(3)One who is moribund and one who is taken to be executed after being sentenced by the court is neither the object of a vow nor valuated. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya says: He is not the object of a vow, because he has no market value; but he is valuated, due to the fact that one’s value is fixed by the Torah based on age and sex. Rabbi Yosei says: One with that status vows to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and takes vows of valuation, and consecrates his property; and if he damages the property of others, he is liable to pay compensation.

We may not close the eyes of a dying man. Whoever touches and moves him is a murderer. For R. Meir used to say: He can be compared to a lamp which is dripping; should a man touch it he extinguishes it. Similarly whoever closes the eyes of a dying man is considered as if he had taken his life.

We do not interrupt the study of the Torah until the soul departs from the dying man. When R. Simeon, the son of R. ‘Aḳiba, fell ill, the latter did not interrupt his expositions in the Academy but made inquiries after him through a messenger. The first messenger came and reported, ‘He is very ill’. He said to [his disciples], ‘Continue to ask questions’. Then a second came and reported, ‘He has grown worse’. R. ‘Aḳiba resumed the study of the Torah. A third came and reported, ‘He is dying’, and he said [to his disciples, ‘Continue] to ask questions’. A fourth came and reported, ‘He is dead’. Whereupon he arose, removed the tefillin, rent his garments and said to them, ‘Our brother-Israelites, hearken! Until now we had the duty to study the Torah; but from now onward we have the duty to occupy ourselves with honouring the dead’.
A large assembly gathered to bury R. ‘Aḳiba’s son, and he said to them, ‘Bring a bench for me to the cemetery’. He stood upon it and expounded, ‘Our brother-Israelites, hearken! Not because I am a scholar [have you come here], there being greater scholars here than I; not because I am a rich man [have you come here], there being richer men here than I; the men of the Darom know R. ‘Aḳiba, but how should the men of Galilee know him? Men know him, but how should women and young children? I know, however, that your reward is great because you have only taken the great trouble to come here for the honour of the Torah and for the sake of the commandment [to attend the dead to the grave]. I should be comforted though I had seven sons whom I [now] buried. Not that a man desires to bury his children, but I know that my son is destined for the World to Come because he caused the many to be righteous, and whoever causes the many to be righteous, sin occurs not through him, and whoever causes the many to sin, they do not afford him the faculty to repent. Moses was righteous and caused the many to be righteous, [therefore] the righteousness of the many was [considered] dependent on him, as it is stated, He executed the righteousness of the Lord, and His ordinances with Israel. Jeroboam, the son of Nebat, sinned and caused others to sin, [therefore] the sin of the many was [considered] dependent on him, as it is stated, For the sins of Jeroboam which he sinned, and wherewith he made Israel to sin’.

Mishnah: “If there is a doubt whether it is dark or not dark,” etc. It happened that Rebbi Eliezer was dying on a Friday when it got dark. His son Hyrcanus entered to remove his phylacteries. He told him, my son, you neglected the commandment of the light which is for the Sabbath and for which one incurs extirpation and you came to remove phylacteries which is only rabbinical and is only a [positive] commandment. He left crying and said, woe to me that my father has lost his mind. He told him, your mind is lost, my mind is not lost. When his students saw that he answered him wisely they entered to him and started asking him. He answered on the impure impure and the pure pure; at the end he said “pure” and his soul vanished. They said, it is clear that our teacher is pure. Rebbi Mana said, it still is clear. Rebbi Joshua entered, removed his phylacteries, was embracing him, and kissing him, and crying, and said, my teacher, my teacher, the vow has been dissolved; my teacher, chariot of Israel and its riders.

The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Akiva learn these halakhotfrom Rabbi Yehoshua? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: When Rabbi Eliezer took ill, Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues came to visit him. He was sitting on his canopied bed [bekinof ], and they were sitting in his parlor [biteraklin]; they did not know if he would be able to receive them, due to his illness. And that day was Shabbat eve, and Rabbi Eliezer’s son Hyrcanus entered to remove his phylacteries, as phylacteries are not worn on Shabbat. His father berated him, and he left reprimanded. Hyrcanus said to his father’s colleagues: It appears to me that father went insane, since he berated me for no reason. Rabbi Eliezer heard this and said to them: He, Hyrcanus, and his mother went insane. How can they neglect Shabbat preparations with regard to prohibitions punishable by stoning, such as lighting the candles and preparing hot food, and engage in preparations concerning prohibitions by rabbinic decree, such as wearing phylacteries on Shabbat? Since the Sages perceived from this retort that his mind was stable, they entered and sat before him at a distance of four cubits, as he was ostracized (see Bava Metzia 59b). It is forbidden to sit within four cubits of an ostracized person. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: Why have you come? They said to him: We have come to study Torah, as they did not want to say that they came to visit him due to his illness. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: And why have you not come until now? They said to him: We did not have spare time. Rabbi Eliezer said to them: I would be surprised if these Sages die their own death, i.e., a natural death. Rather, they will be tortured to death by the Romans. Rabbi Akiva said to him: How will my death come about? Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Your death will be worse than theirs, as you were my primary student and you did not come to study. Rabbi Eliezer raised his two arms and placed them on his heart, and he said: Woe to you, my two arms, as they are like two Torah scrolls that are now being rolled up, and will never be opened again. I have learned much Torah, and I have taught much Torah. I have learned much Torah, and I have not taken away from my teachers, i.e., I have not received from their wisdom, even like a dog lapping from the sea. I have taught much Torah, and my students have taken away from me, i.e., they have received from my wisdom, only like the tiny amount that a paintbrush removes from a tube of paint. Moreover, I can teach three hundred halakhot with regard to a snow-white leprous mark [bebaheret], but no person has ever asked me anything about them. He could not find a student who could fully understand him in those matters. Moreover, I can teach three hundred halakhot, and some say that Rabbi Eliezer said three thousand halakhot, with regard to the planting of cucumbers by sorcery, but no person has ever asked me anything about them, besides Akiva ben Yosef.Rabbi Eliezer described the incident: Once he and I were walking along the way, and he said to me: My teacher, teach me about the planting of cucumbers. I said one statement of sorcery, and the entire field became filled with cucumbers. He said to me: My teacher, you have taught me about planting them; teach me about uprooting them. I said one statement and they all were gathered to one place.After these comments, the Sages asked him questions of halakha: What is the halakha, with regard to ritual impurity, of a ball made of leather and stuffed with rags, and likewise a last, the frame on which a shoe is fashioned, which is made of leather and stuffed with rags, and likewise an amulet wrapped in leather, and a pouch for pearls, wrapped in leather, and a small weight, which is wrapped in leather? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: They are susceptible to impurity, and their purification is effected by immersing them in a ritual bath as they are, as there is no need to open them up. They asked him further: What is the halakha with regard to a shoe that is on a last? Is it considered a complete vessel, which needs no further preparation, and is therefore susceptible to impurity? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: It is pure, and with this word, his soul left him in purity. Rabbi Yehoshua stood on his feet and said: The vow is permitted; the vow is permitted; i.e., the ostracism that was placed on Rabbi Eliezer is removed. Rabbi Akiva was not present at the time of his death. At the conclusion of Shabbat, Rabbi Akiva encountered the funeral procession on his way from Caesarea to Lod. Rabbi Akiva was striking his flesh in terrible anguish and regret until his blood flowed to the earth. He began to eulogize Rabbi Eliezer in the row of those comforting the mourners, and said: “My father, my father, the chariot of Israel and its horsemen” (II Kings 2:12). I have many coins, but I do not have a money changer to whom to give them, i.e., I have many questions, but after your death I have no one who can answer them. The Gemara returns to the matter at hand: Apparently, Rabbi Akiva learned the halakhot of gathering cucumbers through sorcery from Rabbi Eliezer, not from Rabbi Yehoshua. The Gemara answers: He learned it from Rabbi Eliezer but he did not understand it. Later he learned it from Rabbi Yehoshua, and Rabbi Yehoshua explained it to him.The Gemara asks: How could Rabbi Eliezer have performed that act of sorcery? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that one who performs an act of sorcery is liable? The Gemara answers: Performing sorcery not in order to use it, but in order to teach oneself the halakhotis different, and it is permitted; as the Master says that it is derived from the verse: “You shall not learn to do like the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found among you…one who uses divination, a soothsayer, an enchanter, or a sorcerer” (Deuteronomy 18:9–10), so that you shall not learn, i.e., it is prohibited for you to learn, in order to do, but you may learn, i.e., it is permitted for you to learn, in order to understand the matter yourself and teach it to others.

MISHNA: In the case of an agent who brings a bill of divorce to a woman, and when he had left the husband was elderly or sick, the agent gives her the bill of divorce based on the presumption that the husband is still alive, and there is no concern that in the meantime he has died, thereby canceling the bill of divorce...GEMARA: Rava says: They taught that this presumptive status exists only concerning an elderly man who has not reached his years of strength, i.e., the age of eighty, and an ordinary sick person, as the majority of sick people continue to live and recover from their illnesses. But if the husband was an elderly man who had reached his years of strength, or if he was moribund, then, as the majority of moribund people proceed to die, he does not have this presumptive status.

Rav Pappa answered: And were it not for the force of his action, the stone would go down and not to the side. Rather, although it is a weak force, the force of his action is a partial cause of the damage caused by the stone going to the side; therefore, he is liable. The Sages taught: If ten people struck an individual with ten sticks and as a result of the beating he died, whether they beat him simultaneously, or whether they beat him one after the other, they are exempt from liability for killing him, as two people are not liable for an action that they performed together. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: If they struck him one after the other, the one who struck him last is liable, because he hastened his death.Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And both Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, interpreted the same verse in drawing their halakhic conclusion. The verse states: “And a man who strikes any soul mortally, he shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:17). The Rabbis hold that “any soul” means that one is liable for murder only when there is an entire soul, i.e., when the murderer alone is responsible for taking the entire life of the victim. And Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira holds that “any soul” means that one is liable for murder for taking any soul, even if the victim had already been beaten and was close to death. § Rava says: All concede that in the case of one who kills one who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [tereifa] he is exempt from liability, as in a certain sense the legal status of the victim is that of a dead person. All concede in a case where one kills an individual dying from an illness caused at the hand of Heaven that he is liable, as no other individual took action contributing to his death, and the murderer alone took his remaining soul. They disagree only in a case where one kills an individual dying from injury caused at the hand of a person. One Sage, the Rabbis, likens this case to the case of a tereifa, and therefore rules that the one who kills him is exempt. And one Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, likens this case to the case of an individual dying from an illness caused at the hand of Heaven, and therefore rules that the one who kills him is liable. The Gemara asks: As for the one who likens this case to the case of a tereifa, what is the reason that he does not liken it to the case of an individual dying from an illness caused at the hand of Heaven? The Gemara answers: In the case of an individual dying from an illness caused at the hand of Heaven, no action was performed by a person to kill him, whereas in this case of an individual dying from injury caused at the hand of a person, an action was performed by an individual to kill him. Therefore, it is a case of two people who performed an action together, and they are not liable. The Gemara asks: And as for the one who likens this case to the case of an individual dying from an illness caused at the hand of Heaven, what is the reason that he does not liken it to a tereifa? The Gemara answers: In the case of a tereifa, his status is like that of one whose organs, the trachea and the esophagus, are cut, who is considered to be slaughtered. The status of this individual dying from injury caused at the hand of a person is not like that of one whose organs, the trachea and the esophagus, are cut, as there is no particular defect; rather, he is like one suffering from general frailty, like any frail or elderly individual. A tanna taught a baraitabefore Rav Sheshet: The verse that states: “And a man who strikes any soul mortally, he shall be put to death” (Leviticus 24:17), serves to include the case of one who strikes another and it is a blow in which there is not sufficient force to kill, and then another individual comes and kills him; the verse teaches that the second individual is liable.The Gemara challenges: If the first individual struck him with a blow in which there is not sufficient force to kill, this halakha is obvious, as the first did not perform an act of killing at all, and it is only the second who killed him. Rather, emend the baraita to teach: The verse serves to include the case of one who strikes another and it is a blow in which there is sufficient force to kill, and then another individual comes and kills him; the verse teaches that the second individual is liable. And this unattributedbaraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, who holds that one who completes the killing of an individual is liable to be executed as a murderer. Rava says: One who kills a tereifa is exempt as it is as though he killed a dead person. And as for a tereifa who kills another individual, if he killed him before the judges in court, he is liable to be executed. If the killing was not before the judges in court, he is exempt.The Gemara explains: In the case of a tereifa who killed before the court, what is the reason that he is liable? He is liable, as it is written: “And you shall eradicate the evil from your midst” (Deuteronomy 13:6), from which it is derived that there is a mitzva for the court to eradicate evil that it witnesses firsthand. In the case where the killing was not before the judges in court, he is exempt, as any testimony against the tereifais testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony. Even if the witnesses testifying that the tereifa committed murder are found to be conspiring witnesses, they cannot be executed, as they conspired to kill a tereifa. And any testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony is not characterized as testimony, and is not accepted in court. And Rava says: One who sodomizes a male who is a tereifa is liable to be executed for committing an act of sodomy. And as for a tereifa who sodomizes a male, if he does so before the judges in court, he is liable to be executed. If the act of sodomy was not before a court, he is exempt. The Gemara explains: If he committed an act of sodomy before the court, he is liable, as it is written: “And you shall eradicate the evil from your midst.” If the act of sodomy was not before a court, he is exempt, as any testimony against a tereifais testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony. The Gemara asks: Why do I also need this ruling? This case of sodomy is identical to that case of murder; why then does Rava cite two cases with regard to capital transgressions involving a tereifa? The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to mention the case of one who sodomizes a tereifa, as there is a novel element introduced in that halakha. Lest you say: Let the status of one who sodomizes a male who is a tereifabe like one who engages in necrophilia, and let him be exempt from execution. To counter this, Rava teaches us that his liability is due to the pleasure that he experiences, and this man who sodomizes a tereifahas pleasure, as, although the legal status of a tereifa is that of a dead person in certain senses, he is, in fact, alive. And Rava says: Witnesses who testified with regard to a tereifa that he committed a capital transgression, and then they were rendered conspiring witnesses are not executed, as they conspired to kill one whose status is that of a dead person. Witnesses who are themselves tereifa who were rendered conspiring witnesses are executed. Rav Ashi says: Even witnesses who are themselves tereifa who were rendered conspiring witnesses are not executed, due to the fact that they are not susceptible to a situation where witnesses who rendered them conspiring witnesses can themselves be rendered conspiring witnesses. Witnesses who render the witnesses who are themselves tereifa conspiring witnesses who then are rendered conspiring witnesses are not executed, because they sought to kill a tereifa, whose status is that of a dead person. Therefore, their testimony is testimony that you cannot render conspiratory testimony and is disregarded. And Rava says: An ox that is a tereifa that killed an individual is liable to be executed, like any animal that kills a person. And an ox belonging to a person who is a tereifa that killed an individual is exempt. What is the reason for this halakha? It is as the verse states: “The ox shall be stoned and its owner shall also be put to death” (Exodus 21:29). Based on the juxtaposition between the owner and his ox it is derived: Anywhere that we can read concerning the situation: “And its owner shall also be put to death,” we read, i.e., apply, concerning it: “The ox shall be stoned.” And anywhere that we cannot read concerning it: “And its owner shall also be put to death,” we do not read concerning it: “The ox shall be stoned.” Since the owner of the ox cannot be executed, as he is a tereifa, his ox is also not liable to be stoned. Rav Ashi says: Even an ox that is a tereifa that killed an individual is exempt. What is the reason for this halakha? Based on the juxtaposition between the ox and the owner, since if the owner were a tereifahe would be exempt, an ox that is a tereifa that killed an individual is also exempt.§ The mishna teaches: If one set a dog against an individual and the dog killed him, or if one set a snake against an individual and the snake killed him, the one who set the dog or the snake is exempt from punishment. If he imbedded the snake’s fangs into another person and caused the snake to bite him and kill him, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to be executed, and the Rabbis exempt him. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov says: When you analyze the matter you will find that according to the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, venom of a snake stands within its fangs, and in this case the entire action is performed by the individual who imbeds the fang in the other person’s skin. The snake is passive. Therefore, the one who causes the snake to bite is liable to be executed by beheading with a sword as a murderer, and the snake is exempt.According to the statement of the Rabbis, venom of a snake is discharged by the snake itself. The snake directly causes the death, while the individual who imbeds the fang is merely an indirect cause. Consequently, the snake is executed by stoning, and the one who caused the snake to bite is exempt from execution. MISHNA: In the case of one who strikes another, whether he does so with a stone or with his fist, and the doctors assessed his condition, estimating that it would lead to death, and then his condition eased from what it was, and the doctors revised their prognosis and predicted that he would live, and thereafter his condition worsened and he died, the assailant is liable to be executed as a murderer. Rabbi Neḥemya says: He is exempt, as there is a basis for the matter of assuming that he is not liable. Since the victim’s condition eased in the interim, a cause other than the blow struck by the assailant ultimately caused his death. GEMARA:The Sages taught: Rabbi Neḥemya interpreted this verse in arriving at his ruling. It is written: “If he rises and walks outside

(1) One in a dying condition is considered a living being in all respects. We may not tie up his jaws, nor may we annoint him with oil, nor wash him, nor stop off his organs of the extremities, nor may we remove the pillow from under him, nor may we place him on sand, clay-ground or earth, nor may we place on his stomach a dish, a shovel, a flask of water or a globule of salt, nor may we summon the towns on his behalf, nor may we hire pipers and lamenting women, nor may we close his eyes before his soul departs. And whosoever closes [the dying person's] eyes before death is regarded as one who sheds blood. One may not rend garments, nor bare the shoulder in mourning, nor make a lamentation for him, nor bring a coffin into the house in his presence before he dies, nor may we begin the recital of Ẓidduk Haddin before his soul departs. Gloss: Some say that we may not dig out a grave for him. although it is not [done] in his presence, [i.e.,] in the house, — before he dies. It is [likewise] forbidden to dig out any grave to be [left] open until the next day, in which the corpse will not be buried the same day, and there is danger in this. It is likewise forbidden to cause [aught] to hasten the death of one who is in a dying condition, e.g., one who has been in a dying condition for a long time, and could not depart, — [the law is that] we may not remove the pillow or the mattress from under him [just] because some say that there are feathers from some fowl which cause this [prolongation of death]. He may likewise not be moved from his place. It is also forbidden to place the Synagogue keys under his head in order that he may depart. However, if there is aught which causes a hindrance to the departure of the soul, e.g., [if] near that house there is a knocking sound, viz., a wood-cutter, or there is salt on his tongue, and these hinder the departure of the soul, it is permitted to remove it therefrom, for there is no [direct] act [involved] in this, since he merely removes the hindrance.

(2) One who is informed, 'We saw your relative in a dying condition three days ago,' is bound to mourn for him, For it is certain that he has already died.

(3)Ẓidduk Haddin is recited when the soul departs, and when he reaches [the words] 'Judge of Truth,' the mourner rends his garments.

(4) As soon as he feels death approaching, they should not separate themselves from him, lest his soul depart whilst he is alone. And it is a religious duty to stand near the [dying] person during the departure of the soul, as it is written, 'That he should still live alway; that he should not see the pit. For he seeth that wise men die, the fool and the brutish together perish etc.'

(5) It is a custom to pour out all drawn water in the neighbourhood of the corpse.