, like its arrangement on Passover eve that occurs during the week, when it is slaughtered at seven and a half hours, so is its arrangement on Passover eve that occurs on Shabbat, when it is also slaughtered at seven and a half hours. There is no distinction in this regard between Shabbat and a weekday; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: Like its arrangement on Passover eve that occurs on Shabbat eve, when it is slaughtered at six and a half hours, so is its arrangement when Passover eve occurs on Shabbat, when it is also slaughtered at six and a half hours. Therefore, the mishna that teaches that on Passover eve, the daily offering is slaughtered at seven and a half hours and offered at eight and a half hours, both during the week and on Shabbat, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael. The Gemara seeks to clarify: According to this explanation, with regard to what principle do these tanna’im disagree? The Gemara answers: They disagree about whether or not the additional offerings of Shabbat precede the bowls of frankincense. On Shabbat, in addition to the regular daily rite, additional Shabbat offerings were sacrificed, and the frankincense that had been placed in bowls on the showbread the previous Shabbat and remained there throughout the week was burned on the altar. The dispute is as follows: Rabbi Yishmael holds that the additional offerings precede the bowls. Therefore, the priest sacrificed the additional offerings at six hours, as everyone agrees that the time to sacrifice the additional offerings is at six hours; and he offered the bowls at seven hours; and then he sacrificed the daily offering at seven and a half hours. Rabbi Akiva holds that the bowls precede the additional offerings. Therefore, the priest offered the bowls at five hours, sacrificed the additional offerings at six hours, and sacrificed the daily offering at six and a half hours. Rava strongly objects to this explanation. Is Rabbi Akiva teaching: Like its arrangement on Passover eve that occurs on Shabbat eve? He did not formulate his opinion in this manner; he merely teaches: Like its arrangement on Passover eve. Therefore, the above explanation does not correspond to Rabbi Akiva’s formulation. Rather, Rava said an alternative explanation of the dispute. This is what the baraita is saying: Like the arrangement of the daily offering on an ordinary day during the week, so is its arrangement on Shabbat that occurs on Passover eve. The daily offering is sacrificed at eight and a half hours; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: Like its arrangement on Passover eve that occurs on a weekday, so is its arrangement on Passover eve that occurs on Shabbat, at seven and a half hours. Therefore, the mishna that teaches that the time to sacrifice the daily offering on Passover eve is the same both during the week and on Shabbat is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara asks: According to this explanation, with regard to what point do they disagree? They disagree with regard to the possibility that the meat will become warm and spoil before it is roasted. Rabbi Yishmael holds that we are concerned lest the meat become warm and spoil. As the daily offering is slaughtered earlier on Shabbat, the Paschal lamb is also slaughtered earlier. Since it is prohibited to roast the meat until the conclusion of Shabbat, the concern is that the meat will spoil with the passage of time. And Rabbi Akiva holds: We are not concerned lest the meat become warm and spoil. Therefore, it is possible to slaughter the Paschal lamb earlier, even when Passover eve occurs on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: If, according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, we are not concerned that the meat might spoil, let us sacrifice the daily offering at six and a half hours, as there are many Paschal lambs and no voluntary vow or free-will offerings to be sacrificed. Why, then, should they postpone the daily offering? The Gemara responds that Rabbi Akiva holds: The additional offerings precede the bowls and therefore the priest would sacrifice the additional offerings at six hours, and offer the bowls at seven hours, and then sacrifice the daily offering at seven and a half hours. Rabba bar Ulla strongly objects to this explanation. Does the baraita teach: Like the arrangement of the daily offering during the week, so is its arrangement on Shabbat that occurs on Passover eve; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael? The baraita simply teaches: So is its arrangement on Shabbat. Rava’s explanation also fails to correspond to the wording of the baraita. Rather, Rabba bar Ulla said: The baraita should be understood as referring not to the eve of Passover, but to the rest of the days of the year, and this is what it is teaching: Like its arrangement on an ordinary day during the week, so is its arrangement on an ordinary Shabbat, at eight and a half hours; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, who maintains that there is no distinction at all in this regard between Shabbat and a weekday. Rabbi Akiva says: Like its arrangement on an ordinary Passover eve that occurs on a weekday, at seven and a half hours, so is its arrangement on an ordinary Shabbat. Since no free-will offerings are offered on Shabbat, the daily offering can be sacrificed earlier. And the mishna, which teaches that the daily offering on Passover eve is slaughtered at the same time, whether during the week or on Shabbat, can be said to be in agreement with all opinions, both that of Rabbi Yishmael and that of Rabbi Akiva. According to this explanation, with regard to what principle do these tanna’im disagree? They disagree concerning whether a decree should be issued on account of voluntary vows and free-will offerings. Rabbi Yishmael holds that we issue a decree for Shabbat due to weekdays. During the week, the sacrifice of the daily afternoon offering is postponed until eight and a half hours of the day, due to the voluntary offerings that must be sacrificed before the daily offering. The same should be done on Shabbat, so as to avoid distinctions. And Rabbi Akiva holds that we do not issue such a decree. The Gemara asks: If we do not issue such a decree, why do we postpone the sacrifice of the daily offering until seven and a half hours? Let us sacrifice it at six and a half hours. The Gemara responds: Rabbi Akiva holds that the additional offerings precede the bowls of frankincense. Consequently, the priest sacrifices the additional offerings at six hours, and offers the bowls at seven hours, and sacrifices the daily offering at seven and a half hours. The Gemara raises an objection with regard to these explanations from another baraita which teaches: The daily offering is sacrificed throughout the entire year in accordance with its law. In other words, it is slaughtered at eight and a half hours and sacrificed at nine and a half hours. And on the eve of Passover it is slaughtered at seven and a half hours and sacrificed at eight and a half hours. If Passover eve occurs on Shabbat it is as if it occurred on a Monday, i.e., it is like an ordinary weekday. This indicates that no distinction is made with regard to the eve of Passover, whether it occurs on Shabbat or during the week; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: If the eve of Passover occurs on Shabbat, its arrangement is like its arrangement on the eve of Passover when it is advanced to six and a half hours of the day. Granted, according to the opinion of Abaye, this baraita works out well, as it is consistent with his explanation of the previous baraita. But according to the opinion of Rava, it is difficult. The Gemara responds: Rava could have said to you: Do not say: It is as if it occurred on a Monday. Rather say: It is like an ordinary Monday, and explain the words as follows: If the eve of Passover occurs on Shabbat, no changes are introduced, and the daily offering is sacrificed at the same time that it is sacrificed on an ordinary weekday, at eight and a half hours of the day. The Gemara raises an objection from another baraita: If the eve of Passover occurs on Shabbat, the daily offering is sacrificed in accordance with its arrangement all year long, at eight and a half hours of the day; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: It is sacrificed in accordance with its arrangement on an ordinary Passover eve. Granted, according to the opinion of Rava, this baraita works out well. But according to the opinion of Abaye, it is difficult. Abaye can say to you: Do not say according to Rabbi Yishmael’s statement in the baraita: In accordance with its arrangement all year long. Rather, say: In accordance with its arrangement every year; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. In other words, no distinction is made between the eve of Passover that occurs on Shabbat and the eve of Passover that occurs during the week. The daily offering is sacrificed at seven and a half hours. This is consistent with Abaye’s opinion. According to this explanation, Rabbi Akiva says that the halakha is not so. Instead, the daily offering is sacrificed in accordance with its arrangement on Passover eve that occurs on Shabbat eve. This is the way the baraita must conclude according to Abaye. As the Gemara mentioned previously that the daily morning offering precedes all other sacrifices, it cites a baraita that explains this law. The Sages taught: From where is it derived that no sacrifice shall precede the daily morning offering? The verse states: “And the fire on the altar shall be kept burning on it, it shall not be extinguished; and the priest shall kindle wood upon it every morning, and he shall prepare the burnt-offering upon it and shall cause the fats of the peace-offerings to go up in smoke upon it” (Leviticus 6:5). The Gemara asks: What is the biblical derivation? In other words, how is it derived that the burnt-offering in this verse is referring to the daily morning offering? Rava said: “The burnt-offering,” with the definite article, is referring to the first burnt-offering, i.e., the daily morning offering, which is first both chronologically and in terms of importance. The baraita continues: And from where is it derived that nothing is sacrificed after the daily afternoon offering? The verse states: “And shall cause the fats of the peace-offerings to go up in smoke upon it.” The Gemara again asks: What is the derivation? Abaye said: “Upon it.” Upon, i.e., after, the first burnt-offering, that is, the daily morning offering, may the peace-offerings, i.e., the voluntary vow and free-will offerings, be sacrificed throughout the day. But peace-offerings may not be sacrificed upon, i.e., after, its counterpart, which is the daily afternoon offering. Rava strongly objects to this explanation: If so, say it is peace-offerings that we must not sacrifice after the daily afternoon offering, but burnt-offerings we may sacrifice, since this derivation is referring only to peace-offerings. Rather, Rava said: “The peace-offerings [hashelamim] upon it” should be homiletically interpreted to mean that upon the daily morning offering, rather than after the daily afternoon offering, completes [hashlem] the offering of all other sacrifices. The Sages taught in a baraita: The daily offering precedes the offering of the Paschal lamb, the Paschal lamb precedes the afternoon burning of the incense, and the burning of the incense precedes the lighting of the lamps of the Temple candelabrum. An item, i.e., the Paschal lamb, about which it is stated: “In the evening” and “in the afternoon,” should be sacrificed after an item, the daily afternoon offering, about which it is not stated “in the evening,” but only “in the afternoon.” With regard to the Paschal lamb, the verse says: “You shall sacrifice the Paschal lamb in the evening, at the going down of the sun, at the season in which you came out of Egypt” (Deuteronomy 16:6), and it also says: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6), whereas regarding the daily afternoon offering it only says: “And the second lamb you shall offer in the afternoon” (Numbers 28:4). The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the halakha that the Paschal lamb is offered after the daily afternoon offering is derived from these verses, then the burning of the incense and the lighting of the lamps of the candelabrum should also precede the offering of the Paschal lamb. The item, the Paschal lamb, about which it is stated “in the evening” and “in the afternoon” should be sacrificed after the item about which it is stated only: “And when Aaron lights the lamps in the afternoon he shall burn it, a perpetual incense before the Lord throughout your generations” (Exodus 30:8), which relates to both the burning of the incense and the lighting of the lamps. The Gemara answers: It is different there, in the case of lamps, as the Merciful One explicitly excludes in the Torah the possibility that the lamps will be kindled first by means of the word it [oto], which emphasizes that the lamps are kindled later. The Gemara clarifies: As it was taught in a baraita concerning the verse pertaining to the lamps: “In the tent of meeting, outside of the veil, which is before the testimony, Aaron and his sons shall set it in order from evening to morning before the Lord; it shall be a statute forever to their generations on behalf of the children of Israel” (Exodus 27:21). The phrase “from evening to morning” indicates that you shall allocate the candelabrum its measure of oil, so that it will burn from evening until morning. The baraita continues: Alternatively, the same verse can be interpreted as follows: There is no rite that is valid from evening until morning but this one alone, since all the other rites are performed only during the day. What is the reason that this verse is interpreted to mean that lighting the lamps is the only rite valid from evening until morning? It is because the verse said with regard to the candelabrum: “Aaron and his sons shall set [ya’arokh] it [oto] in order, to burn from evening to morning.” The verse uses the separate word it [oto], rather than a pronominal suffix attached to the word ya’arokh to form the word ya’arkhenu, in order to emphasize that it, the lighting of the candelabrum, is from evening until morning, but no other rite is from evening until morning. And the Torah juxtaposes the burning of the incense to the kindling of the lamps, as it explicitly states that the incense is burned at the time the lamps are kindled: “And when Aaron lights the lamps in the afternoon, he shall burn it, a perpetual incense” (Exodus 30:8). From this it is derived that no other rite is performed in the Temple after burning the incense and lighting the lamps, not even the Paschal lamb. That explains the opinion cited in the previous baraita and its sources. It should, however, be noted that it was explicitly taught in a baraita in accordance with our difficulty and contrary to the opinion cited in the previous baraita: The daily afternoon offering precedes the afternoon burning of the incense, the burning of the incense precedes the lighting of the lamps, and the lighting of the lamps precedes the Paschal lamb. This is proof that this is the correct order: An item, the Paschal lamb, about which it is stated “in the evening” and “in the afternoon” should be delayed until after an item, i.e., the incense and lamps, about which it is stated only “in the afternoon.” The Gemara asks: As already stated, isn’t “it” written in the verse, from which it is derived that lighting the lamps is the final Temple rite of the day? The Gemara answers: This word “it” is necessary, in order to exclude a rite that is performed inside the sanctuary, as opposed to the Paschal lamb, which is sacrificed outside, in the courtyard. The Gemara asks: And what is this rite? The Gemara answers: The burning of the incense. It could have entered your mind to say that since it is written: “And when Aaron lights the lamps in the afternoon he shall burn it” (Exodus 30:8), say that perhaps we should light the lamps first and then we should burn the incense, as the verse does not clearly state which of the two comes first. Therefore, the Merciful One excludes this possibility by use of the word “it,” from which it is derived that no other rite is performed inside the sanctuary after the lamps are kindled. The Gemara asks: However, if that is the halakha, why do I need the phrase “in the afternoon he shall burn it,” which seems to add nothing? The Gemara answers that this is what the Merciful One is saying: This verse does not come to establish the time for lighting the lamps; it comes to teach that at the time when you light the lamps, the incense should already be burning. The Sages taught in a baraita: Nothing may precede the daily morning offering but the morning burning of the incense alone, as it is stated about the burning of the incense: “In the morning, in the morning.” And it is derived that the incense, an item about which it is stated: “In the morning, in the morning,” as it is written: “And Aaron shall burn upon it incense of sweet spices; in the morning, in the morning, when he dresses the lamps, he shall burn it” (Exodus 30:7), should precede an item, the daily offering, about which only one morning is stated: “The one lamb you shall offer in the morning” (Numbers 28:4). And similarly, nothing may be delayed until after the daily afternoon offering but the afternoon burning of the incense, the lighting of the lamps, the offering of the Paschal lamb, and one who lacks atonement on Passover eve, i.e., one who was ritually impure, such as a leper or a zav, and who immersed in a ritual bath to become pure. Such a person is required to bring an offering before he may partake of consecrated food, and he is referred to as one who lacks atonement until he does so. In the event that he neglects to bring his offering before the daily afternoon offering on Passover eve, the Sages instituted a special ordinance to enable him to bring his offering even after the daily offering. He immerses a second time after bringing the offering, thereby becoming fit to eat sacrificial foods, and he eats his Paschal lamb in the evening. Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says that even one who lacks atonement on the rest of the days of the year brings his offering after the daily afternoon offering, and that he immerses and eats sacrificial food from a voluntary offering that he brought during the day, in the evening. The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the first tanna, who permits sacrificing offerings after the daily afternoon offering only for one who lacks atonement on Passover eve, there is good reason for this policy: The positive mitzva of the Paschal lamb, which carries with it the punishment of karet for one who is qualified to bring the Paschal lamb and does not do so, will come and override the positive mitzva of completion. There is a positive mitzva to complete all the offerings before the daily afternoon offering. Failure to fulfill this command certainly does not involve karet, and therefore it is overridden by the more stringent mitzva of the Paschal lamb. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, in what way is the strength of this positive mitzva to eat sacrificial meat greater than the strength of that positive mitzva to complete all the offerings of the day before the daily afternoon offering? Ravina said that Rav Ḥisda said: Here we are dealing with the special case of a bird brought as a sin-offering. This occurs when the person lacking atonement, e.g., an impoverished leper, is required to bring only a bird as a sin-offering, as in that case the altar has only the bird’s blood. Its meat is not brought on the altar at all; it is eaten by the priests. The mitzva to complete all offerings before the daily afternoon offering applies only to burning fats on the altar. Sprinkling blood onto the altar is permitted even after the daily afternoon offering. Rav Pappa said: Even if you say that we are dealing here with a person lacking atonement who is required to bring an animal sin-offering, it is possible to sacrifice it and still observe the mitzva of completion. How? The sacrificial parts of this sin-offering that are burned on the altar are not burned on the same day. Rather, the priest brings them up and leaves them overnight on the top of the altar. They are then burned the next day after the daily morning offering. If these sacrificial parts are left elsewhere overnight, they become disqualified; however, if they are left overnight on the top of the altar they remain fit. Consequently, it is possible for one to bring his offering and still observe the positive commandment of completion. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there also a guilt-offering that one who lacks atonement, e.g., a leper or a zav, must bring, and only sheep may be brought as a guilt-offering? Granted, according to Rav Pappa, the solution in the case of the guilt-offering is also for the priest to leave it overnight on the top of the altar. However, according to Rav Ḥisda, what can be said, as sprinkling the blood of the guilt-offering alone does not suffice to achieve atonement? They say: According to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, is referring here to one who lacks atonement and who already sacrificed his guilt-offering. He has only to bring a sin-offering, for which he can sacrifice even a bird, in order to achieve full atonement. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there also a burnt-offering among the atonement offerings? And if you say that the failure to sacrifice the burnt-offering does not prevent atonement, wasn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, himself says: Just as failure to sacrifice his sin-offering and his guilt-offering prevents the leper from achieving full ritual purity, so too does failure to sacrifice his burnt-offering. And if you say, in an attempt to answer as before, that the baraita here is dealing with a situation in which he already offered his burnt-offering; may his burnt-offering be brought before his sin-offering? Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: It is written concerning one who entered the Temple or ate consecrated food while ritually impure: “And he shall bring them to the priest and he shall offer that which is for the sin-offering first and pinch off its neck close by its head, but shall not divide it” (Leviticus 5:8). To what purpose does the verse state that the sin-offering is first? If it is to teach that this sin-offering should be offered prior to the burnt-offering, it is already stated: “And he shall offer the second as a burnt-offering according to the ordinance” (Leviticus 5:10), and there is no need for two verses. Rather, this is a paradigm and a foundation for the principle that all sin-offerings should precede all burnt-offerings that come with them. In every case, the sin-offering is sacrificed first. And we maintain that this principle is so weighty that even the sin-offering of a bird precedes a burnt-offering of an animal. Rava said: The halakha of the burnt-offering of a leper is different from other sin-offerings and burnt-offerings, as the Merciful One says with regard to the halakhot of a leper: “And the priest shall offer the burnt-offering” (Leviticus 14:20); this is interpreted as referring to the burnt-offering that has already been offered. From here it is derived that the leper achieves atonement even if the standard order is reversed and the burnt-offering is brought before the sin-offering. Rav Shemen bar Abba said to Rav Pappa: According to your opinion, that you said he brings them up and leaves them overnight at the top of the altar, do we stand and perform an action for the priests whereby they may come to a mishap. As they may think that these fats are from offerings brought on that day, and so they may burn them that day, although these fats must be left until the next day. He said to him: Priests are vigilant and may be relied upon to avoid that mistake and to warn their fellow priests to be careful as well. Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana, and some say it Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: But, isn’t it the case that as long as the sacrificial parts of the sin-offering have not been burned on the altar, the priests may not eat the meat? As it was taught in a baraita with regard to peace-offerings: I might have thought that the priests would be permitted to eat the breast and thigh, which are designated for them from the peace-offering, prior to burning the sacrificial parts of the offering on the altar. Therefore, the verse states: “And the priest shall burn the fat upon the altar, and the breast shall be for Aaron and his sons” (Leviticus 7:31). From here it is derived that the priest is first obligated to burn the fat, and only then: “The breast shall be for Aaron and his sons. And, in addition, as long as the priests have not eaten the meat of the offering, the owners of the offering have not achieved complete atonement, as it was taught in a baraita that the verse: “And they shall eat those things with which atonement was made to consecrate them, to sanctify them; but a stranger shall not eat of them for they are sacred” (Exodus 29:33), teaches that the priests eat, and consequently the owners of the offerings achieve atonement. If so, how can one who lacks atonement achieve atonement that day when the priests may not eat the meat of his sin-offering until the sacrificial parts are burned the next day? He said to him: Since it is impossible to complete the offering any other way, due to the positive mitzva of completion, they rendered these sacrificial parts as ones that became ritually impure or were lost. In those cases, it is permitted for priests to eat their portions. As it was taught in a baraita: I might have thought that if the sacrificial parts became ritually impure or were lost, the priests would not be entitled to the breast and thigh, the eating of which ordinarily depends upon burning the sacrificial parts on the altar. Therefore, the verse states: “And the breast shall be for Aaron and his sons” (Leviticus 7:31), which indicates that in any event it is an absolute gift, even if some of the accompanying rites were not performed in the proper manner. Rav Kahana raised a contradiction: It is written in one verse: “Neither may the fat of My festive-offering remain overnight until morning” (Exodus 23:18), which indicates that the fat may not remain overnight and into the morning hours, but it may remain all through the night. However, in another verse it is written: “And he shall burn upon it the fat of the peace-offerings” (Leviticus 6:5), and it is interpreted: Upon it you shall complete all the offerings, which indicates that the fats of all the offerings brought during the day must be burned before the daily afternoon offering. Rav Kahana raised the objection and he resolved it: The verse which indicates that the fat may remain all through the night is referring to fats that were left over after the blood was sprinkled during the day, after the daily morning offering, and there was no opportunity to offer them on the altar before the daily afternoon offering. Although ideally they should be offered on the altar before the daily afternoon offering, if they were left over, they may be offered until morning. Similarly, Rav Safra raised a contradiction before Rav: In one verse it is written: “Neither shall the sacrifice of the feast of Passover be left over until morning” (Exodus 34:25), from which it can be inferred that it may not remain overnight and into the morning hours, but it may remain all through the night. Accordingly, the fats of a Paschal lamb that was slaughtered on a weekday Passover eve may be offered on the altar on the night of the Festival. However, elsewhere it is written: “The burnt-offering of each Shabbat on its own Shabbat in addition to the continual burnt-offering and its libation” (Numbers 28:10), from which it is derived that the burnt-offering of a weekday is not offered on Shabbat, and the burnt-offering of a weekday is not offered on a Festival. Therefore, it should be prohibited to burn the fats of the Paschal lamb on the altar on the Festival, as it is a weekday offering and consequently may not be offered on a Festival. Rav said to him: Rav Abba bar Ḥiyya already raised this contradiction before Rabbi Abbahu, and he answered him: Here, in the verse that says that the fat may not remain overnight and into the morning hours but it may remain on the altar all through the night, we are dealing with a case where the fourteenth of Nisan occurs on Shabbat, as the fats of a Shabbat offering may be sacrificed on the altar on a Festival. It is only in that specific case that the fats of the Paschal lamb may be burned on the night of the Festival. He said to him: Because the fats of Shabbat offerings may be sacrificed on a Festival, shall we arise and say that this verse is written exclusively with regard to the special case of the fourteenth of Nisan that occurs on Shabbat, and not with regard to the standard case? He said to him: Leave the interpretation of this verse alone, since it compels itself to be established as referring exclusively to this special case, because the contradiction needs to be resolved in some manner. MISHNA: The Paschal lamb that the priest slaughtered not for its own purpose, i.e., at the time of slaughter he said that his intent was to slaughter it as a different offering, e.g., a peace-offering or burnt-offering, rather than as a Paschal lamb; or if the priest received the blood, or carried the blood to the altar, or sprinkled the blood on the altar while saying that it was not for the purpose of the Paschal lamb; or if the priest performed the rites both for its own purpose and not for its own purpose; or not for its own purpose and for its own purpose; in all these cases, the Paschal lamb is disqualified. How does one perform the rites for its own purpose and not for its own purpose? It is in a case where the priest said that his intent is for the purpose of the Paschal lamb and for the purpose of a peace-offering. And how does one perform rites not for its own purpose and for its own purpose? It is in a case where the priest says that the offering is for the purpose of a peace-offering and for the purpose of a Paschal lamb. GEMARA: Rav Pappa raised a dilemma: The mishna says: For its own purpose and not for its own purpose. Did we learn in the mishna concerning a case where the priest had both intentions while performing one rite, i.e., he stated both intentions while slaughtering? Or, did we learn in the mishna concerning a case where the priest had the two intentions while performing two rites, i.e., during one rite he said that it was for its own purpose and in another of the four rites he said that it was not for its own purpose? Rav Pappa elaborates on the difference between these two different explanations. Shall we say that we learn in the mishna with regard to one rite, and therefore our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that a person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement? Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Meir disagree in the case of one who says: This animal is a burnt-offering and a peace-offering. Rabbi Yosei says that not only the beginning but also the conclusion of his statement is significant, and the animal has been consecrated as both a burnt-offering and a peace-offering. It is therefore unfit to be offered on the altar; rather, it must be sold when it develops a defect and the money used to purchase animals for both a burnt-offering and a peace-offering. And similarly in the case of our mishna, where the priest says that his intent is for the purpose of a Paschal lamb and for the purpose of a peace-offering, Rabbi Yosei would say that the animal has been slaughtered for both a Paschal lamb and a peace-offering, and is therefore disqualified. For if our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, surely he said: Hold one accountable for the first expression, and what he says after that is of no consequence. Rabbi Meir disagrees with Rabbi Yosei about the case of one who says: This animal is a burnt-offering and a peace-offering, for he maintains that the sacrifice has the status of a burnt-offering. Since the first term that he uttered was burnt-offering, the animal is consecrated as a burnt-offering, and it can no longer become a peace-offering. And similarly in the case of our mishna, where the priest says that his intent is for the purpose of a Paschal lamb and for the purpose of a peace-offering, Rabbi Meir would say that the animal has been slaughtered only for a Paschal lamb and the offering is fit. Or perhaps the mishna meant to teach a case of two rites. During the first rite, one had a particular intent, and during the second rite he had a different intent. Then, even according to Rabbi Meir, who said that in general we hold one accountable for the first expression, this rule applies only in one rite, but in two rites even he concedes that it disqualifies. Since the second statement was made during a different rite, it too is significant. They said: To which part of the mishna does this discussion refer? If we say that the discussion pertains to the case in the mishna of slaughtering an offering first for a different purpose and then for its own purpose, then whether these intentions are verbalized during one rite or during two rites, whether according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir or according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, the offering is disqualified from the first statement, as also Rabbi Yosei holds that a person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement. That does not mean that the final statement is primary but that it too has value and complements the previous one. Therefore, since one initially intended to offer the Paschal lamb for a different purpose, it was immediately disqualified. Rather, the question is concerning the case of slaughtering an animal first for its own purpose and then for a different purpose; what exactly are the parameters of that case? The Gemara cites a series of sources in order to resolve this question. Come and hear a resolution to the question from what is taught in the mishna: A Paschal lamb that one sacrificed for a different purpose, and he received the blood, and carried it to the altar, and sprinkled it for a different purpose, is disqualified. This needs clarification: What exactly are the circumstances? If we say that the case is exactly as it was taught, that these four rites are all performed for a different purpose, why do I need to say that he intended to perform all of them, i.e., the slaughter, receiving of the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling it upon the altar, for a different purpose? The offering has been disqualified from the first improper intention during slaughter. Rather, is this not what the mishna is teaching: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered for a different purpose, or alternatively, he slaughtered it for its own purpose, but received the blood, and carried the blood, and sprinkled the blood for a different purpose, or alternatively, he slaughtered it, and received the blood, and carried the blood for its own purpose, but sprinkled the blood for a different purpose, in all these situations the offering is disqualified? If so, it is a case of different intentions in two rites, and the mishna can also be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara asks: If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: For its own purpose and for a different purpose. The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances? If we say that one had these two intentions during two different rites, that is precisely the meaning of the first clause and there is no need to repeat it. Rather, must we not say that in this part of the mishna, one had both intentions during one rite, and the mishna is according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said that a person is held accountable even for the conclusion of his statement? This proof is refuted: No, actually it is possible to explain that even the latter clause of the mishna is referring to a case in which one has conflicting intentions during two different rites, and the difference between the first clause and the latter clause of the mishna is as follows: The first clause is referring to a case in which one is standing at the time of the slaughter and thinking about slaughtering the animal as a different offering; alternatively, he is standing at the time of the sprinkling of the blood and thinking about sprinkling for a different purpose. The latter clause of the mishna, on the other hand, is referring to a case in which one is standing at the time of the slaughter and thinking about sprinkling for a different purpose. For example, where he said: I am hereby slaughtering the Paschal lamb for its own purpose, but my intent is to sprinkle its blood for a different purpose. And the mishna teaches us a new halakha, that one can intend from one rite to another rite, meaning that one can disqualify an offering through an improper intention about an upcoming rite while performing an earlier rite. And this was the question raised by Rav Pappa on a different occasion. He asked if intent during one rite concerning the performance of a different rite can disqualify an offering. Since our question has not been resolved, it is necessary to bring another proof: Come and hear that which is taught in the last clause of the mishna: Or for a different purpose and for its own purpose, the offering is disqualified. The Gemara analyzes this statement: What exactly are the circumstances? If we say that it speaks about two rites, there is a difficulty: Now that you have already said that if the priest first performed a rite while intending that the offering be for its own purpose, and then performed a rite with the intention that it be for a different purpose, the Paschal lamb is disqualified, is it necessary to say that it is disqualified when the priest first performed a rite while intending that the offering be for a different purpose, and then performed a rite with the intention that it be for its own purpose? It is obvious that the offering is disqualified immediately with the first expression of intent. Rather, isn’t the mishna addressing a case in which the priest has two intentions during one rite? And since the last clause of the mishna talks about one rite, the earlier clause of the mishna must also speak about one rite, and the mishna is according to Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara refutes this proof: No, actually it is possible to explain that the last clause speaks about two rites, and by right it was not necessary to include this case, as it could have been inferred from the previous case. It was included for stylistic considerations: Since the mishna taught the case in which the rites are performed for its own purpose and for a different purpose, it also taught the case in which the rites are performed for a different purpose and for its own purpose. The Gemara again attempts to bring a proof: Come and hear that which is taught in a different mishna: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb with the intent that it be for those who cannot eat it, i.e., for people who physically cannot consume it; or for those who were not registered for it, i.e., for people who did not register in advance for this particular offering; or for uncircumcised or ritually impure people, whom the Torah forbids from consuming the Paschal lamb, it is disqualified. Here, in the mishna cited, it is obvious that one had this intent during one rite, as the mishna explicitly states that he had this intent during the slaughtering. And since the latter clause, which is the next mishna, speaks about one rite, the first clause, which is the current mishna, must also speak about one rite, and it is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. The Gemara refutes this proof. Are the two cases comparable? Need they be exactly parallel? Perhaps this case is as it is, and that case is as it is. The latter clause, the next mishna, speaks about one rite, whereas the first clause, the current mishna, speaks either about one rite and is not according to Rabbi Meir or about two rites and is even according to Rabbi Meir. The Gemara further proposes: Come and hear a solution based on what was taught later in that other mishna: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb with the intent that it be for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is valid. This ruling must be clarified: What exactly are the circumstances? If we say that one had two intentions during two different rites, e.g., he slaughtered it for those who can eat it and sprinkled the blood for those who cannot eat it, then the reason that the sacrifice is valid is that he had the disqualifying intention at the time of the sprinkling, which does not invalidate the offering because there is no intent concerning those who can eat it during the sprinkling. That is, intent to feed the Paschal lamb to those who are unable to eat it invalidates the offering only during the slaughter but not during the sprinkling. But if one had both intentions during one rite, such as the slaughter, during which intent with regard to those who will eat the offering is effective, the sacrifice is disqualified. However, this conclusion is difficult, for we maintain that if only some of those who are to eat the Paschal lamb are unable to do so, such as in this case, the offering is not disqualified. Rather, doesn’t it refer to a case in which one had both intentions during one rite, and nevertheless it is valid? And since the latter clause speaks about one rite, the first clause, the current mishna, must also speak about one rite, and yet the offering is disqualified, because even the conclusion of one’s statement is significant, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. The Gemara refutes this proof as it refuted the previous one: Are the two cases comparable? Perhaps this case is as it is and that case is as it is. There is no reason to equate the cases, as it is possible to say that the latter clause speaks about one rite, whereas the first clause, the current mishna, speaks either about one rite or about two rites. Therefore, there is no conclusive resolution to Rav Pappa’s question. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered on the rest of the days of the year other than the eve of Passover for its own purpose and for a different purpose, what is its status? The Gemara clarifies the two sides of the issue: Does the intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose come and nullify the intent to offer the sacrifice for its own purpose and thereby make it valid, or not? The law is that a Paschal lamb that was slaughtered for a different purpose at a time other than Passover eve attains the status of a peace-offering and is therefore valid. The question raised here is whether or not partial intent to slaughter the animal as a peace-offering rather than as a Paschal lamb suffices to validate the offering. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said: I raised this question in the presence of Rabbi Yirmeya and expressed my opinion: Since intent to offer the sacrifice for its own purpose validates it at its proper time, i.e., on the eve of Passover, and intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose validates it not at its proper time, i.e., the rest of the year, there is room to equate the two situations. Just as intent for its own purpose, which validates it at its proper time, does not nullify the intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose, i.e., if one intends to offer the sacrifice both for its own purpose and for a different purpose it is disqualified, so too, intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose, which validates it not at its proper time, does not nullify the intent to offer the sacrifice for its own purpose, and it is disqualified. It can be concluded from here that whenever one’s thoughts concerning an offering are a combination of validating and disqualifying intentions, the offering is disqualified. And Rabbi Yirmeya said to me: No, this reasoning is not to be relied upon. If you say this rule concerning the intent to offer a Paschal lamb applies when it is sacrificed for a different purpose, it is because this disqualification applies to all offerings, as slaughtering an offering for a purpose other than its own disqualifies all offerings to one extent or another. Therefore, intent for the sacrifice’s own purpose does not nullify intent for a different purpose. But can you necessarily say the same thing about the intent to slaughter a Paschal lamb for its own purpose at other times of the year, a disqualification that does not apply to all offerings but to the Paschal lamb alone? Only the Paschal lamb is disqualified if it is slaughtered for its own purpose not at its proper time, and therefore intent for a different purpose can indeed nullify intent for its own purpose. Rav Dimi’s argument having been refuted, the Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about Rav Dimi’s question? Rava said: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered on the rest of the days of the year with the intent that it be for its own purpose and for a different purpose is valid. The reason for this is as follows: In an otherwise undetermined situation, the animal stands to be offered for its own purpose, for one did not rescind its status as a Paschal lamb either verbally or by intent. But nevertheless, when he slaughters it for a different purpose, it is valid. Apparently, then, the intent to offer the sacrifice for a different purpose comes and nullifies the presumed intent to offer it for its own purpose; the statement that one makes to slaughter the offering as a peace-offering rather than as a Paschal lamb has the power to remove it from its previous status as a Paschal lamb. Accordingly, we should also say that when the priest slaughters the animal both for its own purpose and for a different purpose, the intent to offer it for a different purpose carries more weight and comes and nullifies the stated intent to offer it for its own purpose. Rav Adda bar Ahava said to Rava: Perhaps a case where one explicitly said that he was slaughtering the offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose is different from a case where he did not say this. The proof of this is that if one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it, it is valid, but wherever he slaughters it only for the sake of those who cannot eat it, it is disqualified. Now, why should this be? Surely in an otherwise undetermined situation, the animal stands to be offered for those who can eat it. This indicates that presumed intention cannot be equated with intention that is explicitly verbalized. Rather, a case where one explicitly said that he is slaughtering the animal for those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it is different from a case where he did not say this. So too, a case where he explicitly said that he is slaughtering the offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose is different from a case where he did not say this. Rava said to him: Are the two cases comparable? Granted, there, with regard to the Paschal lamb and the purpose for which it is offered, as long as one did not uproot the animal’s status as a Paschal lamb at the time of slaughter, in an otherwise undetermined situation, it certainly stands to be offered for its own purpose; its standing as a Paschal lamb can be changed only if it is explicitly designated as something else. But here, with regard to a Paschal lamb and the people for whom it is slaughtered, in an otherwise undetermined situation, does it stand to be slaughtered for those who are registered to eat it? This is not the case, for in the instance of every Paschal lamb, there is the possibility that perhaps these will withdraw and others will come and register for it. For we learned in a mishna: People can register for a particular Paschal lamb and withdraw from it until it is slaughtered. Therefore, it is possible that this Paschal lamb will not be suitable for its subscribers at the time of its slaughter, and it makes sense to distinguish between a situation in which one explicitly stated that it is for people who can eat it, in which case it is valid even if he intended it also for people who cannot eat it, and a situation in which he did not make an explicit statement. This is different from slaughtering a Paschal lamb not in its time, for in that case the offering maintains its previous status as a Paschal lamb until its status is explicitly changed through a verbal statement. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to a Paschal lamb that one slaughtered on the rest of the days of the year with a change of owner, i.e., he slaughtered it not for the sake of its original owner, what is its status? Is a change of owner like a change of sanctity? A Paschal lamb whose sanctity is changed to that of a peace-offering now has the status of a peace-offering, and so too, a Paschal lamb that is slaughtered not for the sake of its original owner, an intention that at its proper time would disqualify the sacrifice, now has the status of a peace-offering. And it validates it, for a peace-offering that was slaughtered not for the sake of its original owner is valid. Or, perhaps not, for it remains a Paschal lamb and is disqualified. Rav Pappa said: I raised this question in the presence of Rava and expressed my opinion: Since a change in sanctity invalidates it as an offering in its proper time, as if one intended it in its proper time as a peace-offering it is invalid, and a change in owner, i.e., one intended that the offering be for someone other than its owner, also invalidates it in its proper time, the following analogy is made: Just as a change in sanctity, which invalidates it in its proper time, validates it as an offering after its proper time, a change in owner, which invalidates it in its proper time, also validates it as an offering after its proper time. And Rava said to me: No, this analogy is not to be accepted: If you say this about a change in sanctity, it is because the disqualification it causes is in the offering itself, for the disqualification relates to the very sanctity of the offering, and it applies to all four of the rites, for the disqualification caused by a change in sanctity can occur not only during the slaughter but also during any of the four rites performed with an offering. And furthermore, the disqualification following from a change in sanctity applies after death. If one consecrates an offering and dies, his son must bring the offering in his place, and it can be invalidated through a change in sanctity. Moreover, it applies to communal offerings as it does to the offerings of an individual. However, can you necessarily say the same thing with regard to a change in owner that does not have these characteristics? Its disqualification is not in the offering itself; and it does not apply to all four rites but only to the sprinkling of the blood on the altar; and it does not apply after death, for after the owner has died there is no true owner of the offering, and therefore, if the priest intends to offer it for someone else the offering remains valid; and it does not apply to communal offerings as it does to the offerings of an individual, since it is not possible to have in mind a different owner, as it is owned by the whole community. And even though two of these differences are not fully accurate and can be disputed, as will be explained, two, at least, are accurate. The Gemara explains the lack of accuracy: For what is different about a change in owner that defines its disqualification as not being in the offering itself? Is it that its disqualification is merely due to thought? If so, it is possible to say that a change of sanctity is also merely a disqualification due to thought and not in the offering itself, and therefore there is no real difference. And furthermore, with regard to that which was said, that a change in owner does not apply after death, there is the following difficulty: According to Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami, who said that the disqualification resulting from a change in owner applies after death, so that if the offering of the deceased was brought for a different person, the son of the deceased must bring another offering in his father’s name, what is there to say? However, at least two of these differences are accurate. Rather, Rav Pappa’s suggestion should be rejected, and Rava said: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered on the rest of the days of the year with a change of owner is considered like one that does not have an owner. In other words, it is considered like a Paschal lamb that was slaughtered not for the sake of its owner at its proper time on Passover eve, and it is disqualified. MISHNA: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for people who cannot eat it or for those who did not register in advance to eat it, or if one slaughtered it for people who are uncircumcised or for those who are ritually impure, whom the Torah prohibits from eating the Paschal lamb, it is disqualified. However, if one slaughtered it for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it; for those who have registered for it and for those who have not registered for it; for the circumcised and for the uncircumcised; for the ritually impure and for the ritually pure, it is valid, for a partially invalid intent does not disqualify the offering. If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb before midday it is disqualified, as it is stated: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). If he slaughtered it before the daily afternoon offering it is valid, as long as another person stirs its blood in order to prevent it from congealing until the blood of the daily offering is sprinkled. And if the blood of the Paschal lamb is sprinkled before the blood of the daily offering, it is nonetheless valid, as this change does not disqualify the offering. GEMARA: The Sages taught in the Tosefta: How so the case of slaughtering the Paschal lamb for those who cannot eat it? It is a case where one slaughtered it for the sake of a sick person or for the sake of an old person who is unable to eat even an olive-sized portion of the Paschal lamb. How so the case of slaughtering the Paschal lamb for those who did not register for it? It is a case where one group registered for it, and one slaughtered it for the sake of a different group. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, which are not explicitly written in the Torah, derived? The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And if the household be too little for a lamb, then he and his neighbor who is close to his house shall take one according to the number of the souls; according to every man’s eating you shall make your count for the lamb” (Exodus 12:4). “According to the number of” teaches that the Paschal lamb is slaughtered only for those who have registered for it. Everything is done according to the number of people who have registered before the slaughtering. I might have thought that if he slaughtered it for those who did not register for it, he would be considered as one who has violated a commandment, but nonetheless the offering would be valid after the fact. Therefore, the Torah teaches this law with the double formulation of “according to the number” and “you shall make your count”; the verse repeated it to make this requirement indispensable, so that the offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered for those who did not register for it. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The term “you shall make your count [takhosu]” is Aramaic [Sursi], like one who says to his fellow: Slaughter [kos] me this lamb, to teach that the registration must take place before the slaughtering. We have found a source for the halakha that a Paschal lamb slaughtered for those who have not registered for it is disqualified. But from where do we derive the halakha that it is similarly disqualified if it is slaughtered for those who cannot eat it? The Gemara answers that the verse says: “According to every man’s eating you shall make your count”; those who eat it are juxtaposed, and thereby equated, to those who are registered for it. This teaches that just as the offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered for those who did not register for it, it is likewise disqualified if it is slaughtered for those who cannot eat it. If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for people who are circumcised on condition that uncircumcised people achieve atonement through the sprinkling of its blood, i.e., although the uncircumcised people are prohibited from eating the Paschal lamb, it was his intention that they achieve atonement through the blood of the offering, Rav Ḥisda said: The offering is disqualified. Rabba said: It is valid. The Gemara explains: Rav Ḥisda said it is disqualified because intent that the offering should be for uncircumcised people has sufficient force to disqualify the offering at the time of the sprinkling. Rabba said that it is valid because intent that the offering should be for uncircumcised people can only disqualify the offering during the slaughter and not during the sprinkling. Rabba said: From where do I derive to say this halakha? As it was taught in a baraita: I might have thought that an uncircumcised person would disqualify the other fit members of the group who come with him. And it may be inferred logically to the contrary that he does not disqualify the others: Since lack of circumcision disqualifies a Paschal lamb slaughtered for that person, and similarly, ritual impurity disqualifies it, the following can be said: Just as with ritual impurity, partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity, meaning that if one member of the group for which the offering is slaughtered is ritually impure, the offering is not disqualified for the entire group, so too, with lack of circumcision; partial lack of circumcision was not made to be like full lack of circumcision, meaning that if one member of the group is uncircumcised, the offering is not disqualified as it would be if all members of the group were uncircumcised. Or perhaps go this way and maintain the following: Since lack of circumcision disqualifies the offering, and similarly, intent to eat the offering beyond the allotted time disqualifies the offering, this can be said: Just as if one said at the time of the slaughter that he intended to eat part of the offering beyond the allotted time, partial invalid intent was made to be like intent to eat the entire offering at an invalid time, and the offering is disqualified, so too, with lack of circumcision; partial lack of circumcision was made to be like full lack of circumcision, and the offering is disqualified. Let us see to which it is similar, i.e., which comparison seems more reasonable: Do we derive a matter, namely, the halakha with regard to uncircumcised males, that does not apply to all offerings, from another matter, namely, the halakha with regard to the ritually impure, that does not apply to all offerings, as when it comes to other offerings, one who is ritually impure may send his offering with a proxy and thereby achieve atonement? And the halakha with regard to intent to eat the offering beyond the allotted time, which applies to all other offerings, should not be used to prove anything about our case. Or, perhaps, go this way: We derive a matter, namely, the law with regard to uncircumcised males, for which no allowance is made from its rule, from a matter, namely improper intent with regard to the time, for which no allowance is made from its rule, as there are no exceptions for either of these two disqualifications. And the law with regard to ritual impurity should not be used to prove anything, as there are circumstances in which an allowance is made from its rule. Under certain circumstances it is permitted to offer the Paschal lamb while ritually impure, such as when the entire Jewish people is ritually impure. In order to resolve this issue, the verse states: “This,” as it says: “And the Lord said to Moses and Aaron: This is the ordinance of the Passover: No stranger shall eat of it; but every man’s servant that is bought for money, when you have circumcised him, then shall he eat of it” (Exodus 12:43–44). What is implied from the emphasis of “this”? If you say that it comes to teach that if all the members of the group are uncircumcised the offering is disqualified, but if only part of the group is uncircumcised it is not disqualified, this is derived from the words “and all uncircumcised males,” in the verse: “And all uncircumcised males shall not eat of it” (Exodus 12:48). The amplification indicated by the word all teaches that the offering is invalidated only if all members of the group are uncircumcised. Rather, is this not what it is teaching: The verse states: “And all uncircumcised males,” to teach that only if all members of the group are uncircumcised is the offering disqualified, but if only part of the group is uncircumcised it is not disqualified. And if you say that the same is true of sprinkling the blood of the offering, i.e., that if it is done for a group whose members are all uncircumcised, the offering is in any event disqualified; therefore the verse states: “This,” to restrict application of this law and teach: It is during slaughter that if all members of a group are uncircumcised, the offering is disqualified; but during sprinkling, even if all members of the group are uncircumcised, it is not disqualified. And if you say: What is the leniency of sprinkling such that this intent for a group whose members are all uncircumcised disqualifies the offering only during the slaughter but not during the sprinkling? Rabba’s reasoning is that there is no intent concerning those who may eat of the offering during the sprinkling. Intent to feed the Paschal lamb to those who are unable to eat it invalidates the offering only during the slaughter, but not during the sprinkling. And Rav Ḥisda is of the opinion that, on the contrary, the baraita should be understood in the opposite direction. The verse states: “And all uncircumcised males,” teaching that only if all the members of the group are uncircumcised is the offering disqualified, but if only part of the group is uncircumcised, it is not disqualified. This applies during slaughter; however, during the sprinkling, even if only part of the group is uncircumcised it is disqualified. And if you say that the same is true of sprinkling in that the offering is not disqualified unless all members are uncircumcised; therefore the verse states “this” to restrict the application of this halakha and teach that it is only during slaughter that part of the group does not disqualify the offering, but during the sprinkling even part of the group disqualifies the offering. And if you say: What is the stringency of sprinkling such that part of the group being uncircumcised disqualifies the offering during the sprinkling, but not during slaughter? The answer is that piggul status is established only during sprinkling. The status of piggul applies to an offering when one performs at least one of the rites with the intent that the offering be consumed outside the allotted time, but only if no rite was performed with some other invalid intent, such as intending that the offering be eaten outside its designated place. This can only be confirmed at the time of the sprinkling, which is the last of the four essential rites. Consequently, sprinkling is the rite most likely to disqualify an offering due to improper intent. Rav Ashi strongly objects to this method of interpretation: From where do you derive that this expression “and all uncircumcised males” means that all the members of the group are uncircumcised? Perhaps this expression “and all [kol] uncircumcised males” means that any of its members is uncircumcised. Therefore, the Merciful One says in the Torah: “This,” to teach that the offering is not disqualified unless all of its members are uncircumcised, and there is no difference between slaughtering and sprinkling. Therefore, the dispute between Rabba and Rav Ḥisda must be based on some other proof text and issue. Rather, Rav Ashi said: Rav Ḥisda and Rabba disagree with regard to this verse, which is stated with regard to a different offering: “And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him” (Leviticus 1:4). It is inferred: For him and not for his fellow. One cannot achieve atonement through an offering that has been designated for someone else. Rabba and Rav Ḥisda disagree with regard to the halakhic conclusions that should be drawn from this law. Rabba holds that the law applies to another who is similar to him: Just as he is eligible for atonement through the sprinkling of the blood of this offering, so the law applies to another who is eligible for atonement. This comes to exclude this uncircumcised person, who is not eligible for atonement. Since an uncircumcised person is not fit for the Paschal lamb, slaughtering it for him does not disqualify the offering. And Rav Ḥisda holds that with regard to this uncircumcised person as well, since he is obligated to bring the Paschal lamb, he is considered eligible for atonement through the Paschal lamb. Why is an uncircumcised person seen as obligated to bring the Paschal lamb? Since if he wants, he can make himself fit through circumcision, and the obligation will automatically apply to him. There is a way for him to include himself among those who eat the offering; therefore, he cannot categorically be considered someone who is not eligible for atonement. Consequently, slaughtering the Paschal lamb for him disqualifies the offering. The Gemara challenges this explanation: But does Rav Ḥisda accept this argument of since? Does he maintain that one can discuss a situation that does not exist due to the possibility that the present circumstances might change? But it was said that Rabba and Rav Ḥisda disagree about this as it pertains to the case of one who bakes on a Festival for use during the week: Rav Ḥisda said he is flogged for having violated the Festival by baking in order to eat the food on a weekday; Rabba said he is not flogged. The Gemara explains: Rabba said he is not flogged for the following reason: Since if guests arrive, whatever he bakes will be fit for him to use on the Festival itself, and he will not be guilty of any transgression, now too, although guests have not yet arrived, the food is considered fit for him, and he is not flogged. At the time of the baking, the act was not unequivocally prohibited. Rav Ḥisda said he is flogged; we do not state the principle of since. At first glance, there is an internal contradiction with regard to the opinions of both Rabba and Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara notes: Granted, the apparent contradiction between the first statement of Rabba and the second statement of Rabba is not difficult. Here, in the case of the Paschal lamb whose blood is sprinkled for an uncircumcised person, an action is lacking, as the person must undergo circumcision in order to become eligible to eat from the Paschal lamb. However, there, in the case of one who bakes on a Festival, no action is lacking on the part of the baker. But the first statement of Rav Ḥisda and the second statement of Rav Ḥisda are difficult to reconcile. They say, in answer to this contradiction: When Rav Ḥisda does not accept the principle of since, it is only to be lenient and exempt a person from lashes; however, to be stringent and disqualify the Paschal lamb, he does accept this line of reasoning. Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: The baraita quoted above teaches: Since lack of circumcision disqualifies a Paschal lamb and ritual impurity also disqualifies it, the following comparison applies: Just as in the case of ritual impurity, partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity, so too, in the case of lack of circumcision, partial lack of circumcision was not made to be like full lack of circumcision. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to this ritual impurity, what are the circumstances? If you say that the baraita is referring to the ritual impurity of the people who registered for the offering, then there is a difficulty. For what then is the meaning of the ruling in the baraita that partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity? It means that if there are four or five people who are impure and four or five people who are pure, those who are impure do not disqualify those who are pure. This, however, is difficult, as with regard to lack of circumcision as well, those who are uncircumcised do not disqualify the offering, as we learned in a mishna: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for both circumcised and uncircumcised people, it is valid. What is different about the halakha with regard to impurity, that there it is obvious to him that those who are ritually impure do not disqualify the members of their group who are pure? And what is different about the halakha with regard to lack of circumcision, that there he is in doubt about the halakha? Rather, the baraita must certainly be explained as referring to the impurity of the meat of the offering. And what is the meaning of the ruling in the baraita that partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity? It means that if one of the limbs became impure, that which became impure we burn and the rest we eat. This conclusion is challenged: How did you establish this baraita? It was established as referring to a case of impurity of the meat. If so, say the latter clause of the same baraita as follows: We derive a matter that does not apply to all offerings, the case of uncircumcised men, from a matter that does not apply to all offerings, namely ritual impurity, and the halakha with regard to intent to eat the offering outside the allotted time, which applies to all offerings, should not be used to prove anything about the case at hand. Now, what type of impurity is being discussed here? If we say that it is impurity of the meat, why do you say that it does not apply to all offerings? This halakha certainly applies to all offerings. Rather, it is obvious that the clause under discussion relates to impurity of the people who are to eat from the offering. And what is the meaning of the statement that it does not apply to all offerings? It means that with regard to all offerings, an uncircumcised person and one who is ritually impure cannot eat from the offering, but nonetheless they can send their offerings with others who can sacrifice them on their behalf; however, with regard to the Paschal lamb, an uncircumcised person and one who is impure cannot send their offerings. Consequently, the Gemara arrives at the surprising conclusion that the first clause of the baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, while the latter clause of the baraita relates to impurity of the people. Ravina said to Mar Zutra: Yes, this explanation can be accepted. The baraita can be understood as arguing from the general category of impurity, which applies in one case and not in another, rather than from a specific type of impurity in both cases. And if you wish, say a different answer: The latter clause is also referring to impurity of the meat. And what is the meaning of the statement that it does not apply to all offerings? It means that with regard to all offerings, whether the fats of the offering that are burned on the altar have become impure and the meat of the offering remains, or the meat has become impure and the fats remain, the priest may sprinkle the blood, and the offering is accepted through the burning of the sacrificial parts or through the priests’ consumption of the meat. However, when it comes to the Paschal lamb, if the fats have become impure and the meat remains pure and fit to be eaten, the priest may sprinkle the blood; but if the meat has become impure and the fats remain pure and fit to be burned on the altar, he may not sprinkle the blood, because in the case of the Paschal lamb, the owner’s obligation to eat the meat is the essence of the offering. The Gemara asks: How did you establish this baraita? It was established as referring to a case of impurity of the meat. If so, say the next clause of this same baraita as follows: We derive a matter, i.e., the halakha with regard to uncircumcised people, for which no allowance is made from its rule, from a matter, i.e., improper intent with regard to the time, for which no allowance is made from its rule. And the halakha with regard to ritual impurity should not be used to prove anything, as there are circumstances in which an allowance is made from its rule, since it is permitted to offer the Paschal lamb while ritually impure. The Gemara clarifies: What type of impurity is being discussed here? If you say that it is impurity of the meat, where is it permitted to eat impure sacrificial meat? Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is talking here about impurity of the people. And where is an allowance made from its rule? It is made in the community; when the majority of the community is ritually impure, it is permitted to offer the Paschal lamb and eat it while impure. The Gemara expresses surprise again: It turns out then that the first clause of the baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, while the latter clause relates to impurity of the people. The Gemara answers: Yes, and there is no difficulty, as the baraita argues from the general category of impurity without necessarily relating to the same type of impurity. And if you wish, say a different answer: The entire baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, and where is it permitted to eat impure sacrificial meat? It is permitted in a case of the impurity of the Paschal lamb, as we learned in a mishna: A Paschal lamb that comes in impurity, e.g., when the majority of the community is ritually impure and the offering may be brought in impurity, may also be eaten in impurity, as from the very outset it came only to be eaten. This is unlike the law with regard to other offerings that are brought in impurity; their blood is sprinkled on the altar, but their meat may not be eaten. Consequently, even the prohibition to consume impure sacrificial meat is permitted under certain circumstances. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raised an objection from a baraita that teaches: The Paschal sacrifice may be a young lamb or goat less than one year old. In the case of a Paschal lamb that has passed its first year, so that it has automatically become a peace-offering, if he slaughtered it at its appointed time on Passover eve for its own purpose as a Paschal lamb, and similarly, if he slaughtered another offering, e.g., a lamb that had been sanctified as a peace-offering, for the purpose of a Paschal lamb at its set time, the tanna’im disagree with regard to the status of the offering. Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies the offering; and Rabbi Yehoshua validates it, based on the principle that offerings brought for the purpose of other offerings are valid. The only exception is the Paschal lamb, which when brought for another purpose is invalid. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, in both of these cases the animal is not truly a Paschal lamb; rather, it is a peace-offering brought with the intent that it serve as a Paschal lamb. The Gemara infers: The reason that the sacrifice is disqualified is that it was brought at its proper time; it is in this case that the tanna’im disagree. But if it was not brought at its proper time, it is valid according to everyone, as it is like any other peace-offering that was slaughtered for a different purpose. But why is this so? Let us say: Since slaughtering another sacrifice for the purpose of a Paschal lamb disqualifies it at its proper time, this should also disqualify it not at its proper time. Consequently, the ruling quoted above is difficult according to the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, who accepts the principle of since for the sake of stringency. Rav Pappa said: It is different there in the case of another sacrifice slaughtered for the purpose of a Paschal lamb, as the verse said: “And you shall say: It is a Passover sacrifice to the Lord, Who passed over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt when He smote Egypt, and delivered our houses. And the people bowed the head and prostrated themselves” (Exodus 12:27). The word “it” indicates that the Paschal lamb must be brought as it is, according to its details, without any change. It, the Paschal lamb, must not be offered for the purpose of other sacrifices; and other sacrifices must not be offered for its purpose, i.e., as a Paschal lamb. In both of these cases, the offering is disqualified. It may now be inferred: At its proper time, on Passover eve, when the Paschal lamb is disqualified if it is brought for the purpose of other sacrifices, other sacrifices are disqualified according to Rabbi Eliezer if they are brought for its purpose, i.e., as a Paschal lamb. But not at its proper time, when a Paschal lamb offered for the purpose of other sacrifices is valid, other sacrifices offered for its purpose as a Paschal lamb are also valid. Since the verse’s use of the word “it” links the disqualifications of a Paschal lamb offered as a different sacrifice and any other sacrifice offered for the purpose of a Paschal lamb, the principle of since does not apply. There is a fundamental problem in the mishna that was clarified during the course of a particular incident: Rabbi Simlai came before Rabbi Yoḥanan. He said to him: Would the Master teach me the Book of Genealogies? The Book of Genealogies was a collection of tannaitic teachings that formed a midrash on the book of Chronicles. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Where are you from? He said to him: From Lod. Rabbi Yoḥanan further asked: And where is your present place of residence? He said to him: In Neharde’a. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: I have a tradition that we teach these subjects neither to Lodites nor to Neharde’ans, and certainly not to you who comes from Lod and your residence is in Neharde’a, such that you have both shortcomings. Rabbi Simlai pressured Rabbi Yoḥanan until he agreed to teach him. Rabbi Simlai said to him: Teach me the Book of Genealogies in three months. Rabbi Yoḥanan took a clod of dirt, threw it at him, and said to him: Berurya, wife of Rabbi Meir and daughter of Rabbi Ḥananya ben Teradyon, was so sharp and had such a good memory that she learned three hundred halakhot in one day from three hundred Sages, and nonetheless she did not fulfill her responsibility to properly learn the Book of Genealogies in three years because it is especially long and difficult. And you say that I should teach it to you in three months? After your inappropriate request, I am not inclined to teach you at all. When Rabbi Simlai was taking leave to go, he said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Even so, my teacher, as I have already come, let me ask you a question: What is the difference between one who offers a Paschal lamb both for its own purpose and for a different purpose, in which case the offering is disqualified, and one who offers the sacrifice with the intent that it be both for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, in which case the offering is not disqualified? He said to him: Since I understand from your question that you are a Torah scholar, come and I will tell you the answer: When one sacrifices an offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose, the disqualification is in the offering itself; that is, the disqualifying intention relates to the sacrifice itself. In contrast, when one sacrifices an offering for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, the disqualification is not in the offering itself, as the disqualifying intent relates to the people who are to eat from it. Furthermore, when one sacrifices an offering for its own purpose and for a different purpose, it is impossible to identify its prohibition; that is, there is no way to differentiate between valid and invalid parts of the offering. In contrast, when one sacrifices an offering for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is possible to identify its prohibition. If some of the people may eat it and some may not, it is possible to distribute the offering to each group and thereby determine which part of the offering is invalid. Furthermore, the intent that the offering be for its own purpose and for a different purpose applies and can disqualify the offering in all four rites, namely: Slaughtering, receiving the blood, carrying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling it on the altar; however, the intent that it be for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it does not apply during all four rites, as it has no effect during the time of the sprinkling. Moreover, the intent that the offering be for its own purpose and for a different purpose is a disqualification that applies to communal sacrifices as it does to individual sacrifices; in contrast, the intent that it be for those who can eat it and those who cannot eat it does not apply to the community as it does to an individual. Rav Ashi said that careful analysis of these answers demonstrates the following: The argument that its disqualification is in the offering itself and the argument that it is impossible to identify its prohibition are one and the same thing; they are not two separate reasons. As, what is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that when one brings an offering for a different purpose, its disqualification is in the offering itself? It is because it is impossible to identify its prohibition, and therefore the prohibition applies to the offering itself. Having mentioned the Book of Genealogies, the Gemara notes that Rami bar Rav Yuda said that Rav said the following about it: From the day the Book of Genealogies was hidden and no longer available to the Sages, the strength of the Sages has been weakened, and the light of their eyes has been dimmed, as the book contained the reasons for many Torah laws and lists of genealogies that are now lost. Mar Zutra said: The Book of Genealogies’ exposition of Chronicles was so extensive that it was said, in exaggeration, that the verses from the word Azel mentioned in the verse: “And Azel had six sons and these are their names: Azrikam, Bocru, and Ishmael and Sheariah and Obadia and Hanan; all these were the sons of Azel” (I Chronicles 8:38), to the word Azel mentioned in a different verse with the identical wording: “And Azel had six sons and these are their names: Azrikam, Bocru, and Ishmael and Sheariah and Obadia and Hanan; these were the sons of Azel” (I Chronicles 9:44), bore four hundred camels of expositions written about these verses. It was taught in a baraita that Aḥerim say: If one sacrifices a Paschal lamb for both circumcised and uncircumcised people and had in mind first the circumcised people and then the uncircumcised people, the offering is valid. But if he had in mind first the uncircumcised people and then the circumcised people, it is disqualified. The Gemara asks: What is different about having in mind first the circumcised people and then the uncircumcised people, such that the offering is valid? One might say that in order to disqualify the sacrifice, we require that all the people he has in mind be uncircumcised, and this is not the case here, as some of them are circumcised. But if this is so, when he has in mind first the uncircumcised people and then the circumcised people, we should also say that in order to disqualify the sacrifice we require that all the people he has in mind be uncircumcised, and this is not the case here. What, then, is the difference between the two cases? The Gemara asks: Let us say that Aḥerim hold that slaughter is not legally significant until the end, meaning that the slaughter is considered to take place only at the end of the rite and not during the time it takes to perform the act of slaughter, in accordance with the opinion of Rava in a different context. As Rava said: It is still a dispute, meaning that the disagreement whether one is held accountable only for his first expression or also for the conclusion of his statement applies even when it is one’s clear intention that the status he wishes to confer should apply only at a particular time, e.g., if one says that an animal should be consecrated as a burnt-offering until midday and from then on as a peace-offering (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). The opinion of Rabbi Meir, referred to here as Aḥerim, is that one is held accountable only for his first expression. Therefore, based on these two assumptions, if one put the circumcised people before the uncircumcised people, his statement with regard to circumcised people applies but his statement with regard to uncircumcised people does not apply. If the slaughter is legally considered to take effect in a single instant, and if one said that his intention is for circumcised people at that moment, his statement takes effect. In the reverse case, if one put the uncircumcised people before the circumcised people, his statement with regard to uncircumcised people applies, but his statement with regard to circumcised people does not apply. Rabba said: No, we should not say this. Actually, Aḥerim hold that slaughter is legally significant from beginning to end, and with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where one decided in his mind to slaughter the offering for both of them, both circumcised and uncircumcised people, and he verbally expressed his intention with the phrase: For uncircumcised people, but did not have a chance to say: For circumcised people, before the slaughter was already finished as he was saying: For uncircumcised people. And it is with regard to this point that they disagree: Rabbi Meir, who is Aḥerim, holds that we do not require that one’s mouth and heart be the same; what is legally significant is his verbal expression. Since he said: For uncircumcised people, he has disqualified the offering. And the Rabbis hold that we require that his mouth and heart be the same. Since he wanted to express his intent for both circumcised and uncircumcised people, he has not disqualified the offering. The Gemara expresses surprise: But does Rabbi Meir hold that we require that his mouth and heart be the same? The Gemara raises a contradiction based on a mishna in tractate Terumot that states: With regard to one who intended to say that the produce he has designated should be teruma, but he mistakenly said the word tithe; or he intended to say tithe but mistakenly said teruma; or he intended to vow: I will not enter this house, but mistakenly said: That house, i.e., he mistakenly referred to a different house; or he intended to vow: I will not derive benefit from this person, but he said: From that person, i.e., he mistakenly referred to someone else; he has not said anything until his mouth and heart are the same. This is an unattributed mishna, and unattributed mishnayot are presumed to be authored by Rabbi Meir. Rather, Abaye said the following explanation: We are dealing with a case where the person expressed two different intentions within the act of slaughter itself, as valid slaughter involves cutting most of both the windpipe and the esophagus of the animal. The first clause is referring to a case where he said: I cut the first organ for circumcised people and the second organ even for uncircumcised people, so that in the second organ even circumcised people are included. Consequently, he had circumcised people in mind at each stage of the slaughtering. The latter clause is referring to a case where he said: I cut the first organ for uncircumcised people and the second organ for circumcised people, so that in the first organ circumcised people are not included, and his intent during that stage is solely for uncircumcised people. And Rabbi Meir follows his own line of reasoning, as he says that piggul status can be conferred upon an offering at half of what renders it permitted. In other words, piggul status applies not only when one has a disqualifying intent during the entire act that renders the animal permitted, e.g., while slaughtering both the windpipe and the esophagus, but even if one has the disqualifying intent during half of the act that renders the animal permitted, e.g., while slaughtering one of those two organs. And the Rabbis also follow their regular line of reasoning, as they say that piggul status cannot be conferred at half of what permits it. Since he expressed his intent for both uncircumcised and circumcised people over the course of the entire act of slaughter, the offering is not disqualified. MISHNA: One who slaughters the Paschal lamb with leavened bread still in his possession violates a negative commandment, as the Torah states: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread; neither shall the sacrifice of the festival of Passover be left until the morning” (Exodus 34:25). Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who slaughters the daily afternoon offering on Passover eve with leaven in his possession violates the commandment. Rabbi Shimon says: One who slaughters the Paschal lamb on the fourteenth of Nisan for its own purpose with leaven in his possession is liable; but if he slaughtered it for a different purpose he is exempt. And for all other offerings that one slaughters on Passover eve, when owning leaven is prohibited, whether he slaughtered them for their own purpose or he slaughtered them for a different purpose, he is exempt. And during the festival of Passover, if one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for its own purpose he is exempt. Since a Paschal lamb that is slaughtered for its own purpose at an improper time is disqualified, it is not an offering at all and there is no violation of the commandment: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread.” However, if he slaughtered it for a different purpose and thereby validated the sacrifice as a peace-offering, he is liable for having sacrificed it with leaven in his possession. And for all other offerings that one slaughters on Passover, when it is prohibited to slaughter with leaven in one’s possession, whether he slaughtered them for their own purpose or he slaughtered them for a different purpose, he is liable. This is with the exception of a sin-offering that he slaughtered for a different purpose with leaven in his possession. Unlike other offerings, a sin-offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered for a different purpose, and therefore one does not violate the prohibition of “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread.” GEMARA: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One is never liable for having violated the commandment: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread” unless the leavened bread belongs to the one who slaughters the Paschal lamb, or to the one who sprinkles its blood, or to one of the members of the group; and he is liable only if the leaven is with him in the Temple courtyard itself. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is liable even if the leaven is not with him in the Temple courtyard. With regard to what principle do they disagree? If you say that they disagree with regard to whether the expression “with” indicates next to, namely, that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that “with” always indicates next to, and therefore “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread” means that the leaven must not be next to the one slaughtering the sacrifice, in the Temple courtyard itself, and Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that when the verse says “with,” we do not require that the leaven be next to the slaughterer in order to transgress, then this is difficult, because they have already disagreed about this once before. As we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who slaughters a thanks-offering inside the Temple courtyard while its bread, namely the forty loaves that are brought together with the offering, is outside the wall, the bread has not become sanctified, as the verse states: “And he shall offer with the thanks-offering unleavened cakes.” (Leviticus 7:12). A question was raised with regard to this mishna: What is the meaning of the phrase outside the wall? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It means outside the wall of Beit Pagei, the outermost wall around Jerusalem, but if the bread was merely outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, it has been sanctified, as we do not require that the bread, described as “with” the offering, be next to it in order to be sanctified. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish disagreed and said: Even if the bread was merely outside the wall of the Temple courtyard, it has not been sanctified. Apparently, he holds that we require that the bread described as “with” the offering be next to it in order to be sanctified. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish have already disputed this issue, they presumably did not repeat this same dispute in other contexts. Rather, say that they disagree about an uncertain warning. There is a general rule that the courts only administer corporal punishment if the transgressor was warned before he committed the transgression. The question arises as to whether punishments are administered after an uncertain warning, i.e., when it is unclear at the time of the warning whether or not the person being warned will actually transgress. It is possible to explain that this is the basis of the dispute with regard to leaven: If the leaven is outside the Temple courtyard, the one issuing the warning cannot be certain that the person he is warning actually has leaven in his possession at the time of the slaughter. The Gemara suggests that such a warning is considered an uncertain warning, and Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that an uncertain warning is a valid warning while Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish disagrees. However, this is difficult, as they also disagreed about this once before. As it was stated that if a person said: I take an oath that I will eat this loaf today, and the day passed and he did not eat it, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish both said that he is not flogged even though he violated his oath and thereby transgressed the prohibition of: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain” (Exodus 19:7). However, they disagree about the reason for this law. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is not flogged because it is a prohibition whose transgression does not involve an action, as his transgression was in failing to eat the loaf, and there is a principle that for any prohibition whose transgression does not involve an action one is not flogged; however, an uncertain warning is considered a valid warning. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: He is not flogged because it is an uncertain warning, and an uncertain warning is not considered a warning. For example, if he is warned in the middle of the day that if he does not eat the loaf he will be flogged, the warning is uncertain because even if he does not eat the loaf at that moment he still has time to eat it later. But for a prohibition whose transgression does not involve an action one is flogged. Thus, Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish have already disagreed with regard to this issue as well, and there would have been no reason for them to repeat their dispute. They say in answer to this: Actually, we can explain that they disagree about whether “with” indicates next to, and it is necessary to teach that they disagree about the case involving the leaven in addition to the case of the loaves of the thanks-offering, because the cases are not entirely comparable. As, if they disagreed only with regard to leaven, I would have said that it is only with regard to that case that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that when the verse says “with,” we do not require that the slaughterer have the leaven next to him in order to transgress, because it is a prohibition, and wherever it is, it is. On the eve of Passover in the afternoon one is prohibited to possess leaven anywhere. However, with regard to sanctification of the bread, it becomes sanctified only inside the Temple courtyard. Consequently, say that in that case Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that we require that the bread described as “with” the offering be next to it. Therefore, if it is inside, it is sanctified; and if not, it is not sanctified. This is just as it is with regard to a vessel used in the Temple service, which sanctifies a meal-offering only when the meal is inside it and not when the meal is outside of it. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that the dispute applies in both cases. And had we been taught the dispute only with regard to sanctification of the bread, I would have said that only in this case did Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish say that we require that the bread described as “with” the sacrifice be next to it, such that if it is inside the Temple courtyard, it is sanctified; and if not, it is not sanctified. But with regard to leavened bread, he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that when the verse says “with,” we do not require that the slaughterer have the leaven next to him in order to transgress, for it is a prohibition and wherever it is, it is. Therefore, it is necessary to say that they argued in both cases. Rav Oshaya asked Rabbi Ami the following question: If the slaughterer does not have leaven in his possession but one of the members of the group does have, what is the halakha? Rabbi Ami said to him: Is it written: You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with your leavened bread, meaning you may not slaughter the Paschal lamb with the leaven of the slaughterer? It is written: “You shall not offer with leavened bread” (Exodus 34:25), meaning you may not slaughter it with anyone’s leaven and not necessarily leaven that belongs to the slaughterer. Rav Oshaya said to Rav Ashi: If so, even if someone at the end of the world has leaven it should also be a violation. Since there is no limitation to this prohibition, it should apply even if the leaven belongs to someone who is not associated in any way with this Paschal lamb. Rav Ashi said to him that the verse says: “You shall not offer,” and the end of the verse states: “Neither shall the sacrifice of the festival of Passover be left until the morning.” The verse equates the two prohibitions, from which the following may be derived: “You shall not offer with leavened bread” applies to those who are governed by the prohibition of “neither shall be left over,” namely, the members of the group that registered for this Paschal lamb. People who are not part of this group are not obligated to ensure that the Paschal lamb does not remain until the morning; similarly, they are not taken into account with regard to the prohibition against sacrificing the offering while in possession of leaven. Rav Pappa said: Therefore, based on this reason, the priest who burns the fats of the Paschal lamb transgresses the negative commandment of “You shall not offer” if he has leaven in his possession. Since he is included in the prohibition of leaving over sacrificial parts of the offering, he is also included in the prohibition against sacrificing the offering with leaven, although he is not one of the people who will eat this Paschal lamb. The Gemara points out that it was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa: One who slaughters the Paschal lamb with leavened bread in his possession transgresses a negative commandment. When? When the leaven belongs to the slaughterer, or to the one who sprinkles the blood, or to one of the members of the group. If leaven belonged to someone at the end of the world, he is not bound to him, meaning that the slaughterer need not take him into account. And whether he slaughters the animal, or he sprinkles the blood, or he burns the fats, he is liable. But one who pinches the neck of a bird, which is not a Paschal offering but a burnt-offering or sin-offering, if he does so with leaven in his possession on the fourteenth of Nisan, after the prohibition against owning leaven has taken effect, he does not transgress anything. The Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita: One who slaughters the Paschal lamb with leavened bread in his possession transgresses a negative commandment. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even one who slaughters the daily afternoon offering on the eve of Passover with leavened bread in his possession violates the prohibition. They said to him: They stated this prohibition only with regard to the Paschal lamb. When does one transgress the prohibition? When the slaughterer, or the one who sprinkles the blood, or one of the members of the group has leaven in his possession. If someone at the end of the world had leaven, he is not bound to him. The baraita continues: And whether he slaughters the animal, or he sprinkles the blood, or he pinches a bird-offering, or he sprinkles the blood of the bird-offering onto the altar, he is liable. But one who scoops a handful of flour from a meal-offering while in possession of leaven does not transgress a negative commandment, because a meal-offering is not included in the prohibition, which is phrased “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice.” One who burns the sacrificial parts of the Paschal lamb or any other sacrifice on the fourteenth of Nisan with leaven in his possession does not transgress a negative commandment. There seems to be a contradiction between the ruling in the first baraita with regard to pinching and the ruling in the second baraita with regard to pinching. In addition, there seems to be a contradiction between the ruling in the first baraita with regard to burning and the ruling in the second baraita with regard to burning. The first baraita rules that one who burns the sacrificial parts is included in the prohibition but that one who pinches the neck of a bird-offering is not, and the second baraita says the opposite. The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning that both baraitot refer to the same issue, ask about the baraita itself, as first it teaches: They said that this prohibition applies only to the Paschal lamb, and then it teaches that whether he slaughters the animal or he sprinkles the blood, or he pinches a bird-offering, or he sprinkles the blood of the bird-offering onto the altar, he is liable. Pinching and sprinkling the bird’s blood apply to bird-offerings but not to the Paschal lamb. Rather, say instead that both this baraita and that baraita express the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. And there is no contradiction between the ruling in the first baraita about pinching and the ruling in the second baraita about pinching: Here, where it says that one who pinches does not transgress, it is referring to the fourteenth of Nisan, while there, where it says that one who pinches does transgress, it is talking about the intermediate days of the festival of Passover. And both this baraita and that baraita express the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that the prohibition does not apply to other sacrifices on the fourteenth of Nisan but does apply to them during the intermediate days of Passover, as explained in the mishna. There is also no contradiction between the ruling in the first baraita about burning and the ruling in the second baraita about burning, as the matter is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: There is one who compares burning to slaughtering, as Rav Pappa did, and there is one who does not compare them. It was stated in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: One is liable even for slaughtering the daily afternoon offering on the eve of Passover with leaven in his possession. What is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that the verse states: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice with leavened bread” (Exodus 34:25). “My sacrifice” indicates the sacrifice that is designated to Me; and what is it? This is referring to the daily offering, which is a burnt-offering brought each day as part of the Temple service. It was further stated in the mishna that Rabbi Shimon says: On the fourteenth of Nisan one is liable for sacrificing the Paschal lamb with leaven in his possession, but he is not liable for sacrificing other offerings with leaven; however, during the Festival one is liable for sacrificing any offering with leaven in his possession. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for Rabbi Shimon’s opinion? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “My sacrifice [zivḥi],” “My sacrifice [zivḥi],” two times, as first it is written: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice [zivḥi] with leavened bread” (Exodus 23:18) and then it is written again: “You shall not offer the blood of My sacrifice [zivḥi] with leavened bread” (Exodus 34:25). If the two instances of the word zivḥi are combined, their letters may be rearranged to read: A sacrifice [zevaḥ], and: My sacrifices [zevaḥai]. This indicates that the law applies both to the Paschal lamb and to the rest of the sacrifices. To teach what halakha does the Merciful One divide them from one another and not explicitly write: My sacrifices? It was to say that at the time when there is a sacrifice, meaning at the time of the Paschal lamb, as mentioned in the continuation of the verse, one is not liable for My sacrifices. On the eve of Passover, when the Paschal lamb is brought, there is no liability for offering other sacrifices with leaven. However, at a time when there is no sacrifice, during the festival of Passover, one is liable for slaughtering any of My sacrifices with leaven in his possession. It was taught in the mishna that according to Rabbi Shimon, if one sacrificed a Paschal lamb during the intermediate days of the Festival for its own purpose as a Paschal lamb, one is exempt from liability if he had leaven in his possession during the time of the slaughter, as it is an invalid offering. However, if he sacrificed it for a different purpose, he is liable, because a Paschal lamb that is slaughtered at a time other than Passover eve is valid as a peace-offering. The Gemara analyzes this ruling: The reason he is liable is that he slaughtered it explicitly for a different purpose; but had he slaughtered it without specific intent he would be exempt, because the offering would be disqualified. Unless he specifically states otherwise, the animal retains its status as a Paschal lamb and is subsequently disqualified because it is not the proper time to sacrifice a Paschal lamb. The Gemara expresses surprise: Why must he expressly state that he is sacrificing it as a different offering? Isn’t a Paschal lamb sacrificed during the rest of the days of the year presumed to be a peace-offering? There should be no need to state explicitly that it is a different offering. Learn from this that a Paschal lamb sacrificed on the rest of the days of the year requires uprooting, i.e., one must explicitly declare that he is sacrificing the offering as a peace-offering, and not as a Paschal lamb. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Gamda said: A group of scholars were studying this issue and it emerged from the group, that is, one of the scholars made a statement with which the rest of them agreed, and it was subsequently forgotten who had made the statement, and they said as follows: We are dealing here with a case where the owners of the offering were ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse during the first Passover, and they were deferred to the second Passover. A person who was ritually impure or on a distant journey and therefore failed to bring the Paschal lamb at its proper time on the fourteenth of Nisan must compensate by bringing the offering on the fourteenth of Iyyar. In such a situation, the offering presumably stands to be sacrificed as a Paschal lamb, and it does not automatically become a peace-offering unless its owners explicitly declare it as such. However, this would not be true of other Paschal lambs after the time to offer the Paschal lamb has passed. MISHNA: The Paschal lamb was slaughtered in three groups, meaning those bringing the offering were divided into three separate sets, as it is stated: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). The verse is interpreted as referring to three groups: Assembly, congregation, and Israel. The procedure for sacrificing the offering was as follows: The first group of people sacrificing the offering entered, and when the Temple courtyard became filled with them they closed the doors of the Temple courtyard. They sounded uninterrupted, broken, and uninterrupted trumpet blasts, as was done while sacrificing any offering. The priests stood in rows from the place of slaughter to the altar, and in their hands they held bowls [bezikhin] of silver and bowls of gold in order to receive the blood of the offerings. There was a row entirely composed of priests holding silver bowls, and a row entirely composed of priests holding gold bowls, as the gold and silver bowls were not mixed in the same row. The bowls did not have flat bases that would allow them to be put down, out of concern that perhaps the priests would set them down and forget about them and in the meantime the blood would congeal and become disqualified for sprinkling on the altar. An Israelite would slaughter the sacrifice, and a priest would receive the blood and immediately hand it to another priest standing next to him, and the other priest would pass it to another. Each priest would receive a full bowl of blood from the priest next to him and return to him an empty bowl being passed in the opposite direction, the contents of which had already been sprinkled on the altar. The priest who was closest to the altar would sprinkle a single sprinkling of blood against the base of the altar, i.e., against the north and west sides of the altar, where there was a base. The first group exited upon completion of the rite, and the second group entered; the second group left upon completion of its rite, and the third group entered. As it was done by the first group, so was it done by the second and third groups. All the people standing in the Temple courtyard while the Paschal lambs were being slaughtered would recite hallel. If they finished reciting it before all the offerings were slaughtered, they recited it a second time, and if they finished reciting it a second time, they recited it a third time, although in practice they never recited it a third time, as the priests worked efficiently and finished the rite before this became necessary. Rabbi Yehuda says: The third group never reached even once the opening verse of the fourth chapter of hallel: “I love that the Lord hears the voice of my supplications” (Psalms 116:1), because its people were few and the slaughtering of all the offerings was completed during the recitation of the first three chapters. As it was done during the week, so was it done on Shabbat; only that on Shabbat the priests would rinse the Temple courtyard, cleaning away the blood, contrary to the wishes of the Sages, as the priests did not want to veer from the weekday procedure in this regard. Rabbi Yehuda says: Before the floor was rinsed, a priest would fill a cup with the blood of the many offerings brought that day that was now mixed together on the floor and then sprinkle it with a single sprinkling upon the altar. But the Rabbis did not agree with Rabbi Yehuda with regard to this point. How would one suspend and flay the Paschal lamb in the Temple? Iron hooks [unkelayot] were secured into the walls and pillars, and upon them one would suspend the offering and flay it. If anyone lacked a place among the hooks in the Temple courtyard to suspend and flay the offering, there were thin, smooth rods there, which he would place on his own shoulder and on another’s shoulder, and from it he would suspend the offering and flay it. Rabbi Eliezer says: When the fourteenth of Nisan occurred on Shabbat, when moving the rods is prohibited (Rambam), he would rest his hand on another’s shoulder and the other’s hand on his own shoulder and suspend the offering and flay it. He would tear open the flesh of the offering and remove its sacrificial parts, i.e., the fats and other parts offered on the altar. He would place the sacrificial parts in a large basin [mageis] and burn them on the altar. If this took place on Shabbat, when carrying is prohibited, the first group would exit and remain on the Temple Mount; the second group would remain within the rampart, which was an area outside the women’s courtyard; and the third group would stand in its place in the Temple. They would wait there until nightfall, and as soon as it became dark, they would all go out and roast their Paschal lambs, everyone in his own place. GEMARA: Rabbi Yitzḥak said: The Paschal lamb is slaughtered only in three groups of at least thirty people each. What is the reason for this rule? The verse says: Assembly, congregation, and Israel, and each of these terms refers to a group of no fewer than ten people. We are uncertain as to whether this means that we need three groups of ten people at the same time or one after another. Therefore, in order to satisfy both possible interpretations, we require three groups of thirty people each. As, if you say we need all thirty at the same time, we have that, and if we need them one after another, we have that as well. Therefore, in pressing circumstances when there are not enough people present, even fifty people suffice. How so? Thirty enter and perform the necessary rite, ten others enter and ten of the original group leave so that those present are considered a new group, and then ten others enter and ten more leave so that those present now comprise a third group. In this way the Paschal lamb is slaughtered in three groups of thirty people each, although the total number of people involved is only fifty. The mishna teaches that the first group entered, after which they closed the doors to the Temple courtyard. It was stated that the amora’im disagreed about the precise wording of the mishna. Abaye said: We learned in the mishna that the doors of the Temple courtyard miraculously closed by themselves. Rava said: We learned in the mishna that people would close the doors of the Temple courtyard at the appropriate time. What is the practical difference between them? The practical difference between them is with regard to whether we rely on a miracle. Abaye said: We learned in the mishna that the doors closed by themselves; as many people as entered, entered, and we rely on a miracle to close the doors so that an excessive number of people not enter and thus create a danger (Rabbeinu Ḥananel). Rava said: We learned in the mishna that people would close the doors, and we do not rely on a miracle to ensure that the courtyard not become overly crowded. And that which we learned elsewhere in a mishna with regard to the ban placed upon Akavya ben Mahalalel for having spoken harshly about Shemaya and Avtalyon, that Rabbi Yehuda said: Heaven forbid that Akavya ben Mahalalel was banned; it must have been someone else, as even when the entire Jewish people would come to Jerusalem for the Festival, the Temple courtyard would not close on any man from Israel as full of wisdom and fear of sin as Akavya ben Mahalalel; Abaye can explain this statement according to his opinion, and Rava can also explain it according to his opinion. Abaye can explain it according to his opinion as follows: No man from Israel was in the Temple courtyard when it closed by itself who was as full of wisdom and fear of sin as Akavya ben Mahalalel. Rava, too, can explain it according to his opinion as follows: No man from Israel was in the Temple courtyard when they closed it who was as full of wisdom and fear of sin as Akavya ben Mahalalel. The Sages taught: No one was ever crushed by the great throngs of people in the Temple courtyard, except for one Passover in the days of Hillel when an old man was crushed, and they called that Passover the Passover of the crushed. The Sages taught: Once, King Agrippa wished to set his eyes on the multitudes [ukhlosin] of Israel to know how many they were. He said to the High Priest: Set your eyes on the Paschal lambs; count how many animals are brought in order to approximate the number of people. The High Priest took a kidney from each one, as the kidneys are burned on the altar, and six hundred thousand pairs of kidneys were found there, double the number of those who left Egypt. This did not reflect the sum total of the Jewish people, as it excluded those who were ritually impure or at a great distance, who did not come to offer the sacrifice. Furthermore, this was a count of the Paschal lambs and not of the people, and there was not a single Paschal lamb that did not have more than ten people registered for it. They called that Passover the Passover of the crowded, due to the large number of people. The Gemara questions one of the details of this story: How could the High Priest take a kidney? Didn’t he have to burn it on the altar? The Gemara answers: He first took the kidneys for the count, and subsequently he burned them. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it written: “And the priest shall burn it on the altar; it is the food of the offering made by fire to the Lord” (Leviticus 3:11)? The singular “it” apparently indicates that he must not mix the fats of this sacrifice with those of another; rather, he must burn each set separately. The Gemara answers: He subsequently burned them one by one and not all together. The Gemara asks further: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that the plural “them” in the verse: “And the priest shall burn them upon the altar; it is the food of the offering made by fire for a satisfying aroma; all the fat is the Lord’s” (Leviticus 3:16) indicates that all the sacrificial parts of a sacrifice must be offered at the same time? Rather, it must be that when the High Priest took a kidney for counting, it was merely momentary seizure; that is, he took it from them until they brought him something else with which to keep track of the numbers, and it was this other item that was counted afterward. It was stated in the mishna that the priests stood in rows and that there were rows of priests holding silver bowls and rows of priests holding gold bowls, but that in no rows were there both gold and silver bowls. What is the reason that there was no intermingling of gold and silver bowls? If you say that it was due to concern that perhaps a priest would take a gold bowl to keep for himself and then return a silver one in its place, the solution described in the mishna does not alleviate this concern. Here, too, in a row where everyone is holding gold bowls, there is concern that perhaps a priest would take a two-hundred-dinar bowl, keep it for himself, and then return a one-hundred-dinar bowl in its place (Rid). Rather, the reason is that this arrangement, where all the bowls in each row are of the same color, is aesthetically more attractive. It was further stated in the mishna that the bowls did not have flat bases. The Gemara adds that the Sages taught a baraita that states: None of the bowls in the Temple had flat bases for the same reason, so that they should not be put down, which would allow the blood to congeal. This was with the exception of the bowls of frankincense that would be placed on the showbread, which did have flat bases. They could not have sharp bottoms out of concern that perhaps the priests would rest them on the bread and the bread would break. The showbread had an intricate and delicate shape, and a bowl with a sharp bottom could pierce or break the bread. It was taught in the mishna: An Israelite would slaughter the offering and a priest would receive the blood and pass it to other priests. The Gemara asks: Is it not sufficient if someone who is not an Israelite slaughters the offering? Must the ritual slaughter be performed specifically by an Israelite, and not by a priest or a Levite? The Gemara answers: The mishna teaches us this halakha itself, that even if the slaughter is performed by a non-priest it is valid. And that which was stated in the mishna that the priest receives the blood comes to teach us that from receiving and onward the rite is a commandment cast upon the priesthood, and a non-priest may not perform it. It was also taught in the mishna that the priest would pass the bowl of blood to another priest. The Gemara suggests: Learn from this that carrying without walking, i.e., transporting the blood to the altar by passing it from hand to hand without actually walking with it to the altar, is considered a valid act of carrying the blood of a sacrifice to the altar, one of the four rites involved in the offering of a sacrifice. This would resolve the same unanswered question in tractate Zevaḥim. The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps the priest would move a little with his feet as he passed the bowl to the next priest, in order to fulfill the requirement to walk with the blood to the altar. Rather, what does this account of how they transported the blood to the altar teach us? The Gemara answers: It teaches us that the priests were arranged in rows in order to increase the number of people involved in the rite and fulfill the principle that “in the multitude of people is the king’s glory” (Proverbs 14:28). It was further stated in the mishna that each priest would receive a full bowl of blood and return an empty one. The Gemara infers: But the opposite was not done; the priest would not first return an empty bowl and then receive a full one. This supports the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: One must not postpone the performance of mitzvot. When one is presented with the opportunity to fulfill a mitzva, he must do so immediately and not delay for any reason. In this case, since bringing the blood to the altar is a mitzva, the priest should first fulfill the mitzva at hand and receive the full bowl of blood, and only then should he return the empty bowl. It was also stated in the mishna that the priest who was closest to the altar would sprinkle the blood upon the altar. Who is the tanna who holds that the blood of the Paschal lamb requires sprinkling from afar upon the altar, and that pouring the blood directly from the bowl onto the altar does not suffice? Rav Ḥisda said: It is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: The verse states: “But the firstborn of an ox, or the firstborn of a sheep, or the firstborn of a goat, you shall not redeem, they are sacred; you shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar and you shall burn their fat for an offering made by fire, for a satisfying aroma to the Lord” (Numbers 18:17). It is not stated: Its blood, but rather “their blood.” Similarly, it is not stated: Its fat, but rather “their fat.” This teaches with regard to the firstborn animal, which is mentioned explicitly in the verse, as well as the tithed animal and the Paschal lamb, which have a level of sanctity similar to a firstborn animal, that they all require placement of their blood and sacrificial parts on the altar, although the Torah does not give explicit instructions with regard to this aspect of the rite for a tithed animal or Paschal lamb. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that their blood requires sprinkling upon the altar on a side that has a base? Rabbi Elazar said: This is derived by way of a verbal analogy between the word sprinkling used here and the word sprinkling used with regard to a burnt-offering. Here, it is written: “You shall sprinkle their blood upon the altar;” there, it is written with regard to a burnt-offering: “And he shall slaughter it on the side of the altar northward before the Lord; and the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall sprinkle its blood round about upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:11). Just as the blood of a burnt-offering must be sprinkled on the altar in a place where there is a base, so too, the blood of a Paschal lamb must be sprinkled in a place where there is a base. The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive with respect to the burnt-offering itself that its blood must be sprinkled on the altar in a place where there is a base? The Gemara answers that the verse said: “And he shall pour all the blood of the bull at the base of the altar of the burnt-offering, which is at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7). Apparently, the blood of a burnt-offering requires sprinkling at the base, as the verse specifically links the base of the altar to the burnt-offering. It was stated in the next clause of the mishna that after the first group exited, the second group and then the third group would enter. It was taught in the Tosefta with regard to the third group: It was called the lazy group because it was the last of the three groups. The Gemara asks: But it would not have been sufficient without this third group, as the Paschal lamb must be offered in three shifts. What, then, should the members of the third group have done? The Gemara answers: Nonetheless, the members of the third group should have hurried themselves so that they would not be in the last group. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The world cannot function without a perfume merchant or without a tanner [bursi], who processes bad-smelling hides. While both of these occupations are necessary, fortunate is he whose profession is that of a perfume merchant, and woe to him whose profession is that of a tanner. Likewise, the world cannot exist without males or without females; yet fortunate is he whose children are males, and woe to him whose children are females. It was further stated in the mishna that in the same manner that the procedure involving the Paschal lamb was performed during the week, so was it performed on Shabbat, and that even on Shabbat the priests would rinse the floor of blood, contrary to the wishes of the Sages. The Gemara asks: Contrary to the wishes of whom? Which Sage did not consent to this practice? Rav Ḥisda said: It was contrary to the wishes of Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that rinsing the floor on Shabbat is prohibited by Torah law. As, if one accepts the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him, don’t they say that rinsing the floor is prohibited due to a rabbinic decree? And the principle is that rabbinic decrees do not apply in the Temple. Consequently, it should be permitted to wash the floor in the Temple on Shabbat according to the opinion of the Rabbis. The Gemara asks: What is the source of this dispute? The Gemara answers: As it was taught in the following baraita: One who milks an animal, or sets milk to curdle (Arukh), or makes cheese is liable if he performed the activity in the measure of a dried fig-bulk; one who sweeps the house, or sprinkles water on the floor, or removes honeycombs, if he did so unwittingly on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, as he has performed a labor prohibited by Torah law on Shabbat. And if he did so intentionally on a Festival, he is flogged with forty lashes; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say with regard to the cases of sweeping, sprinkling water on the floor, and harvesting honeycombs: Both this, performing these actions on Shabbat, and that, doing so on a Festival, are prohibited only due to rabbinic decrees. According to Rabbi Eliezer, rinsing the floor is the same as sweeping the floor. Therefore, it is prohibited on Shabbat even in the Temple, as there is no allowance to perform a labor prohibited by Torah law that is not essential for the proper sacrifice of the offerings. Rav Ashi said: You can even say that the priests rinsed the floor contrary to the wishes of the Rabbis, who hold that the prohibition is due to a rabbinic decree, and that the mishna is according to the opinion of Rabbi Natan. As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Natan says that a rabbinic prohibition that it is absolutely necessary to violate for the sacrificial rite, they permitted in the Temple. However, a rabbinic prohibition that it is not absolutely necessary to violate for the sacrificial rite, they did not permit in the Temple. Rinsing the floor is not essential, as the Temple rite can continue even if the floor is not washed. Therefore, this rabbinically prohibited activity was not permitted in the Temple. The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yehuda says that the priest would fill a cup with the blood that was mixed together on the floor and then sprinkle it on the altar. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: He would fill a cup with the mixed blood, so that if all of the blood of one of the sacrifices was spilled, this cup would contain a small amount of that blood, and sprinkling it on the altar would render the sacrifice fit. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: But this blood that poured from the throat of the animal onto the floor had not been received in a vessel and is therefore unfit to be sprinkled on the altar. The Gemara expresses surprise: How do they know with certainty that this blood had not been received in a vessel? Rather, this is what the Rabbis said to Rabbi Yehuda: Perhaps this blood had not been received in a vessel and is therefore unfit to be sprinkled on the altar. Rabbi Yehuda said to them: I, too, spoke only about blood that had been received in a vessel. The Gemara expresses surprise in the opposite direction: How does Rabbi Yehuda know that the blood collected from the floor had in fact been received in a vessel? The Gemara answers: Priests are vigilant, and so they were certainly careful to receive all the blood in a vessel. The Gemara asks: But if they are so vigilant, why did the blood spill? The Gemara responds: Owing to the speed with which they worked, the blood spilled. Therefore, it is necessary to fill a cup with a mixture of the blood found on the floor and sprinkle it upon the altar. The Gemara asks: But isn’t blood squeezed from an animal after the initial spurt concluded mixed with it? Some of the blood on the floor is blood that continued to drain from the animal after the initial spurts of blood that followed the slaughter, and such blood is unfit for the altar. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says that blood squeezed from an animal after the initial spurt concluded is proper blood in every way. As it was taught in a baraita: One who consumes blood squeezed from an animal after the initial spurt concluded violates a warning, i.e., a Torah prohibition for which flogging is the punishment for its violation. This is not as severe as consuming regular life blood, the blood that spurts out from an animal as it is being slaughtered, for which one is liable to receive karet. Rabbi Yehuda says: One who consumes blood squeezed from an animal after the initial spurt concluded is liable to receive karet, as this blood is treated as proper blood. The Gemara challenges this answer: Didn’t Rabbi Elazar say that even Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to atonement that sprinkling on the altar blood squeezed from the animal after the initial spurt concluded does not make atonement? As it is stated: “For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that makes atonement by reason of life” (Leviticus 17:11). This verse indicates that blood with which life leaves the animal, meaning blood that spurts immediately upon slaughter, makes atonement when it is sprinkled on the altar; however, blood with which life does not leave the animal, meaning blood that drains out after the initial spurt, does not make atonement. In that case, even Rabbi Yehuda should be concerned that the blood collected in the cup contains blood squeezed from an animal after the initial spurt concluded. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his line of reasoning, as he said: Blood does not nullify blood. The small amount of blood in the cup that is fit for sprinkling on the altar is not nullified even if most of the blood in the cup is blood squeezed from an animal after the initial spurt concluded. Therefore, it may still be sprinkled upon the altar and make atonement. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: According to your statement that there is no need to fill a cup of blood from the floor, why did they plug the drains of the Temple courtyard on Passover eve and not let the blood flow immediately into the drainage pipes? They said to him: It is praiseworthy of the sons of Aaron, the priests, to walk in blood up to their ankles, thereby demonstrating their love for the Temple rite. The Gemara asks: How could they walk in blood up to their ankles? Doesn’t the blood interpose between the feet of the priests and the floor of the Temple and thereby invalidate the rite? The Gemara answers: The blood is moist and therefore it does not interpose. As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to blood, ink, milk, and honey, when they are dry, they interpose with respect to ritual immersion and other matters; when they are moist, they do not interpose. The Gemara asks further: But don’t their garments become soiled? And we learned in a mishna: If the priest’s garments were soiled and he performed the Temple rite while wearing them, his rite is invalid, because the priestly garments must be fine and beautiful. And if you say that they raised their garments so that the garments would stay clean, there is a difficulty. Wasn’t it taught in a different baraita that explicates the verse: “And the priest shall put on his linen garment [middo]” (Leviticus 6:3), that the verse uses the word middo to teach that the garments must be according to his measure [kemiddato], fitted to his size, not too short and not too long? If the priest raises his garments, they will no longer be exactly his size. The Gemara answers that the priests would walk in the blood while carrying the sacrificial limbs to the ramp of the altar, which is not actually a rite, but only preparation for a rite. The Gemara asks: And is it not one of the rites? But from the fact that this task requires priesthood, as it can be performed only by a priest, the implication is that it is considered a rite. As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And the priest shall bring it all and burn it upon the altar; it is a burnt-offering, an offering made by fire, of a satisfying aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:13), that this is referring to the carrying of the limbs to the ramp. Rather, we must say that the priests would walk in the blood while carrying wood to the wood pile on the altar, which is not a rite. The Gemara asks: But if the floor of the Temple was full of blood, how did they walk without soiling their garments while carrying the limbs to the ramp and while carrying the blood to the altar? The Gemara answers: They would walk on platforms raised above the floor and thereby avoid soiling their clothes. It was taught in the mishna how one would suspend and flay the Paschal lamb, and that after the flaying he would tear it open and remove its sacrificial parts and then place them in a large basin in order to burn them. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that he himself, the priest who placed the sacrificial parts in the basin and no one else, would burn them? The Gemara answers: Correct the wording of the mishna to say: In order to burn them on the altar, meaning that he would place them in a large basin as preparation for their being burned on the altar, but not that he himself would necessarily burn them. It was also stated in the mishna: The first group exited the Temple courtyard with their Paschal lambs. It was taught in a baraita: Each and every one would place his Paschal lamb in its hide and cast it over his shoulder behind him and carry it home that way. Rav Ilish said: They carried it home in the manner of Arab merchants [tayya’ut]. MISHNA: These are the matters related to the Paschal lamb that override Shabbat, when the eve of Passover occurs on Shabbat: Its slaughter, the sprinkling of its blood, the cleaning of its intestines and the burning of its fats on the altar, all of which are services that must be performed on Passover eve while it is still day. However, its roasting and the washing of its intestines, which need not be done by day, do not override Shabbat; rather, one waits until after Shabbat to perform these tasks. Carrying the Paschal lamb through a public domain does not override Shabbat. The Paschal offering consisted of either a lamb or a goat, sometimes quite young and unable to walk the entire way, so that it had to be carried on a person’s shoulders. Similarly, bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit and cutting off its wart do not override Shabbat, as all these tasks could have been performed before Shabbat. A wart is considered a blemish that disqualifies the animal from being brought as an offering, but once the wart is removed, the animal is fit to be sacrificed on the altar. Rabbi Eliezer says: All of these procedures override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference? If slaughter, which is ordinarily forbidden on Shabbat as a biblically prohibited labor, nonetheless overrides Shabbat when performed for the sake of the Paschal lamb, then these activities, namely carrying the animal, bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit, and the like, which are prohibited due to rabbinic decree, should they not override Shabbat? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: The law governing a Festival proves otherwise, for the Torah permitted on it acts that are normally prohibited as labor, such as slaughtering, cooking, and baking, and yet it is forbidden to do on it acts that are prohibited due to rabbinic decree. Thus, we cannot derive policy with regard to rabbinic prohibitions from the rules that govern Torah laws. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: What is this, Yehoshua? How can you suggest such a weak proof? What proof can be deduced from optional activities that would apply to a mitzva? How does the fact that rabbinic decrees remain in effect on a Festival with respect to optional activities prove that one is also forbidden to transgress a rabbinic decree in order to fulfill the mitzva of offering the Paschal lamb? Rabbi Akiva responded and said in defense of Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion: Sprinkling the purifying water of a red heifer upon someone who had contracted ritual impurity through contact with a corpse proves the matter, for it is done for the sake of a mitzva, in order to allow the person to offer the Paschal lamb, and it is prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, and nonetheless it does not override Shabbat, for the purification rite is not performed on the eve of Passover that falls on Shabbat. So, too, you should not be surprised about these activities, namely carrying the animal, bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit, and cutting off its wart, that although they are performed for the sake of a mitzva and they are prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: I do not accept this proof. With regard to this sprinkling itself, I infer that it, too, is permitted for the same reason: If slaughter, which is a biblically prohibited labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not right that sprinkling the purifying water of a red heifer, which is prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, should override Shabbat? You cannot challenge me based on a premise with which I disagree. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Eliezer: Or perhaps we can reverse the order of your argument and say the opposite: If, as we know by accepted tradition, sprinkling the purifying water on Shabbat, which is prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, does not override Shabbat, then with regard to slaughter, which is prohibited as a biblically prohibited labor, is it not right that it should not override Shabbat? Therefore, it should be prohibited to slaughter the Paschal lamb when the eve of Passover occurs on Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva, how can you say this? You have thus uprooted what is written in the Torah: “Let the children of Israel offer the Paschal lamb in its appointed time” (Numbers 9:2); the phrase “at its appointed time” indicates that the offering must be brought on that day, whether it is a weekday or Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Eliezer: My teacher, bring me an appointed time stated in the Torah for these tasks, namely, carrying the animal or bringing it from outside the Shabbat limits, like the appointed time stated with respect to slaughter. The Paschal lamb must be slaughtered on the fourteenth of Nisan, but there is no fixed time when the animal must be brought to the Temple, and it is therefore possible to transport it before Shabbat. Rabbi Akiva stated a principle: Any prohibited labor required for the offering of the sacrifice that can be performed on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughter, which cannot be performed on the eve of Shabbat, overrides Shabbat. GEMARA: The Sages taught a baraita with regard to the basic halakha governing the eve of Passover that occurs on Shabbat: This law was forgotten by the sons of Beteira, who were the leaders of their generation. The fourteenth of Nisan once occurred on Shabbat, and they forgot and did not know whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not. They said: Is there any person who knows whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not? They said to them: There is a certain man in Jerusalem who came up from Babylonia, and Hillel the Babylonian is his name. At one point, he served the two most eminent scholars of the generation, Shemaya and Avtalyon, and he certainly knows whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not. The sons of Beteira sent messengers and called for him. They said to him: Do you know whether the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat or not? He said to them: Have we but one Paschal lamb during the year that overrides Shabbat? Do we not have many more than two hundred Paschal lambs, i.e., sacrifices, during the year that override Shabbat? They said to him: From where do you know this? He said to them: “Its appointed time” is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb and “its appointed time” is also stated with regard to the daily offering, for the verse says: “Command the children of Israel and say to them, My offering, the provision of My sacrifice made with fire, for a sweet savor to Me, shall you observe to offer Me at its appointed time” (Numbers 28:2). From here we learn that the daily offering is brought even on Shabbat. Thus, the daily morning and afternoon offerings are brought on more than fifty Shabbatot over the course of the year, and two sheep are offered every Shabbat as additional offerings, for a total of more than two hundred sacrifices a year that override Shabbat. Just as the expression “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the daily offering, indicates that it overrides Shabbat, so too “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb, indicates that it overrides Shabbat. And furthermore, it is an a fortiori inference: If the daily offering, the neglect of which is not punishable by karet, overrides Shabbat, is it not right that the Paschal lamb, the neglect of which is punishable by karet, should override Shabbat? After Hillel brought these proofs, they immediately seated him at the head and appointed him Nasi over them, and he expounded the laws of Passover that entire day. In the course of his teaching, he began rebuking them [mekanteran] them with words. He said to them: What caused this to happen to you, that I should come up from Babylonia and become Nasi over you? It was the laziness in you that you did not serve the two most eminent scholars of the generation living in Eretz Yisrael, Shemaya and Avtalyon. They said to Hillel: Our teacher, if one forgot and did not bring a knife on the eve of Shabbat and cannot slaughter his Paschal lamb, what is the law? Since he could have brought the knife before Shabbat, he cannot bring it on Shabbat; but what should he do in this situation? He said to them: I once heard this halakha from my teachers but I have forgotten it. But leave it to the Jewish people; if they are not prophets to whom God has revealed His secrets, they are the sons of prophets, and will certainly do the right thing on their own. The next day, on Shabbat that was the eve of Passover, one whose Paschal offering was a lamb took the knife and stuck it in its wool; and one whose Paschal offering was a goat, which does not have wool, stuck it between its horns. Hillel saw the incident and remembered the halakha that he had once learned and said: This is the tradition I received from the mouths of Shemaya and Avtalyon, meaning that this is in fact the proper course of action. This concludes the text of the baraita and the Gemara will begin to elucidate it. The Master said above: “Its appointed time” is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb and “its appointed time” is stated with regard to the daily offering. Just as “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the daily offering, indicates that it overrides Shabbat, so too “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb, indicates that it overrides Shabbat. And from where do we derive that the daily offering itself overrides Shabbat? If we say because “in its appointed time” is written in its regard, “in its appointed time” is also written with regard to the Paschal lamb. Were it possible to derive from this expression that the sacrifice is offered even on Shabbat, it would not be necessary to derive the law governing the Paschal lamb from a verbal analogy between the daily offering and the Paschal lamb. Rather, you must conclude that the expression “its appointed time,” which is stated with regard to the Paschal lamb, does not indicate to Hillel that the Torah was so particular about the timing of the Paschal lamb that its slaughter overrides Shabbat. Here too, with regard to the daily offering, you must say that “its appointed time” does not indicate to him that it is brought on Shabbat, and so this expression is not the source of this law. Rather, the law is derived from the verse that states: “The burnt-offering of Shabbat on its Shabbat, beside the continual burnt-offering and its libation” (Numbers 28:10), from which it may be inferred that the daily burnt-offering is brought even on Shabbat. The Gemara raises another question: The Master said in that same baraita: And furthermore, it is an a fortiori inference: If the daily offering, the neglect of which is not punishable by karet, overrides Shabbat, is it not right that the Paschal lamb, the neglect of which is punishable by karet, should override Shabbat? The Gemara points out that there is room to refute the logic of this argument: What is unique about the daily offering that enables it to override Shabbat? That it is frequent, and something that is frequent always takes precedence; and also that it is totally consumed on the altar, unlike the Paschal lamb, most of which is eaten by human beings. The Gemara explains that this is what happened: Hillel first told them the a fortiori inference, but they refuted it and proved that it was not reliable, as explained above; and then he told them the verbal analogy, and a verbal analogy is based on an oral tradition originating from Moses at Sinai and must be accepted. The Gemara asks: But since Hillel learned this verbal analogy from his teachers, why do I need an a fortiori inference? Why did he add a logical argument of his own if he had an explicit verbal tradition that this was the halakha? The Gemara answers: Rather, he said it for them, to show that they had not sufficiently exerted themselves in clarifying this halakha: Granted, you did not learn the verbal analogy on your own, because you acted according to the principle that one may not expound a verbal analogy on one’s own. Since there is no limit to the laws that one can extract using this method of derivation, such a derivation is only legitimate if it has been transmitted as part of the oral tradition, and apparently they did not learn this verbal analogy from their teachers. But an a fortiori inference, which one can derive on one’s own, you should have derived and you would then have known how to resolve this question. They said to him: It is a faulty a fortiori inference, as we have shown that it can be easily refuted. The Master said further in the baraita: The next day, one whose Paschal offering was a lamb stuck the knife in its wool, and one whose Paschal offering was a goat stuck it between its horns so as to avoid carrying the knife on Shabbat. But surely he did work with consecrated animals, using the lambs and goats that had been consecrated as sacrifices to transport the knife, and it is forbidden to make use of consecrated animals. The Gemara answers that the person acted here in accordance with the opinion of Hillel, as it was taught in a baraita: They said about Hillel that no one ever misused his burnt-offering. How did he ensure this? He was careful not to consecrate the animal in advance, but rather he would bring it in an unconsecrated state to the Temple courtyard and there he would consecrate it, and then immediately he would place his hand on its head and slaughter it. On that day, those who used their Paschal lambs and goats to transport knives consecrated their animals only after they arrived in the Temple courtyard. The Gemara asks: If so, how could they consecrate the Paschal offerings that year when Passover eve occurred on Shabbat? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: One may not consecrate animals, take a valuation vow, consecrate objects for use by the priests or the Temple, or separate terumot and tithes. They stated all of these prohibitions with regard to a Festival, and it is an a fortiori inference that these activities are prohibited on Shabbat as well, for the Sages decreed that one should not engage in these activities because they are similar to business transactions and weekday activities. The Gemara answers: This prohibition of consecrating an animal as a sacrifice on Shabbat or a Festival applies only to obligatory sacrifices that do not have a set time to be brought. But obligatory sacrifices that have a set time, such as the Paschal lamb, one may consecrate even on Shabbat. For Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A person may consecrate his Paschal lamb on Shabbat and his Festival peace-offering on the Festival. Since these sacrifices must be brought on a specific day, they may be consecrated on that day even when it is Shabbat or a Festival, as the Sages did not uphold their decree in this circumstance. The Gemara asks: But is he not driving a laden animal? One who leads a lamb that is carrying a knife is considered as one who is driving a laden animal, which is prohibited on Shabbat. The Gemara answers: It is driving a laden animal in an unusual manner, as a lamb is not typically used to carry loads. The Gemara asks: Even driving a laden animal in an unusual manner is problematic; granted that there is no prohibition by Torah law, but there is at least a rabbinic prohibition. When one performs a prohibited act on Shabbat in an unusual manner, he does not transgress a Torah prohibition, but nonetheless, he violates a rabbinic prohibition. The Gemara answers: This is precisely what the sons of Beteira asked Hillel: If there is an act that is permitted by Torah law, and a rabbinic decree stands before it and disallows it, what is the law with regard to the permissibility of uprooting the rabbinic decree in an unusual manner, in a situation in which one does so in order to fulfill a mitzva? Bringing the sacrifice is a mitzva, whereas leading the animal while it carries a knife is an unusual way of violating a rabbinic prohibition. Is this permitted? Hillel said to them: I once heard this halakha but I have forgotten it. But leave it to the Jewish people and rely on them to come up with a solution on their own, for if they are not prophets, they are the sons of prophets. With regard to the incident with Hillel, Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Anyone who acts haughtily, if he is a Torah scholar, his wisdom departs from him; and if he is a prophet, his prophecy departs from him. The Gemara explains: That if he is a Torah scholar, his wisdom departs from him is learned from Hillel, for the Master said in this baraita: Hillel began to rebuke them with words. Because he acted haughtily, he ended up saying to them: I once heard this halakha, but I have forgotten it, as he was punished for his haughtiness by forgetting the law. That if he is a prophet his prophecy departs from him is learned from Deborah, as it is written: “The villagers ceased, they ceased in Israel, until I, Deborah, arose, I arose a mother in Israel” (Judges 5:7). For these words of self-glorification, Deborah was punished with a loss of her prophetic spirit, as it is written later that it was necessary to say to her: “Awake, awake, Deborah; awake, awake, utter a song” (Judges 5:12), because her prophecy had left her. Similarly, Reish Lakish said: Any person who becomes angry, if he is a Torah scholar, his wisdom departs from him, and if he is a prophet, his prophecy departs from him. The Gemara explains: That if he is a Torah scholar his wisdom departs from him is learned from Moses, as it is written: “And Moses became angry with the officers of the host, the captains over thousands and the captains over hundreds, who came from the battle” (Numbers 31:14). And what was his punishment? As it is written afterward: “And Elazar the priest said to the men of war who went to the battle: This is the statute of the law, which the Lord commanded Moses” (Numbers 31:21), which proves by inference that this law had become hidden from Moses due to his anger. And that if he is a prophet, his prophecy departs from him, we learn from Elisha, as it is written that he became angry with the king of Israel and said to him: “Were it not that I have regard for the presence of Jehoshaphat the king of Judea, I would not look toward you, nor see you” (II Kings 3:14), and it is afterward written: “But now bring me a minstrel; and it came to pass when the minstrel played that the hand of the Lord came upon him” (II Kings 3:15). Because Elisha became angry with the king of Israel, his prophetic spirit departed from him and a minstrel was needed to rouse it anew. Rabbi Mani bar Patish said: Whoever becomes angry, even if greatness has been apportioned to him from heaven, he is lowered from his greatness. From where do we derive this? From Eliab, David’s older brother, as it is stated: “And Eliab’s anger burned against David and he said: Why did you come down, and with whom have you left those few sheep in the wilderness? I know your insolence and the evil of your heart, for you have come down to see the battle” (I Samuel 17:28); we see that Eliab became angry. And when Samuel went to anoint him after God had told him that one of Yishai’s sons was to be the king, concerning all of the other brothers it is written: “The Lord has not chosen this one” (I Samuel 16:8), whereas with regard to Eliab it is written: “And the Lord said to Samuel: Look not at his appearance, nor at the height of his stature, for I have rejected him” (I Samuel 16:7). This proves by inference that until now He had loved him, and it was only at this point that Eliab was rejected. Had it not been for his anger, Eliab would have been fit for greatness; but owing to this shortcoming, God rejected him. The Gemara raises an additional question incidental to the previous discussion proving that the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat: We have found proofs that the daily offering and the Paschal lamb override Shabbat. From where do we derive that they also override ritual impurity? For we have a tradition that if the entire community is ritually impure, they nonetheless offer the communal sacrifices and the Paschal lamb. They say: Just as the law governing the Paschal lamb is derived from the law governing the daily offering in regard to the overriding of Shabbat, so too the law concerning the daily offering is derived from the law concerning the Paschal lamb in regard to ritual impurity; just as the Paschal lamb overrides communal impurity, so does the daily offering. The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Paschal lamb itself, from where do we derive that if most of the nation is ritually impure, the sacrifice is offered anyway? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: For the verse states: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: Any man of you or your generations who shall be impure by reason of a corpse, or on a distant journey, he shall keep the Passover to the Lord. On the fourteenth day of the second month at evening they shall keep it, and eat it with matzot and bitter herbs” (Numbers 9:10–11). We can infer from here that a single individual or a group of individuals are deferred to the second Pesaḥ if they are ritually impure, but the entire community or the majority thereof is not deferred to the second Pesaḥ; rather, they observe the first Pesaḥ in a state of ritual impurity. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: This verse cannot serve as proof, for you can say that it is to be understood as follows: A single individual or a group of individuals is deferred to the second Pesaḥ, but the community has no remedy, neither on the first Pesaḥ nor on the second Pesaḥ. Rather, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish rejected this proof and said that a different proof may be brought from here: “Command the children of Israel that they send out from the camp any leper and any zav and anyone impure by reason of a corpse” (Numbers 5:2). Let the verse say only that they are to send out those who are ritually impure due to a corpse, and not say anything about zavin and lepers, and I would say this law on my own through an a fortiori inference: If those ritually impure due to a corpse, whose impurity is not so severe as it is contracted from an external source, are sent out from the camp, with regard to zavin and lepers who are the source of their own impurity, all the more so is it not clear that they should be sent out? Thus, the verse contains unnecessary information. Rather, it teaches you that you have a time when zavin and lepers are sent out from the camp, but those who are ritually impure due to contact with a corpse are not sent out. And what is this time? When a Paschal lamb is brought in impurity, when those impure due to contact with a corpse are permitted to participate, but a zav and a leper may not. From here we learn that when most of the nation is ritually impure due to contact with a corpse, the Paschal lamb is brought anyway in a state of ritual impurity. Abaye said: If so, that this is how the verse is to be interpreted, let us also say that the verse should only say zav and those ritually impure due to a corpse and not say leper, and I would say this law on my own through an a fortiori inference: If a zav is sent out, then with regard to a leper, whose ritual impurity is more severe than that of a zav, all the more so is it not clear that he should be sent out? Rather, the seemingly unnecessary mention of a leper teaches that you have a time when only lepers are sent out, but zavin and those ritually impure due to contact with a corpse are not sent out. And what is this time? When a Paschal offering is brought in impurity, when zavin and those impure due to contact with a corpse are permitted to participate, but a leper may not. And if you say that it is indeed so that even a zav may participate when the Paschal lamb is brought in a state of impurity, there is a difficulty, for didn’t we learn in a mishna: When a Paschal lamb is brought in a state of ritual impurity, zavim and zavot, menstruating women and women after childbirth, whose impurity is comparable to that of a zav, may not eat from it; but if they ate, they are exempt from karet. This demonstrates that the verse cannot be explained in accordance with Reish Lakish’s inference. Rather, Abaye said: Actually, the law can be derived from the first verse quoted by Rabbi Yoḥanan: “Any man who shall be impure by reason of a corpse.” And the derivation should be understood as follows: If so, that the verse comes to teach that only an individual can rectify his situation on the second Pesaḥ, but not the community, the Merciful One should have written: “Any man who shall be impure.” Why do I need the words “by reason of a corpse”? And if you say that these words “by reason of a corpse” come for this reason, to teach us that it is only one who is ritually impure due to contact with a corpse that is deferred to the second Pesaḥ but the rest of those who are impure are not deferred to the second Pesaḥ, there is a difficulty. For wasn’t it taught otherwise in the following baraita: One might have thought that only those ritually impure due to contact with a corpse and those on a distant journey observe the second Pesaḥ. From where do we derive that even zavin, lepers and those who had relations with menstruating women may participate in the second Pesaḥ? Therefore, the verse states: “Any man,” to include even people with these types of impurity. If so, why do I need the words “by reason of a corpse” that the Merciful One writes, as it would seem that they teach us nothing? Rather, this is what the verse is saying: A single individual or a group of individuals are deferred to the second Pesaḥ, but the entire community or the majority thereof is not deferred to the second Pesaḥ; rather, they observe the first Pesaḥ in a state of ritual impurity. And when we say that the community observes it in a state of impurity, that is only when they are ritually impure due to contact with a corpse, as indicated by the expression “by reason of a corpse,” but when they are impure with other types of impurity, they do not observe it in a state of impurity, even if the majority of the community is impure. Having cited verses dealing with the requirement to send out the ritually impure from the camp, the Gemara addresses several halakhot relevant to that topic. Rav Ḥisda said: A leper, who must be sent out from all of the camps including the Israelite camp, who went in beyond his boundary, that is, he entered an area that is prohibited to him, is nonetheless exempt from the punishment of lashes. With regard to the ritually impure, the Torah states: “Both male and female shall you send out, outside the camp shall you send them, and they shall defile not their camps in the midst of which I dwell” (Numbers 5:3), from which we learn that an impure person who enters the camp is liable to receive lashes for having violated the prohibition of “they shall not defile.” A leper, however, is exempt, as it is stated: “All the days that the plague shall be in him he shall be impure; he is impure, he shall dwell in isolation, his dwelling shall be outside the camp” (Leviticus 13:46). The Gemara explains that the verse is explicated in the following manner: “He shall dwell in isolation” means he shall dwell alone, without even the company of others who are impure. “His dwelling shall be outside the camp” teaches that the verse has transmuted the negative precept into a positive mitzva. In other words, the verse establishes that if a leper entered an area that is prohibited to him, he is commanded to leave, and fulfilling this command removes the full force of the prohibition he has already violated. The rule is that lashes are not administered for the violation of a prohibition, if that violation can be rectified by the fulfillment of a positive commandment. An objection was raised against Rav Ḥisda from a baraita: A leper, who may not even enter the Israelite camp, who went in beyond his boundary, is punished with forty lashes like one who violates a regular Torah prohibition. Similarly, zavin and zavot, who are prohibited from entering the Levite camp, who went in beyond their boundaries, are punished with forty lashes. And one who is ritually impure due to contact with a corpse is permitted to enter even the Levite camp. And not only did they say that one who is ritually impure due to a corpse may enter this area, but even a corpse itself may be brought into the Levite camp, as it is stated: “And Moses took the bones of Joseph with him” (Exodus 13:19), the words “with him” implying that the bones were taken within his boundary, i.e., that Joseph’s coffin was found in the same area in which Moses dwelled. Since Moses was a Levite and lived in the Levite camp, it follows that even a corpse may be brought into the Levite camp. In any event, we see from the first clause of the baraita that a leper does in fact receive lashes for entering an area prohibited to him, against Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara answers: This is a matter that is subject to dispute between tanna’im, for it was taught in a different baraita: “He shall dwell in isolation” indicates that he shall dwell alone, meaning that other ritually impure people, such as zavin and those who are ritually impure due to contact with a corpse, should not dwell with him. One might have thought that zavin and those who are ritually impure due to contact with a corpse are sent to one camp, meaning that the laws governing which camps they may or may not enter are the same for both. Therefore, the verse states: “Both male and female shall you send out, outside the camp shall you send them out, and they shall defile not their camps in the midst of which I dwell” (Numbers 5:3). The plural term “camps” teaches that there are multiple camps for those who are ritually impure, so that we give a camp for this one and a camp for that one; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Thus, in his opinion, there are three camps: One which a leper may not enter, one which a zav may not enter, and one which even someone ritually impure due to contact with a corpse may not enter. Rabbi Shimon says: It is not necessary to derive this law from the plural term “camps,” for surely the verse says: “Command the children of Israel that they send out from the camp any leper and any zav and anyone impure by reason of a corpse” (Numbers 5:2). The verse includes an unnecessary phrase: Let the verse say only that they are to send out those who are ritually impure due to a corpse, and not say anything about those impure as a zav, and I would say on my own that a zav is obviously included in this law: If those ritually impure due to a corpse are sent out from the camp, all the more so is it not clear that zavin should be sent out? If so, why is a zav stated? To give him a second camp, that is, to teach us that the law governing a zav is more severe than the law relating to one who is impure due to a corpse and there is an additional camp that he may not enter. And furthermore: Let the verse say only that they are to send out a zav, and not say anything about a leper, and I would say on my own that a leper is obviously included in this law as well: If zavin are sent out, all the more so is it not clear that lepers should be sent out? Why then is a leper stated? To give him a third camp that he may not enter. When the verse says with regard to a leper: “He shall dwell alone,” the verse has transmuted the negative precept into a positive command. This teaches us that a leper who enters a camp that is prohibited to him does not receive lashes for his violation of a negative commandment, which is consistent with the ruling of Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara questions the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: We see from the discussion cited above that it was clear to Rabbi Shimon that the impurity of a zav is more severe than that of one who is ritually impure due to contact with a corpse, and that the impurity of a leper is even more severe than that of a zav. What is the stringency of a zav over one who is ritually impure due to a corpse? That the impurity of the zav issues out upon him from his own body, rather than coming from an external source, as is the case when impurity is contracted from a corpse. But on the contrary, it may be argued that the legal status of one who is ritually impure due to a corpse is more severe, as he requires sprinkling of the purifying waters on the third and seventh days of his purification process, whereas a zav, who is also impure for seven days, does not require such sprinkling. The Gemara answers: Therefore, the verse states not just “impure” but “and anyone impure.” The additional words come to include one who is ritually impure due to contact with a creeping animal. He, too, is sent out from the camp like one who is impure due to contact with a corpse, and it is clear that the legal status of a zav is more severe than one who is ritually impure due to contact with a creeping animal. The Gemara asks: And what is his stringency? In what way is a zav more stringent than one who has contracted ritual impurity from a creeping animal? The Gemara answers: As we have said, that his impurity issues out upon him from his own body, unlike one who has contracted impurity from a creeping animal. But on the contrary, it is possible to say that the legal status a creeping animal is more severe, for it imparts ritual impurity even through an accident. A zav only becomes impure when it is clear that his discharge did not result from sickness or some other accident, but a person who comes into contact with a creeping animal contracts ritual impurity regardless of the circumstances of that contact. They say in answer to this question: In a case like this, meaning, if we compare the two cases in this way, a zav also becomes impure through an accident, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, for Rav Huna said: The first sighting of a zav establishes ritual impurity even through an accident. In order to contract the more severe ritual impurity of a zav that lasts seven days, a man must experience at least two zav discharges. If he has only a single discharge, he contracts a less severe ritual impurity that lasts until evening, like one who experienced a seminal emission. This first discharge establishes impurity even if it results from some accident, and no effort is made to attribute it to some other factor. The Gemara asks further: What is the stringency of a leper over a zav? That a confirmed leper is required to let his hair grow and rend his garments and he is prohibited from marital relations, none of which applies to a zav. But on the contrary, there is room to say that the legal status of a zav is more severe, for a zav imparts ritual impurity to that upon which he lies or sits even if he does not come into direct contact with it, and he imparts ritual impurity to an earthenware vessel through movement. If he causes an earthenware vessel to move, it becomes ritually impure even if he touches it on the outside, and even if he does not touch the vessel at all. Ordinarily, an earthenware vessel becomes impure only through contact on the inside of the vessel. The Gemara answers: The verse states not just “zav” but “and any zav,” and this inclusive expression “any” comes to include a person who experienced a seminal emission, whose impurity is of the same type as a zav, and it is clear that the legal status of a leper is more severe than a person who experienced a seminal emission. We can therefore derive through an a fortiori inference that if one who experienced a seminal emission is prohibited from entering a certain camp, a leper is certainly prohibited from entering that camp. The Gemara asks: And what is his stringency? In what way is the legal status of a leper more severe than one who experienced a seminal emission? As we said, that he must let his hair grow and rend his garments and he is prohibited to engage in marital relations. But we may ask: On the contrary, there is room to say that the legal status of one who experienced a seminal emission is more severe, for he becomes ritually impure even with any amount. For the Torah did not specify an amount of semen that must be emitted in order to become impure, and one therefore becomes impure upon emitting even a minute amount, whereas leprous signs do have a minimum measure. The Gemara answers: He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Natan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: In order for a zav to become ritually impure, he needs to experience a discharge substantial enough to cause a blockage of the tip of the male organ. But the Rabbis did not agree with him. Thus, according to Rabbi Natan, a zav only becomes ritually impure if he experiences a discharge of a particular amount. And one who experienced a seminal emission is compared to a zav and therefore the same amount of discharge is required in order to cause ritual impurity. Therefore, the ritual impurity of a leper is more severe than that of one who experienced a seminal emission, and the original a fortiori inference applies. The Gemara asks: The expressions “any zav” and “anyone impure” teach that their respective categories are more inclusive than one would otherwise have thought. But why do I need the inclusive expression “and any leper”? What does the word “any” include? The Gemara explains: Since it is written “any zav,” it is also written “any leper,” so that the wording of the verse will be consistent. The Gemara challenges the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda quoted above: Rabbi Shimon spoke well when he derived the three camps from which the three different classes of people are sent out from the verse: “That they send out from the camp any leper and any zav and anyone impure by reason of a corpse.” How does Rabbi Yehuda counter this argument? The Gemara answers: He needs that verse for that which was taught in a different baraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: One might have thought that if zavin and lepers pushed and entered the Temple courtyard during the offering of a Paschal lamb that is brought in a state of impurity, when the majority of the nation are ritually impure due to contact with a corpse, that perhaps they would be liable for punishment for having violated the prohibition of entering the Temple while ritually impure. They are prohibited from entering even under such circumstances. Therefore the verse states: “That they send out from the camp any leper and any zav and anyone impure by reason of a corpse” (Numbers 5:2), which teaches us that at a time when those impure due to a corpse are sent out, zavin and lepers are sent out and are liable to karet for entering the Temple; but when those impure due to a corpse are not sent out, zavin and lepers are not sent out, meaning, they are not liable to receive karet for entering the Temple. The Master said above: The fact that the verse does not just say “zav” but rather the inclusive expression “and any zav” comes to include a person who experienced a seminal emission. The Gemara notes: This exposition supports the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, for Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tunnels under the Temple were not sanctified with the sanctity of the Temple; and a person who experienced a seminal emission is sent outside the two camps just like a zav. The exposition quoted above supports this second ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara raises an objection based on what we learned in a mishna: The law governing a person who experienced a seminal emission is like the law governing someone who became ritually impure through contact with a creeping animal. What, is the intent not to compare them with regard to their respective camps, that one who experienced a seminal emission is prohibited from the same camps that are prohibited to one who touched a creeping animal? Thus, it follows that a person who experienced a seminal emission is permitted to enter the Levite camp. The Gemara answers: No, they are compared with regard to their impurity, in that each is impure only until the evening. The Gemara expresses surprise: Why did the mishna need to teach that they are comparable with regard to their impurity? Impurity until evening is explicitly written in the Torah about this one, meaning that one who came into contact with a creeping animal is impure until the evening and then must undergo ritual immersion in order to become pure, as it states: “And for these you shall be unclean; whoever touches the carcass of them shall be unclean until evening” (Leviticus 11:24). And impurity until evening is explicitly written about that one, one who experienced a seminal emission, as it states: “And if semen goes out from a man, then shall he bathe all his flesh in water and be unclean until evening” (Leviticus 15:16). Rather, is it not that they are compared with regard to their camps, which is not explicit in the Torah? The Gemara answers: No, actually it is possible to say that the comparison relates to their impurity, and it teaches us that a person who experienced seminal emission is governed by the same law as someone who became ritually impure through contact with a creeping animal in another regard: Just as contact with a creeping animal imparts ritual impurity through an accident, even when the contact is unintentional, so too a person who experienced a seminal emission becomes ritually impure through an accident, even when the emission of semen is unintentional, unlike the law governing a zav. The Gemara raises an objection: We learned in the continuation of the previously cited mishna that the law governing one who had relations with a menstruating woman is like the law governing one who is ritually impure due to a corpse. With regard to what did they formulate this comparison? If we say they made the comparison with regard to their impurity, that they are both impure for seven days, impurity for seven days is explicitly written about this one, someone who had relations with a menstruating woman, and impurity for seven days is explicitly written about that one, someone who is impure due to a corpse, and so there would be no need for the mishna to inform us of these laws. Rather, is it not that they are compared with regard to their camps, to teach that one who had relations with a menstruating woman is sent out from the same camp as someone ritually impure due to a corpse? And from the fact that the comparison in the latter clause of the mishna relates to their camps, it stands to reason that the comparison in the earlier clause of that same mishna between one who experienced a seminal emission and one who became ritually impure through contact with a creeping animal also relates to their camps, and not as we explained it earlier. The Gemara rejects this argument: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is; each part of the mishna formulates its own comparison. The Gemara raises an objection from that which was taught: The legal status of a leper is more severe than a zav and the legal status of a zav is more severe than one who is ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, with regard to which camps they are prohibited to enter; to the exclusion of a person who experienced a seminal emission, for the legal status of one who is ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse is more severe than his status. The Gemara wishes to clarify this enigmatic statement: What is the meaning of the words, to the exclusion of a person who experienced a seminal emission? Is the intent not that he is excluded from the category of a zav and enters the category of one who is ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, for the legal status of one who is ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse is more severe than his status, as his impurity lasts for seven days, and nonetheless he is permitted in the Levite camp. We should therefore learn from here that someone who experienced a seminal emission is also permitted in the Levite camp. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, the intent is that one who experienced a seminal emission is excluded from the camp of one who is ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, and he enters the camp of a zav, meaning that he is excluded from the Levite camp, just like a zav. And although the legal status of one who is ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse is more severe than his status and he is permitted in the Levite camp, and so it would seem that one who experienced a seminal emission should similarly be permitted, nonetheless, we compare him to that to which he is similar. The ritual impurity of one who experienced a seminal emission is fundamentally similar to that of a zav, and different from that of one who is ritually impure due to a corpse. A tanna taught a baraita before Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi: “If there be among you a man that is impure by reason of a nocturnal occurrence, he shall go outside the camp, he shall not come within the camp” (Deuteronomy 23:11). This verse may be expounded as follows: “He shall go outside the camp,” this is the camp of the Divine Presence. “He shall not come within the camp,” this is the Levite camp. From here we derive that a person who experienced a seminal emission must go out from two camps. Rav Yitzḥak said to the tanna: Something is amiss in the wording of this baraita: You have not yet brought him in and you already send him out? In other words, in order to say that the words “he shall not come within the camp” teach that a person who experienced a seminal emission must leave the Levite camp, you must first prove that he was there to begin with. Another version, which differs from the previous one only in formulation but not in substance: You have not yet sent him out and you already bring him in? In other words, how can you say that the words “he shall not come within the camp” refer to the Levite camp if we have not yet learned that he must leave that camp in the first place? Rather, emend the baraita and say that it reads as follows: “Outside the camp,” this is the Levite camp. “He shall not come within the camp,” this is the camp of the Divine Presence. Ravina strongly objects to this exposition of the verse: Say that both this and that refer to the camp of the Divine Presence, that he must leave the camp of the Divine Presence and may not enter it; and the repetition comes to teach that he violates a positive command to leave the camp and a negative command barring entry into the camp. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse say only: “He shall go outside the camp, he shall not come within,” or “within it.” Why do I need the repetition of the word “the camp”? Conclude from this that it is to give him a different camp; it refers not to the same camp that he left but rather to a different one. We learned in the mishna that cleaning the intestines of the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat. The Gemara asks: What is meant by cleaning the intestines? Rav Huna said: It means that he punctures them with a knife allowing the excrement to exit. Rav Ḥiyya bar Rav said: It refers to the removal of the secretions of the intestine, which come out through the pressure of the knife and would ruin the entire sacrifice and cause it to become putrid were they allowed to remain in the intestines. Rabbi Eliezer said: What is Ḥiyya bar Rav’s reason for explaining the term in this manner? As it is written: “Then shall the lambs feed as in their pasture, and the ruins of the fat ones [meḥim] shall wanderers eat” (Isaiah 5:17). From where may it be inferred that this verse is in any way connected to our discussion? As Rav Yosef translates this verse: “And the righteous shall inherit the possessions of the wicked.” This indicates that the word meḥim, understood by Rav Yosef as referring to the wicked, is a term of degradation. This led Ḥiyya bar Rav to interpret the mishna’s clause with regard to cleaning [miḥui] the intestines as referring to removing the repulsive matter inside. Having explained the latter part of the verse in Isaiah, the Gemara turns to the beginning of that same verse. “Then shall the lambs feed as in their pasture [kedavram].” Menashya bar Yirmeya said that Rav said: As was said about them [kamedubar bam], i.e., as the prophet promised. To what prophecy does the verse refer with the expression “as was said about them”? Abaye said: It is referring to the continuation of the verse: “And the ruins of the fat ones shall wanderers eat.” Rava said to him that this cannot be: Granted, were it written only “the ruins of the fat ones,” it would be possible to explain as you said. Now that it is written “and the ruins,” with the addition of the word “and,” this indicates that it states something else, and the verse contains two separate prophecies. Rather, Rava said: This verse should be understood in accordance with what Rav Ḥananel said that Rav said. For Rav Ḥananel said that Rav said: In the future, the righteous will resurrect the dead. It is written here: “Then shall the lambs feed [vera’u] as in their pasture,” the lambs serving as an allusion to the righteous, and it is written there: “Tend your people with your staff, the flock of your heritage, who dwell alone in the wood, in the midst of Carmel; let them feed [yiru] in Bashan and Gilad as in the days of old” (Micah 7:14). “Bashan” is an allusion to the prophet Elisha, who came from the Bashan. How do we know that Elisha came from Bashan? As it is stated: “Joel the chief, and Shafam the next, and Yanai and Shafat in the Bashan” (I Chronicles 5:12), and it is written: “Here is Elisha ben Shafat who poured water on the hands of Elijah” (II Kings 3:11). “Gilad” is an allusion to Elijah, as it is stated: “And Elijah the Tishbite, who was of the inhabitants of Gilad, said” (I Kings 17:1). Based on the similarity of the verses and the verbal analogy between the two instances of the word “feed,” we learn that in the future the righteous will be like Elijah and Elisha, who resurrected the dead. This idea is derived from a different source as well. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: In the future the righteous will resurrect the dead, as it is stated: “Old men and old women shall yet again dwell in the streets of Jerusalem, and every man with his staff in his hand for very age” (Zechariah 8:4). And the staff will then be used as it was used by Gehazi when Elisha sent him to bring the son of the Shunamite woman back to life, as it is written: “And you shall lay my staff on the face of the child” (II Kings 4:29). As we have been discussing the world of the future and the resurrection of the dead, the Gemara cites additional statements on these topics. Ulla raised a contradiction between two verses: In one verse it is written: “He will destroy death forever, and the Lord God will wipe away tears from off all faces, and the insult of His people shall He take away from off all the earth; for the Lord has spoken” (Isaiah 25:8). And in another verse it is written: “There shall be no more there an infant who lives a few days, nor an old man who has not filled his days; for the youngest shall die a hundred years old” (Isaiah 65:20), implying that people will live long lives, but death will not be totally eradicated. Ulla answers: This is not difficult: Here, in the first verse, it is referring to Jews, who will not die at all, while there, in the second verse, it is referring to gentiles, who will live exceedingly long lives but eventually die. The Gemara asks: What are gentiles doing there in the future world? The Gemara answers: As it is written: “And strangers shall stand and feed your flocks, and the sons of the alien shall be your plowmen and your vineyard workers” (Isaiah 61:5). Rav Ḥisda raised a contradiction between two verses: In one verse it is written: “Then the moon shall be confounded and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem, and before His elders will be His glory” (Isaiah 24:23), which indicates that in the future there will be no light at all from the sun or the moon. And elsewhere it is written: “Moreover the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold, as the light of seven days, on the day that the Lord binds up the breach of His people and heals the stroke of their wound blow” (Isaiah 30:26), which indicates that the light of the sun and moon will be even brighter than before. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: Here, where it says that the sun and the moon will be ashamed before the glow of the Divine Presence, it is referring to the World-to-Come, which is an entirely different world; while there, where it says that their light will increase, it is referring to the days of the Messiah. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Shmuel, who said that there is no difference between this world and the days of the Messiah except for subjugation to foreign kingdoms, but in all other ways, including the illumination of the celestial bodies, the world order will remain unchanged, what is there to say to reconcile these verses? The Gemara answers: This and that refer to the World-to-Come, and it is not difficult: Here, where it says that the sun and the moon will be totally ashamed, it refers to the camp of the Divine Presence; while there, where it says that the light of the sun and moon will be greatly magnified, it refers to the camp of the righteous. Rava raised a contradiction between two parts of a verse. It is written: “I put to death and I make live” (Deuteronomy 32:39) and in that same verse it is written: “I wound and I heal.” Now once it says that He gives life to the dead, all the more so is it not clear that He can heal those who are still alive? What then does the second clause add to the first? Rather, the second clause clarifies the first one: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said: Those same people whom I put to death I will bring to life, just as those people whom I wounded I will heal. In other words, the verse means to say that just as God will heal the same people He wounded, so will He revive those He put to death; and not, as the verse might otherwise have been understood, that He puts some people to death and gives life to others. Similarly, the Sages taught in a baraita: “I put to death and I make live”; one might have thought that this refers to death for one person and life, i.e., birth, for another person, in the customary manner of the world. Therefore, the verse states: “I wound and I heal”; just as the wounding and the healing mentioned here clearly refer to the same person, so too death and life refer to the same person. From this verse, there is a refutation to those who say that there is no Torah source for the resurrection of the dead, for it is explicitly mentioned in this verse. Alternatively, the verse can be explained as follows: At first, those whom I put to death I will bring to life, but they will be revived with the same injuries that they had when they died; and subsequently, those whom I wounded I will heal, meaning that their injuries will be healed after they are resurrected. We learned in the mishna that when the eve of Passover occurs on Shabbat, burning the fats of the Paschal lamb overrides Shabbat. The Gemara notes that it was taught in the Tosefta: Rabbi Shimon said: Come and see how dear is a mitzva performed in its proper time. For burning the fats and limbs and inner fats is valid all night and it would have been possible to wait until the conclusion of Shabbat and burn them at night, but nonetheless we do not wait with them until nightfall; rather, we burn them immediately, even on Shabbat. The mishna also taught that carrying the Paschal lamb through a public domain, bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit and cutting off its wart do not override Shabbat. The Gemara raises a contradiction from another mishna in tractate Eiruvin, which teaches: One may cut off a wart by hand on Shabbat in the Temple but not in the rest of the country outside the Temple. And if the wart is to be removed with an instrument, it is forbidden both here, in the Temple, and there, outside the Temple. From here we see that in the Temple cutting off a wart, at least by hand, is permitted. Two amora’im, Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, disagreed about how to resolve this contradiction. One of them said: Both this mishna in Pesaḥim and that mishna in Eiruvin speak of cutting off the wart by hand. This mishna that forbids cutting it off refers to a moist wart, which is considered like the flesh of the animal. It is therefore prohibited by rabbinic decree to cut off the wart; and since it could have been removed before Shabbat, the decree applies even in the Temple, where rabbinic decrees are generally not applicable. That mishna that permits cutting it off refers to a dry wart, which breaks apart by itself, and so there is no prohibition even by rabbinic decree to cut it off. And the other one said: Both this mishna and that mishna speak of cutting off a moist wart, and it is not difficult. This mishna that says it is permitted talks about removing the wart by hand, which is prohibited only by a rabbinic decree that was not applied to the Temple; whereas that mishna that says it is prohibited talks about removing the wart with an instrument, which is prohibited by Torah law and forbidden everywhere. The Gemara asks: And according to the one who says that this mishna speaks about cutting off the wart by hand and that mishna speaks about cutting it off with an instrument, what is the reason that he did not state like the other amora that this and that talk about cutting off the wart by hand, and it is not difficult; this mishna speaks of a moist wart, while that mishna speaks of a dry wart? The Gemara answers that he could have said to you: A dry wart breaks apart by itself, and so there would be no need to teach us that it may be removed. Both mishnayot must therefore refer to a moist wart, and the difference between them is whether the wart is being removed by hand or with an instrument. The Gemara reverses the question: And according to the one who says that both this mishna and that mishna talk about removing the wart by hand, and it is not difficult; this speaks of a moist wart while that speaks of a dry wart. What is the reason that he did not state like the other amora that this and that are discussing a moist wart and it is not difficult; this mishna in Eiruvin speaks about cutting off the wart by hand and that mishna in Pesaḥim speaks about cutting it off with an instrument? The Gemara answers that he could have said to you: The case of cutting off the wart with an instrument is taught there in Eiruvin in that very same mishna: If the wart is to be removed with an instrument, it is forbidden both here, in the Temple, and there, outside the Temple. Therefore, there would be no reason to repeat the same halakha here in this mishna, as it is stated explicitly in the other mishna. The Gemara asks: And the other amora, how does he account for the repetition according to his explanation? The mishna here teaches the law with regard to an instrument because it comes to teach us the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua; for according to our mishna, Rabbi Eliezer permits cutting off a moist wart even with an instrument in order to render the animal fit to be brought as a Paschal offering. We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer said that if slaughter, which is ordinarily forbidden on Shabbat as a biblically prohibited labor, nevertheless overrides Shabbat when performed for the sake of the Paschal lamb, then activities that are prohibited by rabbinic decree should certainly override Shabbat when performed for that purpose. Rabbi Yehoshua disagreed, arguing that the law governing a Festival proves otherwise. Rabbi Eliezer countered that the law governing an optional activity, such as preparing food on a Festival, cannot be brought as proof with regard to the mitzva of offering the Paschal lamb. The Gemara notes that Rabbi Yehoshua follows his regular line of reasoning, for he said that rejoicing on a Festival is also a mitzva, and therefore whatever one does in order to enhance one’s enjoyment of the Festival is considered an act performed for the sake of a mitzva, just like the offering of a sacrifice. For it was taught in a baraita that these two tanna’im disagreed about this matter: Rabbi Eliezer says: A person has nothing but to choose on a Festival; he either eats and drinks or sits and learns the entire day, but there is no specific mitzva to eat on the Festival. Rabbi Yehoshua, on the other hand, says: Divide the day, half of it for eating and drinking and half of it for the study hall, for he holds that eating and drinking are obligatory on the Festival. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And both of them derived their opinions from one verse, i.e., the two of them addressed the same textual difficulty, resolving it in different ways. For one verse says: “It shall be an assembly for the Lord your God; you shall do no labor” (Deuteronomy 16:8), which indicates that the day is set aside for Divine service, and another verse says: “It shall be an assembly for you; you shall do no servile labor” (Numbers 29:35), which indicates a celebratory assembly for the Jewish people. Rabbi Eliezer holds that the two verses should be understood as offering a choice: The day is to be either entirely for God or entirely for you. And Rabbi Yehoshua holds that it is possible to fulfill both verses: Split the day into two, half of it for God and half of it for you. Ayin, beit, mem is a mnemonic consisting of the first letter of Atzeret, the middle letter of Shabbat and the final letter of Purim. Rabbi Elazar said: All agree with regard to Atzeret, the holiday of Shavuot, that we require that it be also “for you,” meaning that it is a mitzva to eat, drink, and rejoice on that day. What is the reason? It is the day on which the Torah was given, and one must celebrate the fact that the Torah was given to the Jewish people. Rabba said: All agree with regard to Shabbat that we require that it be also “for you.” What is the reason? Because the verse states: “If you proclaim Shabbat a delight, the sacred day of God honored” (Isaiah 58:13). Rav Yosef said: All agree with regard to Purim that we require that it be also “for you.” What is the reason? Because it is written: “To observe them as days of feasting and gladness” (Esther 9:22). The Gemara relates: Mar, son of Ravina, would spend the entire year fasting during the day and eating only sparsely at night, except for Shavuot, Purim, and the eve of Yom Kippur. He made these exceptions for the following reasons: Shavuot because it is the day on which the Torah was given and there is a mitzva to demonstrate one’s joy on that day; Purim because “days of feasting and gladness” is written about it; the eve of Yom Kippur, as Ḥiyya bar Rav of Difti taught: “And you shall afflict your souls on the ninth day of the month in the evening, from evening to evening you shall keep your Sabbath” (Leviticus 23:32). But does one fast on the ninth of Tishrei? Doesn’t one fast on the tenth of Tishrei? Rather, this comes to tell you: One who eats and drinks on the ninth, the verse ascribes him credit as if he fasted on both the ninth and the tenth of Tishrei. The Gemara relates that Rav Yosef, on the day of Shavuot, would say: Prepare me a choice third-born calf. He said: If not for this day on which the Torah was given that caused the Jewish people to have the Torah, how many Yosefs would there be in the market? It is only due to the importance of Torah study that I have become a leader of the Jewish people, and I therefore have a special obligation to rejoice on this day. A somewhat similar story is told about Rav Sheshet, that every thirty days he would review his studies that he had learned over the previous month, and he would stand and lean against the bolt of the door and say: Rejoice my soul, rejoice my soul, for you I have read Scripture, for you I have studied Mishna. The Gemara asks: Is that so, that Torah study is beneficial only for the soul of the person who has studied? But didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: If not for the Torah and its study, heaven and earth would not be sustained, as it is stated: “If not for My covenant by day and by night, I would not have set up the laws of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:25). It is the Torah, the eternal covenant that is studied day and night, that justifies the continued existence of the world. The Gemara answers: This is indeed correct, but at the outset when a person does this mitzva, he does it for himself, and only afterward does he have in mind the benefit that will be brought to the entire world. Rav Ashi said: And even according to what Rabbi Eliezer said, that rejoicing on a Festival is optional, there is a refutation: If on a Festival, when a biblically prohibited labor, such as slaughtering, baking, or cooking, is permitted even when it is performed for an optional activity, nonetheless a rabbinic decree that is with it is not permitted, and we do not say that since they permitted an optional activity they permitted everything associated with it; how much more so on Shabbat, when a biblically prohibited labor is only permitted when it is performed for a mitzva, isn’t it right not to permit a rabbinic decree that is with it? Activities that are forbidden due to a rabbinic decree should thus be prohibited on Shabbat even for the purpose of a mitzva, against the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. And Rabbi Eliezer rejects this refutation because, in his opinion, permitting a rabbinic decree for the sake of a mitzva is preferable. We cannot derive through an a fortiori inference that since rabbinic decrees were not permitted for optional activities associated with rejoicing on festivals, they must not be permitted for the purpose of a mitzva on Shabbat. This is because it is possible that they permitted rabbinic decrees for mitzva purposes due to the importance of the mitzva. It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer said: What reason do I have? If actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva and are done after the slaughter, such as cleaning the intestines which is permitted according all opinions, override Shabbat even though the mitzva has already been done, is it possible to say that actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva and must be done before the slaughter do not also override Shabbat? Rabbi Akiva said to him: What reason do I have to reject this comparison? If actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva that are done after the slaughter override Shabbat, that is because slaughter has already overridden Shabbat and therefore an action that violates a rabbinic decree is performed, after Shabbat has already been overridden; can you say that actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva and are done before the slaughter should override Shabbat even though slaughter has not yet overridden Shabbat? Alternatively, Rabbi Akiva has another reason: Perhaps the offering will be found to be disqualified due to a blemish and the person will be found to have violated Shabbat retroactively when he slaughtered the animal without fulfilling a mitzva. Rabbi Eliezer rejects this argument: If so, if you are concerned about this possibility, it should also not be slaughtered; for perhaps the offering will be found to be invalid and the person will be found to have violated Shabbat retroactively. Rather, the course of the discussion must have gone as follows: Rabbi Akiva said this last reason to Rabbi Eliezer at the beginning and he refuted it as explained above; and then Rabbi Akiva said to him this other reason of: What reason do I have to reject this comparison? If actions that facilitate the performance of the mitzva override, etc. We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Akiva responded and said to Rabbi Eliezer that the law governing the sprinkling of the purifying water of a red heifer proves that actions prohibited by a rabbinic decree, even when they are performed for the sake of a mitzva, do not override Shabbat. He then goes on to argue that we can reverse the order of the argument and conclude by way of an a fortiori inference that even slaughter does not override Shabbat. It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer said to him about this: Akiva, you have lightheartedly responded to me with a faulty a fortiori inference with regard to slaughter. His death will be with slaughter; meaning, as punishment for this disrespect you will be slaughtered by other people. Rabbi Akiva said to him: My teacher, do not deny my contention at the time we are discussing this inference, for this is the tradition I received from you: Sprinkling is forbidden by rabbinic decree and does not override Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Seeing that Rabbi Eliezer taught Rabbi Akiva this halakha that sprinkling purifying water does not override Shabbat, what is the reason he retracted his opinion? Ulla said: When Rabbi Eliezer taught him this halakha, he taught it to him with respect to sprinkling that is performed in order to enable a ritually impure priest to partake of teruma. This sprinkling does not override Shabbat because even separating teruma itself does not override Shabbat. But he never taught Rabbi Akiva this halakha with respect to sprinkling that is performed in order enable someone to eat of the Paschal lamb. The Gemara notes that Rabbi Akiva as well, when he challenged Rabbi Eliezer, challenged him with regard to the halakha of sprinkling for teruma, and his objection should be understood as follows: Eating teruma is a mitzva, and sprinkling purifying water on someone who is ritually impure is only prohibited due to a rabbinic decree; nevertheless, sprinkling purifying water on a ritually impure priest, in order to enable him to eat teruma, is prohibited on Shabbat. Thus it follows by a fortiori inference that slaughter, which is a biblically prohibited labor, should certainly be forbidden on Shabbat, even when performed for the sake of a mitzva. And Rabbi Eliezer thought Rabbi Akiva was challenging him with regard to the halakha of sprinkling that is performed in order to enable someone to eat of the Paschal lamb; that is why he said that he disagreed about sprinkling as well. Rabba raised an objection to Ulla’s explanation, based on a different baraita which states: Rabbi Akiva responded and said: The sprinkling of purifying water on someone who is ritually impure due to contact with a corpse proves the matter when his seventh day of impurity occurs on Shabbat and it is also the eve of Passover, for it is done for the sake of a mitzva, in order to allow the person to eat of the Paschal lamb, and it is prohibited only due to a rabbinic decree, and nonetheless it does not override Shabbat. From this baraita it is clear that Rabbi Akiva challenged Rabbi Eliezer with regard to the halakha of sprinkling that is performed in order to enable someone to eat the Paschal lamb. Rather, we must reject Ulla’s explanation and say instead that Rabbi Eliezer certainly taught Rabbi Akiva about sprinkling that is performed in order to enable someone to eat of the Paschal lamb. And with regard to the question that seeing that Rabbi Eliezer himself taught him this halakha, what is the reason that Rabbi Eliezer refutes it, the Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer forgot his own teaching and Rabbi Akiva came to remind him of his teaching by drawing an a fortiori inference that would cause Rabbi Eliezer to remember what he himself had taught. The Gemara asks: If so, then let Rabbi Akiva say explicitly that this is what Rabbi Eliezer himself had taught him. The Gemara answers: He thought that it would not be proper to tell his teacher that he had forgotten his teaching, and therefore his initial attempt was to remind him indirectly. The Gemara questions the reason for the halakha under discussion. What is the reason that the sprinkling of purifying water does not override Shabbat? Since it involves the mere moving of the liquid from the utensil in his hand to the body of the person seeking purification, why should it be forbidden on Shabbat? Let it at least override Shabbat on account of the mitzva of the Paschal lamb. Rabba said: The prohibition against sprinkling is a rabbinic decree that was instituted lest one take the utensil containing the purifying water and carry it a distance of four cubits in the public domain, thus violating an actual Torah prohibition. This is consistent with Rabba’s opinion in several other places in the Talmud that the Sages forbade the fulfillment of certain mitzvot due to a similar concern about carrying in the public domain. The Gemara asks: At least according to Rabbi Eliezer, let us carry the purifying water even in the public domain, for Rabbi Eliezer said as a general rule that actions that facilitate the performance of a mitzva override Shabbat, even if they are not mitzvot themselves and involve transgression of Torah prohibitions. They say that there is room to distinguish between different situations: The rule that actions necessary to facilitate a mitzva override Shabbat only applies when the person himself is fit to fulfill the mitzva and the obligation to fulfill it is incumbent upon him. But here where the person himself is not fit to eat the Paschal lamb, as he is presently ritually impure, the obligation to fulfill the mitzva is not incumbent upon him, and therefore actions that would enable him to fulfill the mitzva do not override Shabbat. Rabba said: According to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer that when a person is unfit no obligation is incumbent upon him, in the case of a healthy baby, one may heat water for him to strengthen him even further in order to circumcise him on Shabbat, as he is already now fit to be circumcised. But in the case of a sickly baby, one may not heat water for him to strengthen him in order to circumcise him, for owing to his sickliness he is not presently fit for the mitzva, and acts that facilitate a mitzva do not override Shabbat if the person is not currently fit for the mitzva. Rava said: But if the baby is healthy, why does he need hot water to strengthen him? Rather, Rava said: All babies are considered sickly with respect to circumcision, as they all need to be washed with hot water. Therefore, both in the case of a healthy baby and in the case of a sickly baby, one may not heat water for him to strengthen him in order to circumcise him on Shabbat, even according to Rabbi Eliezer, as he is not presently fit for the mitzva. Abaye raised an objection to Rabba’s distinction between someone who is currently fit for the mitzva and someone who is not, based on what was taught elsewhere in a baraita: An uncircumcised adult who did not circumcise himself before Passover is liable to the punishment of karet for having intentionally violated the mitzva to bring the Paschal lamb, as an uncircumcised person may not eat of the offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. But here the person himself is not fit, for as long as he is uncircumcised he is not obligated to bring the Paschal lamb, and nonetheless the baraita is teaching that he is punished with karet. Apparently, the obligation is incumbent upon him even though he is presently unfit to perform the mitzva. Rabba said in answer to this objection: Rabbi Eliezer holds that one may not slaughter the Paschal lamb or sprinkle its blood for someone who is ritually impure due to contact with a creeping animal because he is currently impure, even though he can immerse in a ritual bath and become pure by the night of Passover. And Rabbi Eliezer further maintains with regard to any form of impurity due to which an individual is deferred to the second Pesaḥ, that if the entire community is afflicted with it, they observe the first Pesaḥ in a state of ritual impurity. And he accepts yet another principle: Anything that applies to the community applies to an individual, and anything that does not apply to the community does not apply to an individual. On the basis of these principles, we can say as follows: With regard to lack of circumcision, if the entire community is uncircumcised we say to them: Arise, and circumcise yourselves, and offer the Paschal lamb, and we do not allow them to offer the sacrifice while uncircumcised. Therefore, with regard to an individual as well, we say to him: Arise, and circumcise yourself, and offer the Paschal lamb; and if he does not circumcise himself and offer the Paschal lamb, he is liable to the punishment of karet. With regard to impurity, however, if the whole community is impure we do not sprinkle the purifying water on them; rather, they offer the Paschal lamb in a state of ritual impurity. Therefore, an individual, as well, is exempt from sprinkling; and since he is exempt, sprinkling does not override Shabbat. A distinction may be drawn between the two cases: An uncircumcised person must circumcise himself, but a person who is ritually impure need not undergo purification. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: Are these principles really correct? But there is the second Pesaḥ, which does not apply to the community and yet it applies to an individual. Rava said to Rav Huna: It is different there, as the community already offered the Paschal lamb on the first Pesaḥ in a state of ritual impurity, and therefore the second Pesaḥ can apply to individuals although it does not apply to the community. The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita in which it was taught: One might have thought that only one who was pure and not on a distant journey is punishable by karet for having neglected to offer the Paschal lamb, as the Torah explicitly states that a person who was ritually impure or on a distant journey is exempt from the first Pesaḥ and obligated in the second Pesaḥ. But as for one who was uncircumcised or ritually impure from a creeping animal and all the others who are ritually impure not from a corpse, and they did not undergo circumcision or purification before Passover, from where do we know that they are also liable to receive karet? The verse states: “But the man that is clean, and is not on a journey, and fails to keep the Passover, then that person shall be cut off from his people” (Numbers 9:13); the expression “but the man” comes to include anyone who can become pure and fit to participate in the Paschal lamb, but fails to do so. The Gemara infers from this baraita: From the fact that he searches for a source to include one who is ritually impure from a creeping animal, it is clear that he holds that one may not slaughter the Paschal lamb or sprinkle its blood for someone who is ritually impure from a creeping animal. For if one may slaughter and sprinkle for someone impure from a creeping animal, why did he search for a source to include it? He is the same as anyone who is pure and did not offer the Paschal lamb, for he could have sent his offering with someone else and eaten from it in the evening after having undergone ritual immersion. Rather, it is clear that one may not slaughter or sprinkle for him; and, nonetheless, if he neglected the mitzva of the Paschal lamb, he is liable to receive karet. Apparently then, although he was not fit at that time to offer the Paschal lamb, the obligation is nonetheless incumbent upon him to render himself fit. And although this does not apply to the community, for a community that is impure with the impurity of a creeping animal brings the Paschal lamb in a state of impurity, it does apply to an individual. Rather, Rava said that we should reject the previous statement and say instead that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one may slaughter the Paschal lamb and sprinkle its blood for someone who is ritually impure from a creeping animal, and the same is true with regard to someone who is ritually impure from a corpse on his seventh day of impurity. If so, for what purpose is the sprinkling of the purifying water? If it is possible to slaughter the Paschal lamb and sprinkle its blood on this person’s behalf even when he is impure, the only reason to sprinkle the purifying water is for the purpose of eating the Paschal lamb. However, eating of the Paschal lamb is not essential for the fulfillment of the mitzva, for if the blood of the sacrifice is sprinkled in a permitted fashion on someone’s behalf and afterward he is unable to eat the meat of the sacrifice, e.g., it became impure or was lost, he has fulfilled his obligation and is not liable to receive karet. This being the case, sprinkling the purifying waters is not an act that is necessary to facilitate a mitzva and does not override Shabbat even according to Rabbi Eliezer. Rav Adda bar Abba said to Rava: If it is so, that one may slaughter the Paschal lamb for someone who is ritually impure from a creeping animal, it turns out that the Paschal lamb is slaughtered for people who cannot eat it, and it is stated elsewhere that such a sacrifice is disqualified. Rava said to him: When it says that a Paschal lamb that is slaughtered for people who cannot eat is disqualified, this refers to a case where it is slaughtered for a sick or elderly person who is not at all fit to eat the sacrifice. But this person is essentially fit to eat the sacrifice but has not yet been made ready to actually eat it. He himself is regarded as fit to eat the sacrifice, and it is only some external factor that prevents him from doing so. We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Akiva stated a principle that any prohibited labor required for the offering of the sacrifice that can be performed before Shabbat does not override Shabbat; whereas slaughter, which cannot be performed on the eve of Shabbat, overrides Shabbat.Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to the Paschal lamb. The Gemara points out that we also learned something similar to this in another mishna with regard to circumcision: Rabbi Akiva stated a principle: Any prohibited labor required for circumcision that can be performed on the eve of Shabbat because it need not be done specifically on the day of the circumcision does not override Shabbat; the circumcision itself, which cannot be performed on the eve of Shabbat, since it is not yet time to perform the circumcision, overrides Shabbat. And Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva with regard to circumcision. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state this ruling in both cases, for had Rav taught us that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva only with regard to the Paschal lamb, the conclusion would have been: It is specifically there that the facilitators of a mitzva that can be performed the day before do not override Shabbat because thirteen covenants were not established upon the Paschal lamb, and it is therefore not so significant. But with regard to circumcision, upon which thirteen covenants were established, as is evidenced by the fact that the word covenant appears thirteen times in the chapter relating to circumcision (Genesis 17), which serves as a covenant between God and the Jewish nation, I would say that even facilitating actions that could have been performed on Shabbat eve should override Shabbat. And had Rav taught us that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva only with regard to circumcision, the conclusion would have been: It is specifically there that the facilitators of a mitzva that can be performed before Shabbat do not override Shabbat, as there is no punishment of karet if the circumcision is delayed, since liability for karet only applies when the child becomes obligated in mitzvot and chooses not to circumcise himself. But with regard to the Paschal lamb, where there is karet for one who fails to offer the sacrifice at its proper time, I would say that such facilitators should override Shabbat. It is therefore necessary to teach that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in both cases. MISHNA: When does one bring a Festival peace-offering with the Paschal lamb? A special offering is brought on the fourteenth of Nisan together with the Paschal lamb when the Paschal lamb comes on a weekday rather than on Shabbat, and when it comes in a state of ritual purity as opposed to when it is brought in a state of impurity because most of the community is impure, and when many people are registered for the Paschal lamb so that each person will receive only a small portion from it. When these three conditions are met, the Festival peace-offering is eaten first and the Paschal lamb is eaten afterward. When, however, the Paschal lamb comes on Shabbat, or when few people are registered for it so that each person will receive a large portion, or when it is brought in a state of ritual impurity, one does not bring a Festival peace-offering with it. With regard to the extra offering itself, the Festival peace-offering would come from the flock, from the herd, from sheep or from goats, from males or from females, as the Festival peace-offering is not bound by the limitations governing the Paschal offering, which must be specifically a young male sheep or goat. And the Festival peace-offering is eaten for two days and one night like other peace-offerings. GEMARA: The Gemara questions why this halakha is recorded here: What did the mishna previously teach that made it relevant to teach this halakha with regard to a Festival peace-offering despite the fact that it seems to be unconnected to the previous mishnayot? The Gemara answers: Since it taught that carrying the Paschal lamb through a public domain and bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit do not override Shabbat, it also taught with regard to the halakha of a Festival peace-offering, that it does not override Shabbat. And this is what the mishna is saying: When does one bring a Festival peace-offering with the Paschal lamb? When it comes on a weekday, in a state of ritual purity, and when each person’s portion is small. Rav Ashi said: Learn from this that the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth of Nisan, which comes with the Paschal lamb and is the subject of our mishna, as opposed to the Festival peace-offering that is brought on the first day of Passover and is called the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth, is not an obligation, meaning there is no Torah obligation to bring this offering. For if it should enter your mind to say that it is an obligation, it should come even on Shabbat, and it should come even when each member of the group will receive a large portion of the Paschal lamb, and it should come even in a state of ritual impurity. The Gemara asks: If there is no obligation to bring this offering, what is the reason that it nevertheless comes when each person’s portion of the Paschal lamb is small? The Gemara explains that the reason is as it was taught in a baraita: The Festival peace-offering that comes with the Paschal lamb is eaten first; the reason for this is so that the Paschal lamb will be eaten when one is already satiated. The Paschal lamb should not be eaten in a needy manner, but rather in joy and when one is already filled to satisfaction. The mishna taught that the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth is eaten for two days and the intervening night. The Gemara notes that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of ben Teima, for it was taught in a baraita that ben Teima says: The Festival peace-offering that comes with the Paschal lamb on the fourteenth of Nisan is like the Paschal lamb and is eaten for only a day and a night, whereas the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth, i.e., the Festival peace-offering brought on the first day of Passover, just as it is brought on the first day of each of the other Festivals, is treated like a regular peace-offering and is eaten for two days and one, i.e., the intervening, night. And if one consecrated an animal to be used as a Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth, but it was not slaughtered on that day, on the next day he can fulfill with it his obligation to bring a peace-offering of rejoicing, as it is stated: “And you shall rejoice on your Festival,” but he cannot fulfill with it his obligation to bring a Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth. The Gemara asks: What is the reason and scriptural basis for ben Teima’s opinion? The Gemara explains: As Rav taught his son Ḥiyya based on the following verse: “Neither shall the offering of the feast of the Passover be left to the morning” (Exodus 34:25). “The offering of the feast,” this is referring to the Festival peace-offering; “the Passover,” as per its plain meaning, i.e., this is referring to the Paschal lamb itself. And with regard to both sacrifices, the Merciful One states in the Torah: “It shall not be left to the morning.” This proves that the Festival peace-offering may be eaten for only a day and a night. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the opinion of ben Teima, is the Festival peace-offering that is brought with the Paschal lamb eaten roasted like the Paschal lamb itself or is it not eaten roasted? The possible considerations are as follows: When the Merciful One compares the Festival peace-offering to the Paschal lamb in the Torah, was that only with regard to leaving it over until the morning, but with regard to the mitzva of roasting, no such comparison is made? Or perhaps there is no difference; the comparison was complete, and the Festival peace-offering is roasted just like the Paschal lamb. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a solution from what was taught in a mishna: In the time of the Temple, one of the questions that the children would ask on the night of Passover was: How is this night different from all other nights? For on all other nights we eat meat that is roasted, stewed, or boiled, whereas on this night it is all roasted. And Rav Ḥisda said: This is the statement of ben Teima, indicating that even the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth must be roasted. The Gemara concludes: Learn from this that the Festival peace-offering must be roasted just like the Paschal lamb. Another dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the opinion of ben Teima, does the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth come from the herd or does it not come from the herd, like the Paschal offering, which must be brought from the flock? Does it come even from females or does it not come from females, just like the Paschal offering comes only from males? Does it come even from a two-year-old animal or does it not come from a two-year-old animal, but rather only from a one-year-old animal, like the Paschal offering itself? The Gemara explains that this dilemma is based on a fundamental question similar to the one raised earlier: When the Merciful One compares the Festival peace-offering to the Paschal lamb in the Torah, was that only with regard to matters pertaining to eating and the time during which the Paschal lamb must be eaten, but for everything else there is no comparison? Or perhaps there is no difference and the Torah compared these two offerings in every way. Come and hear an answer to these questions from what was taught in a baraita: The Festival peace-offering that comes with the Paschal offering on the fourteenth of Nisan is like the Paschal offering in every respect. It comes from the flock and does not come from the herd, it comes from males and does not come from females, it comes from an animal that is a year old and does not come from an animal that is two years old, and it is eaten for only a day and a night, and it is eaten only roasted, and it is eaten only by those who registered for it in advance. The Gemara explains how this baraita answers the questions raised above: Who have you heard adopts this reasoning, comparing the Paschal offering and the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth? Surely it is ben Teima. Learn from this that we require everything, that the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth must parallel the Paschal offering in all its details. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from this that they are comparable in every way. Yet another dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the opinion of ben Teima, is the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth subject to the prohibition against breaking a bone, as is the Paschal lamb, with regard to which the Torah explicitly states: “And you shall not break a bone in it” (Exodus 12:46), or is it not subject to the prohibition against breaking a bone? The possible considerations are as follows: Do we say that even though the Merciful One compares the Festival peace-offering to the Paschal lamb, the verse that teaches the prohibition against breaking a bone says “in it,” and these words serve as a qualifying statement, indicating that the prohibition applies only in it, the Paschal lamb, and not in the Festival peace-offering that comes with it? Or perhaps this term, “in it,” teaches that the prohibition applies only to a fit Paschal lamb but not to a disqualified one. The Gemara proposes: Come and hear a solution based on the following mishna: If a slaughtering knife was found on the fourteenth day of Nisan in Jerusalem, one may slaughter with it immediately without concern that perhaps it is ritually impure, for presumably any knife that is valid for slaughtering had already been immersed on the previous day so that it could be used for slaughtering the Paschal lamb. But if it was found on the thirteenth day of Nisan, he must immerse it again due to the possibility that it had not yet been immersed and purified.As for a cleaver [kofitz], a large knife that is used primarily for chopping bones, whether it was found on this day, the fourteenth, or on the other day, the thirteenth, he must immerse it again. The Gemara clarifies: Whose opinion is taught in this mishna? If you say it is the opinion of the Rabbis, who permit breaking the bones of the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth, what is different about a slaughtering knife found on the fourteenth that we say its owner presumably immersed it on the previous day? Is it because it is fit for slaughtering the Paschal lamb? If so, a cleaver found on the fourteenth should also not require immersion before being used, for presumably its owner already immersed it, as it is fit for chopping the bones of the Festival peace-offering. Rather, is it not the opinion of ben Teima, and learn from this that even the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth is subject to the prohibition against breaking a bone, and therefore a cleaver must be immersed again even if it was found on the fourteenth. Since no bones may be broken on the fourteenth of Nisan, neither those of the Paschal lamb nor those of the Festival peace-offering, it is possible that the knife was not immersed in preparation for the Festival. The Gemara rejects this proof: No, actually one can explain that the mishna reflects the opinion of the Rabbis, and it is referring to a case where the time to slaughter the Paschal lamb comes on Shabbat. In this circumstance, all agree that the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth is not sacrificed. Since there is no need for a cleaver, there is no reason to assume that the knife had been immersed in preparation for the Festival. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the latter clause of that same mishna teaches that if the fourteenth of Nisan occurred on Shabbat he may slaughter with the knife immediately, without immersing it, and similarly, if he found it on the fifteenth, i.e., on the first day of the Festival, he may slaughter with it immediately, as it was certainly immersed the day before, and if a cleaver was found tied to a slaughtering knife, then even if it was found on the fourteenth on a weekday, it is like the slaughtering knife, as they were certainly immersed together, it follows by inference that in the first clause of the mishna we are not dealing with a case where the fourteenth of Nisan occurred on Shabbat. Rather, this understanding must be rejected and instead we should say that the mishna is talking about a case where the Paschal lamb came with few people registered for it, so that each person receives a large portion of the offering. Therefore, there is no need for a Festival peace-offering or for a cleaver. The Gemara questions this answer: How do the owners know already on the thirteenth that only a small number of people will be registered for the Paschal lamb? Perhaps more people will register for the offering before it is slaughtered, in which case we should assume that the cleaver was immersed, as it might be necessary to bring a Festival peace-offering together with the Paschal lamb. Rather, we must say that we are talking about a Paschal lamb that came in a state of ritual impurity, in which case a Festival peace-offering is not brought, and consequently there is no need for a cleaver. The Gemara asks: Ultimately, how do the owners know already on the thirteenth when they are immersing their knives that the Paschal lamb will be brought in ritual impurity, so that they need not immerse their chopping knives? Perhaps it will turn out that most of the community is ritually pure. The Gemara answers that we are talking about a situation where the Nasi died, in which case all of Israel must defile themselves in order to participate in his burial. The Gemara asks: When did the Nasi die? If you say that he died on the thirteenth and everyone became ritually impure as a result, why do I need to immerse the slaughtering knife to begin with? It will become ritually impure again in any event. Rather, he died on the fourteenth and they did not know in advance that the Paschal lamb would be brought in a state of impurity. But if so, what is different about the slaughtering knife that he immerses it and what is different about the cleaver that he does not immerse it? The Gemara answers: It was necessary to teach this halakha only in a case where the Nasi was in a dying state on the thirteenth. With regard to a slaughtering knife, about which there is only one doubt, that perhaps the Nasi will die before the Festival and the Paschal lamb will be brought in a state of ritual impurity, he immerses it, for if the Nasi does not die he will need a ritually pure knife to slaughter his Paschal lamb. With regard to a cleaver, about which there are two doubts, that perhaps the Nasi will die and a ritually pure knife will not be needed, and that even if he does not die, perhaps the meat of the Paschal lamb will be plentiful and the Festival peace-offering will not be brought, he does not immerse it. It was taught in a baraita: Yehuda ben Dortai separated himself from the other Rabbis, he and Dortai his son, and went and settled in the south so that he would not be obligated to bring the Paschal lamb, seeing that he was at a great distance from Jerusalem. He did this because he disagreed with the Rabbis with regard to the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth, which in their view does not override Shabbat. He said: If Elijah will come and say to the Jewish people: For what reason did you not sacrifice the Festival peace-offering on Shabbat, what will they say to him? I am astounded at the two most eminent scholars of the generation, Shemaya and Avtalyon, who are great sages and great expositors of the Torah, and yet they did not tell the Jewish people that even the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth overrides Shabbat. Rav said: What is ben Dortai’s reason? As it is written: “And you shall slaughter the Paschal offering to the Lord your God from the flock and from the herd, in the place which the Lord shall choose to rest His name there” (Deuteronomy 16:2). A question must be asked: Does the Paschal offering come from the herd, i.e., from cattle? Doesn’t the Paschal offering come from only the sheep and from the goats, as commanded in the book of Exodus (12:5)? Rather, the verse should be understood as follows. “Flock”; this is referring to the Paschal offering. “Herd”; this is referring to the Festival peace-offering that is brought along with it. And the Merciful One says: “And you shall slaughter the Paschal offering,” thus teaching that the two offerings are sacrificed together. From here ben Dortai derived that the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth is like the Paschal offering in every way, and so it too overrides Shabbat. Rav Ashi said: Need we arise and explain the reason of those who separated themselves from the other Rabbis? Ben Dortai and his son broke away from all the other sages of the Jewish people, and we need not occupy ourselves with the opinions of such people. Rather, the verse comes to explain the opinion of Rav Naḥman, for Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuh said: From where is it derived that a leftover Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace-offering? A leftover Paschal offering is an animal that had been consecrated as a Paschal offering but was subsequently lost and later found after a different animal had already been sacrificed in its place. Alternatively, if one set aside and consecrated money for the purchase of a Paschal lamb and then the price of livestock dropped so that there was money left over after the purchase was made, the extra money has the status of a leftover Paschal lamb. As it is stated: “And you shall slaughter the Paschal offering to the Lord your God from the flock and from the herd.” Does the Paschal offering come from the herd? Doesn’t it come from only the sheep and from the goats? Rather, the verse comes to teach that a leftover Paschal offering shall be brought as something that comes from the flock and from the herd, that is, as a peace-offering, which may be brought from all types of flock and cattle, including both males and females. The Gemara asks about the crux of the matter: And according to the opinion of the Rabbis, what is the reason that the Festival peace-offering does not override Shabbat? It is certainly a communal offering, and all communal offerings override Shabbat. Rabbi Ile’a said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda ben Safra: The verse said with regard to the festival of Sukkot: “And you shall celebrate it as a Festival for the Lord, seven days in the year; it shall be a statute forever in your generations; you shall celebrate it in the seventh month” (Leviticus 23:41). Now is the festival of Sukkot seven days? They are eight days, as the Eighth Day of Assembly is always celebrated at the conclusion of Sukkot. Rather, from here we derive that the Festival peace-offering [ḥagiga], about which the verse states: “And you shall celebrate [veḥagotem] it,” does not override Shabbat. Since every eight-day period contains a Shabbat, the Torah said that the Festival [ḥag] is celebrated, i.e., the Festival peace-offering [ḥagiga] can be brought the entire seven days of the Festival. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: I said before my teachers, pointing out the following difficulty with regard to this source: There are times when you find only six days on which the Festival peace-offering can be brought, for example, when the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, in which case the Eighth Day of Assembly also falls on Shabbat, and so there are only six days on which the Festival peace-offering may be brought. Abaye said: Would the bereaved Avin, another name for Ravin, say such a thing and be so careless as to ask an unfounded question? There is a big difference: Eight you do not find at all; the eight days of the Festival cannot possibly pass without a Shabbat. But seven days on which the Festival peace-offering can be brought are in fact found in most years. Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: With regard to peace-offerings that one slaughtered on the eve of the Festival, one fulfills with them neither the mitzva to bring peace-offerings of rejoicing nor the mitzva to bring a Festival peace-offering. The mitzva of bringing peace-offerings of rejoicing is not fulfilled, as it is written: “And you shall slaughter peace-offerings and eat there, and you shall rejoice before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 27:7). Based on this verse, we require that the slaughter be at the time of rejoicing, on the Festival itself, and if it was slaughtered on the fourteenth it is not. The mitzva to bring a Festival peace-offering is also not fulfilled, for it is something that is an obligation, as everyone is obligated to bring this offering, and the principle is that anything that is an obligation must come only from that which is unconsecrated, meaning that one cannot bring an obligatory offering from an animal that has already been consecrated for another purpose. The Gemara proposes: Let us say that a baraita supports him. The verse states: “Seven days shall you celebrate to the Lord your God in the place that the Lord shall choose, for the Lord your God shall bless you in all your produce and in all the work of your hands, and you shall be but joyous” (Deuteronomy 16:15). This verse seems superfluous, as it was already stated in the previous verse: “And you shall rejoice in your Festival.” The baraita expounds: “And you shall be but joyous” comes to include the last night of the Festival. Even then you must make sure there is rejoicing by eating the appropriate peace-offerings. The baraita considers: Do you say that the verse comes to include the last night of the Festival? Or perhaps it comes to include only the first night of the Festival. Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall be but joyous”; the word “but” restricts this mitzva, meaning that there is not always a mitzva to be joyous. The Gemara clarifies how this baraita supports Ulla: What is the reason that we learn from this expression that it is specifically on the first night that there is no mitzva of rejoicing? Is it not because on the first night he has nothing with which to rejoice? As Ulla said, one cannot fulfill the mitzva of rejoicing with a peace-offering that was slaughtered on the eve of the Festival, because it was not slaughtered at the time of rejoicing. On the last night of the Festival, on the other hand, one can rejoice with a peace-offering that was slaughtered the previous day, i.e., the last intermediate day of the Festival, which is also a time of rejoicing. The Gemara rejects this support: No, it is not for this reason, but rather for the reason taught in the continuation of the baraita: What did you see to include the last night of the Festival in the mitzva of rejoicing and to exclude the first night of the Festival, a distinction that is not even hinted at in the verse? The baraita explains: I include the last night of the Festival in the mitzva of rejoicing, for there is rejoicing on the days of the Festival preceding it, and I exclude the first night of the Festival, for there is no day of rejoicing preceding it. Thus, no support for Ulla can be deduced from the baraita. Rav Yosef raised an objection against the opinion of Ulla: It was taught in a baraita with regard to the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth that one fulfills with it the mitzva to bring peace-offerings of rejoicing, but one does not fulfill with it the mitzva to bring a Festival peace-offering. We can ask, why? Surely, according to Ulla, we require that the slaughter be performed at a time of rejoicing, and this requirement is not fulfilled in this case. The Gemara answers: Rav Idi bar Avin said that the baraita is referring here to a case where he delayed and slaughtered it only on the fifteenth, i.e., on the Festival, which is a time of rejoicing. Rav Ashi said: So too, it is reasonable to understand the baraita in this manner, for if you do not say so, but rather that the Festival peace-offering was slaughtered on the fourteenth, there is a difficulty, for who taught this baraita? Is it not ben Teima who taught it? According to ben Teima, however, he has disqualified it by leaving it overnight, for in his view this Festival peace-offering is similar to a Paschal lamb and may not be eaten the following day. Learn from this that the baraita must be referring to a case where the Festival peace-offering was slaughtered not on the fourteenth, but on the fifteenth. Rava raised an objection against the opinion of Ulla: It was taught in a baraita that the hallel is recited and the mitzva of rejoicing with the peace-offerings of rejoicing is observed on the festival of Sukkot for eight days. Now if you say we require that the slaughter be performed at a time of rejoicing, many times you find that the mitzva of rejoicing is observed for only seven days, such as when the first day of the Festival occurs on Shabbat, when a peace-offering of rejoicing may not be slaughtered. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehuda, said: One rejoices with the male goats of the Festivals. That is to say, in such a situation the mitzva of rejoicing can be fulfilled with the meat of the goats that are brought on the Festivals as sin-offerings, as these offerings, being communal offerings, may be slaughtered even on Shabbat. Rava said: There are two possible responses to refute this. One is that the male goats of the Festivals are eaten raw and are not eaten roasted. Being a non-essential part of the service, roasting the meat is forbidden on Shabbat. Therefore, the meat can be eaten only raw, and there is no rejoicing with raw meat. And furthermore, only the priests eat of the meat of these sin-offerings. With what then do ordinary Israelites rejoice? Rather, Rav Pappa said: In such a situation, one rejoices with clean clothes and old wine. When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he related a different version of what Rabbi Elazar said: With regard to peace-offerings that one slaughtered on the eve of the Festival, one fulfills with them the mitzva to bring peace-offerings of rejoicing, but one does not fulfill with them the mitzva to bring a Festival peace-offering. He explains: One fulfills the mitzva of rejoicing, because we do not require that the slaughter be performed at the time of rejoicing as long as the offering is eaten at the time of rejoicing. But one does not fulfill the mitzva of the Festival peace-offering, because the Festival peace-offering is something that is an obligation, and the principle is that anything that is an obligation must come only from unconsecrated animals. The Gemara raises an objection against Ravin from the baraita that was taught above: “And you shall be but joyous” comes to include the last night of the Festival in the mitzva of rejoicing. The baraita considers: Do you say that the verse comes to include the last night in the mitzva of rejoicing? Or perhaps it comes to include only the first night of the Festival? Therefore, the verse states: “And you shall be but joyous”; the word “but” restricts this mitzva, meaning that there is not always a mitzva to be joyous. The Gemara explains how this baraita is difficult according to Ravin: What is the reason that we learn from here that it is specifically on the first night that there is no mitzva of rejoicing? Is it not because on the first night he has nothing with which to rejoice, as one cannot fulfill the mitzva of rejoicing with peace-offerings slaughtered not at a time of rejoicing? The Gemara rejects this argument: No, the reason is as it was taught in the continuation of the baraita: What did you see to include the last night of the Festival in the mitzva of rejoicing and to exclude the first night of the Festival? The baraita explains: I include the last night of the Festival, for there is rejoicing on the days of the Festival preceding it, and I exclude the first night of the Festival, for there is no day of rejoicing preceding it. Rav Kahana said: From where is it derived that the sacrificial parts of the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth of Nisan, i.e., those portions of the offering that are consumed on the altar, are disqualified when left overnight on the first night after the offering is slaughtered, despite the fact that the meat of the offering may be consumed for an additional day? As it is stated: “You shall not offer the blood of My offering with leaven; neither shall the fat of my Festival offering be left over until morning” (Exodus 23:18), and, juxtaposed with it is the word first, in the verse: “The first of the first fruits of your land you shall bring to the house of the Lord your God” (Exodus 23:19). This comes to say to us that the morning mentioned in the first verse is the first morning after the offering has been sacrificed. Rav Yosef strongly objects to this proof: The reason is that it wrote the word first. But had it not written the word first, I would have said: What is the meaning of the term morning? The second morning after it was sacrificed. This raises a question: Is there anything like this where the meat of an offering that is to be eaten is disqualified already from the evening, as the meat of a Festival peace-offering may be eaten only for two days and the night between them, while the sacrificial parts to be consumed on the altar are permitted until the next morning? Abaye said to him: Why not? For there is the Paschal offering according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, who holds that the meat that is to be eaten is disqualified already from midnight and may no longer be eaten after that time, while the sacrificial parts to be consumed on the altar may be offered until morning. Rava said: This is what was difficult to Rav Yosef: Is there anything like this, i.e., that the tanna does not need the word “first” to teach us that the word “morning,” written with regard to the meat of an offering, is referring to the first morning, whereas Rav Kahana requires the word “first” to teach us that the word “morning,” written with regard to the sacrificial portions to be consumed on the altar, is referring to the first morning? This is despite the fact that the latter, owing to their greater sanctity, are obviously more easily disqualified than the former. The Gemara asks: What is this source alluded to by Rava? The Gemara explains: As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “Nor shall any of the meat that you sacrifice on the first day at evening remain overnight until the morning” (Deuteronomy 16:4), this verse teaches that the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth is eaten for two days and one night; that is, it may not remain overnight until the morning of the sixteenth. Or perhaps it is eaten for only a day and a night; that is, it may not remain overnight until the morning of the fifteenth. Since for that it would have sufficed to say that an offering sacrificed “on the first day shall not remain overnight,” when it says that an offering sacrificed “on the first day shall not remain overnight until the morning” (Deuteronomy 16:4), the extra phrase “until the morning” indicates that the verse speaks of the second morning. There is still room to say: Or perhaps it is eaten only until the first morning, and how do I establish what the Torah says, that a Festival peace-offering may be eaten for two days and one night? This applies to Festival peace-offerings other than this one. The baraita explains: When it says with regard to a peace-offering: “But if the sacrifice of his offering is a vow or a free-will offering, it shall be eaten on the same day that he sacrifices his offering; and on the morrow also, the remainder of it shall be eaten” (Leviticus 7:16), it teaches that any peace-offering, whether a vow or a free-will offering, or an obligation, including the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth, is eaten for two days and one night. The Master said above in the baraita: Or perhaps it is only the first morning. The Gemara asks: But you already said that when it says that any offering sacrificed “on the first day shall not remain overnight until the morning,” the extra phrase “until the morning” indicates that the verse speaks of the second morning. What need is there then to prove this a second time? The Gemara explains that this is what the baraita is saying: Or perhaps it is only that the verse is speaking about two different Festival peace-offerings, one being the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth and one the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth, and the halakha is that this, the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth, may be eaten for only a day and a night until its morning, the morning of the fifteenth, and this, the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth, may be eaten for only a day and a night until its morning, the sixteenth of Nisan. It then says: But with regard to that which we maintain, that a Festival peace-offering may be eaten for two days and one night, if so, the verse that addresses a peace-offering and says: “But if the sacrifice of his offering is a vow or a free-will offering,” with regard to what case is it discussing? If it is talking about the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth, surely it is written about it, according to this interpretation, that it is eaten for only a day and a night. And if it is talking about the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth, surely it is written about it that it too is eaten for only a day and a night. Rather, this verse that discusses a vow or free-will offering clearly must be discussing the Festival peace-offering of the fifteenth, and the entire other verse: “Nor shall…remain overnight until the morning,” is referring to the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth and thus has taught that the Festival peace-offering of the fourteenth is eaten for two days and one night. The Gemara returns to what it wanted to prove with regard to the term “first”: The reason is that it is written that an offering sacrificed “on the first day shall not remain overnight until the morning,” for what is the implication of the word morning? The second morning. We can infer from here that wherever the term morning is written unmodified and without further specification, it is referring to the first morning after the offering was sacrificed, even though the word “first” is not written in relation to “morning.” Thus, Rav Kahana’s derivation from the word “first” was unnecessary. MISHNA: A Paschal lamb that one slaughtered for a different purpose on Shabbat, not knowing that it is prohibited for him to do so, is disqualified, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for it because he unwittingly performed a prohibited labor on Shabbat. As for all other offerings, such as a peace-offering, that one unwittingly slaughtered on Shabbat for the purpose of a Paschal offering, if they were not fit for the Paschal offering, e.g., if they were female or cattle or more than a year old and clearly ineligible for the Paschal offering, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Because he did not fulfill the mitzva to bring a Paschal offering, his act of slaughter was therefore unnecessary. And if they were fit, Rabbi Eliezer nevertheless deems him liable to bring a sin-offering for his unwitting transgression. But Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him, because he maintains that if someone intended to perform a mitzva, and despite his error he in fact performed a mitzva, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering. And in this case he performed a mitzva, because offerings that are sacrificed for a different purpose are still fit. Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: If, with regard to the Paschal lamb, which is permitted to be slaughtered on Shabbat for its own purpose, when one changed its purpose he is nevertheless liable, then, with regard to other offerings that are forbidden to be slaughtered on Shabbat even for their own purpose, when one changed their purpose, is it not right that he should be liable? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, this reasoning is faulty. If you say that one is liable to bring a sin-offering if he slaughtered a Paschal lamb for a different purpose, it is because he changed its purpose for something forbidden, as the offering he intended it to be may not be slaughtered on Shabbat. But can you necessarily say the same thing about other offerings that he slaughtered for the purpose of a Paschal offering and thus changed their purpose for something that is permitted to be sacrificed on Shabbat? Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: Let the communal offerings, such as the daily offering and the additional-offerings of Shabbat and the Festivals, prove the matter, for they are permitted to be slaughtered on Shabbat for their own purpose, and nevertheless, one who unnecessarily slaughters a different offering for their purpose is liable. This indicates that even when a particular offering may be slaughtered, one is nevertheless liable if he slaughtered a different offering for the purpose of the permitted offering. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, if you say this halakha with regard to communal offerings, it is because they have a limit, as there is a specific number of communal offerings that must be offered on any particular day and there is no reason one would mistakenly sacrifice extra offerings for this purpose. But can you necessarily say the same thing about the Paschal lamb, which does not have a limit, making it more likely for someone to make a mistake? Rabbi Meir says: According to Rabbi Yehoshua, even one who unwittingly slaughters other offerings for the purpose of communal offerings beyond their daily limit is exempt for the same reason, i.e., that he intended to fulfill a mitzva that is permitted on Shabbat. The mishna continues with another halakha with regard to the Paschal lamb: If one slaughtered a Paschal lamb on Shabbat and mistakenly intended it for those who cannot eat it, such as sick or elderly people who are unable to eat the meat, or for those who did not register for it, or for the sake of the uncircumcised or for those ritually impure, the offering is disqualified and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for his unnecessary act of slaughter. If, however, he slaughtered it for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, or for those who registered for it and for those who did not register for it, or for the circumcised and for those who are uncircumcised, or for those who are ritually impure and those who are ritually pure, he is exempt. Since a Paschal lamb slaughtered with dual intentions of these types is valid, the act of slaughter was justified. If he slaughtered it and it was found to have a blemish, the offering is disqualified, and he is liable to bring a sin-offering for having unwittingly performed a prohibited labor on Shabbat, as he should have examined the animal before it was slaughtered. If he slaughtered it and it was found to have a hidden condition that would cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa] and that could not have been discovered before the slaughter even if it were examined properly, the offering is disqualified, but he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. This is not a case of shogeg, unwitting violation of Shabbat, but rather of ones, an unavoidable accident. If he slaughtered it and afterward it became known that the owners had withdrawn from it and registered for a different Paschal lamb, in which case this one was slaughtered unnecessarily, as no one was registered for it, or it became known that they had died or became ritually impure, in all these cases he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, because he slaughtered with permission. At the time of the slaughter, he did not know and had no reason to suspect that the offering would be disqualified. GEMARA: When the mishna speaks of one who slaughtered a Paschal lamb on Shabbat for a different purpose, with what precisely are we dealing? If you say we are dealing with one who erred in that he actually thought this was a different offering and not a Paschal offering, learn from it, i.e., from the fact that the offering is disqualified and he is therefore liable to bring a sin-offering, that the erroneous uprooting of the status of an offering constitutes uprooting, even though he had no intention to do so. It would, however, be surprising to find the mishna taking a stand on this issue, as we find elsewhere that it is the subject of an amoraic dispute (Tosafot). Rather, the mishna must certainly be referring to one who intentionally uprooted the animal’s designation as a Paschal lamb and offered it as a different offering. If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: As for all other offerings that one unwittingly slaughtered on Shabbat for the purpose of a Paschal offering, if they were not fit for the Paschal offering, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. And if they are fit, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him. Now if the mishna is referring to one who intentionally uprooted the original designation of the animal, which he knew was not a Paschal offering, what does it matter to me whether the animal was fit or unfit? He certainly does not think that he is performing a mitzva; why then does Rabbi Yehoshua exempt him from bringing a sin-offering? Rather, it is obvious that we must be dealing with one who erred. But if so, we have a contradiction in the mishna, as the first clause is referring to one who intentionally uprooted the animal’s designation, whereas the latter clause is referring to one who erred about it. Rabbi Avin said: Yes, we must accept this conclusion even though it is unusual: The first clause deals with one who uprooted the animal’s designation, whereas the latter clause deals with one who erred about it. The Gemara relates that Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef once found Rabbi Abbahu standing among a multitude [okhlosa] of people, and he said to him: What is the meaning of our mishna? Rabbi Abbahu said to him: The first clause is referring to one who intentionally uprooted the animal’s status, whereas the latter clause is referring to one who erred about it. Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef learned this statement from him forty times, and it seemed to him as though it were resting in his pouch; i.e., he repeated it many times until the mishna became crystal clear to him and etched in his memory. The Gemara raises a difficulty with this understanding of the mishna: We learned in the continuation of the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: If with regard to the Paschal lamb, which is permitted to be slaughtered on Shabbat for its own purpose, when one changed its purpose he is nevertheless liable, then with regard to other offerings that are forbidden to be slaughtered on Shabbat even for their own purpose, when he changed their purpose is it not right that he should be liable? And if it is so that the two parts of the mishna are not talking about the same case, surely they are not similar and cannot be compared; as the first clause is referring to one who intentionally uprooted the animal’s status, whereas the latter clause is referring to one who erred about it. The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Eliezer, who put forward this a fortiori argument, there is no difference, for in his opinion someone who erred while intending to perform a mitzva is liable to bring a sin-offering, even if he made a reasonable mistake. Thus, he does not differentiate between the deliberate uprooting of the animal’s status and the erroneous sacrificing of the offering for a different purpose. The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yehoshua, for whom there is a difference between the two cases, let him answer Rabbi Eliezer in this way, that the first clause of the mishna is referring to one who intentionally uprooted the status of an offering, while the latter clause is referring to one who erred about it. Why does he introduce another factor, that in the first clause he changed the animal’s purpose for something forbidden, whereas in the latter clause he changed it for something permitted? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Yehoshua said to Rabbi Eliezer: According to me, these cases are not comparable, because the first clause deals with one who intentionally uprooted the animal’s designation, whereas the latter clause deals with one who erred about it. However, even according to you, who do not differentiate in this manner, I can still answer as follows: No, if you say that one is liable if he slaughtered a Paschal lamb for a different purpose, it is because he changed its purpose for something prohibited. But can you say the same thing about other offerings that he slaughtered for the purpose of a Paschal offering and thus changed their purpose for something permitted? The mishna continues with what Rabbi Eliezer said to Rabbi Yehoshua: Let the communal offerings prove the matter, for they are permitted for slaughter on Shabbat for their own purpose, and nevertheless, one who unnecessarily slaughters different offerings for their purpose is liable. Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, if you said this halakha with regard to communal offerings, it is because they have a limit. But can you necessarily say the same thing with regard to the Paschal lamb, which does not have a limit? The Gemara asks: Is that to say that wherever there is a limit, Rabbi Yehoshua deems liable one who erred while intending to perform a mitzva? But with regard to the circumcision of babies on Shabbat, which has a limit, we nevertheless learned in a mishna that with regard to one who had two babies to circumcise, one of whom he needed to circumcise after Shabbat and one of whom he needed to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one that should have been circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. This is because he performed the prohibited labor of causing a wound not in the framework of performing a mitzva, as no obligation yet existed to circumcise the child. If, however, there were two babies, one of whom he needed to circumcise on Shabbat eve, and one of whom he needed to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one that he should have circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat, Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering. As circumcision after its appointed time does not override Shabbat, he has therefore unwittingly violated Shabbat. And Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him. Since he intended to perform a mitzva, and despite his error in fact performed a mitzva, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. Thus, we see that even though there is a limit in the case of the babies, Rabbi Yehoshua nevertheless exempts one who errs while intending to perform a mitzva. Rabbi Ami said: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the circumciser first unwittingly circumcised the baby who should have been circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat, when there is still this other baby who should be circumcised on Shabbat with whom he is preoccupied. Since he was legitimately preoccupied with a mitzva, as he knew that there was a baby that needed to be circumcised, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. Here, however, with regard to offerings, we are dealing with a case where he first slaughtered the required communal offerings at the beginning, so that there was no need to slaughter any more offerings, as communal offerings have a limit. Since he had no reason to make a mistake, he is liable to bring a sin-offering for having unnecessarily slaughtered an animal on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: If so, how do we understand the continuation of the mishna, where Rabbi Meir says that according to Rabbi Yehoshua, even one who unwittingly slaughters other offerings for the purpose of communal offerings beyond their daily limit is exempt? According to our explanation, this must be true even though he first slaughtered the required communal offerings at the beginning. But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya from the village of Avel Arav teach in a baraita another version of the dispute, according to which Rabbi Meir said: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua did not disagree over one who had two babies to circumcise, one to circumcise on Shabbat eve and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the one who should have been circumcised on Shabbat eve on Shabbat; in that case, everyone agrees that he is liable to bring a sin-offering. With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to one who had two babies to circumcise, one to circumcise after Shabbat and one to circumcise on Shabbat, and he forgot and circumcised the baby who should have been circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat, as Rabbi Eliezer deems him liable to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him. The Gemara expresses surprise: And how can you understand this baraita in its current formulation? If there, in the latter clause, where he circumcised the baby who should have been circumcised after Shabbat on Shabbat, so that he did not perform a mitzva because the baby was not yet eight days old and the mitzva did not yet apply, Rabbi Yehoshua nevertheless exempted him because he erred while intending to perform a mitzva. Then where he did perform a mitzva, i.e., where he circumcised a baby on Shabbat who was already eight days old before Shabbat and to whom the mitzva of circumcision applied, would Rabbi Yehoshua deem him liable? The Rabbis of the school of Rabbi Yannai said: The first clause of the baraita is referring to a unique situation, where the circumciser first unwittingly circumcised on Shabbat eve the baby who should have been circumcised on Shabbat.